

The Global Unions in the System of Global Governance

The Embedding of Trade Union Political Demands in the
Bretton Woods Organizations

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Declaration

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any other degree. This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. All sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A bibliography is appended.

Glauchau, January 2015

(Yvonne Rückert)

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Acronyms

ACTRAV	Bureau for Workers' Activities (ILO)
ACTU	Australian Council of Trade Unions
AFRO	African Regional Organization
AMC	Asset Management Company
ANND	Arab NGO Network for Development
APRO	Asia Pacific Regional Organization
BWI	Building and Wood Workers' International
CAFOD	Catholic Agency for Overseas Development
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
CGG	Commission on Global Governance
CGU	Council of Global Unions
CI	Communications International
CLS	Core Labour Standards
CST	Civil Society Team
CSU	Christian Social Union
DB	Doing Business (publication)
DGB	Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund
DPG	German Postal Union
DPL	Development Policy Lending
DTC	Developing and Transition Country
EA	External Affairs
EB	Executive Bureau
EC	European Commission
ECB	European Central Bank
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
ED	Executive Director
EI	Education International
EMENA	Europe, Middle East and North Africa

Acronyms

ESMS	Environmental and Social Management System
ESP	Economic and Social Policy
ETUC	European Trade Union Confederation
ETUI	European Trade Union Institute
EU	European Union
EWI	Employing Workers Indicator
FIDIC	International Federation of Consulting Engineers
FIET	Federation of Employees, Technicians and Managers
GC	General Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GG	Global Governance
GPG	Global Public Good
GS	General Secretary
GUF	Global Union Federation
HDN	Human Development Network
HTUR	Human and Trade Union Rights
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICB	International Competitive Bidding
ICEM	International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers' Unions
ICFTU	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
ICSID	International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
IDA	International Development Agency
IDA	International Development Association
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
IEO	Independent Evaluation Office
IFA	International Framework Agreement
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFCTU	International Federation of Christian Trade Unions
IFI	International Financial Institution
IFJ	International Federation of Journalists
IFTU	International Federation of Trade Unions
IGF	International Graphical Federation
IGM	Industriegewerkschaft Metall
IGO	International Governmental Organization
IL	Investment Lending

ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Metal Workers' Federation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMFC	International Monetary and Financial Committee
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
ITF	International Transport Workers' Federation
ITGLWF	International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers' Federation
ITS	International Trade Secretariat
ITUC	International Trade Union Confederation
IUF	International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers' Association
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MEI	Media and Entertainment International
MIGA	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
MNC	Multinational Company
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NI	Neo-Institutionalism
NPO	Non-Profit Organization
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPCS	Operations Policies and Country Services
PERC	Pan European Regional Council
PPP	Public-Private Partnership
PS	Performance Standards
PSI	Public Services International
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SBDW	Standard Bidding Document for Procurement of Works
SME	Small and Medium sized Enterprise
TUAC	Trade Union Advisory Committee
TUCA	Trade Union Confederation of Americas
UN	United Nations
UNI	Union Network International
WB	World Bank
WBG	World Bank Group
WCL	World Confederation of Labour

German summary

Im Jahr 2002 etablierten die internationalen Gewerkschaftsorganisationen (Global Unions) und die internationalen Finanzinstitutionen (IFIs) einen formalen Dialog. Die Global Unions setzen sich aus dem Internationalen Gewerkschaftsbund (IGB), den neun Globalen Gewerkschaftsföderationen (GUFs) und dem Gewerkschaftlichen Beratungsausschuss bei der OECD (TUAC) zusammen. Die internationalen Finanzinstitutionen, welche aufgrund ihrer Gründungsgeschichte auch als Bretton Woods Organisationen bezeichnet werden, umfassen die Weltbankgruppe (WBG), welche sich aus fünf verschiedenen Organisationen zusammensetzt, und den Internationalen Währungsfond (IWF). Seit ihrer Gründung haben sich die Aufgaben der internationalen Finanzorganisationen verändert. Die ursprünglichen Aufgaben der Organisationen zielten auf den Wiederaufbau der Weltwirtschaft nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Seit den 1970er Jahren veränderte sich die Rolle beider Organisationen im Zuge verschiedener Währungskrisen. Heute fördert der IWF die Zusammenarbeit westlicher Industrienationen in der Geld- und Währungspolitik und unterstützt Länder in wirtschaftlichen Krisensituationen mit Krediten und wirtschaftlichen Hilfspaketen. Die Weltbank, welche sich aus der Internationalen Bank für Wiederaufbau und Entwicklung (IBRD) und der Internationalen Entwicklungsorganisation (IDA) zusammensetzt, fördert Entwicklungsländer in ihrer wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung. Die Internationale Finanz-Corporation (IFC) welche ebenfalls Mitglied der WBG ist, unterstützt die Entwicklung des privaten Sektors in Entwicklungsländern. In den vergangenen Jahrzehnten haben die IFIs zu einer Beschleunigung des ökonomischen Globalisierungsprozesses beigetragen, indem sie eine an neoliberalen Prinzipien ausgerichtete Politik gegenüber ihren Kreditnehmern verfolgten. Häufig führten die Liberalisierungsanstrengungen der Kreditempfänger, gemäß den politischen Empfehlungen und Auflagen der IFIs, zu einer Verschärfung der sozialen Ungleichheit.

Mit Beginn der internationalen Finanzkrise im Jahr 2008, die sich noch im Verlauf desselben Jahres in der Realwirtschaft niederschlagen begann, verstärkte sich die Diskussion um eine Neuordnung des internationalen Finanzsystems sowie um innovative Regierungs- und Beteiligungsformen auf internationaler Ebene. Die Global Unions begreifen die Krise

als Chance, die bestehende Kooperation mit internationalen Organisationen auszubauen und sich mittels ihrer Forderungen und Lösungsansätze eine neue Position in dem sich augenscheinlich verändernden Gefüge des globalen Regierungssystems zu erarbeiten. Dies geschieht vor dem Hintergrund eines voranschreitenden Internationalisierungsprozesses, dessen Auswirkungen die gewerkschaftliche Politik vor neue Herausforderungen stellt und eine gewerkschaftliche Mehrebenenpolitik erfordert (Platzer und Müller, 2009).

Mit Blick auf die Integration einer sozialen Dimension in die globale Finanz- und Wirtschaftspolitik gewinnt der Dialog mit den internationalen Finanzinstitutionen, welcher als strategisches Instrument transnationaler Gewerkschaftspolitik verstanden werden kann, an Bedeutung. Der Dialog wurde 2002 auf der Grundlage einer gemeinsamen Vereinbarung zwischen den Global Unions und den IFIs formalisiert. Diese Vereinbarung beschreibt den Rahmen und die grundsätzliche Struktur des Dialogs. Im Jahr 2013 wurde die Vereinbarung um weitere Punkte, die insbesondere den Austausch von Informationen betreffen, ergänzt.

Der Dialog zwischen den Global Unions und den IFIs findet auf drei verschiedenen Levels statt: der Organisationsspitzenebene (headquarters-level), der Sektorebene und der nationalen Ebene. Auf der Organisationsspitzenebene finden in regelmäßigen Abständen aller zwei Jahre so genannte „high-level“ Treffen zwischen Repräsentanten der Global Unions und der IFIs statt. Diese Treffen erstrecken sich über zwei bis drei Tage während derer die Repräsentanten der verschiedenen Organisationen Positionen und Argumente zu verschiedenen Themen austauschen. Aufgrund der begrenzten Zeit, die für jedes Thema zur Verfügung steht, sowie der Größe der Gewerkschaftsdelegation, ermöglichen diese Treffen inhaltlich keine tiefer gehenden Diskussionen. Zusätzlich zu diesen Treffen finden regelmäßig thematische Treffen zu verschiedenen Themen wie zum Beispiel Arbeitsmarktentwicklung oder Rentenreform statt. Diese Treffen fokussieren auf ein Thema und erlauben dadurch einen intensiveren Austausch zwischen den Dialogpartnern. Eine dritte Form von Treffen auf der Organisationsspitzenebene sind die so genannten „interim“ Treffen, während derer die Vertreter aller am Dialog beteiligten Organisationen Fortschritte desselben evaluieren.

Der Dialog auf der Sektorebene bezieht sich auf den Austausch zwischen einer GUF und einer spezifischen Abteilung der Weltbank, die in dem Sektor, den die GUF repräsentiert, aktiv ist. In diesem Zusammenhang kommt den „focal points“, die zwischen einer GUF und einer Abteilung der Weltbank vereinbart werden, eine bedeutende Rolle zu. Die ersten „focal points“ wurden 2004 etabliert, um die Kommunikation von Projekten und Programmen, die beide Dialogpartner betreffen, zu verbessern.

Zwischen 2003 und 2005 fanden ebenfalls mehrere kurze Arbeitsaufenthalte („secondments“) von gewerkschaftlichen Repräsentanten in verschiedenen Weltbankabteilungen statt. Die Idee der Organisation solcher befristeten Aufenthalte geht auf den früheren Weltbankpräsidenten James Wolfensohn zurück, der den Gewerkschaftern damit ermöglichen wollte die institutionelle Kultur der Weltbank besser kennenzulernen. Das übergeordnete Ziel solcher Aufenthalte ist die Kooperation der Dialogpartner auf der individuellen Ebene zu verbessern.

In der Dissertation steht die Analyse des Dialogs auf der Organisationsspitzenebene (headquarters-level) und der Sektorebene im Vordergrund. Der Dialog auf nationaler Ebene spielt eine untergeordnete Rolle für die Analyse. Jedoch wird auf Beispiele Bezug genommen, wenn diese zur Erklärung der Funktionsweise des Dialogs beitragen.

Das Thema der Dissertation wird im sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschungsfeld der internationalen Gewerkschaftsorganisationen verortet, welches seit der Jahrtausendwende auf transnationale gewerkschaftliche Strategien und deren Instrumente im Bereich der Arbeitsbeziehungen fokussiert. Das Forschungsinteresse richtet sich insbesondere auf Kampagnen, Internationale Rahmenabkommen (IFAs), globale Gewerkschaftsnetzwerke, grenzüberschreitende gewerkschaftliche Bündnisse (Euro- und Weltbetriebsräte), die Verankerung der ILO-Kernarbeitsnormen in multilateralen Handelsabkommen sowie neuerdings auf die Funktionsmerkmale und zentralen Handlungsfelder der globalen Gewerkschaftsorganisationen (Croucher und Cotton, 2009; Platzer und Müller, 2009; Müller, Platzer und Rüb, 2004; Greven und Scherrer, 2005).

In der sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung fand die Form des Dialogs, die in der Dissertation untersucht wurde, bisher keine Beachtung. Dies mag zum Einen daran liegen, dass die transnationalen Gewerkschaftsorganisationen bisher insgesamt noch wenig erforscht sind und im Zusammenhang mit Global Governance kaum Beachtung gefunden haben.

Zum Anderen sind viele der genannten gewerkschaftlichen Instrumente wie beispielsweise Internationale Rahmenabkommen oder Europäische Betriebsräte einfacher in ihrer Struktur und Wirkungsweise zu erfassen, da sie für die alltägliche Arbeit der Global Unions und ihrer Mitglieder von größerer Bedeutung sind. In diesem Zusammenhang führt der Dialog mit den IFIs, obwohl er fester Bestandteil der globalen Gewerkschaftspolitik ist und für dessen Administration ein eigens dafür zuständiges Büro in Washington eingerichtet wurde, eher ein Schattendasein.

Der Dialog mit den IFIs stellt für die Global Unions eine Möglichkeit dar, Einfluss auf die Politik der IFIs zu nehmen und deren Bewusstsein für Arbeitnehmerthemen zu schärfen.

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Aufgrund der Tatsache, dass die Global Unions bisher über keinen formalen Konsultationsstatus in den IFIs verfügen, gestaltet sich die Durchsetzung von gewerkschaftlichen Interessen innerhalb der Organisationen schwierig. Dennoch konnten seit dem Beginn des Dialogs einige bedeutende Fortschritte erreicht werden. Diese betreffen zum einen die Integration der Core Labour Standards (CLS) in die Performance Standards der IFC sowie die Integration dieser Standards in die Standard Bidding Documents for Procurement of Works (SBDW) der Weltbank. Die IFC übernahm eine führende Rolle bezüglich der Integration der Standards und war die erste Organisation die sicherstellte, dass ihre Rhetorik und Praxis bezüglich der CLS konsistent war.

Weiterhin kann die (Weiter-) Entwicklung des Dialogs selbst durch die beteiligten Partner als Erfolg angesehen werden. Der Dialog leistete einen wichtigen Beitrag, um „Sprachlosigkeit“ zwischen den Dialogpartnern zu vermeiden und eine nachhaltige Basis für einen konstruktiven Austausch von Argumenten zu entwickeln.

Das Ziel der Dissertation besteht darin aufzuzeigen, welche Ergebnisse die Dialogpartner im Zeitverlauf erreicht haben, welche Faktoren den Dialog positiv beeinflussen und welche Faktoren hinderlich sind. Die Analyse des Dialogs kann als Fallstudie über die gewerkschaftliche Einflussnahme auf Entscheidungsprozesse in zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen verstanden werden.

Um die Charakteristika der Dialogpartner, die für die Analyse und Funktionsweise des Dialogs von Bedeutung sind, zu beschreiben, hat die Autorin auf ausgewählte soziologische Organisationstheorien zurückgegriffen. Diese dienen gleichzeitig dazu, die analytische Dimension des verwendeten Global Governance Konzeptes im Hinblick auf seine praktische Anwendung zu stärken. Ein Beispiel diesbezüglich ist die Analyse der bestehenden Machtpositionen der involvierten korporativen Akteure in der Weltordnungspolitik. Diese basieren unter anderem auf unterschiedlichen Ressourcenbeständen und strukturellen Differenzen der Organisationen.

Mit Hilfe der verwendeten Organisationstheorien konnte beispielsweise aufgezeigt werden, dass die IFIs keine vollständig „inklusive“ Organisationen sind, da sie zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen wie die Global Unions nicht mit umfangreichen „Teilnahme-rechten“ ausstatten. Vielmehr ist es häufig der Fall, dass Charakteristiken der korporativen Akteure, wie beispielsweise deren Organisationskultur und ihre begrenzte Lernfähigkeit, die Möglichkeit von der Expertise der Gewerkschaften zu profitieren, einschränken.

Der Arbeit liegt ein qualitatives Forschungsdesign zugrunde, in welchem verschiedene Methoden, zu denen das Experteninterview, die Inhaltsanalyse und die nicht-teilnehmende

Beobachtung zählen, miteinander verknüpft wurden. Mittels der Daten- und Methoden-Triangulation soll ein Erkenntniszuwachs auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen und ein Gewinn an Objektivität erreicht werden. Die Verknüpfung der Methode des Experteninterviews mit weiteren Forschungsmethoden ermöglicht zusätzlich die Probleme, die ein bewusstes Auswahlverfahren von Interviewpartnern und ein teil-standardisierter Fragebogen mit sich bringen, zumindest teilweise zu kompensieren.

Die Autorin hat insgesamt 34 Interviews mit Repräsentanten der internationalen Gewerkschaftsorganisationen und ihrer Mitglieder sowie Repräsentanten der Weltbank, der IFC, des IMF und der Internationalen Arbeitsorganisation (ILO) im Zeitraum von 2008 bis 2011 geführt. Die Interviews fanden vorrangig im Hauptsitz der Organisationen, welche sich in Brüssel, Genf, London, Berlin, Frankfurt/Main, und Washington befinden, statt. Im Nachgang der Interviews hat die Autorin regelmäßig auf Informationen vom ITUC/Global Unions Büro in Washington zurückgegriffen, welches die Schnittstelle zwischen dem IGB und den GUFs darstellt.

Die Ergebnisse der Arbeit basieren neben den Transkripten der Experteninterviews auf der Auswertung von schriftlichen Dokumenten in der Form von Protokollen, Statements, Positionspapieren und Berichten sowie dem während des technischen und des Organisationsspitzenreffen (high-level meeting) angefertigten Beobachtungsprotokoll im Jahr 2009. Als Beobachterin des Organisationsspitzenreffens war es der Autorin möglich den Austausch der Akteure aus nächster Nähe mitzuverfolgen.

Die Analyse des Dialogs hat gezeigt, dass es ein komplexes Netz an Faktoren gibt, die dem Dialog in seiner Entwicklung förderlich sind und andere Faktoren, die den Dialog behindern. Diese Faktoren sind sowohl mit der individuellen Ebene (individuelle Akteure) als auch der korporativen Ebene verbunden. Auf der individuellen Ebene kommt den Einstellungen und Wahrnehmungen der Akteure bezüglich des Dialogs und der Gesprächspartner eine bedeutende Rolle zu. Auf der korporativen Ebene sind die Größe, Wesensart, Struktur, Ressourcen, Wissensmanagement und die Fähigkeit einer Organisation zu lernen bedeutsam.

In der Dissertation wird unter anderem aufgezeigt, dass die Einstellungen und Wahrnehmungen der individuellen Akteure in denjenigen Organisationen eine größere Rolle bezüglich des Dialogs und seiner Kommunikationsstrukturen spielen, in denen individuelle Akteure einen größeren Spielraum bezüglich der Entscheidungsfindung haben. Dies ist beispielsweise in der Weltbank der Fall, wo es verschiedene „Machtzentren“ innerhalb des Hauptsitzes der Organisation in Washington gibt und wo die Direktoren der Länderbüros

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über einen erheblichen Einfluss verfügen. Für den Dialog bedeutet dies, dass individuelle Akteure in größerem Umfang den Kontakt und Informationsaustausch mit Gewerkschaftern persönlich bestimmen können. In diesem Zusammenhang können individuelle Akteure den Dialog positiv beeinflussen oder aber zum Hindernis werden.

Im Hinblick auf die Wahrnehmungen und Einstellungen der individuellen Akteure bezüglich des Dialogs und ihre Lernfähigkeit konnte ebenfalls gezeigt werden, dass diese durch Charakteristiken der korporativen Akteure wie beispielweise die Organisationskultur und die in den Organisationen verankerten Routinen beeinflusst werden. So hat die IFC beispielsweise eine viel stärkere Innovationskultur als der IWF und die WB. Auf individueller Ebene kann dies die größere Offenheit gegenüber den Gewerkschaften und deren Expertise erklären.

Individuelle Akteure und deren Wahrnehmungen werden weiterhin stark beeinflusst durch das Paradigma, welches in der Organisation dominiert für die sie tätig sind. Die Analyse hat diesbezüglich gezeigt, daß die gegensätzlichen Paradigmen der IFIs und der Global Unions, die unter anderem in unterschiedlichen ökonomischen Ansätzen zum Tragen kommen, hinderlich sind für den Dialog.

Trotz der bereits erreichten Erfolge gibt es weiterhin viele Herausforderungen bezüglich der Funktionsweise des Dialogs für die involvierten Organisationen. Dazu zählen beispielsweise die mangelnde Umsetzung positiver Rhetorik von Seiten mancher IFI Repräsentanten in entsprechende Handlungen sowie die Umsetzung der auf der Organisationsspitzenebene erreichten Ergebnisse auf nationaler Ebene aufgrund der begrenzten Ressourcen der nationalen Gewerkschaftsorganisationen. Diese und andere Herausforderungen werden im Rahmen der Dissertation ausführlicher beschrieben und analysiert.

Introduction

In 2002 a formalized dialogue between the Global Unions¹ and the international financial institutions (IFIs)² was established. The IFIs are made up of the World Bank Group (WBG)³ and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). There had been exchanges on a non-regular basis before 2002 between the Global Unions and the IFIs, however, such exchanges had no formal structure and were often prompted by the potential outcomes of a number of structural adjustment programmes initiated by the IFIs. When the international financial crisis translated into serious outcomes in the real economy in 2008, it prompted a serious debate around a re-organization of the international financial system and the development of new forms of governance and participation at the international and financial level. The Global Unions took the crisis as an opportunity to further develop the existing dialogue between themselves and the IFIs at the international⁴ level. In the context of these challenges the Global Unions have demanded that ‘...labour must be involved in discussions for designing a new global financial architecture’ (Global Unions, 2009a: 22).

Coming out of this crisis we need a new development model where the state is able to balance the extremes of markets with social environment and public policy objectives. Governments must set the limits of the financial economy by directing investment to long term goals of creating decent work, building

¹The Global Unions include the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), the nine Global Union Federations (GUFs) and the Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) which connects the international trade union movement to the OECD.

²The IFIs are also known as the Bretton-Woods-Organizations, they are shareholder organizations which have the objectives of promoting cooperation, supporting growth, economic development and securing financial stability.

³The WBG includes the World Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Agency (IDA) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The World Bank is considered to be a multilateral development bank (MDB) and there are other MDBs such as the Asian or African Development Banks. All such banks have a widespread geographical focus and their core business includes the offering of loans and policy advice to client governments.

⁴In this thesis the term ‘international’ is used to describe the work of trade unions beyond the level of the state and is used in the same sense as transnational. The term can be understood as participation and action relating to the solution of global problems beyond bilateral relationships.

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equality in society and ensuring a fair distribution of the fruits of growth. Achieving that goal will require far more union action at the international level – the global union task is just beginning (Ibid., 2009b: 22).

