Que fais, Adam?
Questions and Seduction in the *Jeu d'Adam*

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Introduction

In order to apply the principles of dialogue analysis to questions and their linguistic realisations in Old French I have chosen as a textual basis the *Jeu d'Adam,* because this play views the well-known story of the Fall of Man also as a dialogic play with the seductive power of questions.[1] Thus, the *Jeu d'Adam* seems a good field of examination for a linguist who wants to ask some questions about the forms and functions of interrogatives. A study of questions implies on the one hand the specific formal type of interrogative sentences and on the other hand the interrogative act as the illocution of asking a question. The crucial point in a linguistic analysis is here to model the relations between interrogative sentences and interrogative acts, separating both levels methodically, then bringing them together again in a synthesis when describing the illocutionary potential of certain interrogative sentence types.

In the following analysis I will limit myself to certain types of interrogative acts which occur with a high frequency and which in my opinion express basic communicative needs. In a next step, I will illustrate the verbal realisations of these illocutionary acts with examples taken from the *Jeu d'Adam,* putting my emphasis on interrogative sentence types.

In the first paragraphs I will expose some special characteristics of the adjacency pair of question and answer and try to formulate a definition of the illocutionary act of asking a question. Then I shall turn to a presentation of various types of interrogative acts described as typical illocutions which I will try to illustrate with examples from the *Jeu d'Adam,* i. e., the method applied will be onomasiologic, focusing on the contextual function of the interrogative act. In a synoptic view I will then summarise and link the results to the dialogue types used in the play and concentrate on their possible roots in historical circumstances.

2. *Anrede und Erwiderung* – 'Question and answer'

According to the well-known dictum by Wilhelm von Humboldt, the dualism of language is expressed in the unity of *Anrede* and *Erwiderung*, 'address' and 'reply', which is inherent in any act of speaking:[2]

> Es liegt aber auch in der Sprache selbst ein unabänderlicher Dualismus, und alles Sprechen ist auf Anrede und Erwiederung gestellt. Das Wort ist kein Gegenstand, vielmehr den Gegenständen gegenüber etwas Subjectives, nun aber soll es im Geiste des Denkenden doch ein Object, von ihm erzeugt und auf ihn zurückwirkend seyn. Damit es sich nun von einem bloßen Scheinobjecte, einem Traumbilde, unterscheide, muß es Wesenheit in einem Hörenden und Erwiedernden gewinnen. (Wilhelm von Humboldt: "Natur der Sprache überhaupt", quoted after the edition by Christmann 1977: 26).

This general concept of 'address and reply' becomes especially obvious in the pair of question and answer.[3] This adjacency pair is not only a good illustration of Humboldt's philosophical approach to language, but is likewise able to serve as a pattern for the exchange of active and passive roles in dialogic interaction and thus, finally, represents a model of the dynamism of dialogue.[4] In both perspectives the adjacency pair of question and answer is regarded as a sequence which contains two directly succeeding expressions of different speakers and forms an integrated whole: the answer closes what the question opened and the question as first element draws the answer as second element after it.[5] Lack of an answer is always regarded as a violation of rules which requires a justification, because the functional unity is usually broken and a continuation of the dialogue will be more difficult.[6]

This typical character of dialogue secures question-answer sequences the increased attention of academics, since they enable us to analyse the several different organisational levels of dialogues (Bucher 1994: 239fi): the patterns of action, the propositional and thematic links, the control of the flow of information and the strategies used to govern the dialogue. Since question-answer sequences prototypically illustrate the functioning of dialogues, the viewpoint of dialogue analysis is almost ideal to give insights in the connections between interrogative acts and interrogative forms. This contextual method permits to capture the different pragmatic potential of interrogative sentences and work out their profiles as illocutionary acts. In order to point out the close

link of the interrogative act with its context, I will refer to this illocution not as a speech act but as a dialogue act to underline its reciprocity and interactional power (cf. also Franke 1990: 8f., 15; Oksaar 1981: 130f., 146).

As a textual basis for this pragmatic approach I refer to the *Jeu d'Adam* or *Ordo representations Ade,* a bilingual liturgic play which probably dates from the middle of the 12th century and combines liturgic Latin elements with dramatised parts written in the vernacular such as the story of Adam and Eve. The *Jeu d'Adam* as a drama grows out of liturgy and represents the Christian story of redemption in the frame of a figural interpretation of the world.[7] The examples quoted here are from the first part, which dramatises the Fall of Man in dialogues between the protagonists Adam, Eve, Diabolus and Figura, who is a personalisation of God as the *salvator mundi.*

When analysing the pragmatic potential of interrogative acts, it is crucial to distinguish between the organisation of turn-taking and the illocutionary level.[8] In the case of the adjacency pair of question and answer, the organisation of turns and that of illocutions are mostly homologous, i.e., question and answer can be identified with different turns (Fritz 1994a: 184). However, the turn-taking organisation need not necessarily coincide with the structure of the acts of asking and answering questions. This point is illustrated by the following text from the *Jeu d'Adam,* where Figura shows Adam the paradise:[9]

(1)   V.188-198
        188 Tunc Figura manu demonstret paradisum Ade, dicens:
        189   Adam!
        190 Adam
        191   Sire!
        192 Figura
        193   Dirrai toi mon avis.
        194   Veez cest jardin?
        195 Adam
        196   Cum ad num?
        197 Figura
        198   Paradis.

Figura	Adam!
Adam	Yes, my Lord!
Figura	I want to tell you what my intention is. Do you see this garden?
Adam	How is it called?
Figura	Paradise.

In the sense of knowledge distribution the question *Cum ad num?* (V.196) is prototypical. Adam, who asks the question, does not have any knowledge about the garden. The questioned Figura, however, is very likely to possess this knowledge as he has called Adam's attention to it. On the level of the illocutionary acts, this interrogative sentence is a clear case of an interrogative act, but if we have a closer look on the level of turns, it occupies a marked position. The interrogative act *Cum ad num?* (V.196) follows directly after another question *Veez cest jardin?* (V.194) but is neither an evasive counterquestion nor a comprehensive question. Instead, *Cum ad num?* contains the answer to *Veez cest jardin?* as a presupposition: asking for the name of the garden presupposes that Adam does see the garden. Including in its presupposition an answer to Figura's question, *Cum ad num?* closes the sequence V.194-196 and simultaneously opens another question-answer sequence V.196-198. The interrogative act thus forms the intersection of two adjacency pairs and creates a structure of elliptical coupling (cf. Conrad 1986: 430; Merritt 1976: 341ff.; Stenström 1988: 309). This overlay of function in *Cum ad num?* also proves that the illocutionary value of a question can only be determined contextually (cf. Bucher 1994: 244, 245).

After having sketched the interrogative act as the initiative part of the adjacency pair of question and answer in the light of the dialogic nature of language I will now concentrate on the illocutionary act of asking a question. This accentuation of the one part of the adjacency pair seems legitimate to me, as the interrogative act is the more narrowly determined part of the pair, whereas it appears harder to find a common pragmatic denominator for answers. Answers contain an extremely broad range of reactions - even no answer can be an answer.[10] Intuitively, it makes sense to say that everything that follows a question is in a certain way an answer, whereas this sequential definition does not work vice versa. This asymmetric relation indicates that the interrogative act is the more narrowly determined element of the adjacency pair of question and answer. Therefore, it seems more promising to start a characterisation of question/answer pairs, based on a description of the question as an illocutionary act, as I will do in the next section.

3. Questions as dialogue acts

 The fact that the concept of questions is familiar to all speakers and forms part of our general knowledge does not make life easier for the linguist. In everyday life we subsume a large range of illocutionary acts under the label of question. It is therefore very difficult to find a common illocutionary denominator (cf. Lang 1993: 44ff.) After a short review of the previous research in this area, I will try to put forward an outline of a solution to this "question about questions".

