Assessing the Level of Self-Reliance and Livelihood of Encamped Refugees

Syrian Refugees in Jordan

Anna-Mara Schön

Rainer Hampp Verlag
Achieving self-reliance among refugees is favoured by many international organisations, though hardly achieved for refugee camps. In many cases, deprived of their human rights, located in remote areas and without access to the local labour market, encamped refugees have no other opportunity than turning to negative coping mechanisms to survive, including sex work, child labour, crime and dangerous work in the informal sector. This book concentrates on measuring self-reliance and identifying factors influencing it in camp settings.

Key words: Self-reliance, livelihood opportunities, refugees, refugee camps, power dynamics, gender equality, performance measurement, Syria, Jordan

Anna-Mara Schön has recently finished her Phd at the University of Kassel, Germany. Her research interests are human rights, self-reliance, refugees, gender equality, power dynamics, but also local organic agriculture.
Labor and Globalization

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Preface

Anna-Mara Schön deals in her dissertation with self-reliance and livelihood opportunities of encamped refugees. Due to the global situation and increasing numbers of refugees, this is a topic with high social and political relevance. From a scientific point of view, this is an issue that required an interdisciplinary approach in order to measure the autonomy of refugees and to identify the factors influencing it. This is the reason why the submitted work was part of an interdisciplinary doctoral collegium "Social Human Rights". With a view to and into the special situation of the refugees in Jordan, this book is initially devoted to one country; a transfer to other countries and regions is possible. Anna-Mara Schön presents a quantitative and a qualitative approach, complementing each other.

The quantitative approach focuses on measuring the self-reliance of refugees in camps using the "Camp Performance Indicator System" (CPI). This indicator model is elaborated from gaps in existing approaches and research and includes both indicators and a graphical representation of the relationships between the indicators. The CPI Framework and System are of high relevance for the academia as well as for the application in politics, aid agencies and UN actors and can be transferred from Jordan to other refugee camps worldwide with some adaptations. The qualitative analysis is based on expert interviews, conducted mainly in Jordan. The case study focuses on Jordan, with the two largest refugee camps Zaatari and Azraq. As a result, factors influencing the self-reliance of refugees are linked to scientific topics related to power and gender and lead to the model of factors influencing the self-reliance of refugees in Jordan. In a discussion, the results of the quantitative and qualitative analysis are combined with scientific approaches to power and gender justice. Recommendations for different interest groups are worked out.

It was and is a great honour and pleasure for me, both from a scientific and personal perspective, to have accompanied Anna-Mara Schön in the creation of this work over several years. I am grateful that, together with Prof. Dr. Scherrer, I was allowed to be active as one of the reviewers in the graduate college "Social Human Rights of the University of Kassel and the University of Applied Sciences Fulda" and that I was able to experience Anna-Mara Schön as a doctoral candidate and research assistant in my team as a great enrichment. During the whole process of creating this work I have experienced a lot from and with Anna-Mara Schön: At the University of Applied Sciences Fulda, in the House of Logistics and Mobility, at the German Jordanian University and in the doctoral collegium Social Human Rights.

All those who are looking for a work that is scientifically, practically and interdisciplinarily dedicated to the topic of self-reliance and refugee camps have chosen the right work. Anna-Mara Schön has written a dissertation that closes gaps in research on the topic and, with this book, breaks new ground in the entire field.

June, 6th 2020

Prof. Dr. Dorit Schumann
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### List of Abbreviations

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<td>3RP</td>
<td>Regional Refugee &amp; Resilience Plan</td>
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<td>ACTED</td>
<td>Agence d'Aide à la Coopération Technique Et au Développement</td>
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<td>ALNAP</td>
<td>Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance</td>
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<td>approx.</td>
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<td>Art.</td>
<td>Article</td>
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<td>ATM</td>
<td>Automatic Teller Machine</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>BMZ</td>
<td>Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung</td>
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<td>BSC</td>
<td>Balanced Scorecard</td>
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<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women</td>
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<td>CfW</td>
<td>Cash for Work</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CPI System/Framework</td>
<td>Camp Performance Indicator System/Framework</td>
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<td>CRRF</td>
<td>Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework</td>
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<td>CTA</td>
<td>Community Technology Access</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>e.g.</td>
<td>exempli gratia</td>
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<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council</td>
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<td>ECWR</td>
<td>Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights</td>
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<td>ETF</td>
<td>European Training Foundation</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUPRHA</td>
<td>European Universities on Professionalization on Humanitarian Action</td>
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<td>F</td>
<td>Feminine</td>
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<td>FE</td>
<td>Feminist economics</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</td>
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<td>HD</td>
<td>Human Development</td>
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<td>HPC</td>
<td>Higher Population Council</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarter</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<td>ibid.</td>
<td>Ibidem</td>
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<td>ICARA</td>
<td>International Conferences on Assistance to Refugees in Africa</td>
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<td>ICESCR</td>
<td>International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and communications technology</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>internally displaced people</td>
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<td>iff</td>
<td>if and only if</td>
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<td>IIF</td>
<td>Introduction of Influential Factors</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<td>Intern.</td>
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<td>International Organisation</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<td>Interview</td>
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<td>Jordanian Dinar</td>
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<td>Jordan INGO Forum</td>
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<td>JRS</td>
<td>Jesuit Refugee Services</td>
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<td>KfW</td>
<td>Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau</td>
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<td>km</td>
<td>kilometre</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGBTIQA+</td>
<td>lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, questioning/queer, asexual, plus</td>
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<td>LRRD</td>
<td>Linking relief, rehabilitation and development</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>Milestones</td>
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<td>m</td>
<td>Masculine</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<td>MFI</td>
<td>Micro finance institutions</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Members of Parliament</td>
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<td>NFI</td>
<td>Non-food item</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>the Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<td>PoC</td>
<td>People of Concern</td>
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<td>QIP</td>
<td>quick impact projects</td>
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<td>RAWA</td>
<td>Revolutionary Association of the Women for Afghanistan</td>
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<td>ROSCA</td>
<td>Rotating credit and savings associations</td>
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<td>SCOR</td>
<td>Supply Chain Operations Reference-model</td>
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<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and gender-based violence</td>
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<td>SRID</td>
<td>Governmental camp management in Jordan</td>
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<td>SWOT</td>
<td>Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats</td>
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<td>THP</td>
<td>The Hunger Project</td>
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<td>UDHR</td>
<td>Universal Declaration of Human Rights</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’s</td>
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<td>UNHR</td>
<td>United Nations Human Rights</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East</td>
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<td>USA / US</td>
<td>United States of America / United States</td>
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<td>USD/US $/$</td>
<td>US Dollar</td>
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<td>VAF</td>
<td>Vulnerability Assessment Framework</td>
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<td>WASH</td>
<td>water, sanitation and hygiene</td>
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<td>WAW</td>
<td>Women for Afghan Women</td>
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<td>WDI</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WISE</td>
<td>Women’s Islamic Initiative in Spirituality &amp; Equality</td>
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<td>WLUML</td>
<td>Women Living Under Muslim Laws</td>
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<td>WRC</td>
<td>Women's Refugee Commission</td>
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<td>yrs</td>
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List of Symbols

i count index
n sample size
r Pearson correlation coefficient

Raw score vectors:
X = (X_1, X_2, ..., X_n)
Y = (Y_1, Y_2, ..., Y_n)

Mean score:
\bar{X} = 1/n \sum_{i=1}^n X_i
\bar{Y} = 1/n \sum_{i=1}^n Y_i
1. Introduction

Since the arrival of a large number of refugees in Germany in 2015, some right-wing voices demand centralised confinement of refugees in barely inhabited areas of the country. There, it is argued, the refugees could await their repatriation as soon as the war, from which they had fled, has ended. Also, it is assumed that being deprived of human rights, especially of the rights to move freely and to work, these newly arrived foreigners would not pose a threat to their hosts (i.e., the existing German population) or take away their jobs. Although there are several studies to show that refugees benefit a host country if they are allowed to work, it had been impossible to persuade the xenophobes. Witnessing perceptions like these and arbitrary governmental behaviour, on the one hand, and following endless discussions on the importance of self-reliance and livelihood conducted by humanitarian aid agencies on the other, gave the impetus for present work.

Impeding refugees to work has major negative consequences for different stakeholder groups. If denied access to the local labour market, refugees often have no choice but to turn to negative coping mechanisms compelling them to take up sex work and making way towards increasing child labour, crime and dangerous work in the informal sector (UNHCR 2014a, p. 13). Unemployment leads to poverty, the development of physical and mental health problems and social stigmatisation (Yunus 2018; Oschmiansky 2010; van Damme 1995). Not only are the adult generations affected, the successive generations also are prone to suffer from lifelong consequences (Mottaghi 2018, p. 34):

If children grow up without any hope, without any prospects for the future, without any sense of them being able to make something out of their lives, then they will become very vulnerable to all sorts of exploitation, including radicalisation. (Yap et al. 2017)

In addition, as the parallel economies created by refugees not allowed to work formally yield no taxes or fees, the host economy loses potential advantages; even the local economy does not benefit from such activities (UNHCR 2012b, p. 104). Humanitarian organisations, facing budgetary shortfalls and a rising number of crises, cannot afford to build programmes merely based on assistance and in-kind donations (ALNAP 2015, p. 49; UNHCR 2005, Appendix One, p.
Thus, if refugees are allowed to use their skills, knowledge and abilities, they can fill up the market gaps and contribute towards its expansion. By gaining financial means, refugees can spend money on food, shelter, transportation, healthcare, education, clothing, entertainment, etc. and thus stimulate the local economy. This benefits host communities rather than harming them by competition, pressure on resources, etc. (UNHCR 2012b, pp. 105-106). Further, such measures will ease dependency on humanitarian budgets and enable refugees to sustain themselves (UNHCR 2014a, p. 7).

These benefits apply to urban refugees as well as encamped refugees. However, the latter are often worse off, as being placed far from cities, they have even less chances to integrate socially, culturally or economically (Hartmann et al. 2013b, p. 2). Exclusion from the official labour market is particularly challenging for people who have to live in camps for a long period of time (UNHCR 2019b, p. 22).

1.1 Research Gap and Research Questions

Refugee camps are at the core of present work not only because of the above-mentioned challenges it throws before the residents, but also because through such an analysis the researcher obtains an opportunity to look at an enclosed environment, which despite interacting with the outer world, exists as a micro-cosmos. For the case study, Syrian refugees in the Jordanian camps Zaatari and Azraq were chosen.

At the outset, no tool to assess the level of self-reliance in refugee camps was available. Thus, based on the assumption of a rather low self-reliance level, no detailed and structured analysis of related causes seemed to be available. Other scholars, such as Betts et al. (2018a), have published their research on the same topic, but from different angles.

Taking into account the lack of a tool as well as analyses concerning self-reliance, two major research questions have been derived:

- How can self-reliance in a refugee camp be measured?
- What are the main factors that influence self-reliance in a refugee camp?

To answer these questions, a multi-disciplinary approach was chosen, as demanded by Oloruntoba and Banomyong (2018, pp. 285-286) in the context of refugee issues. Thus, the first question was approached from the perspective of economics in form of performance measurement, whereas the latter question was analysed by including the theory of power from a political
science point of view. Throughout the journey of present research, more detailed questions arose which have been discussed throughout this work.

Regarding the measurement of self-reliance, one of the questions was if investments in camp infrastructure and services increase the level of self-reliance and, further, if it makes sense to attempt measuring self-reliance in a camp setting. Regarding the second question, from a viewpoint of political sciences, various power relations between different stakeholder groups (refugees, hosts, organisations, etc.) became apparent. Further, as the main inhabitants of refugee camps are often women and children, the focus shifted not only to the question of the role of women in the context of refugees, but also factoring in the context of the Arab culture, as this case study is based in Jordan, a country in the Middle East.

1.2 Limitations
The author of present work is a white privileged, well-educated Western female with an educational background of Business Administration and Supply Chain Management. As this study covers two scientific fields (economics and political sciences), both parts are represented in a limited way and leave many fields, such as ethnography or social science, and controversies open for further research. The method chosen for the qualitative approach is expert interviews. These experts, partly with an Arab and/or Muslim background, were interviewed concerning the Syrian refugee situation in the Muslim country of Jordan and comprised well-educated middle-class members of society. Owing to their background, their opinions might be biased. Further, not all topics could be covered. For instance, although present work explains the inequalities existing between men and women, the author is aware of the difficulties and injustices suffered by lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, questioning/queer, asexual and other (LGBTIQ+) members of the society. They are subject to serious human rights abuses and require specific protection and humanitarian assistance (UNHCR 2019d). In many countries, including the Arab world, LGBTIQ+ people are often stigmatised, face fines, severe punishments or even death penalty (Human Dignity Trust 2019). To address human rights violations against individuals based on their sexual orientation and gender identity, the United Nations, for the first time published a report in 2011, followed by another in 2015 (United Nations Human Rights Council 2015). Due to the limited scope of a Ph.D thesis, the suffering of LGBTIQ+ people is not in focus of present work, which concentrates on the broad distinctions existing between female and male refugees.
Hereinafter, the structure of this work is delineated, starting with an overview and followed by a detailed explanation of the steps involved to find answers to the major and minor research questions raised throughout present work.

1.3 Structure of Thesis
Following an introduction of the study undertaken (Chapter 1), including its aim, limitations as well as its structure (1.1, 1.2, 1.3), Chapter 2 provides the reader with the necessary knowledge regarding refugees, refugee camps, self-reliance and the work of organisations. Scientifically, the topic of self-reliance of encamped refugees was approached from two perspectives – quantitative and qualitative analysis and, as mentioned earlier, it involved two research fields – economics and political sciences. In the quantitative economics-based approach, a measurement system (the Camp Performance Indicator System – CPI System) was elaborated, identifying more than 100 indicators enabling the measurement of self-reliance level in camps. This system is accompanied by a framework (Camp Performance Indicator Framework), showing the inter-relation of different categories under which the identified indicators for the CPI System are clustered (Chapter 3). The qualitative and political sciences-based approach (Chapter 4) especially utilises the concept of the homo economicus, theory of power and gender equality. The theory of power is combined with statements of experts and literature to analyse the power dynamics between different stakeholders as well as gender equality issues in a camp. Chapter 5 resumes all aspects given in Chapters 1 to 4 and discusses their individual elements in the backdrop of the whole picture. The study ends with a conclusion and outlook (Chapter 6).

Detailed Structure of Thesis
The main six chapters are divided into the following sub-chapters:

Chapter 2 gives an in-depth overview of the situation of refugees from varied perspectives as held by different stakeholder groups. Seven different stakeholder groups were identified – refugees, especially refugee women; host community members; local and national governments; the private sector; field officers, headquarters; and donors. Anticipating the results of the analysis of power dynamics, the most important stakeholder group identified in Chapter 4.5.2 are field officers and refugees. Thus, both groups are presented in more detail than the other groups, especially in Chapter 2.

Chapter 2.1 first presents facts and figures, then portrays the situation of refugees given by various authors over the last 70 years from the refugee’s perspective. It critically elaborates the
development of several terms, such as asylum seekers and refugees and the challenges people face that have been marked as such, since they left their countries of origin. At the end of this sub-chapter, the situation of refugees today is shown, including the many challenges and limited prospects of improvement. This chapter guides the reader towards the importance of present work’s topic – self-reliance of refugees – and gives a hint to one of its results: becoming self-reliant in the sense of the definition given by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) which is a difficult endeavour for refugees due to the many restrictions they face.

Chapter 2.2 elaborates refugee camps from diverse perspectives. Firstly, it highlights opinions of different scholars. Secondly, it presents four different types of camps, ending with planned/managed camps as they are the centre of present work. Thirdly, opportunities and challenges of refugee camps are presented in detail, mainly based on academic literature. Here, it becomes apparent that refugee camps provide more challenges than chances for refugees. At the same time, the chapter shows why refugee camps still exist and probably will not cease to exist in the near future.

Chapter 2.3 consists of three major parts, of which 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 are connected with the definition of self-reliance published by UNHCR (2014a, p. 7). Firstly, it compares human rights and the sustainable development goals touching the lives of refugees (2.3.1). Secondly, it presents terms of the definition of self-reliance such as dignity, sustainability (connected in one sub-chapter with the terms vulnerability and resilience) and essential needs. Further terms necessary to understand the concept of livelihood and self-reliance such as poverty, basic needs, well-being and vulnerability are also explained in this sub-chapter. These terms were used either to construct the CPI System introduced in Chapter 3.3 (poverty) or they were part of the elaborate set of indicators of the CPI (basic needs, well-being and vulnerability; see – Chapter 3.3.2). Chapter 2.3.3 compares the humanitarian and development sectors. Understanding the differences of both sectors is important to analyse the challenges faced by the Jordanian government and the organisations supporting Syrian refugees on financial issues and the poor Jordanians (see Chapter 4).

Chapter 2.4 sheds light on the definitions of livelihood and self-reliance. Beginning with a historical overview of the concept of self-reliance and livelihood, it highlights the differences between self-reliance and livelihood and defines livelihood assets, human, natural, capital, financial, physical and social capital (capital in present work synonymously refers to assets), respectively, according to the Department for International Development (DFID). To clarify the terms livelihood and self-reliance in the context of encamped refugees, the sub-chapter continues with
a couple of examples regarding economic activities including explanations why or why not they are rather livelihood opportunities or a step towards self-reliance. Chapter 2.4.2 deepens the definition of self-reliance and livelihood for refugees living in camps. The sub-chapter starts tracing the early evolution of economic activities in refugee settlements and continues by describing the types of work refugees usually have access to, including gender-specific livelihood opportunities. It briefly points out that all stakeholders involved have similar if not the same interests. The chapter further sheds light on why self-reliance is important for refugees in camps, explaining the positive influence of refugees on the local economy. To weigh both sides equally, the sub-chapter then presents the negative influence refugees can have on local economies, whether real or only perceived. The sub-chapter ends by giving examples of how specific countries have handled refugees. As all preceding chapters were written from the perspective of refugees, to balance the chapter, as well as with respect to the analysis in Chapter 4.5.2, Chapter 2.5 is written from UNHCR’s perspective. The views of UNHCR were chosen as the agency is present in all internationally led refugee camps. The perspectives of these two or rather three stakeholder groups (refugees and field officers, as well as UNHCR) is given in Chapter 2 for they are the most important ones as elaborated in Chapter 4.5.2. The other stakeholder groups (hosts, governments, donors, private sector) are mentioned only peripherally. Chapter 2.5 gives an overview of the livelihood and self-reliance programmes undertaken by the UNHCR. After a short introduction (2.5.1), it continues presenting the organisation’s vision and objectives regarding self-reliance as well as the reasons for these objectives (2.5.2 and 2.5.3). Further, 2.5.4 gives an in-depth overview of the different analyses, assessments and tasks which the field officers are theoretically obligated to conduct in the field. A short introduction into gender-based considerations completes this section. The chapter continues summarising the different programmes that field officers need to implement, namely livelihood programmes, such as taking care that refugees receive livelihood consumables and productive assets, employment, e.g., cash-for-work initiatives, employing professionals, starting vocational trainings and job placements and giving refugees access to community technology. Other approaches included in the livelihood programmes are the support of enterprise development and entrepreneurship as well as facilitating financial services, often implemented by partners. The chapter continues by presenting the possibilities field officers have for monitoring and evaluation (2.5.6) and ends with summarising phasing down and handing over plans (2.5.7). As will be shown in Chapters 3 and 4, many of these programmes were thoughtfully compiled by the headquarters but are only partly conducted in the field.
After introducing relevant theory in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 elaborates the development of the CPI system, representing the quantitative approach of present work’s subject. Chapter 3.1 introduces the chapter by presenting performance measurement in humanitarian crises, including the challenges humanitarian field officers face on a regular basis. These challenges derived from literature could also be confirmed by expert interviews (see Chapter 4.2). Based on these challenges, the motivation of developing a tool evolved, as existing tools would not meet the quality requirements for the measurement of self-reliance of encamped refugees.

Chapter 3.2.1 presents eight existing measurement tools and indicators used to develop the CPI. Chapter 3.2.2 introduces the result of the comparison and merging process regarding the identification of categories for the CPI Framework and System. The sub-chapter concludes with the research gap as well as the author’s requirements for the development of the CPI.

Chapter 3.3 introduces the CPI System based on its eight categories. Chapter 3.3.1 systematically describes the development of the CPI Framework and System, describing the phases, including an introduction of Pearson’s correlation coefficient. Further, challenges met when comparing different tools with each other and the final categories selected for the CPI Framework and System are highlighted. Chapter 3.3.2 presents the CPI Framework, interlinked by its categories and the CPI System. In this sub-chapter, all indicators are presented and justified based on existing literature. Terms used here are linked to the definitions given above, such as self-reliance and livelihood or social capital (Chapter 2.4.1 and Category 7 – Social Capital in Chapter 3.3.2). The sub-chapter concludes with the suggestions given by a field expert regarding the CPI System and the subsequent steps to be undertaken.

Chapter 4 presents the qualitative approach and begins with a case study. Chapter 4.1 acquaints the reader with Jordan, the country of the case study, describing its characteristic features – geography (4.1.1), legislative and judicial system (4.1.2), demographics (4.1.3), culture and traditions (4.1.4) as well as labour market (4.1.5). It continues by giving insights of the two main refugee camps – Zaatari and Azraq (4.1.6) as well as the impact of the Syrian refugees on Jordan (4.1.7), including a summary of the project ‘Employment through Labour Intensive Infrastructure in Jordan’ conducted by the International Labour Organization (ILO).

The chapter continues by presenting the methodical approach of expert interviews (Chapter 4.2). In 4.2.1 the definition of experts is given before presenting the different interview partners

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1When only the abbreviation CPI is used, it refers to both the framework (meaning its categories) and the system (including all indicators).
and their fields of expertise. In subsequent sub-chapters, the approaches underlying interview guidelines (4.2.2), execution of interviews (4.2.3), interview evaluation (4.2.4) are presented, as well as the insights attained by conducting such interviews.

In Chapter 4.3, the political theory is presented in light of self-reliance and livelihood opportunities. Firstly, the question is raised if self-reliance and livelihood can or should be seen under the economic concept of the neoclassical homo economicus (4.3.1). In some cases, refugees seek to increase their financial means, often without considering the negative effects on refugee companions, host members or the environment (though this happens out of necessity to cover one’s basic needs). Secondly, Chapter 4.3.2 introduces power as a concept by referring to Steven Lukes’ ‘Three Faces of Power’ (2005), Thomas E. Wartenberg’s ‘Forms of Power’ (1988) and Iris Marion Young’s ‘Five Faces of Oppression’ (1992). After elaborating the differences between power-over and power-to, Lukes’ three-dimensional and Wartenberg’s action-environment as well as concept of situated social power are presented. The sub-chapter closes by familiarising the reader with Young’s ‘Five Faces of Oppression’ and concluding remarks.

Thirdly, the chapter continues by introducing gender equality in form of the terms gender knowledge and gender mainstreaming (4.3.3).

Chapter 4.4 applies the previously introduced term gender knowledge to UNHCR (4.4.1), ILO (4.4.2), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ, 4.4.3) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 4.4.4) as members of these organisations were interviewed for the Jordanian case. Thus, examples of their project work in Jordan are included.

Chapter 4.5 – Identification of Influential Factors (IIF) presents the insights of the experts combined with findings from literature as well as from a comparable study of Betts et al. (2018) analysing the Kenyan refugee settlement Kalobeyei. After a short introduction to the method (4.5.1), Chapter 4.5.2 – Analysis and Findings reveals 66 influential factors derived from existing literature and expert interviews. Each influential factor was analysed with regard to the form of power occurring between involved stakeholders. By describing, analysing and evaluating both the influential factors as well as the different forms of power taking place, it was revealed who can influence the refugees’ level of self-reliance the most or at least under which circumstances (4.5.3 – Evaluation of Results of the IIF). The sub-chapter ends with summary and concluding remarks (4.5.4).

Chapter 5 (Discussion on Self-Reliance and Its Potentials for Encamped Refugees) picks up all topics covered earlier and combines them to discuss the research questions raised throughout present work. In a first step, it merges the most important results of the CPI and the IIF (5.1).
In a second step, the chapter refers to the theory of political science covered in present work (5.2) by setting humanitarian aid agencies in light of the concept of the *homo economicus* (5.2.1), the theory of power dynamics (5.2.2) and the theory of gender knowledge (5.2.3). Chapter 5.3 takes up the topic of gender equality and elaborates on the challenges and solutions that exist in Muslim countries for more gender equality (5.3.1), reflects on gender equality and family life in general in a capitalistic and neoliberal world (5.3.2) and critically reflects organisations’ gender equality and livelihood activities (5.3.3). The chapter ends by giving general recommendations for each of the stakeholder groups involved in camp settings based on the theory of power used for present work (5.4).

Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and gives an outlook.

1.4 Anticipation of Major Results
The major findings of Betts et al. (2018a, pp. 45-47) confirm that promotion of self-reliance, as in the Kalobeyei settlement in Kenya, is associated with a higher degree of well-being among the inhabitants in terms of food security, income and consumption; even ‘kitchen gardens’ can provide higher food security to people in need. Further, community activities and participation as well as the involvement of the beneficiaries themselves need time to evolve; it cannot be designed from outside. Healthy local economies are necessary to integrate refugees within the local markets. If not in place, they have to be built. Eventually, progressive policies for refugees probably help enabling self-reliance among refugees.

Betts et al. (2018a) developed a framework to measure self-reliance and well-being, which was applied to compare different settlements and camps. Intersections and differences with the CPI System are delineated in Chapter 3. As for present work, the CPI could not be filled with real data, and statements about the degree of self-reliance or livelihood opportunities for Zaatari and Azraq camps could not be made. However, findings of Chapter 3 and a range of influential indicators identified based on expert interviews in Chapter 4 help to phrase these major findings:

Given the UNHCR definition on self-reliance (*cf.* Chapter 2), most refugees are not self-reliant. They might find livelihood opportunities ensuring survival, but those activities do not lead to self-reliance. Consequently, most refugees remain dependent on external support (whether they receive it or should receive it to get their basic needs covered). When people are not granted their (basic) human rights, many decide to engage in illegal, unsustainable or unsafe livelihood
opportunities, which raises xenophobia among the host communities. An increase in xenophobia might restrict the rights of the refugees further, again decreasing their livelihood opportunities. Overall, these findings seem to be in line with the findings of Betts et al. (2018a).

Setting up infrastructure and services to cover the basic needs of refugees is essential, though, it does not automatically increase the level of self-reliance among refugees. Along with such investments, refugees have to be granted basic human rights like freedom to move and work.

Women are not seen as equal to men in many societies around the world. To enhance gender equality around the world, as well as in refugee camps, gender mainstreaming has to be implemented. Organisations working in camps can use the setting of camps and while considering traditions, values and norms of the people and engaging with local NGOs and religious institutions, they can support women in campaigning for more rights and freedom.

Humanitarian aid agencies aiming at not only more self-reliance for refugees, but also more gender equality, have to use their power in a transformative way. Despite dominating them, they need to empower them, so that refugees can stand up for their own rights. As outlined by Betts et al. (2018a) this can only happen from within and will take time. Organisations can support such processes and facilitate them by providing the right infrastructure and services. The international community should dramatically increase funding for such endeavours, though ultimately, the change has to come from within.
2 Background Information on Self-Reliance of Encamped Refugees

As the focus of this thesis is self-reliance in refugee camps, the definition of self-reliance by UNHCR is stated here to understand the context of the chapter:

Self-reliance is the ability of an individual, household or community to meet essential needs and to enjoy social and economic rights in a sustainable manner and with dignity. By becoming self-reliant, refugees and displaced persons lead active and productive lives and are able to build strong social, economic and cultural ties with their host communities. Self-reliance can assist in ensuring that persons of concern are better protected by strengthening their capacity to claim their civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights. (UNHCR 2014a, p. 7)

Research of refugee camps needs to be conducted in an interdisciplinary manner (Jahre et al. 2018, p. 338). Thus, further explanation from different angles is needed to understand some terms used in this definition such as refugees and displaced persons (and their distinction), social and economic (as well as civil, cultural and political) rights, dignity, essential needs, sustainable manner (or sustainability).

This section is divided into five sub-chapters. Some terms are explained in depth, including comprehensive insights into current literature (Chapters 2.1, 2.2, 2.4) others are presented in brief (Chapter 2.3). Chapter 2.5 mainly focuses on UNHCR, as it is the main agency managing refugee camp settings. This chapter is written mainly from the perspective of field officers and the UN headquarters. Chapter 2.1 explains the meaning of being a refugee. Chapter 2.2 gives insights on refugee camps. Here, the perspective of refugees is given to contrast it with Chapter 2.5. Chapter 2.3 introduces the Human Rights and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as well as livelihood terms (dignity, poverty, vulnerability, resilience, sustainability, basic needs and well-being) and briefly introduces the humanitarian and development sector (2.3.3). With the knowledge gained here, the reader is equipped for Chapter 2.4, where the terms livelihood, self-reliance and the opportunities refugees have or do not have in camps are introduced.

2.1 Being a Refugee

The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as someone who

owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as
a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (UNHCR 2010b, p. 14)

The group of refugees is regularly confused with other groups of people on the move, such as internally displaced people (IDPs) and migrants. In contrast to refugees, IDPs move inside the country of their nationality and are kept under the protection of their own government, although they have left home for the same reasons as refugees (armed conflict, violence, violation of human rights) (UNHCR 2009, pp. 6, 7). The main difference between refugees and IDPs is that IDPs as citizens keep their rights and protection under the human rights as well as the international humanitarian law, whereas refugees, if not let in and taken care of by other countries, are condemned to death or to a life without rights and security. Migrants, especially economic migrants, on the other side, choose to leave their country to improve their lives. As refugees and migrants often choose the same routes and means of transport means, a clear separation in public discussions is regularly missing. For present work, such a distinction between refugees and migrants is not necessary as the focus is on encamped refugees. If migrants and not refugees by definition live in a camp, they are equally included in the present analyses. IDPs, however, are not part of this study, as they do not live in host countries but their home countries.

UNHCR has a mandate to take care of all forcibly displaced individuals, stateless people and returnees. Stateless people are not considered as nationals by any state. Thus, their situation is usually precarious, as they live on the margins of society (UNHCR 2018d, p. 51). Returnees are defined as former refugees who have returned to their countries of origin but are not yet fully integrated. Such people are assisted for a period of time – in many cases by UNHCR (UNHCR 2018d, p. 61).

Facts and Figures
Forcibly displaced individuals include people fleeing due to persecution, conflict or generalised violence. This group accounts to 70.8 million people at the end of 2018 (UNHCR 2019b, pp. 2-3). Besides refugees (25.9 million, whereof 20.4 million people are under UNHCR mandate and 5.5 million are Palestinian refugees registered by UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East – UNRWA) and IDPs (41.3 million), 3.5 million people are counted as asylum-seekers. Asylum-seekers are people whose ‘request for sanctuary has yet to be processed’ (UNHCR 2018a). Highest pending cases are counted in the United States of America (USA), Germany, Turkey, Italy and South Africa (UNHCR 2018d, p. 10). Where mass movements of refugees occur – ‘frontier crossings by anonymous hordes fleeing in confusion’ (Agier 2011, p. 29), individual interviews with all asylum seekers are not always
feasible or necessary, e.g., because the situation in their home country is obvious (UNHCR 2015, 2009, p. 8). For such situations, which occurred for the first time in the 1990s, the term ‘prima facie’ refugee was established. Part of the refugee population – by UNHCR definition – comprises people in ‘refugee-like situations’. These are people who face the same situation as refugees, but do not (yet) have an official refugee status (UNHCR 2018d, p. 61).

Of the world’s refugee population (under UNHCR mandate), 82 per cent account to only 10 countries, whereof nine are least developed (Figure 1). Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar and Somalia are the top five countries of origin in terms of refugees, accounting to more than two-third of this population group (UNHCR 2019b, p. 3, 2018d, p. 15). To this day, the main country of origin of refugees is Syria with 6.7 million people having fled the country (UNHCR 2019b, p. 3). Syrian refugees are hosted in 127 countries, mainly by Turkey (almost 3.6 million), Lebanon (944,200), Jordan (676,300), Germany (532,100), Iraq (252,500), Egypt (132,900), Sweden (109,300), Sudan (93,500), Austria (49,200) and the Netherlands (32,100) (UNHCR 2019b, p. 14).

For all refugee situations worldwide, the 10 major host countries, in this order, are: Turkey, Pakistan, Uganda, Sudan, Germany, Islamic Republic of Iran, Lebanon, Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Jordan (UNHCR 2019b, p. 17). They host about 63 per cent of all refugees under UNHCR mandate of which Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Bangladesh are part of the least developed countries (UNHCR 2019b, p. 21, 2018d, p. 18). After Lebanon (250 refugees per 1,000 population), Jordan hosts the second largest number of refugees in terms of their own population per capita (72 or 310 for 1,000), followed by Turkey (45).
Being a Refugee in the 20th Century

Figures and facts are important to get an idea about the extent of the global refugee crises. Defining categories and principles of classifications of individuals helps to find logic to specific political contexts. Nonetheless, definitions, being chosen rather arbitrarily, can give – as Agier puts it – only the ‘appearance of scientific rigour’ as they are not based on ‘any universal and fixed scientific framework’ (Agier 2011, p. 33). Thus, people who fled home were marked into categories, such as ‘illegals’, ‘asylum seekers’, ‘refugees’ – depending on the political situation of the host country, the own movement and the own legal status. None of this can explain under which circumstances refugees had to live and make a living. Thus, the refugee situation in the 20th century can be better elucidated from an overview of the academic discussion.

The discussion regarding refugees starts in many political, philosophical and social articles by citing Hannah Arendt. She observes that since the proclamation of the Rights of Man at the end of the 18th century, dignity of man has been a concept tied to nature, and refugees were left with nothing but being human (Arendt 1951, pp. 290-299). A loss of ‘all qualities and specific relationships’ (ibid., p. 299) could be witnessed by the world in the early 20th century. In Arendt’s opinion, World War I was the first war where people, having fled their homeland, became homeless. People had been stateless once they left their state andrightness when they were deprived of their human rights and considered ‘the scum of the earth’ (Arendt 1951, p. 267). Totalitarian states used denationalisation as a powerful weapon, as European nation-states were incapable to guarantee human rights to people who had lost their nationally guaranteed rights (Arendt 1951, p. 269). People singled out as ‘undesirable’ (e.g., Jews, Trotskyites) could not find a safe haven anywhere in Europe. For the victims, human rights, which they could not enjoy, became ‘the evidence of hopeless idealism or fumbling feeble-minded hypocrisy’ (ibid., p. 269). Where on the one hand ‘well-meaning idealists’ (ibid., p.279) held on to the inalienability of human rights, on the other hand, only citizens from the most prosperous and civilised countries enjoyed these rights. Worse, for displaced people – now stateless – solutions like internment camps became a routine solution during and after World War II. Arendt explains that the origin of the term ‘displaced person’ comes from ignoring the existence of statelessness. People not being stateless can be repatriated, even if this means that they can be forced to go back to countries of origin, which do not want them or want them only to inflict punishment.

This discussion on displacement is continued by Agier (2011, pp. 19-24). He brings, among others, the example of the agreement between the Pakistani government and UNHCR in 2001,  

2 In the first half of the twentieth century, the distinction between refugees and stateless people was not as clear as it is – often, but not always – today (Agamben 1996, p. 91).
where overnight Afghans living ‘illegally’ in Pakistan became refugees (Agier 2011, p. 33). In this way, the Pakistani government could put them in camps set up by UNHCR. Agier (2011) claims:

There is nowhere in the world that can serve as a standard for proper classification: all categorizations of ‘refugee’, all asylum policies, are fluctuating realities in history and space. From near or far, they basically depend on the attitude of the dominant powers towards those countries that are dependent on them – politically, militarily or economically. (ibid., p.34)

Back to World War II, Arendt (1951, pp. 293-295) argues that for the first time, people, who had lost their home, could not find a new home. This problem was only based on political organisation and not on overpopulation. Besides this issue, these – innocent – people did not find themselves protected by any government around the world. It seems that Arendt’s comment on the existence or lack of human rights regarding displaced people is still prevalent (ibid., p. 296). Displaced persons do not belong to a nation which is obliged to feed them. Their lives are in the hands of charity and not to law as no nation could be forced to take care of them. Their freedom of movement, probably one of the most important human rights, if given at all, does not allow them to reside somewhere. Their freedom of opinion might exist but is not heard or recognised by anybody. Arendt even suggests that stateless people of the early 20th century are worse off than slaves, as the latter – at least – belonged to some sort of human community, since their labour was needed, used and exploited. In contrast, displaced persons do not have anything else than being human (ibid., p. 297). In many cases, no community in the world is willing and able to guarantee them any kind of rights.

Arendt claims – and this can still be witnessed for many Palestinian refugees today – that people insist on their nationality to not be considered as ‘savages’ or ‘beasts’ (Achilli 2015a, pp. 12-13; Arendt 1951, p. 300). Nationality seems to be the last sign of their former citizenship, their last tie with humanity and to the civilised world (Arendt 1951, p. 300).

The scholar argues that displaced persons without rights are left only with their individuality (ibid., p.302). By not having a profession (anymore), nor a citizenship, an opinion (or at least an opinion no one is interested in), nor a deed which identify and specify them as human beings, they are singled out in society and seen as ‘barbarians’ and ‘aliens’ of which one should be frightened as they have become different to the civilised world. These differences, as created by civilisation, generate hate, mistrust and discrimination (ibid., pp. 301-302). Agamben continues this discussion by deducing a historic continuity between man and citizen (Agamben 1996, p. 90, 1995, pp. 81-86). He discusses the paradox: the moment a person flees from his
home country, his human rights need the most protection. However, by crossing the border, he is not considered a citizen of a state anymore and thus deprived of his rights, which are therefore left unprotected.

Whenever there are/were mass movements, e.g., during the World Wars, in the 1990s during the Rwanda crisis, or in recent times the Syrian crisis, nation-states and their organisations fail to adequately handle the situation, including the protection of human rights (Maldini and Takahashi 2017; Agamben 1996, p. 92). This failure can also be elucidated by distinguishing the terms ‘refugee’ and ‘asylum seeker’ (Agamben 1996, p. 93). It is debatable whether the same person without even moving to a different place enjoys human rights or not, rights which by definition must be granted to every person in this world at any time, depending simply on her state of asylum procedure and if it is accepted or declined (Agier 2011, p. 6).

**Being a Refugee in the 21st Century**

Even though the philosophical and political discussion of what it means to be a refugee could be continued, it is time to show the actual effects on people called refugees, especially on those in protracted situations. According to UNHCR, a protracted refugee situation is where at least 25,000 people from the same nationality are living in exile for at least five consecutive years in a given asylum country (UNHCR 2018d, p. 22). In such situations, even though the emergency phase has long passed, a durable solution is not yet or never will be achieved. One of the major problems of protracted situations is the decline in international humanitarian aid over the years, combined with high economic insecurity due to little employment and availability of land and livestock for refugees (Azorbo 2011, p. 4). Thus, refugees live in dependency for years, trapped in harsh situations due to the inaccessibility of markets, job opportunities and services (Azorbo 2011, p. 1). At the end of 2018, 78 per cent of refugees, i.e., about 15.9 million people lived in protracted situations (UNHCR 2019b, p. 22). Almost 6 million of them have been refugees for 20 years or longer (mainly Afghans living in Iran and Pakistan since 1979); 3.5 million are living as refugees between 10 and 37 years; and 6.9 million (mainly Syrians) have been refugees for five to nine years (UNHCR 2018d, p. 22).

As mentioned above, one of the main challenges for refugees is to face deprivation of basic human rights, especially the restriction of movement, right to work and own property (Jacobsen 2002, p. 103). Further, they are often excluded from other rights, such as freedom of speech and assembly, rights for valid contracts as well as access to education or credit (Holzer 2012; Kibreab 2003, p. 58; Jacobsen 2002, p. 101). They experience lack of protection against physical or sexual abuse and exploitation, harassment and unlawful detention and deportation.
Further, they face increasing difficulties to obtain documentation and services like refugee registration processes, permits to work or to start a business, access bank accounts and social security system, as well as difficulties in receiving travel documentation (Musenga Tshimankinda 2018). Such limitations have a major impact on their lives. For instance, limitations to legal work signify difficulties in accumulating a sufficient amount of capital and/or skills to live a self-reliant life, return home and reintegrate with their home countries (Zetter and Ruudetel 2018).

These restrictions are placed to discourage refugees to stay permanently in the host country (Misselwitz 2009, p. 111; Jacobsen 2002, p. 111). In many countries, refugees are seen only as guests or even intruders and not as permanent residents (Jacobsen 2002, p. 103). Their integration is not desired. Host governments avoid implementing special programmes such as livelihood programmes (cf. Chapter 2.5) for refugees (Jacobsen 2002, p. 111). It is not unusual for refugees to face deep and chronic poverty as well as insecurity (Jacobsen 2002, p. 95). Police harassment and discrimination by the local population makes life difficult and prevents people from engaging in livelihood activities. Working opportunities, if at all, are rather found in the informal sector, where health and safety regulations are ignored and people are exploited through low salaries and long working hours (UNHCR 2012b, p. 8). In many cases, negative coping mechanisms such as survival sex, child labour or engagement in illegal or illegal activities seem to be the only options available to make some money (UNHCR 2012b, p. 104). Summarised and back to Agier et al. (2002), living as a refugee means to be part of the ‘most unthinkable and undesirable populations of the planet’ (p. 320). For many, becoming a refugee means to find oneself in a ‘strange, unpredictable predicament, for which one has not been prepared, that provokes the questioning of one’s own threatened, traumatized identity’ (Agier et al. 2002, p. 322).

2.2 Refugee Camps
On the one hand, refugee camps can be a face for the public, as in the example of Zaatari camp in Jordan or Dadaab in Kenya, which are regularly visited by journalists, officials and celebrities (Crisp 2015). On the other hand, it can be a place easily forgotten by the rest of the world – a place existing outside legal and geographical borders and the common political order, a place to contain the ‘undesirables’ (Agier 2011, p. 18).
Academic Discussion

Literature on, mostly planned/managed, refugee camps is abundant, especially in research fields like sociology/social sciences (Jansen 2016; Kibreab 2003; Montclos and Mwangi Kagwanja 2000; Bowles 1998), anthropology/ethnography (Achilli 2016; Peteet 2016; Achilli 2015b; Agier et al. 2002; Malkki 1995; Harrell-Bond 1986) and geography (Gregory and Pred 2013; Ramadan 2012; Agblorti and Awusabo-Asare 2011), to name just a few. Economics, however, is still rather weakly represented by the scholarly community (Schön et al. 2018; Werker 2007; Jacobsen 2005, 2002), even though, the field of refugees’ livelihoods is gaining attention, especially by Betts et al. (Betts et al. 2018a; Betts et al. 2017; Betts et al. 2015). In refugee studies, it is difficult to identify a certain research field, as most publications are to some degree interdisciplinary. This is because observing refugee situations from only one point of view or research field can never reflect reality in its many different facets. In this chapter, a short introduction of the different camp types is given as well as the opportunities and challenges faced by numerous scholars.

Generally speaking, camps function not only as power tools to care, but also to control mass movements in a standardised way (Malkki 1995). This politicised ‘technology of power’ was established after World War II. Through administrative and bureaucratic processes like counting, registering, but also feeding, schooling and orderly repatriating or resettling millions of people, the ‘modern, postwar refugee emerged as a knowable, nameable figure and as an object of social-scientific knowledge’ (Malkki 1995, p. 498). The factor ‘care’ helps refugees, especially at the beginning of a crisis, to survive (Bulley 2017, p. 47).

A camp is (thought to be) an ethical response to the suffering, a space of hospitality, a safety net; even though imperfect and temporary (Bulley 2017; Ramadan 2012, 2008; Werker 2007; Jamal 2003). Hospitality is provided through food, shelter and (as far as possible) security. Traumatised and exhausted people – the temporary guests – can recover, receive some dignity and, most importantly, survive receiving resources provided by the humanitarian aid agencies (the hosts of the camp) to meet their basic needs and protection (Vriese 2006, p. 12). Simultaneously, people are controlled in camps. This control can not only provide security within the borders of the camp, but also to people with special needs. Owing to the rigid, but efficient and effective processes, beneficiaries can be supplied on a tighter budget than in other cases. For host governments and communities, camps create a (at least perceived) secure atmosphere (Bulley 2017, p. 47; UNHCR 2007, p. 23; Jamal 2003, p. 4). Not only does such an arrangement help to avoid potential conflicts between refugees and locals, but it also facilitates international funding. As the international community seems unable to share the world’s responsibility for
refugees and consequently, their funding, camps are built as ‘eyesores’. In this way, their residents cannot be as easily forgotten or neglected as those who are less visible after being integrated within the host communities (Turner 2016; Jamal 2003). However, this aforementioned control is more a perception than reality as there is no such thing as the camp, so using checklists and handbooks, such as SPHERE or UNHCR standards to build a camp, never result in the same outcomes (Jahre et al. 2018, pp. 325-336; Bulley 2017, pp. 41-42). Where organisations plan rows of orderly tents, soon streets, markets, shops and jungles of makeshift buildings emerge similar to every other urban place, besides visible UN flags and logos (Misselwitz 2009). Where nation-states and organisations try to depoliticise camps, the opposite – hyper-politicisation – takes place. So, due to the void of logical space and symbolic order every action and event is up for interpretation and thus, politicisation (Turner 2016).

To understand better the challenges of camps and their spaces as political zones, four different camp types, as defined by UNHCR, are outlined here.

**Camp Types**

UNHCR distinguishes between four different types of camps – planned/managed camps, self-settled camps, collective centres and reception/transit camps (UNHCR 2018d, p. 60). As planned/managed camps are the focus of this thesis, before introducing the features of protracted – planned/managed camps, other camps will be briefly presented focusing on their advantages and disadvantages. Table 1 shows that most refugees live in private accommodations (61.4%). However, if in camps, most refugees stay in a planned/managed camp (29.5 %) (UNHCR 2018d, pp. 57-60). For each emergency, these numbers vary significantly. For instance, about 90 per cent of the Syrian refugees live in private accommodations, whereas refugees from DRC and Myanmar have rather found refuge in camps or camp-like situations. Since 2014, these figures remain stable (UNHCR 2019b, p. 62).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of accommodation</th>
<th>No of refugee</th>
<th>Distribution (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planned/managed camp</td>
<td>4,977,200</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-settled camp</td>
<td>1,084,900</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective centre</td>
<td>327,700</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual accommodation (private)</td>
<td>10,355,600</td>
<td>61.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reception/transit camp</td>
<td>131,100</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16,876,500</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>3,064,800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand total</strong></td>
<td><strong>19,941,300</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*UNHCR (2018d, p. 60)*

Collective centres are defined as ‘pre-existing buildings and structures used for the collective and communal settlement of a displaced population in the event of a conflict or natural disaster’
Such centres can emerge planned, unplanned or through spontaneous settlements. They consist of existing buildings such as schools, hotels, community centres, factories, etc., which are used as temporary living accommodations for displaced populations (UNHCR 2010a, pp. 1-2). In areas prone to natural disasters, governments might even constantly maintain such centres. If selected, maintained and serviced well, collective centres can be appropriate places for a temporary living situation. If, however, people have to stay in worn-out, overcrowded buildings without minimum infrastructure like running water and electricity, living situations can get extremely difficult for the dwellers. Collective centres are the responsibility of the state. Organisations such as UNHCR support governments to provide welfare and protection for the People of Concern (PoC) (UNHCR 2010a, p. v).

Reception/transit centres or camps are used as temporary shelters to accommodate displaced populations for a short-term (UNHCR 2018e). The goal is to transfer people after two to five days to a more suitable, safe accommodation for a longer period, which still has to be found or constructed. In a transit centre, people should receive shelter (mostly tents), adequate protection, access to water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), health services and nutrition, either hot meals or basic food products to cook a meal. Usually, transit centres are built on land allocated by the government and used at the onset of an emergency or for the repatriation process. The purpose is to help the arrived to survive after their flight and safeguard their social rights. Further, such centres collect information about the scale of the emergency and the demographics of the concerned population (ibid.). Transit centres in African countries3 are usually used by UNHCR, close to their sites or borders to receive, register, record the physical state of the new arrivals and to channel them appropriately (Agier 2011, p. 50).

In case no other shelter can be found, transit centres sometimes remain and become long-term camps (Agier 2011, p. 51). This development is a slow process and building infrastructure like markets, schools, hospitals and training facilities takes time or is not planned at all. People feel trapped in such situations as they are neither able to go back to their home country nor move forward to a new dignified life; tensions and protests evolve and violence as well as power abuses disrupt the co-existence of different people (Rawlence 2016b, pp. 129-130; Agier 2011, pp. 51-52).

Self-settled camps are places where PoCs have settled without being allocated to by the government or the humanitarian community (UNHCR 2018f). As the settling happens

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3Transit centres in Europe are different and mostly led by the state government. As European camps or centres are not the focus of this thesis, more information can be found in Agier 2011, pp. 46-52.
spontaneously before support is available, there is neither adequate planning to meet immediate needs nor infrastructural guidance from experts. The displaced people do not have the right to occupy this land. The location of such camps, which are often overcrowded, is often in poor and hazardous areas or close to insecure areas. Thus, providing essential needs to people in self-settlements can become costly and difficult due to their often unfriendly environments and locations. Conflicts with local communities easily arise and make relocations inevitable. One of the most famous self-settled camps in Europe was the ‘Calais Jungle’ in France which existed from 1999 to 2016 until the French government demolished it (BBC News 2015, 2016). Around the world, many such settlements can be found, in many cases, rather small, invisible and hidden (Agier 2011, p. 40). People fleeing might choose self-settled camps because of divisions by area of origin or along ethnic lines or simply to avoid registration by UNHCR and forced movements to a planned camp (UNHCR 2018f).

Planned/managed camps are not UNHCR’s first choice (UNHCR 2018f; Black 1998, p. 5). Only when other solutions such as lodging with host families or self-settlement within locally and culturally similar communities are not available, the planning of a camp becomes an option. A refugee camp is a form of settlement inhabited by refugees and, generally, assisted by host governments and/or humanitarian actors in a centralised manner. Reception centres, public housing and tents or containers are common in a camp. Each camp is unique, even if most refugee camps are managed by UNHCR. Thus, camps vary heavily in size, quality, type of equipment, location, etc., as the set-up usually depends on funding and the hosting country’s policies (Schön et al. 2018, p. 347; UNHCR 2014b).

All camps (if Turkey is accounted to it) can be found in the Global South (Table 2). The number and especially size of the camps vary significantly. Pakistan, for instance, has 48 camps in the whole country, but the number of inhabitants varies between 605 (Lejay Karez) and 43,825 (Panian), whereas Uganda hosts about half of Pakistan’s total number of refugees only in one camp (Adjumani: District) (UNHCR 2018d).

Figure 2 visualises Table 2 in a map format. Here, the geographic agglomeration becomes very clear – Eastern and Middle Africa, Western and Southern Asia (Figure 2). Usually, a camp has better facilities if its layout and infrastructure are being planned prior to it being set up; in such settlements it is easier to protect and assist the dwellers and thus enhance their quality of life (Jahre et al. 2018, p. 336; UNHCR 2018f; Aubone and Hernandez 2013, p. 31).
Table 2: Aggregated and Sorted Countries Hosting Refugees in Planned/Managed Camps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Country of asylum/residents</th>
<th>People in Camps per Country</th>
<th>Number of Camps per country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>798,953</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>756,231</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>444,939</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>423,306</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>420,904</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>United Republic of Tanzania</td>
<td>316,487</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>256,432</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>228,568</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>226,449</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>221,169</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>137,523</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>137,170</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNHCR (2018d, Annex tables, Table 15)

Figure 2: Visualisation of Table 2 – 12 Countries mapped with a) Most People Living in Camps (left side) and b) Most Camps per Country (right side) in reference to UNHCR (2018d, Annex tables, Table 15)

Opportunities and Challenges of Refugee Camps

Camps are able to absorb huge influxes of refugees. Moreover, goods and services can be provided in an efficient and effective way in camps (Jamal 2003, p. 5; Black 1998). Centralisation helps to monitor and evaluate assistance and facilitates logistical processes. Further, the status of refugees and vulnerable people can be identified more easily. Camps can help to ease the burden for host countries and preserve the institution of asylum, especially when huge influxes enter a host country (Jamal 2003). For instance, the current Syrian crisis and the associated
influx of Syrian refugees place immense stress on Middle Eastern cities, especially on the local infrastructure, services, housing and economic opportunities (Bäumler et al. 2017). It would be ‘unreasonable’ (Jamal 2003, p. 4) for the international community to insist that poor countries should accept this burden without thinking about alternatives.

Some groups, marginalised at home, take living in a camp as an opportunity to empower themselves as an ethnic group and win official recognition like the Twa pygmy group in the Rwandan Hutu refugee camp at Goma in the 1990s (Agier et al. 2002, p. 334). Other outcomes of camp structures can be establishment of new social ties, exchanges, inter-ethnic encounters and identities which would never have happened at home (Turner 2016, p. 143; Agier et al. 2002, pp. 322, 333, 336). Frequent instances of democratisation, emancipation, gender equality and grass-root participation occur in such environments (Misselwitz 2009). Further, refugees’ values, knowledge, rationalities and subjectivities can be re-shaped in a camp, because of the absence of a state and the encounter of different individuals, agencies and religious leaders (Ramadan 2012, p. 70). Such political acts can hardly be foreseen, as each constellation of time, space, camp-society, hosting organisations and the influence of host governments is different. For instance, Kenya’s Kakuma refugee camp has different functions along its timeline and the people’s current needs – it serves as an emergency shelter, transit point, facility centre for healthcare and education, market and as the last resort (Jansen 2016, p. 150). It provides the option to move in and out of the humanitarian system. Besides considering the camp’s (potential) social dynamics, each planning agency should consider the residents as social and political subjects. Each dweller has his own personality and way to survive, own geographical origins, territorial and political affiliations, different conditions of life and access to resources and ability to create his own space (Bulley 2017, pp. 41-42; Ramadan 2012, p. 70). Due to all these factors, comparing camps with each other is challenging.

Criticisms regarding refugee camps and the managing organisations are common in literature (Jahre et al. 2018; Jansen 2016; Abdi 2008; Werker 2007; Agier et al. 2002; Black 1998; Bowles 1998; Harrell-Bond 1986). Reasons for this, among others, are the camps’ isolated locations accompanied by segregation and marginalisation, their never-ending temporariness which creates dependencies and violence, as well as standardised humanitarian response mechanisms for the residents as discussed below.

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4 Like the Nairobi area of Eastleigh, urban refugees can prove to be a huge potential for a city, which has turned the locality to be an economic powerhouse of the city (Jansen 2016: 159).
A typical characteristic of a camp is its isolation. Camps are often set up in remote, lowlly populated areas, surrounded by fences and with restricted and monitored entrance and exit points (Turner 2016, p. 146; Werker 2007, p. 11; Diken 2004, p. 91). Such remote locations are often chosen by host governments in border zones to avoid negative impacts on their communities (Bulley 2017, p. 49). The living circumstances accompanied by low levels of infrastructure and assets have negative impacts on refugees. Lack of opportunities to work and access to markets cause their impoverishment and difficulty in establishing livelihood activities (Abdi 2008, p. 19; Corbet 2016, p. 170; Jahre et al. 2018, p. 326). Reaching out to other communities is difficult because transportation to the next market or city is costly or simply not available (Diken 2004, pp. 91-93; Turner 2016, p. 141; Werker 2002). Police and immigration authorities harass and discriminate refugees and restrict their freedom of movement. Refugees need to pay bribes more often than locals, for example, due to missing or (apparently) invalid documentation or to seek their human rights. They face discrimination and pay higher rents, have no access to public services such as healthcare and education and are even charged exorbitant interest rates (UNHCR 2012b, pp. 6-7).

In general, camps are set up to handle refugee crises temporarily. This temporariness force refugees to reside in uncomfortable ‘in-between places’ to ‘limbo spaces’, in which they sometimes need to exist for decades. Reasons for this temporariness are manifold (Bulley 2017, p. 52; Corsellis and Vitale 2005, p. 15; Harrell-Bond 1986, pp. 18-19). First, governments and humanitarian agencies want to avoid the so-called ‘honey-pot effect’. This effect occurs when living standards in the camp are better than outside the camp. Such circumstances attract more people (hosts and refugees) putting existing budgets under pressure even more. To avoid tensions with host communities, living standards should never be higher than the ones of the local communities. Second, camps are usually built on a terrain which can be taken back at any time. Therefore, camps are not integrated into official maps. Third, when living in insecure and uncomfortable places, people do not feel too much at home and thus, are willing to return to their home countries as soon as possible. Fourth, in this way, camp residents are more likely to ‘remain compliant with the limited hospitality and control mechanisms of the camp space’ (Bulley 2017, pp. 46-53; Jamal 2003, p. 4).

When camps exist for too long, become protracted and the humanitarian machinery fails, human capacity is wasted due to refugees becoming dependent on inadequate aid and losing their self-worth as they cannot improve their living situations by themselves (Corbet 2016, p. 183; Abdi 2008, pp. 18, 21; van Damme 1995). A typical life of an encamped refugee consists of living from day to day on food aid or food vouchers as economic opportunities are usually limited.
Access to farming land and other natural resources such as drinking water and firewood is restricted in many cases (UNHCR 2012b, p. 7). As explained in Chapter 2.1, in most cases, refugees cannot enjoy basic human rights and their economic, social and psychological needs remain unfulfilled (Jamal 2003). After several years of exile and camp life and remaining unsure of when they can leave, refugees feel ‘physically and mentally imprisoned, homeless and hopeless’, useless and disempowered (Abdi 2008, p. 329; Agier et al. 2002, p. 21). This often quoted ‘state of limbo’ (Abdi 2008, p. 29) is created by the lack of opportunities and uncertainties refugees face: Usually, they cannot go home (repatriate), nor settle permanently in their host country (integrate locally), nor do other countries agree on receiving them (resettlement) (Vriese 2006). As the majority of jobs can be found in the informal sector since official employment markets rarely exist in a camp, people suffering most are those who had official, recognised jobs before their exodus (Agier et al. 2002, p. 329).

Further, big, overcrowded camps worsen refugees’ living situations. For instance, Bowles (1998) emphasises the camp size as a big negative aspect. She has compared refugee camps on the Thailand-Burma (Myanmar) border. Due to policy changes, the small self-maintained and self-sufficient refugee settlements were dissolved and big, overcrowded camps created. With this change, social conflicts arose, self-sufficiency became difficult more so due to restrictions of movements, leading to a loss of morale among the refugees (Bowles 1998, p. 14). As the future of the camps became uncertain and people did not know when they had to move again, they lost interest in maintaining their belongings. Children’s education was disrupted leading to failure and higher drop-out rates. If unemployed for a long term, either owing to insufficient external aid or being unable to participate in social structures, people, in general, tend to develop interrelated problems like psychological and health problems including feeling of guilt, aggressiveness and poverty; undergo down-skilling (meaning the loss of obtained qualifications); face socio-cultural and social isolation including stigmatisation, familial tensions and conflicts (Oschmiansky 2010; van Damme 1995). Due to security issues, many camp residents face domestic and community violence, forced marriages, sexual abuse and rape inside the camp as well as from the outside. Armed robbery, banditry as well as ‘ethnic’ violence, between national refugee groups and between refugees and hosts make life dangerous and hard (Bulley 2017, p. 60; Agier et al. 2002, p. 327; Crisp 2000).

The international community and humanitarian agencies know of these negative aspects. Thus, though it seems logical to build reception/transit centres to absorb mass influxes after an emergency and provide the opportunity to survive, it is more difficult to understand why the world still needs refugee camps (Bulley 2017, p. 43). Continued existence of camps after the
emergency phase indicates that the national order has failed. By supporting camps, the humanitarian and caring UN and other organisations see the camp as a place not only to protect but also to contain the suffering stranger away from the Western eye.

The UNHCR and other agencies argue that it is not their job to decide where refugees should settle (Black 1998, pp. 5-6). By shifting away from this political responsibility, they focus more on technical tasks such as planning the camp’s layout, development of its infrastructure, etc. Such standardised humanitarian response mechanisms easily create a sterilised, abstract character (Diken 2004, p. 91). When a camp is built too technically without considering the social dynamics, tensions would arise (Corbet 2016, p. 168). The political path a refugee camp takes depends very much on the aspirations, needs and anger of refugees as well as on the involved Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), UN organisations and host representatives and their rules and norms. On the one hand, UNHCR and other organisations call out for empowerment and involvement of refugees in decision-making processes; on the other hand, field officers fear the rivalry of refugee leaders (ibid., pp. 191, 204). ‘Empowerment is a process/phenomenon that allows people to take greater control over the decisions, assets, policies, processes and institutions that affect their lives’ (DFID 2000, cited in Vriese 2006, p. 3).

UNHCR defines empowerment as

a process through which women and men in disadvantaged positions increase their access to knowledge, resources, and decision-making power, and raise their awareness of participation in their communities, in order to reach a level of control over their own environment. (UNHCR 2001)

There are various cases of political struggles within a camp which can be found in literature (Corbet 2016; Rawlence 2016a; Turner 2016; Holzer 2012; Ramadan 2012; Hovil and Werker 2001).

Regarding the interaction with hosts, scholars have found that higher the tolerance between both groups – hosts and refugees – greater are the benefits attained (Agblorti and Awusabo-Asare 2011, p. 55). From the start of such negotiations, any assumption that encamped refugees are better off than the local population (Abdi 2008, p. 24) should be avoided. In general, a sudden presence of refugees, organisations and a camp can create both benefits and difficulties for the host community (Whitaker 2002). Negative effects lead to host communities’ resentment towards refugees. They may be apprehensive that with refugees’ access to (small) labour markets, oversaturation would easily take place; if they become consumers and gain purchasing power, market prices would increase – either if there is a misbalance between available goods and customers or due to cash transfers/vouchers for refugees (Zetter and Ruaudel 2014, p. 7).
Conflicts also arise when hosts perceive that refugees could be the reason for degradation of existing natural resources, like water, soil or wood or when they do not accept the given legal framework and local norms, due to misunderstandings or other reasons (Agblorti and Awusab-Asare 2011, p. 55). In sum, integration works best where refugees and hosts share the same cultural norms, ways of interaction and religion, and markets are big and stable enough to absorb the newcomers.

Despite the negative effects on local markets, as described above, refugees can also influence markets positively, bring employment, investment and opportunities to the host country (Jansen 2016, p. 151). Especially agricultural producers, landlords, local traders, businesses and retailers, construction contractors and suppliers of humanitarian goods and commodities benefit most from refugee influxes (Zetter and Ruaudel 2014, p. 8). Cheap labour, negative for the competing employee, can benefit the employer. The presence of humanitarian actors and their funds can improve the availability of social services, especially in the health sector and education, which in most cases is also made available for the surrounding communities (Jansen 2016, p. 150). Where markets absorb rising consumption, demands grow. This growth increases competition, which usually leads to price declines and a higher quantity of products. For instance, Dadaab camp became a significant city in the north-eastern province of Kenya, bringing around 14 million US dollar (USD) per year to the area and an annual turnover of USD 25 million owing to the many refugee-run, camp-based businesses (Jansen 2016, p. 151; Refugee Consortium of Kenya 2012).

Jansen (2016) – not neglecting the negative sides – emphasises the positive aspects of a camp and argues that negative impacts need to be put into perspective to the local surrounding. Gender-based violence and insecurity might be an issue in the camp, but it might also be comparable to the wider region or the local cultural practices and customs. The author reflects the different phases experienced by protracted camps: First, a humanitarian economy where basic supplies are distributed and traded; the most important principle is refugees’ protection. Second, when the emergency stage transforms into the ‘care and maintenance’ phase, managing agencies focus more on livelihoods, protection and security, education, empowerment, gender and age. During this phase, also returnees can be drawn back to the camp not only due to on-going violence in their home countries, but also to gain access to education and training. With provisions of a rather high level of education, it can even serve as a place to recruit employees (Jansen 2016, p. 160). Thus, over the years, a camp can transform from an ‘in-limbo place’ to one resembling a city where people lead ‘normal’ lives as well as interdependent with the
surrounding villages and communities (Jansen 2016, pp. 155-156; Misselwitz 2009; Werker 2007, p. 2). Refugees leave the camp to interact with host communities for trade, entertainment or services and host community members enter the camp to benefit from standards (education, health services) higher than outside (Turner 2016). In some cases, refugees are “urbanised” during their residence in a camp (Vriese 2006; Jamal 2003). They get used to the urban infrastructure, such as hospitals, schools and training centres, as well as electricity, close water points, mobile reception and internet. Thus, when leaving the camp, they choose to live in an urban location (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018). In some camps, refugees receive better and higher education as they would have in their countries of origin and thus influence the development of their home country positively upon return (Jamal 2003, p. 5).

Figure 3 summarises the aforementioned chances and challenges categorised in a SWOT table: Strengths and Weaknesses refer to refugees living in a camp, Opportunities and Threats refer to the chances and challenges they face in combination with the outside world, especially the host communities.

![SWOT of refugee camps](image)

*Figure 3: Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) of Refugee Camps (own research)*

This sub-chapter ends with a cut, only to continue with Chapter 2.4.2. Before continuing with livelihood opportunities in camps, it is necessary to introduce a set of livelihood terms in Chapter 2.3.
2.3 Necessary Definition of Terms

To understand why self-reliance is important for the beneficiaries, this sub-chapter presents the – for present work – most important Human Rights and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs; Chapter 2.3.1), as well as meaning of terms like dignity, poverty, vulnerability, resilience, sustainability, basic needs and well-being. Sub-chapter 2.3.2 elaborates the differences between livelihood and self-reliance, based on literature, as understood in this study. Sub-chapter 2.3.3 explains concisely the main differences between the humanitarian sector and the development sector. Understanding these differences is important for the case study of Jordan in Chapter 4.1.