In recent decades the IFIs have increasingly adopted a neoliberal policy regarding their debtor countries, which has arguably been at the centre of the process of economic globalization (Stiglitz, 2002). This is typified by the pressure on countries to privatize state industries, open up borders for more foreign investment and to deregulate their labour markets. In other words where debtor nations have taken steps to ‘liberalise’ their economies, these steps have often been based on the political recommendations and/or the conditions attached to the loans of the IFIs and, of particular concern for the global unions in many cases these policies have led to an increase in social and income inequality (Fresnillo, 2012). Overall it appears that the IFIs and other international organizations such as the OECD and the United Nations have been unable to realise a coherent and effective growth policy and have done little to promote equality at the global level (Mayntz and Scharpf, 2005), indeed they have arguably had the opposite effect (Stiglitz, 2002).

Since the 1980s the IFIs have had an increasing influence over the system of global governance and particularly so since the 2008 crisis. The recent crisis has made the dialogue with the IFIs far more significant for the Global Unions. Already in 2007, in a meeting in the US House of Representatives, the Director of the Global Unions Office in Washington noted that the policy of the World Bank and the IMF has had a direct influence on two thirds of all ITUC members living in developing and growing countries (Bakvis, 2007). The effects of the crisis have been strongly felt even in the formerly strong economies of the European Union (EU). In the EU it is the ‘Troika’ (that is the IMF, the European Central Bank and the European Commission) that have determined the required economic policies of Member States imposing various levels of austerity and restrictions on government spending.

It can be argued that the IFIs have used the crisis as a ‘window of opportunity’ to strengthen their influence over the global economy; a report by the OECD (the DAC Report on Multilateral Aid) makes clear that the IFIs have increased and replenished their capital amongst the shareholdings of nation states. In this context the IDA (part of the WBG) increased its payments to developing countries by about 25 percent from 2008 to 2009 (Ellmers, 2010: 5).

Multilateral agencies reacted quickly to demands from partner countries for additional resources prompted by the economic and financial crisis in 2009.

Partly as a result of this high crisis-related demand and subsequently large disbursements, the year 2010 requires donors to make simultaneous decisions on the replenishment and recapitalisation of several major concessional funds and multilateral development banks (DAC Report, 2010: 17).

In April 2010 the Development Committee⁵ of the World Bank and the IMF stated in their communiqué that the support of the WBG (which provided more than US\$ 100m) and the IMF (almost US\$ 175m) is essential in resolving the crisis.

The crisis response underscored the importance of international cooperation and effective multilateral institutions. With global mandates and memberships, the WBG and the IMF must play key roles in a modernized multilateralism (Development Committee, 2010: 1).

In other words the importance of the IFIs as global governance actors has increased since the 2008 crisis. However, the economic policies of the IFIs have been criticised by a number of external stakeholders, both in terms of their suitability in terms of reducing social inequality and promoting economic growth worldwide. The Global Unions have been one of the key external stakeholders in terms of this debate and have been questioning the policy of the IFIs particularly the introduction of the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s.

This study is based on social scientific research on the Global Union organizations and their dialogue with the IFIs. Since the turn of the millennium much of the existing research on the Global Unions has focused on transnational trade union strategies and their instruments within the field of labour relations. This has included for example research on: international trade union campaigns (Bronfenbrenner, 2006); and lobbying activities (e.g. Alliance for Justice at G4S); cooperation with NGOs and grass-root organizations (Global Unions, 2008⁶); International Framework Agreements (IFAs) (Bourque, 2008; Hammer, 2005); transnational trade union networks (Müller et al., 2004; Müller et al., 2010)⁷; transnational worker representation structures (EWC and World Works Councils) (Müller et al., 2006; Köhler and González Begega, 2010; Waddington, 2010); or more

⁵The Development Committee (Joint Ministerial Committee of the Boards of Governors of the Bank and the Fund on the Transfer of Real Resources to Developing Countries) was founded in 1974; its objective is to act as a forum for bilateral consensus building between nation states with regard to development issues. The Committee has an advisory function regarding development issues on the Board of Governors of the World Bank and the IMF.

⁶Source: Global Unions, 2008 <<http://www.global-unions.org/g4alliance.html>>

⁷Müller et al.(2010: 8) suggests that such networks are ‘...self-help structures without state institutional backing or provision of government resources’

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recently global trade union alliances organized around specific multinational companies (MNCs) (Royle et al., 2012). Other research has focused on the implications of the International Labour Organizations' (ILO) shift towards core labour standards (CLS) in its 1998 Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Principles at Work⁸ and attempts to include social clauses in multilateral trade agreements (Alston, 2004; Greven and Scherrer, 2005; Royle, 2010) as well as the functional roles and central fields of action of the global trade union organizations (Croucher and Cotton, 2009; Platzer and Müller, 2009; Stelzl, 2006).

The work of these organizations [*Global Unions*] is important in coordinating union responses to longstanding distributive and procedural justice issues that have been exacerbated by globalization. Real possibilities exist for international trade unionism to build its position within these discussions (Croucher and Cotton, 2009: 4).

However, as yet the dialogue between the IFIs and the Global Unions has received little attention. On the one hand this could be due to the small amount of research work carried out on transnational trade union organizations themselves and that little attention has been focused on this issue in the context of global governance (Harrod and O'Brien, 2002; Platzer and Müller, 2009).

Neither the trade union influence on bilateral regime building of nation states, decision-making processes within international organizations nor its integration within network structures has yet been systematically examined (Koch-Baumgarten, 2011: 57).

On the other hand it might be due to the limited availability of information and the difficulty of accessing information on this sort of dialogue. IFAs and EWCs are easier to describe in terms of their structure and function, especially as they arguably have greater importance for the day to day work of trade unions and their members. There is also far more information and experience readily available regarding these instruments. In this context the dialogue with the IFIs has so far had a "shadow" existence, even though it has arguably become a more important element of global trade union policy during the last decade.

The author argues that the dialogue with the IFIs can be seen as an instrument of transnational trade union policy which serves to integrate the social dimension within the glob-

⁸The CLS are made up of eight core conventions including the freedom of association, non-discrimination, the abolition of child labour and the right to collective bargaining. In the Declaration the eight conventions are subsumed under four thematic areas or 'principles' (Alston, 2004) (see chapter 1.1.5).

alization of financial and labour markets (Platzer and Müller, 2009). It can be seen as a strategic instrument for the Global Unions to exercise influence over the policy of the IFIs and to shape the rules and institutions of global governance towards a more worker-friendly regime. Due to its specific characteristics (structure, actors, frequency of meetings) the dialogue between the Global Unions and the IFIs differs substantially from social dialogue (as defined by the European Union and the ILO) or lobbying. The ILO for example defines social dialogue as ‘... all types of negotiation, consultation or simply the exchange of information between representatives of governments, employers and workers on issues of common interest’ (Hayter and Stoevska, 2011: 1). However, the dialogue under investigation in this case is a dialogue between international governmental organizations (IGOs) – in this case the IFIs – and non-governmental international organizations (the Global Unions). Even though the IGOs are represented by government officials they act on their own authority as corporate actors. In this sense the IFI/Global Union dialogue has a different constellation of actors in comparison with the social dialogue as defined by the ILO. In comparison with lobbying the dialogue goes beyond such activities because it takes place at the formal and informal level and for the Global Unions is focused on influencing the policies of and gaining commitments from the IFIs (Interview ITUC02, 2008).

The coordination of the dialogue is carried out by the ITUC/Global Unions office in Washington which was established in 1994. It represents the concerns of the international trade union movement in relation to the policies of the IFIs and to a lesser extent the regional development banks⁹. The dialogue takes place on three levels. The highest organizational level is the headquarters level which is the main focus of the study. It includes exchange and cooperation at the top administrative level between the IFIs and the Global Unions. Every two years there is a high-level meeting and at least once a year a thematic meeting. There are also other interim meetings whose objective is to ensure the follow-up on commitments made during these other meetings (World Bank, 2002b).

The second level of the dialogue is at the sector level, this level is based on the creation of ‘focal-points’ between the international sector-level international trade unions (GUFs) and the relevant WB departments and on the creation of ‘secondments’ for trade union officials to spend time working in WB departments (World Bank, 2004: 2; World Bank, 2007b: 5). These were originally proposed by the then WB president James Wolfensohn and provide the opportunity for trade unionists to work on themes agreed beforehand between the unions and the WB (World Bank, 2007b).

⁹They include the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Inter-American Development Bank.

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Due to the fact that the IFIs are active in more than one hundred countries and that the ITUC and the GUFs have their affiliates all over the world, the trade unions have put a lot of effort into decentralizing the dialogue to a third level; that is the country level. This is because the international trade unions wanted to create the opportunity for their national affiliates to be able to take part in the dialogue process (Interview ITUC02, 2008).

In the context of the joint development of the dialogue process both parties agreed to release a joint report after each event (World Bank, 2002b). These reports give a good overview of the issues addressed during the high-level meetings with WB and IMF representatives. For example this includes discussions concerning the progress on the integration of the ILO's CLS, which are central to the demands of the Global Unions. Since the beginning of the dialogue the international trade union movement has tried to focus and direct the consciousness of the IFIs towards the CLS, decent working conditions and workers' rights. In other words the Global Unions have tried to persuade the IFIs to take action in relation to the CLS and working conditions. They have done this by frequently referring to the IFI's own poverty reduction and development strategies. The Global Unions are much weaker in terms of material resources and in their ability to influence national government policy than the IFIs. Furthermore, they do not have a formal consultation status within the IFIs, this means that their influence on the IFIs policy decisions is limited. However, although the challenges are considerable and the results have only been mixed, it can be argued that in the last decade trade unions have made some important achievements in World Bank policy and in relation to their exchanges with the IMF.

This diverse set of outcomes is on the one hand, a result of the conditions existing on the different levels of dialogue and on the other hand, to do with the specific characteristics of the actors involved. However, the scope of this thesis can only provide an examination of one level of the dialogue and that is the dialogue at headquarters level. The sector-level and national level dialogue are only examined to the extent that they will help explain the broader context and function of the dialogue at the headquarters level.

The objective of the thesis is to examine the factors that were the most decisive in promoting or hindering achievements within the dialogue process between the Global Unions and the IFIs. As such it will examine the dialogue as a case study of trade union influence on decision-making processes in international organizations, the efficiency of this instrument and its potential on the global level as a means of influencing the social dimension within the global system of economic governance.

The main part of the analysis is dedicated to the consideration of the dialogue as a dependent variable. In this context the main focus is on demonstrating how the actors par-

ticipating within the dialogue coordinate their actions in an attempt to gain meaningful outcomes. In this respect the thesis will examine the contextual conditions and structural mechanisms (communication structures, mutual perception etc.) which are important for the dialogue, how such conditions changed during the period of the dialogue and if there has been a continuation and or further development of certain practices and mechanisms. The contextual conditions can be differentiated by factors such as the environment of the organizations and organizational properties such as structure, identity, culture and learning capacity. Furthermore, the thesis also asks to what extent the dialogue has become an institution which is independent from individual actors, thus ensuring its existence and efficiency over the medium and long term. It is difficult to carry out analysis of the dialogue as an independent variable. The extent to which the dialogue has an influence with regard to the positioning of the Global Unions (causal relationship) within the global governance system can only be assumed.

With regard to the former the author draws upon theories which can explain organizational properties, in particular structure (neo-institutionalism), culture/identity (management theories) and learning processes in organizations. By connecting these organizational theories with the global governance concept the author hopes to make a contribution to the further development of the latter. The explanation of organizational properties for example can help us to understand and to analyse the communication within the dialogue and the as yet under developed power relationship between different actors within global governance (Mayntz, 2004).

The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 sets out the theoretical framework. Chapter 2 provides the full details of the methods applied, the methodological approach undertaken and the hypotheses and research questions. The analysis is based on a qualitative approach, which in addition to an analysis of secondary materials some 34 expert interviews were conducted in a number of countries with representatives from the Global Unions and the IFIs. The author also participated in a high-level meeting between the IFIs and the Global Unions in 2009 as an observer. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the main actors involved in the dialogue, the international trade union organizations and the World Bank, the IFC and the IMF. The description and analysis of these actors focuses on selected organizational properties which are relevant and important for the dialogue. At the end of chapter 4 the thesis provides a short comparison of the similarities and differences of the two sets of organizations. Chapter 5 examines the development of the dialogue since its formalization in 2002. The chapter describes the outcome of the dialogue and analyses factors which facilitate and hinder the dialogue in relation to the hypotheses presented in

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chapter 2.

The conclusion provides a discussion of the extent to which this form of dialogue can serve as a mechanism of coordination and cooperation between the IFIs and trade union organizations at the global level and its importance in terms of achieving a global social order¹⁰.

¹⁰Following Kohlmorgen (2005: 295) the term ‘international social order’ or ‘international social policy’ is applied and not ‘global social policy’. The ‘...entirety of institutions, practices and norms which regulate the socio-economic position of countries, social groups and individuals at the global level’. International social policy includes labour issues comprising of the development of income and employment as well as labour conditions.

1 Theoretical framework

The theoretical background of this study is based on sociological organizational theories and the global governance concept. The term global governance (GG) can be defined more clearly by examining the characteristics of the actors which are involved in and take part in shaping the global system and global regulatory arrangements. Because GG ‘...is not only a normative desirable type of political structure, with actor constellations and contents, but also an interpretative pattern which is heterogeneous in itself’ (Brand, 2007: 36). In this context, the examination of the dialogue can help to clarify the terms coherence, coordination and complementarity which are interconnected with the shaping of global processes and the questions they raise (Ibid., 2007: 27).

New communication technologies and forms of information processing within the globalization process have changed and restructured economic and political activities at all levels (Held, 2007) requiring the creation of transnational regulatory arrangements¹¹. These involve multitudinous political and economic challenges such as global finance, food and climate crisis¹². Although the globalization perspective considers the sovereign nation state as important (Albert, 2005; Meyer et al., 2006), these challenges cannot be overcome at the national level alone. The paradigm of free market politics which is supported by many national governments, the expansion of international trade of commodities and services and the battle for foreign direct investment has led to increased competitive pressure between nation states and transnational companies. The expansion of world trade also implies a division of labour between societies which ‘...produces a relationship of domination and mutual dependency which is self-reproducing’ (Waters, 1995: 70). All this has resulted in a race to the bottom (Hepple, 2004; Sengenberger, 2005) driven by a reduction and deregulation of worker rights at the national level and which in many cases employers have exploited leading to poorer terms and conditions of work and precarious working conditions, raising considerable challenges for national trade unions.

¹¹Willke considers the concept of world society as a ‘symbolic form of organization’ which includes political structures, but he criticizes the weak rationale for the term society in this context (Willke, 2007: 137–140).

¹²Source: Falk, 2008

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The ILO's objective is to regulate labour conditions internationally through its conventions and recommendations. However, at the global level two of the eight ILO core conventions, No. 87 (Freedom of Association) and No. 98 (Right to Collective Bargaining), are increasingly under threat due to the lack of ratification, bogus ratification (Hepple, 2004) or implementation on the part of ILO members. As yet the USA, for example, has ratified only two of the eight ILO core conventions (CLS) including No. 182 Worst Forms of Child Labour and No. 105 Abolition of Forced Labour (ITUC, 2010b). Many other countries have also only partly ratified the core conventions. For instance, neither India nor China has ratified the conventions on freedom of association and collective bargaining so far.

When governments or transnational companies contravene basic worker rights it makes the work of the GUFs much more difficult (Croucher and Cotton, 2009). Against this background it is essential to develop global democratic structures and 'mechanisms of political cooperation' (Held, 2007: 40) which can build a framework for the interaction of international organizations, nation states and civil society organizations (Becker et al., 2007).

Globalization is playing a major role in shrinking the planet, proliferating issues, and changing the roles of key actors. [...] The emergence of transnational civil society and the contested nature of state sovereignty likewise factor into the rising need for global governance (Karns and Mingst, 2004: 21).

The global governance concept can be applied to analyse the mechanisms of political cooperation, but as yet there is no substantial global governance theory which would allow the classification of the different political, economic and civil society actors within coherently defined categories.

All global governance concepts emphasize the connection between the process of globalization and the issue of regulation. In this context, regulation means the '...intentional designing of regulatory structures as a precondition for problem solving' (Haus, 2010: 469). The definition of the global governance concept used within the study will be outlined in more detail later. The following sections introduce and define some basic terms which are important for the study.

1.1 Definition of the main terms and concepts

The following definitions of the key terms already suggest differences between the actors involved in the dialogue. The term *organization* and the term *corporate actor* are fundamental to understanding the actors or partners who interact with one another within the dialogue. These terms also need to be distinguished from the term *institution*. The definition of these terms is geared towards the analysis of the dialogue and for that reason does not integrate all facets of the respective terms. The point is to stress the criteria which are important for the object of the research. Although both the organizations as corporate actors and the individual actors as agents (staff members and representatives) play an important role in the dialogue, the main focus of attention in this study is the corporate actor.

The study does not claim to explain the existing interdependency between the micro and the meso level in a logical-analytical way through methodological individualism¹³. This approach is excluded because with regard to the interdependency relationship the thesis can only make suppositions on the basis of examples. According to the findings in this study the thesis cannot provide any conclusions regarding the specific mechanisms by which values and norms produced at the micro level are transmitted into the collective memory of an organization.

1.1.1 'Organizations' and 'actors'

The Global Unions, in particular the ITUC and the GUFs, as well as the World Bank Group (in particular the IBRD and the IFC) and the IMF are central to the analysis of the dialogue. Furthermore, although the ILO is not directly involved in the dialogue it is an important actor, because trade unionists perceive the ILO as a strategic partner. The Bureau for Workers' Activities (ACTRAV) is the connecting link between trade unions in general and the ILO.

According to Abraham and Büschges (2009) all organizations are based on the pooling of resources, the purposive use of resources which are oriented towards the objectives of the organization, a structure based on the division of labour, a leadership authority and a constitution, which regulates the use of resources and the operating methods. All

¹³Methodological individualism relates social phenomena to individual actors. That means that these phenomena are caused or created by individuals. Methodological individualism exists in a number of different versions and had been brought from economics to sociology by Max Weber. An overview is given by Udehn (2002).

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organizations which directly participate in the dialogue at the headquarters-level are international organizations. They can be classified according to political science terminology into international governmental and international non-governmental organizations. The ILO is a special type of an international governmental organization, because in its central decision-making bodies there are not only government representatives but also representatives of national employees and national employer associations. One distinguishing feature between international governmental and international non-governmental organizations is the direct or indirect nature of their governmental act of foundation. In those cases where the foundation of an international organization can neither be ascribed to international law nor to an enactment of an existing international governmental organization, the organization can be described as an international non-governmental organization (Rittberger and Zangl, 2005). With regard to this definition the Global Unions belong to the international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and the IFIs to the international governmental organizations (IGOs). All these organizations are formal organizations which have binding agreements in the form of rules.

Rules are explicit or implicit norms, regulations, and expectations that define and order the social world and the behaviour of actors in it. Bureaucracies are both composed of and producers of rules (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004: 18).

For the analysis of the mode of operation of these organizations in the context of the dialogue it is necessary to clarify their status as actors. It is important to understand these organizations act as actors if only because doing so makes it ‘... possible to bring to account at the theoretical level, that organizations not only adapt to their environments but that they intervene actively’ (Felsch, 2010: 17).

In the following section the author ascribes the status of a social actor to all international organizations participating within the dialogue which includes at least a partial autonomy of action for these organizations. The theoretical construction of an organization as an independent actor makes it necessary to differentiate the term from the term of institutions (see subchapter 1.1.3). Organizations can be considered as social actors because society grants them their status and directs expectation towards them. Furthermore, organizations are able to act in an intentional manner because they are ‘... capable of deliberation, self-reflection, and goal-directed action’ (King et al., 2010: 292). They are sovereign actors which can act independently of the wishes of their members to some extent (Ibid., 2010).

Within the neo-institutional discourse the sovereignty attributed to individual and collec-

1.1 Definition of the main terms and concepts

tive actors¹⁴ is interlinked with *responsibility* and *accountability*. The instigation for actors to assume responsibility for their actions is on the one hand driven by the external environment and on the other hand, generated by the actors themselves through self-attribution. In other words, actors ‘... sometimes assume responsibility in what can be understood as a symbolic recognition of an imposition of responsibility which is associated with the communicated willingness to accept sanctions which are viewed as fair and which follow their imposition’ (Meier, 2009: 78). For individual actors the organization itself constitutes the environment which implies demands. Organizations as actors are ‘plausible subjects’ of intended and non-intended actions, to which can ‘... be addressed sets of cognitive and normative expectations’ and which reveal elements of ‘... socially institutionalised concepts of responsible action’ (Ibid., 2009: 77–80¹⁵).

The members of the Global Unions (national trade unions and national trade union centres) and the IFIs (governments) are sovereign collective actors which to a certain extent determine the objectives, activities and resources of the international organizations. However, the international trade union movement has a much longer history and was founded on completely different grounds than the IFIs. In particular due to their membership the political sovereignty of the IFIs is arguably more limited than in comparison with the international trade union organizations.

IGOs are actors on the world stage, working according to both their own bureaucratic logic and the whims of those who are hired by states to run them (Oestreich, 2007: 183).