On the level of their propositional content, questions are analysed as propositions presenting a deficit of knowledge, a missing parameter in the set of information. In the wh-question *Where is the garden?* the propositional content presents a missing parameter, the location, which is represented by the interrogative adverb *where,* while the rest of the information set is presupposed to be known. In contrast, yes/no-questions like *Do you see the garden?* offer a complete proposition but put the truth value of the proposition as a whole into question (cf. Weydt 1985: 313). In a tradition that goes back to Searle (1969: 66, 69, and 1979: 44-47, 48- 51), this deficit of knowledge is mostly viewed as a motivation for the interrogative act so that the question functions as a request to fill the knowledge gap.[11] As the question calls for an answer that delivers the relevant information, the interrogative speech act is traced back to another speech act, namely the directive speech act.[12] That interpretation of the question act as a directive, however, excludes types of interrogative acts that for various reasons do not aim at an answer as a supplier of lacking information like for example the often discussed type of the rhetorical question. What is more, a comparison of forms of dialogue organisation shows that interrogative acts and directives, while they have a high degree of reciprocity and "interactive power" (Bucher 1994: 242) in common, open up different ranges of possible responses. Thus, the utterances *What are interrogative acts?* and *Define the interrogative act* dispose of different pragmatic potentials and will equally trigger different reactions of the interlocutor.[13]

Therefore, interrogative acts can only be understood to a limited extent via the common denominator of the directive as a means of adapting the world to the words. The basic semantic-pragmatic value of the interrogative act lies much more in indicating a gap in the correspondence between the words and the aimed-at world[14] - and that indication of a deficit does not necessarily have to involve a volitional nuance (cf. Lang 1993: 49f.). The gap in the correspondence of world and words now results in the fact that the speaker can only take a limited guarantee for his enunciation concerning a certain situation and therefore cannot perform an assertion. As the speaker's knowledge of the situation proves to be fragmentary, he expresses himself only with "limited liability". Therefore, the disclosing of a gap via an interrogative act does not only have impact on the propositional content, but in a pragmatic extension also has to be related to the speaker and his limited commitment. In order to describe the pragmatic phenomenon of the speaker commitment as a responsibility in conversation, Heger (²1976: 276f.) has coined the term of *kommunikative Regreßpflicht,* i.e., the speaker is "liable to recourse" and so has to take on a "communicative liability". With the performance of an assertion, the speaker invests his enunciation with a truth value and must assume the responsibility for this assignment towards his interlocutors. This pragmatic extension not only includes the speaker but also the addressee and proves to have an impact on the attitude of both interlocutors. If the speaker points to a knowledge deficit, he can "point to" the relevance of this deficit and by doing so simultaneously perform a directive that aims at closing the gap.

The interrogative act understood as the act of pointing at a gap, coupled with limited communicative liability, seems to be a basic illocutionary act that is not to be localised on the same level as the directive. My hypothesis is that the interrogative act forms an illocutionary level of its own. The assumption of such a basic level is also backed by models of question theory that define the interrogative act in relation to the assertion and conceive question and assertion as poles that establish a pragmatic continuum.[15] This complementary way of interpreting questions and assertions, which may at first sight appear as a circular definition, is substantiated by the nature of questions and assertions, because both illocutionary acts can be described by using the same parameter, i.e., the degree of speaker commitment, of "communicative liability".

Based on these preliminaries, a definition of assertion and interrogative act can now be undertaken. With an assertion, the speaker takes total communicative liability and thus signals that the proposition is true and the propositional content complete: words and world are in full correspondence. By uttering an interrogative act, the speaker does not assume this communicative liability and indicates that he has to step back from that responsibility, because he does not know yet whether world and words are in correspondence, be it that the propositional content itself is marked by a gap or that a complete proposition has not yet been tested as to its correspondence with the world.

Viewing the interrogative act as a reference to an incongruity or a propositional gap in the correspondence of world and words is admittedly a wide pragmatic denominator. However, it seems that this "fuzziness" also forms a characteristic quality of the interrogative act as an act that leaves a large margin of interaction to the speaker and the interlocutor as well (cf. also Traverso 1991: 211, 213, 220). The fact that the interrogative act

points in an almost deictic way to a gap may also explain the highly activating quality of questions that call up responses even if they, like rhetorical questions, don't aim at an answer.

In this context it is of vital importance to draw a sharp borderline between the level of sentence types and the illocutionary level of the acts that are performed by sentence types such as declarative and interrogative sentences (cf. Altmann 1987: 22, 25, 30; Meibauer 1987a: 3, 9; Padučeva 1986: 374; Bucher 1994: 240, 244). Thus, interrogative sentences may perform "pure" interrogative acts, and declarative sentences may realise prototypical assertions. In those cases, the utterances would be located at the poles of the continuum. But an illocution performed by an interrogative sentence may as well take an intermediate position on the continuum or even be closer to the pole of assertion than to the affinitive pole of the interrogative act (cf. Maury 1973: 309f.; Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1991b: 95-108 *(actes intermédiaries)-,* Gelas 1991: 364f.). The localisation on the continuum is the result of many heterogeneous factors. It is remarkable that syntactic and grammatical factors like the sentence type seem to have less impact on the pragmatic potential than the propositional content or the knowledge distribution between the interlocutors (cf. Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1991b: 91, 92f., 95).[16] Concerning the relation between interrogative sentences and interrogative acts, it can be said that interrogative sentences have elective affinities to interrogative acts, but may as well realise enunciations that are close to the pole of assertion.[17] Vice versa, interrogative acts are prototypically realised with interrogative sentence types, but can also be performed using other sentence types such as declarative sentences.

The continuum of question and assertion forms a basic layer of pragmatic values that concern the parameter of communicative liability, which is inherent in every kind of enunciation. Of course, there are more pragmatic values than question and assertion like those listed by the various classifications of illocutionary acts (cf. Searle 1979: 12-20; Schoenthal 1979: 47-52; Meibauer 1986: 9-18; Lang 1993: 44-47). If those acts cannot be hosted on that first level, this is because they belong to a secondary illocutionary level. On this secondary level, interrogative acts and assertions receive a second pragmatic "layer" of illocutionary values and can for example function as commissives or directives.[18] This illocution of a second order can determine an utterance in a different way - a phenomenon which may explain why interrogative acts are volitional to different extents.

Talking of question types, we must therefore methodically operate a strict separation between the *signifiant* of interrogative sentences and the *signifié,* i.e., the types of interrogative acts. Those interrogative acts are to be characterised via two pragmatic levels: a basic level formed by the continuum of communicative liability ranging from assertion to question, and a secondary level of illocutions of second order depending on the given context of conversational interaction.

After having sketched the outline of the interrogative act in general, I will now turn to a presentation of selected types of interrogative acts.

4. Types of interrogative acts

Recent research in the domain of questions shows a tendency to renounce mere stock-taking of intonational or syntactic characteristics of interrogative sentences and concentrates instead on a pragmatic approach to the formulation of functional identities. This semantic-pragmatic identity is supposed to be a basic pragmatic value of an interrogative sentence type and thus represents the *signifié* of the sentence type that forms the *signifiant.* The basic value is supposed to be present in all uses of that interrogative sentence type whose semantic-pragmatic profile may of course vary according to contextual determinants.

For my examination of interrogative acts in Old French texts I will use as a starting point the pragmatic profiles that have been elaborated in order to describe the interrogative sentence types of contemporary French. These illocutionary acts will be separated from the interrogative sentences that realise them in modem French and will instead be considered as types of illocutions that perform frequent communicative tasks.[19] Flaving formulated such a functional profile, I will try to extract the syntactic structures which fulfil that communicative task in the dialogues of the *Jeu d'Adam.* The selected method is onomasiologic, and thus the prototypes of interrogative acts are to be regarded as onomasiologically based prototypes. The functional identity, originally elaborated as *signifié* of an interrogative sentence type, is disconnected from the *signifiant* and considered as a concept of human interactions whose linguistic realisations are to be examined.[20] It is, evidently, of special interest to know whether there is a corresponding interrogative sentence type in Old French.[21]

Interrogative sentences in Old French show inversion (verb-subject-object) with such frequency that the inversion can be considered as the syntactic marker for interrogative sentences.[22] Only very rarely do we find interrogative sentences with the "canonical" word order subject-verb-object, which lack the syntactic marking of interrogatives and are characterised as interrogative sentences only by a rising intonation (cf. Brunot and Bruneau [3]1949: 486, 528; Gamillscheg 1957: 614; Kaiser 1980: 105-106).[23] This sentence type corresponds to the intonation-marked interrogative sentence of the type *Pierre arrive demain?,* which is very frequent in spoken

contemporary French. This rare usage of the intonation-marked interrogative sentence may be due to the fact that the intonation as a marker is restricted to the spoken language and therefore does not appear in the written documents which are our only source of information.[24] However, it seems to me equally possible that this type of interrogative sentence is rarely found in written texts because its pragmatic profile may have an affinity to spoken language in the sense of face-to-face interaction marked by spontaneity and a close relationship of the interlocutors. This language type, for which Koch and Oesterreicher (1985: 19-24 and 1990: 8-12) coined the term *Nähesprache,* is rarely granted access to the level of the written word; thus we cannot entirely exclude the possibility that the intonation-marked type may also have been used in Old French but did not fully succeed in entering the universe of written texts.[25]

4.1. Interrogative acts containing orientation

The functional type of interrogative acts containing orientation is confined to the so-called yes/no-questions. I take this type from Stempel and Fischer (1985), who described this functional identity in their analysis of the intonation-marked question type in contemporary French. An interrogative act contains orientation in the sense that a question of the type *p?* does not present an enunciation *p* to the interlocutor as an open yes/no-decision *(p* or *non-p).* In the case of orientation, the speaker presents a favoured hypothesis that functions as a pre-decision and introduces the speaker's preferences in the interaction.[26] Questions containing orientation function as projections of a favoured answer and are therefore asymmetric, as they insinuate a speaker- preference (cf. Stempel and Fischer 1985: 254f., 265).[27] Thus, the interrogative acts containing orientation have a functional identity defined by interactional qualities that permit the speaker to ask for relevant information while bringing forward a hypothesis of his own and building up a positive image (cf. Stempel and Fischer 1985: 262, 264; Stempel 1994b: 324f).