2.3.1 Human Rights and Sustainable Development Goals

In 1948, the UN General Assembly proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievements for all peoples and all nations (United Nations 1948). For the first time, it was agreed upon protecting universally fundamental human rights. The General Assembly proclaims the declaration as

common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations (author’s note: including refugees),
to the end that every individual and every organ of society […] shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms […]. (United Nations 1948)

Article 1 claims that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights and should act towards another ‘in a spirit of brotherhood’ (ibid.).

From the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) different instruments were elaborated, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), enforced in 1976 or the UN Charter (1945). For this thesis, especially the ICESCR is taken into account. Summarised, they include right to self-determination (Article 1.1), right to work and free choice of work (Art. 6.1), right to technical and vocational guidance (Art. 6.2), right to just and favourable work conditions (Art. 7), right to form and join trade unions (Art. 8.1 (a)), right to social security and social insurance (Art. 9) and the right to protection of children and young persons from economic and social exploitation (Art. 10.3) (General Assembly 1976). Further, everyone should have the right to adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing and to the continuous improvement of living conditions (Art. 10.3), to be free from hunger (Art. 11.1) and to have access to medical service and attention in the event of sickness (Art. 12.2). Primary education should be free for everybody (Art. 13.2. (a)), secondary education should be made generally available and accessible (Art. 13.2 (b)) and higher education should be accessible to all, depending on their capacity and appropriate means (Art. 13.2 (c)). Where persons have missed primary education, fundamental
education should be made available (Art. 13.2 (d)). Highlighted is also Art. 15.1 (a) – the right to take part in cultural life. These human rights are mentioned as they build the base for the main activities of humanitarian aid agencies in case of natural or man-made disasters and protracted refugee crises. Worth mentioning is also the Convention and Protocol related to the Status of Refugees (1951) which is grounded in Article 14.1 of the UDHR, stating that ‘everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution’. Besides providing a single definition for ‘refugee’ and clarifying a refugee’s legal rights, the Convention is very close to the UDHR and lays down basic minimum standards for the treatment of refugees (General Assembly 1976). Such rights include primary education (Art. 22), ability to work (Art. 24), the provision of documentation (Art. 23), especially travel document in passport form, and freedom of movement (Art. 26).

Many, if not most rights cannot be seen separately from another. For instance, freedom of movement (Art. 13.1) not only refers to a human being’s right to cross borders (Art. 13.2), but is also important to improve a person’s standard of living (Art. 25.1) and enables this person to contribute to the economic and social life of the host country as well as the country of origin (Long and Crisp 2010).

Based on existing instruments on human rights, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were built in 2000, followed by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015. The SDGs, though not explicitly created for refugees, aim to end poverty, protect the planet and ensure prosperity for all (United Nations General Assembly 2015). All goals are supposed to be achieved by 2030. Hereafter, a range of SDGs are connected to human rights also important for, but often denied to, refugees (Schön et al. 2018, p. 366): universal education goals (SDG 4), e.g., including more children/young adults in secondary and higher education (related to Human Right 26 ‘right to education’); rights of working people (SDG 8); right to live decently from their salaries (related to Human Right 23 – ‘right to work’ and Human Right 25 – ‘right to a standard of living adequate for health and well-being’). Societies should create conditions for people to have quality jobs, so while stimulating the economy the environment should not be harmed. All people should obtain job opportunities including decent working conditions. According to SDG 9, to gain development, a country needs industrialisation. For industrialisation, technology and innovation are necessary (United Nations 2015; United Nations General Assembly 2015; General Assembly 1976; United Nations 1948). Innovation should be related to organisational response (Betts et al. 2017, pp. 165-167; Noori and Weber 2016; Ramalingam et al. 2015) and undertaken by refugees themselves (Miller and Kleinschmidt 2016; Kleinschmidt 2015; Betts et al. 2015). SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions) serves as the
‘foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’ and is directly related to the reason why human rights were created (United Nations 2015, 1948).

In most refugee situations hosted by signatories or non-signatories, refugees are not granted the rights they should enjoy based on different conventions and international goals (Zetter and Ruaudel 2018). This might not come as a surprise as human rights violations are common around the world. In 2017, Amnesty International assessed human rights violations in 159 countries (Meredith 2018). However, in some cases, situations for refugees can also improve, as can be witnessed in Jordan, a non-signatory state. Owing to pressure created by the international donor community the country provides a quota of work permits to Syrian refugees as well as for encamped refugees since 2016 and 2017, respectively (Zetter and Ruaudel 2018).

2.3.2 Humanitarian and Development Sector

Understanding the main differences of the humanitarian and the development sector is pivotal to understand the aid provided for the Syrian crisis in Jordan. Modern humanitarian aid roots back to the 19th century and was born out of natural and human-based emergency situations (Anyangwe 2015). Its main objective was to keep people alive. The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP) defines the humanitarian system as ‘the network of interconnected institutional and operational entities through which humanitarian assistance is provided when local and national resources are insufficient to meet the needs of the affected population’ (2015, p. 18).

Humanitarian organisations respond to sudden-onset disasters and chronic crises, build resilience and act as advocates (ALNAP 2015, pp. 51-99). Their goal is to protect lives and dignity of vulnerable populations and communities affected by natural disasters and conflicts worldwide (EUPRHA 2017). It is estimated that in the humanitarian sector 4,400 NGOs and 274,000 workers are active worldwide. In 2018, 135.3 million people needed humanitarian assistance and protection around the world of which 97.9 million were reached (OCHA 2019). For this, the humanitarian sector required USD 25.2 billion, but received only USD 15.1 billion (59.8%).

Development aid was created out of colonialism, before World War II (Anyangwe 2015). The development assistance as known today evolved after the war. Its focus is on technical assistance, education, health, job training and agriculture. Its main objectives are to create livelihoods, growth and to decrease poverty. In 2017, the money paid for development aid amounts to USD 147 billion (OECD 2018). This money also includes 12.8 per cent humanitarian aid (USD 18.8 billion). Middle East and North Africa received 11.7 per cent of the 18.8 billion (ibid.).
While funding for humanitarian assistance is required to be spent in six to 18 months, developing aid can be spent in three to five years (Anyangwe 2015). The main problem of today is that many emergencies become protracted situations making it difficult to determine the end of emergency relief and the start of development aid. In case of Jordan, for instance, this line is difficult to draw as elaborated in Chapter 4.

In the 1990s, an on-going discussion about linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) has started (Hinds 2015, p. 1). This approach tries to link and create synergies between short-term humanitarian aid and longer-term development support as humanitarian needs, poverty and state fragility are often interrelated. Especially for displaced persons like Syrians in the Middle East, this separation of funding can mean living in a cycle of dependence on humanitarian assistance (ibid., p. 3). Protracted camp situations are in between humanitarian aid and development aid as humanitarian aid usually takes care of emergencies and development aid is rather bilateral and given to states based on their development plans (Aleinikoff 2015, p. 2). This ‘in-betweenness’, also called ‘care and maintenance’, is one of the reasons why self-reliance is still heavily underfunded, even though organisations know for many years that fostering self-reliance prevents dependence (Aleinikoff 2015, pp. 3-5). Although, fostering self-reliance is not (yet) the core function of humanitarian organisations, UNHCR and NGO partners fund tens of millions of dollars to strengthen livelihood opportunities. They provide training in skills like tailoring, soap making or woodworking; they also distribute farming tools or livestock. Nonetheless, according to Aleinkoff (2015), no significant analysis and no follow-ups are conducted to measure if the participants improved on a material level. Further, in some situations, aid agencies abandon a place not when they are sure that the people can manage to live self-sufficiently, but when the funding stops (Ohlsen 12/3/2018; Harrell-Bond 1986). For instance, in 1990, Sudanese refugees in Uganda were not assisted anymore as funding ceased. They had to be considered as totally ‘self-reliant’, although most people were still bitterly poor at this point (Ohlsen 12/3/2018).

One of the options which can avoid such situations for the beneficiaries is to link aid through multi-year funding, as done, for instance, by the Australian Government in the Middle East. The government has prepared an assistance package for the Syrian crisis in that region with $220 million Australian dollar over three years (IV: 12 - Australian Embassy 1/13/2019). The main challenges to bring the humanitarian and the development sectors together are manifold (Hinds 2015). For example, governments fear to make unpopular decisions (Anyangwe 2015). At the governmental level, different ministries manage the two sectors. In Germany, the
Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) is responsible for development aid, whereas the Foreign Office manages emergency relief (Hinds 2015). Competition between both offices easily emerges, making a close project coordination even for third parties difficult (IV: 06 - GIZ 1/14/2019). Besides challenges on the management side, implementing LRRD is not an easy task on the operational side. Some operational agencies have specialised in one field or the other and thus cannot provide both kinds of assistance (Hinds 2015). Another problem is fear of losing control as some international NGOs are afraid to be cut out of the system (Anyangwe 2015).

Talking to agencies working in Jordan, the frustration of partners not having strategic ideas of their projects became apparent. During side conversations on the field trip in 2019, it came to light that in many cases, organisations do ad hoc work and concentrate on current projects. Overall coordination is missing, as are exit strategies, despite a constant decrease in funding. Regardless of these problems, many experts still praise the separation of both fields. Interviewed by Anyangwe (2015), Lydia Poole, who works on the annual Global Humanitarian Assistance reports, stated:

There are clear and good reasons why humanitarian and development funding and modes of engagement are separate. Primarily, principled humanitarian assistance which is provided on an impartial basis requires actors to be able to operate independently, which means that you don’t work with governments in most cases because governments are often party to conflict. Whereas, the primary partner of development actors tend to be governments. (Anyangwe 2015)

She further reports that humanitarian assistance provides aid based on assessed needs. The main goal here is to save lives and alleviate suffering. Humanitarian actors prefer to work alone. In contrast, development aid is provided on the basis of the priorities of the recipient government and focuses on complex state-building. Development workers must work within multi-stakeholder teams to solve problems in a technocratic fashion (ibid.).

Drawing the line between humanitarian aid and development aid is especially difficult in the case of implementing livelihood opportunities or a higher level of self-reliance in general. The differences of both terms as well as the livelihood opportunities, in general, available before the encamped refugees, are outlined hereafter.

2.3.3 Livelihood-related Terminologies
Dignity, poverty, vulnerability, basic needs, sustainability and resilience – each term can be examined from different angles and disciplines. As the scope of this thesis is self-reliance, the
The purpose of this sub-chapter is to shortly introduce each of these terms and give definitions relevant for present work.

**Dignity**

Although mentioned five times in the UDHR, the term ‘dignity’ does not have a commonly accepted definition. It is rather a concept which can be examined from different angles – religious, philosophical or experiential (Moka-Mubelo 2017, pp. 90-92). For instance, the experiential concept explains that each human being should respect human dignity simply out of being moved by the horrors and the injustice that fellow human beings have/had to experience (ibid., pp. 103-105). With the moral outrage perpetrated by the Nazi regime and the Holocaust, human rights were formulated after World War II. ‘Never again must human beings allow the humiliation of their own humanity’ (Moka-Mubelo 2017, p. 103) was the slogan of the time and the ground to create human rights as an international commitment to avoid a repetition of such crimes. The deeper meaning of human dignity, as well as the importance to protect and promote it, comes from ‘the need to protect people from atrocities, cruel and inhuman treatment’ (ibid., p. 103). It is ‘not necessarily inspired by talks on human dignity nor by the reading of documents and treaties on human rights, but rather evoked by witnessing the suffering of fellow humans and the experience of individual powerlessness to stop such atrocities’ (ibid. p. 103).

Human dignity can be seen as a reminder helping to defend and protect human rights, despite crimes against humanity (ibid., p. 114). Further, dignity helps to balance the different categories of human rights – political, social and economic rights – as it ‘grounds the individuality of all categories of rights’ (Habermas 2010, p. 468, cited in Moka-Mubelo 2017, p. 117). Because of dignity, people respect each other, live free and equal. Human rights, each being equally important and interdependent, have the power to grant citizens the status of legal subjects. For everyone it is important to recognise all human beings as the bearer of rights, regardless of her geographical, cultural or political background. In this way, the individual and everyone’s right to be different is respected and paves the way to a common ground of humanity (Moka-Mubelo 2017, p. 123).

**Poverty**

Commonly, poverty is measured based on facts, such as income, available resources and the ability to meet current needs (The World Bank Organisation 2014). If the level of income falls below a certain minimum level to meet basic needs, a person is considered poor. Globally, a

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5Not being the scope of this work, for a deeper discussion about human dignity, for more details see Moka-Mubelo (2017), Habermas (2010), Kant (1996).
person living on USD 1.90 a day or less is termed as being extremely poor. Poverty is more than lack of money or goods, it is also ‘humiliation, the sense of being dependent on them, and of being forced to accept rudeness, insults, and indifference when we seek help’ (Narayan 1999, p. 16). Narayan (1999) suggests that poverty is multidimensional which cannot be solely put in quantitative economic or social indicators. Different individuals or groups define poverty in different ways, depending on their experiences and interlocking factors. Because of the multidimensionality of poverty, it is hard for people to move out of their misery. For instance, when people live in the outskirts of cities, their children have fewer choices of schools and good employment is limited. They are marginalised as they cannot afford to participate in social or cultural activities, thus becoming more isolated. Due to this isolation, they are cut off from information or the assistance necessary to progress. Thus, the World Bank has not one indicator to measure poverty, but many (World Bank 2018). Two of them are presented below as they are also relevant for Chapter 3 (Development of CPI System).

Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population)(World Bank DataBank 2019c): This indicator is measured based on national, country-specific poverty lines. A country might have a unique poverty line or different ones, for instance, for urban and for rural population. Household survey data collected from nationally representative samples of households build the base to compute poverty. To construct a correctly weighted distribution of per capita consumption or income, it is important to assess sufficiently detailed information to grasp the household’s income, consumption and production. National poverty lines differ from each other, depending on the country’s specific economic and social circumstances. These lines also reflect local perceptions of the level and composition of consumption or income necessary to be non-poor. This perception usually rises with the average income of a country, which makes cross-country comparisons difficult. Used by governments and the World Bank, this indicator can guide and monitor the results of the country’s poverty reduction strategy. National poverty lines are generally estimated from the cost of a food bundle, which is based on the prevailing national diet of the poor having adequate nutrition for good health and normal activity. It also includes an allowance for non-food spending. The indicator needs to be adjusted for inflation to measure real terms and make meaningful comparisons over time possible. Further, countries recalculate the poverty line on a regular basis, as diets and consumption baskets change (ibid.).

Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population)(World Bank DataBank 2019b): The second World Bank indicator presented here was developed to enable international comparisons of poverty, knowing that such comparisons are difficult and need to be treated
with some care. A common standard in measuring extreme poverty is the meaning of being poor in the world’s poorest countries. In 1985, this meant having USD 1 a day. In 2008, this level was raised to USD 1.25 and in 2015, the amount increased to USD 1.90 a day. This level of poverty applies to 15 of the poorest countries, ranked by per capita consumption (World Bank DataBank 2019b; The World Bank 2019b). Reported World Bank statistics are usually based on consumption data and, when unavailable, on income surveys. Tests on measuring poverty based on consumption in comparison to income did not show significant statistical differences. Poverty lines of USD 3.20 and USD 5.50 are used for lower middle-income and upper middle-income countries, respectively (ibid.).

UNHCR’s definition on poverty is similar to the definitions above on household level. A household is defined as ‘a group of people who contribute to a common household economy, and who rely on the income from that economy for at least the greater part of their essential needs and expenditures’ (UNHCR 2012b, p. 41). People of Concern are generally categorised in one of the following five groups by UNHCR (UNHCR 2012b):

- *Extremely poor or destitute individuals and households* with no means of income and very limited social support. Generally, older people, terminally ill or disabled persons with little social or family support are part of this category.
- *Economically active poor households* engage in work, but have few household assets, a high dependency ratio within the household and no long-term coping mechanisms in crises.
- *Medium-income households* have a more or less regular income, can borrow money or lend small amounts, possess productive assets or have at least access to them. Productive assets include equipment, skills and remittances, among others (see Chapter 2.4.1).
- ‘Better-off’ households lend money to their community, employ others, have diverse households and productive assets and are socially and economically linked outside of their community. Additionally, such households enjoy higher public profiles.
- ‘Other’ containing people who do not fit into any of the above categories (ibid.).

**Vulnerability, Resilience, Sustainability**

The traditional definition of vulnerability is the lack of ability to cope with stress (small, regular, predictable disturbance with a cumulative effect) or shocks (large, infrequent, unpredictable disturbance with immediate impact) (Scoones 1998). Consequently, a vulnerable person is more likely to be affected by events that threaten livelihoods and security than non-vulnerable persons. When displaced, people face many stress factors and shocks and, consequently, are often vulnerable (Vriese 2006, p. 3; Schafer 2002, p. 26).
Resilience is a measure to assess a household’s ability to absorb shocks and stresses. The more well-diversified assets and livelihood activities a household has, the better it can cope with shocks and stresses (Vriese 2006, pp. 2-3; Satgé et al. 2002, p. xix). European Universities on Professionalization on Humanitarian Action (EUPRHA) summarises resilience as: ‘The capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to resist, adapt, and recover from hazardous events, and to restore an acceptable level of functioning and structure’ (EUPRHA 2017).

In the community development context, resilience initiatives focus on adapting to new conditions. Traditional knowledge is used in an innovative way, new environmental knowledge is created and living conditions and employment are improved (Marchese et al. 2018, p. 1276; Lew et al. 2015). It focuses more on processes of systems or features. In contrast, sustainability initiatives rather focus on preserving traditional methods of resource use, livelihoods, environmental knowledge and environmental resources. Its main emphases are the outcomes of that system. ALNAP suggests, according to EUPRHA (2017), that sustainability ‘is concerned with measuring whether an activity or an impact is likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn […] many humanitarian interventions, in contrast to development projects, are not designed to be sustainable’.

As the importance of sustainability and resilience became clearer in the last decades, the answer of the international community was the development of the aforementioned SDGs and thus, the joint efforts to meet challenges people around the world face, such as those connected to climate change.

_Essential Needs_
Essential or basic needs are necessities covering all elements required to lead a safe and dignified life (Jamal 2000, p 3). They go beyond minimum standards consisting of security, shelter, water, food, health and sanitation. Minimum standards, outlined in the UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies as well as in the SPHERE Handbook, ensure human survival and cover basic protection and assistance, which if not met, people’s health is seriously affected and such insufficiencies can lead to death (Sphere 2018; UNHCR 2007; Jamal 2000, p. 3). At an early stage of an emergency, access to life itself, is what humanitarian organisations, governments, host populations and others need to provide to refugees (Jamal 2000, p. 3). Basic needs depend on time and context, meaning that at the onset of an emergency, they could be consistent with minimum standards, but can grow over time, because people cannot and should not live on minimum standards for a long period (Jamal 2000, p. 3). Whereas minimum standards are usually covered
in the form of in-kind assistance, basic needs can also be covered by other forms of assistance, such as provision of legal information, counselling, facilitating registration of refugees, identifying separated children, etc. (Sphere 2018; Kelley et al. 2004, p. 11). In the case of the protracted Syrian refugee situation in Jordan, for instance, the struggle for basic needs of camp and non-camp refugees is mostly met by cash assistance and vouchers than by in-kind donations (Röth et al. 2017, p. 7). In Jordan’s refugee camps, children are offered catch-up classes by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) to prevent them dropping out of school too early; another attempt is to get those children back to school who dropped out because of their current living situation. A further example is winterisation schemes: to support refugees in Jordan’s cold winters, refugees receive an extra amount of 115 Jordanian Dinar (JD, about 136 Euro) from NRC (ibid.).

The level of basic needs covered depends very much on the funding level of the respective refugee situation. As an example, the regional sector achievements and funding situation of the Syrian crisis is visualised below. Figure 4 shows eight main sectors in which organisations and the government invest in and are active to support Syrians in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt. It also shows the funding situation and its gaps (3RP 2017, p. 7).

**SELECTED REGIONAL SECTOR ACHIEVEMENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROTECTION</th>
<th>FOOD SECURITY</th>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
<th>HEALTH &amp; NUTRITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>636,552 children participating in sustained Child Protection programmes</td>
<td>2.75 million individuals receiving food assistance (cash, voucher or in-kind)</td>
<td>1.09 million children enrolled in formal education (primary or secondary)</td>
<td>2.76 million primary health care consultations provided to individuals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BASIC NEEDS</th>
<th>SHELTER</th>
<th>WASH</th>
<th>LIVELIHOODS &amp; SOCIAL COHESION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>280,878 households received seasonal support through cash or in-kind</td>
<td>90,922 households received assistance for shelter or shelter upgrades</td>
<td>1.43 million people benefiting from access to adequate quantity of safe water through sustainable systems</td>
<td>30,337 individuals assisted to access wage employment opportunities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 4: Funding Gaps in Most Sectors for Syrian Refugees in the Middle East (3RP 2017, p. 7)*
Well-being
In contrast to poverty, well-being (besides material well-being; Stiglitz et al. (2009a, p. 5)) cannot be easily connected with income and consumption (Camfield 2012). Well-being is a rather subjective, relative concept considering economic, environmental and social dimensions (Stiglitz 2018; Stiglitz et al. 2009a). Subjective well-being differs between individuals/groups depending on their age, gender or context-specifics and can change over time (Camfield 2012). It is relative, because depending on the situation surrounding an individual/group, a person can feel better/worse off than another person in the same situation, if the latter is surrounded by less/more wealth. In addition to income and consumer goods, people value non-material goods, such as self-esteem, sense of control and inclusion (DFID 2000, 2.6). Further, factors like physical security of household members, their state of physical and mental health, access to services and political enfranchisement, as well as maintenance of their cultural heritage, among others, influence the subjective well-being of a person. Also, the aspects increasing or decreasing people’s well-being are the employment situation, the social capital/social network, environmental conditions, such as air pollution and childhood experiences (Stiglitz 2018, p. 4). Thus, analysts assessing well-being focus on current well-being as well as sustainability to see if natural, physical, human and social stocks of capital matter not only for current lives, but are passed on to the next generations (Stiglitz et al. 2009a, p. 5). Furthermore, organisations, like UNHCR, aim to improve (socio-economic) well-being of its beneficiaries, especially by providing livelihood activities, education and training (UNHCR 2014a, pp. 11, 16, 2012a, pp. 11, 24, 2012b, pp. 18, 77, 2006, pp. 15, 22, 33, 2005, p. 57, References). Throughout this work, well-being emerges several times and its concept was embedded into the development of the CPI System (Chapter 3).

2.4 Livelihood and Self-Reliance
Calling for a higher level of self-reliance for uprooted people is not a new idea, neither in the academic nor in the humanitarian world. In the 1950s, when refugee camps first emerged, UNHCR focused mainly on providing legal protection and resettling European refugees back to their home countries (Vriese 2006, pp. 5-6). Between the 1960s and 1980s, UNHCR was occupied by responding to refugee crises in sub-Saharan African countries. The focus here was mainly on emergency relief and providing basic needs, such as food, water, shelter and healthcare. In some areas, large-scale agricultural settlements were established. At the Arusha Conference in 1979 already, self-reliance for refugees was part of the conversation (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018). At this conference, African states acknowledged their
responsibilities as hosts and not only reasserted their commitment to the 1969 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Refugee Convention, but also called out for more commitment from the international community. The conference was followed by the International Conferences on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA I and II) which took place in 1981 and 1984 (Betts 2004, pp. 6-12). The ICARA conferences primarily aimed at mobilising additional resources for refugees in Africa. ICARA I focused on short-term relief, ICARA II intended to link humanitarian aid more with development aid to find durable solutions (Vriese 2006, pp. 5-6; Betts 2004, pp. 6-12). By this time, it was recognised that the phases of relief, self-reliance and development overlap. After the conference, the UN Technical Team was sent to 14 concerned states to witness the infrastructural burden caused by the refugee influxes. The intention was to provide facilities such as healthcare, education, road access, agricultural training and equipment as well as vocational training to provide social and economic links between refugee and host communities (Betts 2004, p. 11). However, the required funds were not met because of a north–south polarisation in expectations and interests: while the African states wanted to share the burden, the donor states wanted to see durable solutions. The consequence was a lack of commitment from donors and recipient states and thus, both conferences are seen as failure. From the mid-1980s to the end of the 20th century, UNHCR focused on repatriation programmes, acted as firefighters as new emergencies took place and lost sight of refugee situations becoming protracted. In such situations, many refugees ended up in dependency and marginalisation (Vriese 2006, p. 5). Only with the beginning of the new millennium, new interest in protracted refugee situations, refugee livelihoods and self-reliance grew. From this point on, livelihood approaches were developed and refined (cf. Chapter 2.5). Today, almost every organisation in (protracted) refugee situations is involved somehow in livelihood activities. Nonetheless, livelihood opportunities in refugee contexts all over the world are heavily underfunded (UNHCR 2018g, p. 28). Looking at the Syrian refugee crisis, for instance, the joint efforts of the Jordan government and the international donor community have borne fruits: compared with 2016, the percentage of people supported to access employment opportunities has increased from 30 per cent to 45 per cent (3RP 2017, pp. 30-31). Even the amount of funding received has increased from 16 per cent to 36 per cent in 2017. However, reaching only 36 per cent of the required funding signifies that chronic underfunding still persists. Looking at other crises, such as the South Sudanese refugees, only 4 per cent has access to self-employment or facilitated businesses at the regional level (UNHCR 2018g).

The impact of encamped refugees’ (in-)ability to work is deepened in Chapter 2.4.2. First, the definitions of livelihood and self-reliance as well as their differences are clarified.
2.4.1 The Differences between Livelihood and Self-Reliance

Livelihood is the ability to maintain and sustain life (Jacobsen 2002, p. 98). Based on the well-known definition by Chambers and Conway in 1991, the Department for International Development (DFID) developed their definition further for the DFID Livelihood Framework (DFID 2000; Chambers and Conway 1991). During this time, different frameworks regarding livelihood were established, but the DFID Livelihood Framework is the one most widely accepted. As UNHCR has taken up the DFID definition and developed it further, the UNHCR (2012b) definition is used in present work and reads as:

Livelihoods comprise the capabilities, assets (human, natural and capital, financial, physical and social) and activities required for a means of living. Livelihoods enable individuals, households, and communities to cope with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance their capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable opportunities for the next generation. A livelihood is made up of the following attributes: the possession of human capabilities (such as education, skills, health and psychological orientation); access to tangible and intangible assets; and the existence of economic activities. Livelihoods are sustainable when they contribute net benefits to local and global communities and in the short and long-term. (UNHCR 2012b, p. 126)

The definition of livelihood refers to the means used to maintain and sustain life by using available activities, capabilities and assets (Vriese 2006, p. 1). These three terms are explained here.

Definition of Terms

Livelihood activities include all activities which allow people to secure the basic necessities of life required for the means of living (UNHCR 2014a, p. 7). These necessities include food, water, shelter and clothing. By engaging in livelihood activities, people obtain knowledge, skills, social network, raw materials and other resources to meet the needs of an individual or a group sustainably and with dignity.

Capabilities consist of a combination of knowledge, skills, state of health and the ability to work or command work of a household (Vriese 2006, p. 1). When people increase their human capabilities, for instance, in the form of schooling and training, they have more chances ‘to lead the lives they have reason to value and to enhance the real choices they have’ (Sen 1999, p. 293). Usually based on past experiences, households build strategies by using their assets and capabilities to meet their objectives. However, external environments can influence such strategies in varying degrees up to the point that livelihood becomes impossible (Vriese 2006, p. 1). Refugees reach this point not only due to trauma, but also because of a limited set of resources, the loss of assets and capabilities or simply by being deprived of their basic rights.
DFID mentions assets and capital synonymously. The tangible and intangible livelihood assets mentioned in the DFIDs and UNHCRs definitions include ‘human, natural, financial, physical and social capital’ (DFID 2000, 2.3).

**Human capital** are skills, knowledge, work experience, physical ability to work, like a good health state and education (DFID 2000, 2.3.1). It is expected that the better the state of education and health, etc., the more a person can achieve in life (Sen 1999, p. 294). At the household level, the available labour (quantity and quality) is calculated not only by the household size, health status, skills level, number of dependents (household dependency ratio), but also the leadership potential (DFID 2000, 2.3.1). As the human workforce is key to generate income, it is seen as one of the major assets of a household (UNHCR 2012b, p. 22). Core dimensions of poverty are factors like ill-health and/or lack of education (DFID 2000, 2.3.1).

**Financial capital** can be used to make money from money; ‘it serves as the agent for reallocating and redistributing wealth’ (Perez 2003, p. 71). At a smaller scale, financial capital can be used to improve livelihood strategies, e.g., by investing in a household’s own education and vocational trainings, investments in business, or for consumption (UNHCR 2012b, p. 23). It includes savings, credit, insurance, remittances, cash flows and stocks. Financial capital can be transformed into other types of capital, such as new skills or political influence. It is also the least available to the poor, making other types of capital important (DFID 2000, 2.3.5). Only reliable financial capital inflows can be used to plan investments and make a positive contribution.

**Natural capital**

is the stock of renewable and non-renewable natural resources (e.g., plants, animals, air, water, soils, minerals) that combine to yield a flow of benefits to people. […] Natural capital underpins our societies, economies, and institutions and regulates the environmental conditions that enable human life. (Natural Capital Coalition 2018, p. 6)

Natural capital basically includes the environment used for human livelihood purposes, like water and air quality, biodiversity, marine resources, trees, grazing land, farming land and related protection such as storm protection, erosion protection and waste assimilation (UNHCR 2012b, p. 23). Where natural capital is destroyed, either by natural processes themselves like fires, floods, earthquakes or by man-made disasters, the vulnerability of the poor, in particular, deepens (DFID 2000, 2.3.3). Natural capital is clearly important for those engaging in resource-
based livelihood activities, such as farming, fishing and gathering in forests or extracting minerals (ibid.).

*Physical capital* expands to infrastructure and equipment used to achieve livelihood. It includes not only shelter, buildings in general, all types of transportation, tools and equipment, water supply and sanitation, clean and affordable energy supply, but also access to information and communication (UNHCR 2012b, p. 23). Where people do not have access to infrastructure or services, such as water and energy, poverty increases (DFID 2000, 2.3.4). People have to spend long periods of time on non-productive activities, such as fetching water or collecting firewood, decreasing their remaining time for education or income-generating activities. Further, the state of health suffers, for instance, at times when health facilities are inaccessible or opportunity costs are too high. Without appropriate infrastructure, costs to produce and transport own products are relatively high and gives a person comparative disadvantages in the market. Limited infrastructure or transportation means also make transportation to markets costly (Werker 2002, p. 9). This has negative effects on human capital as more time and effort have to be spent to meet basic needs, produce goods and to gain access to markets.

*Social capital* is intangible. It includes networks as well as vertical and horizontal connectedness; while vertical connectedness is between different hierarchies like patrons or clients, horizontal connectedness refers to individuals with shared interests (UNHCR 2012b, p. 23). Social relationships can take an important role; for instance, where ink and paper is missing, trust and honour are vital to start businesses (Sen 1999, pp. 70, 268). Social capital illustrates the importance to work together, trust each other and expand one’s access to other entities, be it political, civic or cultural (DFID 2000, 2.3.2). Developing social values and a sense of responsibility, for instance, regarding environmental ethics or social life can make regulations and forceful state actions unnecessary (Sen 1999, p. 269). Social capital includes memberships in formal groups and relationships leading to the overall acceptance of norms, rules and common practices, and reducing transaction costs and providing informal safety nets (DFID 2000, 2.3.2). Social capital can directly influence other types of capital; e.g., improved efficiency of economic relations increases people’s income and rates of saving, hence financial capital. Innovation, knowledge and sharing of that knowledge are facilitated by social capital and increases human capital. Social capital can also simply improve one’s sense of well-being, for instance, the feelings of belongingness, identity and honour.

If people engage in livelihood activities, the outcome is usually an income stream (cash exchange or barter) and include activities like agriculture, pastoralism, fishing, employment
within a market sector or as an entrepreneur (UNHCR 2014a, p. 7). Work provides the basis for food security and self-reliance. It adds stability, prosperity and peace to a community. This however only applies to work carried out safely, securely and with dignity (ibid.).

In comparison to livelihood, self-reliance (see definition at the beginning of Chapter 2) refers to developing and strengthening livelihoods of people (or in connection with UNHCR – of refugees) and to reduce their vulnerability and long-term reliance on humanitarian or external assistance. In the context of UNHCR, there has been an attempt to bring about durable solutions of self-reliance, thereby trying to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) or rather, since 2015, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Whereas maintaining one’s livelihood means to make a living in some way, being self-reliant could be described as ‘one step further’ as it includes leading an active and productive life and being able to not only enjoy social and economic rights but also to have the capacity to claim one’s rights, always in a dignified and sustainable way. Summarised, self-reliant persons are better protected because they have the means to claim their civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights (cf. definition given at the beginning of Chapter 2). When people participate in claiming their rights, a society becomes more equal, just and empowered (UNHCR 2005, Book One, pp. 2-3).

Examples Regarding Self-Reliance versus Livelihood for Encamped Refugees
Besides the aforementioned definitions of self-reliance and livelihood given by UNHCR, even UNHCR employees (as became clear during the expert interviews) do not have a common understanding of both terms. To clarify the understanding of these terms for present work and its focus – the refugee camp – a couple of examples are given below, depicted with opinions given by the experts (which are introduced in Chapter 4.2.1).

The presence of shops and traders or economic activities in general are the first sign of (partial) self-reliance in an area (IV: 01 - Irish NGO 9/24/2018). A person is self-reliant, when she does not depend on assistance from any organisation and earns enough to meet one’s own needs and that of one’s own family (IV: 02 - UNHCR Amman 9/26/2018; IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018; IV: 05 - UNHCR Copenhagen 12/18/2018). Further, self-reliance could be divided into three levels: Level One is to be able to provide security for one’s family; Level Two signifies that a person can provide basic things like food, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and shelter; Level Three is having the privilege to go beyond covering basic needs regarding food and basic things (IV: 03a - UNHCR Zaatari Camp 10/21/2018).

Self-reliance does not occur solely by fleeing from a country to find safety and protection or by bringing along one’s assets. In these cases, a person’s social or economic rights are not met.
Such cases are rather part of livelihood strategies (Vriese 2006, p. 11). Further, some suggest that obtaining humanitarian assistance per se is a livelihood strategy developed by refugees, as some refugees choose rather not to engage (or reveal the engagement) in rebuilding their lives, but present themselves as needy to receive assistance (Vriese 2006, pp. 12-13). In this example, he does not lead an active and productive life in a dignified way. Living in a camp and using its safety net could be defined as another livelihood strategy used by many households. Some family members leave the camp to find alternatives, while the more vulnerable part of the family remains in the camp, where they are taken care of and receive education, healthcare and other services (Jamal 2003, p. 4). If the ones ventured out fail at becoming self-reliant, one can return to the camp and again use this safety net provided by the international community. Using the safety net of a camp, including free shelter, food and other assistance, it is argued, does not lead to self-reliance (IV: 05 - UNHCR Copenhagen 12/18/2018). Though education and health services should be a universal good and provided free of charge for everyone everywhere, paying rent is a clear sign of the possibility to become self-reliant (ibid.).

Reselling food aid – often seen as fraud – is rather a livelihood opportunity. Although the person can make some money by selling it and thus make free consumption choices, the money made will not be enough to become self-reliant as food aid is limited (IV: 05 - UNHCR Copenhagen 12/18/2018; Jansen 2016, p. 151).

In general, a steady source of income from a job or a business is necessary to become self-reliant. Whether remittances, when coming in as steady source of income, or financial means taken from home mean being self-reliant, is a matter for discussion (IV: 05 - UNHCR Copenhagen 12/18/2018). Though in present work, remittances are considered to be part of livelihood opportunities because they do not necessarily signify that the person leads an active and productive life, they are still included into the CPI System (#57 in 7 – Social Capital). Such money coming in as a safety net can enable people to be active and productive while, simultaneously, being not bound to the obligation to make enough money to meet their basic needs. The discussion of including remittances or not can be led in conjunction with the homo economicus introduced in Chapter 4.3.1 and discussed in Chapter 5.

In other words, in present work, self-reliance refers to the ability to make a living, legally and voluntarily, using one’s skills and knowledge in the given circumstances. It does not include receiving remittances or donations. Further, it excludes prostitution if it is illegal in the host country and/or if the person feels forced to engage in sex work. Other illegal activities, such as smuggling or stealing are also ruled out, as it is assumed here that those activities do not benefit a person in enjoying social and economic rights with dignity (Jacobsen 2002, p. 96).
A person or household is called self-reliant in present work when the head of the household is in dignified employment or self-employed, works in the formal or informal, but not in the illegal sector and earns enough money on a regular basis to save money to cope with short-term emergencies (cf. Table 5 in Chapter 3.3.2). The children of the household can go to school and do not have to engage in child labour, besides supporting the parents after school and performing homework duties (Women's Refugee Commission 2015).

The next sub-chapter elaborates which working opportunities encamped refugees have and why work is important for them. It continues describing not only the benefits but also the challenges that a high influx of refugees bring to the host countries when crossing a border. The sub-chapter ends with examples of how host countries handle their refugee situations.

2.4.2 Livelihood Opportunities in Refugee Camps
Where people settle, trade is not far. Refugees, as everybody else, are likely to use their economic, social and physical capital to rebuild their lives, if they can (Vriese 2006, p. 26). Thus, usually the moment refugee settlements are established, economic activities start, mostly in the form of reselling food aid and non-food items to increase consumption choices or through small businesses like establishing food stalls, showcasing small handcrafts, setting up coffee and teashops or those of hairdressers (Betts et al. 2018a, p. 25; Agier et al. 2002, p. 330). Such businesses, though in most cases informal, are more or less recognised or at least tolerated (Agier et al. 2002, p. 330). Further common activities at this early point are trading humanitarian food and non-food items in an informal way (Omata 2018; Vriese 2006, p. 13).

All stakeholder groups involved in a refugee situation have the same or similar interests, including economic welfare (Women's Refugee Commission 2015, pp. 3-4). For instance, the host government as well as the local population want to see the region economically developed. The private sector longs for profit. If the company is local and makes some profit and/or expands its markets, the whole region can gain from it (taxes, new job positions, etc.). The displaced group wishes to become self-reliant and both host government and local population would like to see a reduced burden on resources and environment (ibid.). If all stakeholder groups have the same interests, such as a thriving economy, jobs and reduction of the burden on local resources, why is it so difficult to lead refugees towards self-reliance? Based on existing literature, this chapter explains why self-reliance or at least engaging in livelihood activities is important for all those involved. It also gives reasons why the same is not working in so many cases.

Types of Work
Typical entrepreneurial activities in camps are carpentry, welding, tailoring, textile production, money exchange services, charging or renting mobile phones, transportation, repair of electronics, small-scale
bartering, petty trade for goods and services, growing and preparing food, raising livestock or gathering firewood (Women's Refugee Commission 2009, p. 94). These and other tasks are either conducted formally or informally. Formal and informal work is divided into self-employment, casual labour and regular waged labour (UNHCR 2012b, p. 48). Informal work has disadvantages like limited sustainable livelihood through irregular income and/or minimal wages, discrimination and exploitation, extortion, theft and non-payment. These disadvantages can lead to an increase in youth and child labour as well as child marriage (Zetter and Ruaudel 2018; Save the children 2014; Zetter and Ruaudel 2014). Self-employment or having a micro-enterprise (formal and informal) has the advantage that refugees can choose their working hours and the place to work. Especially, refugee women are likely to choose working from home as they can take care of their children while working.

In jobs like construction, camp services provision, security guarding, trading and commerce as well as domestic work (UNHCR 2012b, p. 48), usually casual labour (formal or informal) is involved. Formal casual labour opportunities are especially provided by NGOs through Cash for Work (CfW) programmes (UNHCR 2012b, p. 92). CfW is an emergency tool and not one to build livelihoods or create self-reliance, but to support refugees in a more dignified way as through in-kind donations (IV: 11 - ACTED 1/16/2019). Thus, CfW programmes are always short-term (UNHCR 2012b, p. 92). If casual work is informal, employees do not work under any formal work regulations. Thus, exploitation such as non-payment, bad or dangerous work conditions are common (UNHCR 2012b, pp. 8, 48). High competition forbids employees to fight for more rights.

Regular labour is the safest and most reliable income source, especially if formal. However, refugees often earn less than their local counterparts do. Some NGOs provide a certain number of such positions (beyond CfW), e.g., in health and education, commercial agriculture, as guards or cleaners in government or private offices, or as shop helpers and drivers (UNHCR 2012b, p. 49).

**Gender-Specific Livelihood Opportunities**

In many countries and societies, gender roles are clearly distributed in terms of income generation activities or rights. In various cultures, the typical tasks that women are responsible for include food production and preparation, gathering firewood, caring for and feeding livestock, processing and distributing fish, collecting water and/or keeping bees (Women's Refugee Commission 2009, pp. 133-143). Men, in contrast, are often involved with catching fish, controlling cash income or taking decisions (Women's Refugee Commission 2009, pp. 139-140). For instance, in many sub-Saharan African countries, women own chicken but are prohibited to eat meat or eggs, nor are they allowed to make decisions about the birds without consulting men. As traditionally, access to land is granted to men, during displacement household leading women have difficulties to access land and inputs for agricultural and pastoral activities; for this reason, the whole household might face food insecurity issues (Women's Refugee Commission 2009, p. 118).
Women engaged in livelihood activities are usually confronted with the double burden of unpaid and paid work, since in many societies the responsibility for feeding, clothing and caring for children, the elderly, sick or disabled people lies with the women (Women's Refugee Commission 2009, p. xvii). This double-burden can overwhelm and exhaust women, deteriorating their health. Due to displacement situations, gender roles can change and create tensions between men and women at the household or community level, exposing the woman to higher risks of domestic violence, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), as well as exploitation or non-payment at the workplace (UNHCR 2012b, p. 43; Women's Refugee Commission 2009, pp. xvi, 9, 118). Risks increase because livelihood opportunity itself is dangerous and unsafe (e.g., working as commercial sex workers) or women put themselves at risk of rape, violence and abuse through the income-generating activity such as collecting firewood in unsafe areas (Women's Refugee Commission 2009, p. vi).

**The Importance of Self-Reliance and/or Livelihood Opportunities for Encamped Refugees**

Crossing a border does not make people ‘useless’. Before their exodus, most refugees had educational background, professional experiences, technical skills, social networks and the creativity to build a new life (Ekren 2018; Yunus 2018). They played productive roles in their community, took care of their children and provided for their families (Aleinkoff 2015, p. 3). It is natural that by crossing a border, these displaced people would bring along with them their skills and knowledge to the host country. Accessibility towards formal livelihood opportunities contributes to a person’s social, emotional and economic well-being (Women's Refugee Commission 2015, p. 2). Sustainable and resilient self-reliance provide people the ability to obtain food security and protection from stress and disasters without depending on somebody else. However, when people are trapped in protracted refugee situations and idleness, their skills, knowledge and ambitions fade. If the youth spend several years unemployed or underemployed, they tend to suffer from lifelong consequences (Mottaghi 2018; Yunus 2018) like poverty, physical and mental health problems, down-skilling (meaning the loss of obtained qualifications), socio-cultural setback as well as social isolation including stigmatisation, familial tensions and conflicts, feeling of guilt and aggressiveness (Rawlence 2016a; Oschmiansky 2010; Kibreab 2003; van Damme 1995). Those unemployed for a long period, as discussed in Chapter 2.1, feel hopeless as their human capacities, skills and knowledge remain wasted (Ayoubi and Saavedra 2018; Ekren 2018; Yunus 2018; Women's Refugee Commission 2015, p. vi).

**Positive Influence of Refugees on the Local Economy**

Throughout research studies, scholars have shown how refugees have contributed positively towards local economies (Al Ajlan 2018; Ayoubi and Saavedra 2018; Bilgili and Loschmann 2018; Schilling 2018; Whyte et al. 2018; Omata 2017; Agier et al. 2002, p. 322; van Damme
Camp economics are stabilising factors at the global (refugees sending remittances), national (refugees engaging in work illegally outside of the camp) and local (engaging economically with host communities) levels (Larkin and Clark 2017, p. 23). In general, the pursuit of livelihoods and, thus, economic activities can benefit human security, which includes economic, civil and political security. Jacobsen (2002, p. 96) defined it as ‘a situation in which people can pursue livelihoods without violent conflict’. Allowing refugees to work and giving them access to the labour market secures their livelihood, leading to sustainability, reducing vulnerability, a high degree of resilience and a dignified life (Ekren 2018; Zetter and Ruaudel 2018, p. 10; UNHCR 2012b, p. 20). Economic activities of refugees usually result in interdependence between refugees and hosts and play a major role in revitalising host communities (Al Ajlan 2018, p. 29; Bilgili and Loschmann 2018, p. 22; Omata 2018, p. 21). Refugees engage in business activities and become part of the local and national markets and industries. They play minor, sometimes even major, roles in supply chains and are engaged in the import and export of goods and services (Omata 2018, p. 19). If allowed, refugees can produce, sell and consume goods and services and pay taxes, stimulating local markets to provoke economic growth (Aleinkoff 2015, pp. 3, 7; UNHCR 2012b, p. 104; Kibreab 2003, pp. 58, 65). Further stimulations come from remittances and international aid (Ayoubi and Saavedra 2018, p. 39). Upon the arrival of refugees as well as aid workers, the local economy is stimulated (Jacobsen 2002, pp. 95-96). Locals open or expand businesses, such as restaurants, bars, hair salons, guesthouses and shops to attract new customers. Further, by exchanging food, labour and assets, people get in touch with each other and weave social and economic networks. Engaging with host communities creates social interdependence and new social networks between refugees and others as well as between refugees and hosts. Such ties help to pursue livelihood (Agblorti and Awusabo-Asare 2011, p. 36; Werker 2007, p. 2).

**Negative Influence of Refugees on the Local Economy**

Refugees are perceived as competitors in the job market and for local resources as well as a burden threatening the balance of economic, social, cultural, environmental, political and interstate stability (Aleinkoff 2015, pp. 3, 9; Women’s Refugee Commission 2009, p. 4). This is especially the case in host countries which are economically poor, politically instable, poor in natural resources and have to deal with high unemployment rates as well as violations of human rights (Women’s Refugee Commission 2009, p. 3). A high influx of refugees is not welcome in most countries, especially if they stay for a mid- to long term. This can be witnessed in many areas of the world. In 2014 in Turkey, for example, 38.9 per cent Turkish citizens were
convinced that refugees were not of any concern to Turkey and that they should be sent back to their home countries (Weise 2018; Erdogan, Murat, M. 2014, p. 34). Furthermore, 62.2 per cent agreed that ‘Syrian refugees disturb the peace and cause depravity of public morals by being involved in crimes, such as violence, theft, smuggling and prostitution’; 47.4 per cent were of the opinion that ‘Work permit should never be granted’ (Erdogan, Murat, M. 2014, pp. 30, 32).

However, four years later, the majority of Turkish citizens wished Syrians to return back to their country as soon as the war is over (Istanbul Bilgi University 2018, p. 63). Driven by negative public opinions, governments all over the world tend to hesitate to make generous efforts for the well-being of refugees, since they fear it will affect the election results. So they restrict working policies for refugees, either refrain from or only partly issue formal working permissions and restrict the freedom of movement despite different international conventions, laws and agreements (Women's Refugee Commission 2009, p. 8).

**Examples of Countries handling Refugee Situations**

In some countries, like Rwanda and Uganda, making refugees self-reliant is a central point of the government in response to the influx to their country (Bilgili and Loschmann 2018; Omata 2018). In such host environments, refugees are relatively free to move as well as work legally. In Uganda, for instance, refugees are given a plot of land to cultivate; thus, farming produce became the most important commodity in refugee areas such as in the Kyangwali settlement. Agblorti and Awusabo-Asare (2011, p. 52) report on the revival of fishing and farming activities in Ghana having decreased due to labour shortage prior to the refugee influx. Kenya restricts refugee rights like freedom of movement, however, they are not always enforced eagerly by law enforcement (cf. Chapter 4.5 for more information). A rather laissez-faire approach gives refugees the opportunities to leave and enter the camps, as they need to in order to obtain livelihoods.

Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey – all countries greatly impacted by the Syrian crisis – committed to create 1.1 million jobs for refugees and the host communities by the end of 2018 (Schilling 2018, p. 42). Supported by the international community, they have granted work permits and opened their labour markets. Turkey, for instance, recognised the importance of allowing refugees to work. Since 2016, it has authorised Syrians to obtain formal work permits (Del Carpio et al. 2018, p. 10) so that Syrians become economically independent are able to contribute to the local economy. With regard to the contribution of working refugees towards the economy, in developed countries, on average it takes 10 to 15 years to reach the break-even
point, meaning that revenues are higher than expenditures (Ayoubi and Saavedra 2018; Ekren 2018, p. 30; Whyte et al. 2018).

2.5 UNHCR Approach Regarding Livelihood and Self-Reliance
This section is based on three major UNHCR reports – The Handbook for Self-reliance (2005), Livelihood Programming in UNHCR: Operational Guidelines (2012) and Global Strategy for Livelihoods 2014–2018 (2014) – which are the most recent documents and/or provide a detailed overview of the subject. While this chapter demonstrates the predefined approach to refugee situations as laid down by the headquarters, Chapter 4.1 shows the reality on the basis of Zaatari camp in Jordan as well statements from the expert interviews.

2.5.1 Introduction
Since the publication of the Handbook for Self-reliance in 2005, but at least since 2008 when the UNHCR Livelihood Unit was established, UNHCR has tried to motivate refugees to become more self-reliant (Women's Refugee Commission 2015, p. iii; UNHCR 2005, Book One p. 13). UNHCR builds its livelihood strategy on five main blocks (Figure 5):

- **assessment** phase when the livelihood context is assessed, as well as the refugees’ livelihood assets/capital (used synonymously) and their strategies;
- **design and planning** phase whereby a long-term strategy is created and partners and stakeholders identified;
- **implementation** phase of the strategy and processes includes tracing and tracking of the progress and outputs and necessary in-between adjustments;
- **monitoring and evaluation** phase assesses the impact the processes make, also feedback into the processes of the programme are given at this point (UNHCR 2012b, p. 25);
- **phasing down and handing over** is important, though often not taken seriously enough which effects the beneficiaries negatively, as shown in Chapter 4. The different phases are intertwined and presented after giving an overview of UNHCR vision, objectives and reasons for their livelihood strategy.
2.5.2 UNHCR Vision and Objectives

By implementing livelihood activities, UNHCR aims to achieve manifold goals like accomplishing durable solutions, improving the dignity of the people, creating a future for refugees and their families, decreasing dependency and increasing self-reliance of PoC as well as host communities (UNHCR 2014a, 2012b, p. 9). The agency’s vision states: ‘UNHCR aims to ensure that all persons of concern are able to make a safe and sustainable living that meets their basic needs, contributes to their dignity and provides for the full enjoyment of human rights’ (UNHCR 2014a).

The objectives of livelihood programming are separated into three categories: Livelihood provisioning, livelihood protection and livelihood promotion (UNHCR 2012b, p. 86). The first group of objectives aims to reduce vulnerability. Interventions in this stage have a direct and immediate effect on refugees’ socio-economic well-being. In-kind and cash donations try to meet the refugees’ basic needs on the one hand and minimise the beneficiaries’ expenditures on the other (UNHCR 2012b, p. 16). This phase is also called the ‘emergency phase’ (UNHCR 2014a, p. 11). The second group seeks to prevent negative coping mechanisms and have a direct and short-to medium-term effect on the beneficiaries’ socio-economic well-being. Here, refugees are ought to increase or expand their sources of income (UNHCR 2012b, p. 86). The focus of this phase lies on asset recovery and protection through programmes like cash and vouchers for work, microfinance for business development or for saving, etc. To adapt to the environment of the host community, refugees receive trainings of the local language or life-skills. Legal and
employment counselling helps them to decide which steps to take next and issuing or certifying documentation helps them to achieve these goals (UNHCR 2012b, p. 18). Through these goals, refugees can mainly meet their immediate consumption needs (UNHCR 2014a, p. 23). Medium-term interventions, like targeted vocational or technical skills training in areas like agriculture, construction work, crafts or entrepreneurship aim to build or improve livelihood assets as well as strategies (UNHCR 2012b, p. 18). The third group of goals promotes livelihood indirectly and meets the people’s socio-economic medium- to long-term well-being. Here, refugees are ought to get access to markets (including labour markets) and services. To accomplish these goals, UNHCR not only tries to improve access to productive resources, employment and business opportunities (UNHCR 2014a, p. 23), but also to information about the existing services, their entitlements and rights. Usually, all three groups of objectives take place at the same time, as there are always different groups of beneficiaries with varying needs.

2.5.3 Reasons for UNHCR’s Objectives
The legal framework UNHCR operates upon is based on the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (UNHCR 2010b), especially the right to freedom of movement, freedom to work, access to education, healthcare and other social services, if available. The purpose of the Convention is to set a legal frame for refugees to become independent from aid and integrated into local facilities and markets, regardless of their backgrounds (UNHCR 2014a, pp. 11, 14). Further, the Livelihood Strategy aims to support achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs, formerly, MDGs, see Chapter 2.3.1), especially SDG 1 – No Poverty, SDG 5 – Gender Equality and SDG 17 – Partnerships (United Nations 2015; UNHCR 2014a, p. 16).
Organisations such as UNHCR focus on livelihood and self-reliance strategies as they can help to avoid refugees slipping into poverty through enhancing the refugees’ economic capacity. New skills can help to rebuild war-torn areas when people repatriate and facilitate integration into host communities. Independently, living people experience a higher level of dignity (UNHCR 2012b, p. 9). Thus, refugees need to be supported to shift from being aid recipients to become self-reliant and, consequently, able to contribute to peace, stability, as well as prosperity of the host communities, as these, among the governments, carry a heavy burden by refugees seeking protection in their communities (UNHCR 2014a, p. 8).

2.5.4 Analyses, Assessments and other Tasks for UNHCR Field Staff (I)
Different assessments and analyses should be conducted after the first phase of the emergency intervention in order to secure a satisfying transition towards sustainable development
Each assessment should include all stakeholders – refugees, host communities, public and private sectors and other organisations engaged with refugees. Table 3 gives an overview of the different assessments and analyses defined further within the text.

To conduct surveys and interviews as well as to identify the most vulnerable PoC, livelihood zones (also called wealth-groups or socio-economic groups) need to be classified (A), thereby categorising refugee groups according to the related demographic and geographic information (e.g., numbers, gender and age, health and nutrition status) and their socio-economy (e.g., social organisations, community services). Further details of such analyses include occupation patterns (including rights and obligations of each social group), social and cultural customs (classified as B; e.g., household food and money utilisation, gender roles, self-organisation of households and communities), among others (UNHCR 2014a, pp. 4, 11, 2012b, p. 28, 2005, Appendix One, pp. 23-27, 37-38).

An accurate profiling of the refugees’ assets including real assets in the refugees’ place of origin is important to identify the level of immediate support required for adequate economic recovery and protection (UNHCR 2014a, p. 23). This assessment should be completed as early as possible, i.e., after the basic needs are met and refugees have begun to settle, in order to gain insights of the interventions targeting livelihood so that assets are not exhausted (UNHCR 2012b, p. 14). Analyses of refugees’ interests, practices and capacities as well as labour assessments are another part to identify the living situation of the refugees (UNHCR 2005, The Toolkit, p. 26). There is no point in starting programmes in which refugees have no interest (Mallett et al. 2018, p. 52). Socio-economic profiling of refugees and local population needs to be conducted to determine the target groups which need to receive cash-assistance (UNHCR 2014a, p. 25) and the programmes which should be considered for the camp (UNHCR 2019f).

To identify livelihood zones, refugees’ interests and capabilities (A) is important to understand the context of the refugees living in the camp (B). To understand the legal framework in which the organisation can plan its livelihood strategy (C), it is necessary to analyse the policies in the host country. To comprehend which organisations work in and around the camp including past, present and future projects for collaboration and to avoid parallel activities (D), it is essential to map potential humanitarian partners and their projects. To learn about the different private actors and which opportunities they can give to refugees regarding formal and informal jobs and trainings (E), it is important to explore private businesses including financial services and value chains. To know which resources are available for refugees and host communities like water, electricity, farmland, woods, etc., as well as the economic power of the region (F), it is necessary to assess the economic situation of the region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Type of Assessment</th>
<th>Purpose of Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Identify livelihood zones, refugees’ interests and capabilities</td>
<td>To categorise refugees demographically, geographically, socio-economically and as per their skills and interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Examine different social and cultural customs of refugees</td>
<td>To understand the context of the refugees living in the camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Analyse the policies in the host country</td>
<td>To understand the legal framework in which the organisation can plan its livelihood strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Map potential humanitarian partners and their projects</td>
<td>To comprehend which organisations work in and around the camp including past, present and future projects for collaboration and to avoid parallel activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Explore private businesses including financial services and value chains</td>
<td>To learn about the different private actors and which opportunities they can give to refugees regarding formal and informal jobs and trainings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Assess the economic situation of the region</td>
<td>To know which resources are available for refugees and host communities like water, electricity, farmland, woods, etc., as well as the economic power of the region</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Analyse markets and value chains in the local region</td>
<td>To identify financial services, existing formal and informal employment opportunities and to understand existing markets as well as value chains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Explore financial services for locals and refugees</td>
<td>To comprehend which financial services are already in use and how, which ones are accessible to refugees and for which services a demand exists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Assessment of the social and cultural context of the host community</td>
<td>To understand the social and cultural situation refugees have to live in while being in the host country including the challenges and opportunities they face with regard to this situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>Power dynamics in refugee and host communities</td>
<td>To identify vulnerable individuals, households and communities and those being in danger due to exploitation or violence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from UNHCR (2014a, 2012b)

Such profiling can be used to identify skills, needs and protection risks of different groups, such as women and youth (UNHCR 2012b, pp. 12, 43, 2005, The Toolkit, p. 26). It is essential to understand the context refugees live in to build the right strategy and have successful outcomes, meaning a high level of self-reliant refugees at the end of a programmes’ phase (UNHCR 2005, The Toolkit, p. 21). Organisations rate their self-reliance programmes as successful when they meet the indicators they have defined before. Two UNHCR indicators, for instance, are ‘refugees work for three continuous months’ or ‘refugees are able to provide for their families for six continuous months’ (IV: 02 - UNHCR Amman 9/26/2018).

Another important analysis (C) is to understand the policies in the host country (UNHCR 2012b, pp. 28-30). Hence, implementing agencies need to understand which government policies, laws and regulations act in the host country, if refugee laws and directives exist, if they are respected or violated, if the government has signed the Refugee Convention, as well as the government’s policy towards human right to work and freedom of movement. In addition, organisations need to know about laws regarding work, like minimum working age and work safety and get a feeling of how refugees are treated locally as a workforce (UNHCR 2012b, p. 30, 2005, The Toolkit, p. 26). If human rights are not respected, UNHCR has the obligation to advocate them. The key to success of related initiatives is communication and advocacy. Advocating human rights for refugees is essential, as the best thought-out programmes will not be successful if refugees do not enjoy the basic human rights such as freedom of movement and to work (UNHCR 2012b, pp. 10, 15). The right to work is one of the most important rights to enable and secure self-reliance and dignity (UNHCR 2014a, pp. 4, 11, 2012b, p. 86). It allows refugees to pay taxes and fees, and thereby stimulate markets by engaging in new services and bringing in products (Zetter and Ruaudel 2014, pp. 7-8; UNHCR 2005, Book One, p. 10).

Another assessment takes into account all institutions and organisations relevant for livelihood opportunities of refugees. An organisational mapping includes organisations, local markets and financial systems (D-H).
Partner mapping (D, E) identifies potential local, national and international partners suitable for market-driven livelihood interventions (UNHCR 2014a, p. 28). Short-term objectives are usually part of humanitarian organisations who contribute to meet the basic needs of beneficiaries. Long-term goals are part of development agencies (cf. Chapter 2.3.3). Experiences made with partners in former interventions facilitate thorough decisions (UNHCR 2005, The Toolkit, pp. 47-48). Partners are necessary to achieve synergies and develop a common ethos with refugee communities (UNHCR 2014a, pp. 23, 27-28, 2012b, p. 95). To avoid redundancies by parallel work, UNHCR should also be integrated in the development of local plans and processes (UNHCR 2019f).

To empower communities, refugees and host communities are supposed to participate in all stages of the project (UNHCR 2014a, pp. 4, 11). Improving self-reliance without strong communities would not prove sustainable.

All partners have to be monitored carefully regarding their status (if they are registered and authorised to work in that area), reputation, experience, capacity and approach to interventions (UNHCR 2014a, p. 46, 2012b, pp. 108-110). The task of the coordinating organisations is to supervise that no harm is done and refugees are not exploited as cheap labourers.

It is relevant for any organisation engaged in livelihood activities to understand the economic situation of the host area (F), including the availability of resources such as raw materials, livestock, agricultural land, water, etc. (UNHCR 2005, The Toolkit, pp. 27-28). A socio-economic analysis helps to understand under which circumstances and policies refugees live (UNHCR 2005). Previously collected related data for the camp area, including development plans and project information provided by development agencies should be taken into consideration (UNHCR 2012b, pp. 10-13, 2019f). Attempts at contributing and aligning different strategy plans gain support and appreciation of the host government and the host community (UNHCR 2012b, p. 13). The informal sector should be of special interest, as this is usually the main area of employment for refugees. Informal work includes farm labour and agriculture, livestock production, security work, domestic work and childcare, among others (UNHCR 2012b, p. 31). To identify their skills, the available data on refugee profiles need to be compared with the economic activity and opportunities available (UNHCR 2019f, 2014a, p. 27). These assessments should seek to create a sound understanding of the proportion of refugees having legal residency and/or work permits, those being employed or self-employed, the national and local employment situation and (natural) resources available (UNHCR 2012b, p. 32, 2005, The Toolkit, pp. 25-29).
Local markets carefully need to be assessed and/or available data accessed, as they are the key elements to livelihood activities (G). Market assessments, if conducted by trained staff, aim to minimise disruptions by understanding local market dynamics, including camp markets and host community markets, also taking into account the activities already in place (UNHCR 2019f, 2014a, p. 36, 2012b, p. 34). One part of the market assessment is value chain analyses to find out about the markets, particularly those in which the refugees engage and to give the latter a chance to make thoughtful decisions on trainings, business activities and jobs (UNHCR 2014a, p. 36). Value chain analyses map products from production to markets and assess at which point value is added to the product and the players involved in each step. Thereby, only the products with the highest growth potential should be selected. Value chains include participants and their functions, product flows and input at each point as well as marketing, distribution and transportation channels (UNHCR 2012b, p. 36). For key products, such as agricultural products, current as well as potential yield and quality need to be taken into account (UNHCR 2014a, p. 28, 2005, The Toolkit, pp. 25-29).

The last category of the organisational mapping is the financial system (H). Financial services include sending and receiving remittances, savings and credit facilities and can be formal, semi-formal or informal. Formal services include banks, post offices or money transfer operators for remittances, insurance companies or (village) banks and micro finance institutions (MFIs). Semi-formal are international organisations, cooperatives, unions, moneylenders or MFIs, especially for savings and credit. Informal services include rotating credit and savings associations (ROSCAs) or other savings groups for savings and credit, as well as informal value transfer systems, like ‘Hawala’, which is used to receive and send remittances (UNHCR 2012b, p. 38). Informal services are often more available to refugees, whereas formal services are usually safer and more reliable and thus, more sustainable. The purpose of this assessment is to bring to light if microfinance services are available and the details they include like requirements to get loans, amount of interest rates, consequences when loans cannot be repaid, etc. (UNHCR 2005, The Toolkit, p. 28).

Besides assessing the economic situation of the host community to find out the possible economic opportunities for refugees, the social and cultural context needs to be evaluated to find out the real opportunities refugees available (I).

Moreover, UNHCR has to consider existing power dynamics and negative coping mechanisms using the prevalent assessments on education, child protection and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) (UNHCR 2014a, p. 36), as well as analysing the different strategies men and women use to make a living (J).
Livelihood assessments aim to identify the environment refugees live in to increase refugees’ opportunities to engage in self-reliance activities (UNHCR 2012b, p. 11). Instead of focusing on refugees’ problems and needs, their perceived strengths and opportunities should rather be taken into account (UNHCR 2012b, p. 11). Thus, using the results gathered by the assessments described above, a SWOT analysis can identify strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats regarding the livelihood situation of the refugees. The recommendations derived of these analyses are used to build a strategic plan which is outlined in the next chapter (UNHCR 2012b, p. 62), after shortly introducing the Age, Gender and Diversity (AGD) Policy.

**Gender-Based Considerations**

Since 2011, UNHCR field officers apply the Age, Gender and Diversity (AGD) Policy in their worldwide operations (UNHCR 2019k, 2011). By analysing the AGD dimensions, the multifaceted protection risks and capacities of individuals and communities are better understood, which is important to promote and implement equal opportunities for all people. UNHCR approaches should not be women-specific, but gender-sensitive, including men while prioritising women to transform gender roles and simultaneously avoid tensions between men and women (UNHCR 2012b, p. 98; Women's Refugee Commission 2009, p. xvi). For each refugee context, cultural practices, gender inequalities and distribution of gender roles existing in the specific community as well as the occupations acceptable to women need to be assessed (UNHCR 2012b, p. 39; Women's Refugee Commission 2009, pp. 50, 74). Interventions can only be successful if the barriers which women face because of restrictive customs are taken into consideration beforehand. In this way, measurements to either overcome or bypass such barriers, like limited access to business networks, credit and/or education, can be implemented (UNHCR 2012b, p. 98; Women's Refugee Commission 2009, p. 194). Especially in contexts in which women were not engaging in income-generating activities before flight, an assessment can expose the non-monetised skills women have that can help them obtaining jobs. Such skills can be child caring, cooking, sewing, cleaning, etc. (UNHCR 2012b, p. 56; Women's Refugee Commission 2009, pp. 50, 100).