Although some governments have a critical influence on the political direction of the World Bank and the IMF, this study is not based on the state-centred approach¹⁶ of international governmental organizations. In fact it is assumed that these organizations have a certain degree of independence which allows them to develop their own priorities and ideas and to conciliate conflicts between their stakeholders. Oestreich (2007) provides a detailed analysis of the extent to which international organizations are capable of playing an independent role within international politics and to promote public goods¹⁷. Although Oestreich

¹⁴For a broader debate about the sovereignty of collective actors see Vanberg (1995).

¹⁵The conceptualization of the term *actor* introduced by Meier (2009) does not claim to offer a framework for an analytical approximation of organizational processes. However, the definition of the term *actor* valid for this case study is the basis for the descriptive and analytical presentation of the properties of the participants of the dialogue.

¹⁶Among international relation theories in addition to realistic and neo-realistic approaches the liberal inter-governmentalism focuses on the nation state as main actor of international politics.

¹⁷The term public good originally derives from economics where it describes goods which are non-rival and non-excludable such as national financial stability or defence (Long and Woolley, 2009).

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(2007) is partly focused on state-centred research; his main focus is on the self-contained developed preferences, aims and strategies of organizations themselves. In this context he demonstrates that international organizations are able to act as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ and that this capacity is not only related to a simple bureaucratic self-interest (Ibid., 2007: 3).

The terms of *organization* and *collective actor* are related to the term *corporate actor* which is often used as a synonym. However, the term corporate actor is not used in a coherent way within social sciences and it therefore needs to be introduced and defined separately in this study (see subchapter 1.1.2). According to Cox and Jacobson (1997) all organizations possess elements of ‘forum’ and ‘service’ organizations which vary considerably depending on the organizational system. In other words all organizations are arenas which offer space for discussion and negotiation as well as specific services for their members. Organizations with predominant service properties arguably have an extended bureaucratic structure because they deal with a greater range of task coordination (Cox and Jacobson, 1997). With regard to the different types of organizations participating in the dialogue, the IGOs could be considered to have a strong focus on services due to the extensive administration tasks associated with their development programmes and lending.

As mentioned earlier, the term *actor* will not only be used with regard to collectives but also with regard to individuals. According to Mayntz (2009c: 110) international organizations as the sub-organizations of the United Nations (UN) are hybrids which consist of ‘... a global actor which is able to act autonomously and a negotiating system comprising government representatives’. In addition to government representatives, individual actors can also be staff members, delegates and policymakers such as the executive directors of the IFIs for example. They are influenced by their social environment, able to form their own opinion and to reflect their social and economic backgrounds and experiences according to their own values and standards. In this context they may try to initiate organizational changes within the scope of their professional role. They may partly act in an intentional way and in principle they are able to assume responsibility for their own actions.

The connection between incentive and participation and the integration of individual actors in an organization is highlighted by behavioural theory (March and Simon, 1961). In the context of the dialogue the individual actors as representatives steer the direct objective oriented communication and its course; a capacity which an organization as a whole does not possess. The analysis of the dialogue provided by the thesis will therefore examine the extent to which the results of such communication are reflected within the collective

memory of an international organization, which means in it values (institutions), knowledge and behavioural norms, and which preconditions are necessary for that to occur. In doing so, the external observer is faced with certain limits. It is neither possible to trace back the changes to their point of origin, as these have been triggered by the influence of individual actors, nor to determine the degree of influence which some individual actors might have. In this regard the only indications are the perception and the personal assessment by individual actors who are in touch with these issues. Apart from the difficulty of explicitly identifying the extent and the weight of individual contributions with regard to particular change processes and to differentiate them from other influencing factors, the mechanisms which drive the interaction and the exchange between the micro- and the meso-level are a black box. The focus is on the corporate level, however the individual level will be considered when necessary. Particularly in the analysis chapter both levels might be interconnected in a selective way on the basis of the empirical data, for example with regard to the question of how individual actors perceive the corporate actors.

1.1.2 The relationship between corporate and individual actors

The term *corporate actor* is omnipresent within sociology. In most of the literature on organizational sociology this actor is the basis for analysis, accordingly for this reason, this term will be defined separately in this section. Coleman (1990) describes collective formations which are perceived as units of action as corporate actors. Individual actors make up the structure of corporate actors by pooling their resources together (Abraham and Büschges, 2009). Accordingly, all formally organized collectives are corporate actors. The term corporate actor has later been taken up by Vanberg (1995: 9) who defines it as ‘...a spectrum of social formations as consistent object of theoretical contemplation’ which includes organizations and the nation state. The use of the term corporate actor therefore makes sense in this study, as all forms of organizations, including governments, which are important for the dialogue, can be subsumed within it.

As mentioned earlier the term implies the merger of resources by individual actors. These resources include material and non-material commodities. In the context of the analysis of the dialogue it is important to understand in what way the availability of resources is organized within these particular organizations. For example, how are decisions made concerning the distribution of resources, what type of organizational benefits do they create and how the participation of individuals and other collective actors affect how these

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benefits are organized (Ibid., 1995). One example is the way in which the net income of the World Bank is distributed. There Article V of the WB's constitution (Articles of Agreement) states that the Board of Governors determines the part which shall be allocated to surplus or rather distributed to the Bank's shareholders.

The availability and dominant influence over the stock of resources determines the dynamic of an organization to a certain extent because preferences will also be determined on this basis. Furthermore, the issue of resources also illustrates that a corporate actor is a unit of action, as decisions are made regards the handling of resources and at the same time, a social system as structures determine the decision making process. Abraham and Büschges (2009) make a clear differentiation between the unit of action and the social system. However, with regard to a corporate actor this differentiation cannot be maintained. The authors themselves note that (Ibid., 2009: 198), '...the typical characteristics of a particular organization' have an influence on it. In this respect the term corporate actor includes the organizational autonomy to act and the structural particularities which for example arise from membership.

The relationship between a corporate and an individual actor can be seen as an exchange relationship which becomes effective as soon as one individual actor decides to become a member of an organization (Ibid., 2009). This exchange relationship takes place between two actors which may have very different natures. In comparison to individual actors, corporate actors cannot show emotions and they express their actions with the aid of their agents which are individual actors (Preisendörfer, 2008).

(...), individuals belonging to an organization can be thought of as member-agents – members speaking and acting on behalf of the organization, members who know when they are acting on their own and when they are acting as agents (...). [...] Every organizational member is, to a degree, an extension and representative of the organizational actor (King et al., 2010: 293).

With this in mind, individual actors, as for example representatives of governments or staff members, design the characteristic traits of a corporate actor (for example the World Bank). The (participation) rights, duties and responsibilities of individual actors which are interlinked with their membership, are anchored within the constitution of the organization.

Schimank (2002: 35) distinguishes two basic types of organizations depending on their hierarchical structure and the organizational objectives: 'interest organizations' and 'work organizations'. Both types of organizations have in common that they are corporate actors

1.1 Definition of the main terms and concepts

because they bundle together the influence of individual actors (Schimank, 2007b). The international trade union organizations can be seen as a type of interest organization, because they are constituted in a direct democratic way and their objectives are ‘...tied to the common interests of their members’ (Schimank, 2002: 33).

At the beginning is (...) the recognition of matching interests on the part of the individual actors. If the actors then come to the conclusion that they could be stronger together then they could start to negotiate how the collective pursuit of interests could be organized (Schimank, 2002: 33).

Schimank (2008) notes however, that despite the democratic orientation of interest organizations there is an everlasting tension between the leadership of an organization and its rank and file. This is also because the leadership ‘... is looking for its own decision making sovereignty to act in a coherent way within a decent time’ (Schimank, 2008: 160). Such tensions can be seen in the relationship between the GUFs and their affiliates or between the ITUC and the GUFs. With regard to the latter there have been and still are differences between the ITUC and the GUFs in dealing with the IFIs for example.

Whilst the GUFs belong to a type of interest organization, the IFIs represent a type of work organization. The IFIs have been founded by governments of sovereign nation states in order to pursue certain interests. In contrast to interest organizations like the GUFs or the ITUC, there may be a number of conflicting interests between all the participating individual actors (representatives of nation states, staff members). On a formal level, the selection of staff members for the IFIs follows criteria which support the ‘...organizational production of output’ (Schimank, 2008: 160). Such criteria can be the educational background, political convictions, the ability and willingness to adapt to established values and norms and the willingness to serve the organization. Furthermore, both the WB and the IMF have to fulfil certain international quotas which reflect the diversity of their membership. These requirements create limitations regarding organizational self-determination and a gap between the required and actual qualifications of personnel (Schimank, 2008). In this context it is important to distinguish between ‘management’ and ‘ownership’, because the scope of such a separation extends or limits the freedom of organization (Oestreich, 2007: 15–19).

In contrast to interest organizations the motivation of staff members in work organizations is less likely to be based on personal principles or values and much more on financial rewards and personal reputations. It can be argued that many individual actors in work

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organizations act in a benefit-oriented manner and have a tendency to ‘shirk’ that is intentionally perform at a lower level than they could (Schimank, 2007b). Possible solutions to this include the creation of incentives such as higher salaries, bonuses, improved career opportunities and more effective sanctions for low performance.

With regard to the description of an organization as an actor in a general sense and as a corporate actor in a more specific sense, it is clear that it is difficult to unite all facets of an organization under the term actor. In the thesis therefore the author will use the term *corporate actor* for all the actors which participate within the dialogue. In this context the author will consider them both as independent social actors, which interact with other social actors, and as social systems which influence their member agents (individual actors). Preisendörfer (2008) suggests that one can differentiate between three different actor relationships which are all relevant for the dialogue: first, a relationship between individual actors, second, a relationship between individual and corporate actors and thirdly, a relationship between corporate actors. Both the Global Unions and the IFIs maintain a relationship with corporate actors at the intra- and inter-organizational level. At the intra-organizational level this relationship concerns the exchange with governments (IFIs) and national trade unions (Global Unions) and at the inter-organizational level the exchange with one another. All different relationships are connected with different patterns of interaction and hierarchies.

1.1.3 The term ‘institution’

The term *institution* needs to be distinguished from the term organization. In organization studies the term institution and institutionalization has become prominent largely due to writers such as Zucker (1977), Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983). In the German speaking arena Senge (2006) and Müller (2009) provide a good overview of the development and facets of the term institution. Institutions represent a framework of orientation for the member agents of an organization and in this context they form a constituent part of the organizational social system. They involve ‘normative obligations’ which must be taken into account by individual actors (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 341). As Foreman and Whetten (2002: 622) put it:

(...) an institution is a set of widely shared and persistent beliefs about what constitutes proper practice for specific purposes

1.1 Definition of the main terms and concepts

In this sense institutions can be understood as constraints to options that individual and corporate actors are likely to exercise, even though these constraints can become modified in the course of time (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). According to Scott (2001) institutions can constitute first, a formal constraint (for example in the form of laws and rules), secondly, a pressure felt by individual actors (for example in form of norms and values) and thirdly, a cognitive impact which is manifested in mutual beliefs and meaning systems which are not questioned.

Institutions which have a cognitive impact can be considered as ‘scripts’ which means that they can lead to the result that actions proceed ‘...routinely, as a matter of course and quasi-automatic’ (Senge, 2006: 39). A criticism of new institutionalism offered by Senge (2006: 46) concerns the unsystematic ‘...selection, weight and operationalization’ of institutions. This criticism may be justified, but it cannot be approached in a general way and only if the focus is on a particular constellation of actors or specific organizations.

The institutions which are important for the analysis of the dialogue in this study will be distinguished on two levels. First, at the global level (macro-level), which characterises the environment of the organizations concerned, norms, values and rules which in this case are interconnected with globally recognised human and worker’s rights which are of importance¹⁸. Secondly, at the meso-level intra-organizational institutions such as rules and principles which serve as instructions for individual actors and which determine the externally cultivated image of an organization as a corporate actor are crucial. The perception of institutions takes place through individual actors which translate them for corporate actors. Only in this way does it become possible for corporate actors to comply with the responsibility awarded and to behave as autonomous actors.

1.1.4 Institutionalization

Institutionalization is a dynamic and on-going process (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). According to Zucker (1977) institutionalization can be understood as process and property variable. During the institutionalization process individual actors ‘...transmit what is socially defined as real’ and ‘...at any time in the process the meaning of an act can be defined as more or less taken-for-granted part of this social reality’ (Zucker, 1977: 728).

¹⁸In this study these institutions are understood as international institutions. Their definition follows that of Zürn (1998: 171) who suggests that this term describes a ‘mechanism of governance’ which is not bounded to territories.

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This means that for example certain facts or obligations ‘...take on a rule like status in social thought and action’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 341).

The quality of the dialogue can be inferred from the extent of institutionalization and the effectiveness of new rules and norms, even though it is important to notice that practices and behavioural patterns are not equally institutionalized. This depends, amongst other things, on the time an institution has been in place and on the acceptance by organizational members (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). Institutions with a short history or little acceptance are more likely to face change.

In this context, the introduction of new standards and guidelines in the IFIs which concern workers as well as labour market issues in general and the institutionalization of new procedures concerning the adoption of programmes which give external stakeholders a formal advisory function are important aspirations for trade unions. The ILO plays an important supporting function in terms of trying to persuade the IFIs to adopt more socially orientated policies in this context because the major goal for this organization is to enforce international labour standards at the national, regional and international level.

In the light of the continuing international financial crisis some of the perspectives, in particular the deregulatory approach that has been applied by the IFIs is arguably obsolete and therefore questionable from the point of view of the Global Unions.

In recent years the IMF has consistently advised dozens of countries to reduce workers’ protection, often using highly dubious justifications for doing so, and in some cases has adopted loan conditionality to force the changes. [...] Fund staff have never, to our knowledge, encouraged countries without unemployment benefits to adopt them. The problem is not inherent to the new database but lies in the policy bias of the IMF, which consistently perceives labour market regulations as obstacles to growth even given the absence of factual evidence (Bakvis, 2011: 3).

However, in order to achieve a profound change of the IMF’s approach and the underlying paradigm through the dialogue, organizational learning must take place at the IMF which, in a later stage, could lead to a change of the identity of the organization. In this regard, individual actors such as for example the leadership of the organization can play an important role.

1.1.5 Human rights – worker rights

Human rights include societal, cultural, economic, political and social rights which are based on the principles of universality and inalienability. This means that every individual actor should be able to call on these rights without discrimination and that they are not a privilege which is allocated by an authoritative entity (Twomey, 2007). An important reference which has shaped the social understanding of human rights is the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights¹⁹. In this context Article 23 and Article 24 refer explicitly to worker rights.

- (1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. [...]

- (4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

However, the ideas underpinning the creation of international labour standards dates back to the late 19th century, but the first major institutional change in this respect was with the establishment of the ILO 1919 (Hepple, 2004). The ILO is as specialized organization of the United Nations and has produced a broad range of labour standards at the global level. With the adoption of the ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work in 1998, the ILO started to promote eight core conventions or core labour standards (CLS) which constitute ‘universally recognized human rights’ (Sengenberger, 2005: 7). They are summed up within four main areas which are described as 1) ‘Freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining’ (including Convention No. 87 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, and Convention No. 98 Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining); 2) ‘Elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour’ (including Convention No. 29 Forced Labour, and Convention No. 105 Abolition of Forced Labour); 3) ‘Abolition of Child Labour’ (including Convention No. 138 Minimum Age, and Convention No. 182 Worst Forms of Child Labour) and 4) ‘Elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation’ (including Convention No. 100 Equal Remuneration, and Convention No. 111 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) (ILO, 2002). The declaration of the ILO reaffirmed these selected rights as fundamental rights and stressed that human rights are one of its prime concerns (Valticos, 1998).

¹⁹Source: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, <<http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml>>

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The close relationship between the declaration of human rights and the conventions and recommendations of the ILO becomes, amongst others, apparent in the shared ‘... essence of their inspiration and objectives’ (Valticos, 1998: 136). This suggests that all ILO conventions and recommendations contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights. The ILO conventions on freedom of association, the abolition of forced labour and the elimination of discrimination have had a great impact on human rights in the sphere of civil and political rights. Although human rights and labour rights are conceived as individual rights they both have a collective dimension, which means, that individual rights are ‘... in fact meaningful only when exercised in a collective manner’ (Ibid., 1998: 137). However, even though human rights and international labour standards have entered universal consciousness it is difficult to assess their real impact which lies in implementation and practice. Furthermore, the ILO was also heavily criticised for its shift towards the promotional principles of the 1998 Declaration and emphasis on the CLS at the expense of other conventions. Critics argue that the Declaration reflected the ILO’s marginalization in the global system of economic governance and the dominance of neoliberal economic policy promoted by the Washington consensus and US foreign policy from the 1980s onwards (Alston, 2004; Standing, 2008; Royle, 2010).

Both human rights and international worker rights can be considered as Global Public Goods (GPGs). GPGs are public goods across national borders (Long and Woolley, 2009) which can ‘... only be produced by collective decision’ (Baylis and Smith, 2006: 383). The concept has been promoted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 1999) and is nowadays a key concept in international development. The benefits of such goods cover more than one country, they include preferably all population groups and they have a cross-generational impact. GPGs comprise natural global commons, human-made global commons and policy outcomes (Carbone, 2007). Thus, human rights according to the 1948 Declaration and the ILO core conventions belong to the second group because they are universal principles which are independent of citizenship or nationality (UNDP, 1999). Organizations which produce and promote GPGs are, amongst others and in addition to the ILO and the UN, the World Bank and the IMF. In this context these organizations make decisions regards their priority and their funding. According to the definition of the World Bank GPGs comprise:

(...) commodities, resources, services and systems of rules or policy regimes with substantial cross-border externalities that are important for development and poverty-reduction and that can be produced in sufficient supply only through cooperation and collective action by developed and developing coun-

tries (Agerskov, 2005: 2).

The GPG definition of the World Bank is a very broad definition which includes as general desirable policy outcomes development and poverty-reduction. It does not mention the achievement or implementation of specific rights or any priorities with regard to this. A reason for that could be the principle of political neutrality towards borrowing governments which is written down in the Bank's Articles of Agreement. The World Bank and the IMF are aware of human and labour rights, but they relate these rights to different economic basis than for example the Global Unions would do. Meanwhile for the latter, labour rights are defined by their organizational objectives and their action strategies, the WB and the IMF use them as a guideline or moral compass if the expected output of their organizational practices is connected with ethical and social consequences. A new architecture for development cooperation would require a strong commitment of the WB and the IMF to 'social and economic justice and increased international cooperation' (BetterAid, 2011: 6). With regard to the dialogue a different perception, conceptualization and use of labour rights can influence the acceptance of ideas regards development and the general mutual acceptance of the participating actors in a positive or a negative way.

1.1.6 The dialogue between the Global Unions and the IFIs

The dialogue examined in the thesis is not considered as social dialogue according to the definition of the ILO nor as a form of lobbying activity. A more detailed definition and differentiation of these terms will be provided in chapter 5. In the thesis the dialogue will be seen as an instrument and as having an active process. This means it is not a mechanistic and unproductive debate between people who only seek to defend their own points of view. Rather, the purpose of dialogue is:

(...) to establish a field of genuine meeting and inquiry (...) – a setting in which people can allow a free flow of meaning and vigorous exploration of the collective background of their thought, their personal predispositions, the nature of their shared attention, and the rigid features of their individual and collective assumptions. [...] (...), dialogue seeks to have people learn how to think together – not just in the sense of analysing a shared problem, but in the sense of surfacing fundamental assumptions and gaining insight into why they arise (Isaacs, 1993: 25).

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In this sense the dialogue can help to develop a common strength and capability for working and creating new things together among a certain group of people and between individual actors which belong to different organizations. The emergence and promotion of the dialogue can mainly be traced back to the commitment of the international trade union movement. For that reason, from the point of view of the Global Unions the dialogue is considered as a strategic instrument.

From the beginning, the dialogue served to explore differences and common grounds between the different organizations. During this time several trade unionists experienced the hostile attitudes of representatives and staff members of the IFIs. In the course of time a larger proportion of the staff within the IFIs have become more strongly committed to the dialogue and started to consider the mutual exchange from a different perspective. For example, the more recent joint reports of the high-level meetings and statements at the WB website indicate a very positive assessment concerning the development of the relationship with trade unions and suggest an improving and more substantial relationship.

As the World Bank (WB) has reached out to the civil society sector over the past several decades, relations with one constituency, trade unions, has seemed to evolve the farthest in terms of the breadth and substance (World Bank, 2011²⁰).

The dialogue is related to organizational knowledge and organizational learning. In this context one of its objectives is to impart tacit (unexpressed) knowledge among individual actors and to uncover internal organizational perceptions and thoughts. Different personal, occupational and organizational backgrounds of individual actors make them refer to different paradigms and perspectives, which are not necessarily apparent to outsiders. For that reason the first challenge of the dialogue was that the participants recognized these differences and that they accepted that ‘...the purpose of the dialogue is not to hide these differences, but to find a way of letting them be explored’ (Isaacs, 1993: 95).