  The following example forms part of a dialogue between Adam and Diabolus that can be characterised as a competitive and antagonistic dialogue (cf. Franke 1990: 78, 81 ff.; Haug 1984: 281). By provoking Adam skilfully into asking questions and then retarding his own answers in an even more skilful way, Diabolus has succeeded in arousing Adam's *curiositas*,[28] Adam is now ready for the revelation of the long announced secret of the tree of knowledge:

(2) V. 269-272; 294-301
   269 Diabolus
   270   Vols le tu saver?
   271 Adam
   272   Bien en iert mon talent.
   [...]
   294 Diabolus
   295   Kar tu ne deiz nul bien aver.
   296   Tu as le bien, ne seiez joïr.
   297 Adam
   298   E jo comment?
   299 Diabolus
   300   Voldras l'oïr?
   301   Jol te dirrai priveement
   Diabolus Would you like to know?
   Adam I'd like to very much.
   [...]
   Diabolus Because you are not supposed to have anything good.
       You have the good and you don't know how to use it.
   Adam And why?
   Diabolus Do you want to hear it? I will tell it to you secretly.

The interrogative sentence *Vols le tu saver?* (V.270) is marked by an inversion and presents the word order that is typical of interrogative sentences. The second interrogative sentence *Voldras l'oïr?* (V.300) is marked by the ellipsis of the subject pronoun so that it cannot be decided whether it has "canonical" word order (subject-verb-object) or inversion: the word order difference in this case is neutralised. This neutralisation of the syntactic question marker generates an interrogative sentence type of its own, characterised by the fronting of the verb and probably also by a rising interrogative intonation that differentiates the interrogative sentence from declarative sentences that frequently present the same word order (cf. Foulet 1921: 244; Lerch 1934: 314- 316; Gamillscheg

1957: 558; Kaiser 1980: 244).

With both interrogative sentences Diabolus does not offer an open alternative to Adam but presents a hypothesis about Adam's wishes, which Adam is meant to confirm. From the context it seems that V.300 contains a stronger orientation than V.270, because at the beginning of the conversation Adam still shows stronger resistance, allowing only a weak hypothesis on the part of the devil. However, as the conversation continues, Adam becomes more tempted to ask questions so that Diabolus, anticipating the dispositions of his interlocutor, then only needs to ask for confirmation and can insinuate his own preference for reasons of persuasion. Here, the presentation of a hypothesis "I assume that you want to know about it" is meant to exercise influence on the interlocutor. The examples also show that the concept of the knowledge gap to be filled not only refers to the propositional content and validity but also to the attitude of the interlocutor, which Diabolus wants to find out about by asking for confirmation of his assumptions.

The argumentation here is rooted in the contextual colouring of the interrogative acts and in the organisation of the dialogue. But it seems possible that the different strengths of the hypotheses are also determined by the different syntactic structures. Thus, in *Vols le tu saver?* (V.270) we have the inversion as marker of the interrogative sentence that typically performs an interrogative act, and therefore the interrogative character may be stronger than in *Voldras l'oïr?* (V.300) where the difference of word order is neutralised.[29] In order to verify this hypothesis, similar sequences of both interrogative sentence types would have to be analysed. Yet with examples from Old French it is unfortunately not possible to elucidate the pragmatic profile of both types with commutations and speaker testing - an aspect that underlines the importance of the contextual approach of dialogue analysis.

Interrogative acts containing orientation are not necessarily always a means of persuasion but can also be used for the constitution of the text, especially for the establishment of topics - the strategy is centred on the message so that we could speak of a referential function. This function can be illustrated by the already quoted question (3) that Figura addresses to Adam:

(3)   V. 194
         Figura

                  Veez cest jardin?
                  Do you see this garden?

The interrogative act of V.194 *Veez cest jardin?,* rather then disclosing a knowledge deficit, asks for confirmation of the very probable possibility that Adam sees the garden. Each time they talk of paradise the players are instructed to point at the garden, which is represented on the scene on an elevated place, and thus Figura, according to the stage direction, also points to the garden while asking the question. From these circumstances it follows that in spite of the still pending confirmation, Figura can enunciate a hypothesis which is so strongly validated that the speaker could almost assume the communicative liability: if Figura cannot presuppose the fact of Adam seeing the garden, Figura can at least presuppose the possibility of that fact. The progression of the dialogue further establishes the reason why Figura formulates this presupposition as a "weak" interrogative act. The question *Veez cest jardin?* emphasises the object *cest jardin* and establishes the garden as a new topic exactly by using an interrogative act which in itself has a focusing effect. Even weak interrogative acts that are quite close to the pole of assertion still have a momentum of openness that may be used in order to capture the attention of the interlocutor.

The following dialogue parts are meant to illustrate the finding that the degree of the contained orientation can be intensified by lexical elements, but also by the use of negation, which is the case in the next example, where the orientation is strengthened by a negation external to the proposition. In the text Diabolus tries to play down the power of Figura on the God-fearing Adam by emphasising the *gloire* Adam lives in:

(4)   V. 332-338
         332 Diabolus
         333   Molt es entré en fol jornal.
         334   Quant creiez mal te poisse venir.
         335   N'es tu en gloire? Nen poez morir!
         336 Adam
         337   Deus le m'a dit que je murrai
         338   Quant son precept trespasserai.
                 Diabolus You are completely mistaken if you believe that anything bad could happen to you.
                           Don't you live in glory? You can't die!
                 Adam   God told me I have to die if I trespass this command.

The interrogative sentence *N'es tu en gloire?* (V.335) which is marked by an inversion contains a negation that is external to the proposition, i.e., the negation is not part of the proposition but is related to the act of enunciation and expresses a negating and refusing attitude of the speaker. Whereas internal negations, which form part of the logic of the proposition of a question, are to be paraphrased with "Is it the case that non-p?", an external negation amounts to "Is it not the case that p?" and thus refers to the illocutionary act (cf. Searle 1969: 32; Borillo 1979: 35, 38).[30] By uttering the assumption "Is it not the case that you live in glory?" Diabolus asks for a positive confirmation and "negates" a deviating opinion - the possible refusal of the assumed life in glory would reject the expectations of the speaker and would constitute a possible face-threatening act (cf. Brown and Levinson 1987: 59, 61-65).

The next dialogue part illustrates the way lexical elements can make the orientation more intensive. Diabolus has met with a rebuff in his effort to seduce Adam, and now makes a second attempt:

(5)   V. 394-395
         Diabolus
                  Adam, que fais? Changeras tun sens?
                  Es tu encore en fol porpens?
                  Adam, what are you going to do? Will you change your mind?
                  Do you insist on your foolish resolution?

Trying to convince Adam Diabolus uses a whole volley of interrogative acts whose orientation gets stronger and stronger and results in a climax. Whereas the interrogative act in *Changer as tun sens?* (V. 394) contains a rather weak orientation and functions as a careful investigation of Adam's mind, the insinuated preference of Diabolus in *Es tu encore en fol porpens?* (V.395) comes out very clearly with the lexical semantics of *fol porpens* that denigrates Adam's formerly enunciated opinions as foolish resolutions - a reproach hard to swallow for Adam, who is characterised by his *ratio* as *imago Dei.*

4.2. Loaded interrogative acts

The concept of the "loaded" question concerns interrogative acts that contain presuppositions which have not yet been ratified by the interlocutors and thus have not already been covered by the conversation. The ammunition of a loaded question is a presupposition that does not form part of the mutual consensus of the interlocutors (cf. Walton 1988: 198, 200, 207f., 214ff; Bucher 1993: 97, 100f., 102; Bucher 1994: 250f.). The loaded interrogative act as functional element is supposed to leave the interlocutor with his back to the wall: if he answers the question according to the principle of co-operation he has to accept a presupposition that can damage his image heavily, but if he refuses to answer he appears as an interlocutor who violates the co-operative principle.