As in many cultures, women are responsible for domestic activities; livelihood programmes designed for women must take into account the double-burden many women shoulder by balancing unpaid household workload and income generating activities (UNHCR 2012b, p. 95; Women's Refugee Commission 2009, p. xvii). Childcare solutions and flexible work hours are mandatory for every livelihood intervention targeted at women (Women's Refugee Commission 2009, p. 33). Additional measures to achieve gender equality are to pay equal wages for women and men and to ensure that women have equal voices in community groups (Women's Refugee Commission 2009, pp. 33, 81).

Important questions to assess livelihood interventions for women should touch topics like spending priorities of men and women, the control of spending within households, the division of labour within the household, the method of payment women prefer, etc. (Women's Refugee Commission 2009, pp. 63-
All interventions should be monitored and examined through a gender lens to avoid unforeseen events putting women unnecessarily at risk (Women's Refugee Commission 2009, p. 194).

2.5.5 Programme Planning (II) and Implementation Phase (III)
As soon as the initial emergency phase, including intensive support, terminates, sustainable long-term self-reliance initiatives become necessary (UNHCR 2014a, pp. 4, 11). The aforementioned SWOT analysis (cf. 2.5.4) helps to build a three- to five-year or even multi-year strategic plan. Such a plan focuses on employment areas with the highest probability of success (UNHCR 2019f). It can include the identification of new markets and value chains and bring to light a set of comprehensive livelihood-support interventions that contributes to self-reliance goals (UNHCR 2014a, pp. 28, 30).

Dialogues need to be initiated, especially with national and local authorities, to improve the recognition of diplomas and professional certificates; accessibility to markets, land and productive natural resources; attainability of work permits, training and learning opportunities, and financial services; freedom of movement, association and the rights to business ownership and membership in business associations. Local authorities, employers, businesses and public service providers should be informed about the refugees’ offers (skills, knowledge) and requirements. Communication needs to be directed to refugees regarding the status quo of their rights in the host communities, their obligations and general information regarding their host communities. Feedback from communities and other stakeholders is taken into account and awareness-raising events are used to improve the situation for all stakeholders (UNHCR 2014a, pp. 4, 19-21, 42, 2012b, pp. 13, 104). The main areas of interventions – productive assets and livelihood consumables, employment, enterprise development and financial services – are presented below.

Livelihood Programmes
Each refugee context is unique. Therefore, tailored, appropriate and reliable programmes are necessary. It is important to consider the refugees’ strengths and needs as well as the goal to improve the economic well-being of the region. In this section, four main areas of livelihood activities are elaborated, though by no means complete – livelihood consumables and productive assets, employment, enterprise development and financial services (UNHCR 2014a, 2012b; Women's Refugee Commission 2009; UNHCR 2005).
Livelihood Consumables and Productive Assets

The difference between livelihood consumables and productive assets (or physical capital as explained in Chapter 2.4.1) is that livelihood consumables meet basic needs and help to prevent assets depleting, whereas productive assets are necessary to make an income (UNHCR 2012b, p. 87). Resources like financial capital can be used to meet basic needs or to buy equipment and tools to generate income, given that the local markets are (still) functioning. Short-term interventions or those at the beginning of a crisis, especially after a crisis has hit and physical capital has been lost or destroyed, mainly aim to provide essential goods and services, as well as replace or preserve existing productive assets (UNHCR 2014a, p. 24, 2019f). Essential goods and services are food, water, health, household goods and cash savings as well as safe shelter, ability to safeguard household valuables and savings. In case of refugees having livestock (capital), they need access to grazing land and water (UNHCR 2012b, p. 89). Refugees having lost critical assets need to be provided with them to enable them to continue or start new income-generating activities and to prevent an increase in vulnerability and dependency (UNHCR 2019f). At this point, the turning point is from short-term to long-term interventions where organisations need to help beneficiaries to increase their assets through their own economic capacity. Simple livelihood activities are introduced at the beginning like keeping small livestock or growing kitchen gardens. Providing renewable energy sources can also be an important step to decrease refugees’ dependencies from external sources. More advanced interventions are to advocate access to farmable land, improve yield and its quality and increase agriculturalists’ and pastoralists’ resilience against socio-natural disasters and climate change as well as the identification of new markets and value chains (UNHCR 2014a, p. 28).

Employment

Employment interventions include cash-for-work programmes, improvement of employability through vocational training/apprenticeship programmes and the creation of jobs (UNHCR 2012b, p. 92).

For-work Initiatives

For-work initiatives are used to inject cash into the community and to rapidly provide (short-term) employment (Women's Refugee Commission 2009, p. 58). Refugee workers are engaged in activities like building, camp management and maintenance, provision of essential services such as food distribution, healthcare, education and security. Cash-for-work, food-for-work and asset provisioning projects mainly aim to help refugees maintain their assets and develop new
skills and knowledge (UNHCR 2014a, p. 28, 2012b, p. 92; Women's Refugee Commission 2009, p. 56). Distribution of cash is cheaper than food as purchase, transport and storage of food is expensive, whereas cash can even be distributed through local entities, such as banks and money transfer agencies. Both food and cash can disrupt local markets, which makes prior analyses important to avoid conflicts within displaced communities or between them and the local communities. Proper wages, usually local minimum wages, need to be paid equally to men and women and throughout different groups (age, ethnicity, gender, etc.) and all stakeholders need to be included into the planning and managing processes to avoid envy (UNHCR 2005, The Toolkit, pp. 70-72, Appendix One, p. 92). Being unsustainable, for-work programmes should never be planned and/or used for long-term interventions (Women's Refugee Commission 2009, p. 71). Further, such programmes can never address the employment needs of all encamped refugees (Bilgili and Loschmann 2018, p. 22).

Professionals
UNHCR identifies and connects skilled refugees like teachers, artisans, healthcare workers, technicians and other professionals with potential employers, new markets and value chains (UNHCR 2014a, p. 28). If refugees do not have their diplomas and professional certifications anymore, UNHCR’s task is to help recovering them. Another task is to advocate recognition of foreign certificates and diplomas and to find work for professionals, so that they can keep and enhance their skills. Further, UNHCR needs to start collaborations with tertiary education and professional skills facilitators such as universities and companies to enable access for refugees (UNHCR 2012b, p. 95).

Vocational, Technical Training and Job Placements
Capacity building is based on refugees’ interests and capacities to achieve self-reliance and can equip participants with the right tools to become self-reliant (UNHCR 2014a, pp. 41, 46; Women's Refugee Commission 2009, p. 28). Therefore, trainings need to consider knowledge of locals as well as of participating partners and should be based on existing local resources. Skills and vocational training have to be suitable to market demand, but also to the interest of participants. As many refugees cannot continue working in the jobs they worked before, training opportunities are vital to increase peoples’ human capital and get better economic opportunities (UNHCR 2012b, p. 93). The length of the training should be adequate – too short might not qualify the participants enough in the local job market, too long might demoralise participants as they are usually eager to start their new careers. Getting participants into appropriate jobs
after the completion of training is vital to keep up their motivation and that of future participants and to prevent disillusionment which might lower the community’s morality (UNHCR 2012b, pp. 93-96; Women's Refugee Commission 2009, pp. 31-33). Further challenges can be a fair selection of participants, a general low level of education among the participants as well as unplanned costs such as transportation to training location, which makes it difficult for poor people to participate (Women's Refugee Commission 2009, p. 35; UNHCR 2005, Appendix One, pp. 71-72).

Community Technology Access
Using the newest technology in refugee situations can lift refugees out of poverty. Thus, UNHCR introduces the development of innovative income streams and use of technology in agriculture to increase quantity and quality of products (UNHCR 2014a, pp. 5, 27). New technology also facilitates access to local and global markets. In order to participate in such markets, have greater access to job opportunities and engage in formal and informal trainings, UNHCR has launched the so-called Community Technology Access (CTA) programme and expanded it in 2014 (UNHCR 2014a, p. 29).

Access to the internet includes impact-sourcing initiatives. Impact-sourcing initiatives integrate internet-based jobs in underprivileged locations such as refugee camps, bringing employment with higher income to people usually not participating in technology-enabled work (UNHCR 2014a, p. 30).

Enterprise Development and Entrepreneurship
The development of enterprises is twofold. Projects can improve the whole market systems and value chain functions as well as focus on single businesses. Existing businesses are encouraged to create jobs for refugees. UNHCR’s task is, among others, to increase the formal work sector for refugees, identify promising markets and value chains and help to facilitate them by improving logistic areas such as transportation, storage, packaging and other areas like finance and marketing (UNHCR 2012b, p. 97). In camps, typical crafted products are soap, tools and clothes as well as more sophisticated products such as efficient stoves. Services, which can be provided are often health services for animals or of traditional medicines, battery and mobile phone charging and repairing, money-exchange services, internet cafes and, recently, IT services and solar tea stalls (UNHCR 2012b, p. 98, 2005, Appendix One, pp. 50-51).
Financial Services

Microfinance is seen to be a tool to enhance self-reliance in camps and for host communities, as long as host country policies for refugees and the local economy does not forbid it (Azorbo 2011, p. 23). Microfinance is defined by the UNHCR Handbook for Self-reliance as ‘the provision of financial services in a sustainable way to micro-entrepreneurs and other individuals with low incomes who do not have access to commercial financial services’ (UNHCR 2005, Appendix One, p. 125).

It helps refugees to generate income in protracted situations to endorse durable solutions also after donors have retreated (Azorbo 2011, p. 10). With credits being available, refugees manage their cash flows as they can plan and expand their business activities. Further, a better management of income and expenditures can lead to make joint decisions within a household, especially between men and women (UNHCR 2012b, pp. 100-101). Of major importance is a careful client selection to avoid loans being used for consumption or to pay back other loans. Loans taken by people with business experience are the most successful (Azorbo 2011, p. 19). Frequently used models like the Grameen Bank model do not tackle the poorest of the poor, but people with some business expertise who might have enough resources without microcredits (Azorbo 2011, p. 4).

2.5.6 Monitoring and Evaluation (IV)

The monitoring and evaluation phase is necessary to evaluate the level of implementation of the strategic plan. Performance progress measurements at set intervals reveal on time if the approaches are meeting the desired outcomes, help to undertake important management decisions and adapt plans to altering circumstances as well as to improve the communication with partners and stakeholders (UNHCR 2014a, p. 37, 2012b, pp. 13, 59, 72). Regarding livelihood programmes, evaluations bring to light if poverty and exploitation could be reduced and self-reliance as well as gender equality could be increased (Women's Refugee Commission 2009, p. xvi).

To enable monitoring, standards, outputs and performance, it is relevant to define indicators (UNHCR 2012b, pp. 72-76). These indicators need to be combined with the objectives of the implementing entity as well as all participants (Women's Refugee Commission 2009, p. xvi). Their purpose is to monitor and report targets. Frequent monitoring and evaluation helps to plan which human, operational and budgetary resources are vital and to track changes in household capacities, opportunities and income levels (UNHCR 2012b, pp. 72-76). Policies, institutions and processes might change during the implementation phase and thus need to be monitored
and documented annually. Changes in the local economy and their impact on the refugees such as on housing, access to land, markets, education and health facilities need to be tracked as well. On a quarterly basis, UNHCR needs to monitor its financial situation. Activity and output monitoring need to be conducted twice to four times a year by visiting refugee homes, businesses, training centres and through observation. Depending on the outcomes of the monitoring and evaluation, modifications in the strategic plan have to be made to map the new realities (UNHCR 2012b, pp. 72-76, 2005, The Toolkit, p. 58).

Evaluations include analyses of actions, impact and sustainability (UNHCR 2014a, p. 37, 2012b, p. 11). Guidelines mandate that UNHCR and its partners need to undertake an annual review of the socio-economic profiles, households’ livelihood assets and strategies as well as the levels of income and compare them with the initial findings. The focus lies on the outcomes and whether results and targets have been met or not (UNHCR 2012b, p. 77).

Besides all these requirements regarding monitoring and evaluation, reality looks different as presented in Chapter 3. This sub-chapter ends with the phasing down approach.

2.5.7 Phasing down and Handing over (V)

Phase-down and hand-over plans need to be developed and integrated into the livelihood strategy (UNHCR 2012b, p. 79). Reasons for phase-downs are to shift UNHCR interventions from the resource-intensive emergency phase to longer-term livelihood aid or to terminate programmes when donors step back from supporting refugee situations. Getting people towards self-reliance means being able to reduce the budget for the intervention as fewer refugees need full support (UNHCR 2012b, p. 13). Good planning prevents the immediate termination of livelihood support projects if resources run out. UNHCR’s phase-down approach is a gradual diminution of support and subsidies and increasing livelihood-protection and -promotion activities. Instead of promoting or supporting offers which rely on international donations, UNHCR needs to invest in national and local service providers as well as in trainings, microfinance and business development, etc. The livelihood strategy guideline also emphasises that vulnerable households need to be identified in the phasing-out, if not done earlier, and ensured of the receipt of long-term assistance like in-kind donations, vouchers or cash till the time they meet the benchmarks regarding self-reliance (UNHCR 2012b, p. 82).

This sub-chapter provides a detailed overview of the livelihood approach that organisations such as UNHCR take or at least should take to increase the level of self-reliance. However, in many protracted refugee situations this approach remains an objective rather than reality. A long list of obstacles exists; the challenges and chances are detailed in Chapter 4.5.
The next chapter presents the CPI System including the steps involved in its development. The CPI is a tool to assess and measure the level of self-reliance of encamped refugees. The CPI Framework is also used to identify and categorise the unquantifiable influential factors presented in Chapter 4.5.
3 Measuring Quantitatively Self-Reliance in Refugee Camp Settings

The overall goals of this research were to identify the means of measuring self-reliance (quantitative method) and the factors that influence self-reliance (qualitative method), including different power dynamics in camps. Therefore, two quite independent approaches were developed. First, an indicator system and a framework were created to display and measure self-reliance, as both were missing for refugees in camps\(^6\) (Camp Performance Indicator Framework and System is called ‘CPI’, when both framework and system are meant). Second, key findings that emerged from the first approach were combined with those obtained from expert interviews and literature research and were described and named as Identification of Influential Factors (IIF) (see Chapter 4.5).

The motivation to develop the CPI was that there was no tool which could capture the collective impact of all interventions concerning self-reliance. To measure self-reliance and to enable comparisons of different camps and/or different timelines of one camp, such a tool was thought indispensable. The main difficulty in creating the CPI was to find ‘the balance between creating an easy-to-use tool and assessing the camp in-depth to generate valuable results’ (Schön et al. 2018, p. 354). The CPI encompasses measuring the level of infrastructure and services as well as the management level necessary in a camp for self-reliance.

In the following sections, a short explanation is given, why measuring performances is important per se and why existing tools used in the commercial world were not an option for this research project (Chapter 3.1). Chapter 3.2 gives an overview of existing tools. The approach of developing the CPI is given in Chapter 3.3.1. Chapter 3.3.2 presents the tool, including a description of how the existing tools influenced its creation.

3.1 Performance Measurement in Humanitarian Crises

Performance measurement can be defined as ‘the process of quantifying the efficiency and effectiveness of action’ (Neely et al. 1995, p. 1229). While effectiveness refers to doing the ‘right things’, efficiency could be translated into the formula ‘get more done with the resources you have’ (Haavisto and Goentzel 2015, p. 307). Thus, a performance measure (indicator) is the metric used to quantify the efficiency and/or effectiveness of an action, whereas a performance

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\(^6\)While developing this framework, researchers presented their way of assessing self-reliance in a camp (Betts et al. 2018). Instead of focusing on measuring the level of infrastructure and services as well as the level of management necessary for self-reliance in a camp (as done for the CPI), they focused more on individuals and households. Betts et al. (2018) influenced the development of the CPI and is further included in the assessment of influential factors (IIF).
measurement system is the set of metrics to quantify the efficiency and effectiveness of actions (Neely et al. 1995, p. 1229). In literature the terms performance measurement frameworks and systems are used interchangeably (Beamon and Balcik 2008, p. 13). Performance measurement frameworks clarify boundaries, specify dimensions and show the relationship between the different dimensions (Rouse and Putterill 2003, p. 792). Thus, frameworks are the base for developing performance measurement systems. In the commercial, but also in the humanitarian field, performance measurement systems are usually used to track either the reduction of costs or the increase of services provided to customers or the respective beneficiaries (Pfohl op. 2010, p. 43-44; Bölcske 2009, pp. 21, 61–62, 91-92). In this study, performance measurement is used to track the increase or decrease of self-reliance in a refugee camp (and neither an organisation nor a supply chain). It is important to understand why a new framework was developed instead of using existing tools from the commercial sector (e.g., the Balanced Scorecard).

Performance Measurement and Challenges in the Humanitarian Field

Already in the 19th century, the importance of measurement was clear:

> When you can measure what you are speaking about and express it in numbers, you know something about it… [otherwise] your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely in thought advanced to the stage of science. (Lord Kelvin, 1824-1907 in Neely et al. 1995, p. 1228)

Building knowledge is important in all forms of organisations (profit and non-profit) as well as in different settings (supply chains, sudden-onset disasters, refugee camps, etc.). Creating transparency might be the main objective for performance measurement in any organisation or construct. Performance measurement is used to (Kovacs et al. 2018; Maghsoudi and Pazirandeh 2016; Haavisto and Goentzel 2015; Abidi et al. 2014; Beamon and Balcik 2008):

- inform decision makers at different levels about the knowledge gained
- implement and realise strategic, long-term goals (e.g., those set by the donor community, the SDGs or referring to the ‘do no harm’ principle)
- facilitate cooperation and communication
- create transparency/visibility throughout all processes, actions and supply chains (check if strategies and fieldwork are aligned; resources and funds are spent effectively and efficiently throughout the whole supply chain)

Regarding performance measurement, the field of logistics and supply chain management has been extensively studied by humanitarian scholars (Lu et al. 2016; D'Haene et al. 2015;
Haavisto and Goentzel 2015; Schiffling and Piecyk 2014; Abidi et al. 2013; Bleken 2010; Bölsche 2009; Beamon and Balci 2008; Kovács and Spens 2007). One of the reasons is that logistical processes cost organisations up to 80 per cent of their funds available for relief operations (Tomasini and van Wassenhove 2009; van Wassenhove 2006, p. 475). With performance measurement, these costs can be reduced or at least managed. Regarding the efficiency of the process two questions have been frequently posed – first, if performance measurement is so beneficial, why do only 20 per cent of all humanitarian organisations measure the performance of their supply chain operations consistently and thoroughly (Bleken 2010, p. 677); second, in general, why do only a fraction of organisations (14 per cent in 1996) collect reliable measures of mission impact (Sawhill and Williamson 2001, p. 372; Sheehan 1996). The answers to these queries are manifold. First, measuring ‘the alleviation of human suffering’ is far more complex than measuring profit, return on investment or shareholder value creation (Sawhill and Williamson 2001, p. 371). Further, humanitarian operations are usually very complex and chaotic which makes tracking much more difficult, especially regarding the outcome of actions (Haavisto and Goentzel 2015, p. 303; Abidi et al. 2014, 2013, p. 33; Bleken 2010, p. 677). In inter-agency processes, it is not always clear whose responsibility it is to track, control and manage data regarding relief operations. Another reason could be the lack of capability and capacity to track the achievement of goals. Many smaller organisations, for instance, do not have the funds to track the success rate of their projects after they have ended (Schön et al. 2018, p. 348). Lack of time is another issue. Field officers move from one crisis to the next and do not have the time or motivation to evaluate their actions properly (Haavisto and Goentzel 2015, p. 303).

Information gained for this research project confirms the challenges before performance measurement in humanitarian organisations (see Chapter 4 for introduction of experts):

*Lack of transparency due to lack of or partial access to collected data by partners or the public:

Concerning refugees, UNHCR uses the tool ‘ProGres’ as a refugee registration database for gathering primary data (IV: 05 - UNHCR Copenhagen 12/18/2018). This data includes names and basic information, such as the country of origin. If there is time, second-level data is tracked, such as employment and educational-level data. The primary data is used to decide if people are to be considered refugees or not. According to interviewee No. 5, this data is the most sensitive data that UNHCR collects. Therefore, data protection is of highest concern and each data officer has access only to her data sets. To maintain a high level of data protection security, all data sets are stored decentralised at the field of its level (IV: 05 - UNHCR Copenhagen 12/18/2018). This data cannot be accessed by outsiders (the public or partners, not even other
UNHCR staff) and thus, does not provide transparency outside UNHCR regarding the impact of a crisis. As only some UNHCR staff members have access to this sensible data, only they can create transparency, e.g., by writing reports. The reader of such reports has no other option than to believe the truthfulness of the reports as she lacks access to the data.

*Low quality of data because of low motivation of field officers to gather data and guesstimating:* For determining people’s refugee status, the level of profession or education is not relevant, thus, secondary data is only gathered when the field team has the time and resources to do so. According to expert No. 5, in protracted refugee situations, such data is gathered as there are multiple rounds of verification of refugees. In UNHCR (as well as in other organisations), the data quality of operations varies a lot. In most cases, as stated by the UNHCR member, the data quality is rather on the lower scale of quality. Reasons are – as mentioned above – the overburden of field officers, but also that it is not prioritised. ‘Guesstimating’ is a widespread workaround to deliver data required by the headquarter or partner organisations (IV: 05 - UNHCR Copenhagen 12/18/2018; IV: 11 - ACTED 1/16/2019).

Another UNHCR tool is called Global Focus. It is UNHCR’s main operational reporting portal for donors and other key partners (IV: 05 - UNHCR Copenhagen 12/18/2018). It provides data of existing protection risks for PoCs and regularly updates information about UNHCR’s programmes, operations, financial requirements, funding levels and donor contributions (UNHCR Global Focus 2019). It can, at least partly, be accessed by the public but does not give out data at the base level, so it could not be used to collect data for the CPI System.

A tool used especially for the refugee situation in Jordan, is the UNHCR tool ‘scs.raisunhcr.org’ – an inter-agency coordination platform. It combines different tools, such as ActivityInfo or the UNHCR Data Portal. Guesstimating is also used to feed this system, as confirmed by interview partner No 11. Once a month, as compulsory by UNHCR, partner organisations must upload their indicators. When organisations have own measurements (e.g., ton instead of cubic meter), they must recalculate or simply estimate the data for UNHCR, thereby easily falsifying the reality of a situation. As the indicators are used to compare different refugee settings, partner organisations have little room for negotiations regarding the type of indicators measured (IV: 11 - ACTED 1/16/2019).
During the pre-phase of this research project, it could be verified that data accuracy and availability (for the public) is very low as well as data transparency at a detailed level (such as a camp) is not provided (Schön et al. 2018; Borchert 2019).

Lack of cooperation, vision and strategy plans in organisations impede successful project management at the field level:

The interviews could not reveal which assessments regarding UNHCR’s livelihood strategy (cf. Table 3, Chapter 2.5) were conducted for Zaatari camp, though the question was asked various times to field officers from different organisations. Gaining unpublished data regarding the level of livelihood or self-reliance in the case study camp was not possible, although apparently data on livelihood and self-reliance was collected (IV: 05 - UNHCR Copenhagen 12/18/2018).

The lack of cooperation between organisations was criticised (IV: 06 - GIZ 1/14/2019; IV: 10 - NGO Zaatari Camp 1/15/2019). If organisations, especially donors, had exchanged information regarding their projects and initiatives and cooperated more, money and time could have been saved. In the opinion of interviewee No. 10, this lack is the reason why many projects do not and will not work. Till date, each organisation is working on its own, oblivious to the action of other organisations. Regarding CfW projects, regular meetings with UNHCR and others exist, but communication has remained very limited for topics such as gender issues (IV: 06 - GIZ 1/14/2019). Furthermore, field officers complained about the lack of vision and strategic goals of partner organisations. They stated that some organisations undertook actions only because their donors demanded so, but did not have clear strategic plans for their activities. Such a lack of strategic thinking makes working with partner organisations very difficult. Interviewee No. 10 stated that NGOs might contribute innovative ideas but are ‘bad’ at implementing those ideas into successful actions (IV: 10 - NGO Zaatari Camp 1/15/2019). In some cases, field officers implement projects while not being convinced about the projects’ prospects. As performance measurement needs clear visions and strategies, which in turn need to be derived into a set of indicators, for instance, like the Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton 1992), such an approach to fieldwork can hardly contribute to targeted data tracking.

Summarised, the expert interviews conducted for this research confirmed that when organisations do not develop and internally communicate their visions and strategies, projects and field activities are difficult to be implemented successfully and appropriate measurement is unlikely. Measuring indicators per se is not always the priority of field officers due to time constraints or motivation, missing data accuracy lowers the quality of data sets and takes place because field
officers and partner agencies do not or cannot assess demanded data appropriately. Data in humanitarian settings, e.g., regarding refugees, can be very sensitive and needs to be protected.

Motivation for Development of Camp Performance Indicator System
It was neither possible to find data which could measure or assess the self-reliance level in a refugee camp nor a general and accessible tool to measure self-reliance. Further, in general, the level of data transparency for self-reliance has been low. Given the results of Maghsoudi and Pazirandeh (2016), together with the observed low level of data transparency, organisations’ performance in creating self-reliance as well as resource sharing have been low. As indicated above, the overall question was how could organisations improve the self-reliance level (as shown in Chapter 2.5, an existing goal of at least some organisations) if they do not measure it. If they do measure it, why is no data or tool available for the public or for partnering organisations (as was confirmed by interview partners)? These questions as well as the lack of transparency motivated this research project and prompted the creation of the CPI Framework and System.

Adapting Existing Tools?
To measure humanitarian supply chains, approaches are usually derived from existing commercial tools, such as the Process Reference Model, the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) or the Supply Chain Operations Reference-model (SCOR) (Abidi et al. 2014; Schumann-Bölsche et al. 2015, p. 37). Generic models link business processes, metrics, best practices and technology. Thus, they are able to measure logistics performances (especially key elements concerning quality, time and costs) of organisations and their humanitarian supply chains (Lu et al. 2016, p. 224). Especially the BSC has been used by different scholars (Lu et al. 2016; D’Haene et al. 2015; Schiffling and Piecyk 2014; Lin Moe et al. 2007; McLachlin et al. 2009; Davidson 2006). It puts the firm’s (or organisation’s) strategy and vision at the centre and gives managers (or humanitarian actors) through a set of indicators a fast and comprehensive view of their actions (D’Haene et al. 2015, p. 149). The motivation to use such tools are usually to test internally or on a supply chain level if strategies and actions are aligned (D’Haene et al. 2015; Haavisto and Goentzel 2015; Schiffling and Piecyk 2014). In addition, organisations are able to connect their performance with individual operations (Haavisto and Goentzel 2015, p. 311). This connection could be used to increase the impact and the quality of an operation. However, scholars have criticised the usage of such tools as too rigid to account for all cultural nuances impacting activities. Furthermore, one tool could not be used for all existing NGOs or settings (Sawhill and
Williamson 2001; Abidi et al. 2014). Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management research has also widely neglected refugees and refugee settings (Seifert et al. 2018). Refugees and internally displaced persons need to be considered more than ever in fields like humanitarian logistics, as their numbers increase and their needs vary from people in need after a sudden onset (natural) of disaster (Oloruntoba and Banomyong 2018, pp. 286-288). Measuring the outcome of humanitarian aid in protracted situations is beyond classical key performance indicators, aiming to measure if the right goods and services get to the right people at the right place at the right time at the right costs (Oloruntoba and Banomyong 2018, p. 288). Further, existing tools hardly consider perspectives such as politics, culture and sociology, running the risk of a too narrow frame and a limited view of their research results (Oloruntoba and Banomyong 2018, p. 288; Seifert et al. 2018, p. 418; Kovács and Spens 2011, p. 10).

Studying commercial tools or tools used for humanitarian logistics confirmed the above-discussed challenges and disadvantages. They would not be easily adapted to measure concepts, such as self-reliance or locations like refugee camps. Further, using such tools would centre the research too much to the question of costs and services and less to the well-being of a person in a wider sense (important for self-reliance, cf. Chapter 2.4 and below, Chapter 3.3). A more open approach is suitable for this research project, as explained in Chapter 3.3. More important than the input of resources such as money and staff, were political, socio-economic and gender perspectives. The CPI is a generic tool; it does not aim to measure the objectives of a single organisation rather depicts if the combined inter-agency efforts of all organisations working in a camp bring a positive outcome, i.e., a higher self-reliance level. However, using existing tools cannot and should not be disregarded. Connecting the measurement of the input of resources, such as funds and staff, with the increase/decrease of self-reliance in a camp, could bring valuable results for all organisations working in a camp. For instance, using and adapting the BSC could be a good way to execute such a connection.

Ensuring High Qualitative Standards
Studying different documents on developing indicators of complex issues such as well-being or poverty and on computing indices, suggested the use of existing indicators rather than creating new ones (Expert Group on Measuring Quality of Employment 2015; Alkire et al. 2014; Stiglitz et al. 2009a, 2009b; OECD 2008; Scoones 1998). The quality requirements were to use standard quality criteria like relevance, accuracy, timeliness, accessibility, interpretability,
coherence (OECD 2008, pp. 46-48), though not all criteria are always met in the CPI as explained below.

*Relevance* refers to the degree up to which the current and potential user needs are met (OECD 2008, p. 46). This criterion applies to the CPI as irrelevant data does not add value to the tool and only increases its complexity in an unnecessary way.

*Accuracy* is the degree to which an indicator can estimate or describe the characteristics it is supposed to measure (OECD 2008, pp. 45-46). One requirement was that every user should be able to understand immediately what the indicator wants to assess.

*Timeliness* refers to the period between the availability and the event or phenomenon it describes. Related to this is *punctuality* which reflects the release of data and the time of publication (OECD 2008, pp. 45, 47). This is where complexity increases. In an ideal world, camp management would assess such indicators, as in the CPI, on an annual basis to see if they had increased or decreased. However, as revealed by Schön et al. (2018), data is often unavailable or at least not published.

*Accessibility* refers to the original source of data (OECD 2008, pp. 45, 47). The lack of this criterion was also pointed out by Schön et al. (2018). By going through different reports, it was sometimes difficult to find out the original source or how the data was derived. This critique also applies to Chapter 3.2; the way different tools are created is often not revealed by their authors.

*Interpretability* refers to the ease a user can understand, use and analyse the data (OECD 2008, pp. 45, 47). Coherence states to which degree the data is logically connected and mutually consistent. Figure 8 in Chapter 3.3 attempts to create this interpretability and coherence by describing the interconnectivity of the data.

Besides such criteria, another requirement was to not add unnecessary complexity to the CPI System. In humanitarian contexts, different field officers with various educational backgrounds have been engaged. All readers/users are supposed to grasp the CPI System without prior knowledge to the field or higher mathematical skills. Avoiding complexity was also the reason why no indicators were computed and those computed not used. Each indicator chosen for the CPI were to be easily measured through interviews, data collected by organisations or estimations in a camp.
Existing, similar or comparable indicators used to develop the CPI System have been introduced in the next sub-chapter.

3.2 Measuring Self-Reliance and Livelihood – Existing Indicators
Different organisations and humanitarian actors have identified the need to create indicators to assess which interventions improve the situation of refugees (Women's Refugee Commission 2015, pp. 1, 2). Due to an increasing need of a budget as well as a widening funding gap (ALNAP 2015, pp. 49, 68), efficiency and effectiveness are to be improved. Further, evidence is necessary to demonstrate to donors and the public the degree of benefits humanitarian actions provides to refugees. A simple tool would help to maximise resources (Women's Refugee Commission 2015).

Even if organisations such as Women’s Refugee Commission (WRC), UNHCR, WFP, International Rescue Committee (IRC), among others, have started to use indicators to measure their own projects, there was no tool capturing the collective impact of all interventions. This lack of data became evident while undertaking the first assessment of the available data for present work (Schön et al. 2018), thus making it difficult if not impossible for the humanitarian community to clearly identify where more investments, service provision and development projects are most necessary.

Along with the aforementioned humanitarian organisations and institutions, academic researchers have started to look into measuring self-reliance too, though not by creating an index or a tool (Betts et al. 2018b). Applied indicators are rarely based only on self-reliance, but rather on the vulnerability and overall well-being or to a specific location, i.e., a camp. In the following sections (cf. Chapter 3.2.1), developers and their indicators are presented from the self-reliance and livelihood point of view. Herein, all presented tools/indicators were used to develop the CPI System. Methods and findings of the CPI are presented in Chapter 3.3.1 and Chapter 3.3.2.

3.2.1 Presentation of Existing Indicators
The following eight different indicators/indices and tools are presented which were used for comparison and selection of the CPI indicators.

Initiated by the WRC and RefugePoint, the Refugee Self-Reliance Initiative is now a Community of Practice including 17 entities, such as Danish Refugee Council, IKEA Foundation,
International Rescue Committee, Joint IDP Profiling Service, Mercy Corps, Oxford Refugee Studies Centre, UNHCR (RefugePoint 2019). The aim of the initiative is to create an advanced version of a tool to track refugee households’ degree of self-reliance. The overall goal is to reach five million refugees with self-reliance programming in five years and thus, to reach a paradigm shift in refugee response (RefugePoint 2019; Slaughter and Leeson 2017, p. 5). The Self-Reliance Index focuses on non-camp refugees and is mainly based on WRC’s Well-Being and Adjustment Index (which was developed by the WRC in 2014–15 and was transferred completely into the Refugee Self-Reliance Initiative), the Vulnerability Assessment Framework, UNHCR’s livelihood indicators, Samuel Hall’s Multi-Dimensional Integration Index, the Joint IDP Profiling Service indicator library and RefugePoint’s Self-Reliance Measurement Tool (Slaughter and Leeson 2017, p. 5).

Durable Solutions Indicator Library (2018)
In 2015, an inter-agency process – ‘Informing Responses to Support Durable Solutions for IDPs’ – has started to develop an indicator library for governments, humanitarian and development actors in order to provide evidence-based joint response in displacement situations and to analyse better individual displacement situations (JIPS 2018a, p. 6, 2017). Durable solutions for IDPs are achieved when persons could either be reintegrated to their place of origin (return) or integrated into the area where they took refuge (local integration) or if they could be integrated in another part of the country (settlement elsewhere in the country). These persons then no longer rely on assistance or protection and enjoy human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement (The Brookings Institution 2010, p. 5).

In April 2018, the group, consisting of International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), the World Bank, UNDP and UNHCR, among others, launched the Durable Solutions Indicator Library as well as the accompanying Durable Solutions Analysis Guide (JIPS 2018b, 2017). The project is based on the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs. The framework seeks to support field officers with humanitarian and development challenges in IDP situations (JIPS 2018a, p. 3; The Brookings Institution 2010). It is recognised as the benchmark on durable solutions for IDPs, but lacks a clear guideline of usage (JIPS 2018a,

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7Fill the date of writing and developing the CPI System (spring 2018), the indicator set was not yet published. The author received a Pre-Test Version by email, which is included in the indicator comparison.
Hence, the Durable Solutions Project complements the IASC Framework and operationalises its key elements through indicators, tools, methodologies and guidelines.

The study conducted by Betts et al. (2018b) did not primarily focus on developing indicators, but rather gathered data in Kenya to answer the question ‘What difference does it make – in economic terms – to be a refugee?’ (Betts et al. 2018b, p. 4). The research team, also including specially trained refugees and host nationals, conducted 4,355 surveys (1,738 from host communities and 2,617 refugees) in and around the refugee settlements in Kakuma and Nairobi. A conceptual framework was created with three dimensions (livelihoods, living standards and subjective well-being) as well as four main sets of explanatory/independent variables (regulations like property rights, freedom of movement, business constraints – ‘how you are governed’; networks like remittances, support, informal insurance and credit – ‘who you know’; capital like finance, education, health – ‘what you have’; and identity like gender, age, ethnicity – ‘who you are’). The purpose of this framework was to explain variation in economic outcomes (economic activities → income → consumption → well-being) for both refugees and hosts. Kenya is a starting point for a multi-country panel data set which is to be collected in the upcoming years by the research group. Their overall goal was and is to compare data from refugees and host communities with each other (Betts et al. 2018b, pp. 7–9). To develop the framework, qualitative tools were used engaging refugee and host communities, such as semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, participatory livelihood mapping, etc. In addition, expert interviews with representatives of relevant organisations were carried out. The questionnaires were adapted throughout the different survey rounds. After collecting the data, the team used regression analysis to show how independent variables explain economic outcomes (Betts et al. 2018b, pp. 10, 49).

The Hunger Project – Measuring Self-Reliance (2018)
The Hunger Project (THP) is an organisation engaging in sustainably fighting against hunger (The Hunger Project 2018b). Even though not working with refugees but in rural communities of the Global South, the initiative was included as the indicators are comparable with the indicators of organisations/projects presented in this sub-chapter.

THP developed a set of indicators to measure the self-reliance level of their so-called ‘Epicentres’. An Epicentre is defined as a ‘dynamic centre where communities are mobilised for action to meet their basic needs’ (The Hunger Project 2018b, p. 2). About 50 indicators were
developed with which programme outputs (short-term results of activities), outcomes (changes in communities) and impacts (long-term general changes) regarding self-reliance are measured. The data is collected in different ways: quarterly, annually or every three to five years. Each indicator is either absolute (yes/no) or relative (increasing/decreasing) and is weighed with one point (outputs), two points (outcomes) or three points (impacts) to calculate the overall self-reliance score. If the score reaches 80 per cent or more, the epicentre is considered to be self-reliant. The Hunger Project includes the SDGs, for example, its targets on hunger and poverty (The Hunger Project 2018a)\(^8\).

**UNHCR – Vulnerability Assessment Framework (2015)**

Due to the lack of proper tools to analyse collected data of different UNHCR partners in the Syrian crisis, the Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) was developed by UNHCR Jordan (UNHCR Jordan 2015). There was no specific definition of the term ‘vulnerability’, making comparison of data difficult. The VAF aims at identifying vulnerable Syrian non-camp refugees, registered with UNHCR in Jordan, as well as monitoring any change taking place over time. By identifying and monitoring the most vulnerable people, interventions can be targeted more efficiently and effectively. The tool is used to make decisions about the ‘who’, ‘how’ and ‘where’ of interventions regarding vulnerability. The limitations of the welfare model are its incapacity to indicate whether refugees engage in dangerous or demeaning work to achieve high expenditure as well as to capture the degree of a household’s sustainability (UNHCR Jordan 2015, pp. 10, 71).


In the document ‘Global Strategy for Livelihoods 2014–2018’ (see Chapter 2.5), indicators play a central role as each of the four strategic objectives has a range of indicators (UNHCR 2014a, pp. 21, 25, 32). The external goals include:

- Objective 1: Promote the right to work and the right to development
- Objective 2: Enable people to preserve and protect their productive assets as well as meet their immediate consumption needs
- Objective 3: Develop and expand proven and innovative ways of supporting refugees’ economic self-reliance

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\(^8\) Indicators which used uncommon abbreviations without further explanations as well as indicators including scores were not considered for the CPI development.
Objective 4 is internal and involves improvement of planning, learning and practice on successful approaches to livelihoods development and their impact on self-reliance. The document does not reveal how the indicators were chosen, but they are closely related to UNHCR’s Global Strategy for Livelihood as can be derived from the strategy document (UNHCR 2014a).

The Operational Guidelines are, as introduced in Chapter 2, an important UNHCR document for self-reliance activities for field staff (UNHCR 2012b). In the section ‘Monitoring’, a list of indicators is presented regarding the Objective ‘Level of livelihoods and self-reliance improved’. The indicators are clustered by outputs (e.g., ‘Comprehensive livelihood assessment, strategic planning and monitoring’, ‘Access to work facilitated through removal of legal barriers’, ‘Recognition of diplomas by host state facilitated’, ‘Access to wage earning employment facilitated’, etc.) (UNHCR 2012b, pp. 73-75). The goal of measuring indicators related to their outcomes is to evaluate if expected results/targets have been achieved or not. Further, the document presents impact indicators (UNHCR 2012b, p. 78).

Not all tables/figures including indicators of the Handbook for Self-Reliance (*cf*. Chapter 2.5) are related to self-reliance (UNHCR 2005, The Toolkit, pp. 56-68). Some indicators focus generally on refugee interventions. Though not mandatory, field officers can use these indicators. The selection of indicators is more a recommendation than a requirement. Rather, it encourages field officers to create own indicators suitable for the particular situation in place (UNHCR 2005, Appendix One, p. 60). Indicators are supposed to be relevant, measurable, clear, practicable and reliable.

Based on these existing indicators and tools and on the method described in Chapter 3.3.1, the CPI emerged. The following chapter summarises the approach.

3.2.2 Short Assessment of Available Categories and Research Gap
Names of CPI categories derive from the well-being dimensions from Stiglitz et al. (2009a), SDG categories, categories of the World Development Indicators (WDI) (World Bank 2018) or directly from the tools presented earlier, in case they were not represented otherwise (see Chapter 3.3 and Online Supplement A).

Some categories were used by almost every existing tool like education, food, shelter and health. Others vary significantly in labelling, but mean the same, *e.g.*, social capital – identity
– community involvement, etc. or material living standards – poverty – consumption – basic needs – indebtedness, etc. Underrepresented or very specific categories were not considered in the CPI System, such as ‘Affordable and clean energy’. When categories fit to several dimensions, the most relevant was chosen. For instance, the WDI indicator Labour force, female (% of total labour force) was inserted under ‘Demographics’ but is also related to ‘Employment’ or ‘Gender equality’.

Directly comparing the above-described tools and selection of indicators was not the objective of this analysis. Some tools use complex analytical methods to compute indicators based on different data sets, like the Vulnerability Assessment Framework. Others use questions to survey refugees, as the WRC Livelihood Manual. The tool of The Hunger Project seems well elaborated. It includes respective communities for data collection. In discussion rounds and regular meetings, the performance of the community is presented, discussed and goals adjusted. Public boards present project data regarding planning, performance and the financial status. Thus, all community members gain project information and can interact with the project leaders (The Hunger Project 2018a). Online Supplement A has proven to be a valuable starting point for the development of the CPI. Still, categories and indicators had to be methodically integrated. The next chapter presents the different steps taken to develop the CPI in accordance to the author’s requirements given below:

- Only existing indicators were used to increase the chance to obtain already measured data and to avoid creating indicators not meeting common standards as described in Chapter 3.1
- To avoid compiled indices, as most of the above presented sources do not specify how they developed their indices
- To assure relevance of all indicators for self-reliance; therefore, indicators on poverty were used as a starting point (see Chapter 2.3.2 and 3.3)
- To use a method which can be described step by step (see Chapter 3.3) to justify the CPI development

3.3 Developing a Camp Performance Indicator System for Self-Reliance
The purpose of a measurement system for self-reliance and livelihood (based on the definitions given in Chapter 2.4), among others, must answer the following questions:
Who lives in a camp? What is the state of health of the residents? What is their level of school education? What are the skillsets of the encamped refugees? What materials and consumption goods do they require to meet their essential needs? Which safety nets are available? What is the level of security in the camp?
Which infrastructure is available and what is necessary to gain livelihood opportunities and a high level of self-reliance (% of people being self-reliant)?

An in-depth literature analysis revealed that apparently, there is no indicator framework to assess the self-reliance level and livelihood activities of encamped refugees (Schön et al. 2018). Although, considering the above discussed disadvantages of performance measurement (Chapter 3.1), an indicator framework and system would still be useful to compare different camps. Framework refers in present work to the categories clustering the indicators (Figure 8). The CPI System includes all indicators (Figures 9-18 and Online Supplement B). A cross-camp comparison must not replace a profound analysis of each camp. Thus, Chapter 4 covers a range of influential factors enhancing or impeding self-reliance, mostly based on Zaatari camp in Jordan. The CPI’s main task is to ascertain if the organisations’ intentions of a high self-reliance level in a camp are met.

3.3.1 Method Description – Development of the CPI Framework and System

The tools and indicators presented above gave good indications regarding the importance of categories as well as specific indicators for the CPI, especially when the same categories/indicators were used in different tools but lacked case studies and data. For present work, it was mandatory to use a quantitative approach to select indicators for the CPI. Therefore, bigger and complete datasets had to be used. Data of similar fields was consulted which was comparable to self-reliance of refugees in camps as well as they were big enough and complete for a quantitative comparison. Thus, the World Bank Database was considered as a starting point. The World Bank maintains 68 different databases, including World Development Indicators (1,575 indicators), Gender Statistics (631 indicators), Jobs Statistics (167 indicators) and SDG Statistics (348 indicators) (The World Bank 2018a), which were all taken into account. The World Bank’s primary indicator collection of development indicators is the WDI dataset. The data is compiled by officially recognised international sources and is the most accurate source of its kind. To reduce the number of available indicators of the four indicator collections, correlation analysis was used. Before presenting the correlation tests in detail, the following figure (Figure 6) shows the itinerary of the CPI development. The development phase took several steps forward and backward to finally reach the results presented below. Figure 6 shows in which steps the CPI was developed. No relevant feedback could be obtained when the CPI Framework and the method behind the CPI System were presented (Milestones M4 and M5). Feedback obtained from experts (M6) is summarised in Chapter 3.3.2. The literature research for justifications was an ongoing process and integrated whenever new insights could be found.

Correlation Testing

Correlation is a bivariate analysis measuring the strength of association between two variables as well as the direction of their relationship (Rodgers and Nicewander 1988, p. 61). This means
that two variables are somehow associated, connected, linked or correspondents (Mukaka 2012, p. 69). In 1895, Pearson developed the ‘Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient’ which is still widely used, including in present work (Rodgers and Nicewander 1988, p. 61):

\[ r = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n}(X_i - \bar{X})(Y_i - \bar{Y})}{\sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^{n}(X_i - \bar{X})^2 \sum_{i=1}^{n}(Y_i - \bar{Y})^2}} \]

The raw scores in the numerator are centred by subtracting out the mean of each variable (X and Y) (Rodgers and Nicewander 1988, p. 61). The sum of cross-products of the centred variables is accumulated. To have equal units, the denominator adjusts the scales of the variables. The formula describes the correlation coefficient \( r \) being the centred and standardised sum of cross-product of two variables (X and Y) in the range -1 to +1 (Mukaka 2012, p. 69; Rodgers and Nicewander 1988, p. 61).

A rule of thumb for interpreting the size of a correlation coefficient is (Mukaka 2012, p. 71; Mittag 2014, p. 122): (Very) high correlation: (-)1 to (-)0.5; medium correlation: (-)0.5 to (-)0.3; low/negligible correlation: (-)0.3 to 0. If two variables correlate, the value of one variable can be predicted from the second variable (McKIlup 2005, p. 176). A positive number indicates that the variables are directly related (both variables go up or down) (Mukaka 2012, p. 69). A negative number indicates that the variables are inversely related (if one variable goes up, the other variable tends to go down or vice versa).

Calculating the correlation coefficient was chosen as a method to find out which indicators correlate with self-reliance. Yet, the World Bank database does not include a self-reliance indicator. As indicators with potentially very similar outcomes to a self-reliance indicator, the indicators \( \text{Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (\% of population)} \) as well as \( \text{Poverty headcount ratio at$\text{1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (\% of population)} \) were chosen among the 24 different indicators of the available poverty data set of the World Development Indicators. The first indicator was chosen because as described in Chapter 2.3.2, a person living below the national poverty line is not able to make ends meet alone in the respective country and can therefore rarely be called self-reliant.

The indicator measuring the \( \text{Poverty headcount ratio at$\text{1.90 a day}} \) is used as a common standard for measuring extreme poverty worldwide (The World Bank 2018a; World Bank DataBank 2019b). Further, it is the only indicator used in the Jobs Statistics to measure poverty.
Starting point: No data and no measurement system for self-reliance available (see Schön 2018)

2017

Conducting correlation analysis with indicators of World Bank database

How to measure something without data?

Idea: Use similar data → World Bank database?

Identifying other tools/indicators

M1: Selection of 133 indicators (out of 2,715)

M2: Selection of 109 indicators/164 incl. sub-categories (out of 495)

Identifying camp related indicators from all sources

Identifying new categories for CPI Framework

M3: Receiving study Betts et al. (2018)

Integrating study Betts et al. (2018) in CPI

M4: Presentation of CPI at HOPE Mini Conference, Leuven

M5: Presentation of CPI at PhD Workshop, Kassel

Searching justifications for indicators in literature

M6: Receiving expert feedback

Writing/Finalising Chapter 3

Compiling indicator list (see Appendix B)

Constructing CPI Framework

Making final changes on basis of expert feedback

Figure 6: Phases of CPI Development Process
To calculate the correlation coefficient, full data sets are mandatory. The data base however does not provide every indicator for every country. Further, indicators in different countries are selected at different times. For instance, the indicator *School enrolment, secondary, female (% gross)* was measured in Afghanistan in 2015 and 2017, but not in 2016. In Denmark it was measured in 2015 and 2016, but not in 2017. Other countries did not measure this indicator at all.

Steps to adjust available data are described hereafter, exemplified for the World Development Indicators collection. As a preparatory step, one of the available categories was chosen, which are Economic Policy & Debt (509 indicators), Education (151 indicators), Environment (135 indicators), Financial Sector (62 indicators), Gender (20 indicators), Health (207 indicators), Infrastructure (40 indicators), Poverty (24 indicators), Private Sector & Trade (173 indicators), Public Sector (83 indicators), Social Protection & Labour (157 indicators), Social: health (14 indicators). Of the chosen category, the complete set of data as well as of all 217 countries was selected in the online World Bank Tool (Figure 7, left box). In the section ‘Time’, the 10 recent years were ticked (2008-2017) (Figure 7, middle box) and in “Layout” the order was rearranged to 1 – Country (row), 2 – Time (row), 3 – Series (column) (Figure 7, right box). Under “Format Numbers” the box “separate thousands by commas” was unchecked and the changes applied. The complete data set was downloaded as an Excel data sheet.

Figure 7: Usage of Online World Bank Tool (World Bank 2018)

Due to missing data as well as to reduce the data set, the median of each country was calculated. A new data set was created with only medians. Next, all indicators were calculated per row as well as per column and then sorted top-down. The purpose was to see which countries (row)
had the highest number of indicators available and which indicators (columns) were measured for the highest number of countries. Now, the countries with a high number of available data were chosen (randomly selected as each data set changed dramatically regarding the availability of indicators). Countries with only little data available were discarded. The same procedure was executed for the columns. Indicators, which were available for too few countries, were discarded as well. These actions were performed until a full data set was available. Sometimes this meant that a high number of countries as well as indicators could not be considered for further calculations, but indicators with only a low availability are of no use for calculating correlations between two variables as it easily biases the results.

The new full data set was used to calculate the correlation with the dependent variables (*poverty ratio at national poverty lines and poverty headcount at $1.90 a day*). The results were sorted, beginning with the highest. Results correlating less than 0.3 or -0.3 were not taken into account. To get a full data set of the two dependent variables, all countries had to be considered. Therefore, all countries were clustered by region. When data of a country was missing, the median of the other available countries of that region was calculated and taken as the indicator for the missing country data (‘Region and Dependable Indicators’). This method could bias the data especially when only a very limited data set of countries was available, but as each data set varied significantly regarding its selection of countries, it was important to have a full data set of all 217 countries for the dependent variables. This method to fill in missing data was also used for a couple of data sets, when the countries missing were manageable (e.g., for data set ‘Education’). The results were sorted depending on the correlation index. This step was repeated with the World Development Indicator Database, the World Bank Jobs Database, the World Bank SDG Database and the World Bank Gender Database. Table 4 shows an overview of indicators available in data base (b) per category (a), of indicators used after adjusting the data sets (c), of the indicators which correlate with poverty national (d) as well as which correlate with poverty USD 1.90 a day (e).

All indicators correlating with one of the dependent variables were taken to a new Excel sheet and cleaned of duplicates (as some indicators appear in different indicator collections). To further downsize the number of indicators, similar ones were aggregated.
Table 4: Overview of Correlating Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a) Category</th>
<th>b) Available indicators</th>
<th>c) Used indicators</th>
<th>d) Correlating with poverty national</th>
<th>e) Correlating with poverty 1.90 USD a day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDI</td>
<td>1575</td>
<td>1034</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>114</td>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>2721</td>
<td>1639</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td></td>
<td>60.2%</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Based on own research**

For example, the indicator measuring if people have a bank account appeared in different varieties in different indicator collections (‘Financial Sector’ of the WDI, the ‘Gender’ collection as well as in SDG Goals collection):

- Account at a financial institution (% age 15+)
- Account at a financial institution, female (% age 15+)
- Account at a financial institution, income, poorest 40% (% ages 15+)
- Account at a financial institution, income, richest 60% (% ages 15+)
- Account at a financial institution, male (% age 15+)
- Account, female (% age 15+)
- Account, income, poorest 40% (% ages 15+)
- Account, income, richest 60% (% ages 15+)
- Account, male (% age 15+)
- Account, older adults (% ages 25+)
- Account, primary education or less (% ages 15+)
- Account, secondary education or more (% ages 15+)
- Account, young adults (% ages 15-24)

Potentially relevant for the CPI is how many people and if they have a bank account or rather, as revealed in later discussions, access to any money transfer systems (incl. Hawala, Western Union or an Automatic Teller Machine (ATM), etc.). Thus, all 13 indicators were aggregated to **Account (% age 15+) for both female and male. After the aggregation, 290 indicators remained in total. Of these, a pre-selection was made to discard all indicators (about 157) unsuitable for refugee camp setting (e.g., **Cost to export (US$ per container)**). With this method, it was possible to select 133 indicators out of 2,721 indicators from four different databases. These 133 indicators do not yet represent the CPI System. The next step was the comparison of these indicators with existing tools and indicators, presented in Chapter 3.2.1.
Indicator Comparison Analysis

A first milestone was to narrow down the dimension of indicators from 2,721 to 133. However, the difficulty was to decide which of these indicators are suitable for the CPI System, particularly into a refugee camp context and which of the similar indicators should be selected for the framework. For example, for ‘Education’ these similar indicators, among others, were available:

- The % of population ages 25 and over that attained or completed lower secondary education
- The % of population ages 25 and over that attained or completed primary education
- The % of population ages 25 and over that attained or completed short-cycle tertiary education

To make a decision regarding the selection of a correlating indicator, the eight independent sources of indicators described in Chapter 3.2 were considered as well as following questions raised:

- Are all, some or only one of such indicators relevant to measure livelihood purposes in a refugee camp?
- Why is one indicator more relevant than the other ones?
- Is it possible at all to measure the respective indicator in a camp context?

For this process, all relevant indicators of the different sources were extracted, sorted and clustered (Appendices A and B). The final overall categories used in the CPI Framework and System (called CPI Categories) derived from categories used by the ‘Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress’ (Stiglitz et al. 2009a, p. 14), SDG categories (United Nations 2016) and categories used by the sources of the existing indicators.

CPI Categories:

- Category 1 – Demographic Data
- Category 2 – Basic Needs
- Category 3 – Gender Equality
- Category 4 – Camp Funding
- Category 5 – Camp Location
- Category 6 – Legal Issues
- Category 7 – Social Capital
- Category 8 – Employment Matrix and Income
- Category 9 – Children’s Education and Political Voice

These categories are used to categorise the indicators in this chapter as well as the influential factors (IIF) presented in Chapter 4.

To further reduce the number of indicators, first, similar ones were inserted into one row of the table, resulting in a dataset of 343 indicators. Second, only those indicators adding value to the
CPI were selected. Third, indicators were discarded, if not relevant for cross-camp analyses. These steps downsized the data set to 109 or 164 indicators, depending on including or excluding the sub-indicators. At this stage, the final selection of indicators for the CPI had to be made, before requesting feedback from experts. Therefore, for each indicator (or collection of indicators, when aggregated) a reason or justification was given why the indicator would be relevant. The reasons/justifications were taken from existing literature, expert interviews or simply based on logic\textsuperscript{9}. The results are presented in the next sub-chapter. Online Supplement B lists all indicators, including its justifications.

3.3.2 The Camp Performance Indicator Framework and System
The greatest challenge of the final selection of indicators was to determine the relevant indicators to identify the self-reliance level and the supporting camp’s infrastructure and services. Three different approaches were used to meet this challenge. Besides the justifications from literature (a), an overview of the categories was created to find reasonable interrelations (b). This overview is presented below. Figure 8 as well as the list of 109 indicators (Online Supplement B) including the sub-groups was given to a WFP senior emergency/programme officer who gained experience in different Sub-Saharan African countries. His most important comments are reported at the end of this chapter and are included in Online Supplement B.

\textit{Camp Performance Indicator Framework – Interrelations of Categories}
After compiling the indicators, they had to be justified. The first step of justification consisted of ordering them in a reasonable way to explain why each category (1 to 9, see above) and each indicator was useful and necessary (CPI Framework, Figure 8). Each square in the CPI Framework presents one of the nine categories. The blue numbers show the relevant indicators (presented and described below in this chapter). The plus sign displays a positive reinforcement (e.g., the better the state of health of people, the more likely they are able to work), the minus sign stands for a negative reinforcement (e.g., the more natural disasters happen, the fewer people are able to work or maintain their businesses). The hexagon stands for ‘level of-…’ and the circles/ovals were used to indicate a result, such as ‘labour force’ which is the sum of all people healthy enough and willing to work. The oval ‘income’ results from the employment situations and remittances people receive.

\textsuperscript{9}The author is aware that by that method, if other authors conducted this task, deviation would be possible
The Employment Matrix is plotted in the CPI Framework cylinder and again in Table 5 as a matrix. Table 5 should not be read from left to right. It is supposed to capture the amount of people per age group working in

- the sector (formal, informal, unemployed or self-employed)
- full-time or part-time
- the period of time (indefinite, temporary, irregular, seasonal or unsteadily)
- by which employer (by NGO, by somebody in the camp or by somebody outside the camp) and
- if his livelihood activity brings enough income to save regularly, only irregularly or not at all.

If such a table was published for every camp setting, comparing the level of self-reliance of encamped refugees for different camp settings would be easy. A best-case scenario for a person to reach self-reliance would be to work only at the age of 24 to 65 in the formal sector, full or part time depending on her choice, in an open-ended contract, earning enough to make regular savings. Full time refers to a 40-hour workweek.
Which factors influence the level of self-reliance of refugees in camps?

Figure 8: CPI Framework (own research)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Formal/informal</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Employer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adults (24-65 yrs)</td>
<td>In formal sector (with work permit)</td>
<td>full-time</td>
<td>open-ended</td>
<td>by NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in informal sector</td>
<td>part-time</td>
<td>temporary</td>
<td>in camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>not employed, but seeking</td>
<td></td>
<td>irregular/seasonal</td>
<td>out of camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>self-employed</td>
<td></td>
<td>unsteady</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth (15-14 yrs)</td>
<td>in formal sector (with work permit)</td>
<td>full-time</td>
<td>open-ended</td>
<td>by NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in informal sector</td>
<td>part-time</td>
<td>temporary</td>
<td>in camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>not employed, but seeking</td>
<td></td>
<td>irregular/seasonal</td>
<td>out of camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>self-employed</td>
<td></td>
<td>unsteady</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children (&gt;14 yrs)</td>
<td>in formal sector (with work permit)</td>
<td>full-time</td>
<td>open-ended</td>
<td>by NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in informal sector</td>
<td>part-time</td>
<td>temporary</td>
<td>in camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>not employed, but seeking</td>
<td></td>
<td>irregular/seasonal</td>
<td>out of camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>self-employed</td>
<td></td>
<td>unsteady</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elder (65+ yrs)</td>
<td>in formal sector (with work permit)</td>
<td>full-time</td>
<td>open-ended</td>
<td>by NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in informal sector</td>
<td>part-time</td>
<td>temporary</td>
<td>in camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>not employed, but seeking</td>
<td></td>
<td>irregular/seasonal</td>
<td>out of camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>self-employed</td>
<td></td>
<td>unsteady</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on own research
This sub-chapter presents the selected and numbered indicators categorised by the nine categories (CPI Categories) introduced above. To fine-tune the indicators of each CPI category into further groups, each indicator is sorted by a Category B (in boxes above the indicators, written in capital letters) and if necessary, an addition (below Category B in the same box, written in italic). This way, a better overview was created (e.g., CPI category Demographic data has subcategories such as Health and Well-being, Education, etc. – cf. Figures 9-18). Category B are all categories used by Stiglitz et al. (2009b, p. 14), one of the eight tools the CPI is based on (cf. Chapter 3.2.1) or by the United Nations (2016) for the SDGs. In the CPI System attached (Online Supplement B), all indicators, CPI categories, Category B plus Addition, rationales and explanatory text are displayed. The numbering of all indicators in Figures 9 to 18 and of those in Online Supplement B are identical. All indicators are supposed to consider the complete camp population. Further, most indicators should display the percentage of total (% of total) if not stated otherwise behind the indicator (e.g., see indicator 5 – Age dependency ratio (% of working-age population)). If there is a sub-indicator like male/female or children/youth, the ‘% of total’ is supposed to be measured for ‘% of all male’ or ‘% of all female’ (presented below the indicator in the respective box). About 50 per cent of the indicators are UNHCR indicators; they have not or only slightly been changed. It is assumed that UNHCR indicators are accurately assessed by UNHCR. Some indicators, like those in the sub-category Financial Services (indicators 70-79), are part of the CPI because of this assumption. For some categories more indicators than deemed necessary were inserted to increase chances that at least some indicators of each category are assessed by an organisation working in the camp. The indicators 99 to 109 are UNHCR field management indicators. They were included based on the explications given in Chapter 3.1 regarding measuring the organisation’s performance. If assessed, they might reveal how seriously UNHCR and other camp organisations take their task to improve self-reliance of refugees. It is assumed that these indicators are assessed nonetheless and thus, are easily filled out.

For a better overview, all indicators are assigned to one of these three groups (A to C):

A) Indicators revealing background information of the community, such as demographic data, traditions, skills and education acquired in the home country as well as other factors affecting positively or negatively the level of self-reliance; on these indicators and factors camp management cannot act upon or only marginally (coloured in grey shades and marked with A in the descriptions of Figures 9 to 18)
B) Factors affecting positively or negatively the level of self-reliance on the basis of which camp management can be influenced (coloured in green shades and marked with B in the descriptions of Figures 9 to 18)

C) Indicators directly pointing to the extent of self-reliance within the refugee community (coloured in blue shades and marked with C in the descriptions of Figures 9 to 18)

Yellow headers indicate that the indicator categories are split in more than one group. Although some indicators could be assigned to more than one group, only one group was chosen for each indicator.

In many camp scenarios, e.g., in Zaatari camp, the household level is considered more important than the individual level. Most people live with other family members and support each other, especially in Arab countries, where families are valued highly (cf. Chapter 4.3.3). Many indicators, especially those connected with livelihood opportunities, were changed to make an assessment by the household level possible as measuring the individual level would not gain any useful insights. In these cases, like indicator 60 – Population participated in cooperatives, production groups and community-based organisations the population is supposed to be assessed to see the ratio of male – female participants.

The following descriptions go from left to right along the CPI Framework (Figure 8). All figures are explained hereafter, including the most important justifications from literature.

Category 1 – Demographic Data

Step 1 of the CPI System is to assess who lives in a camp (Figure 9). When assessing a camp, this task should be accomplished quickly as demographic data is usually tracked by the camp management (though, not all data is published). Demographic data set is useful for the CPI as knowing who lives in a camp is essential to target the residents with the right type of support (Werker 2007). If, for instance, a camp consists (almost) exclusively of women and their children, the workforce is probably lower than if households also include men. Indicators #1 to 9 can present such information. To determine the appropriate supporting programmes, it is useful to know about the educational background of the people brought to the camp (#11-13), their state of health (#3, 23, 26) and the fertility rate, as correlations exist between the number of children couples decide to have and their level of vulnerability (DFID 2000). Further strategies to survive are commercial sex or forcing young daughters into early marriages (UNHCR 2012b, p. 131). People with trauma, anxiety, despair and depression are less able to become self-reliant (UNHCR 2005, Appendix One, p. 33; Mottaghi 2018). Trauma and mental stress can be a
reason why refugees become vulnerable and incapable to provide for themselves (Vriese 2006, p. 1; Mottaghi 2018, p. 34).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEMOGRAPHICS</th>
<th>HEALTH AND WELL-BEING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1a-e) Population age 0-4, 5-11, 12-17, 18-59, 60+ years</td>
<td>24) Fertility rate, total (births per woman)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Population by sex male/female</td>
<td>25) Adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 women ages 15-19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a-b) Population of household-head male/female children/youth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Age dependency ratio (% of working-age population) by other household member(s) by NOG/UN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Arrival date last year 2-5 years 5+ years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Households with concrete plans to remain in current location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Population with separated household members male/female</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Unaccompanied and separated children</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Population with disabilities male/female</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) Population of working-age with vocational training male/female</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12) Population of working-age who is literate male/female</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13) Population of working-age having worked in a formal profession prior to flight male/female</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23) Population with contagious and stigmatised disease</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26) Population with psychosocial trauma (as reported by returnees and by medical staff) treated/untreated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 9: CPI Category 1 – Demographic Data; all indicators of this category belong to Group A**

**Category 2 – Basic Needs**

Basic Needs (Figure 10) denote what should be provided by organisations in a refugee situation (see Chapter 2.3.3 – Essential needs which is synonymously used for basic needs). It shows if a good state of health is given by providing enough food, drinking water, sanitation facilities as well as safety and security. This category is called Basic Needs because it represents the most vital basic needs. ‘Basic Needs Extended’, included in Category 4 – Camp Funding, is an extension of these basic needs. ‘Basic Needs Extended’ is important for self-reliance, but not vital for survival.

It is debatable if indicator #44 belongs to the category Health and Well-being or Material Living Standards, but in this context, it was selected as an indicator of the latter. The state of health is important, as the economic costs of a poor level of health is high. The economic costs of malnutrition, for instance, are high as it prolongs the cycle of poverty and impedes growth.
(Mottaghi 2018). Poor physical health leads to low productivity and increase in disease. Further, malnutrition causes stunting and wasting in children, leading to cognitive deficiencies. Affected children will miss schooling leading to them losing employment in adulthood. If refugees do not have access to enough good quality water, not only the dignity and well-being of the refugees be affected, but will also lead to power struggles (Cronin et al. 2008; IV: 03a - UNHCR Zaatari Camp 10/21/2018). Indicators #64 to #67 indicate the level of safety and security in a camp, which is mandatory to be covered by the camp management (see Chapter 2.3.3 – Essential Needs).