Every dialogue begins with a conversation which is based on some deliberation. Individual actors pay attention selectively which means they notice some things and miss other things and they agree with some views and disagree with others. Furthermore, in the course of the dialogue several crises might occur. To begin with the first crisis might be related to the conclusion of some individual actors that the dialogue is being forced upon them and cannot work in this way. Later on, the underlying fragmentation and incoherence of thoughts

²⁰Source: World Bank, 2011 website; ‘Assessing 5 years of World Bank – Trade Union Engagement’ <<http://go.worldbank.org/XQTIEZ0T40>> [Accessed 25 July 2012]

can lead to frustration among the participants. At this stage, for example, they might tend to defend their views even if they are wrong. Other individual actors feel that they cannot tell ‘... where the group is heading; they feel disoriented, and perhaps marginalized or constrained by others’ (Ibid., 1993: 96). If this stage can be overcome and people come to the point of reflecting on each other’s views in an objective way, then it is possible to exchange meaning and information more seriously and to transform previous forms of interaction which were less productive into more productive ones. The dialogue can help to develop a mutual understanding among individual actors of how external stimuli are named by an organization and the way an organization (automatically) responds to them. It is not so much about solving problems, but rather the uncovering of differences with regard to individual and collective perceptions and the development of new (joint) perspectives. The dialogue can provide a setting which helps to change influences on organizational thinking and it ‘... holds the potential for allowing entirely new kinds of collective intelligence to appear’ (Ibid., 1993: 39). In particular with regard to global governance, which does not include constellations of negotiation such as corporatism which might be available at the national or regional level, the development of joint perspectives among different actors through dialogue is a first important step and a precondition for further cooperation regards the establishment of global social policies.

1.2 Global Governance

The concept of global governance (GG)²¹ is relatively new in comparison with theories of organizational sociology. Since the beginning of the 1990s it has become more and more important within the socio-scientific debate and has been further developed over time by organizations and academics. Overviews of trend-setting contributions to the development of the concept are provided for example in the report of the Enquete-Commission (2002) ‘Globalisierung der Weltwirtschaft’ (Globalization of the World Economy) and by Dingwerth and Pattberg (2006b).

The current worldwide economic crisis has been strengthened by the self-interest of international finance and its agents have arguably created a greater need for the development of transparent and democratic global governance structures as the current system has encouraged ‘... unregulated economic development which simply follows the existing rules and

²¹ As a sub-concept of global governance which focuses on global labour regulations can be understood the concept of ‘Global Labour Governance’. It is based on the assumption that global labour problems require governance (Meardi and Marginson, 2014). However, the present conceptualization of the concept in terms of analytical dimensions with regard to different actor constellations is weak.

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cemented interests' (Held, 2007: 99–100). Over time the understanding of the term “governance” has gradually adapted with the changing political reality. Until the mid-1980s the term was used synonymously with “political steering”. Later the term included two different meanings which were, however, both focused on the nation state. On the one hand the term was geared towards the non-hierarchical shaped interaction between different actors that is the cooperation between governmental and non-governmental actors in public-private networks. On the other hand the term was seen as representing the coordination of individual action and the generation of a social order. At the beginning of the 1990s the Commission on Global Governance (CGG) named the national actors as main actors within the system of GG. Even though the incorporation of national actors (governments) within the global system led to a ‘reconfiguration’ of their political power, national actors are still key to the development and compliance of global standards and norms (Scherrer and Brand, 2011; Held, 2006; Karns and Mingst, 2004; Messner, 2005).

By the beginning of the 1990s definitions of governance theory which were largely related to the national level were being increasingly questioned by the processes of European integration and the acceleration of globalization. In comparison to the European level, the theoretical context at the global level is far more complex due to the much greater variety of forms of governance (Mayntz, 2009b). For example, during the last three decades IGOs, multinational enterprises and civil society have become more important at the global level, with the latter including grass root movements, INGOs and trade unions. One characteristic of global governance is ‘... the decreased salience of states and the increased involvement of non-state actors in norm- and rule-setting processes and compliance monitoring’ (Brühl and Rittberger, 2001: 2).

All forms of the global governance concept have in common a focus on global problems whose solution would arguably require a stronger international cooperation due to the loss of capacity of national governance. Global problems are associated with different types of problems which include ‘global goods’ and ‘global problems of interdependence’ (Messner, 2005: 34–35). The latter refers to interdependencies between different policy fields or rather the implications of political actions which cannot be taken into consideration by individual corporate actors in a comprehensive way because they do not have the ability to do so. For example the IFIs only have limited possibilities to estimate the social implications of their development programmes and support programmes at an earlier stage because of the lack of expert knowledge or the limitation of expert knowledge on restricted sets of assumptions and economic models. The economists working in the WB ‘... have strong academic backgrounds and a strong conceptual basis’ (Interview WB01, 2008), but

in many cases they lack practical experience.

The expert knowledge of trade unions is centred around ‘...social policy, the world of employment and its organizational and institutional context (...) all over the world’ (Koch-Baumgarten, 2011: 64). This knowledge could, at least partly, help to close the knowledge gaps the IFIs have with regard to the estimation of social implications of their programmes. At the same time this knowledge transfer would help to strengthen the political coherence between both social actors at the global level. Trade union officials argue that in order to reach a maximal efficiency regarding the transfer and the processing of knowledge it would make sense to integrate trade union representatives in the process of project planning. It is in this context that the trade unions demand ‘...a seat at the table which has the voice of working people in the heart of those discussions’ (Interview IT03, 2009).

With the help of the global governance concept existing forms of international cooperation can be analysed and new steering processes can be examined.

The development of an international culture of cooperation takes for granted a foundation of joint values and action principles as well as a minimum of trust, reliability, capacity to compromise and respect for the legitimate interests of others, in addition to generally agreed regulations and rules of procedure. Without a fair coordination of interests which respects the principles of justice, cooperation cannot work (Nuscheler, 2002: 81).

So far the existing international cooperation within global governance has been characterized by a democratic deficit (in addition to governance and control problems) through which only a limited spectrum of interests is effectively represented. This can be related to existing power asymmetries at the global level. For example, organizations of ‘social governance’ like the ILO have much less enforcement power than the IFIs (Evans, 2008: 8).

In this respect the question also arises as to what extent the international trade union organizations are able to act as a democratic, social balancing entity (Koch-Baumgarten, 2011). Civil society organizations do not have a (direct) regulatory influence, due to their limited access to the decision making bodies of the IGOs, however, they have been able to extend their area of influence since the end of the 1980s. Since that time many international organizations have begun to open up to civil society actors and provide them with the option, albeit often channelled through specific departments, to express their views and concerns to the organizations. In this context the World Bank Group and the IMF

established respectively, external relation departments which screen and coordinate the exchange with civil society organizations.

Despite their opening up to civil society groups the IFIs are not globally inclusive institutions which equip non-governmental actors with participation rights. Rather, the norms and rules of international organizations constrain their ‘civil society agenda’ (Tussie and Riggiozzi, 2001: 175). According to the assessment of Boorman (2007a: 19) the IMF is ‘... very close to being an all-inclusive organization’; however, this seems to characterize more the self-perception of the organization than reality. In reality they still do not allow enough participation from other institutions. Neither the World Bank Group nor the IMF exploit all the opportunities to obtain ‘... useful and precise information for problem identification and diagnosis as well as for adequate policy implementation and the monitoring of norm compliance’ (Rittberger, 2008: 14).

1.2.1 Global Governance – the normative and the analytical dimension

Dingwerth and Pattberg (2006a; 2006b) distinguish between two general uses of the global governance concept: first as an analytical concept and second as a political programme. The latter can be expressed as either a normative perspective or as a critical perspective. Scherrer and Brand (2011) add another perspective which is the use of the global governance concept as descriptive category. In this context global governance describes new developments in international relations and stresses the importance of other spatial levels in addition to the national level.

The analytical perspective focuses on the actual or perceived reality of world politics and the factors which determine new forms of political regulation. Furthermore, it considers the efficiency of mechanisms of interaction at the global level and its impact. Thus, global governance as an analytical concept attempts to explain a structure-process-impact relationship (Mayntz, 2008a; Brand and Scherrer, 2005).

Global governance as a normative concept refers to the question on how actors at the global level should react to the decreasing steering capacity of governments (Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2006a). This perspective integrates action oriented towards global public welfare. In doing so the term public welfare has to be considered in different ways concerning global sectoral policies (economy, labour and health). This goes back to the fact that at the global level the term of public welfare is developed in a normative-a priori way and

the decision making it relates to is not connected to the consent of individual members of society. The critical perspective is closely related to the normative perspective and focuses on the question of in what ways hegemonic discourses contribute to the establishment of societal power relations.

Whilst the normative perspective of global governance focuses on the establishment of order, that is an intentional form of regulation, the analytical perspective focuses on possible forms of interaction and its mode of operation (Brand, 2007). However, it is difficult to consider both perspectives separately as the analytical perspective also integrates normative elements. These normative elements concern for example requirements for shaping global governance as well as the different perception of global problems by individual and corporate actors and the need to take on responsibility (Schimank, 2007a; Woods, 2003).

The concept of the 'governance arrangement' constitutes a connection between '... the demand and the supply of global governance' and can provide some useful starting points for the explanation of the structure-process relationship (Koenig-Archibugi, 2003: 50). Thus, real (or hypothetical) arrangements, suggests that individual corporate actors, are characterized by the properties 'publicness', 'delegation' and 'inclusiveness' (Ibid., 2003: 52). The first property describes the degree of participation and the power of enforcement of an actor with regard to the composition of rule systems and procedures which depends on the personnel and financial resources that an organization has available. The property 'delegation' comprises the competences ascribed to an organization (for example legislative and executive responsibilities) and the extent of autonomy and power of discretion available to an organization. The ascribing of competences depends on the composition of membership of an organization, its formal structure and the political importance of the organization within global governance.

The third property 'inclusiveness' marks the degree of participation of the organization's members and the integration of external stakeholders within the areas of political decision making as well as the development of norms and rules. This as has already been mentioned is only partly reflected within the IFIs due to their hierarchical structure and their lack of inclusiveness. It can be argued that this dimension is more strongly developed within trade union organizations due to the prevailing democratic structures.

1.2.2 Definition of the global governance concept

So far, the global governance concept has only been weakly specified and as such indicates neither a new theory nor an analytical category (Behrens and Reichwein, 2007). In the broadest sense global governance can be defined as ‘...governing, without sovereign authority, relationships that transcend national frontiers’ (Finkelstein, 1995: 369). Points of criticism are the insufficient consideration of the close connection between political and economic structures and processes, an insufficient analysis of the constitution of problems and the insufficient analysis of power relations among corporate actors (Scherrer and Brand, 2011).

The concept of global governance for the purposes of this study is oriented towards a new ‘culture of cooperation’ which is based on a multilateral understanding of politics adjusted to democratic principles (Huber, 2008: 57). In this context it is about the initiation of cooperation and coherent action between corporate actors towards a specified global problem, where each actor has different resources available and represents different interests. Furthermore, global governance is not considered as equal to established forms of governance such as at the national level where socially binding programmes are decided and implemented. The mechanisms of regulation at the global level comprise of ‘...flexible standards, targets, guidelines, or benchmarks rather than precise requirements’ (Abbott and Snidal, 2008: 530).

In the following sections the cooperation and exchange between the IFIs and the Global Unions within the dialogue is considered as a constellation which contributes to political regulation at the global level. The analytical perspective of global governance which is applied here will take into account the existing power relation between those actors and also address the ‘power political calculation’ (Mayntz, 2004: 74). Such a calculation can, amongst others things, manifest itself as a lack of intended direction in form of ‘non-decision-making’ and the avoidance of problems as well as the selection of political reform objectives which primarily serve to protect the own position (Ibid., 2004: 75). It is assumed that learning and knowledge transfer among corporate actors can help to achieve a more ‘...favourable international distribution of power’ and to promote a more effective global governance (Zürn, 1998: 201).

The governance arrangement concept suggested by Koenig-Archibugi (2003) can make a contribution to the characterization of the starting conditions for the interaction of the corporate actors. The IMF and the World Bank are ‘governance-givers’, that is they define sets of rules and policies at the global level and have therefore, in contrast to the Global

Unions, an accepted international legitimacy and strong public profile at their disposal (Koenig-Archibugi, 2003: 50). The dialogue cannot change the advantage enjoyed by the IFIs which is related to their organizational nature. However, arguably it can help the Global Unions to achieve a more favourable position within the system of global governance, which in turn may allow them to take a more active role as interest representing organizations.

1.3 Organizational theories

Organizational theories can help to explain and analyse organizational characteristics and contribute to the analytical perspective of global governance in this regard. Organization sociology was largely developed within the international arena after the World War II in the United States, even though the representatives of this particular sociology are transnationally connected nowadays (Preisdörfer, 2008). Within the German speaking area an overview of the main theoretical developments is for example provided by Hatch (1997), Hall (1991) and Scott (1998, 2004) as well as Kieser (2002) and Abraham and Büschges (2009).

International relations theorists are not the only ones who are important for understanding international cooperation and global governance. Organization theorists, especially from sociology, provide insights relevant to studying international organizations as organizations (Karns and Mingst, 2004: 56).

According to the selection of approaches within organizational sociology different priorities can be set concerning the analysis of organizations. Sociological theories have the advantage that they ‘...expect and explain a much broader range of impacts that organizations can have and specifically highlight their role in constructing actors, interests, and social purpose’ (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 702).

Organizations of all forms are central building blocks of modern society and their structures reflect broader societal developments and conditions. This is also true of international organizations whose structure partly reflects global economic, political and social (power) relations. In the following sections organizations are considered as social actors which are able to make decisions, behave of their own will and which can be held accountable for their actions (King et al., 2010). The status of actor is granted to them through their members and society. Furthermore, organizations have some form of intentionality that guides their action and behaviour (Ibid., 2010).

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The selection of organization-theoretical approaches and theories is geared towards organizational characteristics such as structural particularities, identity, power resources and the ability to change and learn. Based on these organizational characteristics the thesis emphasizes the differences in the patterns of argumentation and action with regard to global socio-political questions which determine the course and the efficiency of the dialogue. They furthermore provide indications with regard to the potential for the development of a coherent policy between the partners in the dialogue. The following table 1.1 outlines the properties assigned to the organizational dimensions which the author considers as important for the dialogue and the theories the thesis will draw on for their description.

Table 1.1: Organizational theories

Dimension	Property	Theoretical Explanation
Bureaucracy	Structure: Formal / Informal Decision making	Sociological NI Behavioural Theory
Organizational identity / culture	Knowledge Power	Management studies
Organizational dynamic	Change Learning	Sociological NI Cognitive learning theories

Source: own illustration

1.3.1 Organizational structure

The organizational structure describes the ‘internal relationships’ of an organization which are ‘... marked by a mixture of formal and informal actions and structures’ (Allmendinger and Hinz, 2002: 10). The structure of an organization determines the character of the corporate actor and has an effect on the action of individual actors. Its elements are positions, policies, programmes and procedures which in the case of the IFIs and the Global Unions are enforced by its member organizations. These elements of the formal structure are a manifestation of powerful institutional rules which ‘... function as highly rationalized myths that are binding on particular organizations’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 343). That suggests that firstly, they are rationalized and impersonal prescriptions for individual actors which specify appropriate means for achieving organizational objectives. Secondly, that they are highly institutionalized elements which limit the autonomy for decision making of individual actors and ‘... must be taken for granted as legitimate’ (Ibid., 1977: 344). Examples for such myths are technical procedures which are considered as taken-for-granted

means by organizational members which are introduced independently from their possible and real efficiency.

The formal structure becomes partly visible in the bureaucratic apparatus which through its administrative hierarchy and its rules and routines guarantees a fluency of workflows for individual actors (Friedberg, 1994; Blau and Schoenherr, 1971). Bureaucratization is partly influenced by the proliferation of rationalized myth in society (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Scott and Davis (2007: 55) describe the functions of the formal structure and its elements as follows:

Specialized roles and rules, information channels, training programs, standard operating procedures – all may be viewed as mechanisms both for restricting the range of decisions each participant makes and for assisting the participant in making appropriate decisions within that range.

Thus, the formal structure of organizations simplifies the decision making process for organizational members because it reduces complexity by standardizing processes, distributing responsibility amongst different individuals and regulating and constraining information flows (Blau and Schoenherr, 1971). The organizational structure and its hierarchies mark an essential difference between the IFIs and the Global Unions (Beetham, 1996; Crouch, 2005). In comparison to the Global Unions the IFIs have ‘... a variety of graduated organizational ranks’ which the staff members perceive as ‘unalterable’ and ‘autonomous’²². At least at the formal level a strongly developed administrative hierarchy constrains the possibility of self-management and the initiative of staff members. As formal bureaucracies both organizations have in common that they share ‘... international tasks (such as ‘development’), create and define new categories of actors (such as ‘refugee’), create new interests for actors (such as ‘promoting human rights’), and transfer models of political organization around the world (such as markets and democracy)’ (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 700).

The formal structure is directly connected to elements which characterize the informal structure. The latter is ‘... necessary to the operation of formal organizations as a means of communication, of cohesion and of protecting the integrity of the individual’ (Williamson, 1995: 39). The informal level plays an important role within the dialogue, because most formal decisions between corporate actors are preceded by informal agreements at the individual level. The capacities, abilities and attitudes of individual actors affect the development of strategies which are necessary for the attainment of organizational goals and

²²Source: Zeit 2006 (38): ‘Wenn die Sieger verlieren’ (<<http://www.zeit.de/2006/38/IWF-Weltbank>> [Accessed 15 September 2006])

decisions regarding the establishment of cooperation with external actors. In the broadest sense individuals form informal structures through their personal contacts by which they exert influence on the development and the continuance of the formal structures. To comprehend the importance of the structure of an organization in its entirety as well as the action of individual actors within it, the thesis will draw on institutionalism and on organizational behaviour theory which analyses the impact of structure on individual actors.

1.3.1.1 The new institutionalism

Sociological institutionalism includes both an old and a new version. One of the most influential approaches of US-American organization studies is neo-institutionalism (NI) which focuses on the way in which societal institutions exert an influence on organizations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983²³).

Apart from the development of institutions in organizations and their implications for the formal structure, the neo-institutionalists also examined the impact of institutional environments on organizations. The relationship or rather the exchange between organizations and their environments has been described through the concept of isomorphism. Isomorphism means the incorporation of externally legitimated elements (institutions) regardless of whether they increase organizational efficiency or not, but which help an organization to maintain its stability and to promote its own success (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). The incorporation of institutions protects an organization from having its conduct questioned. Such institutions can be compulsory legal institutions such as laws, but also norms and societal expectations which can have the same effect as laws (Miebach, 2007). The ratification and implementation of ILO conventions corresponds to such norms of appropriate behaviour defined at the international level.

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) distinguished three isomorphic processes, including coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism²⁴, all of which can lead to homogeneity among organizations belonging to the same organizational field. In the broadest sense the Global Unions and the IFIs could be considered as belonging to the same field as they both promote development even though they do not depend on each other. With regard to the dialogue coercive isomorphism could be relevant for the Global Unions and the IFIs. According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 150) coercive isomorphism is the result of formal

²³Source: in the German speaking area Senge (2006); Hasse and Krücken, (2009).

²⁴Beckert (2010) added the mechanism 'competition' and suggested that isomorphism does not only produce homogeneity but also heterogeneity.

and informal pressure exerted on an organization by organizations of the same organizational field or by cultural expectations of society. Such pressures are perceived as ‘... force, persuasion, or as invitations to join in collusion’.

However, requirements in the form of environmental institutions must not necessarily be concordant with the current structure. For that reason organizations try to protect their formal structure by minimizing the evaluation and control of activities and by coordinating structural units in an informal way. This strategy is described as ‘decoupling’ which means that ‘...elements of structure are decoupled from activities and from each other’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 357). In other words, an organization decouples what it professes to do, from how it actually operates. This disconnection between (announced) formal procedures from everyday practices can provide individual actors with more flexibility.

The creation of specific departments and professional roles by the World Bank and the IMF whose main tasks consist of coordinating and “administrating” the contact with civil society actors could be considered as an example of decoupling to some extent. The Civil Society Team (CST) of the World Bank, which replaced the Bank’s former NGO unit in 2004, is the ‘institutional focal point’ of the organization with regard to the engagement with civil society (World Bank, 2011²⁵). Its functions are described as strategy development, the provision of advice to senior management, the monitoring of civil society engagement of staff across the organization, guidance and training activities for staff as well as the provision of civil society groups with access to Bank information and personnel. However, in reality the influence of this unit within the whole organization seems to be very limited suggesting a decoupling from other organizational units and activities. According to the information of the director of the ITUC/Global Unions office in Washington the staff from the External Affairs (EA) department which is part of the CST makes real efforts to meet trade union concerns and ‘...to push Bank people to deal seriously with trade unions’, however, the department does not have a lot of influence in the organization (Interview ITUC02, 2011).

1.3.1.2 Decision making of corporate and individual actors

Decision-making is a function which is largely attributed to individual actors. Important contributions in this respect have been made by Barnard (1968) as well as the scientists of the Carnegie Institute of Technology March and Simon (1961, 1976) and Cyert and

²⁵Source: World Bank, 2011 website <<http://go.worldbank.org/8DJ82AMKB0>> [Accessed 10 September 2011]

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March (1995, original 1963). In comparison to decision-making of individual actors there has been less research on decision-making of corporate actors. However, it is argued that corporate actors which are able to act in a sovereign way to a certain extent are also able to make decisions on their own. The decision-making of an organization as a corporate actor is often directed by its self-view which becomes manifest in its identity and objectives (King et al., 2010).

Two of the four pillars of the Carnegie School have been the concept of bounded rationality and decision-making of organizations. The concept of bounded rationality refers to the cognitive limitations of individual actors, limited individual knowledge and incomplete preferences which are obstacles to rational decision making (Gavetti et al., 2007).