Considering the "diabolic" mechanism of this pragmatic type, it is not surprising that this question-technique is one of Diabolus' favourites and appears with high frequency in the dialogues of Diabolus with Adam.[31] As loaded interrogative acts are exclusively used by Diabolus, they strongly characterise that figure. The following dialogue excerpt begins with Adam, who explains his convictions to Diabolus:[32]

(6)   V. 319-326
         319   *Adam*
         320   *Jol te dirrai.*
         321   *Mon creator pas ne offendrai.*
         322   *Diabolus*
         323   *Criens le tu tant?*
         324   *Adam*
         325   *Oïl, par veir.*
         326   *Jo l'aim e criem.*
                Adam   I will tell you: I will not offend my Creator.
                Diabolus   Do you fear him so much?
                Adam   Yes, indeed, I love him and I fear him.

As Adam is as a faithful liege man linked to God by the bonds of a vassal to his king - *Mon creator pas ne offendrai* (V.321) - this relation cannot be attacked bluntly and has to be eroded with the technique of the loaded question. With the interrogative act *Criens le tu tant?* (V.323) Diabolus presupposes that Adam's attitude is caused by mere fear so that Adam in the case of giving an affirmative answer risks a negative self-image, appearing as a coward trembling before his master. However, a negative answer would be even more compromising as it would imply giving in to Diabolus' argumentation. Here, Adam counters elegantly by extending the propositional content and

naming not only fear but also love as the powers that guide him (V.326).

As the conversation goes on, the temperature rises and Diabolus loads a whole volley of interrogative acts with presuppositions that Adam cannot ratify without violating his duties as a vassal of God:

(7)　　V. 403-408

403	*Diabolus*	*Ne munteras james plus halt?*
404		*Moll te porras tenir por chier*
405		*Quant Deus t 'as Jet sun jardenier!*
406		*Deus t 'afeit gardein de son ort,*
407		*Ja ne querras altre deport?*
408		*Forma il toi por ventre faire?*

Don't you have any higher ambitions? You can consider.
yourself very happy that God has made you his gardener! God
has called upon you to be the warden of his garden, won't you
ever seek any higher fulfilment? Did he create you just to fill
your belly?

Performing the interrogative acts *Ne munteras James plus halt?* (V. 403) and *Forma il toi por ventre faire?* (V. 408) Diabolus tries to impart presuppositions to Adam that have not been covered in the course of the conversation and that are impossible to accept.[33] Of course, God did not create Adam as a being that dedicates himself to a life in ease and to physical comforts. For that reason Adam cannot simply negate the first question *Ne munteras jamas plus halt?* (V.403), neither can he answer positively the second interrogative act *Forma il toi por ventre faire?* (V. 408) - both answers would imply that Adam accepts a presupposition that violates the Divine commands. On the other hand, however, a positive answer to the first and a negative answer to the second question would equally imply a trespassing of God's command - Diabolus indeed has set a diabolically skilful trap for Adam. Thus, with his back against the wall, Adam decides to cut the Gordian knot, he chases Diabolus away and thwarts the attempts of Diabolus to start a new conversation by asking more questions - the end of the conversation also puts an end to the attempted seduction.

4.3. Rhetorical questions

Rhetorical questions, which in rhetoric are treated under the term of *interrogatio* (cf. Lausberg 1990: §§ 766-779),[34] present themselves as a special case of interrogative acts for several reasons. On the level of propositional content the illocutionary act seems to signal a deficit of knowledge; however the speaker disposes of all the information necessary to fill the gap and presupposes that this is also the case on the side of the addressee. The interrogative act implies the answer that can be deduced from the question using the pattern of "reversed polarity".[35] For take the example of a yes/no- question, the interrogative act *Don't you see that I'm trying to concentrate on my work?* implies the statement *You see that I'm trying to concentrate on my work* and leads to the inference that the addressee is supposed to let the speaker work and should stop being a nuisance. Because of this implication of an assertion, rhetorical questions not only presuppose the answer - the notion of "presupposition" here in my opinion is too weak and should rather be reserved for interrogative acts containing orientation. It proves more adequate to say that rhetorical questions imply the answer as it can be deduced completely (see for example Rehbock 1984: 168 and 1987: 360). Thus, as the propositional content of the answer is evident in the context, the act of answering is not expected from the interlocutors.[36] The degree of obviousness of the deduced answer depends on the context and on the norms and convictions shared by the interlocutors (cf. Rehbock 1985: 182; Schwitalla 1984: 133, 139, 140).[37] Of course, the obviousness of the answer may also be reinforced by the fact that the speaker continues his turn directly after the question, thereby preventing any answer from-someone else (cf. Rehbock 1984: 158, 161; Grésillon 1980: 276; Meibauer 1986: 160-164, 183). As the rhetorical question implies a statement that can be deduced from the interrogative sentence, the illocutionary value of the rhetorical question is close to the pole of assertion or can be the equivalent of an assertion (cf. Grésillon 1980: 275). Thus, rhetorical questions, being interrogative sentences that perform assertions via deduction, can be classified as "tropical" (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1991b: 105)[38] uses of interrogative sentences, i.e., the contextual factors of usage change the illocutionary value completely. Rhetorical questions establish a consensus among the interlocutors by two means. Firstly, they recur to shared knowledge that can be described as static and given, and secondly, they create consensus in a dynamic process by the implied answer that can be deduced from the rhetorical question - a process the speaker and addressee perform together. In this case, the speaker does not ask for lacking information, he asks for a consensus with his interlocutor and wants his opinion to be accepted.[39]

This sketch of the rhetorical question makes clear that an interrogative act functions as a rhetorical question because of contextual factors - the functional profile of the rhetorical question is not correlated with a certain type of interrogative sentence (cf. Grésillon 1980: 273f.; Schwitalla 1984: 134; Rehbock 1984: 153f.; 176f.).[40] This

means that the rhetorical question as a concept is not linked to a *signifiant* and therefore forms an onomasiologically based prototype.

Rhetorical questions often assume a referential function in more monologic texts in that they structure the text and focus important parts of an argumentation. Rhetorical questions and the answers they imply also establish the line of argumentation and thereby prove to be closely related to the rhetorical figure of *subiectio,* i.e., a feigned dialogue in monologic speech supposed to render an argumentation more vivid.[41] Thus, the act of speaking is modelled as such in a *mise en scène de la parole* (Cerquiglini 1981: 86). This subtype of a rhetorical question is illustrated in the next text where Adam, after the Fall, mourns his offence in long monologic replies while Eve as interlocutor is eclipsed most of the time (cf. Plantin 1991: 75).

(8)　V.665-674

> 665　*Ai, mort! por quoi me laisses vivre?*
> 666　*Que n'est li monde de moi delivre?*
> 667　*Porquoi faz encombrer al mond?*
> 668　*D'emfer m'estoet tempter le fond.*
> 669　*En emfer serra ma demure*
> 670　*Tant que vienge qui me sucure.*
> 671　*En emfer si avrai ma vie;*
> 672　*Dont me vendra iloc aïe?*
> 673　*Dont me vendra iloec socors?*
> 674　*Ki me trara d'itel dolors?*
>
> Oh Death, why do you let me live? Why is the world not freed from me? Why am I still a burden to this earth? I should feel the depths of hell with my own flesh. In hell I will dwell till comes the one that will redeem me. In hell 1 will spend my life. Wherefrom will help come to me? Wherefrom will 1 receive support? Who will free me from such pain?

Through the sequence of rhetorical questions in V.665-667 Adam implies that there is no reason why the earth should not be freed from him: he is, as the following verses further pronounce, destined for hell. The volley of interrogative sentences in V.672-674 in which Adam maintains that there is no possibility of salvation for him functions in an analogic way. The interrogative sentences *Dont me vendra iloc aïe?/ Dont me vendra iloec socors?/ Ki me trara d'itel dolors?* (V.672-674) function as rhetorical questions whose assertion can be deduced with the pattern of "reversed polarity": 'Wherefrom will I receive help?' - 'From nowhere'; 'Who will help me?' - 'No one'.