![Figure 10: CPI Category 2 – Basic Needs; Group A: Indicators #64-68, 95; Group B: Indicators #22, 27, 29b, 29c, 44, 28](image)

### Category 3 – Gender Equality

Indicators chosen for the category Gender Equality (Figure 11) showcase the cultural and legal aspects which need to be considered for related programmes, but also to see how much and in which way women participate in the labour force. As presented in Chapters 4 and 5, in many cases in Jordan, women are not automatically part of the workforce. Different programmes try to soften the cultural boundaries for women to engage in livelihood activities. In some contexts, women do not have the same rights (by law) as men. Such aspects need to be considered when assessing the self-reliance level but also by UN organisations and NGOs when designing livelihood programmes. Gender equality could certainly also be presented by using other indicators than #94, 96 and 97. The topic is not supposed to be fully covered by the indicators used here. However, these indicators were extracted from the tools (Chapter 3.2.1) and help to determine if women can make decisions concerning their lives and that of their children (#94), participate in empowering programmes (#96) and take part in positions of power (#97).

The indicators of these three categories (Demographic Data, Basic Needs and Gender Equality) present the level of health of a community and the size of the labour force (#4). The share of
women of the labour force is one indicator of the level of gender equality within a camp or a society.

**Figure 11: CPI Category 3 – Gender Equality; Group A: Indicator #94, Group B: Indicators #96, 97**

The labour force of a camp consists of refugees able to work and seeking work (Figure 12). Children, no matter, if able to work or looking for work, are excluded (Indicator #10, described in Category 9).

**Figure 12: Desired Labour Force; Group A**

**Category 4 – Camp Funding**

The level of camp funding (Figure 13) not only determines how comfortable the residents are, but also describes the types of programmes implemented in a camp and how thoroughly the camp is managed. Most camp settings are chronically underfunded, especially as soon as a camp situation becomes protracted. The first part of Figure 13 shows Trainings and Advice (#14-21, 36, 37 and 88) programmes provided to refugees. As explained in Chapter 2.5, this is a significant part of the livelihood programmes in camps. When people with a low socio-economic status and thus, usually a low level of digital skills are forcibly displaced, their chances to enter the host labour market are rather low, even though they are provided with internet access (Peromingo and Pieterson 2018, pp. 32-33). With time, their chances to employment decrease further, because workplaces require employees to stay up-to-date with relevant technology. As education and training opportunities, but also communication services for refugees
or general access to information (e.g., on housing, employment, legal rights) are also more and more technology-driven, it gets harder for people with low technology skills to catch up. Skills training and education in general are no luxuries. The higher the level of education and training of a community, the more it grows and prospers (Vriese 2006, p. 21). Some refugees try reconstructing their past lives, not considering that this might be unrealistic (Belghazi 2018). Highly educated refugees, in particular, desire to continue working in their professional fields (Mozetič 2018). For professional groups which are regulated by law like medical doctors or teachers (rather than IT specialists, which account to non-regulated groups), this attempt is often challenging, especially when important documents are missing and hard, if not impossible, to regain (#36, 37, 88). As refugees living in a camp have often lost all their assets, they need support to get back on their feet. Indicators #33, 41-43, as well as indicators regarding financial services (#70-79) assess this kind of support. Especially, if refugees were engaged in agricultural and livestock activities prior to their flight, related programmes can help creating livelihood activities in an effective way (if the legal framework is given). For people all over the world animals are of enormous importance to generate income, serve as means of transport and for security and cultural activities (Pollock 2018; Alshawawreh 2018). For refugees in particular, keeping animals can improve people’s health and well-being as well as have positive psychological effects, besides being a source of food and a commodity (Owczarczak-Garstecka 2018). Giving out loans can be a way to help refugees start their own businesses (UNHCR 2005, Appendix One, p. 121). Development funds need to benefit refugees and the local population simultaneously to avoid tensions among both groups (Vriese 2006, p. 32). For women though, receipt of loans might backfire and endanger their financial and personal physical security. As gender-related risks reveal, while debt can impoverish women, it can increase the already high burden on women or lead to negative mechanisms like prostitution which women might be compelled to pursue to pay back loans. If women are granted access to loans easily, oppressed women might be forced by their husbands or male relatives to get loans (Azorbo 2011, p. 7). Werker (2002; 2007) describes why provision of means of transport (#54-56) might be significant for refugees trying to engage in livelihood activities: High transportation costs increase the isolation of camps and settlements. If refugees have access to vehicles, goods and people can move better and profits many be retained within the refugee communities. However, this is not always feasible due to high investment costs. In Zaatari camp, a bus system was established within the camp to bring workers to the main entrance as otherwise, they would have to walk.
up to an hour. Such distances prevented many people from working outside the camp (IV: 02 - UNHCR Amman 9/26/2018).

Indicators #100-109 are UNHCR (2014) indicators presented in the Global Strategy for Livelihoods (cf. Chapter 2.5). They were taken into consideration for the CPI and, if used, field officers need to provide related data. Assessing such data helps to see if field officers have understood the guidelines, grasped the complex economic dynamics of the refugee camp in which they are working and can report the requirements provided by the headquarter (Omata 2017; Del Carpio et al. 2018; Ayoubi and Saavedra 2018; UNHCR 2012b).

The indicators regarding ‘Basic Needs Extended’ are an extension of Basic Needs. If goods and services, such as water, food and sanitation provision are better than the minimum and if refugees get access to (enough) electricity, they can use them to engage in livelihood activities. For example, crowded and noisy living situations and thus, hampered routines such as bathing, studying, eating or sleeping can impede working hours (Ekren 2018). If households have direct access to water and sanitation facilities, more time would be available for work or other activities. If electricity is available, goods can be produced at home for selling.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
<th>Trained and advice</th>
<th>FINANCIAL SERVICES</th>
<th>Financial programs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14)</td>
<td>Population of working-age provided with language training for livelihoods purposes</td>
<td></td>
<td>70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15)</td>
<td>Population of working-age provided with e-learning/education/skills training in CTA (Community Technology Access)</td>
<td></td>
<td>71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16)</td>
<td>Population of working-age provided with vocational training appropriate to needs, capacities and local market conditions</td>
<td></td>
<td>72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17)</td>
<td>Population of working-age provided with entrepreneurship/business training</td>
<td></td>
<td>73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18)</td>
<td>Population of working-age provided with financial literacy training for livelihood purposes</td>
<td></td>
<td>74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19)</td>
<td>Population of working-age provided with guidance on labour market opportunities</td>
<td></td>
<td>75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20)</td>
<td>Population of working-age community members targeted in livelihood-support projects</td>
<td></td>
<td>76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21)</td>
<td>Population of working-age receiving life-skills training for livelihood purposes</td>
<td></td>
<td>77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMPLOYMENT</td>
<td>Trained and advice</td>
<td>RESIDENCES/HUMAN RIGHTS</td>
<td>Trained and advice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36)</td>
<td>Population of working-age registered in job placement services</td>
<td></td>
<td>88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37)</td>
<td>Population of working-age using business development services (marketing, networking, info on business market, incubator)</td>
<td></td>
<td>89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATERIAL LIVING STANDARDS (INCOME, CONSUMPTION AND WEALTH)</td>
<td>Financial programs</td>
<td>MATERIAL LIVING STANDARDS (INCOME, CONSUMPTION AND WEALTH)</td>
<td>Financial programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33)</td>
<td>Households receiving conditional grants for business start up</td>
<td></td>
<td>41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42)</td>
<td>Households receiving cash/vouchers for agriculture/livestock purposes</td>
<td></td>
<td>43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54)</td>
<td>Population with subsidised or free access to transport equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td>56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59)</td>
<td>Population with access to transport and mobility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55)</td>
<td>Population with access to transport and mobility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRISIS MANAGEMENT</td>
<td>Management</td>
<td>CRISIS MANAGEMENT</td>
<td>Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100)</td>
<td># of livelihoods interventions with a planned or implemented external evaluation</td>
<td></td>
<td>101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102)</td>
<td># of project evaluations published and disseminated</td>
<td></td>
<td>103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104)</td>
<td>Socio economic profile and livelihood capacities of PoC (women, men, youth) defined and monitored</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105)</td>
<td># of livelihoods interventions with economic baseline data</td>
<td></td>
<td>106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107)</td>
<td># of plans that incorporate lessons from previous evaluations</td>
<td></td>
<td>108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109)</td>
<td># of vocational and technical training institutions that waive or reduce tuition fees for PoC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110)</td>
<td># of livelihoods interventions with a planned or implemented external evaluation</td>
<td></td>
<td>111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112)</td>
<td># of project evaluations published and disseminated</td>
<td></td>
<td>113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114)</td>
<td>Socio economic profile and livelihood capacities of PoC (women, men, youth) defined and monitored</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115)</td>
<td># of livelihoods interventions with economic baseline data</td>
<td></td>
<td>116)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117)</td>
<td># of plans that incorporate lessons from previous evaluations</td>
<td></td>
<td>118)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119)</td>
<td># of vocational and technical training institutions that waive or reduce tuition fees for PoC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEALTH AND WELL-BEING</td>
<td>Basic needs extended to increase working opportunities</td>
<td>HEALTH AND WELL-BEING</td>
<td>Basic needs extended to increase working opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29a) Time to collect drinking water less than 30 min</td>
<td></td>
<td>53)</td>
<td>Population residing in adequate living space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45)</td>
<td>Population with access to a sufficient, balanced diet without assistance</td>
<td></td>
<td>46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
<td></td>
<td>male/female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47)</td>
<td>Electric power consumption (kWh per capita)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 13: CPI Category 4 – Camp Funding: Group A: Indicators #70, 75, 76; Group B: Indicators #14-21, 29a, 37, 46, 53-56, 71, 72, 78, 79, 88, 99-109; Group C: Indicators #33, 36, 41-43, 45, 47, 73, 74, 77
Refugees often live isolated from host communities or far from work opportunities and thus, have less access to basic amenities or the workplace (Azorbo 2011, p. 5; Bilgili and Loschmann 2018) (Figure 14). To compare camps, it is necessary to know if refugees live close or far away from markets (#31).

Government regulations might prevent refugees from accessing land for productive purposes, natural resources or deny them access to markets and financial services, etc. (UNHCR 2005, Appendix One, p. 26). When refugees do not have legal access to the much-needed natural resources, they are likely to engage in illegal activities or use natural resources unsustainably, for instance, through exploitative farming practices or unsustainable harvesting of woodlands (UNHCR 2005, Appendix One, p. 27). Such activities can harm the environment and the living conditions of their hosts (Jacobsen 2002, p. 107). Indicators #48-52 assess whether refugees engage in agricultural and livestock activities and the means they pursue.

Indicator #69 assesses how much refugees are affected by natural disasters. Natural disasters not only have a huge impact on aid provision as transportation of food and non-food items (NFIs) can be interrupted (Harrell-Bond 1986, p. 179), but also on businesses, local markets and products (Montclos and Mwangi Kagwanja 2000, pp. 217-218). In Zaatari camp, businesses are regularly stopped by disasters, therefore, a drainage system was planned to be constructed in 2019 to minimise flooding (IV: 11 - ACTED 1/16/2019).
Category 6 – Legal Issues

One of the most decisive criteria for the success rate of livelihood programmes might be the freedom of movement and work (Figure 15). Where economic freedoms such as freedom of movement (#86, 87) are restricted, participation in outside markets is limited and the business environment inside is weakened (Werker 2002). Refugees might have only uncertain access to (external) markets (#32), e.g., they might/might not have leave permits owing to which, they cannot plan properly. Hence, such costs of uncertainty are compounded by transaction costs in the form of waiting and inflexibility (Werker 2007, p. 5). Further, this category also assesses other legal issues, such as prevention of early marriages (#84) or illegal taxation. Laws, if enforced, can prevent early marriages, thus protect young girls. Illegal taxation is often used as a tool to enforce power over others (Werker 2002, p. 14).

If refugees cannot benefit from national social security systems (#98), which is usually the case in less developed countries, organisations should support them. Individuals and households which are not able to become self-reliant after the emergency phase must be supported in the long term with essential services, food and other supplies, integrating the emergency approach.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table: Material Living Standards (Income, Consumption and Wealth)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% able to work in agricultural sector/ Employment matrix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48) Households engaged in some form of income generation based upon local resources or assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49) Households with access to arable land or other productive natural resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50) Households with ownership or secure rights over agricultural land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51) Households having livestock for commercial purposes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52) Households with access to irrigation water and who rely mostly on agricultural production in irrigated lands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAFETY, SECURITY # natural disasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69) Population suffering by natural disaster, extreme weather conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMPLOYMENT Availability of markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31) Existence of public market within a reasonable distance from the production sites (yes/no)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
with the livelihood approach (UNHCR 2014a, pp. 23-25, 2012b, p. 12). The challenge for the implementing partners is to identify vulnerable people. Not having an identity card (#93) can lead to many problems for refugees, like arrests, physical abuse or property confiscation (Harrell-Bond 1986). Further, when host governments or host communities do not recognise diplomas or certificates (#90-91), the refugees’ access to markets is influenced negatively (Vriese 2006).

Livelihood programmes, which are poorly designed, limited in scale and/or are not aligned with government institutions, might fail accruing formal recognition (Del Carpio et al. 2018). This results in refugees earning diplomas which they cannot use for formal job seeking or for obtaining legal work permits. Thus, refugees need to know not only about the diploma recognition process in the host country but also about general diploma recognition processes.

Figure 15: CPI Category 6 – Legal Issues; Group B: Indicators #32, 84, 86, 89, 90, 92, 93, 98; Group C: Indicators #85, 87, 91

Category 7 – Social Capital

In many countries, social networks and social institutions are the only way to engage successfully in livelihood activities (UNHCR 2005, Appendix One, p. 33). Social capital (Figure 16) is important for economic, political, financial or simply social purposes (see Chapter 2.4.1). It can consist of networks used for business opportunities or to strengthen the rights of the network (#34, 35, 59, 60, 80-83). Such networks can be set up by organisations, refugees or hosts. It can consist of local relationships (family, friends, communities; #61, 62) to which one can turn
when necessary or international relationships which may be used for financial support (remittances; #63). Especially, when ethnicity of refugees and host communities are similar and/or when camps exist in the long term, refugees are likely to interact with their host communities (Larkin and Clark 2017, p. 17; Enghoff et al. 2010, p. 25). Social networks based on solidarity can be safety nets to face social insecurity and limited income-generating opportunities together (Musenga Tshimankinda 2018; Vriese 2006, p. 14). If such networks are destroyed through conflict or flight, it might become impossible to accumulate assets (UNHCR 2005, Appendix One, p. 33).

Through remittances refugees can gain stability (Larkin and Clark 2017, p. 23). Remittances (#57) can be used for different purposes: as social security, capital to invest in businesses (helping to become self-reliant), education purposes, obtain assets to rebuild one’s livelihood or simply to assist others (Vriese 2006, p. 14).

Figure 16: CPI Category 7 – Social Capital; Group A: Indicators #57, 59, 61-63, 83; Group B: #34, 35, 60, 80-82
Category 8 – Employment Matrix and Income

Refugees are often forced to work for lower salaries than locals (Bilgili and Loschmann 2018). Reasons are the urge to survive as well as the lack of a voice. Others, for example, organisations, need to step out and advocate less exploitation. Therefore, information regarding the refugees’ work related to their income is of interest (Figure 17). To collect information, the Employment Matrix could be used as a template (Table 5). If each camp had such a table, a cross-camp analysis could reveal the number of refugees working in certain fields and who could make a living of their livelihood activities. Indicator #30 is part of the sub-category Employment, as measuring the number of registered businesses can indicate if businesses work legally or illegally. Legal businesses could be taxed and these taxes could be used for more and better infrastructure, for instance. Far more important than this indicator, besides the Employment Matrix, are indicators #38-40 and 58, as they draw a clear picture of the financial situation of the encamped households. Obtaining such data, however, is difficult, as refugees tend to make understatements regarding their financial situation out of fear of reduction of their support (cf. Chapter 2.4.2). If refugees understood the necessity of such data and did not fear any reductions/restrictions, reference values might be obtainable.

![Figure 17: CPI Category 8 – Employment Matrix and Income Indicators; all indicators belong to Group C](#)

Category 9 – Children’s Education and Political Voice

Neither Children’s Education nor refugees’ Political Voice are directly connected to self-reliance in the CPI Framework (Figure 8). Children’s education is vital for a better life for them in any future durable solution (Vriese 2006, p. 8). Education can prevent violence, create economic opportunities and give refugees the option to become self-reliant. Being well aware of the importance of education, it is still argued here that children’s education is not per se important for their parents’ level of self-reliance. Thus, this category contains only one indicator (Figure 18). Measuring the out-of-school-rate (#10) can give direct insights into the rate of child
labour and lost years of children. To get a good overview of the quality of the children’s education, many other indicators should be considered, such as teacher-school ratio, curriculum, daily hours of schooling and the ratio of not only primary education but also secondary and tertiary education (see The World Bank (2018a)). This, however, is not in scope of the CPI as it does not relate to this generation of refugees and their self-reliance level.

The other category standing aside of the categories linked directly to self-reliance is the category Political Voice, including the addition ‘% socially, politically active’. All three indicators are presented below, but also belong to other categories. Measuring them is important as the definition of self-reliance clearly states: ‘Self-reliance can assist in ensuring that persons of concern are better protected by strengthening their capacity to claim their civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights’ (UNHCR 2014a, p. 7).

By measuring the number of people active in political or social activities and comparing them with the results of the Employment Matrix, a better understanding of the level of self-reliance as defined by UNHCR (2014a) could be gained. For instance, in a meeting with a youth committee during the field trip to Jordan in 2016, the participants stated that only a very limited number of refugees participate in such committees. Reasons given are lack of time to participate, as people have to engage in livelihood activities and interest, as they could not see the benefits of such committees (Schön 18 September, 2016).

To finalise the presentation of the CPI, the next sub-chapter presents the main feedback gained from two WFP experts with long experience in refugee situations and monitoring and evaluation of crisis situations.

**Justification by Expert Opinions and Next Steps**

The feedback gained from the WFP experts was rather generic than contributing to each single indicator. Still, it is useful and some aspects could be considered for further adaptions of the CPI System. For instance, the expert states:
General school attendance is not the best indicator when linking it to livelihood. Therefore, questions need to specify who amongst the refugees can read and write – the number/percentage of refugees who can read and write versus percentage of refugees over 15 who are literate. Data for CPI 13 a) and 13 b) will be difficult to get and may not really be interesting for the research. Interesting would be how to know the percentage of refugees with vocational training and/or a formal professional education. With data one could indirectly conclude the number of refugees that are ‘redundant’ or only capable to perform unskilled labour (Ohlsen, Binyason 12/3/2018)

The author agrees and has changed the indicators accordingly. The expert had difficulties to decide which basic needs would be in Category 1 (Basic Needs) and which in Category 2 (Basic needs extended). One suggestion was to put safety issues (connected to emotions) in Category 1 and security issues (connected to technical issues) in Category 2. Due to this feedback, all indicators related to ‘feeling save’ were transferred to Basic Needs (ibid.).

The expert also suggested to consider the differences of camps and warns that direct comparisons are difficult, as each camp has its own prerequisites. For instance, Kakuma camp in Kenya is in an extremely underdeveloped region and provides hardly any opportunities for refugees. Zaatari camp is situated in Mafraq, close to Amman and situated in an agricultural zone. It might be concluded that working opportunities are much better in Zaatari camp. In the case study presented in Chapter 4, it will be demonstrated that the surrounding infrastructure only partly plays a role for the level of self-reliance in the Jordanian camps.

Developing the CPI was supposed to be Step 1 to gain an understanding of the self-reliance level of encamped refugees. One ambition was to gather indicators of Zaatari and Azraq camp to compare both camps using the CPI Framework. As stated in Schön et al. (2018) and confirmed by Borchert (2019), gathering data through published reports does not bring the results necessary for a thorough comparison.

On the field visit to Jordan in 2019, it became clear that obtaining such data is nearly impossible (Schön 2019). Though different emails to UNHCR were sent out, the author did not manage to meet a Zaatari or Azraq camp expert, yet various interviews could be conducted with other UNHCR members. Thus, the CPI System must remain a rather theoretical construct for present work. Further research projects could have a clearer focus on gathering data for the CPI System to bring better results.

Measuring indicators identified for refugee settings cannot be sufficient to grasp the complexity of the situation. To add value to the quantitative approach (Chapter 3), a qualitative approach
(Chapter 4) studying influential factors enhancing or impeding self-reliance in a refugee camp complements present research.
4 Assessing Qualitatively the Potentials for Self-Reliance

Chapter 4 presents the qualitative approach of present work which is built on the CPI system, mainly its nine categories. These categories present a valuable framework for further investigations on the topic of self-reliance in refugee camps.

After introducing the case study – Jordan and its refugee situation – in Chapter 4.1, Chapter 4.2 describes the methodical approach used (expert interviews), including an introduction of the experts interviewed (Chapter 4.2.1), the development of the interview guideline (Chapter 4.2.2) the execution of the interviews (Chapter 4.2.3) as well as their evaluation (Chapter 4.2.4).

Chapter 4.3 outlines the concept of the homo economicus (4.3.1) – the theory based on political science necessary for present work – forms of power (4.3.2) and gender equality (4.3.3). Reasons, why these three political concepts were chosen despite others are the following:

The concept of the homo economicus is the foundation of neoclassical economics and a well-known, widely distributed and controversially discussed paradigm (Urbina and Ruiz-Villaverde 2019; Sen 2012, pp. vii-viii). Thus, it must be assumed that no stakeholder group (humanitarian aid agencies, refugees, etc.) truly acts detached of this paradigm, even though in each group individuals might exist having overcome the thinking of the homo economicus. This also accounts to the interview partners as well as the author of present work who all grew up in more or less capitalistic economic systems. The concept of the homo economicus aims to highlight aspects concerning the behaviour of refugees as well as assess the direction taken by humanitarian aid agencies that create livelihood programmes.

After having developed the CPI, it became apparent that not only measurable facts but also other factors, such as power relations and gender issues, influence the self-reliance level in a camp. Wherever human-beings interact with each other, power relations evolve; and this happens also in a refugee camp context. Interesting insights were gained when analysing all identified influential factors with regard to the stakeholder groups involved, as well as the different forms of power used for the analysis and identified and defined essentially by three authors – Lukes, Wartenberg and Young – upon whose work the analysis of the power relations has been built.

Gender equality is part of present work because only 4 per cent of all refugee applicants for work permits in Jordan are women. This low number is assumed to be related to gender inequality. Although to different degrees, gender equality issues are still relevant all over the world. Focusing on one of the most marginalised groups of the world – women – almost appears
to be imperative when assessing livelihood opportunities and the level of self-reliance. To assess the situation of encamped women, on the one hand, gender equality is scrutinised by introducing theory and thoughts produced by Western and Muslim scholars as well as Muslim initiatives and on the other hand, by presenting approaches of humanitarian aid agencies taken from literature and gained by interview partners. The findings were then used for further recommendations on how to handle gender equality issues in refugee camp contexts (Chapter 5.4). In Chapter 4.4 on the basis of operations in Jordan and in Chapter 4.3.3 focusing on the strategic and operational approaches on gender equality of four organisations interviewed are presented: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 4.4.1), International Labour Organization (ILO, 4.4.2), Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ, 4.4.3) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 4.4.4). Based on the case study, the interviews and literature findings, a variety of influential factors with a strong focus on power were identified in Chapter 4.5.2, after describing the method used (4.5.1). The purpose of the Identification of Influential Factors (IIF) is to elaborate which unquantifiable factors enhance or impede self-reliance of encamped refugees. As power relations between the different stakeholder groups play a major role in a camp setting, they were assessed in detail, followed by an evaluation (4.5.3) and summarised at the end (4.5.4).

4.1 Case Study – Description of Situation in Jordan
This section gives an overview of Jordan, the country used as a case study for present research. It presents Jordan’s geography, governmental structure, demographics, culture as well as traditions and the labour market. The sub-chapter also includes an overview of the Syrian refugee situation, together with the main camps in Jordan, Zaatari and Azraq.

4.1.1 Geography
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is located in the Middle East, northwest of Saudi Arabia, south of Syria and between Israel to the west and Iraq to the east (Figure 20). With the end of the Ottoman Empire, it emerged out of the post-First World War division of the Middle East by Britain and France and gained independence in 1946. Jordan’s main language is Arabic and the main religion is Islam. The capital of the small country (89,342 square km) is called Amman. Due to its central location, Jordan plays a significant role in the struggle for power in the Middle East and is at the crossroad of the so-called Holy Land. Together with Egypt, Jordan is one of the two Arab nations living in peace with Israel (since 1994). It is also a key ally of the

Figure 19: Geography of Jordan (Jordanian Wikipedia 2019)

4.1.2 The Legislative and the Judicial

Jordan’s governmental form is a parliamentary constitutional monarchy, led by King Abdallah II since 1999 as head of state. The country is officially governed by the rule of law and respects human rights as well as media and academic freedoms. The King, immune from any liability and responsibility (Article 30 of the Constitution stipulates), has great power and can dissolve Parliament and appoints members of the upper house of Parliament as well as judges. War and peace are declared by him (Fanack 2018). The legal system is a mix of former Ottoman Empire codes which are based on French law, British common law and Islamic law (CIA 2019). The Chamber of Deputies (or House of Representatives – lower house) is elected while both the Senate (or House of Notables – upper house) and the Prime Minister (PM) are appointed as well as dismissed by the King. The King has also the right to appoint and dismiss ministers or to accept their resignations (Obeidat 2016). Further, he convenes, adjourns and prorogues the National Assembly, has the right to dissolve the Chamber or the Senate and can relieve senators of their membership in the Senate. He is allowed to grant special pardon, commute any sentence and confirm a death sentence (ibid.).

The PM forms his cabinet which must be approved by the Parliament through a vote of confidence (Fanack 2018). The lower house debates and approves by majority legislative proposals as submitted by the government. Bills are passed to the Senate for debate and approval (by majority vote). The King has the final word granting his assent by royal decree or returning the
bill to the lower house for revision, including an explanation of his objections. If the bill is rejected by the Senate, it is also returned to the lower house. If both houses cannot agree on a bill, a two-thirds-majority vote at a joint session of the two settles the matter. Such a session can also overrule the monarch’s veto. Currently, the lower house contains 150 seats, of which nine seats are reserved for Christians, nine for Bedouins, three for either Circassians or Chechens. Since 2003, six seats are reserved for women; the number of seats was raised to 15 in 2012. Among the senators, there are former prime ministers, ministers, tribal leaders, retired senior military officers, former diplomats and judges. Since 2015, the number of seats in the House of Representatives is 130 (reduced from 150). The majority of the elected Members of Parliament (MPs) are usually individuals with tribal affiliations or business persons. As most Jordanians are loyal to their tribe affiliation and locality, traditional, loyalist candidates make up the majority of MPs (ibid.).

As there is no jury system, judges weigh evidence, pronounce verdicts and rule on matters of law. Religious courts (Sharia for Muslims, canon-law courts for Christians and Orthodox) deal with personal status and family matters, like marriage, divorce, inheritance and alimony (Fanack 2018). Civil courts adjudicate criminal and civil cases. Special courts, including the State Security Court or military courts, take care of issues such as offences against the royal family, armed insurrection and financial crimes, among others. If matters are not involving ‘national security’, the judiciary and courts act relatively independent granting fair – though lengthy – trials (ibid.)

Jordan is not part of the 1951 Convention on Refugees or the 1967 Protocol (Saliba 2016). Thus, it treats its refugees – if not granted citizenship as have many Palestinians over the last decades – as ‘visitors’ or ‘guests’, without a particular legal status under domestic law (UNRWA 2019; Saliba 2016). Nevertheless, UNHCR and Jordan signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 1998 to allow UNHCR to provide international protection to persons defined as refugees in Jordan and according to UNHCR definition.

This brief overview of the politics and governance of Jordan helps to understand the inherent power relationships between aid organisations’ field officers and the national and local government (cf. Chapter 4.5).

4.1.3 Demographics
The population of Jordan is estimated at 10.07 million people of which 95-97 per cent are Arabs and around 3 million (around 30 per cent) are non-Jordanians (World Population Review 2019;
Ghazal 2016). About 82 per cent of the population in Jordan are Muslims of which 93 per cent are Sunni Muslims. About 6 per cent belong to a Christian minority (ibid.). Officially, about 500,000 Iraqis and more than 660,000 Syrian refugees (and unofficially about the same amount of Syrians) have moved to Jordan in the last years to flee from violence in their home countries (UNHCR 2019g; World Population Review 2019). Assyrian Christians account for 0.8 per cent of which most are Eastern Aramaic speaking refugees. About 30,000 Kurds from Turkey, Iran and Iraq as well as about 5,000 Armenians have also found a new home in the Kingdom. About 1.2 million illegal migrant workers and 500,000 legal migrant workers are estimated to live in Jordan. Migrant women work especially in nightclubs and hotels (World Population Review 2019).

In 2008, approximately 1.95 million Palestinian refugees were counted, of which most were Jordanian citizens. To prevent Palestinians from resettling in the West Bank, thousands of Palestinian citizenships were revoked (World Population Review 2019). Since 2012, more than 660,000 Syrian refugees have registered with UNHCR in Jordan (UNHCR 2019g). Overall, about 2.8 million refugees were registered with UNRWA and UNHCR by 2016, making Jordan one of the largest host countries of registered refugees in the world (The Economic Policy Council 2017, p. 7).

4.1.4 Culture and Traditions
The main problem of making women vulnerable to rights violation are neither law, nor religion, but custom and traditions (Bezzi 2017, p. 70).

It is a cultural thing that the woman’s place is at home, especially in the view of traditional, less open-minded people. Also, if a woman has studied and a university degree – as soon as she is married or gives birth to her first child, her place is at home. (IV: 07 - Intern. NGO 1/14/2019; IV: 10 - NGO Zaatari Camp 1/15/2019)

Patriarchy and patriarchal structures as they exist today did not derive from Islamic law (Shari’a), but rather from colonialism and imperialism constructing modern nation-states as known today (Hallaq 2009, pp. 118-122). Hallaq elaborates the path the Shari’a took during its different phases, including its downfall due to the French and British Imperialism; only family law and certain elements of property transactions were the remainders of the former Islamic law and its well-developed structures (Hallaq 2009, pp. 89, 115). Far into the 20th century, patriarchy was also a widespread phenomenon of European countries (so not yet fully overcome). France, for instance, declared until 1970 that the husband is ‘the head of the family’;
Germany’s Equality Law of 1957 [art. 1356.I] stated ‘The wife’s responsibility is to run the household’ (Hallaq 2009, pp. 121-122). Family, including extended relatives, clans and tribes, always have been important in Muslim societies as they were the nucleus of social existence; one of the main tasks of the Shari’a and the ‘peacemakers’ such as village imams was to keep peace and order within communities (Hallaq 2009, pp. 57-59). When there was nothing left of this legal system than family law, it became the symbol of Islamic identity; ‘it represented what was taken to be the last fortress of the Shari’a to survive the ravages of modernization’ (Hallaq 2009, p. 115). Further, it has to be noted that for centuries, the Shari’a did not exist in written form and thus enjoyed a wide range of interpretation due to the nature of the Arabic language. Codifying Islamic law by framing it in a written form stripped it off its flexibility. For instance, while the ‘staggering body of discourse’ provided by traditional law respected the wife’s right to various types of support from her husband, the 1917 Islamic Law (remained in effect, e.g., in Jordan until 1951 and in Lebanon to this day) reduced this discourse to two brief articles too short to see the full range of the former rights. Thus, only at that point was the wife bound to the house in a family unit headed by the husband and was bound to obey her husband (Article 73 of the 1917 Law) (Hallaq 2009, pp. 122-123). Though not being part of the legal system in many countries, this patriarchal structure is associated with almost all Arab cultures (Bezzi 2017, p. 64). Giving it up would signify to bow completely to Westernisation and the modern state manifested by Imperialism (Hallaq 2009, pp. 122-123). However, if a region wants to grow economically, it cannot ‘afford to alienate half of its population from both social and professional life’ (bin Talal and Wehler-Schoeck 2017, p. 12).

Field officers of humanitarian aid agencies working in these areas need to understand the meaning of local culture and religion to be able to support the people adequately. Any change, as was confirmed by experts, needs to come from within and cannot be forced on the people by foreign entities (IV: 06 - GIZ 1/14/2019).

The decision of staying at home is made either by the woman herself, her family or her husband, depending on the tradition and structure of the family. As explained in Chapter 4.1.2, ‘family’ is an important institution in Jordan as it is in Arab countries in general. People are not treated as individuals, but as families or households. Traditionally, the role of the woman is at home, taking care of the household and children, whereas the role of the man is to seek work outside of the home (IV: 07 - Intern. NGO 1/14/2019; IV: 10 - NGO Zaatari Camp 1/15/2019). In providing for his family, a man remains in power over the household and at family level. In general, Muslim women are allowed to work. However, considering the Arab culture, working
as a woman is much more constrained compared to other cultures. As personal safety is always a concern, women are not supposed to work alone and along with men or be exposed to the public (IV: 07 - Intern. NGO 1/14/2019; Razzaz 2017, p. 9). In many countries of the West Asia-North Africa (WANA) region, they have to ask their husband or ‘caretaker’ for permission to work. Through disobedient behaviour such as working without her husband’s approval, a woman loses her right to maintenance or receives violent punishment (Bezzi 2017, p. 63; Lloyd-Roberts and Morris 2017, p. 202). In terms of earnings, a woman is entitled to keep whatever she earns, whereas the money a man earns is used to provide for the family. Male family members are responsible for the women of the household. Usually, the husband takes over this role from the father after a daughter is married off. If a woman lacks both relatives, a son, brother, cousin, uncle or grandfather automatically becomes responsible for her. Traditions, interviewee No. 7 says, are very strong in Jordan and people like holding on to them, as for them, traditions, culture and their lifestyle define them as people, as Jordanians and as Arabs (IV: 07 - Intern. NGO 1/14/2019):

Interviewees No. 7 and 10 agree that this is changing, but slowly. Especially well-educated, ‘more modern’ women become more independent and refuse to ‘only be housewives and caretakers of children’ (IV: 10 - NGO Zaatari Camp 1/15/2019; IV: 07 - Intern. NGO 1/14/2019). This independence empowers women, as they become able to manage their own household without their husband (IV: 07 - Intern. NGO 1/14/2019). Further, it puts the husband into a new position – he has to understand his new role and this is beyond solely giving money and providing for his family. If a man does not integrate easily into his new role, he can develop feelings of being lost and vulnerable.

4.1.5 Labour Market

The main labour sector (Figure 21) in Jordan is services, especially government services, finance, transport and tourism/hospitality followed by the industry, mainly manufacturing (The Economic Policy Council 2017, p. 6; The World Bank 2018c, p. 11, 2017). Agriculture only plays a minor part (2%) in Jordan’s job market but a slightly more important one in terms of contribution to the Jordanian economy (4%) (The Economic Policy Council 2017, p. 8).
To reach the official growth target of 5 per cent of the annual gross domestic product (GDP), it is essential that Jordan’s productive sector grows. It is expected thereby that hospitality and tourism would grow by 5 per cent, agriculture and manufacturing by 10 per cent, electricity and water (13 per cent), transport and information and communications technology (ICT) (12 per cent) and construction by 15 per cent per annum (ibid., p. 13). Different investment policies intend to provide new employment opportunities, increase productivity as well as result into added value of local products and services including those exported (ibid, p. 32).

Such investments are necessary, as unemployment has risen to 19.2 per cent in 2019 in comparison to 12.5 per cent in 2010 (Trading Economics 2019). In 2018, youth unemployment (age group 15-24) reached 54.6 per cent for female (2010: 48.6%) and 33.2 per cent for male (2010: 23.9%) labour force (The World Bank 2019a). With the influx of Syrian refugees, the unemployment rate as well as the debt-burden have worsened for Jordan (The Economic Policy Council 2017, p. 6). Poverty level has reached an estimated 13.3 per cent in 2017/2018 and is even higher (approx. 19%) if one looks at transient poverty, which means living below the poverty line during at least one quarter of the year (Microfinanza Srl 2018, p. 6). The national monthly minimum wage is 220 JD (about USD 310) which is not enough money to feed a family (Tabazah 2018; Obeidat 2014).
Female Labour Force

The labour force participation in Jordan among men is about 60 per cent and among women only 15 per cent. Unemployment rate among men is about 12.5 per cent, but among women, it accounts to 25 per cent (Figure 22).

![Economic Activity of Jordanian Men and Economic Activity of Jordanian Women](image)

*Figure 21: Economic Activity of Jordanian Men and Economic Activity of Jordanian Women (Razzaz 2017, p. 24)*

Young women, especially, face problems in transiting from education to stable and satisfactory employment, as they often take over unpaid care and household responsibilities. Hence, only one out of four young women is economically active in the age group 25-29 (men: more than 80 per cent are engaged in employment). Figure 23 gives an overview of the gender differences in school-to-work transition.

![Gender Differences in School-to-work Transition of Youth Aged 15-29](image)

*Figure 22: Gender Differences in School-to-work Transition of Youth Aged 15-29 (2016) (Initiative 2018, p. 4)*

Many Jordanian women do not even expect a long-term career, as their participation in labour force decreases significantly after marriage, owing to difficulties in balancing employment and household responsibilities (Razzaz 2017, p. 6). The government acknowledges this problem and tries to empower women and increase their contribution to the labour force to activate their
economic participation’ (The Economic Policy Council 2017, p. 26). Therefore, in the public sector the government aims to facilitate flexible working hours and working remotely as well as part-time. In the industrial sector, efforts are made to close salary gaps for the same tasks and create equal opportunities (ibid., p. 68). Such measurements are important but can only create impact when the patriarchal tradition, as described earlier, changes. For instance, in times of job shortage, both women and men consider to give priority in the labour market to men. Hence, unemployment among young men is intensifying resistance to women joining the labour market (Initiative 2018, p. 5). Inequality in law such as the right to gain citizenship only when the father is a citizen of Jordan or inheritance laws, under which women inherit only half the share of male heirs (as men were/are responsible for female household members) are still rightful and prevent gender equality (CIA 2019; Initiative 2018, p. 5).

Non-Jordanian Labour Force

In 2017, more than 400,000 migrant workers registered with the Ministry of Labour to work in Jordan (about 22 per cent of the total Jordanian workforce). About three-quarters of them were men and half of them lived in Amman. The majority comes from Egypt (55%) and Syria (10%). Migrant workers take on those jobs that Jordanians are reluctant to do such as agriculture, domestic services and construction because they entail work in difficult conditions (ETF 2017, pp. 13-14).

In comparison to Jordanians or Syrians, the majority of migrant workers come alone and on a temporary basis solely to work and to maximise the remittances which they usually send back home (Razzaz 2017, p. 6). On the contrary, Jordanians (as well as many Syrians) see their employment as a permanent and integral part of their lives and aim at a balanced work and family life. They spend their earnings within Jordan, which has higher living costs than most home countries of the migrant workers. These factors put Jordanians in a disadvantageous competition with migrant workers and Syrian refugees. Non-Jordanian workers face late payment of wages, non-payment for overtime work, long and unpredictable working hours and physically demanding work that leads to low productivity. Payment delays and working days of 13 hours per day are common, especially in agriculture, construction and domestic work (Razzaz 2017, p. 9). Syrian refugees are often willing to work for the same low wages as migrant workers, especially if they have other means to cover their basic needs. However, they cannot accept the same working conditions as they have their families with them. For instance, in the manufacturing sector wages are insufficient to cover rent and other basic needs. So, although it is acceptable to migrant workers working temporarily under these conditions, such a situation is
inacceptable for a (Syrian) worker who has to feed a family (ibid., p.13). Though Jordanians still sympathise with Syrians, they are frustrated about the decline in wage since the Syrian influx (ibid., p. 14).

The government recognises the high number of unemployment of Jordanian citizens and aims to avoid competition for high-skilled labour. Further, they tend to prevent Syrian refugees from fully integrating (IV: 12 - Australian Embassy 1/13/2019). Thus, government has restricted the sectors for which work permits can be obtained to low- and medium-skilled labour. In 2016, the Ministry of Labour ‘has decided to prevent the following professions to foreign labour and not allow these professions to be occupied by others, but Jordanian labour’ (Alqatameen 2016):

- Accounting and administrative jobs
- Clerical jobs including typing and secretarial jobs
- Operator jobs, phones and plug boards
- Warehouses jobs
- Selling (all categories)
- Décor jobs
- Selling fuel in the main cities
- Electricity jobs
- Mechanical jobs and car mechanics
- Drivers
- Guardsmen and messengers

Hiring non-Jordanians is only allowed when Jordanians are not available for the work; non-Jordanians need a one-year renewable work permit in such cases (Razzaz 2017, p. 35). However, the government has also understood that the Jordanian economy benefits from multiplier effects of Syrians spending their wages inside of Jordan and the danger of creating a lost generation and generating social conflict if Syrians are not allowed to become self-reliant. Thus, in 2016, the government (also put under pressure by the donor community at the London conference in February, according to IV: 02 - UNHCR Amman (9/26/2018)) changed the legal framework by introducing ‘The Jordan Compact’ with the intention to convert the burden of the Syrian refugee influx to an economic contribution. At the London conference in 2016, the donor community pledged financial support for the Compact and the European Union (EU) committed to enhance access to the European market. To facilitate self-reliance, the government started to provide work permits (at reduced prices for 10 JD per work permit) for Syrian refugees and temporarily restricted the entry of new migrant workers. The main sectors Syrian refugees are
allowed to work in are agriculture, forestry and fishing (share of work permit issuances: 44.4%), construction (30.4%), manufacturing (7.2%), hospitality and food service activities (6.3%) as well as wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles (5.1%) (Syrian Refugee Unit at the Ministry of Labour 2018, p. 7).

Agricultural workers can obtain work permits using cooperatives of farmers as a sponsor in order to shift freely among a variety of short-term jobs (Razzaz 2017, pp. 13-14, 37-38). The reason for treating the agricultural sector differently is that the length of a work permit covering one year was problematic, as agricultural work is seasonal work (IV: 02 - UNHCR Amman 9/26/2018). In 2017, the cooperatives system was widened to the construction sector. Since then, encamped refugees can obtain a work permit and work outside of the camp (IV: 09 - ILO 1/15/2019; IV: 02 - UNHCR Amman 9/26/2018; JIF 2016, updated 2017). When obtaining a work permit, which is a smart card, encamped refugees can move around freely for one month (IV: 09 - ILO 1/15/2019). Afterwards, they are obliged to return to the camp and re-register, before they leave again. Most work permits in Azraq and in Zaatari were issued for the agricultural sector (IV: 09 - ILO 1/15/2019).

Work Permits for Refugee Women
The number of work permits issued to female refugees is low (4%) in comparison to men (Syrian Refugee Unit at the Ministry of Labour 2018, p. 3). The reasons for this are manifold and some were already mentioned above (especially responsibilities at home). Interviewee No. 7 indicated three different reasons: a) Work permits can be obtained mainly for male sectors, such as construction and farming; especially, construction is not an area where (Arab) women tend to work. The same accounts for waste picking, driving taxis or working on farms, unless it is a family business, etc. b) Owing to the low availability of work permits in female sectors (e.g., sewing), many women, if working outside home, work in the informal sector. c) Refugees living in a camp are on average less educated and less well trained. Encamped refugee women seem to be less independent and have other, probably more constrained, cultural backgrounds than non-camp refugees (IV: 07 - Intern. NGO 1/14/2019).

4.1.6 Jordanian Camps – Zaatari and Azraq
In 2012, the Jordan government established Zaatari camp on a desert field close to the city of Mafraq, approximately one-hour drive northeast from Amman and close to the Syrian border. In June 2019, the number of camp inhabitants accounted to 77,003 inhabitants, a relatively stable number since mid-2014. In 2013, the camp witnessed its highest influx of more than
200,000 inhabitants at a time (UNHCR 2019i). The infrastructure of Zaatari camp improved a lot over the years (3a_Schön 21.10.2018, 8am). At the beginning of the camp formation there were only tents and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) leading the WASH sector provided portable latrines and water tanks as water points fulfilling minimum standards (SPHERE standards in emergency contexts). Later, communal latrines were built to improve these standards up to the level of the now existing water and wastewater network. Gradually fixed caravans were set up and the tents were completely phased out. According to the experts having worked in Zaatari, the camp-level standard is comparatively high since all basic needs were and are provided for the camp residents: food, non-food items, shelter, schooling, health and CfW initiatives (IV: 03a - UNHCR Zaatari Camp 10/21/2018; IV: 10 - NGO Zaatari Camp 1/15/2019; Schumann-Bölsche 2018, p. 237). Besides, approximately 15 hours of daily electricity was made available, two supermarkets were set up and functioning black markets exist (IV: 10 - NGO Zaatari Camp 1/15/2019; Schön et al. 2018).

Azraq camp, the second largest camp in Jordan, was established in 2014 and shelters almost 40,000 Syrian refugees (UNHCR 2019h). Azraq camp faced its peak between 2016 and 2018 when about 54,000 people lived in the camp. It is situated deeper in the desert, further away from relevant cities and infrastructure than Zaatari camp and approx. 1.5 driving hours away from Amman city. Zaatari camp has expanded over time and thus, has grown like a city in a centralised manner, hosting a big market easily reachable by everybody. Azraq camp was purposely built before inhabited. It was divided into five decentralised villages to shield it against air attacks, among others. This decentralisation makes it safer, but decreases market opportunities (Figure 24) (IV: 10 - NGO Zaatari Camp 1/15/2019). WASH facilities as showers and toilets were built at a smaller level and were well established before anybody settled in Azraq camp. In addition, households were properly built with fixed assets. Since day one, water points with tanks and networks have been set up (3b_Schön 13.01.2019, 1pm). Life for Azraq residents seems to be harder than for those living in Zaatari camp: security is strict, the camp is located in the desert far away from job opportunities and the governmental camp management does not allow setting up of black markets as freely as in Zaatari camp (10_Schön 15.01.2019, 1pm; 3b_Schön 13.01.2019, 1pm; 9_Schön 15.01.2019, 10:30am). Village 5 is highly secured as its residents are classified as ‘security risk’ for Jordan. Owing to Village 5, entering is challenging even for field officers and nearly impossible for external people, like researchers (3b_Schön 13.01.2019, 1pm).
A proper presentation of the camp is not being provided in this thesis as this was already done by Schön et al. (2018) and again by Borchert (2019) and would not add value to the case studies related to self-reliance. For Zaatari camp, the field experts mentioned no significant changes of the infrastructure since 2016, and the publication of Schön et al. (2018) was based on it; besides, the water and waste-water network, was completed at the end of 2018 at an expenditure of approximately 40 million Euro (11_Schön 16.01.2019, 8am-4pm). More insights of the camp, camp life, power relations and working opportunities are given in Chapter 4.5 (Identification of Influential Factors).

4.1.7 Impact of Syrian Refugees on Jordan

In general, Jordan is in a difficult economic situation. The country is highly indebted with debts rising despite the provision of international funds. Consequently, taxes and interest rates cause many problems. Thus, Jordan welcomes international donors, but allows assistance to Syrians only if Jordanians can benefit as well. Donors and international organisations face difficulties with these demands as it means to shift from humanitarian assistance, which provides for basic needs to refugees, to development assistance, which in fact also benefits to a larger extent Jordanians (IV: 12 - Australian Embassy 1/13/2019; The Economic Policy Council 2017, p. 5). The demanded ratio of development projects with a high employment element is to include 50 per cent Syrians and 50 per cent Jordanians (cf. Chapter 2.3.3) and 70 per cent Syrians and 30 per cent Jordanians if the project belongs to humanitarian assistance (IV: 06 - GIZ 1/14/2019).

As Jordan is considered a low- to middle-income country, many donor countries do not want

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10Smaller camps, like King Abdullah Park (about 1500 residents) are not considered in present research. Apparently, the small camp was built for vulnerable and elder people and funded by the Arab Emirates who solely take care of it (IV: 10 - NGO Zaatari Camp 1/15/2019).
to spend funding on Jordanians. Donors see a need to provide more for security and protection, while the Jordanian government prefers money to be invested in infrastructure, the core of the country’s development. The government fears that more funding into security and protection could be interpreted to the extent that the government is not able to provide it to the population (IV: 12 - Australian Embassy 1/13/2019).

How the ILO meets these requirements of the government by building infrastructure and simultaneously creating job opportunities for Jordanians and Syrians is described here.

*Project Example: International Labour Organization (ILO)*

The here presented projects by the International Labour Organization (ILO) showcase the effects on Jordanians and Syrian refugees of projects implemented by the international community through IOs in Jordan. Projects implemented in a camp setting are analysed in Chapter 4.5.2.

*Employment through Labour Intensive Infrastructure in Jordan*

The German Development Bank (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau - KfW) funded this ILO project. As the economic activities inside are limited and funding is constantly reduced, job opportunities mainly exist outside the camp. Expert No. 8 was project manager of this ILO project at the time of the interview and shared his insights for present research project (*cf.* also Chapter 4.4.2).

At the time of the interview, project phase 2 was ending and project phase 3 had just started. Project phase 4 had already been signed and is supposed to end in August 2020 (IV: 08 - ILO 1/15/2019). By the time of the interview, about 350,000 workdays had been achieved. The government had demanded to reach 50 per cent Jordanians in order to increase the impact for their citizens. Actually, the Jordanian government tried to achieve reaching 70 per cent Jordanians, but Germany, who provided the project funding, had not signed off to the proposal. In addition, Germany’s target was also to reach at least 10 per cent women and 3 per cent people with disabilities. After difficulties at the beginning, at the end of phase 2, 13 per cent women could be reached. Regarding disabled persons, only 2 per cent were reached. The expert blames the mindsets of the people considering people with disabilities only those in wheelchairs or on crutches and not deaf or dumb people or people with small handicaps. Though more expensive, the ILO encourages and trains the government to use manual labour instead of machines to create more short-term employment. It is not clear though, if the government will maintain manual labour when the funding of the project has ended (IV: 08 - ILO 1/15/2019).
The purpose of the project is to build a long-term infrastructure that best serves the Jordanian economy (if maintained properly). Infrastructure built includes roads, especially tertiary roads in rural areas, water catchments to collect water and soil protection infrastructure through terracing and planting (ILO 2018). The project is divided into three main parts – (1) road construction, (2) agriculture and forestry and (3) municipalities cleaning services (cf. also Chapter 4.4.2). Different details of these project parts are introduced below.

For (1) – road construction, ILO works with the national government which hires contractors to build the roads. For (2) – agricultural infrastructure, the government works directly with the farmers and pays them when the infrastructure is built. For (3) – municipalities cleaning services, the direct project partners are the municipalities (IV: 08 - ILO 1/15/2019). The interviewed project manager prefers working with contractors of the government. Contactors are more likely to send mandatory monthly reports on time than the government, as the former would otherwise not be paid. When reports are sent too late, ILO is not aware of any problems on time and thus, cannot address issues when necessary. For instance, regarding (2) – agriculture and forestry, in some cases, farmers, who paid their workers in cash, diverted some money to buy materials instead of paying the workers on time. To avoid such problems, ILO now transfers wages directly to the workers’ bank accounts (ibid.).

**Short-term Labour**

In ILO terms, short-term employment means that workers are employed for four to six months. A worker can only work during the project phase. Regarding (1) – road construction, the agreed working period is only six months, even though the project phase is 1.5 years. Before the working period can start, roads and the number of roads and their length have to be selected by the ministry, costs have to be estimated, tendering processes conducted and the contractors selected.

As building this infrastructure is a business for the contractors, they choose their methods, which usually consist of the cheapest, low cost version. A road is normally built between two towns and, to be cost-efficient, the contractor uses workers from the nearest town. Workers are regularly laid off when the road is complete. This way, the workers from a town are only employed until the road section to the next town is complete. Another condition preventing longer contracting times is imposed by the German project concept. While ILO counts worker days as the main measurement, the Germans GIZ counts job opportunities: A job opportunity is counted when a worker works for 40 continuous days (and two job opportunities are counted when the worker works for 80 days, etc.). A contract of just 30 days is not accounted for (IV: 08 - ILO
1/15/2019). As a result and in order to increase the number of job opportunities, ILO laid off workers after 40 days exactly. Yet, according to the interviewee, the workers suffer from the short working period, because they are not able to make enough savings in this period of time. ILO sees many disadvantages of counting job opportunities: Besides giving the workers not enough time to make savings, contractors have to invest more money in training as well as in providing protective clothing (ibid.).

Hiring Process
ILO’s project partner GIZ selects the people who are hired based on a selection process it had developed. Regarding Syrians, ILO gets a short-list for potential recruitment from the contractor or the ministry which is sent to UNHCR (IV: 08 - ILO 1/15/2019). UNHCR has a database of Syrians getting food vouchers or cash incentives. UNHCR checks the list and gives feedback of those who are not receiving any benefits in order to prioritise them. This list is sent to the contractor. The people hired will lose their benefits, so they can choose if they want to work or keep their benefits. Using this selection process prevents double benefits while others do not receive any kind of aid. The last selection of workers is left to the contractor. If the contractor has difficulties finding workers, ILO is informed to check its database for local job-seekers. In general, ILO does not focus on employing people living in camps. Getting them to the construction points would be too costly. If construction works are close to the camp, camp residents can be hired through the regular hiring process since they can receive work permits. Problematic for all hired refugees is to re-enter the assistance programme when the employment phase has ended because of long waiting lists and the slow reduction of funds. As a consequence, some refugees refuse to work to not lose long-term assistance. Thus, UNHCR and ILO came to the agreement to re-enter refugees into the assistance programme as soon as the employment terminated (ibid.).

Payment
Regarding (3) – municipalities cleaning services, the payment for the work is 12 JD per day. It used to be 14 JD, but GIZ insisted it to be reduced to 12 JD to prevent disturbing the labour markets (IV: 08 - ILO 1/15/2019). Because of the GIZ job counting system, ILO can only hire workers for two months, although the feedback from the municipality workers is that they would need three months of employment to make enough savings (IV: 08 - ILO 1/15/2019). In (1) – road construction, payment is still 14 JD, as it is too difficult to find workers for 12 JD. In 2016, ILO had conducted a study and found out that though Syrians are willing to work for
less, Jordanians demand to be paid 15 JD to have enough money to make some savings or to pay for schooling, etc. At the beginning, the workers had to pay for their social security. In Jordan, anybody working for more than 16 days has to register and contribute to the social security system. The worker then has access to reimbursements in case of an accident. Especially illicit workers struggled to understand their contracts and were thinking that the contractors were taking out their commissions, so ILO started paying the social security fee directly to the workers.

The purpose of this non-campus example is to show how Jordanians and Syrians can benefit, at least short term, of international support. It further elaborates that – for governments and/or international organisations – choosing more expensive methods, such as manual labour instead of machine labour, can have higher outcomes for the beneficiaries (e.g., higher and longer rates of employment). It also highlights controversial issues of the different stakeholders, such as choosing the right wage, the rate of female and disabled workers as well as the length of employment.

In the following, the reader is familiarised with the method of expert interview.

4.2 Methodical Approach – Expert Interview

The method of expert interview is part of qualitative social research and political as well as social sciences (Flick 2015, pp. 349-350; Gläser and Laudel 2010, pp. 13-15; Bogner et al. 2009, p. 1). Different from other forms of qualitative interviews, expert interviews are not defined by a certain approach but by interviewing experts. A point of criticism is to define a method only due to the group of persons interviewed, which, in addition, can be inaccurate, especially as evaluation methods are somewhat vague, also because collected data can be unfocused, irrelevant and/or contradictory (Bogner et al. 2014, p. 9; Gläser and Laudel 2010, p. 43). However, the strength of this method is that experts are not ‘object’ of an examination but ‘witnesses’. Feelings and emotions aside, they can, to a certain degree, share objective insights and experiences of a situation, an institution or process, etc. Thus, social situations and processes can be reconstructed to find socio-scientific explanations (Gläser and Laudel 2010, pp. 12-13). The reconstructive investigation of a situation or process is the objective of expert interviews, hence, used for present work.
4.2.1 Experts

An expert is a professional who has acquired knowledge and skills through study and practice over the years, in a particular field or subject, to the extent that his or her opinion may be helpful in fact finding, problem solving, or understanding of a situation. (Business Dictionary 2019)

However, non-professionals can be experts if they have the knowledge about social contexts in which they operate on a regular basis (Hildebrandt 2015, pp. 241-242; Gläser and Laudel 2010, p. 11). Based on these definitions of an expert and on their experiences regarding refugee camps, especially Zaatari (and Azraq) camp and/or self-reliance of refugees, 12 experts were chosen for the present research project.

Experts Interviewed for Present Research Project

Before continuing with theory regarding creating an interview guideline and the one used for present research project, the 12 interviewed experts are introduced briefly (Table 6).

Each interviewee differed in experience, position and knowledge regarding self-reliance of refugees. For instance, interviewee No. 2 talked about the general situation of livelihood activities of refugees in Jordan, because they did not have insights regarding the camp. They referred to a colleague for specific camp questions, who did not reply to various e-mails, so could not be interviewed (IV: 02 - UNHCR Amman 9/26/2018). UNHCR has three branch offices in Jordan – one in Amman, another in Irbid and a sub-office in Mafraq. Each camp also has an office. Each office has a separate management but all report to the Amman office, which is the Jordanian hub. The livelihood unit covers the whole country and is situated in Amman. The other offices have focal points which report to the livelihood unit in Amman. Interviewee No. 3 in contrast was working in Zaatari camp but as a WASH officer. Still, he as well as interviewee No. 10, observed how encamped refugees tried to become self-reliant (IV: 03a - UNHCR Zaatari Camp 10/21/2018). During interview No. 3b, the interviewee shared his experiences gained at UNDP when creating livelihood opportunities for women (IV: 03b - UNHCR Zaatari Camp 1/13/2019). Interviewee No. 4 has 30 years of field experience. His last position was UNHCR Representative in Turkey. He gave insights of many situations and approaches of creating livelihood opportunities in various, mostly Sub-Saharan African, countries (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018). Experiences with refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa were also shared by interviewee No. 1. Compared to No. 4, interviewee No. 5 had ‘only’ 2.5 years of field experience. Still, the interviewee’s insights were valuable, also regarding his position in Copenhagen. The Copenhagen livelihood unit is the technical unit responsible for economic inclusion and self-reliance.
In the past six months, at the time of the interview, the interviewee was looking at private sector ownerships from a livelihood, self-reliance and economic inclusion perspective (IV: 05 - UNHCR Copenhagen 12/18/2018). Interview No. 7 was conducted to gain totally different insights – that of a Jordanian Muslim woman working in a professional position in Jordan. The insights she shared were mainly used to support findings from the literature regarding Chapter 4.5 ‘Women in the Arab World’ (IV: 07 - Intern. NGO 1/14/2019). Not directly targeted at the focus of present work but at work for refugees in general, interviewee No. 8 (ILO) shared insights regarding the project titled ‘Employment through Labour Intensive Infrastructure in Jordan’ funded by the German Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ). This project includes 50 per cent Syrians and 50 per cent Jordanians (IV: 08 - ILO 1/15/2019). The Agence d'Aide à la Coopération Technique Et au Développement (ACTED) interviews (No. 11) were special, because ACTED organised a camp visit at Zaatari camp for the purpose of present work. The findings were not recorded but summarised concisely afterwards. The camp visit had to be terminated before schedule due to a sandstorm, but discussions continued at the ACTED Amman office (IV: 11 - ACTED 1/16/2019). Interview No. 12 was recorded, but the Embassy apparently uses audio blockers, which ruined the recording. As soon as the corruption of the record was noticed, a memory log was written. Only the most memorable and relevant parts for present research project could be recovered (IV: 12 - Australian Embassy 1/13/2019). This loss of data is also the reason why the interview is ranked No. 12, though conducted before interview No. 6, who talked about GIZ gender equality programmes in Jordan.

The length of all interviews except that of No. 9 (which lasted only 10 minutes) was between one and two hours. All transcriptions were paraphrased. All paraphrases, plus the notes taken for interviews No. 11 and 12 (25,910 words in total), were sorted by the influential factors which could be identified and clustered for the analysis (Online Supplement D).

The twelve interviews were conducted using a guideline. Guideline interviews provide predetermined topics and questions to be answered. However, neither formulations nor the sequence of questions are mandatory to allow the interview a natural conversation situation without unnecessarily interrupting the flow of the conversation. Using a guideline helps to remember the most important questions necessary to ask in the interview (Hildebrandt 2015, pp. 247-248; Bogner et al. 2014, pp. 27-28; Gläser and Laudel 2010, p. 42).
Table 6: Overview of Interviewed Experts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Position/Task</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
<th>Location/Type of interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Irish NGO in 1990s</td>
<td>Set up camps in Ethiopia for Somalis</td>
<td>24.09.2019</td>
<td>Skype</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>UNHCR in Amman, Jordan (2 interviewees)</td>
<td>Part of Livelihood unit for Jordan</td>
<td>26.09.2019</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>UNHCR in Zaatri Camp between 2012-2016 (now UNDP)</td>
<td>WASH sector in camp</td>
<td>3a) 21.10.2019 3b) 13.01.2019</td>
<td>3a) Skype 3b) UNDP office, Amman, Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>UNHCR 1981-2011</td>
<td>Field experience incl. management positions</td>
<td>26.11.2019</td>
<td>Skype</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>UNHCR headquarter (HQ) in Copenhagen, Denmark</td>
<td>Interface between the private sector partnership division and the livelihood unit, field experience in Rwanda for 2.5 years</td>
<td>18.12.2019</td>
<td>Skype</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>GIZ, Amman</td>
<td>Gender and monitoring expertise</td>
<td>14.01.2019</td>
<td>GIZ office Amman, Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>International NGO</td>
<td>Professionally working Jordanian Muslim woman</td>
<td>14.01.2019</td>
<td>NGO office Amman, Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>Project leader of ‘Employment through Labour Intensive Infrastructure in Jordan’</td>
<td>15.01.2019</td>
<td>ILO office Amman, Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>Responsible for refugee job centres</td>
<td>15.01.2019</td>
<td>ILO office Amman, Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Japan Emergency NGO in Zaatri camp 2013-2018</td>
<td>WASH senior officer in camp</td>
<td>15.01.2019</td>
<td>Future Pioneers Empowering Communities office Amman, Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Agence d’Aide à la Coopération Technique Et au Développement (ACTED) officers, camp manager and deputy country officer</td>
<td>Interviews with staff in different positions</td>
<td>16.01.2019</td>
<td>ACTED office in Zaatri camp and Amman, Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Australian Embassy</td>
<td>Second Secretary, of the Humanitarian division</td>
<td>13.01.2019</td>
<td>Embassy in Amman, Jordan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2.2 Interview Guideline

Bogner et al (2014) defined three categories of knowledge which could be gained from expert interviews – technical knowledge referring to professional or specialist knowledge, knowledge of interpretation including subjective relevance, point of views, interpretations and explanation patterns as well as process or experiential knowledge. Process or experiential knowledge
includes action processes, interactions, organisational constellations, events, etc. (Bogner et al. 2014, pp. 18-19). For present research project, mainly process knowledge of the experts was of relevance as experts revealed insights from within camp walls. To some extent, knowledge of interpretation was given and included in the analysis because interpretation and explanations gained from the experts could be used for a comparison with findings and interpretations from literature. Technical knowledge was also given to some degree but is of less interest, as it also can be found in reports and available literature.

Given the focus of present thesis and the preparation phase, expert interviews were used to gain knowledge regarding power dynamics of stakeholders as well as gender issues in relation with self-reliance. Questions were created in a semi-structured and neutral way to not influence the experts with predefined questions too much (Ahlin 2019; Gläser and Laudel 2010, p. 135). Another goal was to ask easy-to-understand questions (Gläser and Laudel 2010, p. 141). However, almost all experts needed more information based on power dynamics as they could not grasp the intention of these questions (Section 5 of questionnaire, see Online Supplement C). As suggested by literature, a guideline was used to pre-structure as well as navigate through the interview in a flexible manner (Helfferich 2019, p. 670). The guideline for the one- to two-hour interviews consisted of seven thematic blocks with one to three main questions (Bogner et al. 2014, p. 28; Gläser and Laudel 2010, p. 144). The type of questions were narrative-generating ones to gain insights from experiences and events as well as position-taking questions to gain personal evaluations and normative assessments (Bogner et al. 2014, pp. 62-64). It is suggested to use entry questions raising the interviewees interest and disperse potential distrust (Hildebrandt 2015, p. 251). The interviewees should feel competent and taken seriously, thus, it is important to give them room to narrate and make their point.

*Interview Guideline for Research Project*

The guideline was sent out along with the request for an interview to gain trust of the potential interviewees and to give them a feeling of the questions to be raised (Bogner et al. 2014, p. 30). Further, the invitation to the interview included an introductory text regarding the author, the research project, process of data gained by interviews and a declaration of consent. In a short appendix, definitions were given for clarification. The full interview guideline can be found in Online Supplement C. Herein, only the sections and not all questions are introduced:

- Section 1 (*Personal questions*) of the guideline consisted of personal questions to get an idea about the experiences, the interviewed experts have made throughout their career
• Section No. 2 (*Specifying self-reliance*) helped to deepen the understanding of self-reliance, apart from literature and written statements of humanitarian aid agencies

• Section 3 (*Tangible influential factors*) was to find out which tangible influential factors such as infrastructure could increase self-reliance in a refugee camp and the benefits they may generate for the residents, i.e., in Za'atari and/or Azraq camp in Jordan

• Section 4 (*Intangible influential factors*) asked about intangible influential factors, i.e., considering women

• Section 5 (*Personal experience with power relationships*) inquired about insights regarding experienced power issues with other stakeholders

• Section 6 (*Measuring indicators to assess level of self-reliance*), particularly specified for UNHCR staff, sought to evaluate which assessments were conducted for camp settings, and in which the experts had worked. Table No. 3 in Chapter 2.5 was presented to clarify which assessments had been conducted by the staff for a respective camp

• The last Section 7 (*Comments, statements, stories*) let room for further knowledge or experiences the experts were open to share

### 4.2.3 Interview Execution

There are no clear rules about conducting interviews, only experiences summarised in guidelines on successfully conducting interviews (Bogner et al. 2014, p. 49; Gläser and Laudel 2010, p. 172). Knowledge about these guidelines supports the interviewer’s confidence in the interview conduction. Besides mutual respect, another of these guideline rules is to only conduct interviews when the interviewer has a certain degree of knowledge and expertise of the interview topic (Gläser and Laudel 2010, p. 172). In this way, the interviewer can present herself as a valuable conversation partner (Ahlin 2019). However, Gläser and Laudel (2010) suggest refraining from too much professionalism to avoid intimidating the interview partner (p. 172). Further, they advise to show interest and listen actively, concentrating on the content of the statements given by the interviewee, signalling that his words were understood and assessing which information is still missing (ibid. p. 173). Thereby, it is essential not to validate the statements given by the interviewee (ibid. p. 177).