In most human decision-making processes the key question surrounds the discovery and selection of satisfactory alternatives and not optimal alternatives. This means that decision makers stop searching when ‘... they identify an alternative that satisfies their various performance criteria’ (Gavetti, 2007: 526). The search and selection processes for suitable solutions are supported by organizational programmes which set off an elaborate programme of activities or responses if a certain stimulus appears in the environment (March and Simon 1976; March and Simon 1961). Programmes may be developed if there is a need for a high level of coordination. They can describe how to do something or simply state the result desired in which the latter allows more discretion for individual actors. Programmes are not necessarily rigid behavioural specifications, but in some cases they can be (Tosi, 2009). Due to the fact that organizational programmes determine individual behaviour by simplifying the selection process of a reaction towards a specific problem they can lead to the routinization of activities.

In a very broad sense, the concept of routines refers to simple decision rules that require low levels of information processing (rules of thumb), but also to complex, automatic behaviours that involve high levels of repetitive information processing (Dosi et al., 2008: 1166).

The development of new programmes or the modification of programmes by higher level officials does not correspond to such a routinization (March and Simon, 1976). This, for example, could lead to the creation of a new organizational unit responsible for development and the implementation (Tosi, 2009). In the case of the IMF the former managing director Dominique Strauss-Kahn tried to institutionalize a new mind-set in the organization. He also has been called the ‘reform director’ and it could be argued that during his time in office Strauss-Kahn took the first steps to loosen the IMF’s neoliberal discourse by

introducing a governance reform and a reform of conditions attached to loans (Falk and Unmüßig, 2011b).

For external observers, a routinization of activities can provide an indication of organizational knowledge and convictions and help to predict the prospective behaviour of staff members with regard to emerging problems. The conditions that the IMF attaches to its loans can be seen as an organized set of responses and therewith as such a routine activity, because economists do not question the particular circumstances of each case. Despite the emergence of the global financial and economic crisis in 2008 IMF staff members continued to apply well-established neoliberal policies even though these have been strongly criticized by civil society actors. However, it also has to be said that the structural complexity of the World Bank and the IMF impedes the existence and application of coherent sets of responses which means that every organizational unit develops its own programmes with regard to the specific problems it deals with (Crozier and Friedberg, 1980). Furthermore organizational complexity and the fact that higher officials can influence the development of new programmes, offer the possibility of influence for external actors such as the international trade unions. This means that the Global Unions might find suitable counterparts for their concerns in at least some of the organizational units and might be able to influence them in a way that has a sustainable impact on the organizational programmes of the IFIs.

Trade unions have different set of responses to environmental stimuli, depending on the level of action. The national level widely spread routinized activities of the trade unions are social dialogue, collective bargaining and various forms of negotiation and industrial action. However, at higher organizational levels such as the European and the international level these interventions are much more limited. Due to the fact that there is a need for coordination of activity between national unions, international programmes have to be developed. On a more positive note such programmes often allow trade union representatives more discretion as in many cases they focus on the definition of the output desired and not the exact way in which the objectives are to be achieved. At the global level trade union demands regards the IFIs for example include the abolition of the Employing Workers Indicator (EWI) which is central to the IFI's annual publication 'Doing Business' and the renunciation of labour market deregulation measures. In comparison with the IFIs the Global Unions are more likely to try to innovate their programmes. At least on paper the democratic structure and the awareness of staff members in the international unions facilitates a higher number of proposals with regard to possible solutions for new emerging problems. This innovation potential can be seen as a power resource for the Global

Unions.

Decision making at the individual and collective level is also determined by the organizational structure and in particular by the efficiency of communication channels. The level of efficiency determines the ‘...tolerance among members for departmental interdependence’ (Tosi, 2009: 101) as well as the utilisation of a channel. This means that if ‘...two persons or two organizational units have a mutual effective language, then it makes communication easier’ (March and Simon, 1976: 156). Communication within an organization takes place in a planned as well as a spontaneous way and concerns formal and informal communication between individual actors. Informal communication is important because it helps to reduce inefficiencies within the formal structure and strengthen the organizational structure as a whole (Schimank, 2007c; Barnard, 1968). It could be argued that the Global Unions and the IMF have a more efficient internal communication than the World Bank because the IMF, the Global Union Federations and the ITUC are smaller and more centralized.

1.3.2 Organizational identity and culture

Organizational identity and organizational culture are two different concepts which both play an important role in characterizing organizations. The concept of organizational identity is often linked to individual actors (Brickson, 2005) which have a personal and a social identity. The first is related to the way in which individuals see themselves and the second in how they want to be seen by their social environment. As such individual actors present images which they think are appropriate to a given situation and the expectations of others in relation to their environment and social group.

A social identity does not simply spring fully formed from the demands of the situation, but requires effort and practice from the individual and appropriate feedback from others. [...] Social identity, where it is different to the former, consists of the negotiated position between our personal identity and the meanings and images demanded of us in our current social context (Thompson and McHugh, 2009: 390).

The social identity concept may help to explain why individual actors behave in certain circumstances in a specific way. Furthermore, individual actors construct, to some extent, organizational identity through their involvement in organizations. In this context organizational rules and procedures are mechanisms for controlling individual behaviour and

performance but they cannot secure identity. In fact, individual actors develop different tactics to cope with organizational restrictions and ‘...they may in time transform themselves into an image that functions in a way that is useful to the organisation they work for’ (Ibid., 2009: 394).

From the perspective of individual actors organizational identity is what is central, distinctive and enduring about an organization (Whetten and Mackey, 2002 citing Albert and Whetten, 1985). This perception of identity reflects shared perceptions and beliefs among members concerning the identity of an organization. Therefore identity is an ‘...important source of heterogeneity’ because every organization is perceived in a different way by its members (King et al., 2010: 299).

Organizational identity can also be ascribed to organizations as social actors. In this context identity is defined as ‘...institutionalized claims available to members’ and expresses their self-definition (Whetten and Mackey, 2002: 395).

Identity is thus conceived of as those things that enable social actors (...) to be unique actors or entities (Whetten and Mackey, 2002: 396).

The uniqueness of social actors is expressed in their self-definition and is defined by the elements of centrality, distinctiveness and durability which are functional requirements of such a definition. Distinctiveness means how a social actor is similar to and distinct from other organizations. Both, individual identity and organizational identity also require continuity. With regard to organizations that means that organizational identity works like a constitution which gives security to individual members concerning their rights and responsibilities as well as ‘...for planning, explaining, and justifying collective action’ (Ibid., 2002: 397). Thus, individuals and organizations tend to defend their identities and therefore reduce their opportunities to achieve learning that promotes identity change (Brown and Starkey, 2000).

In comparison to organizational culture organizational identity ‘...is more purely cognitive in definition’ (Brickson, 2005: 580). The connection between organizational identity and culture can be examined from different starting points. On the one hand organizational identity might be considered as ‘...self-referencing aspect of organizational culture’ (Whetten, 2006: 227). On the other hand, culture can be treated as a distinguishing property of identity. This means that ‘...members are most likely to invoke specific cultural elements of their organization as distinguishing features when they are experienced as central and enduring organizational attributes (Ibid., 2006: 228). The main focus of the following sections is based on the latter proposition.

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Organizational culture can be considered as something that an organization 'is' or a variable which means that it is considered as something an organization 'has' and which can be manipulated (Meek, 1993: 202). Here culture will be considered as something the organization 'is' which means that culture cannot be created or destroyed by powerful individual actors as for example managing directors or presidents. However, organizational culture is related to the social interaction of individual actors and the process of social reproduction. It influences their behaviour with regard to the use of language, rules and knowledge, but it does not just become passively absorbed. Rather it becomes produced and reproduced and the latter can lead to the transformation of culture (Ibid., 1993). In the following the author defines organizational culture according to Schein (1993):

Organizational culture is the pattern of basic assumptions that a given group has invented, discovered, or developed in learning to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, and that have worked well enough to be considered valid, and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems (Schein, 1993: 237).

According to Schein (1993: 243) '...cultural elements are learned solutions to problems' and all cultural elements derive from consensus. With regard to the adaptation to the environment consensus comprises core missions, goals, strategies to achieve these goals and criteria for evaluation. In relation to internal problems consensus must be found on criteria for inclusion of members, the allocation of influence and power, peer relationships as well as incentives and punishments (Schein, 1989). If the objective would be to describe the whole culture of an organization all of these issues would have to be considered. However, within this thesis only the relevant aspects of culture are applied to the understanding of the dialogue.

Schein (1993) distinguishes three different levels of culture which interact with each other. The first level comprises visible artefacts like behaviour patterns or documents open to public such as charters, constitutions or orientation material for employees. The problem with these data is that they do not give information on why a group behaves in the way it does. The second level of culture comprises organizational values which 'represent accurately only the manifest or espoused values of a culture' (Ibid., 1993: 238). These values are contained in organizational documents and can be accessed by content analysis; however, they do not reveal the underlying reasons for the behaviour of individuals. For that reason Schein refers to the underlying assumptions which 'are typically unconscious but which actually determine how group members perceive, think and feel' (Ibid., 1993:

239). Underlying assumptions are based on values which, at the beginning guide behaviour to solve a problem and if the problem solving is successful those values are transformed in underlying assumptions.

(...), the domain of values can be divided into (1) ultimate, non-debatable, taken-for-granted values, for which the term ‘assumptions’ is more appropriate; and (2) debatable, overt, espoused values for which the term ‘values’ is more applicable. [...] They [*basic assumptions*] can be brought back to awareness only through a kind of focused inquiry, (...). What is needed, are the efforts of both an insider who makes the unconscious assumptions and an outsider who helps to uncover the assumptions by asking the right kinds of questions (Schein, 1993: 239).

Underlying assumptions refer to different core areas including human activities and relationships which mean for example that assumptions can develop concerning the most important functions of the organization, for example what kind of people make up the organization, how individual actors are motivated and which units are the most important for the organization (Schein, 1989). The underlying assumptions can also be influenced by the occupational backgrounds of individual members (Morgan, 1997).

It can be argued that all organizations have a different culture “strength” depending on their membership turnover and the intensity of shared experiences. Hence, an organization with a stable and homogeneous membership and a long and intense history is arguably likely to have a stronger culture. In addition, if there is a stable organizational leadership, high turnovers within the lower ranks is less likely to jeopardize the culture. As the following chapters will highlight, the organizations belonging to the IFIs (for example the IMF and the World Bank) and the Global Unions (for example their national-level union members) each have a strong individual organizational culture, however the reasons for their relatively strong cultures are based on different factors. All organizations also have subcultures due to their functional, divisional and geographic division which can be in conflict with each other. These subcultures emerge when groups of individual actors try to challenge, modify or replace the ‘official’ culture (Jermier et al., 1991: 172).

1.3.2.1 Organizational knowledge

The knowledge of an organization is part of its culture and an important organizational power resource. It enables an organization to act autonomously which can be perceived by other actors as a claim to power. Knowledge can be defined as ‘...a justified belief

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that increases an entity's capacity for effective action' (Alavi and Leidner, 2001: 109). Organizational knowledge is the product of learning and includes the interpretation of information received by individual actors and know-how (Huber, 1991).

In addition to the fact that it enables an organization to perform its characteristic activities, it constitutes a fundamental link '...between some collective pool of knowledge, skills, incentives and opportunities, on the one hand, and the rates, directions and economic effectiveness of this exploration, development and exploitation, on the other' (Dosi et al., 2008: 1165–1166). With regard to knowledge different views can be applied. It can be considered as a state of mind, as an objective, as a process and, as a condition of access to information or a capability (Alavi and Leidner, 2001).

Organizational knowledge is, on the one hand, stored in the minds of organizational members, and on the other hand, it is incorporated into routines and other organizational practices and shared representations as for example norms and rules (Ibid., 2008). For that reason it can be described as '...collective, interactive and socially structured' (Schmierl and Köhler, 2005: 6). Organizational knowledge creation is the process which makes individual knowledge available to the organizational knowledge system. The knowledge process includes several steps. It starts with the creation of knowledge, is followed by the use of knowledge, its transfer and sharing as well as its storage and retrieval for further use (Lindner and Wald, 2011). Due to the long term continuity of the international organizations their departments and units '...act as knowledge silos' and they have available specific mechanisms for knowledge capturing, storing, dissemination and organizational learning (Ibid., 2011: 877).

The corporate actors participating in the dialogue share their knowledge with each other. The uptake of this knowledge is preceded by processes of individual perception within the organizations and then classified according to their own organizational background. In order that knowledge can be recognized, it must be available in an explicit form (explicit knowledge) as for example as digital recordings or transcriptions.

Apart from explicit knowledge, implicit or tacit knowledge plays an important role for individuals and groups. It is connected to elements of individual '...perception, skills, experience and history' and '...underscores that knowledge is never free from human values and ideas' (Nonaka et al., 2006: 1182). In contrast to explicit knowledge which '...is uttered and captured in drawings and writing' (Nonaka and von Krogh, 2009: 635) and which is accessible through consciousness, implicit knowledge is unarticulated and connected to experiences and the intuition of individual actors (Lindner and Wald, 2011). Therefore tacit knowledge becomes explicit knowledge as individuals have to be able to

communicate their cognitive maps through words and action and to articulate ideas and concepts (Crossan et al., 1999).

With regard to the daily fulfilment of organizational tasks it means that individual organizational members draw on explicit and implicit knowledge at the same time because both forms of knowledge are not separate but ‘...mutually complementary’ (Nonaka and von Krogh, 2009: 638). However, where implicit knowledge cannot be expressed or objectivised it is not accessible for other individuals. For that reason tacit knowledge has to be transformed into explicit knowledge so that it becomes accessible for other individuals and so that it can be integrated into the organizational knowledge base.

By interacting and sharing tacit and explicit knowledge with others, the individual enhances the capacity to define a situation or problem, and apply his or her knowledge so as to act and specifically solve the problem (Nonaka et al., 2006: 1182).

Knowledge management includes all practices or processes of an organization to create, store, use and share knowledge. These main processes can be subdivided into sub-processes, including for example the creation of internal knowledge, the acquisition of external knowledge, the storage of knowledge in documents and routines as well as the updating and sharing of knowledge (Alavi and Leidner, 2001).

The development and implementation of knowledge management processes require a long-term perspective. In this context stable organizations like the IFIs and trade unions have the advantage that they can revert to organizational routines and organizational memory and that they are able to learn on that basis. This means that experiences from successfully implemented projects or activities can be transferred to other projects and later into organizational programmes which means that knowledge management can help to develop new routines. Furthermore, even if in organizational teams or organizational units the number of staff grows or reduces, there is a basic continuous composition of teams or units which helps to integrate individual and organizational knowledge.

Furthermore, knowledge management can be explained according to the properties of the context in which it takes place. That means it depends on the properties of an organizational unit (individual actors, groups or the organization itself), the properties of the relationship between the units and the properties of the knowledge itself (tacit and explicit knowledge). Properties of a unit comprise for example the expert and the social status of this unit (Argote et al., 2003: 573). Taking into account the context, for example the global governance system, the IFIs could be considered by governments as higher-status

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organizations than the Global Unions. For that reason the knowledge created by the IFIs is more likely to be 'licensed' by governments than the knowledge created by trade unions. The relationship between two units (organizations), for example the World Bank and the ITUC, is determined by various dimensions such as communication, contact frequency and social similarity. Each dimension may have an influence on knowledge management, but in general '...knowledge coming from units perceived to be part of the same organization is more likely to transfer and improve the performance of a focal unit than knowledge coming from external sources' (Ibid., 2003: 574).

For the creation of new knowledge in an organization it is necessary that organizational leaders establish a favourable social context which supports the knowledge development process. That means they have to motivate individual actors to participate in such a process, for example through the help of social and monetary rewards, and to provide opportunities that they can create and transfer knowledge. Individual actors must have the chance to transcend their knowledge and social practices in which they acquired knowledge. The creation of networks, the application of suitable technological developments (for example internet communities, twitter etc.) and strong social relationships support the knowledge creation process (Ibid., 2003).

The interpretation of knowledge available in organizations and its perception by the actors participating within the dialogue are important regards the success of the dialogue. If the relevant actors are able to identify common intersections these actors are more likely and more quickly able to modify their knowledge and views and to pursue a coherent policy in the subject areas concerned. However, it is difficult to measure organizational knowledge. Within the framework of the thesis changes in the cognitions of organizational members could only be perceived to a limited extent. For that reason the focus has been on the knowledge embedded in organizational practices and routines as well as the knowledge related to services and performance.

1.3.2.2 Power

Power is a very controversial concept in social sciences for that reason there is no consistent definition. In a very general sense power can be understood as an '...unequal relation, or inequality, based on personal attributes, institutional positioning and statuses that are defined, codified and acted upon within historical and cultural contexts' (Roscigno, 2011: 353).

The attribution of the social actor status to international organizations and the sovereignty connected to this status prescribes authority and power to these organizations. Power can be considered as an attribute which is prescribed to individual and corporate actors and their relationships as well as a process which describes a way to behave in interactions. With regard to the latter, Watson (1995: 383) has defined power as ‘...the capacity of any group or individual to affect the outcome of any situation in such a way that access is achieved to whatever resources are scarce and valued within a society or part of that society’. At the individual level power-holders can make decisions about resources, rewards and opportunities of others. In this context it is likely that such powerful individuals are more likely to internalize the goals of an organization and to act in service of them (Overbeck and Park, 2006). Thus, some actors are able to sway the actions of other actors (Piven, 2008).

The power of a corporate actor is determined by different resources which are attributes or things available for the respective organization and which can be used to force or convince another actor (Piven, 2008). According to Morgan (1997) such resources are for example formal authority, the control of resources the organization depends on for actions (finance, skills, personnel), the control of organizational knowledge and internal decision-making processes, the ability to cope with uncertainty which exists within and outside an organization and the use of organizational structure and rules (Morgan, 1997). Crucial characteristics of power resources are the costs involved in using them. Mobilization costs describe the relative ease with which resources can be mobilized and application costs concern the costs when a power resource is applied, as for example the costs of monitoring activities (Korpi, 1985). Further general characteristics are ‘scarcity’, which describes the extent to which a resource is available; ‘centrality’, which describes how important this resource is for the daily life of other actors, the ‘concentration potential’, which indicates the extent of concentration of resource to one or more actors, the ‘storage potential’ which describes the possibilities to store the resource over time as well as ‘liquidity’ which describes the degree to which a resource is ready for use (Ibid., 1985: 34). Finance, for example is a significant power resource which possesses a high concentration potential as well as high storage and liquidity potential. In contrast, human skills cannot be concentrated to a very high degree, they are not scarce and it is difficult to store them and sometimes to activate them.

Differences concerning the distribution of power sources can lead to power asymmetries within and between corporate actors which then may cause conflict if more powerful actors decide to exploit or try to influence weaker actors. Power plays a role with regard to

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relations and interactions among individual actors, their relations and interactions with a corporate actor as well as with regard to relations and interactions among corporate actors. When individual actors surrender sovereignty to an organization then they impose limitations on their personal autonomy and power and they strengthen the power of the corporate actor. Individual actors are influenced by hierarchies which develop over the time and which are anchored in bureaucratic structures, practices and internal power dynamics. The organizational capability to determine membership and the control of the behaviour of individual members is an important source of power for organizations.

This source of power is important as it provides a comparative, distinguishing characteristic of the organization (...). From an organizational actor perspective, the organization exercises power in deliberately admitting and dismissing members of the organization and in “controlling” behaviour through rules, rewards, and sanctions (King et al., 2010: 293).

On an individual level decoupling between formal procedures and everyday practices provides more flexibility to powerful individual actors. It can allow power abuses, as for example the abuse of enforcement power which is connected to certain positions in the organizational structure, and clears the way for intra-organizational inequality. These power asymmetries also become manifest within informal relations among individual actors (Dederichs, 2000).

The power relations and interactions between corporate actors are determined by internal (input factors) and external (output factors) factors. The former are connected to internal power resources and the latter describe the conditions which are found in the organizational environment and which determine strategic success (Offe, 1985: 175).

The IFIs and the Global Unions communicate and interact in different ways with their environment. This can be traced back to intra-organizational characteristics. Within the organizations which belong to the IFIs debates about organizational objectives only take place at the leadership level and the key resources (administration of finance and skills) are concentrated at the top level of this social hierarchy. By contrast, the international trade union organizations extend such discussions to the rank-and-file level which makes it sometimes difficult for the leadership to organize different interests in a coherent way.

(...), union leadership is constantly caught between attempting to provide comprehensive representation for all the interests of its working-class constituency and being limited in its ability to find a formula that reconciles these

partly contradictory interests without endangering their internal acceptability and/or external negotiability (Offe, 1985: 188).

This means that collective action within the IFIs is organized in 'instrumental-monological' patterns and within the trade union organizations in 'dialogical' patterns (Offe, 1985: 193). At the inter-organizational level the IFIs exercise power through leadership and use it in a more defensive, hidden and dispersed way. For example the boards of the World Bank and the IMF have considerable power within and outside their organizations and they '... can be a very persuasive force in framing problems as well as formulating solutions' (Oestreich, 2007: 10). The international trade union organizations exercise power through the activity of members and use power in an offensive, open and concentrated way (Offe, 1985: 193). During the exchange with the environment the IFIs make use of their knowledge in terms of 'technical' imperatives and the international trade union organizations communicate in terms of 'demands and explicit normative claims' (Ibid., 1985: 193).