As the rhetorical questions convey not only rational argumentation - the reasons for Adam's damnation - but also the speaker attitude, i.e. Adam's despair, the rhetorical interrogative acts also show expressive value and this expressivity establishes a kind of "family resemblance" with exclamative acts.[42] According to Rosengren (1992: 264f, 296, 301f.),[43] exclamative acts signal the evaluation of a proposition by the speaker whereby the evaluation as such - surprise, indignation, joy etc. - is not expressed by the exclamative act, which is confined to signalling that an evaluation by the speaker does take place. As rhetorical questions and exclamative acts share the strong expressive component of speaker attitude in their functional profile, the transition between the two illocutions is often fluid.

One more striking detail of Adam's lamentations is that Adam already seems to know about the history of salvation when he says *En emfer serra ma demure/ Tant que vienge qui me sucure* (V.669-670)[44] - an insight that goes far beyond the knowledge of the dramatical figure at that moment of the play. This knowledge, however, though it cannot be justified in the drama context, is not due to the naivity of the poet or proof of the inexperience of the early days of medieval drama. On the contrary, the author here integrates into his play the concept of history of medieval man for whom the history of salvation is present at every moment (cf. Auerbach 1946: 146, 150, 152). Adam here represents this notion of medieval man and he thus bridges the gap to the audience. Looking at it from the dimension of the history of salvation, the audience as Christians embraces the wisdom of salvation that Adam professes as a representative of Christianity. Against this background the pragmatic function of the interrogative sentences can be constituted on the two levels of communication which characterise dialogue in drama:[45] the fictional situation of the dramatic figures and the external communicative situation of the representation of the play that includes the audience. Within the limited scope of knowledge of Adam as a dramatic figure, salvation seems out of reach, but if we look at the scene from the perspective of the omnipresent history of salvation which was then central to the audience, the interrogative sentences receive a second, perhaps more profound interpretation.[46] An audience of devout Christians can answer Adam's questions so that the interrogative sentences may be viewed as question acts. This two-fold interpretation also proves that the functional profile of rhetorical

questions is context-dependent and cannot be correlated to a pre-determined *signifiant.*

Next to analysing rhetorical questions in monologic texts, it is important to point out that this function type equally abounds in more dialogic replies where it takes on a more appealing value (cf. Schwitalla 1984: 150, 153). In the next dialogue sequence the rhetorical question fills a whole turn. After Eve has sworn "fiance" as a vassal to Diabolus, she is about to learn the secret of the forbidden tree but she first has to renew her vow of keeping silent about the secret. This is where the following quotation starts:

(9)   V. 499-506
　　　　499   Diabolus
　　　　500   Nen sache nuls!
　　　　501   Eva
　　　　502   Ki le deit saver?
　　　　503   Diabolus
　　　　504   Neïs Adam!
　　　　505   Eva
　　　　506   Nenil, par moi!

(9a)

Diabolus	Nobody must know about it.
Eve	(But) Who should know about it?
Diabolus	Not even Adam!
Eve	No, not through me!

Eve counters the repeated exhortations of Diabolus with the rhetorical question *Ki le deit saver?* (V. 502) '(But) Who should know about it?' which implies, according to the pattern of "reversed polarity", that nobody will ever know about it. Diabolus refers to that implied assertion with his precision *Neïs Adam!* (V.504) which would not be an adequate answer to an interrogative act. Diabolus' reaction thus confirms that a reply to a rhetorical question is not an answer to the question but a reaction to the assertion it implies. Eve reacts with a renewal of her vow to this more specified command.

Yet I think that a second interpretation of Diabolus' reaction V.504 is possible. Diabolus' reply could be interpreted as a counter-question to which Eve gives an affirmative answer. As punctuation in medieval manuscripts is not consistent, it seems justified to understand a reply in adequate contexts as an interrogative act even when there is no punctuation mark that may indicate an interrogative sentence:[47]

(9b)

Diabolus	Nobody must know about it.
Eve	(But) Who should know about it?
Diabolus	Not even Adam?
Eve	No, not through me!

This reading of the dialogue implies a pragmatic reversal of the sentence types. Thus, *Ki le deit saver?* introduced with the interrogative pronoun *ki* and overtly marked as an interrogative sentence contains an assertion and functions as answer whereas the elliptical *Nets Adam* (V.504) that is not marked as an interrogative sentence could function as an interrogative act.

4.4. Echo-questions

Echo-questions form a functional type that repeats a preceding reply and combines it with rising intonation so that it builds up an interrogative sentence that functions as an interrogative act. In most cases, the echo-question signals an implicit speaker-comment that refers to the topic, the presuppositions or to the performed illocution of the previous enunciation.[48] Echo-questions, which are most closely linked to their context, reflect everyday spoken language and the dynamics of orality in general (cf. Stempel 1993: 290f. and 1995: 46). Echo-questions can repeat a reply word for word, but they may equally summarise its sense in their own words. An echo-question of the latter type is to be found in the following example that is taken from one of the monologic lamentations of Adam. After reaching the conclusion that God may still save him, Adam then doubts the possibility of salvation one more time:

(10)   V. 714-718

> *714   De grant haltesce sui mis a val:*
> *715   N 'en serrai trait por home né,*
> *716   Si Deu nen est de majesté.*
> *717   Que di jo, las? Porquoi le nomai?*
> *718   Il me aidera? Corocé l'ai.*
>
> From great heights I've been thrown down. No mortal man can pull me out, at most God the Lord of Glory can do that. What do I say, miserable man that I am? Why did I pronounce his name? He would help me? I have raised his anger.

In the interrogative act *Il me aider a?* (V.718) Adam doubts the hope of salvation expressed immediately before in V.715f. by questioning the presupposition that underlies V.716: God Almighty can help him, but Adam has forfeited the right to receive God's help.

The interrogative sentence *Il me aidera?* is the only record of an interrogative sentence in the whole play that has the "canonical" word order of subject-verb-object and consequently is not marked syntactically by an inversion.[49] This type of interrogative sentence corresponds to the intonation- marked question in contemporary French. Because of its exclusively intonational marking, this interrogative sentence type, which does not show the syntactic question marker, is often hard to trace. As in the quoted example the intonation is not expressed in punctuation, the readers - and the editors - are left with contextual interpretation.[50] Because this sentence type is extremely rare in the texts of earlier periods that have been passed on to our time, the use of an intonation-marked question that seems closely linked to orality calls for an explanation. In this example the intonation-marked question is used because the two functions of summarising and asking a question at the same time can only be achieved through the use of rising intonation. The intonation as question-marker refers to the act of enunciation, challenges this act and thus conveys the opinion that Adam has lost the right to profess such a "hopeful" reply. This line of argumentation is illustrated by the sequence of echo-question and answer forming a dialogue that approaches the rhetorical strategy of *subiectio* (cf. Lausberg 1990: § 771). Thus, the evolution of Adam's thoughts follows a dialogue structure in the pattern of address and reply and illustrates his introspection and purification - in this sense Adam's *subiectio* also proves a model of the "dialogic" process of thinking.

4.5. Focusing interrogative acts

 The concept of focusing is based on Seelbach (1985: 278, 285ff, 290), who discusses this function of questions when analysing periphrastic questions with *est-ce que.* A focusing question works not only as an interrogative act, but it is also meant to emphasise this act within a dialogue sequence: here, the question itself is centred independent of the speaker-listener interaction.[51] It is a means of controlling the level of attention in a dialogue and can be used to focus certain conversational topics or interventions. With respect to modem French, this effect is derived from the *est-ce que* formula that presents the question act as a question act from the very first beginning.[52] Consequently, the focusing power that is part of the *signifié* is the result of the syntactic constitution of the sentence type, i.e., the *signifiant*. In Old French this effect is achieved with the help of a different syntactic tool on the part of the *signifiant,* the *dislocation à gauche*. In this syntactic construction the element that is to be emphasised, usually the subject or the object, is projected out of the sentence-frame and fronted as a conversational topic (cf. Foulet 1921: 247, 249f.; Kaiser 1980: 90f., 94f.; Stenström 1988: 318; Stempel 1993: 291).[53] The *dislocation d gauche* marks in a more general sense emotional speech and is a common phenomenon in interrogative sentences in Old French. The syntactic procedure is not completely grammaticalised and consequently still preserves an expressive value used to emphasise the topic. The next example from a monologic passage of the penitent Adam illustrates this effect:[34]

(11)   V. 657-662

> *657   Jo ai guerpi mun criator*
> *658   Par le conseil de mal uxor.*
> *659   Alias! pecchable! que frai?*
> *660   Mun criator cum atendrai?*
> *661   Cum atendrai man criator*
> *662   Que jo ai guerpi por ma folor?*
>
> I have turned myself away from my Creator through the advice of my evil wife. Woe! What shall I sinful man do? My Creator, how shall I expect him? How shall I expect my Creator from whom I dissented in my foolishness?