*Interview Execution including Obstacles Regarding the Guideline*

All interview partners were asked if recording would be allowed. At the beginning as well as during the interview, when necessary, the interviewer assured the interviewee that everything recorded is solely for transcription and the names of the interview partners would not be
revealed. It was guaranteed to send out all findings and results of the analysis for feedback before publication.

Each interview began with a short introduction of the research project. The guideline rules of successful interview execution in mind, the interviewer tried to give as much information as necessary to show that the discussion is at eye level, while requests were phrased in a non-judgemental fashion.

Throughout the interviews, the guideline had to be adapted slightly. Though creating difficulties in the evaluation process, the results of the analysis were not influenced negatively by these adaptations. Mainly regarding Section 5 (*Personal experience with power relationships*), the experts had not too many experiences to share. Section 6 sought to find out more about measuring indicators in a camp, though did not fulfil its purpose. Despite talking to various UNHCR staff members, no expert could give realistic and validated statements regarding performance measurement. As mentioned above, no expert could share information about conducted assessments, for instance, in Zaatari camp.

4.2.4 Evaluation

In contrast to evaluating quantitative interviews, qualitative interviews are not evaluated in a standardised manner (including expert interviews) (Bogner et al. 2014, p. 71). Nonetheless, all types of evaluation share the same main objective: extracting information of texts, converting this information into a fitting format and processing the information based on the new format and not the original text form (Gläser and Laudel 2010, p. 197). The qualitative content analysis supports the researcher to reconstruct social issues pointing to questions like ‘What happened?’ (Bogner et al. 2014, p. 73). Reconstruction points to seek truth about processes or conditions. The main idea here is to discover causal dependencies – which factors contributed to result in event X? Therefore, Gläser and Laudel (2010) developed five steps to evaluate the interview transcriptions (Bogner et al. 2014, pp. 73-75; Gläser and Laudel 2010, pp. 197-260). Following a top-down approach, categories are identified which can be adapted during the analysing process (Figure 19). In the first step, questions and a question perspective must be determined to know which perspective is considered when reading the texts. Further, it must be determined how the text is analysed (e.g., sentences or paragraphs). In the second step, a category system is developed including the relations with each other (e.g., cause effects). This system is open, though based on existing categories from literature. In the third step – the extraction phase – the interview texts are systematically extracted and included in the category system. This step is necessary to extract relevant information to answer the research questions derived in step...
one. Clear definitions are necessary to give less scope for interpretation and to take decisions in case information could be linked to more than one category. In the fourth step, data is processed to improve the quality of the data base, like reducing redundant information or correcting mistakes when the interview partner was clearly mistaken. At the fifth step, the research questions are to be answered in relation to the first step, based on the processed data and finding out, if possible, patterns and/or rules for the researched case(s).

This method is mainly used to gain information from expert interviews and to conduct a qualitative content analysis to depict reality (Gläser and Laudel 2010, p. 200). For present work, the qualitative content analysis could only be applied fragmentally. Reasons for not applying the qualitative content analysis properly listed here:

- The category of the dimensions was already determined to some extent by the CPI System (though broadened as it was not sufficient for all influential factors)
- Some expert interviews had to diverge from the interview guideline because of the different specialities of the experts (e.g., No. 6 – general gender issues and No. 8 – labour intensive infrastructure in non-camp settings)
- No hypotheses or research questions were built or sought to be answered by the interviews. Instead, the objective was to use gained information for the case study (Chapter 4.1) and to extract and identify influential factors (Chapter 4.5)

The approach of evaluation is described hereafter.
Evaluation Method Used in Present Research Project

All 12 interviews were transcribed. From the transcriptions, statements were extracted and given a range of iterative labels identified as influential factors as well as a unique code (cf. step 2 and 3 of Gläser and Laudel (2010), Figure 19). The code consisted of the number of the interviewee (1 to 12), the number of the interview question (cf. Online Supplement C for the numbers of the interview questions) and a letter if more than one statements were given to the same question (e.g., 1_1.1a). These codes could then be used to regroup the different statements according to the CPI categories (cf. Chapter 3) as well as the influential factors. Resulting table was added with content from literature and statements extracted from the comparable study of Betts et al. (2018a) to validate the information gained by the expert interviews.

Again, the findings from all sources were sorted by the influential factors and the CPI categories. The previously assigned codes were replaced by the influential factor’s source (cf. Online Supplement D; findings from expert interviews (#1.xy), findings specifically concerning Jordan (literature and expert interviews – #2.xy), findings from literature (#3.xy) and findings from Betts et al. (2018) regarding Kalobeyei Settlement in Kenya (#4.xy) and a number for the influential factor (1.1 to 4.19)).

The findings are outlined in Chapter 4.5.2 and 4.5.3 (Steps 4 and 5 of Gläser and Laudel (2010), Figure 19).

In sum, the interviews were transcribed, re-grouped, coded, clustered and coded again to
• identify influential factors,
• align them with Chapter 3 and the CPI System and
• use them for the configuration of the IIF hence, analysing stakeholders regarding power and influence

The next sub-chapter combines the theory of gender knowledge (cf. Chapter 4.1.2) with the gender approaches interviewed organisations take.

4.3 Theoretical Approach – Political Theory in the Light of Self-Reliance and Livelihood Opportunities

The next sub-chapter presents Steven Lukes and Thomas E. Wartenberg’s theories on power. Both theories are used as the ground for the analysis on power in Chapter 4.5 as well as the discussion in Chapter 5.

In light of the theoretical background knowledge given in Chapters 2.1 to 2.5, a series of political science issues arise concerning the very motives behind various self-reliance-related approaches:

• Which way of thinking is behind the different approaches concerning self-reliance, especially in the context of refugees and refugees living in camps?
• Were the authors of the different UNHCR livelihood and self-reliance strategies influenced by the concept of the homo economicus?
• When talking about gender equality, do stakeholders, executing power or influence, really have the well-being of women in mind or rather a general economic growth of specific areas?
• What is their gender knowledge and how do they seek to mainstream gender?
• If implementing livelihood opportunities in refugee camps, do field officers see themselves as executers of power (and thus, execute power over refugees) or rather as facilitators of opportunities to empower refugees (and thus, follow the concept of power to)?
• How do they see refugees? Do they consider them powerless, helpless people waiting to be served or as actors of their own fate?
• Is the way of the field officers’ activities aligned with the mindsets of the headquarters writing reports and guidelines?

To seek answers to such and similar questions, this chapter introduces the concept of the homo economicus (Chapter 4.1.1), gender knowledge and gender mainstreaming (Chapter 4.1.2) and concepts concerning power dynamics (Chapter 4.1.3). The theory of power given here, especially the forms of power, are essential for the analysis of the influential factors in Chapter 4.5.2. The content of this sub-chapter is picked up and discussed in Chapter 5.
The Concept of the Homo Economicus

In the light of the theory presented in Chapter 2, a question about the economic concepts and theories of human behaviour of the encamped refugees can be raised.

Homo economicus is viewed as a human maximising his own utility, guided by his individual preferences, acting upon his own financial advantages and seeking to achieve his objectives with minimal costs (Urbina and Ruiz-Villaverde 2019, pp. 72-73; Habermann 2010, pp. 152-153; Faber et al. 2002, p. 324). An individual’s preferences, rooted in self-interest and utility maximisation, are stable, coherent and well-defined (Urbina and Ruiz-Villaverde 2019, p. 63; McMahon 2015, p. 141). The homo economicus has well-formed beliefs about the outcome of a situation which an individual updates whenever one gains new information (McMahon 2015, p. 141). Thus, one constantly calculates pleasure versus pain or costs versus benefits to obtain the best results in relation to the means at his disposal (Urbina and Ruiz-Villaverde 2019, p. 66). Neoclassical theorists argue that maximisation of utility is the essential factor that determines a person’s decision-making process. For instance, when worrying about the welfare of others, an individual only does so to the point where it affects her own welfare (Urbina and Ruiz-Villaverde 2019, pp. 65-66).

Many theorists have discussed and further developed the concept of homo economicus, others have rejected it completely and proposed alternatives. The purpose of this chapter is to pick up some of these developments and alternatives and place them in the context of the encamped refugee and his desire to engage in livelihood opportunities or gain self-reliance. Doucouliagos (1994), for instance, argues that an agent has cognitive limitations to rational choice. She does adapt rather than optimise and does not maximise, but satisfice, among others. Thus, the author proposes a refinement of the homo economicus (Neo-Homo Economicus versus Paleo-Homo Economicus, pp. 878-881). The human brain can only process a certain amount of information. Consequently, an agent’s decision-making processes are constrained by his own cognitive limitations; ergo rationality has its boundaries. Thus, ‘optimisation’ to which neoclassical theorists refer to must rather be seen as ‘constrained optimisation’ or ‘adaptation’ (p. 879).

Further, Doucouliagos (1994) takes up the argument that reaching a satisfactory level (or satisficing) equals reaching the maximum – the maximum just depends on the agent’s preferences and perspective. For instance, a worker could earn higher payment if she worked more or

11Though presented as a neutral subject, homo economicus is gendered. Upon analysis, he is a ‘white, heterosexual, elite, and male’ subject (Agenjo-Calderón and Gálvez-Muñoz 2019, p. 144; McMahon 2015, p. 155). Still, in this chapter both gender forms are used to not make this distinction.
harder, but does not do so as for her the extra effort is not worth it – she has reached her maximum and is content (pp. 879-880).

Behavioural economists take criticism one step further. They argue, among others, that people overvalue what they already have, overrate the precision of their own information and are irrationally averse to losses when they have the opportunity to gain more. People work against utility maximisation by choosing familiar or salient options or by not including all available information (McMahon 2015, p. 142). Their actions, it is argued, are rather based on motivations than on economic actions, their preferences are rather influenced by society than purely based on self-interest.

Also, Sen (2012) proposes not to assume that self-interest is more ‘elementary’ than other values. Such values or motives could be moral or social concerns (Sen 2012, p. xii), love or duty (Mansbridge 2012, p. 152), pride, shame, patriotism or even hatred (Anderson 2000, pp. 173-174). All such motives or values present alternatives to self-interest. Another value is social norm, defined as a standard of behaviour shared by a social group, enforced by sanctions such as praise or blame, social inclusion or exclusion (Anderson 2000, pp. 170-171). Theorists who aim to supplement the concept of homo economicus argue that people conform to social norms to express their social identities, relationships to other people or shared intentions and values (model of homo sociologicus). People obey norms, because they have internalised them. The norms are part of a person’s understanding of her identity which is largely linked to membership in social groups (Anderson 2000, pp. 191-192). A social group is a ‘plural subject’, a set of people understanding themselves as ‘we’ – jointly committed to some goals, beliefs and/or principles of action (Anderson 2000, p. 192, cited from Gilbert, On Social Facts, pp. 204-5).

The individual who identifies with a group accepts responsibility for contributing to reach the group’s goal and thus, this person’s self-interest has become the interest of the group (Mansbridge (2012, p. 156) distinguishes between ‘selfish self-interest’ and ‘unselfish self-interest’). This concept of group identification also helps to explain the behaviour of a family related to the context of the homo economicus. Families seek their self-interest outside of the household, while behaving altruistically within it (Agenjo-Calderón and Gálvez-Muñoz 2019, p. 146; England and Kilbourne 1990, p. 161). Even within the family, it is argued that family members act the way it serves their family best; hence, a family member with higher wage rate spends more time in labour force, while one with lower wage spends more time in non-market activities (Becker 1974). Thus, like an individual, a family acts rationally seeking utility and profit maximisation and/or the minimisation of costs, including transaction costs (Zafirovski 1999, p. 47).
An individual is not only part of his family, but also belongs to other groups, e.g., to a state as a citizen; a workplace as an employee, a religious group in the form of a member, etc., and one does not feel equally committed to each group (Anderson 2000, p. 194). Most human beings seem to constantly act out of a complex combination of love, duty and self-interest (Mansbridge 2012, p. 162), also with respect to different groups. Towards his family a person might feel intrinsically motivated and responsible to do his part to attain the goals of the group (the overall family’s welfare, for instance). He does not need any incentive or sanction to act in the self-interest of the group. Concerning his workplace, the same person might not feel a high degree of responsibility to reach the group’s goal (e.g., high profit). To get him working towards the group’s goals, he needs to be incentivised, for instance, by a monetary remuneration.

Under these aspects, a range of questions arise. Is the theory discussed above applicable to an encamped refugee? Does a refugee act as a homo economicus in one of its forms? Which concept do international organisations apply to their livelihood programmes? How does this application affect the beneficiaries? Answers to these questions are not given straightforwardly but will be discussed in Chapter 5.2.1.

4.3.2 The Concept of Power Dynamics

Power is one of the fundamental realities for each and every human being (Wartenberg 1988, p. xi). In daily life and in academic contexts, power is discussed abundantly (Lukes 2005, p. 61). To understand the nature of human beings to oppress and humiliate, power needs to be studied in different contexts (Wartenberg 1988, p. xi). Most studies of power are embedded in critical social science and philosophy and as philosophic discussion can be illuminated from different sides, agreement on the issue, including definitions, measurements and conceptions is yet missing (Lukes 2005, p. 61). It is not the scope of this chapter to contribute to this debate or in general to definitions or conceptions. Rather, the purpose of this sub-chapter is to explain the concepts of ‘power-over’ and ‘power-to’ and different forms of power based on the theorists Steven Lukes (Power – A Radical View, 2005) and Thomas E. Wartenberg (Forms of Power, 1988 and 1990, Situated Social Power, 1992), supplemented by Iris Marion Young’s Five Faces of Oppression, 1992. Excerpts of these theories are used to operationalise power relations in a refugee camp focusing on self-reliance (cf. Chapter 4.5.2).
To understand the concepts of the two theories, the differences of the two categories power-over and power-to are presented. As power-to or empowerment is not in focus of the remaining chapter, its outlines are included shortly hereafter.

**Power-over versus Power-to**
Most theorists acknowledge the differentiation between power-over and power-to. Power-over signifies that the dominating agent, by Wartenberg also called the superordinate agent (Wartenberg 1988), consisting of an individual or a group (labelled here as A), has power to exercise control over the dominated agent, also called the subordinate agent (also an individual or a group, labelled here as B). In contrast, the concept of power-to is directed at individuals or groups and their ability or capacity to act autonomously, making it constitutive for society (Göhler 2009, p. 29; Lukes 2005, p. 34). In contrast to power-over which is seen as a zero-sum game where one must lose so the other one wins, power-to usually generates two or more winners (Göhler 2009, p. 31). The superordinate agent can strengthen the power of the subordinate agent and vice versa. Calling power-to also ‘transformative use of power’, Wartenberg, defines it as a use of power and not a form of power, argues that this kind of power ‘seeks to bring about its own obsolescence by means of the empowerment of the subordinate agent’ (Wartenberg 1990, p. 184). If, however, the superordinate agent seeks to maintain his domination over the subordinate agent, not power-to but power-over is exercised (Wartenberg 1990, pp. 187, 213).

This kind of power, if actually used and not only remaining potential, gives people the ability to act autonomously and to empower themselves (Göhler 2009, p. 32). Hence, empowerment gives people the power to act (Göhler 2009, p. 33). This kind of action could also be conducted in the form of non-compliance or resistance and if conducted collectively, actually gives seemingly powerless people the ability to change or disrupt a system (Weldon 2019, p. 130). Protests organised through social media, for instance, are such acts of empowerment of seemingly powerless people, with which they call for resistance or non-compliance towards governments, corporations or other groups (e.g., the #metoo campaign of and for sexually harassed women) (ibid.).

‘Empowering behaviour refers to the specific actions a person takes to exercise influence on the socio-political environment through participation in community organisations and activities’ (Papa et al. 2000, p. 92). This also holds true in other communities, including refugee camps. Through collective action, such as carrying out communal projects or pursuing resources, people can overcome poverty and even dependency on assistance. Working in a group
has positive psychological effects – people engage in dialogue with each other, participate in networking, share responsibilities and can also collectively resist pressure or dominant social forces from the outside, etc. (ibid., pp. 92-93). Dialogues facilitate self-reflection, self-knowledge and liberation from disempowering beliefs as well as urge one to learn, accept diversity, and develop trust and understanding. The individual of the group undergoes personal transformation and experiences empowerment. Collectively, such a group then has the ability to change its social environment (Papa et al. 2000, p. 94; Young 1994, p. 50).

In refugee settlements, different types of empowerment were identified by Dykstra-DeVette and Canary (2019, p. 332): Material empowerment, e.g., money and transportation, the symbolic aspects of empowerment, or constructing relational empowerment based on community ties. Community empowerment is important as outlined above and in Chapter 4.4 (cf. UNHCR approach). Community-based approaches (cf. Chapter 4.5.2, Category 7 and 9), usually supported by organisations, can give refugees the power-to act on their behalf. In case the community manages to reach a certain size and to voice their concerns loudly and collectively, they might even exercise power-over other stakeholder groups, such as the field officers or even the host government. In 2014, in Zaatari camp, for instance, riots broke out because its inhabitants took offence at not being able to live in a dignified way due to the living circumstances within the camp (Schön et al. 2018; BBC News 2014). As a response, field officers and the government joined forces to drastically and quickly improve the living circumstances within the camp – the riots stopped and since then, the camp remains relatively calm (Kleinschmidt 2015, pp. 7-32; Kimmelman 2014).

The forms of power-over which can be executed is presented below using the theories of Wartenberg (1990, 1988) and Lukes (2005). According to these theorists, the concept of power-over is more interesting to study than power-to, as it reveals how social relationships, practices and institutions work and help to analyse hierarchical social relationships (Lukes 2005, p. 34; Wartenberg 1990, p. 5). Lukes analysed how the powerful secure the (willing) compliance of those they dominate, and can exercise power over the latter (Lukes 2005, p. 10). While Lukes, who published the first edition of “Power – A Radical View” in 1974, intended to contribute to the debate among American political scientists and sociologists about the question of how to think about power theoretically and how to study it empirically (Lukes 2005, p. 1), Wartenberg criticised the existing theory of not being elaborated enough and focusing mainly on the political sphere (Wartenberg 1990, pp. 27-31). Thus, he developed a clear ontology – basically a field
theory of social power – which, according to him, was missing in previous theoretical concepts and different forms of power (Wartenberg 1990, pp. 51-53).

To operationalise the concept of power-over in the context of refugee camps or precisely in the context of Zaatari camp in Jordan, Wartenberg’s as well as Lukes’ theories are presented and compared below, including examples of how to apply certain aspects to encamped refugees in the context of self-reliance.

Three-dimensional View by Lukes (2005)
Lukes sketches three conceptual maps revealing different features of three views of power (Lorenzi 2006, pp. 88-89). He calls his theory the three-dimensional view on power.

The one-dimensional view, based on Dahl (1957, 1961) focuses, in the interpretation of Lukes (2005), on observable behaviour and decision-making as central task. Power is performed when A gets B to do something that B does not want to do and otherwise would not do (Isaac 1992; Lukes 2005, pp. 16-18; Dahl 1957). In this theoretical construct, a conflict is necessary between consciously made preferences. These preferences must be exhibited in actions, so that the parties’ behaviour is observable (Lukes 2005, p. 19). A conflict of preferences is also a conflict of interests, assuming that people are aware of their interests and articulate them overtly. Lukes (2005) concludes ‘that this first, one-dimensional, view of power involves a focus on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, seen as express policy preferences, revealed by political participation’ (p. 19).

The two-dimensional view of power, interpreted by Lukes (2005) on Bachrach and Baratz (1970), includes non-decision-making processes, besides the one-dimensional view regarding decision-making processes. A non-decision is a ‘decision that results in suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of the decision-maker’ (Bachrach and Baratz 1970, p. 44), whereas a decision is ‘a choice among alternative modes of action’ (Bachrach and Baratz 1970, p. 39). In Bachrach and Baratz’s view, demands for change can be killed before the relevant decision-making arena has been spoken about or made accessible or even destroyed in the ‘decision-implementing stage of the policy process’ (Bachrach and Baratz 1970, p. 44). To the actual issues of the one-dimensional view, potential issues are added to the concept of power which did not become actual because of nondecision-making (Bachrach and Baratz 1970, pp. 47-48). Both views assume that an observable overt or covert conflict is necessary for a (non-)decision-making process as otherwise there would be consensus. The assumption is that where consensus prevails, neither decision-making nor non-decision-making
is necessary or even impossible (or at least cannot be analysed empirically) (Lukes 2005, p. 23; Bachrach and Baratz 1970, p. 49). The aforementioned conflicts, Bachrach and Baratz refer to, are between the interests of the powerful non-decision-makers and the interests they exclude from a hearing within the political systems (Lukes 2005, p. 24). The excluded and disadvantaged group B might have grievances. These grievances might be overt or covert, but they always need to be observable and identified. Overt grievances are expressed and generate an issue within the political system, covert grievances are still outside the system and thus, ‘unworthy’ to public attention and controversy (Lukes 2005, p. 24; Bachrach and Baratz 1970, p. 49). Here, Lukes disagrees.

Though valuing the advancement of the two-dimensional view to the one-dimensional view, Lukes developed a three-dimensional view due to three points of criticism of the two-dimensional view (2005, pp. 25-29): First, collective actions exist and can be manifested (Lukes 2005, p. 26). Such actions or policies cannot be automatically attributed to particular decisions or behaviour patterns of an individual. Although aid agencies are made up of individuals, the power exercised by these organisations or collective bodies does not consist of the decisions and behaviour of individuals. Second, stressing on actual conflicts being essential to power is understated. Power can also be exercised over another group or person by influencing, shaping or determining one’s wants, desires and controlling one’s thoughts (Lukes 2005, p. 27). Mass media, the controlling of information, the process of socialisation are all forms of power and control (nearly) impossible to evade. Thus, a more effective power than the one connected with conflict is the one where a conflict does not need to arise at all (ibid.). Third, by assuming that non-decision-making power is tied to grievances not able to enter the political process as an issue, concurrently, one must assume that when not feeling grievances, people’s interests are not harmed by the use of power (Lukes 2005, p. 28). Besides criticising the lack of a definition for ‘grievance’, Lukes (2005, p. 28) reasons that a supreme form of exercising power is to prevent people having grievances at all. Perceptions, cognitions and preferences can be shaped in such a way that they accept their position in the hierarchy by

- not being able to imagine an alternative, or
- seeing it as natural and unchangeable, or
- valuing their position as divinely ordained and beneficial.

Such a latent conflict consists of the interests of the dominant versus the real interests of the subordinates, of which the latter might not even be conscious about (ibid.). The aim of the three-dimensional view is to explain ‘how political systems prevent demands from becoming political
issues or even from being made’ (Lukes 2005, p. 40), but at the same time, these demands must be desired, though not achieved by a significant number of actors in the community (Lukes 2005, p. 40-41). The most effective form of power for Lukes is when it is least observable (Lukes 2005, p. 1) and when those being dominated ‘acquire beliefs that result in their consent or their adaptation to domination, by either coercive or non-coercive forms’ (Lorenzi 2006, p. 88).

For refugee camps, Lukes’ third-dimensional view means, among others, that power is exercised by one stakeholder group (for instance, field officers or the government) without having conflicts with another group (for instance, female and/or male refugees), because decisions or circumstances affecting the latter are based on social and cultural beliefs and have been passed down over generations or are historically embedded (Suliman 2019, p. 4). For instance, the fact that a refugee camp is fenced could cause a conflict between field officers and refugees, but often fences are seen as a necessary tool, also to protect refugees from intruders.

*Action-environment by Wartenberg (1990)*

In contrast to Lukes focusing on ‘real interests’, Wartenberg built his theory around his ‘Ontology of Human Action’, defining the terms ‘action-environment’ and ‘action alternatives’ (Wartenberg 1990, pp. 80-84, 1988, pp. 5-9). In his ontological structure, each human being exists in a social and natural context in which he has access as an agent (individuals or groups) to a set of possible courses of action, such as physical capacities or limitations (Wartenberg 1988, pp. 5-6). This set of possible courses of action is determined by the agent’s interpretation of her situation with regard to the alternatives she has – the so-called agent’s action-environment. The interpretation is accompanied by an evaluation, e.g., on the account of possible consequences or on the account of what ‘she thinks she should choose’ (Wartenberg 1988, p. 6). Thus, in the construct of an action-environment, an agent has a range of action alternatives in a given situation (Wartenberg 1988, pp. 6-7). These courses of action are limited not only to the reason why an agent has to pursue a course of action in a given situation; the agent’s assessment; the awareness of all action alternatives that one as a human being might have; but also by the agent’s valuation. This valuation could include the agent’s emotions, ethical or moral concept or pursuit of satisfying his (basic) needs (Wartenberg 1988, pp. 7-9).
Wartenberg further distinguishes between the exercise and the possession of power (Wartenberg 1988, p. 9-12). ‘A social agent A possesses power over another agent B iff\(^{13}\) A controls B’s action environment in a fundamental manner’ (ibid., p. 10). Power, when possessed, but not exercised, is a capacity – an agent (A) has control of the action-environment of another agent (B), without necessarily taking the courses of action to make the power real. However, one could exercise that power if one chooses to do so. In contrast to possessing power stands the next statement, emphasising on exercising power: ‘An agent A exercises power over an agent B iff A uses his control of B’s action-environment to change it in some fundamental manner’ (Wartenberg 1988, p. 11). Here, power is a real event – the circumstances within which an agent (B) acts and makes choices were changed by another agent (A).

*Situated Social Power by Wartenberg*

As relevant as the concept of the action-environment is Wartenberg’s concept of the ‘Situated Social Power’. He criticises the assumption made by other power theorists that power is dyadic (Wartenberg 1990, p. 141). Rather, he argues, to understand and criticise the true nature of power relationships, the ‘social others’ need to be highlighted (ibid., p. 142). A power dyad is ‘itself situated in the context of other social relations through which it is actually constituted as a power relationship’ (ibid.). This means that A only has power over B, because B knows about and fears the actions of the peripheral social agents as a consequence (Wartenberg 1992, p. 80). Wartenberg explains the situated social power concept in different ways using a range of examples (Wartenberg 1990, pp. 141-161). For the purpose of present work, his example of a teacher-student relationship is sufficient. A teacher can grade a student. A student is mainly and usually interested in receiving high grades, because low grades are punished by society (peripheral to the central dyad student-teacher) with disadvantages in the student’s further life, such as being rejected from higher schools or interesting jobs (Wartenberg 1990, pp. 142-145). The teacher’s power over the student is *structural*: Only because of the presence of the others and their positive assessment of good grades with regard to the student’s abilities and achievements does the teacher have power over the student. Therefore, the actions of the others must be aligned to the dominating agent. Wartenberg calls this ‘social alignment’ (ibid., pp. 149-150). For instance, nations are aligned or non-aligned with one of the two superpowers, meaning that both superpowers have a certain set of policies around which the aligned nations orient themselves. They orient their actions and policies on one of the two superpowers (ibid.). The

\(^{12}\) Wartenberg’s emphasises are not added in this text

\(^{13}\) iff = if and only if
concept of social alignment provides a way to understand the ‘field’ ‘that constitutes a social power relationship as a power relationship’ (ibid., p. 150). Referring to the student-teacher relationship, the grading alignment is able to function as a social alignment, because the opportunity to study at a university is desirable. The ability to enter a university depends on the grades of a student. This power relationship however does not persist when, for instance, the student has little hope of having access to a decent job through good grades due to other constraints of his life, such as his migration status or his living situation (ibid., p. 146). Further, the power relationship between a student and a teacher is disturbed when the student has alternative alignments such as an old-boy network through which the student gets a job despite his grades (ibid., p. 175). Here, the action-environment of the subordinate agent is not influenced by the dominating agent (ibid., p. 176). The teacher-student relationship is also a good example to show why power is dynamic and not static. If the teacher works at a private school to which parents send their children expecting to gain an advantage over others after graduation, a teacher’s grading policy must be in line with the school’s grading policy to keep current students and attract new ones. Thus, teachers must exercise their power in accordance to dictated principles by the school, in this case, they are not dominating, but subordinate agents if the teachers want to keep their employment at that school (ibid., p. 179-180).

In the context of a refugee camp, the situated social power helps to explain, for instance, the behaviour of refugees towards rules established by field officers or the government. In Chapter 4.1, the process of obtaining work permits for refugees in Jordan is explained. By obtaining work permits in the camp, encamped refugees are legally permitted to leave the camp to go to work. Without a work permit, refugees working outside the camp run the risk of being detained by the police. As a consequence, they are not allowed to leave the camp for a certain period of time. The actions of the peripheral social agents incentivise the refugees to obtain a work permit in the respective office maintained by the field officers. Field officers and police are aligned with the work permit policies given by the government.

The concept of the situated social power as well as of social alignments must be kept in mind for the analysis of the different stakeholder groups in a refugee camp (Chapter 4.5). Next, the different forms of power used by Wartenberg and Lukes are outlined.

**Forms of Power**

Lukes and Wartenberg define different typologies or forms of power though Wartenberg goes more into detail (1990, pp. 91-114) than Lukes (2005, pp. 21-22, 35-36), who reproduces the typology given by Bachrach and Baratz (1970). Both define force, coercion, influence and
manipulation. Lukes also includes authority into his conceptual map, Wartenberg includes domination into his theory. The different forms of power are compared with each other and shortly discussed here.

**Force**

Force, regarding Wartenberg, is exercised when ‘A’s power over B is an instance of force iff A physically keeps B from pursuing an action alternative that B has reason to pursue or makes B’s body behave in a way that B would avoid if possible’ (Wartenberg 1988, p. 12). The superordinate agent is able to physically keep the subordinate agent from doing what she would prefer to do or to get something to happen to her she would rather not to. To exist as such, force must be exercised. Force does not need to be directed at the body; it could also be directed towards the possession of B. In any case, the superordinate agent (A) does not attempt to change the subordinate’s mind or create a mutual understanding. By using her as an object, the former simply hinders the latter to act (Wartenberg 1988, pp. 12-14). This definition is aligned with Lukes’ definition of force saying that ‘A achieves his objectives in the face of B’s noncompliance by stripping him of the choice between compliance and noncompliance’ (Lukes 2005, p. 22). For both theorists, force is a form of power for which the dominating agent has to use energy when exercising it. Wartenberg adds that force is predominantly negative and can only keep an agent from performing a certain action but not get him to do something (Wartenberg 1990, p. 101). To get somebody to do something he does not want to do, either a mix of different forms of power is necessary or domination, which is also negative. For Wartenberg, domination is a use of power, not a form of power. It refers to a relationship instead of a single exercise of power and is practised repeatedly and over a long term in a systematic and detrimental fashion (Wartenberg 1990, p. 117).

To adapt force as a form of power in a refugee camp, Lukes’ definition is used hereafter, as it appears sharper and clearer in its definition regarding not having a choice between compliance and non-compliance.

In a refugee camp, in many cases, refugees are the subordinates and field officers or governmental actors (e.g., police force) are the superordinates who force the subordinates to act the way the superordinates prefer. For instance, by fencing the camp, refugees cannot enter or exit the camp as they prefer, but are forced to stay in or out (if they cannot obtain a permit from the superordinates).
Coercion power is defined by Wartenberg as the following:

A social agent A exercises coercive power over social agent B iff (1) A has the ability to affect B in a significant way; (2) A threatens to do so unless B acts in a certain way; and (3) B accedes to A’s threat and alters his course of action. (Wartenberg 1988, p. 15)

This means that the threatening agent A has tools and/or means to affect the situation of B in a way that B’s action alternatives are changed. A must have the ability to communicate to B his ability to affect B, so B understands the significance of the interaction. B must also have the reason to believe that A can affect her situation and will do so in case B does not comply with A’s threat. Otherwise, B would not take the threat seriously. Last, B must not want the threat to become true, so the consequence must be negative and outweigh the action-environment, which existed before the threat was made (Wartenberg 1988, p. 16). For Wartenberg, coercion has a productive nature as this kind of power actually gets the subordinate agent to do something (Wartenberg 1990, p. 101). It can be of a positive character and does not need energy to be exercised in case the threat is made effective (ibid., p. 102).

Lukes’ defines coercion similarly, though not stressing on the energy being used or if it is positive or negative: When a conflict over values or over a course of action between A and B exists, A makes sure that B complies with it by threatening him with deprivation (Lukes 2005, p. 21).

In the case of a refugee camp, such coercion could refer to the police (superordinates) coercing refugees (subordinates) to obtain a permit to exit the camp instead of exiting illegally. The police might try to implement this threat so as to detain refugees caught without a permit. Refugees, for instance, having heard about such detentions, would believe in the threat. Now, if a refugee ‘only’ wants to see family members, he probably would try to obtain a permit and not leave the camp without it, as the negative consequence (of being detained) outweighs the action-environment (seeing family members versus staying inside of the camp). If, however, the refugee has a family in the camp starving to death and he does not leave the camp illegally (because he was not able to get a permit), in such cases, the necessity to do so (the life of family members) would outweigh the risk of being caught and detained.

This example shows that in the case of coercive power, the superordinate cannot literally force the subordinate to do so, the latter can make a choice on how to act, either by a subservient one (give in to the threat) or a confrontational manner (refuse to give in) (Wartenberg 1988, p. 17). Both forms, force and coercion, can create resistance from the subordinates as coercion and force diminish the freedom of a subordinate. In such a case, the subordinates try to resist to the
threats and/or force to stop the superordinates having power over them (Wartenberg 1988, p. 20). Such a scenario could occur in a refugee camp, when refugees, the subordinates, try to exit the camp by force. The police force (superordinates) could answer such behaviour with retaliation, which then could lead to a spiral of violence and mistrust.

**Influence**

Instead of using force or coercion, influence could be another option, as it does not include resistance: ‘An agent A influences another agent B iff A provides B with some putative information which results in B altering his assessment of his action-environment in a fundamental manner’ (Wartenberg 1988, p. 21). Like coercion, influence needs mutual understanding as a base, as the subordinate accepts something the superordinate tells her. Wartenberg separates influence in cases where power is present (personal persuasion or expertise based on trust) and cases where power is missing (rational persuasion based on information) (Wartenberg 1990, pp. 107-109). When information brought to agent B by agent A (e.g., before, B had no access to this information) impacts the action-environment of B and B processes this information by herself, power is not exercised (Wartenberg 1988, p. 23). In contrast, when agent B is in an emotional or financial relationship of dependence to A, A can influence and simultaneously control B’s action-environment. Based on Spinoza and fitting with Lukes’ third-dimensional view, influence is a securer form of power, because the subordinate agent willingly does what the superordinate agent wants him to do (Wartenberg 1988, p. 24).

For Lukes, influence exists where A causes B to change his course of action by not using an overt or covert threat of severe deprivation (Lukes 2005, p. 21). Influence is only a form of power, according to Lukes, when sanctions and/or a conflict of interests is involved (Lukes 2005, p. 35). Lukes concretises his statement by referring to paternalism, where A supposedly knows and acts upon B’s real interests. In this case, A might exercise short-term power over B until B has recognised his real interests. If this point is reached, power is not exercised anymore (Lukes 2005, pp. 36-37). Wartenberg disagrees with this conclusion, outlining that paternalism is always a form of power as A dominates B, because here the dominant agent takes the liberty to think that he knows better than the subordinate agent what is good for the latter (Wartenberg 1990, p. 61). Due to strong argumentation and fine differentiation between rational persuasion, personal persuasion and expertise, Wartenberg’s concept of influence is used.

In a camp, for instance, the decision to send their children to school is usually made by the parents. Field officers can influence the parents by giving out information on the importance of schooling. As long as parents decide to send their children to school on the basis of the
information, which they might have received by other sources, power is not exercised (rational persuasion). If they send their children to school because they trust the field officers, regardless of the information they have received, then it may be assumed that field officers have the power over parents (personal persuasion).

**Manipulation and Authority**

In Wartenberg’s framework, manipulation is a sub-type of influence and not a distinct type of power (Wartenberg 1990, pp. 111-112). ‘An agent A manipulates another agent B iff A influences B for purposes or ends that she keeps concealed from B’ (Wartenberg 1988, p. 25). Wartenberg discusses that manipulation does not necessarily need to harm the subordinate (B), it can also help her. If B discovers her real interests only because A withholds information, B actually might profit from A’s manipulative action (ibid.). Still, he outlines that manipulation is a morally suspect social practice, as A does not treat B fairly and truthfully; thus, power is exercised as B’s action-environment is constrained by the actions of A (Wartenberg 1990, pp. 111-112).

Lukes uses the definitions for manipulation and authority (authority is not defined by Wartenberg) given by Bachrach and Baratz (1970), though disagrees with their conclusion that both types are agreements based on reason (Lukes 2005, p. 27). Manipulation takes place if B complies because he does not recognise the source or exact nature of the demand upon him authority takes place when ‘B complies because he recognises that [A’s] command is reasonable in terms of his own values’ (ibid., pp. 21-22). Instead of acknowledging that an agreement based on reason exists, Lukes concludes that A exercises power over B also if A influences, shapes or determines (and thus manipulates) B’s wants (ibid., p. 27).

One of the reasons why Lukes published ‘Power – A Radical View’ was an attempt to answer the question on how the powerful secure the (willing) compliance of those they dominate. Lukes and Wartenberg answer these questions similarly. Whereas Lukes develops his three-dimensional view focusing on influencing and shaping the wants and interests of the subordinated agent, Wartenberg outlines the structures of domination and how the dominant agent can camouflage his dominance by making the subordinate agent believe this relationship being natural and thus unavoidable and necessary (Wartenberg 1990, p. 128).

There are other arguments why dominated agents could comply to being dominated or, as related to present work, why refugees comply to exploitation and violence. The Five Faces of
Oppression, as developed by Young (1992), are outlined hereafter to add a third view of power dynamics besides the ones presented above.

The Compliance of the Suppressed – Five Faces of Oppression

Oppression is defined by Young as disadvantages and injustices that some people suffer on a daily basis and imposed by a well-intentioned liberal society and not through tyranny (Young 1992, pp. 175-176). Thus, such a type of oppression could not be eliminated by removing the tyrant(s), because oppressions are ‘systemically reproduced in major economic, political and cultural institutions’ (ibid., p. 176). In contrast to oppression embedded into the system is discrimination, which refers to particular victims discriminated by particular – and identified as responsible – agents. Thus, oppression happens in the absence of overt discrimination as a structural phenomenon immobilising or reducing a group (ibid., p. 177). To specify oppression, Young elaborated five faces of oppression which are described concisely below – exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and violence.

Exploitation

Though formally free, workers still suffer from deprivation, lack of control and hence, self-respect, because the capitalist class has extractive power to continuously extract benefits from workers (Young 1992, p. 182, 183). These workers (the have-nots), it is argued, are exploited as their labour benefits others (the haves). Thus, power remains within the group of haves who not only have great wealth but also thrive on the energies expended of the have-nots to maintain and augment their power and status (ibid). In many ways, men can thrive and increase their freedom, power, status and self-realisation due to women’s work. Women nurture and transfer sexual energies to men as well as, in many cases, prepare the fruits that men harvest later and for which receive credit (for instance, women produce agricultural products and men sell them on the market and receive income and credit for this work) (Young 1992, p. 183-184). In addition, if women work for a wage, they are often exploited as their tasks might involve sexual labour, nurturing or caring for a person’s body. The energy and power women expend for such work, which mostly benefits men on whom the women depend on, remain unnoticed and unacknowledged. This energy is used by men for more visible and creative work, to increase their status or simply to be fed sexually and emotionally (ibid., pp. 184-185). In the case of racial groups, exploitation prevails through menial labour. Menial labour signifies the labour of servants, servile, unskilled and lowly paid work for which workers lack autonomy. Often members of the oppressed racial groups are, or in the eyes of the privileged groups ought to be, their
servants; the oppressed work in private households or as servants in the public, in hotels, restaurants or as cleaners, etc. (ibid., p. 185). Such auxiliary work is instrumentalised by another person, so the latter can thrive in his profession, personality or status.

In the case of refugees working outside the camp, exploitation is found in many scenarios. Refugees have difficulties to find other jobs than menial work and suffer from low payments and lack of autonomy, especially if they had well-paid jobs in their pre-refugee lives.

Marginalisation
Another form of oppression is marginalisation. Here, a whole category of people is excluded from useful participation in social life (Young 1992, p. 186). Marginalised groups, such as old people, mentally or physically disabled, single parents or young people who cannot find a job, e.g., because of their colour of skin, are often materially deprived. Frequently and additionally, they depend on welfare (if existent) and have far less opportunities in life than non-marginalised people (ibid. p. 187). Though technically all people have equal citizenship rights, in reality many people ‘are subject to patronising, punitive, demeaning and arbitrary treatment by the policies and people associated with welfare bureaucracies’ (Young 1992, p. 187). Social service providers decide what is best for the beneficiaries and encounter them with arbitrary and invasive authority. Needs are constructed not by the beneficiaries but by the managers of welfare systems, not respecting the rights to privacy, respect and individual choices of the beneficiaries. Productive and recognised activities usually take place in contexts of organised social cooperation. Thus, marginalised people, who have no place in such cooperation, not only experience deprivation of material things, but also face boredom, uselessness and lack of self-respect, since society has no ‘use’ of them (ibid., p. 188).

Many refugees belong to this group of marginalised people. If encamped, they might be ‘better off’ as they benefit from a welfare system established within a camp, but still they face boredom, uselessness and lack of self-respect (cf. Chapter 2). Without successful programmes for self-reliance, it is probable for (encamped) refugees to remain in the group of marginalised people, lacking any opportunity to leave this group.

Powerlessness
Non-professionals, like menial workers, suffer a type of oppression Young calls powerlessness (1992, p. 189). This powerlessness is made visible by non-professionals lacking work autonomy, creativity or decision making at work. They lack technical expertise or authority and
express themselves awkwardly in public or in front of bureaucratic settings. In contrast, professionals can continuously develop their skills and capacities at work, work more or less autonomously and enjoy respect in public spaces. Professionals and non-professionals usually live in segregated neighbourhoods, dress, eat and speak differently and their children do not tend to play together (ibid. p. 190). Over generations, intergroup mobility takes place, however mostly children of professionals become professionals and children of non-professionals remain in their group.

Refugee children rarely have access to universities, thus, they become non-professionals even though they have formerly professionally working parents, but now are marginalised because of their refugee status. As elaborated above, children of non-professionals remain in this group, hence, are powerless. It might become hard if not impossible for refugee children to rise to the group of professionals even after returning to their home country. Concluding, the lack of access to education for refugee children might be dangerous for the well-being and status not only for the current refugees but also for their descendants.

Cultural Imperialism

Cultural imperialism means that one group establishes its experiences and culture as the norm (Young 1992, p. 191). Other groups are challenged under the radar of the dominant norms; their differences are looked at as deviant and inferior. Their non-compliance to the dominant norms is interpreted in a negative way and the group is marked as ‘others’. People experiencing cultural imperialism face stereotyping as well as rendered invisibility (ibid., p. 192). They are defined, positioned and placed in the system of dominant norms by those with whom they do not identify or are recognised by them. Thus, those groups develop their own culture and consequently, members of such a group are defined by their own sub-culture as well as by the dominant culture. ‘Cultural imperialism involves the paradox of experiencing oneself as invisible at the same time that one is marked out and noticed as differently’ (Young 1992, p. 193).

Refugees also experience cultural imperialism as they are marked as others in virtually all societies and compared to the norms of the dominant culture existing in the host country.

Violence

Members of some groups live in constant fear of violence and often random, unprovoked attacks on their persons or properties (Young 1992, p. 193). Young calls such violence systematic, but irrational, as it only occurs because one is a member of a certain group. In society (the
dominant group), such violence is regarded as unsurprising and goes unpunished, not provoking any kind of outrage of the dominant group. One explanation of such violence might be that the dominant group wants to keep their group privileges and domination (ibid., p. 194).

Refugees, as elaborated in Chapter 2 and later in Chapter 4.5, are also victims of arbitrary violence by police or civilians. Their chances for justice are small as they lack access to the jurisdictional system or such a system does not function properly in the host country. Even if it does, the dominant group still tends to blame the victims, here the refugees.

This sub-chapter ends by giving concluding remarks and a definition of the term ‘group’, necessary for the analysis on power dynamics in Chapter 4.

Concluding Remarks
The concepts given here developed by Young, Wartenberg and Lukes all focus on power-over, each in a different way. By developing different forms, typologies or definitions of power, they all agree that power is a complex, multifaceted social reality. Especially, Lukes and Wartenberg point out that the same action can include different agents and different types of power, as can at different times or with regard to different actions where agents can be superordinates or subordinates (Lukes 2005, pp. 35-37, 56, 64, 80; Wartenberg 1988, p. 26).

To operationalise the theory presented in this sub-chapter, Chapter 4.5 applies it to the case study of Jordan’s refugee camps in form of an analysis on power dynamics. In this context, people are accounted to the same stakeholder group who ‘share with others a way of life that defines a person’s identity and by which other people identify him or her’ (Young 1992, p. 177). Thus, identified stakeholder groups for present work are refugees and refugee women, host communities, governments (local, national), field officers (who work either in the camp or in a national office of the host country), headquarter staff (who work mainly at a strategic level), the private sector and the donor community.

The next sub-chapter introduces the expert interviews, which were used as the methodical approach.

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14Young (1992) challenges this definition in her article, but to differentiate the stakeholder groups from each other, this definition is valuable.
4.3.3 Gender Equality from the Viewpoint of Self-Reliance

Gender equality is reached when human beings regardless of their gender or biological sex (see Chapter 1) enjoy the full equality of rights and opportunities (United Nations 2019a). Gender gaps exist everywhere in the world. Economy-wide income losses of gender gaps in women’s entrepreneurship and labour force participation accounts to approximately 27 per cent in the Middle East and North Africa, 19 per cent in South Asia, 14 per cent in Latin America and the Caribbean and 10 per cent in Europe (UNDP 2016, p. 59). Globally, countries are losing USD 160 trillion in wealth due to lifetime earning differences of men and women, amounting to USD 23,620 for each person in the 141 countries analysed by the World Bank Group (The World Bank 2018b).

Focusing on self-reliance of refugees, especially on female refugees, it is necessary to consider gender equality theories with regard to self-reliance as well as the current activities of humanitarian aid agencies. This chapter briefly elaborates the meaning of gender knowledge and gender mainstreaming. Further, it highlights contributions of Muslim feminism to discussions of gender equality and human rights. Understanding gender equality theories as well as approaches of humanitarian aid agencies is necessary for the analysis in Chapter 5. Aspects of the discussion will be on the necessity of gender equality as a tool towards peaceful societies and if it can pave the way for women to reach their full potential by granting them the same opportunities that are granted to men. Alternatively and interconnected with the UN (United Nations 2019a), can gender equality also merely be necessary to gain productivity and economic growth and thus, be a concept of capitalism and modern neoliberal states? As Andresen and Dölling (2005), in the context of modernising municipal administrations, phrase: Modernisation of leadership culture is appreciated but remains subordinated to business economic goals. Thus, individual requests of employees are only granted to maintain the employee’s motivation, so the employer can make full use of her as a human resource (Andresen and Dölling 2005, pp. 181-182, own translation). In the context of self-reliance in refugee camps, the question needs to be discussed, why international organisations aim to increase the percentage of women in the labour force. Is it to give women the possibility to become economically independent or is it because international organisations are a product of neoliberalism and capitalism and thus, aim to increase global economic growth through female self-reliance/livelihood opportunities? Apart from the important part of changing views on feminised (unpaid) work to reach gender equality (Peterson 2005, pp. 510-511), would it not be more beneficial for societies to work on increasing salaries? This way parents (men and women) could gain more to sustain their families and – simultaneously – have more time to care for their children.
Though not aiming to give a final answer to this question, this thesis still attempts to contribute to the discussion of these issues regarding feminism as well as gender mainstreaming in general and in the context of people from the Arab culture(s) (here Syrian refugees in Jordan). It is important to understand the Arab context as Arab societies are more family centric unlike those in the West which revolves around the individual. To be able to follow this discussion, it is necessary to give some theoretical background, starting with the concept of gender knowledge.

Gender Knowledge and Gender Mainstreaming
The term gender knowledge, defined by Andresen and Dölling (2005), refers to the knowledge of people regarding the ‘[…] difference between the sexes, the reasoning of the self-evidence and evidence [of these differences], [and] the prevailing normative ideas about the “correct” gender relations and divisions of labour between women and men’ (Andresen and Dölling 2005, p. 175 cited in Cavaghan 2010, p. 19). This means that a society permanently differentiates both sexes including their relational and hierarchical relationship to each other in the form of descriptive, figurative and linguistic productions of their collective cultural understanding. Each individual growing up in a society continuously incorporates their societal classifications of being ‘male’ and ‘female’ and bears it within himself or herself (Kahlert 2019, p. 180; Andresen and Dölling 2005, p. 175). Andresen and Dölling (2005) intended to find out the extent of reflected gender knowledge of the employees of a municipal administration in a district of Berlin. This administration went under bureaucratic reconstruction (pp. 171-172). Externally, the municipal administration wanted to become ‘citizen- and customer-oriented’, internally, the objective of the reconstruction seemed to be to economise the processes and management to fit into the concept of hegemonic, neoliberal societies. One of the results of the study was that women who work and have children are usually in more demand owing to their double burden of employment/work and family-related tasks than men (Andresen and Dölling 2005, p. 178-179). Neither this burden nor social structures of relationships between men and women, much less structural reasons for different behaviour between both sexes, are part of their reflected knowledge. It seems the interviewees rather acknowledge gender differences only on the level of direct relationships. In the context of work, they see men and women universally as people – ‘all have the same chances’. However, this ‘universal code’ does not consider social and historic conditions of men and women and their individual opportunities of action based on gender. This lack of a gender-sensitive view in an organisation leads to (unintended) discrimination of women because their double burden is not considered. Inequality easily results in an humanitarian aid agencies because
women who carry this double burden (usually) cannot perform as highly as their male colleagues who have no or less family responsibilities (ibid. pp. 176-178). Further, this double burden limits women’s access to decent jobs, increases their stress levels and affects the power dynamics within a household (Dung and van Dai 2019, p. 655).

Hence, when analysing a setting on gender equality, it is important to consider which gender knowledge prevails on site: ‘Gender knowledge is then the hierarchical and hierarchising ascription that assigns specific social roles to women and men – in the division of labour, in the public-political sphere, in the family, in science, etc. – and constitutes specific subjectivities’ (Brand 2010, p. 133). The construct of gender needs to be seen in the context and history of its society. As historically most societies favoured patriarchy, many roles attributed to men and women still favour male interests and forms of living (Brand 2010, p. 133). Deriving the societal differences between men and women is – in the view of feminists – important to make patriarchal societal relations visible. In this way, feminists can propose alternatives concerning the role of paid and unpaid, formal and informal work, division of labour, as well as linkages to class, religious and ethnical dimensions of social structures and the related role of the state and international political institutions (Brand 2010, pp. 144-145).

How organisations deal with gender equality and on which gender knowledge they base their actions and gender mainstreaming are questions that have been dealt with in present work.

The term gender mainstreaming (or mainstreaming a gender perspective) was established at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing (1995). Gender mainstreaming calls out to mainstream the gender perspective into all policies and programmes to determine which effects they have on women and men, respectively (The Fourth World Conference on Women 1995, p. 27). More specifically, the strategy aims to integrate gender equality concerns into analyses and formulation of all policies, programmes and projects as well as involves initiatives to enable both sexes to frame and express their views as well as their participation in decision-making processes across all subjects (Syed and Ali 2019, p. 1; Mukhopadhyay 2016, p. 95). Despite these intentions, according to Cavaghan (2010, p. 21), Hafner-Burton and Pollack (2002) and Duvander et al. (2019, p. 187), gender equality policies often seemed to remain lip services as policy actions continue to be mere rhetorical commitments in the first decade of the new millennium.

Does this also apply to the organisations interviewed in the context of the Syrian refugee situation in Jordan (UNHCR, ILO, GIZ and UNDP)? Further, does their approach fit to the needs of Muslim refugee women in Jordan, or is their approach hegemonic and imposes Western ideas
on the Arab culture? The activities of these four organisations are described and evaluated on their gender knowledge in Chapter 4.4. The findings are discussed in Chapter 5.2.3.

To showcase the impact on projects and activities of organisations because of differing gender knowledge, the findings for UNDP and the World Bank gained by Çağlar (2010) are presented hereafter. In both views, the woman remains the main caretaker of her children. These findings are contrasted at the end of this sub-chapter with the picture of working women as main bread-winners.

Çağlar (2010) studied gender budgeting regarding gender knowledge and economic knowledge in the World Bank and UNDP and revealed that organisations have different gender knowledge backgrounds; thus, they target different aspects of gender budgeting. For instance, according to her, UNDP policies are based on traditional and conservative gender knowledge, where they see women as stabilising factors of society. According to UNDP, these women play a vital role by caring for and nurturing their children in creating and maintaining healthy societies. Economic growth, though important, does not automatically lead to human welfare; thus, human development and economic development cannot be correlated. Women’s unpaid work is valuable and an integral part of the economy as without it physical, psychological and social well-being cannot be guaranteed. Hence, the UNDP approach towards gender budgeting is to compensate women’s unpaid work at the household level and additionally to maintain the traditional division of work between men and women (the latter taking care of the children) to enhance human development (Çağlar 2010, pp. 68-69). Their approach cannot be easily assigned to a specific theoretical stand; it rather adds social policy measures to economic policies. On the contrary, the object of the World Bank is to increase the productivity of mothers at home to give them more time for participating in the market economy. In their reasoning, mothers are more concerned about the intellectual and physical development of their children than fathers, thus more willing to spend part of their own income towards education and health of their children – the future workforce of the economy. The World Bank believes that women are economic subjects, although not like the homo economicus as they act altruistically regarding their children. If investments are made, especially in education, health and income-generating

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15 Gender budgeting refers to bringing gendered inputs and outcomes into macroeconomic models (cf. Çağlar 2010, pp. 29-30) The concept fits to gender mainstreaming and thus, her approach is used here for a comparison of her insights and the current approaches the interviewed organisations use, without differencing gender budgeting and gender mainstreaming further.

16 Tradition is defined in present work as ‘a belief, principle, or way of acting that people in a particular society or group have continued to follow for a long time, or all of these beliefs, etc. in a particular society or group’ (Cambridge Dictionary 2019).
measures to get mothers more efficient, the economy will grow (ibid., pp. 69-70). The World Bank follows economic knowledge based on micro-foundational theories, such as Human Capital Theory or New Institutional Economics.

Women in the 21st century are not merely looked at from the traditional gender perspective of being merely housekeepers; a different gender knowledge, namely, ‘women are the main breadwinners’ has emerged as well. Women’s wages nowadays are of high importance for their families’ well-being as well as for social transformation (Boushey 2009, p. 31; Neetha 2004, p. 1685). Most women around the world work in the service sector (about 62 per cent in 2018, in comparison to 12 per cent female employment in industry and 26 per cent in agriculture (World Bank DataBank 2019a)) as employees or as entrepreneurs (Bruni et al. 2004, p. 260). Many women even migrate to find work, especially where male unemployment, poverty and lack of food are high and job opportunities at the place of origin are scarce (Neetha 2004, p. 1684). Mostly, these women leave their families behind to become the main breadwinners, because their husbands, if at all, find rather informal and insecure jobs and spend a considerable share of their income on own expenses, such as alcohol and intoxicants (Neetha 2004, pp. 1686-1687). These findings are in line with the above-mentioned findings of the World Bank. The more important the earnings of women are for their families, either as main breadwinners or as co-breadwinners, the better is their standing in their families as well as in society (Boushey 2009, pp. 31-32; Neetha 2004, p. 1687). For instance, outside home, women migrants play a decisive role in the community-building process and inside gender relations are renegotiated (Neetha 2004, p. 1687). If they are unmarried, they have greater decision-making power regarding their marriage age and the choice of the groom and within the marriage their control over household expenses is higher (ibid.). Working women in the US are more likely to head families on their own (Boushey 2009, p. 32). Such changes also transform the meaning of being a woman (ibid.). Also, from the point of employers, the view on women has changed drastically. The United Nations, for instance, seeks to employ 50 per cent women (UN Women 2016, p. 2). This goal has not yet been reached; it is still 44.2 per cent female employees in the professional and higher categories (United Nations General Assembly 23 July, 2019).

Despite many women around the world being (main) breadwinners, the traditional gender knowledge – women are housekeepers and child-carers – seems to be more applicable; the share of work permit applications is only 4 per cent in the case of refugee women in Jordan, the focus of present work.
Hereinafter, the view of Muslim feminists is presented to include, how the beneficiaries of humanitarian aid agencies might assess the approaches of the latter.

**Universality of Human Rights and Muslim Feminism**

Many Muslim women aspire to ‘enjoy peace, justice, equality and the freedoms to participate in all spheres of life and live without fear’ (Women For Afghan Women 2019). This and similar statements, especially regarding gender equality and human rights for women in Muslim countries, are made by various NGOs, forums and initiatives of Muslim women, such as Revolutionary Association of the Women for Afghanistan (RAWA), Sisters in Islam, Women for Afghan Women (WAW), Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML), Women’s Islamic Initiative in Spirituality & Equality (WISE) and the Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights (ECWR) (Sisters in Islam 2019a; Revolutionary Association of the Women for Afghanistan 2019; Women's Islamic Initiative in Spirituality & Equality 2019; Women Living Under Muslim Laws 2019; Human Rights Connected 2018). However, how do those initiatives see the gender equality approaches of humanitarian aid agencies in Muslim states?

The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was ratified or acceded by most states worldwide, including Muslim countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and South Sudan to name just a few (United Nations 1981). CEDAW includes ‘equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field’ (Article 1) and prohibits ‘all discrimination against women’ (Article 2b) (OHCHR 1979). Article 5 calls for the modification of state parties to

modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.

(ibid.)

CEDAW further requests that all states take measures to guarantee boys and girls the same education and career chances (Article 10). Article 11 refers to giving women and men the same employment opportunities, also in case of marriage or maternity. This includes maternity leave with pay, provision of necessary supporting social services to enable parents combine family obligations and work responsibilities such as child-care facilities (ibid.).

The principle of human rights, including CEDAW, was derived in the West from British and French philosophers such as Locke and Rousseau (Aslan 2003, pp. 99-100). The concept of
individual rights developed from the European Renaissance, emphasised on rationalism and humanism in the Western civilisation. Founding the United Nations and developing a doctrine of human rights, Western philosophy became a global issue. In the eyes of many Muslims, the United Nations Human Rights (UNHR) is therefore a Western construct and negates Islamic influence. This does not mean that Muslims do not agree with human rights per se, as can be seen in many Muslim organisations supporting gender equality and the principles of CEDAW (Women's Islamic Initiative in Spirituality & Equality 2019; Women Living Under Muslim Laws 2019). The source of the principles of Muslim Human Rights, though, has not been derived from Western philosophers, but from Prophet Muhammad who instituted radical social and economic reforms to give equal rights to marginalised groups, including women (Women's Islamic Initiative in Spirituality & Equality 2019; Aslan 2003, pp. 99-100). One of the main differences between both approaches is the lens on individuals in Western societies and the concern with stability and well-being of the family and community in Islam (Hallaq 2009, p. 58; Aslan 2003, p. 100; al-Hibri 2000, p. 62). Whereas the West has an ‘anthropocentric’ tradition, valuing secularism and humanism most, Islam’s tradition is ‘theocentric’, based on faith and community 17 (Aslan 2003, p. 100, based on A.K. Brohi, Islam and Human Rights 28, pp. 148-160 (1976)).

The majority of Muslim women who are attached to their religion will not be liberated through the use of a secular approach imposed from the outside by international bodies or from above by undemocratic governments. The only way to resolve the conflicts of these women and remove their fear of pursuing rich and fruitful lives is to build a solid Muslim feminist jurisprudential basis which clearly shows that Islam not only does not deprive them of their rights, but in fact demands these rights from them. (al-Hibri 1997, p. 3)

al-Hibri (1997, p. 4) continues that Western governments cannot and should not ‘liberate’ Muslim societies due to various reasons. Too often the so-called ‘liberators’ have supported regimes consistently violating human rights as these have protected Western economic and geopolitical interests (Sisters in Islam 2019b; al-Hibri 1997, p. 4). Hence, many Muslims see the concept of human rights as a Western construct which cannot be accepted because of historic and present Western hegemony. Though not denying human rights per se as they appeared in the Western

17This statement must be looked at carefully and can only reflect a tendency, as also in the West many people follow a theocentric tradition or are members of Western churches with activities in the Global North and South (see i.e. Wuthnow, R., & Offutt, S. (2008). Transnational Religious Connections. Sociology of Religion, 69(2), 209–232. doi:10.1093/socrel/69.2.209; Anderson, J. (2011) Conservative Christianity, the Global South and the Battle over Sexual Orientation, Third World Quarterly, 32:9, 1589-1605, doi: 10.1080/01436597.2011.618648, among others).
world much later than they did in the Muslim world, many Muslims demand to develop a local meaning of human rights with which they can identify (Sisters in Islam 2019b). Further, many Muslim women are not convinced that Western culture has improved the status of women, but rather created exhausted ‘super moms’ and made female sexuality a commodity (al-Hibri 1997, p. 4). Hence, gender equality as per Western standards does not enjoy a good reputation in many Muslim states. Further, in the name of human rights, Western powers tried to tear apart familial structures, an important framework for Muslim communities, to destabilise Muslim societies. Not tolerating such behaviour any more, al-Hibri (1997) observes that Muslim women demand their opportunity and right to fight for their rights, as other women did decades ago, as well as fight themselves through patriarchal religious reasoning. Muslim feminists seek to re-interpret the Quran which, in their opinion, holds the principles of empowerment and justice (Mustafa and Troudi 2019, pp. 137-138). Non-Muslims cannot and should not deny Muslims the right to fight for their human rights by using their means, such as the Quran, but rather take a supportive role.

The above-presented theory and approaches are combined with the findings of Chapter 4 and feminist literature (for details see Chapter 5) to give an answer to questions such as:

- In Muslim areas, should humanitarian aid agencies follow the theocentric or the anthropocentric tradition to increase the level of self-reliance; hence, should the focus be on self-reliance of families or of individuals to really service the beneficiaries?
- Should humanitarian aid agencies whose gender knowledge is different from the gender knowledge of their beneficiaries continue to support them? Would it not be more helpful to transfer these tasks to agencies sharing the same gender knowledge as the beneficiaries have (e.g., Muslim humanitarian/development organisations)?
- Do humanitarian aid agencies really focus on improving the lives of the women or rather on promoting neoliberal capitalism, as it appears that women engaging in wage labour are rather driven by needs and poverty than self-fulfilment (Peterson 2005)? And even if not consciously, is not the work Western aid agencies do always a service to capitalism as their instructions derive mainly from heads of states from developed and thus neoliberal countries?

The next sub-chapter applies the theory just presented to four international organisations interviewed and their gender equality programmes.
4.4 Gender Knowledge of Interviewed Organisations

Examination of organisations relevant for this work (UNHCR, ILO, GIZ and UNDP) and in the context of gender equality and gender mainstreaming revealed that the approaches of all four organisations are very similar and seem to have the woman as an individual in focus, thereby pursuing an approach related to the attitude of the World Bank and thus micro-foundational theories. The gender equality programmes of the four IOs are summarised and compared here.

In the case of ILO, GIZ and UNDP interviews were conducted with a special focus on the Jordanian programmes promoting (refugee) women and work as well as gender equality. The interview findings are also included in this section.

4.4.1 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

UNHCR focuses on community empowerment and self-reliance, though being aware of the challenges – discrimination, domestic responsibilities, lack of affordable transportation, absence of meaningful inclusion, high illiteracy rates and language barriers, among others – faced by women (UNHCR Standing Committee 2016, p. 3). Obstacles to reach gender equality were identified concerning different sectors (ibid. pp. 4-8):

- Registration, documentation and refugee status determination: Registering men as head of family, lack of access to female asylum-seekers living in urban areas, limited recognition of gender-based persecution as valid grounds for asylum
- Management and distribution of food and core relief items: Long distances to distribution centres, extended waiting periods creating protection risks for women and children
- Economic empowerment: Scarcity of adequate economic prospects for women and adolescent girls, limited access to education and training, restrictive cultural practices and legal frameworks, insufficient access to childcare, low-paid job opportunities
- Sexual and gender-based violence: Lack of attention towards root causes, shortage of safe shelters, weak and overburdened identification and referral systems, ineffective justice systems and limited access to PoCs by UNHCR
- Public health: Availability of quality sexual and reproductive healthcare and lack of which being the major cause of death, disease and disability among forcibly displaced women and girls
- Education: Overcrowded, inadequate school buildings and infrastructure, unqualified teaching staff, lack of female teachers, lack of access to sanitary materials, early and forced marriages and risk of SGBV in or on the way to school, restrictions on participation of women and girls in education from community and family
- Shelter, housing, land and property: Finding adequate, safe and affordable housing, discrimination and exploitation by owners and landlords, security risks in camps due to lack of security
measures (locks on doors, adequate lighting); regarding return situations: discriminatory national or customary laws denying women and children the right to inherit, own or use land and property

- **UNHCR capacity**: Inability to identify and respond to gender equality concerns in humanitarian situations, especially in emergencies

To face these challenges, UNHCR aims to improve participation of women in leadership and management structures. In the context of food distribution, for instance (UNHCR Standing Committee 2016, pp. 3-9), UNHCR established gender-balanced management committees and participatory assessments, monitoring and evaluation, and even registered women as heads of household to ensure food security for their families. This was implemented based on a study revealing that when women are targeted in food distribution interventions, child malnutrition rates significantly decrease. To empower women and girls and increase the self-reliance level, UNHCR aims to build on their strengths and capacities instead of portraying them as victims. Economically empowered women have higher chances to participate meaningfully in decision-making processes, including peace and security initiatives. Further, access to sustainable livelihoods decreases the engagement in harmful coping strategies, such as (forced) sex work, early or forced marriage, etc. To improve health services, UNHCR focuses on reproductive health services, treatment of sexually transmitted infections and HIV and the provision of family planning services. Regarding school education, enrolment rates could be significantly increased for girls, as education is vital for protection and empowerment. Educated girls possess more information, therefore, access to more possibilities. Skills and knowledge are important to participate in decision-making processes and to develop self-reliance. Besides all these initiatives, in over 70 per cent operations, gender equality remains a challenge, due to insufficient capacity building, financial and human resources as well as technical expertise (ibid.).