Differences concerning power resources the organizations have available and differences concerning the use of power lead to the creation of power asymmetries between the corporate actors. However, it is difficult to determine the real power positions of two different corporate actors as their resources not only differ quantitatively but also qualitatively (Korpi, 1985).

Due to the dispersed way in which IFIs use their power it could be argued that these organizations are '... vehicles for power politics' (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2006: 4). For the international trade unions it is much more difficult to force institutional change with regard to other actors because of their limited power resources in material terms. However, they can resort to social and cooperative relations which also represent a kind of power, even though this kind of power is more concentrated on the national level than at the international level. The disadvantage in comparison to the IFIs is, however, that the Global Unions have quite high mobilization costs because collective action by a large number of actors is more costly to organize than if a department of the IFIs (which is lead by a small group) sets up financial support in a particular country. Due to the fact that there is a great difference in power resources between both organizations it can be further argued that the Global Unions have a lower motivation to exercise pressure resources and, conflicts of interests are less likely to turn into open conflicts.

1.3.3 Organizational change

Organizational change can be conceptualized as process and content. The first describes the process of organizational change and the second describes what the changes mean for the content (Barnett and Carroll, 1995). There are two different organizational strands which describe organizational change. The first of these suggests that change occurs mainly through adaptation to prior changes, for example in the environment. This strand fits with institutional theory for example. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest that uncertainty triggers organizational change because organizations try to imitate other organizations. They see organizational change, as a change in ‘... formal structure, organizational culture, and goals, programme, or mission’ (Ibid., 1983: 149). According to institutional theory the preservation of legitimacy is one of the driving forces for this process. The second strand refers to selective mechanisms of organizational change and also suggests that some organizations might fail during the adaptation process (Barnett and Carroll, 1995).

Organizational change can be related to internal and external factors. Internal factors are for example the age, size and the culture of an organization. The larger and older an organization is then the less likely it is that organizational change will occur because such organizations are more likely to have well-developed bureaucratic structures, procedures and roles. In general, large organizations

(...), tend to become complacent about their competences. They fail to perceive the need for change until confronted with necessity in the form of a crisis (Farquhar et al., 1989: 34).

If the organizational culture supports trustful relationships organizational change and learning are more likely to be promoted in a positive way. However, the occupational culture, in particular traditionally defined roles, can also contribute to rigidity and resistance to change (Lucas and Kline, 2008). External factors include the development of technology, competitive pressures, social expectations and environmental constraints and opportunities (Barnett and Carroll, 1995).

The outcomes of change processes can affect the organizational identity and culture, the organizational structure (for example hierarchy, technology, communication) as well as organizational functions and modes of action (for example practices, procedures and routines) (Schneider et al., 1996).

Changes in function can be traced in the programs of international organizations. There may be changes in the scale of operations (...). There may

also be changes in the authority of an organization, either because members become more responsive to its decisions or because the organization begins to make enactments of a new kind that place more demands upon members. (...) Finally, there may be changes in the relative importance of an international organization within the issue-area or areas with which it is concerned (Cox and Jacobson, 1997: 78).

However, there is no measure for organizational change and organizational change can vary in its scale and scope (organization-wide or not), its characteristics (perceived as necessary to all or only some units), its timeframe and its importance for the organization; for example if change is critical for the survival of the organization (Andersson and Pan, 2011). For the achievement of an organization-wide change incentives for individual actors play an important role.

Organizational change is closely linked to the processing of knowledge and organizational learning (Child and Heavens, 2004). Organizational learning is always connected with a certain level of change whilst barriers to organizational learning can constrain organizational change. Such barriers are for example the focus of individual actors regarding their job positions, organizational and departmental boundaries which hinder the flow of information among individuals and control systems which may lead to the result that individual actors keep specific knowledge to themselves. However, an increasingly dynamic environment challenges organizations and puts them under increasing pressure to change, learn and adapt and arguably ‘...to take actions that are ethically acceptable and sustainable, and which balance the interests of a range of different stakeholders’ (Rowley and Gibbs, 2008: 357).

1.3.3.1 Organization and learning

Organizational learning has been examined by different academic disciplines focusing on different phenomena such as information processing, product innovation or bounded rationality (Crossan et al., 1999). In general there are cognitive theories which focus on the contents of individual minds (March and Olsen, 1975) and which conceptualize learning as cognitive processes, and organizational theories, as for example the situated learning theory (Contu and Willmott, 2003), which focuses on the process and outcomes of learning and the embeddedness of learning practices in power relations.

Organizational learning is a dynamic process and a social phenomenon which is related to processes of individual learning, but which cannot only be reduced to such individual

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processes (Dosi et al., 2008; Huber, 1991). On the contrary, it is different from the learning of individual actors. The turnover of individual members of an organization does not necessarily mean that an organization loses the knowledge associated with these individuals as some learning is embedded in the organizational structure, strategy or routines. In a very broad sense learning can be defined as a change in the organization's knowledge which manifests itself in changes in cognition or behaviour and which could be embedded in different repositories such as routines and individual actors (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011: 1124). Transformative organizational learning leads to the modification of the identity and the cultural core of an organization (Brown and Starkey, 2000).

In the following sections the thesis will apply an organizational learning framework which links the individual level, the group level and the organizational level with each other. Crossan et al. (1999) developed a multilevel framework of learning based on four premises. They suggest that (1) learning involves a tension between new learning (exploration) and using the knowledge which has been learned (exploitation), (2) learning involves individuals, groups and organizations, (3) all three different learning levels are linked by social and psychological processes and (4) cognition affects action and vice versa. The latter distinguishes organizational learning from the related field of knowledge management, because knowledge management is mainly focused on cognition and not focused on action.

The starting point for organizational learning is the individual actor and his cognitive capacities. Only an individual actor is able to develop innovative ideas, to get insights, to use their intuition and to interpret information. In this respect it is a precondition that individual actors are willing to make and acknowledge their own mistakes and those of others, to reflect on them, to consider different ideas and to test unproven approaches (Bunderson and Reagans, 2011).

In contrast to individual actors an organization only constitutes the context in which individual actors are confronted with specific knowledge and beliefs to which they refer during the interpretation of information (Simon, 1991). An organization does not have intuition and it cannot interpret information. In long-established organizations spontaneous learning of individual actors becomes less likely because prior learning which is embedded in organizational institutions guides interpretation and action. Furthermore relations among actors in long established organizations are more formalized.

Intuiting and interpreting occur at the individual level, interpreting and integrating occur at the group level, and integrating and institutionalizing occur at the organizational level (Crossan et al., 1999: 524–525).

If individual actors work together with other actors they may interpret, in other words explain through words and/or action an idea to one's self and to others. The interpretation process, which in contrast to intuiting reflects the conscious part of individual learning, can result in the development of a common language which passes into an 'integrating' process when a group of individuals develops a shared understanding and acts in a coordinated way through mutual adjustment (Crossan et al., 1999). The headquarters-level dialogue between the Global Unions and the IFIs is understood as a crucial instrument for developing such a new and shared understanding as well as coordinated action at the international level.

Successful actions will be repeated in the future and a workgroup may establish formal rules and procedures to assure the routinization of action. The routines and rules are the outcome of an institutionalization process and characterize the enduring properties of an organization. The routines and rules are independent from individual actors and enables an organization to '... enhance the performance of an existing activity or task or to prepare for new circumstances' (Child and Heavens, 2004: 309).

Institutionalizing is the process of ensuring that routinized action occurs. Tasks are defined, actions specified, and organizational mechanisms put in place to ensure that certain actions occur. Institutionalizing is the process of embedding learning that has occurred by individuals and groups into the organization, and it includes systems, structures, procedures, and strategy (Crossan et al., 1999: 525).

At this point it can be concluded that 'interpreting' means a change in the understanding and actions of individual actors and 'integrating' focuses around coherent, collective action (Ibid., 1999: 528). The institutionalization of learning can mean two things for an organization. First, structural changes and changes with regard to routines are less likely and more infrequent because if something is institutionalized it is more persistent. Second, as the transfer of learning over the different levels takes time, the outcome of institutionalized learning which will be achieved after a certain time may no longer fit with the changes which have occurred in the organizational environment. For that reason organizations always face a tension between new learning and the exploitation of what has already been learned.

1.3.3.2 Organizational dynamic

The dynamic of an organization is determined by the capacity of a corporate actor to change and to learn. The more flexible an organization is with regard to the initiation and implementation of learning processes, the more dynamic it is. The ability to change and to learn is likewise important for the IFIs and the Global Unions because it allows them to be responsive to global political and economic challenges and to maintain their legitimacy. However, in each organization there are effective self-reinforcing mechanisms which can slow down the organizational dynamic. The concept of path-dependency describes such mechanisms and how they limit the scope of alternative actions for an organization. According to this concept a dominant action pattern will be developed which makes it difficult for alternative patterns to get attention and acceptance. If this pattern ‘...gets fixed and develops a quasi-deterministic character’ then a path is developed (Schreyögg and Sydow, 2011).

Self-reinforcing mechanisms are for example ‘coordination effects’ or ‘learning effects’ which both, on the one hand, increase the efficiency of an organization but on the other hand constrain change processes (Ibid., 2011: 324). The former refers to the adoption and application of specific rules and routines which help an organization to reduce its coordination costs because reactions of individual actors can be anticipated in advance. The latter refers to the accumulation of skills and reliability of an operation the more this operation is performed. If the results of the operation meet the organizational expectations it becomes more and more unlikely that an organization will opt for a new solution as the learning process would have to start again. Path-dependency includes the danger that an organization becomes dysfunctional which means it loses its flexibility as well as capability to adapt to new circumstances or to find better alternatives (Ibid., 2011).

1.3.4 The organizational environment

According to organization theory, organizations are open systems which engage with their environment. This means that the environment has an influence on organizations and in turn organizations try to influence the environment for their own good. In other words, organizations interact with their environment and they are environments for other organizations and for individual actors at the same time.

This division is also reflected within organization theory which distinguishes between a general and a task environment. The first is composed of multiple environments including

for example social, political and economic developments. The second refers to other actors such as regulatory groups (governments, trade unions etc.) with whom organizations interact and who directly affect the achievement of organizational goals and the autonomy of organizational leadership (Bourgeois, 1980). This means that the task environment has a direct short-term impact on the organization.

It can be argued that organizations are increasingly having to act in dynamic environments which change quickly. The environment of organizations contains potential stimuli and triggers which can accelerate the dynamic of organizational behaviour and change processes. Within this thesis the international organizations are considered as corporate social actors which can influence individual actors and transform their environments.

The environment can be defined as abstract non-static space, consisting of different systems and sub-systems and its institutions and actors, which are continuously generating new stimuli for organizational action. On the one hand, the environment provides resources and opportunities to an organization, and on the other hand it contains constraints and demands which can be perceived as threats (Scott and Davis, 2007: 19). With regard to the organization-environment relationship, Scott (1998: 100) assumes a reciprocal exchange relationship which is marked by ‘...reciprocal ties that bind and relate the organization with those elements that surround and penetrate it’. The organizations assimilate the input from their environment in the form of information and convert such inputs according to the resources they have available.

In order to ensure its continuance and achieve its objectives each organization relies on interaction with the environment. This interaction could result in an organizational reaction for example concerning a context-sensitive problem grounded in the environment, or a communication, or a negotiation process with other actors.

(...), every organization must negotiate with its environment. In terms of strategic analysis, this means that different actors in an organization’s relevant environment invariably control major sources of uncertainty for the organization (Crozier and Friedberg, 1980: 81).

The Global Unions control sources of uncertainty for the IFIs and vice versa. Nevertheless, as the IFIs have a greater scope and impact than the Global Unions it can be argued that the IFIs create much more uncertainty for the trade unions. In other words the IFIs can exert a greater influence on the environment than the trade unions and have a greater influence on their own environment (Andersson and Pan, 2011). In contrast the international trade unions are weaker organizations and rely more on adaptation processes.

1.4 Global governance and organizational theories

Global governance refers to mechanisms of interaction at the global level and political regulation. Due to the broad range of challenges which international organizations with regard to global governance face, global governance can be understood as a determining factor which puts limits on organizational capabilities. This means that

(...), each international institution is no longer able to deal effectively with its primary mandate without strategic guidance and well-defined relationships with other institutions that address related issues outside its primary mandate, mission, and capacity (Bradford and Linn, 2007: 130).

Labour issues are clearly outside the primary mandate and mission of the IFIs. For that reason, even though the Global Unions are mainly pushing the establishment and maintenance of a stable process of dialogue with the IFIs because of an existing self-interest, the IFIs also can profit from those efforts, for example by amplifying their own expertise in this field. The amplification of expertise and the analysis of arguments of the trade unions on the part of the IFIs, and vice versa, depend on the willingness of the organizations to cooperate and to learn because there is no global institutional framework which puts pressure on those organizations. Due to the lack of a legally binding framework for social partners at the global level and the high degree of voluntarism which is involved in global governance, corporate actors have an even higher level of self-responsibility regards the development of social policy. In this context, the exercise of this responsibility which includes exchange and cooperation with other international corporate actors is determined by individual organizational characteristics.

With regard to the analysis of interaction within the framework of global governance, organizational theories can help to shed light on the organizational particularities of corporate actors. This is important for two reasons. First, these particularities can illuminate possible obstacles and common grounds regards joint interaction. Secondly, they can help to develop further and to specify the analytical dimension of the global governance concept which in particular means the mode of operation of new forms of regulation.

The headquarters-level of dialogue between the Global Unions and the IFIs can be seen as one such forms of regulation. In this context, the connection between the global governance concept and organizational theories relating to the dialogue, aims to provide a better understanding of how the participating corporate actors react to and deal with global problems, how they respond to stimuli anchored in their environment and why they respond in

1.4 Global governance and organizational theories

the way they do, the scope of their own authority and the influencing factors such authority is based on as well as the availability and the use of organizational power.

The theoretical approach includes different perspectives and approaches such as for example the institutional perspective which focuses on an analysis of the impact of internal organizational institutions, in the form of rules, values and norms which mark the identity and culture of an organization, the gathering of new knowledge, the determination of decision making processes as well as organizational learning and change. Organizational knowledge is one of the most powerful organizational power resources. It helps organizations to create their own social reality through classification, regulation and dissemination mechanisms (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). In the context of the dialogue the acquisition and the transfer of knowledge between organizations and within organizations is important. Knowledge transfer refers for example to passing on specific expert knowledge on the part of the Global Unions to the IFIs and vice versa. The latter, for example, is related to information about the initiation of new lending programmes to support countries on the part of the IFIs. The effective processing of knowledge which in the future can lead to a sustainable influence on organizational action and the change of identity, occurs through learning.

Organizational learning is a dynamic process which occurs over time and in connection with the environment the organization is embedded which affects the experiences an organization acquires (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011). Learning is not only related to the exchange of factual knowledge but it also can be understood as an, ‘... on-going search for a time- and context-sensitive identity’ (Brown and Starkey, 2000: 110). The development of an identity is a lifelong process of change which is shaped by phases of exploration and commitment. During an exploration phase within an organization alternative future directions will be considered and the existing identity structure will be considered in a critical and reflexive way (Ibid., 2000). In this respect, the Global Unions and other organizations try to prompt such an exploration phase within the IFIs regards labour issues. To some extent they have been (as we discuss in later Chapters), at least partly, successful, as for example concerning labour standards within the field of procurement. However, the question of to what extent this has also led to a critical and reflexive consideration of the existing identity of the IFIs will be discussed later in the thesis.

The willingness to reflect on organizational identity is based on a perceived pressure to do so. This pressure can be created by the environment and/or corporate actors which are active in this environment or, what is less likely, due to an objective self-assessment of an organization. The latter is less likely as institutionalized values and rules very often limit

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the range of vision of individual actors within an organization. However, the resistance of an organization to respond to any form of pressure is closely connected to its power resources. These resources influence ‘... who gets what, when, and how’ (Morgan, 1997: 170), and they determine the possibilities of an organization to resist pressure or to refuse cooperation without being damaged.

Interim conclusion

The objective of the second chapter was to introduce the theoretical framework which serves to analyse the organizations involved in the dialogue and on which the thesis will partly draw during the development of the hypotheses. The analysis of the characteristics of the international actors is arguably important because, on the one hand, they determine their position in the system of global governance, and on the other hand, they indirectly steer the behaviour of the organizations in the framework of the dialogue and as such have a considerable influence in determining the success of the dialogue.

For the purposes of this study the international organizations which are involved in the dialogue are described as corporate social actors. The actor status of these organizations derives from the expectations of other actors such as governments, individual actors and stakeholders who hold them responsible for their actions (King et al., 2010).

As corporate actors they have a clearly defined relationship with their member organizations. In particular in the case of the IFIs the organizations could be understood as ‘... authorized social actors and social artifacts – that is, social tools fashioned by founders for specific purposes’ (Whetten and Mackey, 2002: 397). However, even though there is a certain dependency relationship which will be taken into account, it does not describe the nature of these organizations within the thesis. Rather, the focus is on international organizations as social actors. This means that even though they do not share the same structural attributes as human actors they do have functionally equivalent characteristics (King et al, 2010). Social actors can take goal-oriented actions, intervene actively in their environment, act without the consent of their members, and they are able to make intentional decisions and use resources to achieve the goals defined in their missions. Finally, they are also able to reflect on their own actions, to learn from experiences and are to some extent accountable for their actions. In other words, organizations as social actors are able to act in a sovereign and autonomous way.

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organization create ‘...fragmented patterns of thought and action’ which affect the flow of knowledge and organizational learning (Morgan, 1997: 88). Both the World Bank and the IMF have strong hierarchical divisions, and the World Bank also has strong horizontal divisions which limit the free flow of knowledge. As a result different subunits ‘...often operate on the basis of different pictures of the total situation, pursuing subunit goals almost as ends in themselves’ (Morgan, 1997: 88). For the dialogue with the Global Unions this can mean that different subunits of the World Bank and the IMF deal with trade unions in an incoherent and inconsistent manner due to different prevailing perspectives and often a lack of adequate and accurate information. In contrast with the IFIs, the structure of the Global Unions is less hierarchical and in theory at least provides all their member organizations with the opportunity of equal participation with regard to intra-organizational issues. However, to what extent member organizations make use of this opportunity depends on the priority they give to a certain issue and on their resources.

For the purpose of explaining structural changes within the IFIs the thesis will refer to the theory of new sociological institutionalism which includes the concept of isomorphism. This concept can help to explain why these organizations have integrated new institutions such as worker’s rights (even if they do not increase their organizational efficiency) and how organizations protect their existing structure, for example through decoupling of structural elements from activities.

Organizational structure also has an effect on decision making. Decision-making is mainly linked to individual actors and their cognitive limitations and incomplete preferences. In order to facilitate coordination among individual actors, the different subunits develop programmes of activities or responses regards certain stimuli which facilitate search and selection processes for individual actors. Over time they can lead to a routinization of activities which make organizational learning processes more difficult. With regard to corporate actors decision making is linked to their self-view which becomes expressed in their identity and objectives. Each organization expresses identity claims as institutionalized mission statements, policies and routines which provide ‘...members and informed outsider with a common set of phenomenological points of reference that guide consequential deliberation and organizational decision making’ (King et al., 2010: 295).

Institutionalized policies and programmes and the routinization of activities can hamper the cooperation between organizations and the development of joint positions and policies. This is because routinized activities tend to hinder organizational agents’ abilities to see the bigger picture. The dialogue which is examined within the thesis can help to mitigate or even overcome problems which are interconnected with organizational characteristics.

In the longer term the dialogue could arguably also play a part in contributing to balancing out the power imbalances among different corporate actors within the system global governance.

2 Methodological approach

The study is based on qualitative research methods which include expert interviews, non-participant observation and a content analysis of documentary materials. Triangulation allows the researcher to adopt ‘...different perspectives regarding the object under investigation’ (Flick, 2004: 12) in order to achieve a greater level of objectivity and the acquisition of knowledge at different levels (Flick, 2004; Lamnek 2005). In this study data and methods-triangulation are applied to the object under investigation. This approach requires that the applied methods are ‘equally utilised’ (Flick 2006a; Flick 2007) and provides for an analysis of the objectives, problem perception and the construction of meaning systems within the different organizations and their impact on the dialogue. Expert interviews are carried out in conjunction with other methods in order to compensate, at least partially, for the problems associated with a conscious selection of interview respondents and a semi-structured interview schedule.

In general, qualitative research includes different types of questions. In this context Flick (2006) distinguishes between questions related to present conditions and questions related to the description of processes. The leading research question which refers to the progress achieved within the dialogue and its context include both condition and process describing elements. On the one hand the thesis will attempt to reveal the structures and mechanisms which determine the dialogue. On the other hand the thesis will describe and analyse the processes of change and the dialogue process itself.

Although the qualitative research includes a very broad spectrum of procedures, there are some paradigmatic similarities relating to qualitative research. They include the alienness postulate as well as the principles of openness and communication (Mruck and Mey, 2005). These principles mark crucial differences concerning quantitative research, in particular concerning the process of the development of hypotheses²⁶.