The self-accusations of Adam concentrate on the aspect of Creator and creature. The Fall of Man appears as an

incomprehensible insurrection against the Creator: how shall Adam now face the Creator? This central question is focused in *Mun criator cum atendrai?* (V.660) by positioning the marked *mun criator* in front in the first sentence, while the focus is then switched to the breach of faith in the next phrase (V.661).[55] This central idea is emphasised not only by the dislocation but also by the *expolitio* of the question sequence V.659-662 as a whole (cf. Lausberg 1990: § 830-§ 842).

After the presentation of different interrogative types in their dramatic contexts of questioning and seducing, I will now turn to some aspects of the dialogue types in which the questions I looked at occurred. As this also implies situating the illocutionary types in a historical frame, the next section will treat the complex problem of the historicity of illocutions and dialogue forms.

5. Questions and the type of dialogue

An analysis of interrogative acts in an Old French text means that the linguist investigates a "fragment" of dialogue interaction of by-gone times. Thus, the last part of my study, apart from giving a brief outline of the presentation and evaluation of interrogative acts in the *Jeu d'Adam*, also has to look at some of the core subjects of historical dialogue analysis.

Historical dialogue analysis is essentially concerned with the evolution of dialogue forms; it attempts to distinguish between possible universals of dialogue and time-period specific strategies and norms of dialogues and it examines the evaluations given to these strategies and norms in their time.[56] As a discipline of historical pragmatics, historical dialogue analysis aims at explaining dialogue forms as social interactions regulated by language structures and historical contexts of acting and communicating (cf. Cherubim 1980: 8f., 13-15; Sitta 1980: 32f., 129-136; Henne 1980: 89; Bax 1991: 199-201; Schlieben-Lange and Weydt 1979: 69-71).

Furthermore, historical dialogue analysis often also aims at a reconstruction of the spoken language of former periods of language evolution - an attempt that has to be aware of the many filters of conservation and interpretation the "authentic" language use had to pass through.[57] However, medieval texts, in spite of their alterity and reduced authenticity, are still regarded as good material for the investigation of conversational types and spoken language, as literature in this period embraced *la rhétorique du conversationnel.*[58] This vitality of everyday-language is also present in the *Jeu d'Adam,* which is regarded as an early document of "realism" (cf. Auerbach 1946: 146f., 150; Schmeja 1974: 42) in the sense that it interweaves *sublimitas* and *humilitas.* Because of this integration of aspects of everyday life in the story of redemption, which also may have repercussions on the language of the vernacular parts, the analysed interrogative acts may be close to the spoken language of that era.

Historical dialogue analysis assumes that dialogues, being historically determined structures, undergo changes in their communicative principles and in their patterns of illocutionary sequencing - two domains that are closely interwoven and linked to the whole complex of human interaction (cf. Fritz 1994b: 547f.; 1995: 495; 1997: 47ff.).

On the illocutionary level, changes may manifest themselves in the patterns of speech act sequencing and in the evaluation of these sequences. As a fixed sequence such as the adjacency pair of question and answer can be considered as a solution of a vital communicative task, it seems evident that the modification of that task in history may equally lead to a modification of the characteristic form of utterance (cf. Fritz 1994b: 547f., 1995: 471f.). The illocutions and their combinations therefore do not form a static inventory of dialogue techniques, and the conversational presentation of questions as well as the combination of the interrogative act with other illocutions and the social and ethical evaluation are subject to change. These transformations are documented by the historical specifications that the adjacency pair has undergone - specifications that are in most of the cases coupled with a varying evaluation of the illocutionary sequence (cf. Fritz 1994b: 547f.).[59]

Up to now, it seems clear that processes of change can affect interrogative acts in two ways. Firstly, on the part of the *signifiant* as the verbal realisation, the type of interrogative sentence can alter, and new structures like the *est-ce que* sentence type may emerge. Secondly, in the presentation of the interrogative act, its embedding in the dialogue form and its evaluation as a form of interaction may change - here language change is considered to correspond to a change in human interaction (cf. Weigand 1988: 159). However, we have to consider a third, widely disputed, possibility: the interrogative act itself could be subject to change over time because of altered communicative needs. Speech acts, after having been considered as universal for a long time, are now seen in their historical dimension as verbal interaction.[60] As socially mediated and historically determined ways of interacting, dialogue acts are not characteristics of languages but of communities and therefore historical in the sense that they form part of the traditions of a community (Coseriu in Schlieben-Lange and Weydt 1979: 75ff.)

However, it seems that elementary dialogue acts such as interrogative acts are less exposed to historical change, whereas norms and patterns of action as well as topics of talks and communicative principles are more strongly rooted in historical circumstances (Fritz 1994b: 546f; 1997: 49, 51f.; see also Schlieben-Lange 1979: 3f.,

23, 26f.). The adjacency pair of question and answer corresponds to a basic communicative need, the pointing out of a knowledge deficit and searching for information. Therefore, it seems likely that the interrogative act in its basic value may constitute a prototype on the illocutionary level. Such an illocutionary prototype is an abstraction in the sense that it manifests itself in historical types determined by the evolution of the guiding principles of dialogue interaction (cf. Fritz 1997: 49, 51f.). Furthermore, these types are coined by the socially and ethically established communicative principles of a community. This last point is most obvious in the *Jeu d'Adam* where questions are regarded not only as a lack of etiquette (cf. Fritz 1997:51), but are seen as a manifestation of sinful *curiositas* in the light of Christian ideology.[61]

In the *Jeu d'Adam* the seduction of Adam and Eve is therefore a seduction through questions leading to more questions. In order to corrupt the innocent and ignorant Adam, who lives in paradisiacal happiness, Diabolus first has to arouse Adam's *curiositas,* which is identical to the aim of seducing him to ask questions:

(12)   V. 257-272
    257   *Tunc veniat Diabolus ad Adam et dicet ei:*
    258   *Que fais, Adam?*
    259   *Adam*
    260   *Ci vi fen grant deduit.*
    261   *Diabolus*
    262   *Estas tu bien?*
    263   *Adam*
    264   *Ne sen rien qui m'enoit.*
    265   *Diabolus*
    266   *Poet estre mielz.*
    267   *Adam*
    268   *Ne puis saver coment.*
    269   *Diabolus*
    270   *Vols le tu saver?*
    271   *Adam*
    272   *Bien en iert mon talent*

Diabolus	What are you doing, Adam?
Adam	I live here in great happiness.
Diabolus	Are you fine?
Adam	I feel nothing that worries me.
Diabolus	But it could be better.
Adam	I don´t know how.
Diabolus	Do you want to know how?
Adam	I would like to.

Diabolus' opening question *Que fais, Adam?* (V.258) is answered by Adam in an evasive way by referring to his life in *grant deduit* (V. 260). Diabolus' insisting on his question by repeating it in another form, *Estas tu bien?* (V.262), indicates that his desire to close his knowledge gap is actually subordinated to another illocutionary strategy. Adam basically confirms his first answer, but his happiness is now formulated *ex negativo: Ne sen rien qui m'enoit* (V.264), so that the possibility of incomplete happiness arises. Diabolus uses this opportunity by giving the exposed statement *Poet estre mielz* (V.266) in order to arouse Adam's *curiositas* by the assertion. Adam is now in a dilemma: to ask what could be better would be the same as to doubt the word of God, as Figura has shown him the paradise as a place of perfect happiness. His *curiositas* results in an illocutionary hybrid *Ne puis saver coment* (V. 268). This assertion of ignorance can on the one hand function as an interrogative act, but on the other hand it can be interpreted as Adam's disbelief in Diabolus' statement. Adam thus secures himself a possible retreat. However, the success of Diabolus' seduction becomes clear in the next question-answer sequence: with *Bien en iert mon talent* (V.272) Adam explicitly acknowledges his *curiositas*. While Diabolus' strategy to provoke questions only succeeds after some detours with Adam and utterly fails in the end, he has a much easier game with Eve from the start:[62]

(13)   V.440-443
    440   *Diabolus*
    441   *Eva, ça sui venuz a toi.*
    442   *Eva*

443		*Di moi, Sathan, et tu pur quoi?*
	Diabolus	Eve, I have to come to you.
	Eve	Tell me, Satan, what for have you come?