### 4.4.2 International Labour Organization (ILO)

The ILO has the UN mandate to advance social justice and promote decent work by setting international labour standards (ILO 2019a). Regarding this mandate and at the international level, it especially gives technical guidance and develops tools to facilitate gender equality in workplaces (ILO 2012). ILO mainstreams gender equality to address the specific needs of women and men in all policies, analyses, strategies, etc. and further intervenes when analyses show that one sex, usually women, has been historically disadvantaged in a social, political or economic way (ILO 2012, p. 4). Actions include closing gender pay gaps, reducing atypical
and precarious employment, improving maternity protection, part-time work, working time, informal economy, childcare, parental leave, family responsibilities and empowering women in general. Among 147 Heads of Government, the ILO agrees that promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women helps to ‘combat poverty, hunger and disease and to stimulate development that is truly sustainable’ (ILO 2012, p. 5; United Nations Millennium Declaration 2000). Typical tasks of the organisation are advancing women’s entrepreneurship, providing technical expertise and maintaining committees for topics regarding gender equality, among others (ILO 2012, p. 1). The ILO targets to improve the situation of many women who bear the responsibilities of care work due to local gender division of labour. Because of this unpaid care work, women face lower social protection coverage and higher poverty risk than men. By providing women with skills through cash transfer programmes, the ILO aims to enable women to enter quality jobs in the labour market (ILO 2012, p. 55). In this way, women can experience freedom, equity, security and human dignity (ILO 2019b). Knowing that policies and strategies are more successful when adapted to local contexts, each region adapts its own Decent Work Country Programmes.

**International Labour Organization (ILO) in Jordan**

In Jordan, ILO divided its project – ‘Employment through Labour Intensive Infrastructure in Jordan’ into three main parts: (1) – road construction, (2) – agriculture and forestry and (3) – municipalities cleaning services. ILO had the mandate to employ a certain percentage of women (around 10%) (IV: 08 - ILO 1/15/2019). Though facing obstacles, the project management outreached this goal after Phase 2. Interviewee No. 8 explained,

> In fact, when I first came, everybody said, ‘You will not get women working’ and we were worried. Even our own engineers, our national engineers said, ‘You will not get it, because cultural-wise, we don’t allow women to work in public places’. So, what we did was… we had a community development officer who’s a lady. I said, ‘You have to go and run awareness workshops, in all the areas’. (IV: 08 - ILO 1/15/2019)

ILO teamed up with the Princess Basma NGO which has offices in all districts. They used the NGO's facilities and contacted people interested in working and invited them to awareness sessions. Here, future workers received information about the type of work and the salary. At this point, the women confirmed (out of necessity) that they were willing to work even in construction sites regardless of society’s opinion (IV: 08 - ILO 1/15/2019). Since then, the opinion regarding women to work outside their homes has changed, according to the interviewee. At the point of the interview, women are actually working in road construction. In some work
sectors/projects, it is easy to engage women (e.g., in female-only tree nurseries), in others, it is impossible (e.g., forestry). Working in forestry signifies to work in remote places, where workers, for instance, have to move from the tracks to relieve themselves, which in itself can be a dangerous act. The same accounts to projects requiring heavy manual labour, such as building terraces or when farms are too remote and public transportation are not available. The interviewee also explained that it is easier to create teams either by gender or equally mixed than teams with only one woman. Further, ILO mandates by its contractors the provision of separate mobile toilets for men and women, so that nobody has to relieve oneself in the open. Regarding gender issues, ILO will conduct awareness trainings in the future, covering topics, like safe working environments, women's rights, insults, sexual harassment and abuse, including actions against it. The contracts with the contractors already include issues like preventing harassment of women, equal opportunities, prohibition of child labour, etc. (ibid.).

4.4.3 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)
Improving gender equality throughout all projects and all project partners has been made an important target in the related documents of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH. Like ILO, GIZ is mainly working at the policy level to advise states and partner organisations on promoting gender equality and implementing gender equality initiatives. For instance, it advises state partners on ‘designing policy, legislation and measures at all levels to meet the differing circumstances and needs of women, men, girls and boys’ (GIZ 2019). Regarding this policy promoting strategy, the example of implementing anti-harassment guidelines in Jordan is given below. It also helps to prevent and overcome gender-specific violence and discrimination, including domestic violence and harmful traditional practices (female genital mutilation and child marriage). On the ground level, it also equips women and girls to use digital media and technology to close the ‘digital gender gap’. One of the reasons why GIZ focuses on gender equality is that when women have self-determination, the same opportunities and share power equally with men, development can grow sustainably (Ihreke 2019).

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in Jordan
GIZ corporate guidelines and guiding principles are applied to all GIZ projects worldwide. As these corporate guidelines include ‘anti-sexual harassment guidelines at working places’, GIZ Jordan aimed to introduce them in Jordan as well (IV: 06 - GIZ 1/14/2019). Even though the existence of sexual harassment in Jordan was first denied because of religious and cultural
backgrounds in the country, the government finally included the guidelines into their Employment Handbook for National Personnel. Since then, all companies in Jordan have to comply with these anti-sexual harassment guidelines (IV: 06 - GIZ 1/14/2019).

Although, gender equality is promoted in Jordan, traditions are still strong and cherished especially by clan leaders who aim to maintain their power. ‘You cannot and should not try to create a cultural change from outside, it has to come from inside. You can support it, but you always meet obstacles’ (IV: 06 - GIZ 1/14/2019). Such support comes, for instance, through gender focal points for each project and office as well as awareness-raising events. According to the interviewee, cultural change can only be initiated from within, but creating space for awareness raising can also be facilitated by international organisations (IV: 06 - GIZ 1/14/2019). When colleagues learn about discrimination and harassment against women, they carry their knowledge to the outside world, states interviewee No. 6.

One specific livelihood project was to train women to become plumbers. A major advantage of women being plumbers is that they can visit households in the absence of male family members. However, especially at the beginning, this project had many opponents, at the governmental level as well as in communities. Women, they said, cannot and should not work as plumbers, women should not work at all, etc. The accompanying high media attention convinced opponents of the advantages of the project. Over time, these women built up cooperatives and to date pursue work routines equal to those of their male colleagues (IV: 06 - GIZ 1/14/2019).

4.4.4 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
The derivation and approach regarding women and women empowerment that UNDP published in its 2016 Human Development (HD) report has changed dramatically to its 1995-1999 versions used in Çağlar (2010). The ‘women’s vital social functions for maintaining families and communities’ (UNDP 1995, p. 98) has been replaced by the acknowledgement that women need better education, healthcare, access to finance and technology to learn skills and knowledge to be able to become independent and empowered, find employment and contribute to society (UNDP 2016, pp. 12-58). ‘If all girls in developing countries completed secondary education, the under-five mortality rate would be halved’ (ibid. p. 12). Gender equality promotes economic growth, reduction of household poverty and human development, thus, focusing on gender equality instead of solely on growth should be mandatory for governments (ibid. p. 42). Aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals and the Millennium Declaration, everyone – not only men – should benefit from advances in human development (UNDP 2016, p. 164).
One of the reasons why women face poverty more than men is that women are typically responsible for more than three-quarters of unpaid family work (UNDP 2016, pp. 7, 12). This workload, which is often based on social norms, decreases choices and opportunities for women and girls (ibid. p. 12). Further, women face discrimination regarding food allocation leading to malnutrition and protein deficiency, often based on the assumption that women need fewer calories. If working formally or informally, women may lack decent work conditions and social security and are paid less than male workers for the same work (ibid. p. 58). About 20 per cent women experienced sexual violence as children (ibid. pp. 58-59). In many societies, violence against women is tolerated, including genital mutilation, due to social norms and patriarchal gender orders. Violence or its threat is a major barrier for women to give fruition to their potentials and feel free to enjoy their freedom of movement (ibid. p. 71).

The approach UNDP follows in the 2016 HD report and the targets of SDG 5 (Gender Equality) include, among others, increasing flexible working arrangements, enlarging care options, reforming legal frameworks towards equal rights (inheritance, owning assets and land, etc.) and increasing the number of female representatives in politics, peace talks and management (UNDP 2016, pp. 12, 28-42, 96-113; United Nations 2016). Further, they promote the option to subsidise unpaid care work through vouchers and credits. Clean water, sanitation, energy services, public infrastructure and transport can ease domestic work, leaving more time for paid work for women. Promoting parental leave for mothers and fathers can balance the share of unpaid care work and give fathers incentives to engage more at home, thereby miss out less on important family time with their children (UNDP 2016, p. 113).

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Jordan
In the case of the UNDP solid waste management project conducted in Jordan, project leaders faced resistance from women, their families and communities regarding the inclusion of women since waste collection is not seen as women’s work (IV: 03b - UNHCR Zaatari Camp 1/13/2019). To face this resistance, UNDP organised community meetings and together with partners tried to prepare women for this kind of work. Together with female participants, they built the workplace, made it female-friendly, set up a nursery and arranged transportation to the workplace. At the beginning, in the meetings male participants were asked to leave so that
female participants would feel comfortable to speak freely. One day, and this is seen as a success regarding empowerment, the women told the men to stay, because they wanted them to hear what they had to say. The female participants were all vulnerable Jordanian or Syrian women who experienced violence and/or whose husbands were incarcerated or absent. Not having many other options, these women started to work for this project and realised how much this work and their earnings empowered them and increased their and their families’ well-being. Soon, other women applied for jobs in this project including those who had disapproved of the projects in the beginning. Interviewee No. 3 mentioned that these findings and procedures are supposed to be used for future waste projects and it is hoped that because of the positive experiences made, it will be easier to engage women in such projects in other municipalities (ibid.).

A comparison of the strategic and operational approaches presented in this sub-chapter is discussed in Chapter 5.2.3. The following sub-chapter elaborates the path of identifying, analysing and evaluating influential factors and power dynamics between camp stakeholder groups which are important to understand why a high self-reliance level is difficult to obtain for encamped refugees.

4.5 Identification of Influential Factors
While Chapter 3 dealt with the question of how to measure self-reliance, this sub-chapter identifies influential factors, impeding or enhancing self-reliance and/or livelihood activities in a camp, as well as the involved stakeholder groups. Influential factors might have positive or negative impact on the self-reliance level of refugees. Besides literature findings, the 12 conducted expert interviews, mainly providing information in relation to Zaatari and Azraq camp in Jordan, were included into the analysis and underpinned with findings from Betts et al. (2018a).

The study of Betts et al. (2018a) takes place in Kenya at Kalobeyei settlement. Kenya hosts about 479,000 refugees of which more than 258,000 came from Somalia (UNHCR 2019j). Most refugees live in the Dadaab camps (almost 213,000), followed by Kakuma camp and Kalobeyei settlement (about 191,000) and Nairobi (almost 75,000). Kalobeyei settlement was established after Kakuma camp in Kenya surpassed its capacity in 2014 (UNHCR 2019c). The study on Kalobeyei by Betts et al. (2018a) was selected as the authors researched on socio-economic outcomes for refugees in the settlement and because of its size as well as its comparability to the research on Jordanian camps. In the study on self-reliance in Kalobeyei, Betts et al. discuss questions regarding the self-reliance level in this new settlement, the comparison between
Kakuma camp and Kalobeyei as well as the possibilities to improve self-reliance at such locations (Betts et al. 2018, p. 6). When Kalobeyei settlement opened in 2015, many refugees moved from Dadaab camp which exists since 1991 (UNHCR 2019a).

The findings of the expert interviews, literature and Betts et al. (2018a) are clustered systematically in the nine categories developed for the CPI (cf. Chapter 3), plus in two additional ones (Category 10 – Political Power Struggles and Category 11 – Others) which are presented in Chapter 4.5.2. In total 66 different influential factors could be identified and each influential factor is analysed for its relation to power. As outlined in Chapter 4.3.2, power is a complex social reality. This complexity might be the reason why not many interview partners could contribute specific examples to the questions concerning power relations or dynamics. Without studying the topic, people neither seem to be aware when and in which contexts power is exercised over them or when they exercise power over others, nor might they be aware of the different notions of ‘power over’ and ‘power to’, as outlined in Chapter 4.3.2. Thus, examining everyday situations in a camp through the lens of power theories is relevant not only to point out where and what kind of power relations exist, but also which meaning such relations have for different stakeholder groups, especially for the refugees living in camps.

4.5.1 Method Description – Development of the IIF

In this chapter on the Identification of Influential Factors (IIF), the findings of the expert interviews are combined with findings from literature. Although, Zaatari and Azraq camp are at the centre of attention, insights into these camps are combined with literature findings and answers of the experts regarding other camp settings. As outlined above, especially the outcomes of the study of Betts et al. (2018a) regarding Kalobeyei, the Kenyan refugee settlement, influence the comparison of camps about the possibilities to become self-reliant. To merge the findings of Chapter 3.3.2 with Chapter 4.5.2 in a structured way, the same nine categories which were used for the CPI are also used for the IIF. Remaining influential factors are joined under Category 10 – Political Power Struggles and Category 11 – Others (including Competition for Funding, Crisis-affected Countries, Field Officers’ Mindsets, Refugees’ Mindsets and Private Sector).

The influential factors are presented in text form based on the statements given by experts or by literature. A two- to three-digit number is allocated to each statement, separated with a dot. These numbers connect the statements, consisting of one or more paragraphs, with the charts given under each category (Figures 25-35). The first digit of the number reveals the source of information: findings from expert interviews (#1.xy), findings specifically concerning Jordan
(literature and expert interviews – #2.xy), findings from literature (#3.xy) and findings from Betts et al. (2018) regarding Kalobeyei settlement in Kenya (#4.xy).

Each unique number of a statement is inserted at the end. Some statements are split in parts for the sake of the text flow. Following the text of the statements, the identified form of power, the sub- and superordinate agents are outlined. The chosen forms of power match with the theoretical chapter on power (4.3.2). ‘Power-over’ is used if not one specific form of power can be attributed to the influential factor. If more than one forms of power are attributed to an influential factor, the most effective one is used for the chart, others are mentioned in the explicationary text. ‘Action-environment’ is used when no specific power relation can be attributed to the factor, but when the influential factor constrains the action alternatives of the different stakeholder groups. To such influential factors, no subordinate agents or superordinate agents are assigned. Eight stakeholder groups were identified: refugees, refugee women and field officers, whereas the term ‘field officers’ is used as a generic term for all staff of humanitarian aid agencies working in the camp. Other stakeholder groups are host community members (hosts), governments (local and/or national – a clear differentiation is not given to not overcomplicate the issue) and the private sector (partners of field officers); assuming that international companies operate on the national level to partner with the humanitarian sector. Donors (synonymous for the international community) and headquarters are stakeholder groups at a higher level, usually separated from fieldwork. Field officers and headquarters are split into two groups to indicate if tasks are rather part of the operational work (field officers who are also in touch with the beneficiaries) or the strategic work (headquarters).

The respective figure at the end of each category summarises graphically the main findings. It should be noted that the analysis (text plus charts) is exemplary based on the findings of and assumptions made for present work and by no means complete.

Each figure is built in the following way: On the far left, the light grey box presents the superordinates identified for each influential factor. The dark grey box on its right side shows the subordinate agents. The influential factors, including their unique identifiers, are clustered according to their appearances, signalling the level where action or power relation mainly (but not exclusively) takes place. Three levels were included in the Figures 25 to 33 for the categories 1 to 9: camp (blue box), local (orange box) and national (green box). A fourth level – international (yellow box) is included for the categories 10 and 11. The international level is excluded in the Figures 25 to 33 regarding the categories 1 to 9 as here the centre of attention is the camp. Analysing international power relations were not the scope of present work as such
assessments require long-term and detailed observation on the international level. Still, in this chapter, the international view is not excluded completely, but limited to the influence of the SDGs as outlined in the descriptive text below. At the camp level, the most affected by the influential factor are refugees and/or field officers working in the camp or directly for the camp. At the local level, refugees, hosts, the private sector and/or field officers play a role concerning the specific influential factor. At the national level, additionally the (national) government and at the international level also the donor community and/or the headquarters of the humanitarian aid agencies are involved. In most categories, only some of the four levels are directly addressed, mainly camp level and local level. This means that at this level the main action takes place. It does not mean, however, that other stakeholder groups cannot intervene in any way. On many occasions, a determined action of the national government, the headquarters and/or the donor community could make a difference. For instance, whenever safety issues occur, mostly refugees and perhaps field officers and hosts are immediately affected by the lack of security within a camp or the region. They have to deal with this situation. Nonetheless, the national government\textsuperscript{18} could take measures to ease the situation and make the region safer and more peaceful.

When such action is apparent, the green boxes are marked with an encircled exclamation mark in the charts and shortly commented in the specific descriptive text. As the involvement of the government is rather possible, but not mandatory or definitive, they are mainly excluded in the analyses of power relationships. The exclamation mark only indicates a possible or desirable involvement.

Above and below the levels are boxes presenting the main focus of attention of the respective influential factors. These boxes present an attempt to cluster the influential factors of each category to summarise them at the end. The focal points of attention are Well-being, Culture, Dependency, Livelihood Opportunities and Type and Quality of Aid at camp level or at the camp and local levels; Safety & Security and Xenophobia at the local level, Host Economy at the national level and SDGs at the international level. For Category 11, Type and Quality of Aid is even allocated to camp, local and national level. For the further understanding of each category, these focal points have no meaning and thus, are only mentioned but not explained further at the end of each category; they are important for the summary at the end of this sub-chapter. The white box on the right side of each chart presents the form of power identified for each

\textsuperscript{18} The donor community could also take measures to ease the situation on camp level. However, as mentioned above, the highly political international level is mainly excluded in present work, besides mentioning the SDGs which is an internationally evolved political concept.
influential factor. Irrelevant to the levels addressed per category, Figures 25 to 35 have the same structure for the sake of uniformity.

In total, 66 influential factors were derived from the analysis of the interviews, the Jordanian case and the consulted literature. They are neither meant to be complete, nor are their analysis and affiliation to different forms of power and stakeholder groups as super- or subordinates irrevocable or inextensible. The outcome of present work is rather thought to be a starting point and invites scholars and field experts for more research on this subject as well as an open discussion on these as well as other findings to come.

4.5.2 Analysis and Findings of the IIF
In this sub-chapter, the identified influential factors are clustered in nine categories, as used for the CPI in Chapter 3, along with a 10th category – Political Power Struggles and a 11th one – Others. At the end of each category, the elaborated power relations, the superordinate as well as the subordinate agents are presented.

Category 1 – Demographic Data
The extent to which a camp community can engage in livelihood activities, let alone become self-reliant, as Category 1 of the CPI shows, depends on the ‘type’ of the residents as determined in relation to their educational background and demographics. In many cases, the more women and children live in a camp, the lower is the degree of livelihood activities, because women take care of children and household in many societies and thus, are to a lesser extent part of the market workforce. Children are not supposed to work but attend school and develop freely. Accordingly, men tend to have more time to seek for work as well as have more extensive experiences working outside of their home.

For instance, in Zaatari camp, more than 50 per cent of its inhabitants are either underage or more than 60 years, while 20 per cent of the households are headed by females. Most people come from the Dar’a region in Syria which implicates a rather low level of education as most of the active population has worked in the agricultural sector (UNHCR 2018c). (#2.7 - Demographics) In the Kalobeyei camp (Kakuma, Kenya), the South Sudanese refugees show the highest educational level with an average of five years of education (Betts et al. 2018a, p. 35). Only about 20 per cent of all people in the camp have attended school for eight years or more. Ethiopians in Kalobeyei often have a business background; South Sudanese and Burundians worked in agriculture before flight. The women tend to stop education early and take over
household activities and/or get married (Betts et al. 2018a, pp. 36-37). By using a regression model, Betts et al. (2018) revealed positive correlation between skills, the years of education, vocational training in the past and the ability to speak Swahili on the one side and the likeliness of having an employment on the other side (Betts et al. 2018a, p. 38). In Kalobeyei, refugees can take care of a kitchen garden, which is done rather by those with agricultural experiences (#4.17 - Demographics).

Refugees with no or only basic education have more difficulties in finding employment than those with higher education (Bilgili and Loschmann 2018). Thus, in general, poorly educated people have less income and are less productive than higher educated people, making it very hard for the former to break out of poverty (Mottaghi 2018). As mentioned in Chapter 3.2.2 – CPI, Category 4 – Camp Funding, digital skills are increasingly becoming important for employment seekers (Peromingo and Pietersen 2018). Peromingo and Pietersen (2018) suggest that digital skills are correlated with people’s level of education and not with factors like, age and gender. Another influential factor is the barrier of language. The inability to communicate can be the reason for missing opportunities of higher education or employment in both formal and informal labour markets (Mottaghi 2018; Werker 2007). (#3.15 – Lack of education and skills)

In Jordan, interviewee No. 2 observed a mismatch between labour market needs and the skills available within the refugee population (IV: 02 - UNHCR Amman 9/26/2018). (#2.38 – Mismatch between labour markets and refugees’ skills) The implications for this mismatch are explained below (Category 8).

Another influential factor regarding demographic data impeding livelihood activities is the degree of vulnerability of the beneficiaries. Vulnerable people are at higher risk to become victims of SGBV. For instance, in Lebanon, a country having no official refugee camps (but about 2,000 informal settlements), refugees live in very poor conditions. They easily become victims of sexual abuse, prostitution, child labour, human trafficking, etc. ‘People are literally sold as slaves’ (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018). In Ankara/Turkey 2011, interviewee No. 4 witnessed at the gate of the UNHCR office, how Turkish recruiters were looking at newcomers, trying to divert single women or abandoned children, so as to exploit them as prostitutes (#1.12 - Vulnerability).

Demographic variables, such as the number of women and children in a camp, are constraints which have to be accepted by all involved stakeholders (Figure 25). They create the action-environment in which superordinate and subordinate agents have to identify and evaluate their
action alternatives. *Lack of education and skills* as well as the *mismatch between labour markets and refugees’ skills* also influence the action-environment of sub- and superordinates. However, in the long term, this mismatch can be changed by investing in trainings and high-quality schooling, if funding is available. Ergo, field officers and the government supported by headquarters and donors can change this situation in the long term. *Vulnerable refugees* (especially refugee women), though also reversible in the long term, are mainly victims of dominant agents, such as other refugees, hosts and even individual field officers who use their power over the subordinates to their advantage. The government as well as the donor community could make investments to ease this vulnerability. The foci of attention are the Type and Quality of Aid at camp level and Well-being at the camp and local levels.

**Figure 25: IIF Category 1 – Demographics**

**Category 2 – Basic Needs**

As explained in the CPI Chapter of Basic Needs, the lack of basic needs leads to poor health and low productivity. Refugees often arrive at camps without any possessions or the same have been worn out due to protracted displacement (Jahre et al. 2018; UNHCR 2014a, p. 13). Without initial assets like skills, access to financial capital and physical health, refugees cannot increase their options to safe, steady and productive work. With respect to Category 1 – Demographic Data, where a context was given between low education and low salaries, at that point low salaries and basic needs were related, especially when not provided externally. Low salaries result in the inability to provide for the basic needs, leading to malnutrition, lack of resilience and negative coping mechanisms, the latter in turn leads to survival sex, child labour and early
and forced marriage (Mottaghi 2018; UNHCR 2014a). Generations can become trapped in a vicious cycle. Social costs, including welfare systems, if available, and loss in human capital are high for local, as well as global communities. (#3.4 – Lack of basic needs)

The impact of the lack of basic needs can be seen in Kalobeyei camp (Kenya) better than in Zaatari or Azraq camp (cf. Category 4 – Camp Funding). In Jordanian camps, field officers have sufficient resources enabling them to cover the residents’ basic needs. For instance, in Kalobeyei, the availability of cooking fuel and food security is rather low, with refugees eating only 1.8 meals per day on an average. By replacing food rations with electronic cash transfers called ‘Bamba Chakula’, the diversity of the diet could be slightly improved (Betts et al. 2018a, p. 20). Cash receivers get a monthly credit on their phones which they can spend at registered shops (Betts et al. 2018a, p. 25). This programme has transformed refugees from being recipients to consumers and has led to the development of several commercial markets in a short period of time. Regarding public goods, access has been limited in Kalobeyei, probably due to the unplanned influx of South Sudanese (Betts et al. 2018a, p. 20). The number of clinics is insufficient, care received is inadequate. Most rural dispensaries are not stocked properly and staffed inadequately. One of the biggest challenges is lack of adequate quantity of groundwater leading to long queuing times to collect water and water shortages in agricultural activities (Betts et al. 2018a, pp. 21-22). Tension between the local population and refugees is common when the latter use the hand-dug shallow wells of Turkana, an area surrounded by the host community, which provoke some host community members to think that their access to water is handled secondary to that of refugees, even though the overall water situation already has improved. Electricity is another public good which achieves only small rates of coverage (Betts et al. 2018a, p. 24). As agencies do not provide electricity in Kenya, only between 2 per cent and 7.2 per cent of the households have access to it. (#4.4 – Lack of basic needs)

Lack of basic needs is a constraint that all stakeholders involved in a camp setting have to deal with (Figure 26). The lower the availability of basic needs, the more the stakeholders have to adapt their action-environment to the specificities of their situation. Refugees and hosts have to make decisions based on the availability of goods; field officers have to develop or adapt their programmes not only according to the funding but also as per the (natural) resources available for that specific camp. The donor community needs to increase funding to decrease the lack of basic needs. The foci of attention are Dependency at the camp level and Xenophobia at the local level.
Category 3 – Gender Equality

Inequality of women is a global problem. Thus, information is abundant regarding their vulnerability and the challenges to which women are exposed. As elucidated above, living in conflict areas is dangerous for women and girls, as they are more vulnerable to SGBV, including sexual exploitation and abuse, rape and domestic violence (UNHCR 2012b, p. 131). This alone is part of gender inequality, emphasised more by its consequences. To avoid SGBV, some women do not dare to visit dangerous places and do not leave their home after dark (UNHCR 2005, Appendix One, p. 31; Jacobsen 2002, p. 117). Other women find no other solution to survive or to provide for their children than forming alliances with soldiers or other men in power (Al Ajlan 2018; Jacobsen 2002, pp. 98, 117). Such alliances expose them to HIV/AIDS, more abuse, abandonment by their sexual partners as well as expulsion from their own communities. Women left pregnant or with a baby have often no power to complain or to receive adequate financial support (Kleinfeld 2018). SGBV can drastically restrict livelihood opportunities for women, e.g., by preventing access to education or inheritance, destroying women’s property or depriving them money. The emotional and physical consequences are severe. Nine out of ten women fleeing the outbreak of violence in the northeast region of Ituri in the Democratic Republic of Congo and arriving in Uganda have suffered rape or sexual violence. One of these women reveals her trauma: ‘I am physically, emotionally, and psychologically affected. I can’t forget the terrible experience’ (Okiror 2018b). Another woman states that she is incontinent, suffers pains in her abdomen and from a whitish secretion coming from her genitals after being raped (ibid.).

(#3.10 – Vulnerability, SGBV)

Besides SGBV, in many societies, women are not meant to make a living (UNHCR 2005, Appendix One, p. 29). With the loss of husband, women easily lose their identity. They are socially marginalised, face discrimination and difficulties regarding access to credit, aid supplies, assets or productive land and face a significant increase in economic burden (Jacobsen 2002, p. 98).
One of the first coping mechanisms of vulnerable families is to take girls out of school or marry them off at an early age (Vriese 2006). Thus, teenage pregnancies are common among Syrian girls and women in Jordan: Four out of ten are married under age (HPC Jordan 2017, p. 2). (#3.9 – Cultural norms) Interviewee No. 4 witnessed in a refugee camp in Mauritania that women were treated as ‘worthless’ because of cultural norms. He was asked by a deputy government official not to talk to women from a sub-group of the Tuareg community called Bellas, who constituted approximately 15 per cent of the population: ‘You don't have to waste your time speaking to them, they are slaves’ (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018). He continues,

In many situations, women are treated like slaves. The just obey instructions and orders coming from male authority to the male managing group in the community. Providing special care to these women is difficult, but a very important work, taking a long time. (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018)

The interviewee explained that the main difficulty is that most societies are male dominated and it is difficult for women to initiate things beyond the control of community members; it is even more difficult in religious societies (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018). (#1.23 – Cultural norms)

In the culture of Arab countries, as pointed out in Chapters 4.1 and 4.3.3, usually the wife takes care of the children and the husband goes out to find working opportunities (IV: 03a - UNHCR Zaatari Camp 10/21/2018). (#2.33 – Cultural norms) The time-consuming role of women at home prevents them from engaging in livelihood activities or obtaining a work permit (IV: 10 - NGO Zaatari Camp 1/15/2019) (#2.46 – Empowering women), a fact which can also be witnessed in Kalobeyei, where women hardly seek employment as they are fully engaged in domestic work and childcare activities (Betts et al. 2018a, p. 27). (#4.13 – Cultural norms)

In Zaatari camp, the situation of women staying at home apparently has become worse over time. Interviewee No. 12 describes the worsening situation in Zaatari, apparently due to less available funding and job opportunities and people becoming even more traditional (IV: 12 - Australian Embassy 1/13/2019) than in the past. With growing frustration and reduced savings, men have started marrying off their young daughters, sending their children to work and prohibiting their women to move freely in the camp. The interviewee mentioned that restrictions on movement and increasing frustration accelerate violence against women and increase of SGBV. However, only in rare cases, women choose to report their male family members.

Empowerment initiatives can help to overcome such restrictions and violations of rights, though they are difficult to implement, especially in very conservative Muslim societies (IV: 04 -
UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018). This difficulty was witnessed by different interview partners (IV: 03b - UNHCR Zaatari Camp 1/13/2019; IV: 06 - GIZ 1/14/2019; IV: 08 - ILO 1/15/2019; IV: 10 - NGO Zaatari Camp 1/15/2019). For success, empowerment initiatives should be initiated by women themselves (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018). (#1.24 – Initiatives from within) One strategy to empower women is initiating livelihood activities, but this can only be successful if a certain level of security is given (IV: 01 - Irish NGO 9/24/2018). Remote camps are often insecure, unsafe and thus, uncomfortable places to move around. (#1.22 - Empowering women in insecure areas) If women and girls still have to move around, they easily get themselves into dangerous situations (UNHCR 2012b, p. 131). Aubone and Hernandez (2013) revealed a connection between civilians who travelled unaccompanied and facing sexual violence due to insecurity outside the camp. Women and children who have to leave the camp for firewood, food and other resources are especially vulnerable to SGBV (Aubone and Hernandez 2013). (#3.12 - Risks from livelihood activities)

With Zaatari and Azraq being rather safe places, the risks of female residents to become victims of SGBV seems low (Schön et al. 2018). Still, residents face challenges and high competition when seeking work. In many cases, jobs do not fit their level of skills, payment is unacceptably low, childcare is unavailable and responsibilities at home are abundant (IV: 02 - UNHCR Amman 9/26/2018; IV: 03a - UNHCR Zaatari Camp 10/21/2018). For instance, the Zaatari camp management, initially restricted work permits for women as they were concerned that the care of children would suffer (IV: 09 - ILO 1/15/2019). They did not want women to leave for a month; they could manage at the most a week. However, ILO advocated that women were to be given the same rights as to men: ‘If families manage to find someone to take care for their children, why should women not be able to leave the camp also for one month? Camp management finally agreed to this and the number of female workers increased’ (IV: 09 - ILO 1/15/2019). (#2.24 – Empowering women)

Regarding the time-consuming responsibilities at home, interviewee No. 2 mentioned that many women were not able or willing to engage in external livelihood activities that were time intensive. This led to high drop-out rates of female training participants when it actually came to employment; moreover, application rates of work permits for women (4%) were exceptionally low (IV: 02 - UNHCR Amman 9/26/2018; Syrian Refugee Unit at the Ministry of Labour 2018). While the above-mentioned cultural norms and responsibilities discouraged women’s participation at work, the selection of male-dominated sectors (mainly agriculture and construction) and distant places for refugees as their work areas hindered their involvement. For instance, when working in the agricultural sector it makes most sense to live close to the fields. Most
farms are in the Jordan Valley, close to the Palestinian border. Especially, the Azraq camp, situated in the northeast of Jordan, is too far away from farms to allow refugees to seek work in the agricultural sector while living in the camp (IV: 12 - Australian Embassy 1/13/2019). Working in the construction sector seems to be unattractive for many women, as these jobs are seen as work for men. In Jordan, at the date of the interview, no woman had applied to work in the carpentry sector (IV: 02 - UNHCR Amman 9/26/2018). For many women, gender-mixed working places remained culturally unacceptable. In Jordan, a female-friendly work sector is the garment sector. Employees are mainly migrant workers from East Asia. If Syrians are to be employed, the government requires half of the employees to be Jordanians. Jordanians are very often not willing to work in the garment sector, so employers cannot find Jordanians and thus, are not allowed to employ Syrian refugees (IV: 12 - Australian Embassy 1/13/2019). (#2.43 – Facilitating equal working opportunities)

Cleaning tasks in Arab countries are generally conducted by men, but organisations implementing such projects in refugee contexts are required to also include women. Interviewees No. 10 and 11 witnessed great resistance from women, their husbands and the whole community regarding women collecting garbage. Husbands did not want their wives to bend down to pick up garbage in the public. They were also concerned for their safety, since the work entailed passing through the prefabricated caravans with the risk of being assaulted or sexually harassed. To face these issues, participating NGOs put a lot of effort into the subject: They organised awareness-raising events, agreed to let women work together in female teams led by women and monitored them closely. They are given vests, gloves and a badge to wear. Provisions are made so that they do not walk alone between caravans; do not work for long hours; and get paid on a weekly basis. In these ways, husbands and communities saw the importance of their work and how women were able to support their families and improve their living conditions (IV: 10 - NGO Zaatari Camp 1/15/2019; IV: 11 - ACTED 1/16/2019). The impact of successful initiatives for the female refugee community, in general, can be extensive as revealed by the examples in Jordan, including those in the camps. Though working women who are able to provide for their families might face jealousy and get drawn into conflicts with community members, they can also become role models (IV: 03b - UNHCR Zaatari Camp 1/13/2019; IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018; IV: 06 - GIZ 1/14/2019). (#1.26 – Role models) As shown above, there are many possibilities for organisations to integrate women into their employment projects and labour market. Such initiatives might include: creation of female-friendly workplaces, provision of external childcare, adaptation of working tasks (e.g., sewing vests instead of planting trees) or organisation of family-friendly and female-friendly settings for training sessions, awareness
campaigns and community meetings (regarding meeting time, location and reachability), etc. (§2.34 – Empowering women)

For this category, the forms of power vary heavily (Figure 27). In case SGBV plays a role, force and coercion can be used to dominate refugee women. Dominating agents can be other refugees, hosts or even field officers. Cultural norms can restrict a woman’s way of life in different forms and constrain her action alternatives. Further, in many cases, they are used by men to dominate women; thus, the superordinate agents listed are refugees and hosts. The national government, perhaps even supported by the donor community and international agreements such as the SDGs, can take measures to increase gender equality and trigger a rethinking of cultural norms. Actions and initiatives to empower women are initiated mostly by field officers, but are only successful if women contribute and are involved in such activities. Especially at the beginning of such activities, support from field officers (superordinate agents) might be useful. The donor community as well as headquarters can assist with financial support and by sharing examples of best practices.

To use this kind of power in a transformative way, it is necessary for the field officers to pull out from such activities as soon as the women are confident to take over (cf. Chapter 4.3.2). Risks, refugee women face when engaging in livelihood activities are mainly of violent nature – thus, force is identified as a form of power executed by refugees, hosts or in the worst case even by field officers. The national government can invest in increasing security.

When field officers and/or governments facilitate equal working opportunities, such opportunities can only be understood as an offer. Communities and especially women, have to decide by themselves if they want to accept such offers or not. Thus, the form of power identified for this influential factor has been influence in the form of rational persuasion without the involvement of power. In case (refugee) women are role models, they can influence other women at a personal level, which according to Wartenberg, involves the exercise of power (cf. Chapter 4.3.2). Foci of attention are: Culture at the camp level, Safety & Security at the local level and Livelihood Opportunities at local and national levels.
Avoiding dependency can positively correlate with high costs and is only possible if the camp receives sufficient funds. Dependency has many sources. It exists, because people flee without their belongings; savings, if they have any, are used up at some point. If, after the emergency phase, they are not allowed (e.g., by denial of human rights, access to land or natural resources) or not able (e.g., by unavailable markets) to make a living, refugees have to be assisted over a long-term period with essential services, food and other supplies (UNHCR 2014a, p. 4, 2012b, pp. 23-25; Jacobsen 2002, p. 106). In Mauritania one Tuareg refugee woman approached interviewee No. 4 saying,

Listen gentlemen, my husband is now completely useless. Before, he used to feed the family to work for the family, so it was helpful; but now in the refugee camp my husband is useless. My real husband is the warehouse where the food distribution is made. (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018)

The interviewee admits that though from the side of humanitarian assistance, providing support for refugees living in host communities is more difficult, integration into families and communities is much better from a human point of view. (#1.3 – Dependency on UN)

Injured and disabled people are on average (perceived as) less productive and thus, become a liability to households (UNHCR 2005, Appendix One, p. 33). (#3.7 – Dependency of vulnerable
people) But also trauma, anxiety, despair and depression, among others, influence the general well-being and thus, the effectiveness of becoming self-reliant (Mottaghi 2018; UNHCR 2005, Appendix One, p. 33). Many refugees are deeply traumatised and feel constant sadness; few even have suicidal thoughts (Chen 2018; Jahre et al. 2018). People with mental health issues often develop physical pain, such as headaches and chest pains. ‘The headaches happen because there is a lot of thinking’, describes a traditional healer in a Rohingya refugee camp.

They (note: his patients) describe that they feel scared all the time and that there’s the pain in their chest. I think it is happening because of the persecution they faced, the troubles that they have encountered, the loss of their things. (Chen 2018)

Mental health issues need time to heal before a person is able to find employment (Belghazi 2018). (#3.8 – Dependency of vulnerable people)

In contrast to ‘really’ vulnerable people, there are always people presenting themselves as more needy than they really are. They are scared to lose humanitarian assistance or defraud with ration cards as part of their livelihood strategies (Vriese 2006, pp.12-13). One of the challenges, field officers face is to identify who is vulnerable, who needs less support, who is open-minded to start a new life and who got used to dependency and could not handle any other support than charity. One of the tools field officers and partners use are microfinance programmes. (#3.34 – Supporting livelihood activities) In Kalobeyei, for instance, only about 1.2 per cent of the interviewed refugees have a loan from a bank, a Micro Finance Institute (MFI), a private lender or a friend/family member (Betts et al. 2018a, p. 28). Lack of access to credit and finance is the most important obstacle to start a business. (#4.14 – Supporting livelihood activities) The risk taken by the project partners of implementing microfinance programmes should not be underestimated. Such programmes might not always be welcome or accepted by the beneficiaries as people have to pay back their loans, often including interest rates (Azorbo 2011, p. 5). This might be seen as being unfair, as there might be more vulnerable people who still receive charity from humanitarian aid agencies, leading to the exploitation of microfinance programmes. Such exploitation might not always happen maliciously, as sometimes refugees simply get confused about loans and grants. The lack of knowledge leads to difficulties in differentiating between the two models, leaving some loan takers with repayment problems. Thus, microfinance institutions are likely to rank camps as high-risk investments not willing to engage in such locations (Azorbo 2011, pp. 5-6), which might be an explanation for the low percentage of refugees in Kalobeyei having received a loan.
Promoting, supporting and initiating income-generating activities is an important but not an easy task and requires well-prepared assessments and analyses of the residents, their cultural backgrounds and the surrounding of the camp (cf. Chapter 2; CPI, Category 4 – Camp Funding). For instance, in Zaatari camp, the first livelihood projects (initiated by NRC) failed (IV: 10 - NGO Zaatari Camp 1/15/2019). Reasons pointed out by interviewee No. 10 were the low quality of soil, lack of water and also the lack of motivation on the part of the residents. In his opinion, the camp residents would not care about small projects, where they have to invest energy long before they can generate an income. People who have lost everything in the war, perhaps even separated from family members and face an uncertain future, rather want to make a living quickly. Thus, they would prefer working for Cash for Work projects, at the market or outside of the camp, where they receive payment after a short period of time (IV: 10 - NGO Zaatari Camp 1/15/2019). (#2.12 – Quick results)

In Jordan, ILO has conducted various initiatives to integrate Syrians and Jordanians into the job market, at least for a short term (cf. Chapter 4.1.7). To increase the number of job opportunities for camp residents, at least outside of the camp, ILO opened two (out of thirteen) job centres in the Jordanian camps, Zaatari and Azraq camp. Apparently, these were the first job centres in refugee camps worldwide. Together with the government, ILO and UNHCR maintain them to issue work permits, refer interested refugees to job trainings and support with job matching, registration and referrals between employers and refugees (IV: 02 - UNHCR Amman 9/26/2018; IV: 09 - ILO 1/15/2019). Since their openings, in Zaatari camp 16,769 work permits were issued until November 2018 and 8,008 in Azraq camp (Syrian Refugee Unit at the Ministry of Labour 2018, p. 8). If employers want to employ camp residents, their backgrounds are checked by ILO and/or UNHCR before they are referred to refugees through the employment centres (IV: 02 - UNHCR Amman 9/26/2018). In the camps, ILO provides training regarding labour rights, safety and health at workplaces or refer interested people to training opportunities, like Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL), especially for the construction sector (IV: 09 - ILO 1/15/2019). To the point of the interview, about 500 Syrians inside the camp received such trainings and a certificate proving their skills in construction. Further, ILO provides transportation inside the camp to bring – male and female workers – to the manufacturing centres. Buses pick them up at certain points in the camp and bring them to the main gate, where they take factory buses to the manufacturing centres. The bus services help especially women to find and keep a job. Before this solution had been found, the transportation issue was keeping women from leaving the camp for work (cf. Category 3) (IV: 02 - UNHCR Amman 9/26/2018; IV: 09 - ILO 1/15/2019). Zaatari and Azraq camp are split in districts. By foot, it can take up to one
hour to get to the main gate from where buses of employers leave to bring workers to factories or workplaces. Prior to the camp bus services, women had to walk long distances, including in winter before sunrise. This prevented women from working, as they did not feel safe due to water puddles, dogs or other safety issues (IV: 02 - UNHCR Amman 9/26/2018). Providing transportation inside Azraq camp was the next project on the ILO agenda at the time of the interview. This step is important as Azraq camp is bigger by size (not residents) and more fragmented than Zaatari camp. For many residents it is not feasible to get to the main gate on time (IV: 09 - ILO 1/15/2019). However, getting women to work needs more than facilitating transportation. Adequate childcare needs to be provided as well (see Category 3 – Gender Equality).

Although humanitarian aid agencies provide childcare for children even at the age of kindergarten in Zaatari camp (The Jordan Times 2019), childcare does not open before 8am and closes around 4pm, as only during this time non-residents can enter the camp (IV: 11 - ACTED 1/16/2019). As buses to workplaces leave early and return late; so women have to find caretakers for their children for the hours they work or they cannot work at all (IV: 02 - UNHCR Amman 9/26/2018). (#2.22 – Infrastructure and services)

Though implementing services and infrastructure is useful, in particular for those purposes mentioned above, interviewee No. 1 pointed out that it is not the answer, only a foundation (IV: 01 - Irish NGO 9/24/2018). Interview partner No. 4 summarised the importance of infrastructure appositely:

In regard to infrastructure, the better it is, the better the ability of the refugees. Good infrastructure, like good roads, good schools, access to internet can all indirectly benefit refugees to become self-reliant. For refugees it is the same as for the rest of the world, good schools give people good education, access to internet helps to grow their businesses or find jobs. (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018) (#1.15 – Infrastructure and services)

This opinion is supported by the answer of interviewee No. 3. As a former WASH officer at Zaatari camp for UNHCR, he emphasised on the importance of shelter and WASH services. He stated that shelter is more important than WASH services as housing creates a certain level of security. When WASH services reach a certain level and are closer to the refugees’ homes, safety and especially comfortability increases. As a result, people start thinking about other issues, like engaging in livelihood opportunities (IV: 03a - UNHCR Zaatari Camp 10/21/2018). According to this interviewee, infrastructure like roads and electricity are installed after WASH services. Knowing Zaatari and Azraq camp, he witnessed that because in Azraq camp people moved in after all facilities were set up, residents started to think about engaging in livelihood
activities immediately after moving in. In Zaatar, for many people this phase only started when WASH services reached a more programmed level after the emergency phase. Regarding security issues, interviewee No. 4 stated that insecurity kills everything, not only self-reliance but also humanitarian aid, general access or speaking to the beneficiaries (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018).

The answers of the experts and the statements made in Chapter 2 about infrastructure and self-reliance or at least well-being are congruent: The better the infrastructure of a place (a camp, a town, etc.), the better the well-being of its residents. (#2.4 – Infrastructure and services) A student’s work, supervised by the author of this thesis, used parts of the CPI and compared Zaatar, Azraq and Dadaab camp in Kenya based on internet findings. The work confirmed this statement: Infrastructure in a camp is essential to improve the well-being and the possibility to increase the level of self-reliance (Borchert 2019). However, stating ‘the better the infrastructure, the better the level of self-reliance’ would be a false assumption. (#2.47 – Infrastructure and services) The newly built wastewater network in Zaatar camp (cf. Chapter 4.1.6), for instance, could not be linked to a higher self-reliance level or livelihood opportunities by interviewee No. 11. It certainly contributes to the well-being and the dignity of the residents, since basic needs are better covered. However, apart from the plumbers maintaining the system, it does not create jobs or gives the residents more free time, as prior to this system, they had received water through trucks, filling water tanks directly installed on-site their shelters (IV: 10 - NGO Zaatar Camp 1/15/2019; IV: 11 - ACTED 1/16/2019; Schön et al. 2018). Yet, interviewee No. 11 mentioned one infrastructure that has been able to improve livelihood activities: a water drainage system which was planned to be built in 2019 for about 2.5 million Euro (cf. CPI – Category 5 – Camp location). Heavy rains easily flood Zaatar camp and a drainage system could stop floods, which at times puts on hold the work of the humanitarian aid agencies but also businesses of the refugees (IV: 11 - ACTED 1/16/2019).

Work opportunities in Azraq camp mostly consist of Cash for Work job opportunities, initiated by field officers. Other activities are very restricted, although some private shops exist. People living in Village 5 can neither leave the camp, nor apply to work outside. Applications are simply rejected. Some of Village 2 residents are former Village 5 inhabitants and face the same problems in obtaining outside working permits. The rejection rate based on security-related issues was about 15 per cent (IV: 09 - ILO 1/15/2019). Because of the high rejection rate, ILO had difficulties in organising job fairs or job matching proposals. To meet these challenges, ILO reached an agreement with the governmental camp management (SRID) to use a list of
those residents who are allowed to work from outside the camp (ibid.). (#2.14 – Safety for host country)

The case of Kalobeyei can further support the argument of infrastructure not being the factor for self-reliance. A camp setting (infrastructure and services) was designed to equally integrate hosts and refugees in order to achieve improved health standards, ensure food and nutrition security, increase school enrolment of children, improve safety and well-being of children, enhance economic resilience and well-being and increase social cohesion as well as reduce conflict over resources (Betts et al. 2018a, p. 8). The logic behind this 15 million Euro programme is

by improving protection, enhancing self-reliance opportunities and integrated service delivery, and building the capacity of local authorities to deliver such services, refugees and their host communities will benefit from a safer and more favourable environment, increasing their livelihood opportunities sustainably, and decreasing the incentives for irregular secondary movements. (EC Europe 2016) (#4.1 – Infrastructure and services)

A reality check reveals that despite proper planning and the development of an integrative system, the self-reliance level in the settlement is less developed than expected.

*Depending groups* (here refugees) are easily marginalised which makes them powerless and targets for exploitation as explained by Young (1992). Not only those they depend on (here field officers) but also other stakeholder groups can exercise power over them, for instance, the government can deprive them of their rights (Figure 28). *Supporting* refugees by initiating *livelihood activities* is seen as an act of empowerment. However, to make it successful the specific refugee situation needs to be thoughtfully assessed and the livelihood activities properly implemented. Otherwise, instead of establishing power-to by the superordinates, influence or power-over in the form of coercion, manipulation or authority will be exercised. Such acts of power easily create resistance, e.g., project rejection by the refugees. Refugees can influence field officers (and the private sector) to adapt their course of livelihood activities, e.g., by not attending trainings. One answer of field officers to such resistance can be to implement short-term projects generating *quick results* and then convince/influence refugees to take part in longer-term educational programmes if thought useful for the specific refugee situation. Investing in *infrastructure and services* is not a form of power, as described above, but rather an extension of the sub- and superordinates’ action-environment. The better infrastructure and services are in and around a camp, the more action alternatives will all stakeholders possess. The government and the donor community can assist here by increasing investments and funding. The
same accounts to increasing safety and security in the host country. When governments or field officers prohibit refugees to leave the camp, they exercise power over the refugees, no matter if the safety of the host country is a real or a perceived cause. Foci of attention are: Dependency at the camp level and Livelihood Opportunities at the camp and local levels.

![Figure 28: IIF Category 4 – Camp Funding](image)

**Category 5 – Camp Location**

As already mentioned in Chapter 2.2, camps are likely to be set up in remote areas where natural resources are limited. This governmental behaviour was confirmed by interviewee No.4:

> Many refugees worldwide are often located in the most hostile environments. Having initiatives, creating projects, are always difficult from a financial point of view. We did the same. When I was the representative in Mauritania, we used to have something like 50,000 Tuareg refugees from Mali – again, in the middle of the desert, the same environment as the Sahrawi refugees in Algeria. So we did organise schools, support gardens, small ones, for the local production, but at high cost and with strong difficulties—land, water, environment, heat, sandstorms… We had sandstorms very frequently. So, at the end, refugees were able to produce vegetables, but it did not go very far. (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018)

Besides living in hostile environments, the remoteness of camps and the lack of natural resources add challenges to the situation of refugees. Setting up and maintaining food pipelines in such environments is difficult, but still cheaper than creating, promoting and supporting long-term income-generating activities (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018). For instance, in
Mauritania, the interview partner and colleagues set up traditional workshop productions, where refugees made traditional items by using animal skins. In the region, the market was limited, as the capital city of Mauritania was 1,200 km far from the camp and exporting the products was difficult. Trucks that had brought in food aid were used for return freight, but transport was not offered free of charge, limiting the success of the business significantly. (#1.1 – Remote areas)

In Algeria, the Sahrawi refugees were supported in maintaining small gardens. This was difficult as water and fertile land for the production of vegetables was mostly unavailable (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018). Another example given by interviewee No. 4 is Djibouti. Due to the war in Ogaden, a big camp for nationals of Somali ethnicity was built. According to interviewee No. 4, it was not conducive to large-scale self-reliance activities. Djibouti has a harsh natural environment with high temperatures and stone deserts. Finding practical solutions for people of nomadic culture was and is challenging. Nomads are usually not open to sedentary activities. In addition, Djibouti itself is not self-reliant – the country has no agriculture and only small amounts of cattle (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018). (#1.2 – Natural resources (limited))

Refugees being hosted for a long time usually impact the social and economic environment of the host country. Hence, refugees quickly face increasingly restrictive regulations and denial of human rights as well as xenophobia and discrimination (UNHCR 2005, Appendix One, pp. 13-14). Deforestation, destruction of agricultural land, water pollution, overburdened water supplies, over-fishing and overuse or destruction of rangeland by refugees’ livestock are some of the problems host communities face (Jacobsen 2002, p. 107). Where natural resources are limited and the quality of soil is not appropriate for agriculture, opportunities for refugees are rare, even if regulations are in favour of the refugees (Vriese 2006, p. 15). No matter what the situation of natural resources is, refugees might still try to engage in agricultural activities. Such practices easily lead to tensions between hosts and refugees (Hovil and Werker 2001). (#3.20 – Natural resources (limited))

Tensions between refugees and hosts because of limited natural resources were also experienced in Jordan. According to interviewee No. 6, in the north, the hospitality of Jordanians towards Syrian refugees diminished over time, not because of cultural differences but because of the scarcity of natural resources (IV: 06 - GIZ 1/14/2019). When an already vulnerable population needs to share limited resources with newcomers, anger or hatred is created easily (Agblorti and Awusabo-Asare 2011). (#2.1, 3.20 – Natural resources (limited))

In Kalobeyei, natural resources are limited as well, since the camp is situated in Turkana County, where the climate is arid, the quality of soil poor and water resources scarce (Betts et
The biggest obstacles for producing food are lack of water and seeds, lack of equipment and poor quality of soil (Betts et al. 2018a, p. 19). (#4.9–Natural resources (limited))

The remoteness of a camp, usually coming along with limited natural resources, isolates refugees from national development plans, markets or work opportunities, which leads to less access to basic amenities (Werker 2007; UNHCR 2005, Appendix One, pp. 13-14). Transportation to thriving places and markets is expensive, restricted or does not exist at all (Bilgili and Loschmann 2018; Azorbo 2011, p. 5; Werker 2007). When transportation costs exceed the potential earning of sales, people have to rely on external traders and intermediaries. When business becomes unprofitable, refugees are immediately excluded from any business outside camps, which leads to even further isolation. Undignified treatment and discrimination can impede refugees to engage in livelihood activities. Hovil and Werker (2001) elucidated random beatings and arbitrary behaviour regarding movement permissions in Ugandan camps. Here, refugees could often not sell their crops harvested inside the camps because they could not rely on receiving the necessary exit permits (cf. CPI, Category 6 – Legal Issues). Another problem of camps set up in poor and remote areas is that they are more likely to be targeted by bandits and criminals. In camps ‘there are simply more items to steal, more people to rob and more women to rape in and around the camps […]’ (Crisp 2000, p. 20). Reaching beneficiaries in conflicts is especially difficult when the area is insecure, as humanitarian organisations do not want to endanger their staff (ALNAP 2015, p. 47). Protection risks are manifold; people having assets are often affected, as they might become targets of criminals and theft, especially when they do not have access to saving accounts or something similar (which is more difficult in remote areas) (UNHCR 2012b, pp. 43-49, 89). Conflicts decrease the security of businesses (UNHCR 2005, Appendix One, p. 121). They also scare away potential entrepreneurs from making investments as well as microfinance institutions from starting to give out loans. A vicious cycle is created – conflicts decrease market demand and market potentials and limited market demands make it difficult to maintain businesses. These limitations can fuel social division, distrust and conflicts. (#3.22–Insecurity, fragile places)

Though locking refugees in a camp situated in remote areas is certainly an act of power, the simple fact to live in a remote area rather constrains the action-environment of the different agents (Figure 29). Thus, the role of the national government is not included in the power analysis, but it is involved nevertheless, as it determines the location of a camp and if a camp exists at all. The same accounts to the insecurity and fragility of camp locations. Though reversible
in the long term by high investments made by the government or the donor community, first, agents have to deal with the situation they find on site. This also accounts to the *scarcity of resources* – it determines the action alternatives that refugees as well as other stakeholders have. Only secondary, these action alternatives can cause power relations between the different stakeholder groups, such as criminal hosts or refugees forcing refugees handing over their assets, etc. Foci of attention are: Livelihood Opportunities at the camp and local levels and Xenophobia at the local level.

![Camp Location Diagram](image)

*Figure 29: IIF Category 5 – Camp Location*

**Category 6 – Legal Issues**

If and how refugees are treated depends on the goodwill of the national host governments. In many cases, refugees are not allowed to move freely and/or work legally. In a suitable legislative environment, the right to work and move around freely is missing, hence, economic activities of refugees cannot be connected to the national economy or with the local population. Livelihood programmes and activities cannot unfold their full potential ([IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018; IV: 05 - UNHCR Copenhagen 12/18/2018; Azorbo 2011, p. 5; Werker 2007; UNHCR 2005, Book One, p. 10]. (#3.2, 1.5 – *Restriction of human rights*) Forcing people into inactivity is a psychological burden on any refugee (or person in general) ([IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018]). When refugees and IDPs face exclusion from labour markets and have no or limited access to educational facilities and health services, they are isolated and/or have to use negative coping mechanisms. Such negative coping mechanisms can include illegal or involuntary livelihood activities, like smuggling, stealing or prostitution ([IV: 01 - Irish NGO 9/24/2018; IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018; Jacobsen 2002, p. 96].) Refugees face economic exploitation, arrest and detention, among others ([UNHCR 2014a; Jamal 2003]. (#3.1 – *Exclusion of labour markets and common facilities*) This ‘behaviour’ puts the refugees and the
region’s security at risk and evokes tension between hosts and refugees. (\#3.3 – Illegal markets)

In Rwanda, for instance, the government decided to settle refugees in a camp in the hunting area of a national park. They did not want them close to the population. The refugees had to remain isolated and surrounded by wild animals. UNHCR, according to interviewee No. 4, had no choice but to serve the refugees in that location. Still, refugees started developing small activities, like planting herbs, beans, tomatoes, etc. around their tents (4_Schön 26.11.2018).

Interviewee No. 5 summarises the disadvantages of camps: ‘Camps are inherently bad. The more closed a camp is, the worse it is. When people live among the host community, it is much easier for them to become self-reliant’ (5_Schön 18.12.2018, 10 am). (\#1.7 - Exclusion of labour markets and common facilities)

Regarding Zaatari camp, experts agree on a relatively high level of well-being of the residents due to good infrastructure and funding. However, they also explained the limitations and risk of isolation without work permits (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018). Formal jobs\(^\text{19}\) inside the camp are almost all short-term CfW jobs under the supervision of NGOs. Informal jobs, e.g., at the market, lead to only a small number of job opportunities in the camp (9_Schön 15.01.2019, 10:30am). (\#2.23 – Informal camp markets) As explained in Chapter 4.1.5, without a work permit, Zaatari residents can only go outside for a brief period of time. With a work permit, they can leave for a month and then have to come back for re-registering. Residents who are caught without a leave or a work permit are sent back to the camp and are prohibited to leave the camp again for some time (IV: 10 - NGO Zaatari Camp 1/15/2019). (\#2.15 – Restriction of human rights)

For humanitarian aid agencies, such as UNHCR and the donor community, there is no choice but to accept and respect decisions of the government (5_Schön 18.12.2018, 10 am). The host countries have their own sovereignty and are the final decision-makers. The organisations can advocate for the refugees and appeal on the government’s self-interest showcasing that ‘happy, self-reliant and integrated refugees are not a threat, but benefit the economy’ (4_Schön 26.11.2018, 8am; 5_Schön 18.12.2018, 10 am). Interviewee No. 4 notes how important UN and NGO programmes are to make sure refugees are not inactive and bored. Interviewee No. 5 emphasises on the importance of humanitarian aid agencies collectively advocating for the refugees and their human rights at the national government level (5_Schön 18.12.2018, 10 am; 4_Schön 26.11.2018, 8am). Interviewee No. 5 has summarised his opinion on human rights:

\(^{19}\) Formal jobs include jobs given out by organisations or based on formal work permits, informal jobs are jobs which are tolerated by the government and thus, not illegal, as are market activities inside of the camp.
The big difference is the freedom of movement and right to work for self-reliance. If they have it, good. If not, bad. The complexity with these legal barriers is that they can be both de jure and de facto. In theory, refugees can have these rights, but in practice, they are not recognised by anyone. Or vice versa, they have a de jure ban on right to work, but in practice, the country is so informal in their economy that nobody cares and the police does not enforce the law as everybody works in the informal sector. (5_Schön 18.12.2018, 10am) (#1.5 – Restriction of human rights)

Such differences between de jure and de facto rights were observed by Werker (2007, pp. 4-6) regarding obtaining permits to work. In the case of Kyangwali Refugee Settlement in Uganda, refugees could request a permit to leave the camp only twice a week, uncertain that their request would be fulfilled when visiting the commander’s office one of the days. This makes it very difficult to plan ahead regarding profit-making business opportunities or to travel to Kampala to obtain a work permit. If they could receive a permit to leave, the refugees had to make sure to come back before the permit expires. Besides being time-restricted, obtaining a work permit was also costly, not only due to the price of the permit but also because of high travelling expenses. These hurdles hindered many refugees from obtaining legal working opportunities (ibid.). (#3.24 – Restriction of human rights)

Besides the right to work and to move freely, host governments often also impose other restrictions. For instance, without freedom of speech, refugees cannot empower themselves and speak up for their rights (Werker 2007, pp. 6-7). If freedom to obtain or even access land for productive purposes is restricted or if refugees do not have access to markets and financial services, consequences are long-term dependency and/or illegal or ill-use of available resources (UNHCR 2005, Appendix One, pp. 26-27). The latter accounts for Kalobeyei, where refugee women are not allowed to brew alcohol and refugees per se cannot use forest resources or keep livestock (Betts et al. 2018a, p. 26). (#3.24, 3.2 – Restriction of human rights, #4.12 – Restricting markets for refugees) The prohibition of keeping animals, especially, can have huge impacts on (certain) groups. For people all over the world, animals are of enormous importance to generate income, serve as mean of transportation, and for security and cultural activities (Alshawawreh 2018; Pollock 2018). For refugees in particular, keeping animals can improve people’s health and well-being as well as have positive psychological effects, besides being a source of food and a commodity (Owczarczak-Garstecka 2018). Particularly for encamped refugees situated in the desert (e.g., Sahrawi refugees in Algeria), the only mean to live self-sufficiently is by following (their traditional) nomadic practices (Angeloni and Carr 2018). Losing livestock is a tragedy to displaced pastoralists (Jacobsen 2002, p. 107). Restocking cattle as well as keeping the herd alive are priorities. Encampment and thus, enforced sedentarism,
disrupts nomadic lifestyles and can lead to high rates of anaemia, especially among children and women of childbearing age. The reason is the offered food basket that is usually based on calories and not on a balanced diet, including fresh meat (ibid.). In most cases, animals are neither integrated in the planning phase of humanitarian assistance nor in camp designs, as the priority of humanitarian aid agencies is human and not animal welfare. Camp management has to restrict animals in the camp because of the unavailability of appropriate livestock shelters, expensive veterinarians and animal vaccination programmes (Alshawawreh 2018; Hoots 2018). Hygienic facilities for slaughtering animals and preparing meat are not provided; fodder, grazing land and water sources are inadequate or insufficient, etc. (Hoots 2018; Alshawawreh 2018; Owczarczak-Garstecka 2018; Pollock 2018; Jacobsen 2002, p. 107). Despite restrictions, refugees still keep animals, often because they were brought from their homeland. Ignoring the existence of animals and their needs in refugee situations leads to a series of problems. Animals of refugees die in host communities or camps due to poor health and fodder conditions, leaving refugees without any means (Pollock 2018). Unsuitable shelter situations, proximity to overcrowded human shelters and unhygienic slaughter conditions can cause an increase in animal diseases and the transmission of certain illnesses to humans (Owczarczak-Garstecka 2018). Further, animals can be exposed to new diseases or carry new diseases to which local animals are not immune. In many refugee situations, tension arise between refugees and host communities due to damaged crops by the refugee animals or degraded grazing areas and water sources (Hoots 2018). It depends on the camp and the management, how and if animals are allowed and integrated into a camp setting. In Zaatari camp, for example, chickens are allowed and kept for food and income as well as donkeys and horses to transport goods and people; birds are kept for a sense of home (Alshawawreh 2018). The animals are sheltered close to the residents’ houses in a similar type of housing (corrugated sheets and canvas). In Azraq camp, residents are not allowed to keep animals besides caged birds. (#3.6 – Forbidding livestock)

Though created by acts of power, informal camp markets and the existence of illegal markets were identified as action-environment, circumstances refugees and other stakeholders have to deal with (Figure 30). When refugees are excluded from markets, labour markets and common facilities, they could include in their action alternatives illegal or criminal acts. As a consequence, power relations could evolve between refugees and hosts or field officers. All other influential factors of this category directly reflect acts of power-over, specifically of marginalisation – by not granting refugees their rights, they are materially deprived, made dependent

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on welfare and are given less opportunities in life (Young 1992). Such measures create powerless refugees who are easily exploited. Further, they must live in constant fear of experiencing violence or even cultural imperialism by the dominant agents. The government could prevent those negative consequences by granting refugees their human rights. In case the government refuses to grant human rights to the refugees, the donor community could try to change the situation by increasing pressure on the host government. If such measures are successful depends on the specific situations. Foci of attention are: Livelihood Opportunities at the camp level, Xenophobia at the local level and the Host Economy at the national level.