²⁶Another difference is reflected in the assumption on which both quantitative and qualitative methodical procedures are based. Qualitative research assumes that the real world is only accessible as reconstruction and not as realistic picture (Schnapp et al., 2006).

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Qualitative research is an inductive hypothesis generating approach which is conducted for description and exploration. In contrast to quantitative research it does not refer to causal relationships among variables which are tested by the use of statistical procedures. Qualitative research normally starts on the basis of research questions, even though there might be some hypotheses inductively generated. However, in qualitative research no distinction is made between null and directional hypotheses (Creswell, 2009).

In the course of the research process new hypotheses are developed and preliminary formulated hypotheses will be revised and specified. Lamnek (2005: 21)²⁷ describes this procedure with the openness principle of qualitative research:

In qualitative research the hypothesis generation process provisionally finishes with the end of the period of investigation. During the research process the researcher should be as open as possible towards new developments and dimensions which can then be included in the formulation of the hypothesis.

Further principles, which Lamnek (2005: 21) relates to qualitative research, are the 'processual character of research and subject-matter' and 'research as communication'. The processual character refers to reproduction, change and the interpretation of actor specific action patterns which will be recorded and explained. In this context the researcher who is actively involved in the research process is a constitutive component of the same. Research as communication means that communication is required for the research process but the understanding of single actions requires an understanding of the context (Ibid., 2005).

The preliminary hypotheses of the thesis refer to theories of organization which have been introduced in the first chapter and data available from the early interviews. Every preliminary hypothesis is related to several research questions (Atteslander, 2008). The results of the expert interviews form the information basis for insights about organizational culture, the mutual perception of corporate actors and their conception of reality. The problem-centred approach²⁸ within the interviews offers the possibility to reveal complex mediation processes of action and evaluation patterns and to gather their relevance criteria, putting the emphasis on the perceptions of the interviewees. This means that the subsequent comparability of data will be ensured by the determination of topics which, at the time of the interviews does not limit the presentation of personal views.

²⁷Hopf (1995) formulates in this context that the wording and the reprobation of hypotheses as well as the specification of questions arise during the research and data collection process.

²⁸Source: Witzel, 1982: 70

2.1 Quality criteria in qualitative research

The theoretical background of the method is the interest in subjective viewpoints. (...) Research questions are oriented to knowledge about facts or socialization processes (Flick, 2006: 164).

During the interviews insights were gathered on the day-to-day activities and workflows of all the relevant international organisations concerned in the study providing a good understanding of such. This was particularly important with regard to the IFIs because the author had little previous experience with these organizations. However, the author does have a stronger background knowledge of the Global Union organizations due to previous experiences working as an intern for the large German metal workers trade union *Industriegewerkschaft Metall* (IG Metall) and the German trade union confederation the *Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund* (DGB).

The data collection which is structured through expert interviews and indirect participant observation was determined by three reference points: the researcher and his/her research interest, the individual actors and their views; and the action situation of the individual actors (Flick, 1995a).

2.1 Quality criteria in qualitative research

Data collection through the use of qualitative methods and the analysis of such data are to a considerable extent, subjectively shaped processes. As such there is assumed to be a degree of objectivity in the framework of these processes, in this study classical and method appropriate quality criteria are applied. Within qualitative research the idea of scientific quality criteria often only emerge during the research activity itself. For that reason, the classical criteria which come from quantitative methods such as representativity, validity and reliability are only applicable to a certain extent (Lamnek, 2005). Scientific quality criteria in qualitative research mainly focus on the analysis of the data and not on the data collection itself as is common practice within quantitative research. In addition to the intersubjective replicability of the process of research and analysis, appropriateness is an important quality criterion. Appropriateness refers to theoretical scientific pre-conceptions with regard to the terms and the methodical approach that are applied, that is procedures for measurement and analysis (Schnapp et al., 2006). Measurement and analysis procedures can then be considered appropriate if ‘...they fulfil the scientific object of the researcher and empirical reality’ (Lamnek, 2005: 145). The well-known criteria and methods relat-

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ing to the test of reliability normally used in quantitative research cannot be applied within qualitative research due to its interpretive and communicative nature.

Even though qualitative research attempts to fulfil the reliability of its research instruments, the specification of this quality criterion in the field of qualitative methods has not yet been achieved. In the context of data collection involving semi-structured interviews the contextual conditions for data collection cannot be controlled or repeated identically. The criterion of validity also contradicts the communicative and interpretive approach because the objective of qualitative research is to develop an understanding with respondents and to get access to their social reality²⁹ (Flick, 2007: 193).

The researcher needs some space for spontaneous interpretation of observed behaviours and statements. This makes it impossible for the researcher to take an entirely independent position within the measuring process³⁰. In contrast to quantitative research where the validity criterion refers to the data collection, qualitative research focuses on the analysis and the interpretation³¹ of these data. Thus, to satisfy the approach of validity, qualitative research has developed several general quality criteria³² which are briefly presented below.

Ecological validation³³ is geared towards the importance of dependency on context and the necessity of adaptation of the data collection process to the particularities of the living environment in order to embrace the social reality of the objective. To take account of this criterion this thesis applies non-participant observation and expert interviews. In the framework of expert interviews the focus is on ‘...the actor which is incorporated in a functional context’ and ‘advancing knowledge which is the result of the privileged position of the expert in a functional context’ (Meuser and Nagel, 2006: 57). Interviewees can remember decision-making processes and official criteria which were important to these processes, but they are often unaware of the foundational logic of decision making and routines (Ibid., 2006).

²⁹The standardisation of context and the isolation of variables which have to be investigated would shape the conditions of interaction in an artificial way. However, the integration of daily routines of the interviewees plays an important role in understanding for what reason subjectivity should be integrated into the research process (Lamnek, 2005: 168).

³⁰Source: Spöhring, 1989: 28

³¹In this study a method of interpretation based on thematic coding is followed by analytical induction.

³²Mayring developed six independent ‘methodological appropriate’ quality criteria for qualitative research. They focus in particular on the ‘argumentative’ backup of interpretation’ for the inter-subjective retrace-ment of the process of data collection and the ‘rule-governed’ methodological procedure which means the systematisation of this procedure. They broadly match with the criteria of Lamnek (Mayring, 2002).

³³Lamnek considers eight forms of validation in general. In addition to the ecological and the argumentative validation these forms include communicative and cumulative validation, validation from experience, procedural validation, validation by triangulation and analytical induction (Lamnek, 2005: 155).

Appropriate data collection methods and the integration of the environmental conditions in the analysis of the data allow the researcher to gain a better understanding of the respondent. Having interests in common with the respondent allows for a closer relationship to develop between the researcher and the respondent, but it also can have negative consequences for the objectivity of the researcher.

Argumentative validation is concerned with a systematic, rule orientated, comprehensible interpretation of the material, which is in turn based on a rigorous and coherent argumentation. In this way argumentative validation guarantees a certain level of inter-subjectivity of the interpreted result. The incremental analysis of the data is taken into account with the application of the appropriate rules during the evaluation procedure. This includes procedural validation which is not focused on rigid normative rules, but on reflexive principles which derive from theoretical and methodological foregoing considerations with regard to the research object and experiences within research practice. This includes for example the accuracy of records, the feedback of the results into the data collection process as well as the behaviour of respondents during the interview. Lamnek (2005: 166) concludes that the qualitative methods of data collection are usually more valid because the ‘... data emerge closer to the social field’ and the ‘... methods are more open and flexible’. With regard to the analysis and interpretation of the data, however, quantitative methods show a higher degree of validity and reliability.

The quality of qualitative research is not only oriented towards quality criteria, but also towards the quality of the statements received during the interviews. This refers in particular to the correct understanding of answers by the interviewer. To exclude misunderstandings during the interpretation of the answers, a context or rather common knowledge with regard to the interviewee is indispensable for the interviewer. With regard to the interviews with trade unionists the author already had a good understanding of the relevant context as mentioned above. By contrast, the interpretation of information received during the interviews with representatives of the IFIs has been more challenging.

2.2 The collection and analysis of data

The data was collected with the help of semi-structured interviews and non-participant observation. In the following sections the development of the semi-structured interview schedule, the observation process and the analysis of the data are explained.

2.2.1 The interview schedule

The interview guide provides a framework for the organization of the research process on a thematic basis and is open to revision. When conducting the interview a semi-structured schedule which included no predefined answers was used. Within such an open conversation the interviewees can give their subjective perspectives and opinions. At the same time there is the possibility to frame additional questions³⁴ whereby ambiguities can be removed and new and emerging lines of enquiry during the interview can be pursued. During the interviews open questions were used. In this case a development of answer categories is, in contrast to the type of closed question, not necessary. In order to prevent comprehension problems and to ensure compliance with perceived meanings, formulations which had been adapted to the work-related daily routine were used, whilst scientific concepts were avoided. Therefore, the author first drew on working papers and documents of the organizations in question. In total more than 34 expert interviews³⁵ with representatives of the GUFs, the ITUC, national trade unions, the ILO as well as the World Bank and the IMF were conducted between 2008 and 2014.

Contacts were made with interviewees directly and there was no random selection from a complete expert register. Some of the contacts came about from a respondent who had already been interviewed (snowballing). As interviewer³⁶ the author tried to approach with an open mind the attitudes and statements of the interviewees and to stimulate their willingness to more detailed answers. The results of the research are based on the transcripts of the expert interviews, the analysis of written documents such as protocols, statements, position papers and reports as well as the observation minutes of the High-level meeting in 2009.

2.2.2 The method of observation

As an observer of one high-level meeting and one technical meeting in Washington in 2009 the author was able to observe the exchange of the actors within the dialogue up close. The author was not a part of the on-going exchange and was only referred to in the minutes. This

³⁴Exploratory questions facilitate the specification of issues which have not been clearly enough communicated by the side of the interviewees and they make clear the request for detailing. By the help of ad-hoc questions problem areas can be addressed spontaneously.

³⁵A listing of all interviews conducted is in the annex A.1. In order to preserve the anonymity of the interviewees single quotations are only encoded by the initials of the organization.

³⁶Scholl describes the role and the therewith connected instructions for the interviewer in more detail (Scholl, 1993: 38).

form of observation can be defined as non-participant and open (Blatter et al., 2005). In the broadest sense observation means ‘...the systematic capture, adherence and interpretation of behaviour perceptible by the senses at the time of its occurrence’ (Atteslander, 2006: 67). The objective of the application of this method consists in the ‘...reconstruction of social reality’ and the generation of hypotheses (Ibid., 2006: 83). For the process and the record of perception the author did not take as a basis an observation pattern. Therewith the possibility to act flexibly and openly within the observation situation has been preserved.

2.2.3 Content analysis

As an instrument for data collection and analysis, content analysis plays an important role in this thesis. On the one hand documents were analysed as separate examination objects and on the other hand qualitative content analysis was applied (Mayring, 2002). Qualitative content analysis is an instrument which is a systematically and rule-governed procedure for the development of categories. As with the interpretation of any data, the decision for a specific methodical process and the development of structures lead to the focus on some data whilst others fade into the background (Flick, 1995).

In the context of a first basic analysis of the documents the aim was ‘...to make the research object manageable’ and ‘...to clarify central commonalities or semblances and important distinctions within the data’ (Lamnek, 2005: 230). According to Mayring (1995) qualitative content analysis is a common method within qualitative social research which includes the summary content analysis and the explanatory content analysis. Whilst the first is geared towards data reduction, the second has the objective of clarifying unclear text elements. The latter can be carried out through a closed context analysis limited to the text or a wide context analysis.

The data was organized with the help of a QDA-Software (MAX-QDA). Kuckartz (2010) distinguishes several steps concerning the analytical process with regard to the application of this software. The first analysis phase focuses on an analytical interpretation of the text. This phase is followed by systematic work with categories and the production of a connection between them.

First, important parts of the text were identified and coded and the codes were organised into categories (Kuckartz, 2010). The decision was made to use in-vivo codes rather than sociologically constructed codes for the categories, as in-vivo codes provide a better fit with the data. In-vivo codes comprise terms which the interviewees use. The procedure described by Kuckartz which can be applied in an inductive, deductive or mixed form

2 Methodological approach

includes thematic coding as suggested by Flick (2007). This inductive orientated process helps to develop categories³⁷ and theoretical connections in relation to the data. This procedure follows the grounded theory as proposed by Strauss (1994), but it is modified in some respects. In contrast to the grounded theory the focus is not on the development of a core variable or category, but on the development of thematic areas and categories which are relevant for the description of the research object. These are based on the views of the different actors that participate in the dialogue.

The underlying assumption is that in different social worlds or groups, differing views can be found. Sampling is oriented to the groups whose perspectives on the issue seem to be most instructive for analysis, and which are therefore defined in advance (...) (Flick, 2006: 307).

A global evaluation was applied prior to the coding of the data. This made it easier to find and designate passages in the text for selective coding and it provided an overview of the themes included in the text. First, keywords were marked and larger passages were structured, secondly, central concepts and statements were marked and ideas and observations were written down in the form of memos.

In theoretical coding, this method may facilitate the finding and assignment of further passages, especially for later steps of axial or selective coding (Flick, 2006: 316).

In the process of the analysis categories were increasingly differentiated and formulated in a more abstract manner and enriched with additional text passages through selective coding. The category systems that were developed for the trade unions and the IFIs were compared and integrated leading to the development of a thematic structure. This served as a basis for the evaluation and analysis of the dialogue.

2.3 Hypotheses and research questions

As mentioned earlier qualitative research is an inductive and subjective approach which means it is more open-ended and exploratory in comparison with quantitative research. Qualitative research is not centred on the testing of hypotheses, but the analysis can generate hypotheses and/or lead to the amendment of the original hypotheses. The basis for

³⁷The coding paradigm as proposed by Strauss (1994: 57) was used according to which data was codified in accordance with the relevance of certain phenomena which are described in categories. They include '...conditions determining interaction between actors, strategies and tactics, and consequences'.

the thesis is a case study on the involvement of external stakeholders (Global Unions) in the decision making processes of the international financial organizations (IFIs). In this context the author developed two preliminary hypotheses and a number of related research questions which formed the basis for the analysis of the dialogue. As we suggest above the hypotheses can if necessary be revised at a later stage according to the outcome of the analysis. Although the hypotheses are not explicitly related to each other there are clear correlations between them. Nevertheless, we have already discussed both the individual and the corporate levels influence in relation to each other so they cannot be analysed fully independently of each other. However, in order to simplify the process of analysis the following hypotheses and research questions are formulated by focusing on each level separately. The first hypothesis refers to the individual level and the second hypothesis to the corporate level. The first hypothesis focuses on communication between individual actors within the dialogue and determining factors such as attitude and perception. The second hypothesis focuses on organizational learning and the extent to which such learning can actually be achieved through the dialogue. Both hypotheses are related to the overarching issue; that is the efficiency of the dialogue as a strategic instrument, both in terms of changing power relations between the Global Unions and the IFIs and the extent to which the dialogue can create a more coherent policy approach regards global governance among these different international organizations.

2.3.1 Hypothesis (I)

Communication processes within the headquarters-level dialogue are determined by the attitudes of individual actors towards the dialogue and their perceptions of each other. The more positive the attitudes and perceptions of individual actors, the more likely it is that organizational resources will be provided for the dialogue and that information exchange at the individual and organizational level will improve. As a result communication and collaboration between individual actors is likely to be better coordinated. By contrast negative individual attitudes towards the dialogue and negative perceptions of each other are likely to slow down or even stop communication processes and the exchange of information at the inter-organizational level.

Research questions:

- *What opinions and attitudes do individual actors in the participating organizations have towards the dialogue? In what ways do attitudes influence communication within the dialogue?*

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- *How do individual actors perceive each other? Which factors influence actor's perceptions?*
- *How do individual actors evaluate the inter-organizational exchange of information with regard to the dialogue?*

2.3.2 Hypothesis (II)

The second hypothesis focuses on organizations as corporate actors and their ability to learn. All organizations involved in the dialogue create different conditions for organizational learning. Organizational learning is a dynamic process which refers to the change of knowledge that is embedded in organizational strategies and routines. Such changes can lead to a modification of the identity of an organization and are likely to be reflected in the attitudes and behaviour of individual actors, even if they are not necessarily reflected in observable changes in behaviour (Huber, 1991). Following Huber (1991) the author assumes that organizational learning takes place if any unit of an organization requires and accepts knowledge which it recognizes as potentially useful to the organization.

The following hypothesis and the related analysis aim to shed light on the extent to which organizational learning has been initiated through the dialogue. The author assumes that the dialogue is likely to have a greater impact on organizational learning especially when organizations like the WB consider themselves as learning organizations, and in organizations which themselves disseminate knowledge widely based on the accumulation of knowledge from a number of different sources. It is assumed that the effect of organizational learning is stronger, when organizational departments obtain more knowledge about an issue or event and the more they develop a shared understanding about an issue or event. The author argues that if such a shared understanding regards issues discussed in the dialogue are developed, not only within one single organization, but also among all dialogue partners, then it is more likely that the dialogue partners will be able to develop a coherent and joint policy approach regards global challenges such as job creation and social inequality. In other words, organizational learning can help to initiate and maintain a convergence process with regard to organizational strategies among the dialogue partners.

Research questions:

- *Which factors support and/or hinder organizational learning initiated through the dialogue within the organizations involved?*

2.3 Hypotheses and research questions

- To what extent has organizational learning taken place in the different organizations which participate in the dialogue and, in particular within the IFIs?*

3 The Global Unions: ITUC, GUFs and TUAC

The Global Unions are international organizations whose members are trade union organizations. They include the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), the nine Global Union Federations (GUFs) and the Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD (TUAC) (White, 2006). The ITUC is an international umbrella organization which brings together trade union national centres from all over the world, whilst the GUFs are international industry-based bodies, affiliating national sectoral unions (Croucher and Cotton, 2009; Abbott, 2011). The international labour movement has a long history which is not within the scope of this thesis; for a recent overview on labour internationalism see for example Hyman (2005).

The Global Unions have a very large membership and clearly defined mandates which make them important actors at the international policy level. The ITUC, for example, has 315 members and represents the interests of 175 million workers from all over the world. Their broad membership base and their democratic structures provide the Global Unions with a source of power and legitimacy which clearly distinguishes them from non-governmental organizations (NGOs³⁸) and non-profit organizations (NPOs).

Unions remain by far the largest membership organizations in the world and have extensive international coverage, dwarfing non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and they are also engaged with the impact of globalisation (Croucher and Cotton, 2009: 4).

Trade unions and NGOs have in common that both are created purposefully and that they are civil society actors which focus on the improvement of society (Gallin, 2000; Poole,

³⁸There is a large variety of NGOs acting at the national, regional and global level. They can be distinguished on the basis of their ‘...social bases, political commitments, ideologies, governing structures and accountability relationships to other organizations’ (Nelson, 2006: 709).

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1981). In this context their actions are value driven and not profit driven (Brunt and McCourt, 2012). Trade unions work on issues which influence the ‘...well-being of people and society as a whole’ including ‘...political and social democracy, civil and democratic rights, poverty elimination, equality, and the rule of law’ (Gallin, 2000: 1). Some NGOs are also active in the field of labour and support trade unions in their work (Ford, 2005). An example of such support is in helping to organize workers in difficult environments such as in companies where trade unions cannot get access (Hale, 2004). Trade union representatives value the work of NGOs, but at the same time they stress that NGOs are advocacy organizations which always advocate particular groups or issues.

The NGOs do very good work. Most of them are just brilliant organizations, but they are advocacy organizations, not representational organizations (Interview ITUC03, 2009).

In terms of the dialogue between the IFIs and the Global Unions which is central to this thesis, it is important to differentiate between trade unions and other civil society actors (such as NGOs) and to highlight the particular characteristics of trade unions as opposed to other societal actors. In other words a clear distinction needs to be made between the dialogue which the IFIs have with civil society actors more generally and the specific dialogue between the IFIs and the Global Unions which is the focus of this study. Dialogue is generally considered by the IFIs as ‘...important channel for communication’ to make their work transparent to other organizations (IMF, 2013e).

Trade unions and NGOs can be differentiated in terms of their members, structures, objectives and strategies, acquisition of resources, values, cultures and forms of collective action. Whilst trade unions are ‘open-membership’ organizations NGOs are ‘closed-membership’ organizations ‘...whose members are generally middle-class activists’ (Ford, 2005: 4). In comparison to NGOs, trade unions provide a ‘...organized structure to groups of working people’ which is based on the principles of democracy and equality (Harrod and O’Brien, 2002: 3). The power of individual actors such as trade union officials and governing bodies is constrained by the constitution of an organization. By contrast, individual actors within NGOs, for example individuals who may found an NGO, can have a lot of power in directing the organization and cannot be voted out or sacked (Ford, 2005).

With regard to their organizational strategies, trade unions focus on different actors such as international organizations, governments and employers when they represent their members. NGOs often are focused on a small group of actors or single actors. They have an

advocacy role and try to ‘...create or leverage political opportunity structures (POS) to influence public policy’ (Johnson and Prakash, 2007: 224).

A further difference exists between NGOs and trade unions in terms of the way in which they acquire resources. Whilst trade unions depend on the contributions of their members, NGOs are often strongly tied to the financial support of donors and governments. These donors have ‘...considerable influence on strategic choices, programmatic practises and the political orientation of NGOs’ and, NGOs are also accountable to them (Nelson, 2006: 709).