As soon as Diabolus addresses her with a phatic phrase, Eve already asks for the purpose of his visit and thus reveals her *curiositas* from the beginning.

The quoted sequences V.257-272 and V.440-443 model the basic structure of "seducing" as a pattern of action in which questions play an important part. The goal of Diabolus' strategy is to induce Adam to take the initiative of acting (and asking questions). The Fall of Man does not start when Adam eats the apple, but already has begun when Adam gives in to his *curiositas* and allows himself to be seduced to ask questions. The scene thus illustrates the medieval view of *curiositas* as a search of knowledge that leads to *superbia* and detracts man from the *memoria* of his real destination (cf. Weddige [2]1992: 62f.). Since Augustine, *curiositas* has been considered a breach of faith towards God, because truth and knowledge are the privilege of God that man shall not desire. In the pursuit of knowledge man loses himself in the pleasure of his intellect and becomes addicted to *superbia*. The *cupiditas scientiae* is identified with the seduction of Adam and Eve in paradise.[63]

6. Some final remarks

This study of questions and seduction in the *Jeu d'Adam* proceeds from onomasiologically based pragmatic prototypes of interrogative acts. The analysis of the question types is not only pragmatic in its integration of the dialogue context but also in the chosen method which is, as a whole, based on pragmatic functional identities. For a study on Old French, this approach proves to be fruitful, as it is the only way to gain access to the usage of language as a historical form of social interaction in by-gone days.

Thus, the undertaken examination shows that only a pragmatic approach, backed by the results of historical dialogue analysis, may be able to shed light on the multiplicity of interrogative forms in Old French. Further research should concentrate on the question whether the polymorphism of interrogative sentences is the mere agglutination of contingent evolutions, or whether it forms a coherent system of complementary pragmatic profiles at the speaker's disposal - one of the many questions in this field that may arouse the nowadays less severely frowned-on *curiositas* of the linguist.

Notes

1 For constructive and insightful comments I thank Franz Lebsanft and Wolf-Dieter Stempel. Special thanks go to Verena Jung and Sönke Siemßen for the proof-reading of the English version.

2 1 translate "Erwiderung" as 'reply' to use a more general term than 'answer'. For a definition of reply vs. answer see Walton (1988: 196).

3 For the dualism of conversation see also Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974: 699-701, 706, 725-727); Goffman (1976: 263); Wenz (1984: 80); Henne and Rehbock ([3]1995: 13).

4 Bucher (1994: 239) regards the question/answer pair as a prototype of dialogue; cf. also Stenström (1988: 304, 307). For an opposed view consult Stierle (1984: 300f.), who sees questions and answers as an elementary sequence that fixes the dialogue and thus limits the openness of conversation.

5 For definitions of adjacency pair cf. Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974: 711, 716f., 728); Goffman (1976: 258, 260, 263, 270ff., 280, 309); Merrit (1976: 327f., 336); Stenström (1988: 304, 307); Franke (1990: 155f); Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1991a: 9); Moeschler (1994: 81f.); Henne and Rehbock ([3]1995: 24, 174f.).

6 Henne and Rehbock ([3]1995: 204ff., 21f.) regard the question as an unconditional obligation, whose non-fulfilment is sanctioned in conversation; see also Franke (1990: 18f., 155f.).

7 Auerbach (1946: 141, 148-152); Noomen (1968: 148-154) and (1971: 6, Introduction); Hunt (1975: 374, 381f., 387); Schmeja (1974: 44); for a further thematic analysis consult Auerbach (1946) and Noomen (1968: 163-180).

8 Cf. Bucher (1994: 240); Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1991a: 34). Henne and Rehbock ([3]1995: 180, 182ff., 184ff.) capture this problem in their distinction of two levels: the level of turns (*Gesprächsschrittebene*) and the level of illocutionary acts (*Handlungsebene*).

9 This and the following texts are quoted from Noomen's edition; I also take over his counting of the verses. The English translation is mine and partly follows the German version by Ebel.

10 Here I refer to pragmatic profiles of questions and answers, as the approach of formal semantics has proved to be of limited value to dialogic approaches. For formal semantics of questions and answers see Böttner (1979: 66, 68-70) and for a critical review on that method see Bucher (1994: 241f.) and Fritz (1994c: 132).

11 For the concept of the knowledge gap see Teyssier (1974: 8); Schlieben-Lange (1983: 96); Parret (1988: 281f., 298); Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1991a: 18 *vide cognitif* vs. *plénitude cognitive*, Rémi-Giraud (1991: 45f. *complétude* vs. *incomplétude*), Rehbock (1992: 189-191,201-204, 207f.).

12 This view is widely represented: Grewendorf (1981: 95f.); Weydt (1985: 313); Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1991a: 14); Parret (1988: 281f., 298). This interpretation seems to be backed by the English performative verb *ask* which is polysemous and means the performance of a question (/ *asked whether he would come tomorrow*) but also of a directive (*I asked him to come tomorrow*). See

also Wunderlich's (1976: 75-86, especially 77f.) classification and the comment by Lang (1993: 44-47).

13 Cf. an analogic example in Searle, (1969: 69); for Searle, *Tell me the name of the first President of the United States* is the equivalent of *What's the name of the first President of the United States?*

14 Concerning the characterisation of acts with the relation of words and world consult Searle (1979: 3f., 12-20) and Lang (1993: 44f., 46, 49f., 51: "[...] daß der Fragende in dem, was er sagt, auf eine Lücke in der (zumindest ins Auge gefaßten) Übereinstimmung zwischen seinen Worten und der anvisierten Welt hinweist" (ibid. 49f.)); see also Schlieben-Lange (1983: 96) for the referentiality of language in general.

15 For the concept of a continuum see Fontaney (1991: 157); Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1991b: 88f.); Rémi-Giraud (1991: 56, 58f.); Traverso (1991: 203f.).

16 Most of the factors like intonation and knowledge distribution are of gradual nature - a fact that speaks in favour of a continuum.

17 Cf. also Berrendonner (1981: 51f.); Bucher (1994: 240f., 244); Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1991b: 105-108). Altmann (1987: 22) embraces this affinity in the term of *Satzmodus* as a regular combination of a formally defined sentence type and a pragmatic function.

18 Similar thoughts are expressed by Fontaney (1991: 157); Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1991a: 25f.); Lang (1993: 51).

19 For the concept of communicative task see Fritz (1994a: 186); Fritz (1994b: 547f.); Fritz (1995: 471f.); Meng (1994: 377ff.).

20 Cf. Koch (1996: 225, 230-237) for a critical review of semasiologically based prototypes and a plea in favour of onomasiologically based prototypes.

21 In this context I can of course not cover the field of investigation on interrogative sentences in Old French and I will limit myself to some remarks that are relevant for my approach. For further research consult Schulze (1888), Foulet (1921), Lerch (1934), Gamillscheg (1957), Renchon (1967), Ménard (1976) and Kaiser (1980).

22 Schulze (1888: 184f.); Foulet (1921: 262, 346ff.); De Boer (1926: 311-317, 327); Lerch (1934: 399); Brunot and Bruneau (³1949: 486-488); Renchon (1967: 37); Ménard (1976: 105); Kaiser (1980: 88f., 127). In Old French, interrogative as well as exclamative sentences are marked by inversion, but the inversion is also possible in declarative sentences and does therefore not qualify as an exclusive question-marker according to Lerch (1934: 396, 399).

23 A different view is found in Schulze (1888: 242f.), who maintains that intonation-marked questions are not that rare.

24 For this problem see Foulet (1921: 244); Kaiser (1980: 109); and Kotschi (1985: 10).

25 For this hypothesis see Schulze (1888: 242f.); Stempel and Fischer (1985: 266) and Stempel (1994b: 323-326). Cf. also Ernst (1984: 441f. n.3, 444) and (1985: 96) on the problem of the intonation-marked type. According to Ernst, the intonation-marked question is already found in the earliest French texts but seems to have acquired a dominant position in spoken language only in the course of the 17th century.

26 Stempel and Fischer (1985: 247f.,, 251, 254f.); cf. also Weydt (1985: 317ff.); Rehbock (1985: 178, 193f.) and (1987: 358-360) for further discussion of the term *Antwortpräferenz*.