**Legal Issues**

![Diagram of Legal Issues]

Figure 30: IIF Category 6 – Legal Issues

**Category 7 – Social Capital**

As explained in Chapter 3.3.2, CPI, Category 7 – Social Capital, social capital, ethnic or linguistic ties can decide if livelihood activities become a success or a failure. These categories also determine access to the labour market (Zetter and Ruaudel 2018). (#3.25 – Social capital (access)) They can also improve the well-being of people, as in the case of Kalobeyei. Though there are restrictions on the free movement of refugees in Kenya, there are no such limitations between Kakuma and Kalobeyei, which many use as a survival strategy (Betts et al. 2018a, p. 34; Betts et al. 2017). They visit narrow or extended networks, engage in businesses with people from the other settlement or visit family and friends. (#4.16 – Social capital (access)) Separation from direct family members and friends not only causes trauma but also the loss of a business partner and thus, economic independence. About half of the South Sudanese adults interviewed by Betts et al. (2018a, p. 31) lost their spouses; especially women face much hardship.
to survive (#4.15 - Social capital - missing family members). Further, the level of remittances from outside members to Kakuma or Kalobeyei refugee residents is low, which, according to Betts et al. (2018a, p. 32), is because of the low level of resettled refugees, as in the case of those from South Sudan. In contrast, in Jordan, remittances sent from family members (nationals and refugees) living in the US or an European country are an important factor to guarantee a decent life or simply survival. (IV: 06 - GIZ 1/14/2019). (#2.17 - Remittances)
The relationship between the host community and the refugees affects the self-reliance level or engagement in livelihood activities significantly. Reasons for difficult or negative relationships can be the limited interaction between both groups and the employment situation, especially when refugees get jobs instead of locals, or worse, when locals are replaced by refugees as happened in Kalobeyei (Betts et al. 2018a, p. 43). Further, many locals (Turkana) are excluded from the cash-assistance programme ‘Bamba Chakula’. Only a few vulnerable are included in the so-called Hunger Safety Net Programme based on socio-economic indicators assessed by the National Drought Management Authority (ibid., p. 42).
Lotuko and Didinga people of South Sudan are accustomed to the plant variety of the Turkana region and thus, are capable of harvesting them instead of buying them from locals (Betts et al. 2018a, p. 42). This ‘self-service attitude’ has caused feelings of resentment amongst the locals. Further, the increasing number of refugees over time, often with different cultural and gender-related norms, has led to xenophobia. The different groups do not comprehend the behaviour of each other. (#4.18 – Social capital (understanding it))
Refugees experience various levels of discrimination from the local actors. This includes low wages, high rental costs, poor public services extended to the refugees (Bilgili and Loschmann 2018; UNHCR 2012b, p. 39). Integration is not desired by the host community, even when refugees have lived in the host country for a long period of time (Kibreab 2003). Corresponding compliance and enforcement mechanisms might be able to overcome such hurdles for refugees (Zetter and Ruaudel 2018). (#3.21 - Xenophobia)
Resentments regarding the other group exist on both sides. Both groups fear competition, over-alienation and damage of culture and traditions. For many refugees in Kalobeyei, the Turkanas, the ‘traditional’ pastoralist with a semi-nomadic lifestyle (Betts et al. 2018a, pp. 41-43), are regarded as not trustworthy. The cultural differences nurture misunderstandings and are an obstacle for integration, though half of the refugees think integration is important. For social and economic development, integration plays a significant role.
Social capital such as relationships and social hierarchies often remain even when people flee (IV: 01 - Irish NGO 9/24/2018) and, as pointed out in Chapter 2.4.2, this can directly influence
people’s income, well-being, etc. If field officers neglect or do not understand such relationships, their projects are less likely to be successful. (#1.21 - Social capital (understanding it)) Interviewee No. 10 as well as interviewee No. 4 emphasise the importance of a community-based approach.

Before, UNHCR used a mechanical reply – 10,000 people fleeing means x tents, y blankets, z jerry cans, etc.; a local partner implementing the programme. Done. Listening to the refugees was not a priority. Now it has become essential. Now, you listen to the people you are supporting, discuss, understand, question them – you have a permanent dialogue with the refugee communities, with special care for groups at risk. (4_Schön 26.11.2018, 8am)

Humanitarian aid agencies have to make sure that their projects fit the needs of the people. For this, they themselves have to be convinced of the potential a project has:

Livelihood opportunities are important, they help to make an income, to give people a better life. But, if you sit in a meeting and you realise that the staff training the people is not convinced that the project is going to work, how can you convince refugees that the project will not fail? (10_Schön 15.01.2019, 1pm)

People – refugees or other beneficiaries – must understand the type of project in which they are engaged and comprehend its needs. If they only participate for the sake of the project, the project will not be sustainable (1_Schön 24.09.2018, 9am). In Ethiopia, for instance, rural roads were built through food for work projects. At the end, people continued using the previous roads as it felt to be more convenient; the new roads did not meet the requirements of the people (ibid).

If you build infrastructure or public assets nobody cares for or nobody wants, there will be no long-term impact. Instead of using Cash or Food For projects to build such unwanted public assets, food could have been given out for free – there would have been no difference for the people. (1_Schön 24.09.2018, 9am)

Taking up the importance of community involvement, the question remains, why besides being a ‘slogan in almost every meeting’ (10_Schön 15.01.2019, 1pm), so many NGOs seemed to not listen to the opinion of the refugees. Interviewee No. 10 attempts an explanation: first, in his opinion, NGOs have their own ideas of what is best for the refugees; second, when donors pay for certain trainings, activities or services, even if they are not considered to be potentially successful when implemented, they will still be proposed and provided by the NGOs; third,
when NGOs plan their projects, the opinion of refugees is often not included. (#1.17 – Community-based approaches)

The explanations given above concerning the formation of xenophobia are multi-layered and fuelled by different actions of different stakeholder groups (field officers, because they allow refugees and not hosts to participate in special programmes; refugees, because they use natural resources in an unsustainable way; hosts, creating and nourishing cultural imperialism towards refugees). The national government might be able to change the situation by increasing social spending for its own population or better for hosts as well as for refugees. The status quo of social interaction (social capital) was shaped by power relations between those involved (Figure 31). Though not irreversible, they now influence the action-environment of those acting with each other. The action-environment is also influenced when family members are missing or when beneficiaries receive extra income by remittances. Community-based approaches were identified as acts of empowerment. If field officers, however, do not use their power in a transformative way but to achieve their or the donors’ own goals, they exercise power over refugees in a dominating way. Foci of attention are: Livelihood Opportunities at the camp and local levels and Xenophobia at the local level.

Figure 31: IIF Category 7 – Social Capital

Category 8 – Employment and Income

Observing people who had come with practically no resources and starting their own businesses in a very short time was an interesting experience for interviewee No. 3. He had witnessed the
emergence of the ‘Shams Élysées’ market street in the Zaatari camp. It happened ‘more or less overnight’ (3a_Schön 21.10.2018, 8am). People made use of any of their competences or material they could find to start a business. They started money exchange systems, sold cigarettes from cardboard boxes, ‘sold’ or rented tents and later caravans which they obtained, for instance, from people leaving the camp. He narrated:

One shop owner, who sold coffee and spices, showed me pictures of his home in Syria before the war. It was a nice house with swimming pool and expensive cars. He had lost everything to the war and came with nothing. Quickly, in the camp he found some partners to go into business with him. Since he knew the business, he found some investors to give him seed money and he started that shop. (IV: 03a - UNHCR Zaatari Camp 10/21/2018)

The interviewee watched the shop grow until it was like a proper city market. The shop owner bought shops next to him to expand his business. ‘Strange businesses, like a billiard place started and somebody even opened a swimming pool’ (ibid.). Creating markets and starting businesses are important to create ‘normal life’ in a camp, especially for the youth (3a_Schön 21.10.2018, 8am). Different interviewees affirmed that Syrians are motivated to become self-reliant and are very innovative. ‘They do not just sit around’ (3a_Schön 21.10.2018, 8am; 10_Schön 15.01.2019, 1pm). (#2.10 – Motivation to start again) However, opportunities in camps are limited regarding the number of labour force as well as growth of businesses.

As mentioned above, influential factors for self-reliance are manifold and include a general lack of confidence in the local government and in society often caused by uncertain, violent political and social circumstances as well as disrespect towards law and order, creating instability and fragility (IV: 01 - Irish NGO 9/24/2018; UNHCR 2005, Appendix One, p. 33). (#1.4 – Fragile places) The range of possibilities to engage in livelihood activities is low in such areas due to weak economies. Weak economies exist because of a lack of assets (or the other way around, it is difficult to accumulate assets in weak economies (UNHCR 2005, Appendix One, p. 33)). Economies are weak because of unstable governments, high insecurity as well as low foreign and domestic investments, among others (Jahre et al. 2018; IV: 01 - Irish NGO 9/24/2018; Azorbo 2011; Nagarajan 1997). (#4.5 – Fragile places) Land mines, destroyed infrastructure and insecurity limit livelihood activities severely, as it is difficult to access farming land, grazing areas, markets, etc., especially when there are no transportation means (UNHCR 2005, Appendix One, p. 33). Poor infrastructure in general make camp operations and their expansion difficult (Jahre et al. 2018). In such environments, people tend to focus rather on survival and short-term planning than on building long-term livelihood activities. (#1.16 – Fragile places)
Maintaining strong social networks, as outlined in Category 7, is one of the factors to engage successfully in livelihood activities.

In such areas, the only way to earn at least some money is by short-term Cash for Work initiatives funded by NGOs. However, CfW is not meant to be sustainable (cf. Chapter 2.5.5 – Programme Planning). Such initiatives were designed to prevent uninterrupted long-term unemployment. CfW does not create self-reliance, rather, participants can earn extra cash to cover additional essential needs (Del Carpio et al. 2018; Women's Refugee Commission 2009, pp. 58, 71). (#3.5 – Livelihood projects in camps)

In Kalobeyei, about 80 per cent of the refugees generate an income by working for the UN or NGO. They accept rather low salaries due to the difficulties they face in obtaining a so-called class M work permit. The M permit grants them to work legally and to receive a regular salary. Concerning the role of ethnic groups or origin, especially Burundians are more engaged in income-generating activities, mainly because other Burundians employ them, however they earn less than the average refugee.

Cash-based interventions, such as the above-mentioned Bamba Chakula and the permission to open informal markets equally only help a fraction of people and do not really create high self-reliance level. As in the Zaatari camp, also in Kalobeyei, the informal market offers a high variety of products to buy but the jobs created there hardly facilitate (potential) self-reliance (Schön et al. 2018, pp. 363, 366), Bamba Chakula has increased the purchasing power of the refugees and the choices that they can avail but not the number of jobs. Only 16 refugees from Kalobeyei and 16 refugees from Kakuma (as well as 29 Kenyan hosts) are registered as traders. On the one hand, WFP restricts traders to register to prevent the number of shops exceeding the demand, which means that new traders need to compete with existing businesses. On the other hand, WFP does not control the prices paid for Bamba Chakula items, as it advocates free market principles. Thus, some refugees sell items cheaper than their host counterparts, which leads to tensions between the traders (Betts et al. 2018a, p. 26). (#4.11– Creating purchasing power through cash-based interventions)

Livelihood programmes to increase the level of self-reliance, as implemented by humanitarian aid agencies appear to be more promising in many cases. However, the following examples for the Zaatari camp show a range of pitfalls preventing successful implementation. Chapter 2.5.4 explained the importance of conducting different assessments before implementing livelihood projects.

The experts having worked in Zaatari mentioned several livelihood projects like sewing bags with old tent tarpaulins by vulnerable people (IV: 02 - UNHCR Amman 9/26/2018) or painting
caravans and creating addresses for each camp location paid by the inhabitants (IV: 10 - NGO Zaatari Camp 1/15/2019). Some projects only happen because the UN or NGO headquarters insist to implement them. (#2.32 – *Headquarter specifications*) Especially when project objectives are unclear, resistance develops, as happened in the case of the address creation project in Zaatari camp. The project was not well accepted, as refugees did not or could not pay for such redesigns (ibid.). As outlined in Category 4, many camp residents are interested in cash for work projects as the payment is considered good. The short periods are appreciated by some and complained about by others, depending on their personal life stories. All seem to appreciate earning extra money. Still, the experts interviewed report of challenges they faced, like decreasing numbers of participants, when projects get into longer-term phases (IV: 02 - UNHCR Amman 9/26/2018; IV: 03a - UNHCR Zaatari Camp 10/21/2018; IV: 10 - NGO Zaatari Camp 1/15/2019). The example given hereafter considers reasons for the declining numbers of participants over the lifespan of a project.

According to interviewee No. 10, one livelihood project was to teach women how to sew and repair damaged clothes (IV: 10 - NGO Zaatari Camp 1/15/2019). These clothes were brought into the camp from outside, so the women could repair them and sell them on the camp market. However, not many women applied for this project. One of the reasons mentioned by interviewee No. 10 was the Arab culture. He explained that most of the people living in Zaatari camp come from Dar’a, a traditional, rural village area in Syria. Arab men, originating from this traditional zone, would not accept the idea of their wives seeking an outside (home) activity. The wife is supposed to stay at home, take care of the children, cook, clean, etc. To solve this issue, field officers went to see the husbands to convince them to let their wives attend the sewing courses. Their success was limited: While some allowed their wives to attend the training, the majority got impatient after a couple of sessions, when there was no immediate return on cash. Field officers explained that during the training sessions, no income could be generated. Income, they clarified, would flow in after the training sessions. Still, in many cases, the husbands could not be persuaded. Occasionally, women were able to participate as long as their husbands were working outside, but as soon as the husband returned home, the female participants were obliged to interrupt the training sessions. To kick-start entrepreneurship, the organisations provided material to repair to those having completed the course. After a while, the task was to source material independently. The challenge was to compete with the cheap Asian products offered at informal markets (IV: 10 - NGO Zaatari Camp 1/15/2019). As long as the female entrepreneurs received support from the organisations, they could keep prices low. As the objective of this project was to render women independent and create self-reliance, the
support was slowly reduced and finally stopped. The women, who gained enough practice, were expected to start their own sewing business, but most participants quit the project without further activity. According to the participants, they neither had the money to source the materials from outside, nor could they travel outside the camp to source their materials themselves. Others did not want to work on their own. The interviewee continued his explanations: Setting up one's own business means to run risks. If a person invests in materials to make her own products, she cannot be sure that people will like it and buy it or – in a refugee camp – can afford the prices she has to ask for. When a business remains unprofitable, it has to be closed again (IV: 10 - NGO Zaatari Camp 1/15/2019).

Another interesting project included the training of plumbers to serve the individual water and wastewater installations in Zaatari camp. According to interviewee No. 10, trained plumbers had become necessary after all homes in Zaatari had been connected to the new water and wastewater network. With reduced funding and the objective to create independence from assistance, the plumbing activity was set up (IV: 10 - NGO Zaatari Camp 1/15/2019). Therefore, a hotline was set up for residents with plumbing problems. At the beginning, all costs were covered by the organisation, including the salary of the plumbers and the supply of repair material. To create sustainability, the costs were slowly shifted to the refugees who had to pay for the repairs. The shift caused many problems. The refugees could not understand why they had to pay for the service. Many questions and discussions arose: What will happen if a customer does not pay? What will the humanitarian aid agencies do? What if the most poor and vulnerable people cannot pay? To keep salaries stable, the humanitarian aid agencies started to pay the plumbers a fixed wage (25 JD per week). The plumbers were asked to present control sheets for the work done and received a topping-up for the services they provided. Quickly, plumbing material became available at the informal market and people started calling the plumber directly without going through the organisation’s hotline. After a while, all plumbing work was entirely handed over to the plumbers. Till date, the system still functions and the hotline is kept to announce the registered names and phone numbers of trained plumbers (ibid.). (#2.11 - Livelihood projects in camps)

Participation in livelihood programmes does not necessarily lead to self-reliance. Refugees can try to find work outside the camp, if they have access to information on how to obtain a work permit, know how to apply for formal jobs and are able to pay for transportation costs or intermediaries (Del Carpio et al. 2018; Werker 2007).

However, even this strategy does not necessarily lead to self-reliance as salaries can be very low (as is often the case in Jordan). Interviewee No. 2 explained that the most important factor
to reach self-reliance is wage. In Jordan, for instance, where costs of living are very high, livelihood interventions with low wages are unsustainable. People living outside the camps earn about 220 JD per month (the national monthly minimum wage, cf. Chapter 4.1.5), but have to pay for rent, electricity bills, water, schools, health, buy medicine, transportation, etc. Their wage is not enough for all expenditures. Refugees in the camp live in caravans that are provided to them, receive health services and basic needs. For them, in the opinion of interviewee No. 2, the minimum wage of 220 JD per month is reasonable (IV: 02 - UNHCR Amman 9/26/2018). (#2.13 – Low salaries in host country) Still, self-reliance, as defined above (cf. Chapter 2.4.1), is hardly reached by both groups. Refugees living among hosts can only survive if they put different salaries together and live in indecent circumstances. Camp residents keep being dependent on humanitarian aid agencies because of low wages and limited working opportunities. Under such circumstances, it might be understandable when people bend the rules and regulations to some extent and exploit the aid system for their own benefits (IV: 01 - Irish NGO 9/24/2018). (#1.37 – Exploitation of aid)

As could be seen in the example of the sewing project above, camp and market sizes play a significant role for businesses and employment. Werker (2007, pp. 8-9) compares a camp market with Adam Smith’ theory. Where markets are too small, people cannot specialise in what they can do best – instead everyone has to take care and produce own goods. But when every person builds a house, grows food, grinds grain and mends clothes for himself, productivity and purchasing power remain low. This leads to low wages and the inability of people to pay external market prices. In such a situation, combined with restrictions of movement and work, high transportation costs and information gaps, encamped refugees have difficulties to compete with outside markets. They have to sell their products for less than the average market prices to intermediaries. A Congolese shopowner in Kyangwali Refugee Settlement (Uganda) explained Werker (2007, p. 9) her situation:

> Few traders come in from Hoima. They hike the price – they are not fair in pricing their stuff. They always like to take a lot of produce and when we compare the exchange with them it’s unfair. They are doing it to us because we don’t have means of looking for other markets. (#3.17 – Market size and terms of trade)

Even when refugees have the right to obtain a work permit, problems can occur; for instance, administrative processes might be costly and burdensome (Zetter and Ruaudel 2018). Some countries, like Lebanon and Zambia, ask refugees for residence permits and/or job offers from employers; in Pakistan local partners are required to obtain real estate. Ecuador and Turkey
allow only limited access to financial institutions to obtain loans and Zambia asks for high fees to start a business. South Africa, according to Zetter and Ruaudel (2018), slowed down the access to formal labour markets and Venezuela has opened its immigration offices in remote areas which are hard to access. (#3.23, 3.16 - Bureaucracy)

The motivation to start again is an intrinsic drive to rebuild one’s life (Figure 32). If any form of power could be attributed to this factor, it might be influence – either through information (no power relation) from field officers, other refugees or else through role models (power-over), probably rather coming from within the refugee community. Fragile places, which have thus emerged from power relations, are categorised as action-environment to which stakeholders must adapt. By investing in safety and security, the national government as well as the donor community could attempt to improve the situation. Low salaries in the host country as well as the market size and terms of trade are also categorised as action-environments, although the latter might be the result of power relations between the government and the refugees. Livelihood projects in camps can influence the refugees’ lives on different scales, depending on their success rate and their acceptance by the beneficiaries. Livelihood projects in the form of CfW initiatives might be nothing more than an aid mechanism for survival and thus, are part of the action-environment that refugees face.

Cash-based interventions with the purpose to create purchasing power have a greater potential to empower refugees than in-kind donations, especially if conducted successfully and aside from disadvantages like the ones mentioned above. As headquarters and donors often support or even demand such initiatives, they are, along with the field officers, part of the superordinate agents. As headquarters usually play an authoritative role, their specifications are followed. If they run counter to the objectives field officers and/or refugees have these specifications are hardly implemented successfully as demonstrated above.

The form of power chosen for the exploitation of aid is manipulation, though the exploiting refugee rather manipulates or takes advantage of the system than of an agent. The examples given above regarding bureaucracy appear to be quite arbitrary. The government can choose, quite freely, how to deal with refugees and use its power over the refugees to make life as difficult as possible. Foci of attention are: Livelihood Opportunities at camp and local levels and Host Economy at the national level.
The level of education in Kalobeyei is not satisfactory. Overall school attendance in Kalobeyei and Kakuma is about 88.6 per cent, with Kakuma rating better (Betts et al. 2018a, pp. 22-23). Schools often have to accommodate children of refugees besides those from the host community; classrooms with more than 300 students exist. In some villages without a school, refugees establish informal schools with voluntary teachers. Nevertheless, for some children, the schooling situation has improved. Some of the South Sudanese refugees stated that the school situation is better than during war-time in South Sudan. Also, the level of adult education is better in Kakuma than in Kalobeyei (of the residents, 50% in Kakuma and between 5% and 30% in Kalobeyei, depending on ethnic groups, are currently attending some form of formal education).

(#4.4 – Basic needs - education) In Jordan, the education sector is of high concern to the government. All children must go to school (IV: 12 - Australian Embassy 1/13/2019). Primary education is the cheapest and thus in focus. While most Syrian children attend a primary school, children seeking higher education hardly have any access. In tertiary education, especially, refugee children are rare as school fees are expensive. National budget cuts worsen the situation. One or two years ago, interviewee No. 12 states, funding for higher school education was better,
but now hardly anybody receives a scholarship to attend university (ibid). (#2.44 – *Education is of government’s concern*) This lack of higher education, occurring in most, if not all, refugee camps worldwide, was taken on, for instance, by the Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) in Guinea and distance education programmes were tested. They even set up a computer lab in a refugee camp and residents were able to study university courses (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018). (#1.35 – *Basic needs - education*)

As stated in Chapter 3.3.2, CPI, Category 9, the participation rate of committees is rather low in Zaatari camp (Schön et al. 2018). In Kalobeyei, most people participate in sports or recreational groups, but only few refugees are part of community-based organisations. Women do not participate in any of such leisure and social groups (Betts et al. 2018a, p. 12). (#4.6 – *Community-based associations*)

*Granting education* or not is a *government matter* or, in the case of refugee children, often the responsibility of humanitarian aid agencies and the donor community (Figure 33); they either grant it or not, they either finance free schooling or not. Thus, granting education was identified as an act of power.

The number of refugees, especially the participation of refugee women in *community-based associations*, however, depends on the influence field officers or other refugees take. Power plays a role when refugees, especially women, are forcefully prevented to participate in such associations. The foci of attention are: Livelihood Opportunities at the camp and local levels and host economies at the national level.

**Children’s Education and Political Voice**

![Diagram of Children’s Education and Political Voice](image)

*Figure 33: IIF Category 9 – Children’s Education and Political Voice*
Category 10 – Political Power Struggles

A range of political power struggles between the stakeholder groups were mentioned by interview partners without clearly identifying them. As they do not fit in any of the nine categories of the CPI, they are clustered in Category 10. The chapter is a collection of relatively small number of answers given by the experts to the question of power relationships between stakeholders and are clustered as per the different stakeholder groups affecting each other. As the experts did not share many insights, this chapter only scratches on the surface of (political) power relations. However, they can still give insights into the different aspects that field officers have to consider when trying to establish livelihood programmes. The following statements show a clear link between government policies, donor policies and the options field officers have (IV: 05 - UNHCR Copenhagen 12/18/2018). Some of the examples were covered before but are presented again in the context of political power struggles. Each paragraph is structured according to the two stakeholder groups involved. At the end of each paragraph, the forms of power playing a role are presented, which is summarised again at the end of this sub-chapter in the form of Figure 34.

**Government – Donors**

In the beginning, the Jordanian government was quite restrictive in handing out working permissions to refugees (International Labour Organization 2017). In 2016, at the London conference, the donor community convinced the Jordanian government to issue work permits for Syrian refugees on the condition to keep funds floating into Jordan (IV: 02 - UNHCR Amman 9/26/2018). This example shows that donors are sensitive to the topic of self-reliance (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018). Donors can advocate on behalf of the UN and the refugees, as well as to protect target groups such as women at risk (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018; IV: 05 - UNHCR Copenhagen 12/18/2018). As humanitarian aid agencies do not control the donors, this strategy has its limitations. (#1.6 – Pressure on governments)

Especially as in the case of the Jordanian government, it seems that the donor community used coercion to improve the economic lives of the refugees. The donor community exerted pressure on the government by threatening to cut funding if the government did not commit to issuing work permits for refugees.
**Government – Field officers**

At the field level, field officers and the government usually work together to take care of the refugee situation. In Jordan, interviewee No. 2 mentioned a good relationship at ‘eye level’ between UNHCR and the Jordanian government. The government is usually present during discussions and both entities consult each other on a regular basis (IV: 02 - UNHCR Amman 9/26/2018). On the contrary, other interviewees working in Jordan revealed difficulties with the Jordanian government. For instance, interviewee No. 8 mentioned the many rules ministries refer to but which in fact are non-existent (IV: 08 - ILO 1/15/2019). Until the ministry comes up with a plan, precious time passes unused.

(2.29 – Relationships between stakeholders) Whereas this situation might occur because the government faces problems for the first time, other issues seem more arbitrary. In Jordan, each humanitarian aid agencies intending to support refugees has to write a project proposal, which then needs to be approved by the government. In many cases, this approval is delayed or even dismissed by the government, until the aid agencies has re-written it (IV: 03b - UNHCR Zaatari Camp 1/13/2019; IV: 08 - ILO 1/15/2019; IV: 10 - NGO Zaatari Camp 1/15/2019). The cabinet normally meets every two weeks. However, in case the meeting is rescheduled and/or it has no time to discuss a project proposal or simply refuses to sign the final project document, projects face significant delays by weeks or months (IV: 08 - ILO 1/15/2019). Various interviewees explained that projects depend on the goodwill of the ministries (IV: 03b - UNHCR Zaatari Camp 1/13/2019; IV: 08 - ILO 1/15/2019). Until then, time is wasted or used in conducting introductory workshops, initial training sessions and planning (IV: 08 - ILO 1/15/2019).

(2.26 – (Arbitrary) governmental behaviour) Quarrels between the government and field officers were also reported by interviewee No. 3. In Azraq camp, UNHCR aimed to set up markets to gain revenues, among others, for further camp development. The government, however, wanted to receive these revenues (IV: 03b - UNHCR Zaatari Camp 1/13/2019). During the time of dispute, the markets could not be used and camp residents had to engage in informal livelihood opportunities or CfW initiatives.

(2.45 – (Arbitrary) governmental behaviour) Jordan is a middle-income country; hence, most international organisations would not be in the country if it was not for the Syrian Refugee Crisis. Most of the Syrians, interviewee No. 8 has talked to, do not want to go back to Syria as they have nothing left behind. In order to invest in their home country, they would need to save money before going back. Most refugees in Jordan hardly earn more than they need for their living expenditures (IV: 08 - ILO 1/15/2019). Those having found a job will stay at least until the security and overall infrastructure in Syria is
improved. If the humanitarian aid agencies would leave the country at this point, many refugees would lose their source of income and be forced to go back to Syria. Regardless, one day, organisations will pull out of Jordan. To facilitate a future for Jordanians and integrated Syrians, the government needs to use the potential organisations have brought to the country. They need to start investing and taking over sectors, such as road construction started by ILO, to avoid migrant workers taking over such job sectors (ibid). (1.39 – (Arbitrary) governmental behaviour)

Expert No. 4 opts for more creativity and seeks to open political doors in order to convince governments facilitating self-reliance or legal work for refugees in general (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018). (1.29 – Pressure on governments) In some cases, such negotiations can be tough and slow. The interviewee narrated about quick impact projects (QIP) in Mauritania to help resettling Mauritanians who had fled to Senegal in 1989. QIPs are small projects for which field officers manage a small budget to quickly finance small projects generated by refugees to get active and start working (e.g., tools for farming, boats for fishing, sewing machines). The success rate of these QIP in Mauritania was 60–65 per cent after two to three years of it being initiated (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018). (1.39 – Pressure on governments)

One of the reasons why governments are restrictive might be their focus on election cycles (IV: 01 - Irish NGO 9/24/2018). In Nigeria, for instance, the government did not want to admit that they were not in the position to provide security in the northern region. During the military campaigns, they went to declare that Boko Haram was defeated and the refugees’ home areas were safe (IV: 01 - Irish NGO 9/24/2018). To prove this declaration, they started bringing refugees and displaced people back to their insecure homes and country. UNHCR was unable to provide any support as they can only be involved when the repatriation act guarantees safe and dignified return (ibid). (1.9 – Election cycles and promises)

Interviewee No. 8 also talked about difficulties during election cycles. He mentioned a mayor who only recruited workers for the ILO project from the tribe he himself belonged to. The other tribe members complained and ILO asked the mayor to recruit people from the town where the work was done. The mayor protested that he made election promises to his tribal people. As he did not fulfil the new conditions, ILO stopped working with this municipality until the issue was solved internally. (2.28 – Election cycles and promises)

According to Betts et al. (2018), also in Turkana, local governments acted to the will of the locals. They prohibited refugees to keep livestock to avoid tensions with Turkana people who live nomadic lives and depend on livestock (Betts et al. 2018a, p. 19). (4.10 – Election cycles and promises)
The government being sovereign of its territories can use its position to dominate the field officers to a certain degree, which also can be seen in the form of the arbitrary behaviour of the Jordanian government or the behaviour during election in Nigeria. The field officers, governed by their headquarters and funded by the donor community, can use these partners to limit the degree of domination (e.g., in the case of the QIP in Mauritania or by pressuring the government to act differently). By worsening their relationship with the government, they have to live with potential consequences such as being expelled from the host country and turning the refugees adrift. As in the case of ILO and the local government, the organisation tried to coerce the government to change its course of action, although unsuccessfully as it had to stop the project.

**Government – Refugees**

Interviewee No. 12 revealed insights about the Jordanian government. She stated that the Jordanian government as well as the Lebanese government want to prevent the stay of Syrian refugees as long as the Palestinians. Thus, both governments refuse any kind of real integration into society. They make sure that Syrians do not get ‘too comfortable’ in the host countries (IV: 12 - Australian Embassy 1/13/2019). (#2.41 – Impeding integration) In 2018, to not publish the information in the Jordan Response Plan, the government cut health subsidies for all refugees shortly before or after its publication (ibid.). This worsened the situation of many refugees living outside the camps and some tried to find space in the camps. However, the official numbers in the camp did not increase, because most did not register or kept their registration in their host community (IV: 12 - Australian Embassy 1/13/2019). One of the negative aspects of this policy regarding self-reliance was that some refugees stopped working to take care of household members because medicine and drugs were too expensive to buy and thus, care activities at home increased. (#2.42 – Cutting support)

Between refugees and the government, domination was also identified as main form of power, as the effects of the governmental actions are mostly detrimental, structural, long-term and occur repeatedly, although not irrevocable. Measures, the government takes to deal with the refugee situation, such as cutting support or impeding integration, depend on the situated social power they find themselves in. Who supports the government? How much do they depend on funding from the donor community? How much leverage has the donor community and why? Is the government pro or contra refugees?
**Field officers – Refugees**

Quarrels between field officers and refugees happen frequently because for people coming from outside (like international field officers), internal power relationships are hard to comprehend, especially when they are linked culturally (IV: 01 - Irish NGO 9/24/2018). (#1.28 – *Existing dynamics (hierarchies, culture, power)*)

The main points, the experts mentioned regarding power relations were power dynamics arising between self-appointed clan leaders and humanitarian field officers. As mentioned above, hierarchies usually remain in place also when people flee. Interviewee No. 1 explained:

> When tens of thousands of people flee from places to places with tenuous security, it is the easiest, maybe not best or wisest, thing to run with the self-appointed leaders, who speak (or might speak) for the refugees, who have lists of everyone who is seeking refuge. Such situations create particular dynamics which are very difficult to understand for field officers coming into such a situation without seeing such dynamics being set up. It was difficult to judge if the self-appointed people were really representing the people. (IV: 01 - Irish NGO 9/24/2018) (#1.27 – *Existing dynamics (hierarchies, culture, power)*)

Power struggles between self-appointed clan leaders and field officers were also witnessed by interviewee No. 3:

> Power relationships emerged especially in the camp between NGO staff and residents who denied access to certain points in the camp. People were generally frustrated; they had lost everything and now have to live in another country. So this frustration led to resistance, only to make a statement. (IV: 03a - UNHCR Zaatari Camp 10/21/2018)

The strategy, the interviewee and some of his colleagues applied, consisted of identifying capable community leaders able to discuss and in the position to consult with the other refugee plans on how to solve the issue at dispute. Consulting with the beneficiaries for their services helped a lot to ease this resistance and finally to proceed (IV: 03a - UNHCR Zaatari Camp 10/21/2018). (#2.30 – *Frustration creating resistance*) Nevertheless, once, the interviewee was nearly kidnapped, because the refugees wanted to make a point and gain a leverage to get things done more quickly. Only the calm reaction of the interviewee prevented the situation from deteriorating. He clarified that in case of refugees threatening field officers, security measures would be raised in a way that an adequate attendance of refugees’ needs would be impossible (ibid.)
The forms of power relations developing within a refugee scenario vary on the basis of existing dynamics and can be exercised either from field officers over refugees or from refugees over field officers. Clan leaders, being authorised by other refugees, could challenge the field officers, field officers can influence the refugees’ way of thinking by giving out information; or even because field officers have gained authority over refugees. Further, force or coercion can be used as seen in the many examples given in Categories 1 to 9, however, the dominating agent should keep in mind that frustration creates resistance and resistance signifies wasting valuable resources (funds, human resources, time, etc.).

Field officers – Field officers

Interviewee No. 6 has talked about challenges regarding coordination (cf. Chapter 3.1 – lack of strategic goals and cooperation). In the case of the plumbers’ project, all participants agreed to start in January but some started three months or even five months later (IV: 10 - NGO Zaatari Camp 1/15/2019). Beneficiaries notice such irregularities. They also see that different humanitarian aid agencies treat problems differently and raise questions, such as: Why is humanitarian aid agencies A paying for the plumbers, while humanitarian aid agencies B is not? Why is humanitarian aid agencies A providing service and material at no cost, whereas humanitarian aid agencies B asks the communities to pay?

The involved staff is participating in meetings, but still there are always delays and no real cooperation. NGOs look very bad in front of refugees. […] All NGOs focus on money and media – who has the most media attention, looks like being the best. It does not matter what happens in reality, how well organisations cooperate, how they coordinate themselves. Refugees in Zaatari camp live a decent life, but the current level could have been achieved in 2015 or 2016, if there had not been so many delays because of miscoordination. (IV: 10 - NGO Zaatari Camp 1/15/2019) (#2.35 – Lack of coordination among organisations)

In informal discussions on the field trip the lack of coordination among organisations was mentioned several times as was the leading role of UNHCR. It became quite clear that in camp settings, UNHCR is the superordinate agent able to exercise power over other organisations. Examples such as the precise demand of certain indicators (cf. Chapter 3.1) underpin such claims. Coordination between organisations is also lacking due to competition for funds and fears that one organisation could gain advantages over the other in the exchange of information or that teamwork could weaken the competence of the individual organisations. These fears are often channelled into power struggles between the field officers. Foci of attention are: Type and
Quality of Aid at camp and local levels, Host Economy at the national level and SDGs at the international level.

**Political Power Struggles**

![Diagram of Political Power Struggles]

*Figure 34: IIF Category 10 – Political Power Struggles*

**Category 11 – Others**

Category 11 sums up all influential factors which can neither be included into Categories 1 to 9 of the CPI nor in Category 10 – Political Power Struggles. The main areas identified are Competition for Funding, Crisis-affected Countries, Field Officer’s Mindsets, Refugee’s Mindsets and the Private Sector which are outlined below.

**Competition for Funding**

An issue all humanitarian aid agencies face is the competition for funding (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018). The volume of funding grows but the need for funding grows exponentially faster (ALNAP 2015, p. 49). Protracted crises, where assistance for well-planned livelihood programmes is necessary for many years, face more difficulties in generating funding (ALNAP 2015, p. 69; Jamal 2003). (#3.28 – Funding) It seems that investing in long-lasting types of activities to offer people self-reliant opportunities is often not seen as priority when at the same time people are threatened by hunger and starvation (IV: 01 - Irish NGO 9/24/2018). (#1.32 – Funding) For instance, the immediate response to typhoon Hayan that had hit the Philippines...
was high, but when it became imperative to restore housing and livelihoods, considerable funding gaps appeared (ALNAP 2015, p. 80). On the contrary, crises affecting national security interests of donor countries have high potential of achieving the necessary funding level, as can be seen for the Syrian crisis and Zaatari camp (IV: 03a - UNHCR Zaatari Camp 10/21/2018; IV: 10 - NGO Zaatari Camp 1/15/2019; IV: 11 - ACTED 1/16/2019; ALNAP 2015, p. 69). Interviewee No. 10 even states that it is time for the humanitarian aid agencies to support people in other parts of the world who suffer more than the residents in Zaatari camp. (#2.40 – Funding) Conversely, interviewee No. 6 fears that a drop in the number of international organisations working in Jordan would put Jordan into a huge crisis. The government has no means to sustain the level of present assistance (IV: 06 - GIZ 1/14/2019). Although other crises demand urgent need for action, leaving Jordan without a clear exit strategy could damage the Jordanian economy and have far-reaching political consequences. (#2.36 – Lack of proper exit strategies)

Though the competition for funding happens among humanitarian aid agencies, eventually the donor community and powerful governments respectively, determine which humanitarian aid agencies receive which amount of funding for its purposes. Thus, the donors were identified as superordinate agents exercising power over the headquarters, therefore, the organisations. The lack of proper exit strategies mainly is an internal deficit that humanitarian aid agencies urgently need to approach. Concerning the other stakeholders, this factor influences mainly their action-environment.

**Crisis-affected Countries**

When multi-year humanitarian funding is allocated to chronic emergencies, planning and longer-term programming could be improved as witnessed in Somalia, Sahel and Sudan (ALNAP 2015, p. 80). Multi-year funding is also an approach of the donor country towards the Syrian crisis (IV: 12 - Australian Embassy 1/13/2019). (#3.28 – Funding) As many humanitarian aid agencies work in countries frequently hit by disasters, successful projects easily disappear when the next humanitarian crisis hits a country and population (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018). In Northern Mali, for instance, all (successful) investments were destroyed when the war re-started in 2013; it is still prevailing at the day of the interview (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018). (#1.33 – Crisis-affected countries)

Kalobeyei camp did not reach the planned level of self-reliance, as South Sudan was hit by a new crisis and more refugees arrived unexpectedly. The provision of emergency assistance overtook the importance of self-reliance activities, though low level of development and
The competitiveness of the camp markets is an inherent difficulty of the project (Betts et al. 2018a, pp. 6, 17, 18). (#4.2 – Crisis-affected countries, #4.8 – Market constraints)

The influential factors presented here display the action-environment of the different stakeholder groups. High investments and a political focus on crisis-affected countries certainly could improve such situations. Hitherto, the different stakeholder groups have to deal with the situation as part of their action-environment, especially as most crisis-affected countries are not in scope of the powerful political actors, besides common agreements like the SDGs (see Chapter 5). The same accounts to market constraints evolving out of the economic situation in the country or the region. In the case of crisis-affected countries, the donor community could attempt to improve the situation by increasing funding or sending peacekeepers.

Field Officers’ Mindsets

Another influential factor regarding self-reliance in camps is the field officers themselves. If not trained well enough with regard to culture and the political agenda of the host countries, but also due to a lack of data to assess a situation and market dynamics properly, planning mistakes happen (Ayoubi and Saavedra 2018; IV: 01 - Irish NGO 9/24/2018; IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018; ALNAP 2015, p. 89; Werker 2007). To avoid planning mistakes, humanitarian aid agencies should always ask the following questions:

What will the duration of a camp be and what happens afterwards? Does the government provide land, especially when refugees plan to stay for a longer term? Does the government want the people to stay? Does the government provide schooling and what type of schooling? Does it provide the typical government services, which can cover for some of the self-reliance needs? What about employment options and what do people need to do to engage in livelihood activities? (IV: 01 - Irish NGO 9/24/2018) (#1.10, 3.32 – Field officers’ background)

To answer such questions, data needs to be available. UNHCR, for instance, sees its biggest gap in acquiring and assessing available data related to the refugees and host economies to better target, plan and implement relevant interventions, select partners, monitor and evaluate more precisely and in a longer-term fashion (Del Carpio et al. 2018; Omata 2018; UNHCR 2014a, pp. 14-15). Initiatives such as the Strengthening Economic Opportunities for Syrians under Temporary Protection and Host Communities in Turkey were established to fill this gap. It consists of a data-based system assessing employers’ demand for occupations and skills focusing on Turkish provinces where refugee numbers are the greatest (Del Carpio et al. 2018). Thus, training providers can design their programmes related to the actual demand of
employers. (#3.29 – Lack of data) Apart from good training, field officers also must have the required knowledge to plan, design and implement self-reliance activities, trainings and workshops. (#3.32 – Field officers’ background) Good training does not automatically provide good results. Field officers might also purposely maintain livelihood programmes out of fear for their own job, which may disappear when humanitarian operations switch from providing aid to promoting self-reliance (UNHCR 2005, Book 2, p. 30). (#3.31 – Field officers’ fear of changes) Further, humanitarian actors should be trained to build linkages and a common ground of understanding with governments and partners to work on the same objectives. One example regarding such a common ground was presented by interviewee No. 10 for Zaatari camp regarding child labour. He reported of having attended countless meetings where child labour needs to be stopped was always discussed, although nothing was done towards it. Once, he witnessed children cleaning police cars in Zaatari camp. They reported it to UNHCR. ‘UNHCR did talk to the police, but it happened again and again. Go to the market, you will see so many children working’ (IV: 10 - NGO Zaatari Camp 1/15/2019).

The only action NGOs took was raising awareness. Children work to support their families. NGOs want to stop child labour, but do not know how to approach the problem properly. In the opinion of interviewee No. 10, it would help to increase opportunities as well as monitoring markets. Shop owners should be charged with a penalty when they hire children (ibid.) (#2.39 – Tolerating harmful practices)

Further, field officers need to understand global and national political agendas to be able to advocate for refugees (ALNAP 2015, pp. 85, 89; Azorbo 2011, p. 17). Yet, trying to gain access to powerful and influential politicians can be dangerous and put humanitarians at risk. It can also impede independence, impartiality and neutrality, which might result in losing access to the affected population (ALNAP 2015, p. 89). (#3.30 – (Political) relationships with partners)

*Tolerating harmful practices* could be identified as domination, as field officers do not seem to be able to interfere with the harmful practices of the police who represent the government. The field officers’ *fear of changes*, as well as their *background*, do not represent an act of power, however, the actions following this fear as well as their background can lead to field officers abusing their ability to exercise power over the refugees to prevent any changes which might disadvantage them. Regarding the *lack of data*, it remains unclear if here an act of power is exercised or not. On the one hand, it could be that data is available, but not published, so those organisations (mainly headquarters) having gathered this data have advantages over other stakeholder groups. On the other hand, the lack of data could be real, which would then influence
the action-environment of all. Field officers’ (political) relationships with partners can also be power relationships depending on the political agenda of the others (see example above and in Category 10).

Refugees’ Mindsets

Lacking the imagination of a future within a camp can hinder refugees from engaging in livelihood activities (IV: 02 - UNHCR Amman 9/26/2018; UNHCR 2005, Appendix One, p. 33). ‘People have to understand that they are happier when they are occupied and take action to use their time while living in a camp instead of sitting around, doing nothing’ (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018). (#1.20 – Motivation to start a new (camp) life)

Instead, many refugees become obsessed by the idea of resettlement (Vriese 2006, 50, p.12).

The idea of resettlement can prevent self-reliance completely. [...] They think, every effort to become self-reliant could close the door for resettlement. Which is true in principle – if you can become self-reliant, there is no reason for you to resettle. But this obsession can also go too far. (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018)

Interviewee No. 4 talked about the Ogunis in Benin, a small English-speaking tribal group from Nigeria. The tribe leaders prohibited their children to go to school because the language of teaching was French. They feared that their children would be unable to resettle in the US if their children were able to speak French. ‘Their obsession was going to the US and not anywhere else, only the US’ (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018). According to the interviewee, this small group was very politicised and hostile to anything that would improve their life by generating income or anything else by themselves in the camps. ‘It's terrible to see how children are taken away any possibility of learning, of discovering, of improving, just because of this obsession of resettlement’ (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018). (#1.13 – Motivation to start a new (camp) life)

Because of this ‘obsession’, some refugees make false statements about their degree of vulnerability to increase their chances for resettlement, which creates difficulties in assessing the true scale of a situation (UNHCR 2012b, p. 17). Further, refugees fear to be classified as settled and not as refugees anymore, when becoming self-reliant which could jeopardise their right of returning home as in the case of the Palestinians (Achilli 2016, 2015a). Other refugees would like to reconstruct their old lives, not considering that this might be unrealistic (Belghazi 2018). (#3.14 – Motivation to start a new (camp) life) In Kalobeyei, for instance, the overall subjective well-being of refugees is rather low, because refugees have lived a better life before or came
on false promises (Betts et al. 2018a, p. 12). (#4.3 – Subjective well-being) Coming from higher social classes and engaging in activities carried out by citizens of lower social classes in their home countries or by women is often difficult for refugees (UNHCR 2005, Appendix One, p. 29). Especially highly educated refugees desire to continue working in their professional fields (Mozetič 2018). For professional groups like medical doctors or teachers, which is regulated by law, this attempt is usually challenging because important documents are missing and hard to regain if not impossible. (#3.14–Motivation to start a new (camp) life) Feeling useless as well as the loss of status can, especially in men, build frustration which might lead to violence against women living in the same household or in general against society (UNHCR 2012b, p. 131). (#3.13 – Subjective well-being)

Each individual making a decision is influenced to a certain degree by her surrounding and environment to check power if power id involved or not. The motivation to start a new (camp) life as well as the degree of well-being one feels are both subjective, but influenced by other people, one’s environment as well as an intrinsic drive.

**Private Sector**

Expert No. 5 explained the role of companies with regard to refugees (IV: 05 - UNHCR Copenhagen 12/18/2018). Since 1951, UNHCR procures all relief items handed out to refugees through the private sector. This includes the private sector as well as state-owned enterprises. Some 20 years ago, UNHCR also started to raise funds directly from the private sector, instead of exclusively raising funds from donor countries. The private sector funding includes donations from companies, foundations but also private individuals. The procurement of relief items was further developed, allowing refugees to obtain certain products directly from a vendor by paying cash or with vouchers received through the assistance programme. It is believed that the direct sale creates additional jobs on the vendor side. The interviewee continued that jobs are also created indirectly when a market is opened in a camp to sell goods: In the case of the market in Zaatari, retail companies and wholesalers from Amman supply the camp and even “own” shops inside. Still, a refugee will be the official shop owner and he might employ a couple of refugees in his shop (IV: 05 - UNHCR Copenhagen 12/18/2018). Such market activities are facilitated by organisations when refugees receive cash and thus, gain purchasing power. Handing out in-kind donations forbids such economic activities and, inadvertently, also livelihood opportunities for refugees and hosts. Thus, it is important that whenever feasible,
refugees should be given cash, so that they can make their own decisions and are empowered (ibid). (#1.40 – (Political) relationships with partners)

As discussed above, giving refugees purchasing power decreases their level of dependence on humanitarian aid agencies, and this is vital towards self-reliance. Usually, field officers cannot grant open markets and trading terms on their own; they have to interact closely with other stakeholder groups, such as the government, the private sector as well as the host communities (Figure 35). Relationships with partners have to be nurtured carefully and maintained well in the long term to create success stories. It must be avoided that one stakeholder group can create and use power against another stakeholder group, which could build up resistance against the former in response. Diplomatic intuition on the part of field officers could help to avoid such situations. Foci of attention are: Type and Quality of Aid at camp, local and national levels and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at the international level.

![Figure 35: IIF Category 11 – Others](image)

**Others**

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<td>Motivation to start a new (camp) life 1.20, 3.14, 1.13</td>
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<td>Subjective well-being 4.3, 3.13</td>
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<td>Market constraints 4.8</td>
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<td>Crisis-affected countries 1.33, 4.2</td>
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<td>Lack of proper exit strategies 2.36</td>
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<td>Types and Quality of Aid</td>
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*Figure 35: IIF Category 11 – Others*
4.5.3 Evaluation of Results of the IIF

In total, 66 influential factors were identified and described in the sub-chapter above. Out of these 66 influential factors, 21 factors influence the action-environment of the different stakeholders (Online Supplement E), 17 influential factors are attributed to ‘power-over’ indicating that superordinate agents, mainly field officers and the government, exercise power over subordinates, mostly refugees. As explained in Chapter 4.3.2, the forms of ‘power-over’ include, force, coercion, domination, authority, manipulation as well as marginalisation, among others. These attributes are allocated 14 times, out of which domination occurs most frequently (seven times). Thus, 31 out of 66 influential factors are assigned to power-over. Influence (mostly in the form of distribution of information and thus, without the exercise of power) is allocated to eight influential factors. Six factors are attributed to ‘power-to’ (in the form of ‘empowerment’). Superordinate agents are counted 77 times in total and subordinate agents 51 times in total (multiple assignments to one influential factor included). To avoid making false assumptions on who mainly exercises power over whom, these figures must be split into the categories ‘power-over’, ‘influence without power’ and ‘power-to’. Concerning ‘power-over’, the group identified as superordinates is mainly the government, followed by field officers, then refugees and hosts. The main groups assigned as subordinates are refugees, followed by field officers and, to a lesser extent due to less cases, refugee women. When looking at the relationship between superordinate and subordinate, refugees equally experience power by field officers and the government, field officers experience power mainly by the government, followed by refugees and refugee women experience power by other refugees, hosts and field officers. For ‘influence’, especially field officers are assigned as superordinates, followed by refugees. Subordinate agents are mainly refugees, influenced by field officers, but also by other refugees. In regard to ‘power-to’, field officers are the main group assigned as superordinate agents, followed by refugee women. The subordinate groups are refugees and refugee women. Refugee women are either empowered by field officers or by other refugee women. Refugees are mainly empowered by field officers.

In many cases, the national government and/or the donor community could improve a difficult situation by investing into an area or by increasing funds. Stakeholders involved in certain actions or affected by influential factors, however, cannot and should not count on such support, but must find other solutions to deal with given circumstances on site.

What do these findings reveal about a camp setting and existing power relationships concerning self-reliance? Basically, refugees are the group most effected by power relations – they
experience different forms of power by field officers, the government and within their community. The fact that almost half of all identified power relations can be assigned to ‘power-over’ indicates that refugees are a highly marginalised and powerless group. A group which – spoken figuratively – waits under the sword of Damocles for others to decide how to use their power – in a dominating or in a transformative way. Does the government take away or grant them their rights? Do field officers really want to improve the level of self-reliance or rather keep up dependency? How is the camp community structured and how freely can individuals move within this community?

Concerning field officers, it first appears that they have a lot of power which they exercise mainly over refugees. If looked closely, however, evidence shows that their power exists, but it is similarly distributed among the categories ‘power-over’, ‘influence’ and ‘power-to’. Surely, this distribution could be further developed into the direction of ‘power-to’ to execute less power over refugees in a dominating way. Further, field officers experience power-over, especially by the government, as well as by their headquarters, other refugees and among each other.

All results have to be considered with care as they are not weighted. For instance, the power, donors can exercise over a hosting government at the national level is certainly more politically effective than the many small actions of power that field officers can exercise over refugees at the camp level. Complex topics such as self-reliance in camp settings must always include considerations of the respective settings and circumstances.

4.5.4 Summary and Conclusion of the IIF
All influential factors of each category are assigned to different focal points of attention. These focal points are clustered into different levels (camp, local, national, international), as explained above. Juxtaposing the main results, they show interdependencies (Table 7).

<table>
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<th>Table 7: Interdependencies of Focal Points of Attention including the Levels</th>
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<td><strong>Camp level</strong></td>
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<td>Livelihood Opportunities</td>
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<td>Livelihood Opportunities</td>
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<td>Type and Quality of Aid</td>
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<td>Type and Quality of Aid</td>
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*Based on own research*
When refugees have no chance to start Livelihood Opportunities, they depend on external support. Further, if not granted a legal framework to engage in Livelihood Opportunities, many engage in illegal activities. This can increase Xenophobia because illegal or informal markets increase the insecurity in the area and the stability of legal markets and thus the host economy. Depending on how the government evaluates the problem, Xenophobia can lead to more or less legal livelihood opportunities for refugees. In any case, livelihood opportunities (legal, illegal and informal) affect host economies; the question remains whether the impact yields positive or negative outcomes. Thus, the type and quality of aid also affects host economies, since they determine the degree of legal livelihood opportunities that refugees can use. The main objective of all stakeholders should be to strengthen the host economies, not only because strong host economies help to reach the global SDGs, but also because strong economies can absorb refugees into local markets more easily. This is only possible if refugees are granted human rights and are allowed to work and move freely in the host country. When refugees contribute beneficially towards the host economy, Xenophobia might decrease, because hosts recognise the advantages that self-reliant refugees bring to their local economy. Further, self-reliant refugees will not depend on organisations, thereby easing the ongoing dilemma of underfunding. Field officers must not fear becoming obsolete; their main long-term tasks should be to facilitate self-reliance, advocate for the refugees and build a dialog between refugees and hosts to decrease Xenophobia. In this way, the crisis-affected areas can be made safer and more secure for all and at a global level, the SDGs are more likely to be reached, also for the refugees.

The study of power must be considered with care. With regard to Lukes’ third dimension of power, for instance, Lorenzi (2006, p. 92) pointed out the difficulty to study something that does not happen. The analysis regarding the forms of power is mainly based on assumptions drawn from the material available. The question must be raised if these assumptions reflect the truth. What are the ‘real’ interests of the different stakeholder groups and how can they be detected? How can the consequences and thus, responsibilities of inaction be measured and linked to a certain actor? To find answers to these questions, inaction must be investigated, structural and institutional power considered and demands, which are prevented from being raised, taken into account (Lorenzi 2006, p. 93). Present work cannot give answers to these questions. The identification of power relations was drawn on overt and covert, but observable, actions and is based on assumptions derived from the case study, interview and literature material. More research, including ethnographical field studies, is necessary.
The next chapter interconnects and discusses Chapters 2 to 4 and ends by giving recommendations for each stakeholder group.
5. Discussion on Self-Reliance and Its Potentials for Encamped Refugees

Refugees and forced migration are studied by a growing community of scholars (Salehyan 2019, p. 146). The topic of self-reliance, in the refugee context, gains importance in academia (Betts et al. 2019; Slaughter 2019) as well as for donor communities and organisations (Khan and Sackeyfio 2019), and shows that present work meets the ravages of time.

In the context of encamped refugees, the main purpose of present work was to elaborate how self-reliance could be measured (I) and which main influential factors exist in this context (II). Throughout this work, further minor research questions arose (i.e., those concerning the homo economicus, women and gender equality), which are taken up later in the discourse. This chapter starts by summarising and evaluating the CPI Framework along with results of the IIF (Chapter 5.1).

It continues by connecting international organisations with the theory given in Chapter 4.3 – the concept of the homo economicus (Chapter 5.2.1), power dynamics (Chapter 5.2.2) and the theory of gender knowledge (Chapter 5.2.3).

In Chapter 5.3, gender equality, especially in the context of women and work, is discussed, including feminist literature. Here, as well as in the recommendations (Chapter 5.4), an attempt is made to answer the minor questions or at least to hypothesise about them. Literature on the topic of encamped female women regarding self-reliance is scarce, therefore, more research is needed in this field. The recommendations given for different stakeholder groups are based on the findings of present work, including the theory of power given in Chapter 4.3.2.

5.1 Camp Performance Indicator Framework Meets Identification of Influential Factors

Identifying, using and managing indicators is essential in a humanitarian ‘world of scarce resources and tough managerial decisions’ (D’Onofrio 2019, p. 70). Although indicators can neither immediately nor fully prevent all human rights violation, they can help create a sound information base. For refugee camps, however, it seems that many indicators are not measured, estimated half-heartedly, or if measured, they are not published. Like other scholars’ publications (Yesufu and Alajlani 2019, pp. 217-218), this work was influenced by the lack of data either not published or not even measured by organisations working in camps. To execute good assessments, data needs to be measured and made available, not only for field officers and
headquarters, but for the public. In this way, external researchers also can assess camp situations and publish studies supporting field management to make decisions. It was not possible to obtain data necessary to test the CPI System (cf. IIF Category 10 – #3.29 Lack of data). By interviewing various UNHCR staff members, no expert could provide realistic and validated statements regarding performance measurement. Most experts knew or were convinced that performance measurement is conducted at some point (IV: 02 - UNHCR Amman 9/26/2018; IV: 06 - GIZ 1/14/2019; IV: 08 - ILO 1/15/2019; IV: 10 - NGO Zaatar Camp 1/15/2019). Yet, nobody could provide concrete facts and figures and referred to general reports available online. This was apparently due to data protection issues and privacy policies (IV: 05 - UNHCR Copenhagen 12/18/2018; IV: 06 - GIZ 1/14/2019), coupled with the difficulty in evaluating data and the understaffed departments pressurised with heavy workload (IV: 12 - Australian Embassy 1/13/2019).

Besides such difficulties, the academia seems to agree on the relevance and importance of assessing and analysing data in a structured way. D’Onofrio (2019, p. 71) points out that ‘defining and measuring the relative benefits of how aid is provided remains a challenging question’ for organisations and academia. Also Slaughter (2019, p. 2) explains that self-reliance is still not measured properly, because of a weak knowledge of how to measure it successfully. Comparative data, collected in the same way, can benchmark comparable contexts (Betts et al. 2019, p. 37). Measuring systems like the CPI (as used in present work), RefugePoint’s ‘self-reliance runway’ approach and UNHCR indicators for livelihood programming (launched in 2018), help closing this gap (Slaughter 2019; UNHCR 2019e). Further, the Global Compact on Refugees, affirmed by the member states of the UN General Assembly in December 2018 and its Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) hold promises to improve the situation of host countries and refugees, considering two concerns – their return and level of self-reliance (Khan and Sackeyfio 2019, p. 697; United Nations 2018, pp. 1-3). Hence, perspectives with regard to refugees shifted – from being seen as a burden they were seen being a responsibility; hence, they were to be integrated, expected to contribute and in the process, become rights-holding members of their host community. The Compact also states explicitly that refugees should ‘not be left behind in a country’s progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals’ (United Nations 2018, p. 12). To find the right solutions for host countries, support from the international community has to be provided. Seven African states that have rolled out the CRRF could already experience a growing resilience within the refugee communities, refugee integration into host communities and an improvement in refugees’ rights (Khan and Sackeyfio 2019,
Because of a higher degree of self-reliance among the refugees, they could improve their lives, contribute to society and even be included in it. These outcomes show that the right path to take is to improve self-reliance as well as ways to measure it. The CPI Framework and System (Chapter 3) were developed to identify and categorise indicators which are able to measure self-reliance.

The CPI was built on the basis of a comparison of existing tools, indicators and indices measuring related issues as well as on UNHCR interventions (Chapter 3.2.2). Thus, its notion is also built on a socio-economic base. Nonetheless, it appears, that the last part of the UNHCR definition of self-reliance was given more weight in the CPI than in the UNHCR guidelines, as it presents the best-case scenario for a person aged 24 to 65, working ‘in the formal sector, full or part time depending on her choice, in an open-ended contract, earning enough to make regular savings’, whereas full-time would not exceed 40 hours per work week. Such a person can enjoy enough free time to have a fulfilling family life and to engage in claiming her human rights in case of violation.

The CPI Framework and System categorises the indicators in relevant overall Categories 1 to 9. Measuring self-reliance is an important task but cannot be the only factor to assess the situation of a camp. Therefore, each camp has to be assessed individually to work out its special conditions and specific influential factors which enhance or impede self-reliance. Thus, in addition to the CPI, influential factors were identified and categorised, based on literature and expert interviews (Chapter 4). These findings were structured in the same Categories 1 to 9 as the CPI, plus two additional categories (Categories 10 – Political Power Struggles and 11 – Others) and are represented in Chapter 4.5 – Identification of Influential Factors (IIF).

The Appendix merges the main findings of the CPI and the IIF in a graphical form to show a selection of topics which the camp management ought to have in mind when planning and managing a refugee camp of a protracted refugee situation as well as when engaging in increasing the number of livelihood opportunities and self-reliance level. Being the centre of present work, the most important findings of the CPI and the IIF are summarised hereafter, emphasising on the different roles of the stakeholders.

First, people accumulating in a refugee camp are in many cases vulnerable and do not necessarily meet the requirements of the host labour market. The degree of this mismatch needs to be assessed and changed by field officers. This only makes sense if refugees have access to labour markets and common facilities, which can only be granted by the host government (Betts et al. 2019, p. 35; D’Onofrio 2019, p. 70). The same accounts for human rights, which despite
being a fundamental step towards self-reliance, does not guarantee livelihood opportunities, as revealed by Betts et al. (2019). The level of employment in rights-restricted Kenya seems higher than in Uganda, where refugees are granted basic human rights (Betts et al. 2019, p. 5). This is perhaps due to the CfW initiatives undertaken by organisations within the camps as well as owing to larger labour markets in Nairobi, capital of Kenya. Researchers could show that the right to work and freedom of movement bring about greater mobility, higher income, lower transaction costs and more sustainable sources of employment in comparison to refugees not having these rights (Betts et al. 2019, p. 35).

Second, field officers have to provide basic needs to create a healthy labour force. To provide this assistance, they need sufficient funding from the donor community to cover not only the basic needs but also extended basic needs to give refugees a chance to engage in livelihood opportunities.

Third, in most refugee camps, at least half of the adult camp population consists of women. Not integrating the female population in general has negative effects on the economy as a whole and prevents economic growth, as discussed in Chapter 4 (The World Bank 2013, p. 20). Field officers can implement programmes empowering women and facilitating equal working conditions (cf. examples given in Chapter 4.4). However, as shown in Chapter 4, most mid- to long-term livelihood opportunities (besides short-term CfW initiatives) can be found outside the camp; therefore, the government has to be included in this process. Government and field officers also have to work together to ensure safety and security, so that women (refugees and hosts) can engage in livelihood opportunities without fearing for their well-being. Otherwise, women will not feel safe enough to participate in the labour market (The World Bank 2013, p. 7).

Fourth, families missing their members, especially those who used to contribute to the livelihood of the family, are usually more vulnerable. Vulnerable persons and families must be identified and their special needs assessed, so that they can receive additional aid from the field officers, who, however, can only provide if funds are available. Funds are more efficiently used when there is good coordination among organisations in the camp. Another obstacle for refugees regarding livelihood opportunities is xenophobia between different groups of camp inhabitants as well as amongst hosts towards refugees (see Chapter 4.5.2). Sophisticated governmental and organisational programmes can help to decrease such apprehensions, especially when both groups feel targeted equally. Comparing Kenya and Uganda, Betts et al. (2019, pp. 20, 30-31) discovered that hosts in both countries think that they are economically better off because of the presence of refugees. Still, in restrictive Kenya, the view on refugees appears to be more
positive than in the liberal Uganda (Betts et al. 2019, pp. 20, 30-31). One of the reasons might be that skills and activities of refugees and hosts are complementary in Kakuma, Kenya, whereas in Nakivale, Uganda, hosts and refugees fulfill the same economic activities and are thus competing with each other.

Fifth, in many cases, camps are built in remote, fragile areas where natural resources are limited, impeding or at least confining livelihood opportunities for refugees but also for hosts. It was shown in Category 5 of Chapter 4.5.2 that governments often decide to locate camps in remote places to impede refugees’ integration as well as restrict interference with hosts. One reason for taking such measures is the hope to be re-elected. As long as camps remain in remote areas, are enclosed by fences, remain incomplete and in risk to be closed whenever the host government decides so, camps remain camps or perhaps city-camps, i.e., cities but in the form of sketches (Agier et al. 2002, pp. 336-337). As long as refugees and hosts cannot enter and exit as they wish, refugees feel controlled and undesired by hosts and are not allowed to work in their preferred field, thus, ‘refugees should not be put in camps but live with host communities’ (IV: 01 - Irish NGO 9/24/2018). Only when refugees have the feeling of ‘being-in-the-world’ (Agier et al. 2002, p. 337), feel less of a burden, can make their own choices and lead productive lives (Vriese 2006, p. 12; Jamal 2003, p. 4) and perhaps even do not feel as ‘refugees’, the international community and the local government can claim to have succeeded. The reality however is that camps exist and will remain. If this system does not change in the near future, would it then not be better to invest more into camps to create the so-called ‘city-camps’ (Agier et al. 2002, p. 318)? At least, as argued by Misselwitz (2009), a city-like character does improve the well-being of encamped refugees. The establishment of a functional city with social structures, including schools, hospitals, social services and a legal system, supports social innovation improving the quality of life, creates political awareness, empowers people economically and socially, encourages entrepreneurship as well as innovations despite limited financial and human resources (Yesufu and Alajlani 2019, pp. 216-281).

Sixth, besides all the disadvantages of refugee camps, especially if located in remote and fragile areas, camps are not inherently bad (cf. SWOT overview, Chapter 2.2). In comparison to urban areas, infrastructure and services in camps, including educational institutions and (short-term) working opportunities, are provided by organisations and not by governments (Betts et al. 2019, p. 5). The quality of such institutions is often better than outside of camps. Though the provision of assistance (food, non-food items, but also health and schooling) can create dependency among refugees, it can also create a safe and secure atmosphere for those family members left behind, when others leave to seek livelihood opportunities outside the camp (cf. Chapter 2.4).
Further, a camp can be an appropriate place to start community-based approaches because field officers are available for support. In case, people get their basic needs covered, they have additional time to engage in such initiatives.

The following sub-chapter reflects self-reliance on the basis of the theory given in Chapter 4.1.

5.2 Embedding the Discourse of Self-Reliance of Encamped Refugees into Political Theory
This chapter focuses on the mindsets and understanding of members of international organisations concerning the political theory presented in Chapter 4.3 – the concept of the homo economicus, the theory of power as well as gender knowledge and gender mainstreaming. Of all stakeholder groups, this chapter focuses on international organisations, as they are the main drivers of planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating concepts for a higher level of self-reliance of refugees in camps (cf. Chapter 2.5). An analysis of the other stakeholder groups in light of political theory would certainly give interesting insights into the interaction of humanitarian and development aid, but that is not within the scope of present research.