27 They are moreover asymmetric in the sense that they do not always call upon an affirmative or negative answer but may equally express a certain concern and ask for an explanation or justification.

28 DuBruck (1979: 167) points out that seduction functions via the appeal to the *curiositas*.

29 For a similar idea of correlation between syntax and pragmatic potential see also Behnstedt (1973: 179); Callebaut (1987: 214ff.).

30 For the functioning of the negation see also Muller (1991: 8, 20f., 40ff.); Moeschler (1992: 11ff., 15ff.).

31 For the characterisation of figures through frequent illocutions consult Betten (1994: 529).

32 For a characterisation of Adam's *ratio* as *imago Dei* compared to the weakness of Eve see Schmeja (1974: 52, 59).

33 For a comment on these verses cf. also Lerch (1934: 316).

34 For a classification of question types in rhetoric consult also Schwitalla (1984: 131ff.).

35 Gamillscheg (1957: 616); Grésillon (1980: 279f.); Borillo (1981: 1-4); Stempel and Fischer (1985: 257-259); Rehbock (1987: 373ff., 378), who gives some exceptions; Meibauer (1986: 160-164, 183); Meibauer (1991: 227, 229-231, 238f.); Rosengren (1992: 296f.).

36 Cf. Lausberg (1990: § 767): "Die *interrogatio* ist der Ausdruck eines gemeinten Aussagesatzes als Frage, auf die keine Antwort erwartet wird, da die Antwort im Sinne der sprechenden Partei als evident angenommen wird." Rehbock (1984: 158, 161) indicates that this may also be the other way round: by not permitting an answer-reaction, the speaker suggests that the answer is evident even if that evidence is questionable.

37 The further conversation is based on the deduced answer cf. Rehbock (1984: 168, 170).

38 I.e., a speech act is tropically replaced (or 'turned around' in 'reversed polarity') by another speech act.

39 Stempel (1984: 162) describes this procedure as not only typical of rhetorical questions: "Es ist sogar vielfach unbeanstandete Praxis, gerade Äußerungsformen der Höflichkeit sozusagen als Alibi für die Inszenierung eines gewünschten Identitätsbildes auszunutzen, wie z.B. viele Frageformen zeigen, die weit über den Einzelfall der sog. rhetorischen Frage hinaus zu reinen Zustimmungs- oder Bestätigungsformen herabgesunken sind."

40 Of course, specific lexical or syntactic means can have affinities to the pragmatics of rhetorical questions, but are not to be regarded as proper markers; cf. Rehbock (1984: 160, 164f.); Meibauer (1986: 112f., 127f., 136ff., 154-157).

41 Lausberg (1990: § 771): "Die *subiectio* ist ein in die Rede hineingenommener fingierter (also monologischer) Dialog mit Frage und Antwort (meist mit mehreren Fragen und Antworten) zur Belebung der Gedankenfolge." Cf. Schwitalla (1984: 132); Rehbock (1984: 169f.).

42 Cf. Lerch (1934: 408), who points out that in Old French interrogatives and exclamatives are equally marked by inversion; cf. Gamillscheg (1957: 611).

43 Rosengren classifies the exclamative act as an illocution that can be traced back to interrogative and declarative acts. The consideration of exclamatives as special cases of interrogatives is also to be found in Gamillscheg (1957: 611).

44 For an interpretation of these verses see likewise Hunt (1975: 511).

45 On literary dialogue and the doubling of communicative levels see Betten (1994: 520); Kästner (1978: 21-25, 30-35).

46 Betten (1994: 529) points out that speech acts have to be interpreted against the background of the doubled communicative situation. Cf. also Rehbock (1985: 217).

47 The manuscript in the edition by Sletsjöe shows no "question mark", just a point that indicates the end of the reply; on the practice and variations of punctuation in interrogative sentences in medieval manuscripts see also Bischoff (²1986: 225).

48 Lebsanft (1984: 283f., 286f.); Meibauer (1987b: 346, 349-352); Reis (1991: 50, 56f.); Bucher (1994: 245). See also Schulze (1888: 144-146, 150f., 154f.), who describes this type as *Wiederholungsfrage*.

49 It seems probable that there is an affinity between echo-questions and the intonation-marked question type, as in modem French echo-questions can only be realised by this interrogative sentence type; cf. Ashby (1977: 37f.); Stempel and Fischer (1985: 246) Schulze (1888: 243f., 141, 147) brings forward material that proves that intonation-marked questions mostly function as echo-questions.

50 In this case Noomen (V.718) and Aebischer (V.380) both understand the reply as an interrogative act and put a question mark in their editions.

51 Consult equally Weydt (1985: 319f.) for the interaction of question type and context.

52 For the development of this interrogative sentence type see Foulet (1921: 253, 257) and Kaiser (1980: 129).

53 For the use of interrogative sentences with dislocation in modem French see Morel (1997: 289f.).

54 On Adam's conduct as a sinner see also Schmeja (1974: 59).

55 For an interpretation of this passage see also Gamillscheg (1957: 558).

56 For the questions related to the historicity of dialogue forms cf. Fritz (1994b: 545); Fritz (1995: 469, 470f.); Fritz (1997: 47f.). See also Henne and Rehbock (³1995: 234, 236); Gloning (1993: 207); Luckmann (1984: 58f.) for historical communicative forms in general. For a more general view see also Weigand (1988: 159); Sitta (1980: 32f.); Bax (1991: 199-201). On the notion of historicity see also Coseriu in Schlieben-Lange and Weydt (1979: 75f.).

57 For the problems of this reconstruction cf. Kristol (1992: 39, 49ff.), Henne and Rehbock (³1995: 234, 236). The problem of the literary stylisation is pointed out by Burger and von Matt (1974: 285f.); Henne (1980: 91); Sitta (1980: 129f.); Betten (1994: 520f,, 533); Fritz (1997: 54). Besides, the attempt to trace back fragments of spoken language in written texts touches the problem of written and spoken language and the variations which texts undergo when changing the medium of tradition; cf. also Grosse (1985: 1187) and Selig (1997: 202-208, 212-218), for a general view on spoken and written language in the Middle Ages.

58 This term was coined by Stempel (1994a: 66f.); cf. also Stempel (1995: 43, 45). This positive view is shared by Grosse (1972: 657).

59 As the history of the question-answer adjacency pair is not yet written, I have to limit myself to some examples to illustrate at least the broad range of the spectrum. Jauß (1984: 393) comments on questioning in Platonic discourse and in scholasticism. Felten (1972: 18f., 21, 25, 30f.) writes on questions motivated by *admiratio* in Dante's *Divina Commedia*; Kästner (1978: 159-164, 122) presents his ideas on the catechetic pattem of question and answer in didactic and liturgic texts in the Middle Ages. Fritz (1994b: 552, 557; 1995: 482, and 1997: 51) cites as an example the evaluation of questioning as a lack of education and etiquette in the Middle Ages, which is illustrated by the instruction Gumemanz gives to Parzival. The advice is as follows (I cite after the edition by Lachmann, 171, 17-21): "irn suit niht vil gevrâgen:/ ouch sol iuch niht beträgen/ bedâhter gegenrede, diu gê/ reht als jenes vrâgen stê/ der iuch wil mit worten spehen."

60 See Schlieben-Lange (1976: 114); Schlieben-Lange and Weydt (1979: 67); Schlieben- Lange (1982: 104, 106ff.) and Stetter (1991: 68, 75-79) for a plea in favour of the historical dimension of speech acts. In Schlieben-Lange and Weydt (1979) note especially the dispute about the degree of historical fixation of speech acts.

61 The negative judgement on the question with all its dialogic dynamic may be a reflection of the fact that the Middle Ages are dominated by the "one-voiced" discourse on theology so that the "two-voiced" dialogue plays a minor role; cf. Stierle (1984: 306f.).

62 This crucial difference in behaviour is the illustration of the topos that the man as *imago Dei* has *ratio* himself whereas the woman can achieve *ratio* only by the guidance of man- see also Schmeja (1974: 52, 59).

63   For a history of the discrimination of *curiositas* see Blumenberg (1973: 71ff., 79, 84, 94, 96ff., 105ff., 108, ll0f., 129f.): "Der Griff nach dem Baum der Erkenntnis hat die unregulierte Wißbegierde zur *vana cura* einer heillosen Weltverfallenheit ausarten lassen" (ibid. 110).

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