To be able to analyse and classify the outcomes of the organisations’ programmes and guidelines, it is important to look at their true intentions. As shown in Evaluation of Results of the IIF (Chapter 4.5.3), field officers do exercise power over refugees to a certain degree and in some cases, even take advantage of their position (see Analysis and Findings of the IIF, Chapter 4.5.2), however, they also use their power in a transformative, empowering way to strengthen refugees. Besides these findings, the question must be discussed if the intention of organisations is to truly empower refugees or if they actually prefer dominating them. Concerning gender issues and gender knowledge (cf. Chapters 4.3.3 and 4.4), is gender equality achieved by getting women in formal work or would it not be better to increase the number of men engaged in domestic and childcare work? Which mindset do organisations follow when seeking to increase the level of self-reliance, the concept of the homo economicus, or one that harmonises economic growth with nature and other communities?

5.2.1 International Organisations in the Light of the Concept of the Homo Economicus
This sub-chapter seeks to find out, which economic concepts related to the beneficiaries do the headquarters and field officers have in mind when developing and implementing guidelines and
strategies regarding self-reliance. Which role does the concept of the homo economicus (or an adaption of this concept) play between the lines?

Beforehand, the questions raised in Chapter 4.3.1, namely if the theory presented in that chapter is applicable to an encamped refugee and if a refugee acts as a homo economicus in one of its forms, are to be discussed.

An encamped refugee is part of different groups (his family, extended family, ethnic community, camp community, etc.) and has different motives and values on which he acts upon, just as everybody else. Within each group he might act differently and feel different degrees of responsibility towards the respective group goals. For instance, for his family he might unselfishly aim to reach the overall family’s welfare without considering his own desires, e.g., by leaving his family to engage in livelihood opportunities outside the camp. When acting as a member of the camp community, the same person might act selfishly, pursuing her or her family’s self-interest, for instance, by selling food rations or engaging in illegal activities to gain an income which does benefit him (or his family), but deteriorates the reputation of the whole camp community and increases xenophobia towards the whole refugee community. Thus, even a refugee aims at maximising utility, influenced, as everybody else, by non-cognitive factors such as culture, emotions or imitation binding his rationality (Urbina and Ruiz-Villaverde 2019, p. 67). Upon closer inspection, one major difference between an (encamped) refugee and a member of the host community appears – i.e., the rights and options that he can pursue are largely limited. The refugee’s ‘best result’ or maximum output is reached quicker than the maximum of a person living outside of a camp, because the refugee is confined to a camp, where he has less options to act and enjoys less rights. Even a refugee living in the host community but not able to enjoy his human rights has fewer opportunities compared to a member of the host community. Are those people content with their situation? In contrast to the worker, who could earn more but chooses not to (see example in Chapter 4.3.1), the refugee is probably not content, as he might want to put in extra effort but cannot due to the confinements of his living situation. Though no differences between the behaviour of refugees and non-refugees seem evident, the limitation of their rights and options makes it difficult to apply the concept of utility maximisation, i.e., homo economicus, to refugees.

The major question raised in this sub-chapter aims to clarify which role the homo economicus (or an adaption of this concept) plays between the lines for international organisations when developing livelihood and self-reliance programmes and which implications this might have for the beneficiaries and the field officers.
As stated in Chapter 2.5.2, short-, medium- as well as long-term goals of the two main UNHCR guidelines ‘Livelihood Programming in UNHCR: Operational Guidelines (2012)’ and ‘Global Strategy for Livelihoods 2014-2018 (2014)’ aim at increasing refugees’ livelihood opportunities to be better off socio-economically than directly after flight. Most tools used in this context are of economic nature such as investing in vocational and skills training, infrastructure, promotion of entrepreneurship, support of agriculture, livestock and fisheries and enhancing access to financial services and microfinance (UNHCR 2014, pp. 4-19; 2012, pp. 18, 86; Azorbo 2011). Nonetheless, non-socio-economic reasons seem to play a role for improving self-reliance. The UNHCR states that its interventions are based on the 1951 Convention related to the Status of Refugees, including the right to freedom of movement, freedom to work as well as access to education and healthcare. It further aims to elucidate refugees about their rights in their specific host country (UNHCR 2014, pp. 4-21, 42; 2012, pp. 13, 104) and to increase their level of dignity (UNHCR 2012, p. 9). Trainings, besides aiming at learning new skills, also teach how to negotiate for jobs, receive fair wages and defend oneself against discrimination (UNHCR 2014, p. 29). The principal arguments are that legally working refugees who are socio-economically better off than purely dependent refugees can benefit the host community financially, stimulate markets and increase the diversity of services of products (UNHCR 2014, pp. 4, 11; Zetter and Ruaudel 2014, pp. 7-8; UNHCR 2012, p. 86, 2005, Book One, p. 10).

The main goal for UNHCR’s investment on livelihood interventions is to reach the point when donors can step back from supporting refugee situations (cf. Chapter 2.5.7), because self-reliance at a community or camp level has been reached (UNHCR 2012, p. 13). This can also be derived from the language used. For instance, the term ‘well-being’ appears four out of five times in the form of ‘economic well-being’ in the UNHCR (2014, pp. 8-21, 42) strategy paper. As explained in Chapter 2.5.4, indicators established to rate if interventions have been successful (‘refugees work for three continuous months’, ‘refugees are able to provide for their families for six continuous months’ (IV: 02 - UNHCR Amman 9/26/2018)) have a purely economic character. Such an indicator does not state how many hours per day or how many household members or in which kind of work environment they have to work to provide for their families. The focus of international organisations is clearly on the economic realm while developing livelihood and self-reliance programmes. The more profit refugees can make the better they can maximise their utility, and the quicker organisations can withdraw from the scene. They seem to be well aware that the limitation of options and denial of human rights hinder refugees from really choosing the best option, so they suggest to field officers to advocate for the refugees’ rights and against the confinement of camps or the exclusion from (labour) markets. In other
words, it appears, the main goal of livelihood interventions is to improve the financial situation of the refugees and tie their well-being to their economic (and only marginally to the social) sphere. The higher the independence of refugees from aid organisations in form of consumption choices, the more successful do livelihood interventions seem to appear. The most important part sought to be improved is the monetary situation and not, for instance, interaction with nature or community building as well as social relationships among each other and with the host communities. These realms seem to play, if at all, a subordinate role. Thus, it is concluded that the concept of the homo economicus (or an adaption of its form) plays a role for international organisations when developing their plans, being aware of the differences (limited options, restricted human rights) from non-refugees. Which implications have this for the beneficiaries and what could be done about it? Answers to these questions and what organisations could do against it are given in Chapter 5.4.

5.2.2 International Organisations in the Light of the Theory of Power Dynamics

Within humanitarian aid agencies also power dynamics play a role, including the mindsets aid workers in headquarters and the field have in general. Generalising might be an unjust attempt, as the whole spectrum of thoughts of staff members are lumped together. Still, at least for the case study of present work, discrepancies between the headquarters’ requirements (given out in form of guidelines and strategy papers) and fieldwork were discovered.

Empowerment is the overall notion which can be found in many strategy papers and guidelines of IOs working with refugees, e.g., ‘Refugees and host communities should participate in all stages of planning, needs assessment, implementation, monitoring and evaluation to design appropriate and sustainable programmes’ (UNHCR 2014a, p. 11) or ‘Socio-economic empowerment recasts refugees as agents of their own long-term development’ (UNHCR 2012b, p. 1).

Though the concept of ‘power to’ or empowerment seems to be incorporated by the headquarters, it seems that it is not yet lived by all field officers, as evidence shows in Chapter 4.5.2. In this regard, interviewees stated that many projects and tasks are rather implemented to comply with demands coming from stakeholder groups, such as donors or headquarters, rather than from refugees, who should be integrated in every project phase as requested by guidelines and handbooks (cf. Chapter 2.5.4). As highlighted in Chapter 4.5.3 – Evaluation of Results of the IIF, when refugees are not heard, but projects are implemented despite refugees’ grievances, it appears that instead of a transformative use of power, organisations (the superordinate agent) seek to dominate refugees (the subordinate agent) and thus, exercise power over them without
the goal of making themselves obsolete (cf. Chapter 4.3.2). The example (repeated in Chapter 4.5.2 – Category 4: Camp Funding) where a woman complains that since she has been living in a camp, her real husband is the warehouse where the food is distributed (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018), shows that despite all good intentions, refugees are in many cases made dependent on organisations through the actions of the field officers. Resistance against such domination is visible when refugees defraud humanitarian organisations by using the system for self-enrichment. Overall, is domination not part of each camp due to the fact that a camp is built in a place chosen by the local government and organisations, surrounded by fences and managed by non-refugees? Are refugees not dominated when they cannot enjoy their human rights or are forbidden to keep animals (cf. Categories 4 and 5 in Chapter 4.5.2)?

Besides such boundaries and cases where projects are not aligned with the refugees’ needs and are dominated in a paternalistic manner, as they are unable to assess their own interests rationally (Wartenberg 1990, p. 183), a power shift seems to take place as could be shown in Chapter 4.5. Whereas community-based approaches were not an issue a couple of decades ago, it has become essential for most guidelines and is more and more practiced in the field when implementing projects (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018).

5.2.3 International Organisations in the Light of the Theory of Gender Knowledge

All four organisations, whose gender knowledge was analysed in Chapter 4.4 (UNHCR, GIZ, ILO, UNDP), use the same or similar reasoning for gender equality. Women, making up half of the global population, should be entitled to benefit as much as men from human development. They need the same level of freedom, equity, security and human dignity as men. The focus of the argumentation of these organisations is on women and not on economic growth. Economic growth and human development are rather by-products when women have come out of poverty. Better education, healthcare, food security and legal frameworks protecting women and girls (from inequality, violence, exploitation, etc.) help them to escape from poverty and have empowering effects at the same time. Empowered are also those women who are able to work and subsequently provide for themselves and their families, as is the approach of the organisations presented. Empowered women have more knowledge and information to participate in decision-making processes and fill higher positions in management and politics. Empowerment through work could be witnessed by experts interviewed when women started speaking for themselves in front of men (see example UNDP). Therefore, governments and decision-makers need to facilitate flexible work, part-time work, more care options and ways to increase...
efficiency of domestic work. Unpaid work must be acknowledged, traditional social norms regarding the distribution of work must be changed and an equal distribution of paid and unpaid work promoted. The gender knowledge that women are the better care takers of their children still persists (see UNHCR), but is slowly being replaced by approaches that promote a balanced distribution of work (unpaid domestic and paid work). Even the gender knowledge of UNDP has changed, as its policies do not seem to be based on a traditional gender division of labour anymore, in which women are principally responsible for unpaid care work (Çağlar 2010, p. 68), but became aware of the importance of women being productive economic actors. This change was also visible in the UNDP work for women projects in Jordan.

The gender knowledge of IOs active in camps and donors financing initiatives to strengthen women seems to clearly understand women as equal to men and related interventions aim to increase the percentage of women in the labour market (cf. Chapter 4.5.2, IIF, Category 3 – Gender Equality). Therefore, different approaches are taken by IOs, as presented in Chapter 4.5.2 (job training for women – also for male-dominated sectors, establishment of childcare facilities, transportation to workplaces, identification of female heads of households, etc.). Further, as proposed by headquarters through their guidelines and strategy papers, field officers are supposed to initiate and advocate discussion groups. One approach is to create safe spaces for men and women to discuss shared values, practices and behaviour about women’s economic decision-making (UNHCR 2012b, p. 134). Besides such approaches, it appears, the main initiatives aim at integrating women into the labour market. No interviewee spoke of programmes in which men were targeted to increase their contributions at home. This suggests that real gender equality has not been reached yet nor will it be achieved by current programmes. Only when men and women equally and naturally share all tasks occurring within a family (wage labour as well as unpaid domestic work, including raising children) and only when this task-sharing is fully accepted and anticipated by society, including employers, gender equality can be reached. As the topic of female wage labour is too complex to cover it in this sub-chapter, the following sub-chapter continues the discussion on gender (in-)equality, also taking into account and discussing the concept of the homo economicus, including its disadvantages concerning refugees.

Summarised, Chapter 5.2 concludes that the concept of homo economicus is part of the mindsets of the authors of livelihood programmes, as developed by organisations. Gender equality has not been reached and never will be if the focus is only on getting women into the labour market rather than on getting men to equally share the burden of domestic work. Internationally
working organisations could push more into that direction. Organisations still tend to dominate and use power over beneficiaries more than they truly empower them. A shift into the right direction has started, but more work needs to be done, also in terms of changing mindsets and eliminating fears of field officers (see Category 11 – Others in Chapter 4.5.2).

5.3 Gender Equality
To create a differentiated picture regarding self-reliance of encamped refugees, the participation of women in the labour force was particularly in focus in present work. The importance of this issue is clear (cf. Chapter 4.1 and 4.3.3): till date, women, worldwide and more particularly in Arab countries, remain disadvantaged in comparison to men. Women have a higher mortality rate (in infancy, early childhood and the reproductive age); the level of education and literacy is lower, as is pay in formal employment (The World Bank 2013, pp. 3, 10). Women are underrepresented in politics and in many countries, they do not enjoy the same legal rights as men. Relevant to present work is the fact that only 4 per cent refugee women in Jordan applied for a work permit (4%, cf. Chapter 4.1.5 – Work Permits for Refugee Women). Also for Kalobeyei settlement in Kenya, Betts et al. (2018a, p. 47) discovered a low participation of women in livelihood activities. In Chapter 4.3.3, questions were raised who would be responsible to change these inequalities and if they should be changed at all, or whether – especially if Western organisations interfere – such changes would only nourish neoliberalism and hegemony, benefitting more the developed countries and capitalists than the people actually affected. Further, it was asked – also in the light of a critique to capitalism and neoliberalism – if it would not be more helpful for the well-being of families and especially children to draft policies aiming for increasing salaries in general, so that both parents could spend more quality time with their children, instead of concentrating to get women into low-paid wage labour. Anticipating the findings, profound answers to these questions cannot be given. However, the questions are not left undiscussed as a research gap regarding these issues exists, which needs to be closed with present and future work.

As elucidated in Chapter 4.3.3, organisations, Western feminists and Muslim feminists seem to agree that women should enjoy equality, human rights and agency, defined as the capacity and

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20 Neoliberalism is ‘a theory of political-economic practices that affirms that the best way to advance human well-being is to avoid restrictions on the free development of entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by the transfer of public assets into private monopolies, reduced public spending on education and healthcare, deregulation of capital markets and foreign investment, and free trade. In other words, social well-being is maximised when the scope and frequency of commercial transactions are maximised’ (Agenjo-Calderón and Gálvez-Muñoz 2019, p. 151, following Harvey 2011).
authority to act and the ability to shape one’s own life, including the freedom of choice, expression and decision making (The World Bank 2013, p. 55). ‘To be truly equal, women must have the opportunity to participate fully in public affairs, and have equal rights in the society and in the home’ (The World Bank 2013, p. 143). This goal is far away from being reached on a global scale. In fact, in some countries, e.g., Saudi Arabia, women are infantilised. She has to be fed and protected while denying that she is an intelligent, able human being: ‘It’s the same kind of feeling they have for handicapped people or for animals. The kindness comes from pity, from lack of respect. The ownership of a woman is passed from one man to another’ (Lloyd-Roberts and Morris 2017, p. 101).

A 2013 World Bank study on Gender Equality in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region suggests that only through employment, women can increase their political and civic participation, also because only then they can prove that they are capable to lead and perform just as well as men (The World Bank 2013, p. 144). It further shows on the basis of examples that success in economic and political life does not necessarily prevent a fulfilled family life or the fulfilment of household responsibilities (ibid., p. 2). These arguments can be supported by the findings of McGinn et al. (2018). The authors revealed that adult daughters of employed mothers are more likely to be employed and, if employed, often hold higher positions, earn more and work more hours than their peers of unemployed mothers (McGinn et al. 2018, p. 374). Further, the sons of employed mothers spend more time caring for family members, whereas their daughters spend less time on housework (ibid.). These findings support the influential factor #1.26 that working women and especially mothers can become role models for the community and family members. Regions prosper if more women have access to economic opportunities (The World Bank 2013, p. 126). The higher the female participation in the labour force, the higher is the economic productivity and economic growth in general in the region. It can benefit from a more dynamic private sector, has a more fulfilled, involved and dynamic workforce and, ultimately, a more inclusive society (ibid.). Chapter 4.4 presented approaches of UNHCR, ILO, GIZ and UNDP are all in line with the World Bank report. The focus of these approaches is women and not economic growth, as summarised in Chapter 5.2.3. Economic growth is a welcome by-product of empowering women by creating gender equality. ‘When women and men have equal chances to be socially and politically active and to influence laws, politics, and policymaking, institutions and policies are more likely to be fair and representative of society as a whole’ (The World Bank 2013, p. 3).
The aforementioned MENA study intends to find out why the employment gap between men and women is especially high in this region compared to the rest of the world. The female labour force participation is 50 per cent worldwide, 25 per cent in the MENA region and 65 per cent in low-income countries (The World Bank 2013, p. 10). Balancing work and family life is difficult, especially for young mothers around the world, including the MENA region (ibid., p. 7). Interesting for this region is that the gap between female and male unemployment rates actually doubled between 1985 and 2010 and is especially high among young people (ibid., p. 8).

5.3.1 Challenges and Possible Solutions for More Gender Equality

The World Bank study on the MENA region has identified and elaborated a set of various reasons for the low female employment rate. Relative to the world average, tradition and patriarchy continue to be quite strong in the MENA region (cf. Chapter 4.3.3 and 4.4), although this slowly changes because of an increase in education, more opportunities and a shift in demographic balance (The World Bank 2013, p. 20, 63). Women today remain in school longer, delay marriage and bear fewer children (ibid., p. 20). Still, in many families the woman’s primary sphere of influence is within the home, whereas the man is the breadwinner and decision maker in the political and economic spheres (ibid., pp. 13, 63). The extent to which married women spend far more time on household chores and childcare than men is particularly high in the MENA region compared to the rest of the world (The World Bank 2013, pp. 63, 66). They even spend twice as much time for these chores than unmarried women. Gender norms restrict women’s mobility, burdens them with household care and occupational segregation (ibid., p. 13). Community sanctions might play a significant role for women staying at home, even though they wish to work (ibid., p. 69). Sons are often preferred and special connections are rather used for the male than the female family members to get job positions (ibid., p. 13). One of the reasons for this might be the view as prevalent among MENA citizens that women’s ability to hold leadership positions as business executives or politicians is less favourable than in the rest of the world (ibid., p. 63). Another reason might be traditions, which, according to interviewees No. 7 and 10, are still very strong among Jordanians and Syrians (cf. Chapter 4.1.4). If parents think that their daughter will stay at home after marriage, but their son has to provide for his family and perhaps even for his sisters, the economically right investment would be to support the son(s) over the daughter(s).

Besides social and cultural norms derived from history, customs and religious beliefs as well as legal frameworks, such as on mobility and choice, restrict work and political participation of
women (The World Bank 2013, pp. 4, 55). A low quality of education including learning critical skills creates a mismatch between what is learned at school and what the private sector demands, especially for girls (ibid., p. 4). Further, women tend to choose ‘gender appropriate’ subjects, such as education, health and welfare, humanities and arts (ibid., p. 106), which are however less sought in the job market (ibid., p. 38). Additionally, MENA women are banned from working in certain industries if deemed dangerous, hazardous or morally harmful to their reputation (ibid., p. 18) or if they fear harassment working in less traditional jobs (ibid., p. 66). In many areas, they are not allowed to work at night which can start as early as 7 p.m. This way, women’s participation in numerous sectors of the economy is limited as is their flexibility of work arrangements (ibid., p.18). Employers perceive women as more costly and less productive than men (ibid., p.4). Women’s participation in the labour force is especially low in countries with high unemployment rates; women, especially lower educated ones, might be discouraged from looking for work. Tertiary-educated women might be willing to remain unemployed for longer time, keen to wait for a popular public sector job position (ibid., p. 8).

Why these constraints for women still exist, was also addressed in Chapter 4.1.4: family law was the last fortress of the Shari’a, giving it up would mean to bow completely to Westernisation, which is connected to hegemony and imperialism (Hallaq 2009).

Despite giving reasons, the World Bank study has also given a set of recommendations – how to increase the participation of women in the economic and political spheres in order to close the gender gaps in voice and agency. These recommendations are in line with the activities of the organisations, presented in Chapter 4.4, at least on a strategic level: efforts must be targeted, coordinated and country-specific on multiple fronts (The World Bank 2013, p. 4). One of the most important issues is probably education, more specifically, to give girls high quality education which matches with the demands of employers (Akhtar 2017; UNDP 2016, p. 73; The World Bank 2013, p. 24). Programmes, like conditional cash transfer supporting families leaving their girls at school, transportation facilities, building girls’ bathrooms, etc. have positively impacted the participation of girls at schools (The World Bank 2013, pp. 20, 129). Working outside home can actually help to release from a restrictive home environment, which in many cases resembles a prison (Lloyd-Roberts and Morris 2017, p. 83). But to be able to work, public transport and childcare facilities are vital as is the change of the legal framework (e.g., in some Muslim countries, women need a permission from their husbands to work) (ibid.). Improving the labour market for all participants can also positively affect the situation of women (The World Bank 2013, pp. 130-138). Further, constraints and bureaucratic bottlenecks of over-
regulated labour markets must be removed and entrepreneurship facilitated to increase female participation (ibid., p. 24). Such constraints can be removed by facilitating choice, mobility and compatibility with family life (ibid., p. 130). To increase compatibility with family life, opportunities for women, such as legal and institutional frameworks, flexible work options, a conducive work environment, etc. are useful investments (The World Bank 2013, pp. 10-11). For instance, in this way, the percentage of married women working in the USA could be increased from only 10 per cent in the 1930s to about 70 per cent in the early 21st century. The consent of their husbands has increased from a very low level to more than 80 per cent nowadays (ibid.). Such a change could also be achieved in the upcoming decades among Jordanians and Syrians. The refugee situation, as tragic as it is, could actually be beneficial for this change, as was World War II for European women (Federici and Henninger 2012, pp. 34, 36). The international organisations active in this region could prove helpful, including their work and empowerment programmes aiming to create opportunities through childcare, transportation modes, etc. (cf. Chapter 4). This hypothesis derived from the first achievements the interviewees revealed for present work as well as from literature (cf. Chapter 4.4): targeting women in food distribution decreased child malnutrition (4.4.1 – UNHCR), access to sustainable livelihoods decreased harmful coping mechanisms (UNHCR), the opinion of women working outside changed since women started working in road maintenance (4.4.2 – ILO). Knowledge gained by staff about the reality of women facing harassment was carried to the outside world (4.4.3 – GIZ); media attention regarding the female plumbers’ project persuaded opponents to agree to the project (GIZ); female waste collectors dared to speak freely in front of men (4.4.4 – UNDP). Such projects appear to truly focus on the well-being of women and girls. Still, many organisations facilitate work, especially in the low-wage sector (cf. ILO, UNDP and UNHCR livelihood projects in Jordan). Too often studies report of exploitative working conditions for refugees, including women. Long working hours, low wages and physically demanding work are the norm rather than the exception (Razzaz 2017), even in livelihood projects run by organisations (cf. presented projects by ILO (road construction), UNDP and UNHCR (e.g., waste collection)). Reasons behind such exploitative systems for women, including female refugees, especially those living in the Global South, are given below.

5.3.2 Family Life in a Capitalistic and Neoliberal Context
As stated in Chapter 4.5.2 (Category 4 – Camp Funding), in Zaatari camp, many mothers do not engage in formal work outside the camp, because external childcare does not cover the hours they would be away from home (working hours plus commuting time). Though, other
family or community members might be able to cover these extra hours, parents have to decide if these options still provide stable, nurturing and safe relationships with and environments for their children (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2019, p. 6). Though it is not parents alone who can create such positive environments, many refugee women engaging in external wage labour, especially those who are not accustomed to work outside home, feel guilty to leave their children alone (or with somebody else) and fear for their children’s well-being and safety, especially if the children have increased emotional needs and attachments due to war experiences (Buecher and Rwampigi Aniyamuzaala 2016, p. 23). In case, they have no choice but to seek work outside home to ensure the survival of their family, many refugee women are overwhelmed and exhausted by the struggle to cope with the new challenges and a constant worry about the family’s needs, which negatively affects their relationship with their children (Buecher and Rwampigi Aniyamuzaala 2016, p. 23).

Thus, the mission of international organisations as well as the donor community, especially in light of the SDGs (Chapter 2.3.1), needs to be examined. Should they invest in livelihood opportunities for women, especially, if most of these jobs are in the low-income sector? Do such jobs increase the level of well-being of women and their children? If not, which other options do international organisations have to support refugee women and families? The following paragraphs cover the topic of historic and current living situations of people working in the low-income sector to give a cautious answer to these questions. More research is definitely desirable to answer them in a more profound way.

In England in the 19th century, for instance, mothers (and fathers) were working 12 to 14 hours per day in factories (Federici and Henninger 2012, pp. 28-32). The state of physical and mental health of England’s children as well as of their parents was devastating. Working women not only had to neglect domestic work, many even sedated their young children with opiates while working, which probably led to a high early childhood death rate (Federici and Henninger 2012, pp. 28-32). In the second half of the 19th century, with the change from light to heavy industry women were pushed out of labour markets and into the role of housewives by male-led trade unions (ibid.). After World War II, the situation changed again and many women freed themselves from their role of being servants for men to fulfil intensive reproduction work (Federici and Henninger 2012, pp. 36-37). Numerous women engaged in wage labour and in this process, sought ways to externalise many reproduction tasks, which were made available in the light of neoliberalism (Federici and Henninger 2012, p. 48). As a consequence, reproductive tasks, such as sewing/repairing clothes, cooking, taking care of children or the elderly, were organised as
external services or commodities (e.g., convenience food, fast food, cheap clothes, etc.), which had to be paid for by the workers in order to create value not only in the future but immediately from reproductive work (ibid.). If paired with a low salary and/or multiple-employment and long working days beyond the retirement age, this neoliberal change of life had significant negative effects on peoples’ quality of life and health (Urbina and Ruiz-Villaverde 2019, pp. 85-87; Rahkovsky et al. 2018; Li et al. 2008, p. 68). Another side-effect of long working days is the destabilisation of communities, as people lack time to invest in social capital (Li et al. 2008, p. 68). Children growing up in neoliberal developed countries (e.g., UK, USA) experience greater social, economic and health inequalities than those living in social democratic nations, especially if the socio-economic status of their parents is low. Financially insecure parents staying at home worry about their financial security, whereas financially secure parents have little time for their children, as they are working outside home (ibid., p. 69). The approach of neoliberal countries to increase economic efficiency and female participation in the labour force has come to the cost of social well-being, including that of families and children (The World Bank 2013, p. 11; Li et al. 2008, p. 71). Consequently, the externalisation of reproductive services and the increase of women in the labour market neither automatically lead to physically and mentally healthy children nor to the higher well-being of their parents, especially if living in a neoliberal country and being part of the low-income group. Apart from neoliberal countries such as the USA, working and living conditions of women (and men) in the Global South have to be considered, as most refugees reside here (cf. Figure 1, Chapter 2.1).

Worldwide, capitalism and globalisation, which will not be discussed further at this point, are the main drivers of competition in the low-skilled sector (Scherrer 2018, pp. 296, 299; Rodrik 2016, p. 4; Federici and Henninger 2012, pp. 53-54). Many people from the Global South additionally suffer because their subsistence was taken away. Land grabbing, cash crops and the destruction of livelihoods created a high quantity of poor people – the proletariat of the 21st century – who are either unemployed, willing to work under undignified conditions in industries producing cheap consumer goods for the developed countries or left to work in the informal service sector (Scherrer 2018, pp. 295–296, 305; Federici and Henninger 2012, pp. 58-61). Working in the informal sector, as many (refugee) women do, is associated with precarious and unhealthy work environments or engagement in low-paid wage homework to make it compatible with domestic, unpaid work. Domestic wage workers are invisible and it is difficult for them to join trade unions (Federici and Henninger 2012, pp. 78-79). They perform monotone, uncertain and underpaid tasks under high competition (Federici and Henninger 2012, p. 73).
Additionally, owing to neoliberalism and state austerity measurements, besides their ‘normal’ domestic tasks, (refugee) women take care of sick or old family members, because hospitals send them home early or are too expensive for the sick to be used at all. Domestic work, informal work and low wages women earn cannot improve their reputation and power relation, neither at home nor in public life. The simultaneous precarious labour market conditions for men (including the female competition for low wage labour) as well as the dissolution of strong family structures lead to growing frustration in men which often gets expressed in domestic violence against women (Federici and Henninger 2012, pp. 78-80).

This short discourse showed which negative effects neoliberalism and the externalisation of reproduction services can have on the level of well-being of adults, especially women and their children due to constant financial stress. It suggests that the same accounts to refugee women and children, who are one of the most marginalised and poverty-affected groups among human beings. In the following section, organisations’ activities concerning gender equality and livelihood issues are shortly and critically reflected.

5.3.3 Critical Reflection of Organisations’ Gender Equality and Livelihood Activities

People’s economic motives are multi-layered and go beyond self-interest, argue feminist economists. Despite the neoliberal approach to only measure economic growth, feminist economics (FE) suggests to rather measure well-being and thus, to create decent living standards for everybody (ibid., p. 148). Following this line, the excerpts presented in Chapters 4.3.1 and 5.2.1 and the context of refugees who due to their flight and war experiences have already suffered higher stress, it must be asked what type of work and what working environments actually benefit adults and children with regard to well-being and decent living standards. Is low-paid wage work the right measurement for women (and men) or would it only increase the already existing exploitation of refugee workers? Though evidence exists that wage in general can lead to prolong education as well as postpone marriage and childbirth (Scherrer 2018, p. 301) and work has the ability to help women to free themselves from their prisons called home (Lloyd-Roberts and Morris 2017, p. 83), should the pursued goal of international organisations not rather follow the well-being of refugees? Instead of focusing too much on the financial and economic realm, as discussed in Chapter 5.2, should organisations not lay more importance on the achievement of the SDGs, especially of No. 1 – No Poverty, No. 3 – Good Health and Well-being, No. 5 – Gender Equality, No. 8 – Decent Work and Economic Growth and No. 10 – Reduced Inequalities (United Nations 2015)?
However, even though willing to improve the well-being of refugees, would international organisations have the power to do so? UNHCR, for instance, did not meet gender equality in 70 per cent of its operations, despite good intentions, well-developed policy plans and strategies (cf. Chapter 2.5), due to insufficient capacity building, financial and human resources and technical expertise (cf. Chapter 4.4) (UNHCR Standing Committee 2016). Further, international organisations cannot ignore market constraints existing in the host country, such as the unemployment rate, predominate sectors, cultural restrictions (such as presented in this work for the case of Jordan), the demographic dynamics, the industrial and agricultural policies, the infrastructural bottlenecks, etc. (Scherrer 2018, p. 305). Changing markets takes time and resources and sometimes only relies on the goodwill or rather geopolitical interests of the international community. Jordan, for instance, has a high unemployment rate, even among tertiary-educated young people. Additionally, salaries paid – including in high-skilled sectors – are low in comparison to the standard of living. As shown above, refugees are often willing to work for less. If they were accepted in the high-skilled labour market, competition for the already highly contested jobs would just increase. What can be done? The next part of this chapter tries to answer this question by giving recommendations for the different stakeholder groups involved in refugee camps.

5.4 Recommendations for Stakeholders based on the Concepts of Power

The recommendations for each stakeholder group has been derived from the findings of Chapters 4, the theory on power elaborated in Chapter 4.3.2 and the discussion led so far. Though some recommendations are already included into programmes of organisations or have been phrased by other scholars or experts, others are the result of present work. They must be understood as an opinion and seek to open the stage for a deeper discussion on the issue. Whereas the focus of Chapter 2.5 clearly is on UNHCR, the focus of this chapter is on all stakeholder groups, giving recommendations beyond the clear and structured measures of Chapter 2.5.

Refugees (Male and Female)

The system of power evolving in a refugee camp cannot be found anywhere else in the world (Agier et al. 2002, p. 322). On the one hand, encamped refugees are victims, waiting for their bimonthly rations, on the other hand, refugees remain individuals who can involve in politics and fight for their rights (Chapter 4.5.2, Category 9 – Political Voice and Category 10). As
outlined in Chapter 4.5, refugees can influence and even have the power over field officers, hosts and other refugees such as refugee women. They also can influence themselves, depending on their mindsets (Chapter 4.5.2, Category 11). Still, they were identified as the stakeholder group experiencing power-over most frequently. Considering Lukes’ three-dimensional view, refugees must not always be conscious about their rights and their wishes or see their situation as given (Chapter 4.3.2). Thus, they might accept the situation of being exploited (more) than their local counterpart. According to Lukes (2005), in case of manipulation, neither conflict nor consensus exist. Though it is argued that if refugees became aware of the issue as an existing problem which can be changed by using combined power (e.g., by teaming up with organisations who give refugees power to fight for their rights), most refugee community members would favour a change of system to their benefits. Until then and as long as refugees are exploited and have only the opportunity to work as non-professionals (see Young (1992)), they experience powerlessness, including oppression and exploitation.

Thus, not many recommendations can be given to refugees but to fight for their legal rights and, while living in a camp, to open their mindsets. Despite all hardship, it might help to identify one’s skills and knowledge and seek for possibilities to create livelihood opportunities, even when living in such limited spaces like a refugee camp (IV: 03a - UNHCR Zaatari Camp 10/21/2018).

Concerning gender equality, refugee men could take the setting of a refugee camp to think over traditional gender roles and be open to experience other worldviews and systems, such as democracy and gender equality. In this regard, power relations could be overcome in relation to hierarchies within the community, household and among different communities and ethnic groups.

Refugee Women

Refugee women could take the ‘opportunity’ of living in a camp to advocate for themselves, their rights and to break up social norms and traditions, if this is what they desire. Camps might be a good place to start such changes as organisations are available and able to help women using their power to change their lives. If camps are set up in Muslim countries, local Muslim NGOs in particular, guided by the principles of equality, could make a difference, as outlined in Chapter 4.3.3. Still, advocating for more rights might put the activists in danger. Refugee women can experience force, as defined by Wartenberg (cf. Chapter 4.3.2), by male refugees (e.g., through domestic violence, expulsion from family network) or host communities (e.g.,
through the threat or execution of SGBV) (IV: 07 - Intern. NGO 1/14/2019). This force might prevent them from taking up this fight for rights or from engaging in livelihood opportunities. However, the risk might be worth it, if not for this generation than maybe for the next:

Women have become active in areas where they were not traditionally active, and they have excelled in every aspect of life where they are engaged, even in societies where women have faced great obstacles in overcoming their traditional roles. […] Women are demanding gender equality in all walks of life. […] Society is gradually accepting and appreciating what women can achieve and contribute. Norms, values and legal frameworks are evolving. (UNDP 2016, p. 41)

Demanding gender equality has to come from within – no outsiders ought to start campaigns without the engagement of the persons concerned like women.

Host Communities

One of the reasons why human rights are not granted by local governments is that locals fear that refugees would take away jobs or (natural) resources. In some cases, this fear is real; in others, it is only perceived. Around the world it is witnessed how easily host communities are manipulated by their governments and their narratives (Salehyan 2019, p. 147). For instance, whereas a positive view on helping refugees by President Eisenhower (USA) in the 1950s led to support from the public, the negative narratives, e.g., by President Trump (USA) or Prime Minister Orban (Hungary) has influenced the public in such a way that many people fear refugees as invaders, terrorists or ‘job snatchers’ (ibid). Thus, the only recommendation given to host communities can be to look at statistics given out by reputable sources, not believe populist narratives of governments who aim to manipulate their people and to put oneself in the position of the refugees and sympathise with them.

Host Governments

Refugee hosting governments have a difficult role when hosting a high number of refugees and are involved in very different power relations with other stakeholder groups. When the donor community, respectively other states, threaten the host government to radically shorten aid if the government does not do what the donor community wants, the government is subject to coercion as defined by Wartenberg and Lukes (cf. Chapter 4.3.2). The host government can still choose to disobey, but then has to sort out its refugee situation on its own, which might be difficult if not impossible for less-developed countries. This situation can also be adapted to Wartenberg’s concept of Situated Social Power, as, for instance, seen in the Iran-
USA crisis in 2018 (though not a refugee issue). Despite the existing nuclear treaty, USA was able to force companies from third states to stop doing business with Iranian companies if they (the companies) want to continue doing business with the United States of America. As a consequence, most international companies withdrew from their Iran businesses (Krauss 2018, Sept. 19; Petroff 2018).

D’Onofrio (2019, pp. 70-71) discusses the arguments given by Harrell-Bond (1986, pp. 8-10) why camps, besides their many negative impacts (cf. Chapter 2), will also exist in the future: camps make refugees visible, attract and renew donor funding, feed stories told by the aid industry and simplify counting, registering and organising people. Further, (democratically elected) politicians are decision-makers bound to election cycles, thus, many lobby against non-camp situations and interfere integration as well as self-reliance processes to keep hosts happy. Voters (hosts) have power over the government, while the government has power over refugees. Safety and security are important issues for host countries. Thus, many host governments prefer refugee camps on justification of (perceived) safety and security for the host population (Fisk 2019, p. 70). However, Fisk (2019) elaborated that in fact refugee camp settings have negative impacts on the physical security of both refugees and hosts. This security could be increased for both groups by establishing fairly distributed economic and social interactions (Fisk 2019, p. 70). Besides possible advantages, governments should re-think their attitude towards encamping refugees and supported by the CRRF, for instance, decide for self-settlements in urban areas. They could influence the opinion of the host population, for example, by campaigning and disseminating trustworthy information of the benefits of economically active refugees, who can move freely and are producers and consumers and not a burden. In their campaigns, they could further refer to gaining access to instruments developed by the international community if they grant refugees more freedom, such as building infrastructure and granting financial support (obviously, the international community then has to deliver).

International Organisations – Field Officers and Headquarters

The recommendations given for this stakeholder group are by far the most detailed. In contrast to other sections, field officers and headquarter are combined here under the stakeholder group organisations. The recommendations aim rather at big international organisations (including United Nations – UN) than on (local) small NGOs.

The better camps are funded by the donor community, with improved level of infrastructure and services. As elaborated in Chapter 4.5.2, investments in infrastructure and services are
beneficial for the general well-being of refugees; with regard to self-reliance, as defined in Chapter 2, such investments play a role only partly. Thus, camp management should first assess which investments would bring most benefits to the refugees and in which context (well-being, self-reliance/livelihood, access to basic needs, access to markets, etc.), depending on the refugees’ priorities. Despite the context, to cover needs in a more targeted manner and to assess a situation properly, well-structured and comparable measurements are necessary.

International organisations have a central role in world politics (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p. 156). By developing new policy ideas and programmes, managing crises and setting priorities for shared activities, other actors not only take IOs seriously, but also influence them. States, NGOs, the private sector, the UN and other IOs affect their work for the better or the worse (ibid.). Host countries might exert pressure on an organisation to bend its own rules (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p. 106). States which established and/or finance organisations (cf. international community and Global Powers, such as the USA) can influence them (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, pp. 23, 158). IOs also influence themselves constantly. One of the reasons for this is that they tend to generate universal rules and categories for very different contexts. As these rules do not fit to newly occurring contexts, exceptions have to be made, leading to constant programme developments or even re-inventions, also called the ‘normalisation of deviance’ (ibid., pp. 39-40). Due to the size of an IO, it pursues multiple audiences, multiple principals and multiple missions with sometimes contradicting objectives. Unable to fight on all fronts with the same strengths, organisations need to make decisions regarding priority or the degree of compromise (ibid., pp. 36-37).

Big organisations enjoy great authority and autonomy from the member states fed by their principles of neutrality, impartiality and objectivity which stand in contrast to the self-serving states (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p. 23) and their expertise in their field (e.g., UNHCR in refugee relief work) (ibid., p. 26). Thus, they are given mandates for lobbing states to change their attitude regarding humanitarian and human rights law (ibid., pp. 28-29). But IOs have also evolved to bureaucracies and bureaucracies ‘are often the authorities that classify, label and invest meaning in information. Indeed, they have the authorities that decide what information should be collected in the first place’ (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p. 30). By mapping and constructing social reality, they classify the world. The power big organisations have is to decide which issues are included in the agenda of international discussions and who can participate (ibid.). Lacking accountability and transparency, criticism regarding their detached and undemocratic character is raised (ibid., p. 157).
With this complexity in mind, a few recommendations are made for IOs regarding self-reliance and gender equality of refugees, although some of these recommendations might already be part of the programme of some organisations.

Concerning self-reliance, organisations ought to advocate more for refugees, grant them their human rights, especially the freedom to move and the right to work. As shown in Chapter 2.4.2, granting refugees the possibilities to work and engage in local markets brings many benefits to the local community as well as the national economy. They also ought to negotiate with host countries to open professional sectors for high-skilled refugees to decrease exploitation, marginalisation and powerlessness of refugees (cf. Chapter 4.5.2). The refugee’s knowledge and expertise could be used in the hosting country to oppose brain drain, if existing. As elaborated in Chapter 3.3.2 and Table 5, the best-case scenario for a person to reach self-reliance would be to work only at the age of 24 to 65 in the formal sector, full or part time, depending on her choice, in an open-ended contract, earning enough to make regular savings. This best-case scenario should be in focus of big organisations, but also of the international donor community if it truly seeks to implement the SDGs for all human beings.

To reach these goals, granting human rights like the right to work and move freely as in the case of Uganda, is not enough as demonstrated by Betts et al. (2019, p. 15). Additionally, organisations and host governments should work together to widen labour markets to increase economic opportunities. This is especially important where a high rate of unemployment exists, such as in Jordan. Economic opportunities can also be created by improving infrastructural bottlenecks, e.g., by constructing roads and agricultural infrastructure, as done by ILO in Jordan (cf. Chapter 4.1.7). Though not focusing on the creation of long-term employment, the ILO approach can have long-term benefits for Jordan, especially if the government maintains the new infrastructure regularly.

Including refugees into the labour market and simultaneously widening it is difficult if the level of skills of refugees is low and/or the demography of refugees (mostly women and children) does not meet the requirements necessary to widen markets. Training low-skilled people takes time and resources – fruits cannot be harvested quickly. To facilitate long-term training, funding should be given in multi-year packages, so that organisations can calculate better and for a longer period of time (IV: 12 - Australian Embassy 1/13/2019).

By creating decent work for refugees and hosts (incl. low-skilled people) (see SDG 8), together with paying wages high enough to make savings, workers become consumers with more purchasing power. This not only broadens job markets but also gives beneficiaries the ability to decide how to lead their lives. If jobs are not available, refugees (and vulnerable hosts) should
be given cash, so that they can make their own decisions and are empowered as consumers. The worst big organisations can do is handing out in-kind donations, as they hinder economic activities and inadvertently also obstruct livelihood opportunities for refugees and hosts (IV: 05 - UNHCR Copenhagen 12/18/2018).

Considering the arguments made above regarding neoliberal practices, another recommendation to IOs is to not execute neoliberal orders from donor states or the hosting country and fight vehemently against the exploitation of workers. Further, existing social norms ought to be respected. Social norms are ‘implicitly established rules of behaviour. Some may be helpful in promoting harmonious coexistence, but others may be discriminatory, prejudicial and exclusive’ (UNDP 2016, p. 78). Breaking up social norms is difficult and needs to come from within as confirmed by interview partners (IV: 06 - GIZ 1/14/2019). Still, IOs could guide refugees to get to know other lifestyles, worldviews and norms but should neither break them up without the consent of the refugees nor push refugees out of their roles they have in society. For instance, if mothers (or fathers) find it fulfilling to take care of children and household, organisations should not push them to work (e.g., by decreasing assistance and thus, create necessity to work in order to survive). Engaging in enforced economic activities, especially in the low-wage sector, could hardly be related to empowerment, but is rather a service to capitalists who gain from the exploitation of workers (Federici and Henninger 2012, pp. 44-45; Peterson 2005, pp. 511-514). One answer against enforced economic activities is the remuneration of domestic work for refugees and hosts staying at home and taking care of children and household. This concept, also called Aid for Dependent Children, is widely discussed and demanded by feminists (Federici and Henninger 2012, p. 43). The assumption that such an instrument can be used to increase the reputation of domestic work is wrong, as could be witnessed in the MENA region – still it decreased vulnerability and poverty (The World Bank 2013, p. 94). Organisations like UNDP (cf. Chapter 4.4.4), for example, promotes the option to subsidise unpaid care work through vouchers and credits (UNDP 2016, p. 113).

Organisations should keep in mind the social norms of the respective area of their mission, also regarding gender equality. They should not impose their social norms on others, but accept the regional values important to the people, such as the theocentric tradition in Muslim regions. Field officers with an anthropocentric worldview should involve Muslim NGOs and Imams with a theocentric worldview, who value gender equality and human rights (although if not based on the UN, but on the Qur’an – cf. Chapter 4.3.3 and above). In this way, trusted local
authorities could advocate gender equality in front of men and truly help girls and women to fight for their rights, open traditional gender roles and make education available for girls.

Free schooling and healthcare around the world should be universally free services for everybody (IV: 05 - UNHCR Copenhagen 12/18/2018). This would empower women and men alike and also ease situations such as in Uganda, where refugees often work for less than their Ugandan counterparts and cannot afford to send their children to school (Betts et al. 2019, pp. 4-5). Education is important as it is correlated with higher future income (Betts et al. 2019, p. 36). The countries with the best population health indicators, highest life expectancy, lowest infant mortality and child poverty are the Nordic countries like Sweden (Li et al. 2008, p. 72). Simultaneously, they have the largest proportion of children living with employed mothers in the so-called developed world. These countries achieve the top ranks by providing free or subsidised high-quality childcare outside home, well-trained staff, a high staff-child ratio as well as enough financial resources to meet educational and emotional needs of children. By providing enough funding, international organisations can establish high quality healthcare facilities, schools and train teachers.

Betts et al. (2019, p. 38) argue that there is not a common understanding regarding the term self-reliance. In present work, the 2014 UNHCR definition was used which includes the terms (as discussed in Chapter 2) ‘dignity’, ‘sustainability’ and the ‘capacity to claim their civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights’. The capacity and especially time to love, care and educate one’s children properly, should also be part of this definition, if not already included by using the terms ‘dignity’, ‘sustainability’ and the capacity a person should have to claim his rights. Current changes regarding the donor community like the affirmation of the Global Compact on Refugees could fuel this discussion for the benefits of the refugees. Such approaches, it is hypothesised, would neither intervene with Islam or other religious beliefs nor would it be hegemonic in the sense that Western ideas are forced upon the Arab culture; in fact, it would be an honest approach to strengthen refugees’ and especially female refugees’ rights. In this way, families and individuals are served in an equal way and international organisations following a rather anthropocentric instead of a theocentric approach can still serve refugees from different religious and cultural backgrounds without intervening too much into the refugees’ ways of life nor betraying their (the organisations’) own beliefs.

Further recommendations for internal changes are inspired by interviewee No. 4, indicating the importance of proper planning from the start of an emergency. If, at an early stage of an emergency, humanitarian organisations anticipate that the situation might become protracted,
refugees could take care of themselves more easily. However, he also clarifies that such planning is difficult:

It is a dream, because the challenges at the early stage of an emergency are so huge that spending time and investing in longer-term plans are often not realistic. You have to negotiate with the government, you have to recruit staff, you have to set up camps in many cases, though refugee camps are certainly not the best human situation and should be avoided. (IV: 04 - UNHCR HQ 11/26/2018)

But why should dreams not come true if all groups work together?

Community participation, though already part of humanitarian assistance, must be further encouraged. This would break up the power relations existing between organisations and host states as superordinates and refugees and also hosts as subordinates, because the latter learn what the former want, as they decide on the learning material in schools and the types of training conducted (Bulley 2017, p. 52). Regular meetings and the dissemination of information give refugees the power to decide what is best for the community and take influence away from the field officers (cf. Chapter 4.5.2). Having the right information can also avoid resentment and too high expectations, because the beneficiaries participate in the process of camp development (Betts et al. 2018a, pp. 45-46).

The last recommendation concerns strategies and guidelines which are prepared by the headquarters and is given based on informal email discussions with a former member of the UN WFP. Headquarters, in principle, set strategies, policies, rules and regulations covering all business areas for both headquarters and field officers. Divided into business areas, headquarters conduct elaborate trainings and outline programmes and projects as well as guidelines, which should be implemented by field officers. However, for field officers it is not mandatory to follow them step by step (see for instance UNHCR Handbook for Self-Reliance, 2005). Quite often, partners in the field understand and interpret guidelines and even organisational rules and regulations differently. This results in difficulties to engage the various, local and especially new partners in the field. Field officers actually need to spend a considerable amount of time to study guidelines and seek clarifications from the senior management of headquarters or cross-reference existing guidelines. Some of the guidelines require the field officer to build new checklists, formats and templates resulting in very time-consuming processes, while the practical work during an acute refugee influx or in refugee camps requires constant attention and readiness. To improve the relationship of headquarters and field officers, the former could change its employment policy from employing long-term staff instead of the temporary local
and international staff (so-called consultants). Additionally, they could add experts specialised in creating guidelines and templates to the local teams to reduce the workload of field officers in the area. Such a change might also influence the unsatisfactory situation of data availability and indicators (see above).

International Community

The international community with regard to refugee issues consists of the donors and refugee hosting countries (United Nations 2019b). Neither an in-depth overview of both entities nor an analysis of the power relations among the donor states is in the scope of present paper.

Once a year, the UNHCR High Commissioner presents the annual report of UNHCR to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the General Assembly of the United Nations through the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee (Third Committee) (UNHCR 2019l). The General Assembly ‘occupies a central position as the chief deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the United Nations’ (General Assembly of the United Nations 2019a). It is one of the six principal organs and the only one in which all member nations are represented equally (United Nations 2013). ECOSOC links policymakers, parliamentarians, academics, foundations, businesses, youth and more than 3,200 NGOs to improve sustainable development (ECOSOC 2019). The Third Committee’s focus is on social, humanitarian affairs and human rights issues. It is one of the six main committees at the General Assembly (General Assembly of the United Nations 2019b). The Third Committee considers and adopts three resolutions related to UNHCR, including the resolution on assistance to refugees, returnees and displaced persons in Africa (UNHCR 2019l).

The main donor country for UNHCR is by far the USA (2019 contributions: USD 1,668,082,053). The second largest donor is the EU (2019 contributions: USD 478,034,742). They are followed by Germany, Sweden, Japan, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, private donors in Spain and Canada (2019 contributions of Canada: USD 59,194,791), etc. The first Sub-Saharan state appearing in the list of donor countries is Sudan (place 66 – contribution in 2019: USD 413,075) (UNHCR 2019m). Does the amount of funding by states play a role in the decision-making processes? Although in UN organisations such as UNHCR it is mandated by the UN General Assembly that each of the 193 members of the UN has one vote, it seems that power is not distributed equally among these member states (General Assembly of the United Nations 2019a; Okiror 28 February 2019; Puchala 2005). When two major donors (Germany and UK) froze funds to UNHCR Uganda due to fraud, corruption and mismanagement,
there were fears of major disruptions in the life-saving assistance to refugees (Okiror 28 February 2019). When the German cabinet took months to come together, funds were held back until the new government was established (IV: 12 - Australian Embassy 1/13/2019). During that time, UNICEF and other organisations faced high funding problems, including the drying out of programmes, because promised funds were not paid. UNICEF Jordan, for example, had to borrow money from the headquarters to maintain the WASH sector in the camps. Other programmes had to be stopped, leaving beneficiaries in terrible living situations.

The actual consequence of such outcomes gives major donors more power over international organisations than smaller donors, although technically, they have the same vote in the General Assembly. Further, while not going into detail, the UN is frequently criticised with regard to the hegemony of its main influencers, the USA and other Western countries (Puchala 2005). ‘The predominant impression within the Secretariat and among many member-state delegations is that almost everything the United Nations does or does not do is conditioned by the will, whims, and resources of the United States’ (Puchala 2005, p. 574).

If this critique holds true, the question arises with regard to present work whether USA (and perhaps other Western states) actively prevents self-reliance and gender equality among refugees. As elaborated in Chapter 2.4, self-reliance has been on the table for a couple of decades but not many refugees can call themselves self-reliant (by the definition given in present work). The same accounts to the existence of camps (which is under criticism at least since the publication of Barbara Harrell-Bond’s *Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees* in 1986) and the denial of human rights for refugees (Asylum Access and Refugee Work Rights Coalition 2014, p. 5). Answers to these questions are probably more complex than pillorying capitalist countries, especially the USA. Geopolitical interests, the general funding situation, the highly politicised debate of keeping or changing the dual-system of humanitarian and development aid, general power relations among states and the yearly circles of generating funding, instead of multi-year funding, etc. are all part of the game.

Despite all these differences and the notorious challenges raised above, the international community can record progress, such as the Global Compact on Refugees. By assigning the Global Compact on Refugees, a great step towards a higher level of self-reliance among refugees has been taken by the donor community. As stated above, first positive results could be recorded. However, it does not seem to be an objective of the Compact to avoid camps in the future. The only mention of refugee camps occurs in the context of reception centres close to the border: ‘Efficient mechanisms to pursue alternatives to camps away from borders will be supported,
where considered relevant by the concerned host country.’ (United Nations 2018, p. 10). The ball was returned to the host country.

Facilitating livelihood opportunities in very different regions around the globe is a complex and difficult endeavour, which, according to interviewee No. 1, even donors have understood by now. Food security, for instance, cannot be seen in terms of food only; it also needs to be considered how cash fits into a family food cycle, how self-reliance is aimed at household, regional and national levels (IV: 01 - Irish NGO 9/24/2018). Further, by creating free schooling and healthcare, many people would be freed of a massive financial burden, which could increase gender equality on a large scale. Self-reliance could be increased by the international community pushing development plans such as building infrastructure (roads, schools, hospitals) in the host country to provide impetus for economic activities for refugees and hosts (Aleinkoff 2015, pp. 6-9). Such actions are outlined in the Global Compact so that refugees are ought to be seen as consumers and producers, not as a burden.

These objectives, repeated many times by different scholars, can only be implemented properly when nation states finally start to drastically increase donations (though funding is constantly increasing, funding gaps are still huge) – and maybe more importantly – to disburse existing pledges and commitments in a flexible and timely manner. This would also give international organisations and the UN more freedom to act on a long-term cycle. Further, the international community could increase pressure (e.g., by threatening with and/or implementing sanctions) on host countries to grant refugees their human rights, especially to work and move freely.

Private Sector

Private partnerships will become more important, especially since the assignment of the Global Compact on Refugees (United Nations 2018, p. 7). The Compact invites member states to include – where appropriate – the private sector for job creation, infrastructure strengthening and the development of innovative technology, among others. International organisations have increased their partnership with the private sector to create strategic win-win situations. In case of UNHCR, they identify problems refugees have and start discussions with companies. One approach is to solve problems through strategic procurement; another approach is using direct sales; here, refugees can obtain the product directly from the company by paying with cash or vouchers. Selling directly to the community creates jobs as the company needs to hire people to sell their products. The more complicated a product is such as a bank for remittances the more jobs can be created (IV: 05 - UNHCR Copenhagen 12/18/2018).
The recommendation to the private sector is not to follow neoliberal ideas of quick profit maximisation, but to work together with organisations to create long-term win-win situations for all: profit maximisation for the company, long-term reliable partnerships with the organisations and most importantly, long-term decent work opportunities for refugees and hosts.

As outlined above, these recommendations are a contribution to the ongoing discussion on how to improve humanitarian and development aid in the hope that as more evidences emerge to bring out the disadvantages of the current system, there are possibilities of real changes occurring for the beneficiaries.
6. Conclusion

By developing the CPI System, present work seeks to further investigate the question on how to measure self-reliance in a refugee camp context. The in-depth analysis of existing tools and indices as well as the futile search for respective data showed that a change in international and UN organisations regarding data management is of great importance. The further identification of influential factors (IIF) and the detailed case study of Jordan, including Zaatari, its biggest refugee camp, illustrated that supporting refugees is a complex, interrelated multi-sectoral task. The findings can be summarised in a statement as:

If the level of self-reliance is low in one of the most modern refugee camps situated in a progressive country – Zaatari camp in Jordan, supported with millions of Euros by the international community, reaching self-reliance in camps is and probably remains ‘a dream’.

The findings of present work suggest that the overall level of self-reliance is still rather low among refugee camp communities. If the ability to decide how to treat refugees remains with the governments and the donor community does not push more fiercely towards self-reliance while additionally helping economically weak countries to improve significantly, it is doubtful that the situation of refugees will change towards more self-reliance at all or if so, only marginally. The situation seems to be highly politicised – inside as well as outside camps.

In the camp, power relations depend on the refugees inhibiting it, their ethnic backgrounds, their history, their demographics, their pre-flight experiences and roles in society. No camp is like another and each situation has to be assessed on its own by the field officers on site. This also holds true for the refugees’ relationships with hosts outside the camp. The availability of natural resources and markets, the forms of community behaviour, rules of society, skills and experiences of both groups, if they are complementary or incompatible, all define the power relations and relationships of both groups.

With regard to refugee camps, governments decide to grant human rights, the international community decides on the amount of funding and international and UN organisations decide on the type of assistance they provide and for whom. Because each refugee scenario has its own challenges, no universal validity can and should be outlined at this point. Universal recommendations would only dilute the specific requirements each refugee situation and refugee camp have. The purpose of present work and especially of the identification of the influential factors was to sensitisie the different stakeholder groups, academia and the public of the different power relations and constellations prevalent amongst refugee influxes. Each camp must be assessed
specifically taking into consideration its different outcomes. Data needs to be made accessible to the public and should be merged to one database fed by different IOs, UN organisations and NGOs, but categorised in a well-structured manner regarding the outcomes (e.g., well-being, self-reliance, basic needs, etc.). Such a database should be easy to find for everybody (newcomers and experts of humanitarian and development aid) and disseminated widely. In this way, the public would have an actual chance to assess the reality of a situation without depending on often euphemised reports published by organisations. It would also prevent the multiplication of repeated quotations of outdated data in new reports, misleading the reader trying to comprehend a certain humanitarian situation (Schön et al. 2018). Further, a well-curated database would also give independent (and underfunded) scholars, who cannot go to the field due to lack of resources, a chance to objectively assess refugee situations. So far, assessments based on detailed data are too often left to academic departments receiving enough funding as well as access to camp sites such as the Refugee Economies Programme based at the University of Oxford.

The development of the CPI was one way to approach the topic of measuring self-reliance. To gain further knowledge, the adaptation of existing commercial tools, such as the Balanced Scorecard, could be of great relevance for academia and humanitarian experts. Yet, such projects require higher data availability as outlined above as well as close cooperation with IOs.

To opt for or against refugee camps is not the purpose of present work. As seen throughout this thesis, despite the fact that negative aspects of refugee camps outweigh the positive ones, especially if located in remote areas with limited resources and eroded soil, positive aspects do exist. Particularly for the vulnerable people, a camp can be a safer, more tranquil solution than a life outside where they are left on their own. Even democratic structures can evolve to help the formerly marginalised groups (see Chapter 2.3). As long as basic services, like schools and health facilities, are not provided for free in an adequate manner across the globe, the free services provided in a camp might appear favourable than the costly services outside. Further, the provision of basic needs within a camp can give refugees the time and energy to create new businesses or community-based initiatives for a better economic, social and political life. As long as refugees do not receive such lifesaving aid outside, camps might be favoured. In contrast to earlier hypotheses, it also appears that support within the camp is two to three times cheaper than short-term support outside the camp, such as that provided by RefugePoint (D’Onofrio 2019, p. 71; Slaughter 2019, p. 13). In the long term, approaches targeting self-reliance and livelihood of refugees outside camps would certainly reduce or eliminate needs for further aid.
Such approaches are not only more cost-intensive in the beginning, but also more complex because of the range of service providers and potential funding streams and thus, potentially not a priority to field officers (*cf.*, influential factor #3.31 – *field officers’ fear of change*) (D’Onofrio 2019, p. 71). Further, traditional humanitarian donors, following annual funding cycles, seem to prefer low per-capita costs per intervention instead of multi-year funding as, for instance, provided by the Australian Embassy for the Syrian crisis in Jordan (IV: 12 - Australian Embassy 1/13/2019; Slaughter 2019, p. 13).

More important than advocating the end of refugee camps is to advocate for refugees, being granted their human rights, their right to move freely, to work, but also to access free schooling and health services. If schooling and healthcare are not for free or provided insufficiently or if the local economy and/or the labour markets are underdeveloped, refugees will face a life full of uncertainties, instability and unpredictability, no matter whether they live in a camp or in an urban area (Betts et al. 2019, p. 25). As the same applies to vulnerable members of the host community, the international community, IOs, but also host governments must work harder and provide more funding to reach the SDGs for all people around the world.

This objective cannot be reached in the very near future. Thus, other measurements must be used in the interim to improve the lives of refugees such as changes within the system. For instance, all countries could regularly be assessed in a comparable manner regarding markets, culture, quality of schools and availability of skills and knowledge, etc. (such as those described in Chapter 2.5), so that time-consuming assessments by international organisations would not be necessary at the beginning of a refugee situation. International organisations, working hand in hand with refugee-hosting governments, would then have access to these assessments and with funding in multi-year cycles, they would have the appropriate resources to train refugees regarding the market requirements of the host country or to integrate them into the labour market quickly. In this way, refugees would not be made dependable on organisations, as they could engage in economic activities as soon as the emergency phase had ended and ready to start their new lives in the host country until their return.

It is also unrealistic to hope for the creation of special economic zones in or around refugee camps, an approach often heard among refugee experts. In the opinion of expert No. 5 such zones will not come from host governments but have to be pushed by UNHCR and the refugees, as they need the creation of jobs more than the governments. Nevertheless, the interviewee fears that UNHCR, for instance, does not seem to be ready to push for changes in that particular direction (IV: 05 - UNHCR Copenhagen 12/18/2018). This view might change if a research
project analysing this topic from the perspective of power relations could reveal new insights (IV: 05 - UNHCR Copenhagen 12/18/2018).

Though economic issues are highly relevant for refugees, refugee situations must not be reduced to these issues only. The fact that people have to leave their home countries and that they are called and are defined as ‘refugees’ (see Chapter 2) is mainly a political (Bardelli 2018, p. 55) outcome and must be questioned. It is not the refugees’ fault to be refugees, thus, their safety and well-being should be the concern of the rest of the world. Providing and facilitating self-reliance and livelihood opportunities helps refugees, especially if encamped, to feel less ‘warehoused’ and more ‘useful’. If their activities were not necessarily bound to earning money to survive, but to benefit oneself, the local or even global community, to learn and to gain skills, the degree of their well-being could perhaps be higher. Such activities would need more funding, but abandoning neoliberal discourses and practices could change the worldwide narrative of refugees being a threat to host communities.

This research was conducted from the perspective of economics and political sciences and mainly focused on the topic of self-reliance of encamped refugees. Retrospectively, using World Bank data and poverty as reference to assess self-reliance of encamped refugees entails a source of uncertainty. However, results indicate many similarities with the indicators used by other developers of indicators and indices. The intensive comparison with existing indicators could clarify that measuring the level of self-reliance in camps is different from measuring self-reliance of refugees in host communities, as prerequisites of available infrastructure, services and human rights vary from those of people living in refugee camps. Adapting existing indicators could have brought similar results, though, and more time for the analysis of power structures would have been left. The selection of interview partners, as is often the case, was triggered by the author’s network and not particularly by the experts’ knowledge regarding the topics of power relations and gender equality. Interviewing different experts would probably have led to different results.

Further research is certainly necessary from other academic perspectives within the fields of economics and political sciences, as well as others, such as ethnography or law studies. Especially when analysing gender equality issues, the concerned women need to be interviewed to really grasp their situation. Further research should emphasise the location of refugees, e.g., camps in comparison to settlements and/or cities or the different locations of camps (e.g., sparsely populated areas in comparison to densely populated areas). Certainly, further research
regarding political power relations of donor states, international organisations and refugee hosting countries is necessary as well, especially also at a higher political level, since present work’s contributions are limited due to its single case study and its interdisciplinary approach. Though revealing interesting insights and connections, working in an interdisciplinary manner can never touch a topic as deeply as research focusing only on one area. Thus, besides being its strength, the interdisciplinary approach might also be present work’s inevitable flaw. For this reason, the thesis concludes with a call for more research on this and similar topics which were only touched briefly here, including gender equality, FE and Muslim feminism in relation to refugees and self-reliance, as well as the question how SDGs can be reached for refugees in the 21st century.
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Appendix: Merging CPI and IIF

The figure is a duplicate of the CPI Framework (Figure 8) extended with the most important identified influential factors of Chapter 4.5.2. The grey arrows present a selection of the influential factors (including its numbers, cf. Chapter 4.5.2) pointing out of the respective categories 1 to 9 (despite the influential factors of the Categories 10 and 11). The encircled numbers 1 to 6 facilitate orientation between this figure and the descriptive summary in Chapter 5.1.
Information on Online Supplement

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The online supplement contains in total five figures and tables which are listed under the link (OS A to E). As the titles of the tables and figures are the focal point of each OS, separate lists of tables and figures are not included as they would not add any value.
Assessing the Level of Self-Reliance and Livelihood of Encamped Refugees
Syrian Refugees in Jordan
Labor and Globalization | Volume 20
Anna-Mara Schön

Achieving self-reliance among refugees is favoured by many international organisations, though hardly achieved for refugee camps. In many cases, deprived of their human rights, located in remote areas and without access to the local labour market, encamped refugees have no other opportunity than turning to negative coping mechanisms to survive, including sex work, child labour, crime and dangerous work in the informal sector. This book concentrates on measuring self-reliance and identifying factors influencing it in camp settings.

Keywords: Self-reliance, livelihood opportunities, refugee, refugee camps, power dynamics, gender equality, performance measurement, Syria, Jordan

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