Even though the Global Unions have a clear and unique set of characteristics, in that they are the ‘...only universal and democratically organized movement at world level, with an unequalled capacity for resistance’ and they are ‘...the only movement through which millions of workers achieve power through organization’ (Gallin, 2002: 250), the World Bank and the IMF do not officially distinguish between trade unions and other civil society actors. On its website the WB states that it ‘...interacts with thousands of Civil Society Organizations’ worldwide and that these organizations include ‘...NGOs, trade unions, faith-based organizations, indigenous peoples movements, foundations and many other’ (World Bank, 2013 website³⁹). The IMF uses the term in a similar way regardless of which civil society organization they are referring to, ‘...business forums, faith-based associations, labor unions, local community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), philanthropic foundations, think tanks’ (IMF, 2013e).

Apart from the general interaction with civil society organizations described on the websites some members of staff at the World Bank and the IMF do consider the role of trade unions in a more differentiated way. For example one civil society specialist from the External Affairs department of the World Bank considers trade unions as a ‘key constituency’ and to be ‘very important’ actors because of their ‘large memberships’ and because ‘...they are also more organic than other constituencies’ (Interview WB01, 2008). One staff member responsible for the work with civil society organizations at the IMF also recognizes that the legitimacy of trade unions is, in particular at the regional and global level, beyond question and considers the dialogue with trade unions as ‘essential’ (Interview IMF01, 2008).

National trade unions usually act in political areas clearly defined by national governments and have evolved in accordance with the national and local political environment in which they were created – in some cases for example seeing themselves as either reformist, radical

³⁹Source: World Bank, 2013 <<http://go.worldbank.org/KK5KGT24X0>> [Accessed 10 June 2013]

or religiously influenced trade unions. However, the Global Unions do not act in such a bounded political field.

Nevertheless, the daily work of the GUFs and the ITUC is strongly influenced by their members, which have different views regards political issues and different priorities. This heterogeneity is also reflected in the perceived importance of the dialogue between the Global Unions and the IFIs.

It is important to emphasize that the Global Unions do not necessarily think and act in a coherent way, even though on the surface mergers among international trade union organizations have arguably led towards a greater unity within the trade union movement worldwide (Hennebert and Bourque, 2011: 157). For that reason joint statements for example, such as the statements released concerning the spring and the annual meetings of the IFIs, do not necessarily reflect the opinion of each GUF and their members.

3.1 The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC)

The ITUC was founded in 2006 through the merger of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the World Confederation of Labour (WCL). The ICFTU was established after a number of trade unions seceded from the WFTU (World Federation of Trade Unions)⁴⁰. The WFTU was formed after 1945 by a number of Western social democratic and communist unions and oriented towards class based trade unionism. However, during the cold war the US government encouraged US unions to work against the WFTU (Windmuller, 1954; Koftas, 2002). The split in the WFTU was initiated by the AFL-CIO, the British TUC and a number of centre-left or catholic national union Confederations and it was they who established the ICFTU. With the collapse of the Soviet Union the ICFTU gradually became larger and more influential than the WFTU and expanded its membership when a number of Eastern European sector-level unions affiliated to it in the 1990s (Gordon, 2000). Due to its size and resources relative to the WFTU, as well as the support it got from the USA, the ICFTU became the main focal point for developing contacts with governments and other international agencies (O'Brien, 2000: 534).

⁴⁰The first international trade union 'umbrella' organization was the the International Trade Secretariat of National Trade Union Centre (ISNTUC) which was founded in 1913. Later it was renamed the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU). The IFTU was the forerunner of the WFTU. The WCL was established in 1920 as the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU) as an alternative to the secular IFTU (Gottfurcht, 1962; Carew et al., 2000).

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In 2006 a number of influential left-wing union Confederations (such as the French CGT) also merged with the ICFTU to form the ITUC (International Trade Union Confederation). The merger gave the newly formed ITUC a much broader international coverage and it is now the world's largest trade union Confederation, covering 175 million workers and 315 affiliates in 156 countries and territories (ITUC, 2013 website⁴¹). The overall effect on the WFTU has been to reduce its influence with its main affiliates now being based in India, Latin America and the Arab countries (Cotton and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2012). The foundation of the ITUC arguably put an end to the international division between social-democratic and Christian unionism and, due to the above-mentioned factors has been the most important international trade union organization in terms of global coverage and influence (Abbott, 2011).

The ITUC considers itself as a '...countervailing force in the global economy' (ITUC, 2010a: 7). It mainly does political work at the global level and '...seeks to increase inter-governmental cooperation to ensure that the social dimension of globalisation, including decent work and fundamental workers' rights, is right at the centre of decision-making within the world's major global and regional institutions' (ITUC, 2013 website⁴²). The political work at the global level includes to track developments of policies promoted by intergovernmental organizations and new initiatives such as for example the Social Protection Inter-Agency Cooperation Board (SPIAC-B) which was founded in 2012 with the objective to coordinate the work of different international organizations which engage in social protection (World Bank, 2013b). Member of this board are, amongst others, the WB, the IMF, the OECD and the ILO as well as bilateral organizations and five NGOs. The ITUC becomes invited to the meetings (Ibid., 2013b).


3.1.1 Structure

The headquarters secretariat of the ITUC is in Brussels. The ITUC has a '...clearly defined administrative structure' (Poole, 1981: 152) which is shaped by its members. Its members are national trade union centres from all over the world. According to the organizational constitution which determines organizational rules and conditions for membership, the ITUC is '...open to affiliation by democratic, independent, and representative trade union centres' (ITUC, 2010a: 6). Thereby the organization ensures that its affiliates have the

⁴¹Source: ITUC, 2013 <<http://www.ituc-csi.org/about-us?lang=en>> [Accessed 20 January 2013]

⁴²Source: ITUC, 2013 <<http://www.ituc-csi.org/about-us?lang=en>> [Accessed 20 January 2013]

Figure 3.1: Formal structure of the ITUC



Source: own illustration

same basic values and political orientation in common. At the same time the ITUC respects ‘... their autonomy and the diversity of their sources of inspiration, and their organizational forms’ (Ibid., 2010a: 6).

Apart from the rights and obligations of its affiliates the ITUC determines through its constitution the composition and the way of working of its formal governing bodies as well as its relationships with the GUFs, the Council of Global Unions and the TUAC.

The three governing bodies of the ITUC are the Congress, the General Council (GC) and the Executive Bureau (EB). The highest decision making body of the Confederation is the Congress which meets every four years. It is composed of delegates from trade union centres which have the right to speak and to vote. The tasks of the Congress consist of determining the policy and the programmes of the ITUC and in interpreting the constitution (ITUC, 2010a). The decisions of the Congress are made by an absolute majority of delegates and in the case of amendments a two-thirds majority of delegates is required. External stakeholders such as governments, politicians, employers and religious groups are explicitly excluded from having any influence over the decision-making processes of the ITUC (ITUC, 2010a).

The Congress is headed by the president, two deputy presidents, the vice-presidents and the general secretary (GS) (Ibid., 2010a). The organizational role of the president, who

3.1 The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC)

has a voting right in all governing bodies, rotates among the regions of the ITUC at each Congress. The two deputy presidents of the ITUC serve as chairpersons of the executive board and the solidarity fund management board.

The general secretary of the Confederation is elected by the Congress and is also the secretary-general of the Congress. The general secretary cannot be determined by the same region the president comes from. The general secretary is the representative and spokesperson of the ITUC, leads the secretariat and is a member of the General Council and the Executive Bureau with the right to vote. The general secretary has ‘...at all times (...) the right to speak on any subject’ and is responsible for implementing the policies set out in the programme (ITUC, 2010a: 33; ITUC, 2006). His or her responsibilities include the implementation of decisions from the Congress and the General Council as well as administration tasks. These tasks include for example informing members about the agenda of the Congress and preparing the agenda for the General Council meeting. The general secretary can also make decisions with regard to financial matters such as for example the raising of funds for clearly defined purposes or the application for financing from public and private sources. He or she is accountable to the Congress and the General Council (ITUC, 2010a).

Currently Sharan Burrow is the general secretary. Before this she took over as general secretary she held the position of president. The general secretary is supported by the deputy general secretaries which are the general secretaries of the regional organizations of the ITUC. The deputy general secretaries are elected by the General Council and support the secretary-general in leading the secretariat (Croucher and Cotton, 2009: 43). They are not allowed to vote at the General Council and the Executive Bureau.

The Congress elects the General Council and three auditors and has the right to dismiss members. The auditors conduct an annual audit of the accounts of the ITUC and submit their report to the Congress and the General Council. The General Council is the supreme authority during the time the Congress is not meeting and is the executive body. It meets at least once per year. The agenda for the meetings is prepared by the general secretary, but any member of the Confederation has the right to put forward suggestions. All debates are presided over and directed by the president or in his or her absence by one of the deputy presidents (ITUC, 2010a).

The GC has 70 members. The European trade union centres have the biggest share of these with 26 members; more than one third of all the members (ITUC, 2010a). By contrast Africa is represented with 11 members, America with 18 and the Asia-Pacific region with 15. The GC is responsible for ‘...directing the activities of the Confederation and giving

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effect to the decisions and recommendations of the Congress' (ITUC, 2010a: 17). The GC decides on applications for affiliation according to the principles and practices of the ITUC and it has the right to suspend members.

In addition, it carries out administrative tasks such as the preparation of the Congress which includes the preparation of the agenda, the invitation of members and the reviewing of proposals related to agenda items. Other administrative tasks are the appointment of members of Statutory Committees (Credentials Committee and Standing Orders Committee) and the establishment of other committees such as for example the Women's and Youth Committee and the Human and Trade Union Rights Committee. The Credentials Committee is mainly responsible for all questions related to delegations, delegates and nominees whilst the Standing Orders Committee mainly administers content related issues concerning the Congress such as the programme. The GC also establishes the annual budget and adopts the annual financial report of the ITUC.

The GC is supported by the Executive Bureau which meets at least twice per year. The EB deals with all questions of urgency which arise between the meetings of the GC or which are delegated to it by the GC and, it prepares the GC's decisions concerning finances and the annual budget. The EB is elected by the General Council and includes up to 25 titular members of the GC including the chairpersons of the Women's and the Youth Committee. Other members are the president of the ITUC and the general secretary. Each member has a first and a second substitute who are also members of the GC (ITUC, 2010a).

Furthermore, the ITUC has regional organizations which it considers as 'organic parts' (ITUC, 2010a: 18). They have a certain level of autonomy, but are supervised by and accountable to the ITUC. Currently there are four regional organizations determined by the Congress: the Trade Union Confederation of Americas (TUCA), the African Regional Organization (AFRO), the Asia Pacific Regional Organization (APRO) and the Pan European Regional Council (PERC). The Middle East only has a limited presence and there is no formal recognition of the Chinese unions (Croucher and Cotton, 2009). All affiliates of the regional organizations must be affiliated to the ITUC. The task of the regional organizations consists of '... promoting the priorities and policies of the Confederation' (ITUC, 2010a: 19). In this regard they can choose their own policies and actions at the regional level and they have their own finances and annual budgets. However, there are power imbalances between and within the regional organizations, these are caused by the dominant political systems within the regions and the heterogeneity of member organizations. In addition to its regional organizations the ITUC is represented through offices in big cities in strategically important areas. Such cities are for example Washington (ITUC/Global

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Unions Washington Office), Sarajevo (ITUC South-East European Office), Moscow (ITUC Office for the New Independent States) and Geneva (ITUC Geneva Office).

The headquarters of the ITUC is located in Brussels where, according to the list of staff which is available at the ITUC web page, about 60 people are employed within different departments. The five main departments are Human and Trade Union Rights (HTUR), Economic and Social Policy (ESP), Equality (EQ), Campaigns and Communications (CAM/COM), and Finance and Organisation (FIN/ORG). ESP is of particular importance with regard to the dialogue with the IFIs because among other things it promotes ILO labour standards. Other departments which are smaller are for example Conference Services, IT and Translation Services. External Relations is a one person department (ITUC staff list, 2012 website⁴³). The headquarters personnel are paid officials who exercise representative and administrative functions (Burchielli, 2005). These officials are important connectors between the ITUC and its members with regard to the daily business of the ITUC because they receive members' views, develop strategies and represent members at the global level.

3.1.2 **Organizational identity**

The mission of the ITUC is to give effective representation to working people. This very specific mission and the fact that the organization is the '...global voice of the world's working people' makes it so unique (ITUC, 2012 website⁴⁴). The ITUC describes itself as

...countervailing force in the global economy, committed to securing a fair distribution of wealth and income within and between countries, (...), universal access to public goods and services, comprehensive social protection, (...) and decent work opportunities for all (ITUC, 2010a: 8).

In order to achieve its mission the ITUC follows some central values which are the pillars of its identity and culture and which are connected to political and economic objectives (Burchielli, 2005). The values are described within the 'Declaration of Principles' and include solidarity, democracy and equality (ITUC, 2010a). The ITUC '...is committed to provide practical solidarity' to working people, '...to promote and to act for the protection

⁴³Source: ITUC, 2012 <<http://www.ituc-csi.org/about-us?lang=en>> [Accessed 4 April 2012]

⁴⁴Source: ITUC, 2012 <<http://www.ituc-csi.org/about-us?lang=en>> [Accessed 4 April 2012]

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of democracy everywhere' and it '...commits itself to securing comprehensive and equitable economic and social development for workers' (ITUC, 2010a: 5). All values give clear orientations and a common purpose to the affiliates of the ITUC, they are considered as central and distinctive of the organization, and they serve as a '...moral compass for union activity' (Burchielli, 2005: 140).

The identity and culture of the ITUC is based on solidarity among its affiliates and officials. However, the wide range of national identities of trade union centres and their ideologies make it sometimes difficult to obtain solidarity within specific projects (Stirling, 2010). In fact, the funding of activities of Southern trade unions by Northern trade unions tends to reinforce organizational differences. Nowadays '...Southern labour movements increasingly question the use of the ITUC in the representation of their concerns' which makes the building of a joint identity more fragile (Bieler, 2012: 371).

The values mentioned not only guide collective behaviour, but also the behaviour of individual actors such as ITUC officials. In this context the effect the values have at the collective level is also implicit at the individual level. In comparison to the World Bank and the IMF, the ITUC has no specific code of conduct for staff, but it is assumed that individuals representing trade unions or working for the ITUC act in concert with the universally recognized values and principles relevant to trade unions. This means that they should behave in a solidaristic way with other staff and trade union representatives and that they should not take advantage of a situation or information. However, due to the fact that the ITUC is a more politically active and value-based organization and the fact that it does not support its members financially, it is very unlikely that staff are confronted with attempts at bribery by members.

A strong element of the ITUC's organizational culture is consensus which makes decision-making processes easier. So called consensus papers are rarely questioned by ITUC affiliates. This is partly due to the fact that national trade union centres are under-resourced and they cannot put much time into the analysis of statements, and partly because they are often less interested in global issues (Interview DGB01, 2008).

3.1.3 Organizational knowledge and knowledge management

The ITUC's knowledge is strongly related to the paradigm it follows which is oriented towards global welfare and a more equal distribution of economic wealth. One of the main tasks of the ITUC in this regard is the intervention with intergovernmental organizations (such as the World Bank and the IMF) '...on issues relating to the recognition of union

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rights and the respect of international labour standards' (Hennebert and Bourque, 2011: 154). Such regular interventions enable the ITUC to develop expert knowledge regards the bureaucratic functioning of the intergovernmental organizations, their views on political and economic issues and their activities and development programmes.

In comparison to the World Bank's and the IMF's headquarters, the ITUC can only employ a relatively small staff in its secretariat which has to deal with a broad range of tasks and a lot of administration. This is a problem for the ITUC in that administrative tasks tend to undermine the capacity of union officials to develop agendas and appropriate strategies for their implementation and limit them in accomplishing their leading role (Lévesque and Murray, 2002).

Staff tends to come from the most developed countries, most of whom have good language skills and higher levels of education (Cotton and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2012). Members of staff follow the discussions of the intergovernmental organizations, such as for example the economic forecast of the IMF, and analyse and sum up information for ITUC affiliates. Furthermore, they provide information about the course and outcomes of campaigns and other collective activities to affiliates and the public on the ITUC web page. In 2013 the ITUC launched a new series of reports called 'Economic Briefing' which present outlooks on global economic developments. The briefings are addressed to all unionists and the Global Unions and provide part of the available explicit knowledge of the ITUC (ITUC, 2013). In addition, the ITUC supports the web page 'Equal Times'⁴⁵ which provides information prepared by local journalists on global issues and campaigns about work, politics and economy.

Most of the staff of the ITUC can draw on many years of experience of trade union work. They were for example involved in collective bargaining or in the organization of campaigns. The former president of the ITUC, Michael Sommer, worked for the post office, gathered experiences at the German Postal Union (DPG) and was strongly involved in the founding process of the German multi-service trade union ver.di. The General Secretary Sharan Burrow worked as teacher in former times and was active in the Australian Education Union (AEU). Other officials, such as for example the director of the Economic and Social policy department, have worked for more than 20 years for the ITUC (Interview ITUC01, 2008). In view of the fact that many individual actors working for the ITUC contribute their personal experiences from the national level, international trade unionism can be considered as '... an extension of national experience' (Hyman, 2005: 138). This can be problematic insofar as in comparison to national trade unionism, international

⁴⁵Source: Equal Times, 2012 <<http://www.equaltimes.org/about-us>> [Accessed 6 June 2012]

trade unionism is a ‘... distinctive social phenomenon’ which requires a different approach to national level trade unionism (Ibid., 2005: 138).

In comparison to the IFIs the ITUC has a lower turnover of staff and as such the organization can draw on the tacit knowledge of staff for longer periods. However, there is as yet no explicit organizational strategy to make more use of available tacit knowledge or to organize it in a more strategic way so that it is available at all times.

3.1.4 What power does the ITUC have?

All over the world trade unions are struggling with financial resources. This also applies to the ITUC, which depends on its affiliates in this regard. The ITUC has very limited financial resources which is largely a result of the limited willingness and/or capacity of its members to pay higher membership fees. Every year the General Council determines the affiliation fees of which Germany, the USA, Canada, Japan and the Nordic countries provide about 80 percent (Croucher and Cotton, 2009).

Affiliation fees have to be paid by national unions in relation to the number of affiliates. Furthermore, these fees are defined in relation to the national income of each country. In 2009, trade unions from the richest countries paid almost € 200 per thousand members and unions from the poorest countries about € 3 per thousand members (Cotton and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2012). The weighting of membership fees has resulted in the problem that ‘... any fall in paying membership in the wealthiest countries has a disproportionate impact on the resources of the Global Unions’ (Ibid., 2012: 714).

When the ITUC increases fees, it is a common practice that members report lower membership figures to avoid higher payments to the ITUC (Croucher and Cotton, 2009). On the one hand, this is partly due to the problem of a declining membership which ITUC affiliates face at the national level. On the other hand, national trade unions also tend to have a stronger focus on intra-regional relationships than on international work (Cotton and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2012).

The number of affiliates and the paying membership determines the number of delegates by which a member organization is represented at the Congress. In contrast to the IFIs where financial contributions of members officially determine their voting power and voice within decision making processes, the ITUC only makes decisions by an absolute majority (ITUC, 2010a). However, some members are stronger donors than others, allowing them to exercise their influence through funds. Such funds for example are the Solidarity Fund

3.1 The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC)

and the Development Aid Funds to which members contribute on a voluntary basis. The first receives its contributions mainly from Germany and Japan and the second from the Dutch government, the ILO and Dutch and Swedish trade unions (Cotton and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2012). These funds are ‘...increasingly dependent on the ability to show concrete outputs and benefits for the donor countries’ (Cotton and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2012: 715). Furthermore, stronger donors also determine core policies and strategy decisions within meetings of the regional and international committees and through informal negotiations (Ibid., 2012).

Due to the flow of financial resources the main power sources of the ITUC are its legitimacy which it gains through election processes and the power to mobilize and to unite the ‘... democratic and independent forces of world trade unionism’ (ITUC, 2010a: 5). Collective power determines the sanction power of the organization and is based on solidarity among workers and trade unions worldwide. This solidarity is challenged by the different cultural and political backgrounds of ITUC affiliates which, can lead to different views concerning the priority of issues and activities. For many national trade unions and trade union centres economic issues relating to industries and collective bargaining have priority. The ITUC in contrast is more focused on political-diplomatic issues and not so much on collective bargaining and social dialogue. Many national members still see issues at the global level as ‘escapism’ from national problems which is one reason why they limit their support for the ITUC. The statements to the annual and spring meetings of the IFIs which the ITUC drafts in the name of the Global Unions are one example in this context. A representative from the ITF stated for instance that members question the investment of resources ‘...in these long statements of policy which the IMF will ignore’ (Interview ITF01, 2008). Hence, it is difficult for the ITUC sometimes to meet the expectations of their members which in turn limits its organizational authority.

With regard to the individual level, the democratic structure of the ITUC and its strong organizational values arguably limit the exploitation of organizational roles by individual actors. However, there are power imbalances due to the concentration of knowledge and expertise within the ITUC headquarters in Brussels. Senior officers, for example, control and distribute information and have significant power with regard to agenda setting (Croucher and Cotton, 2009). The concentration of knowledge and funds at the headquarters also tends to create a situation where, ‘... regional organizations have tended to act as recipients of policies or resources, rather than initiators’ (Cotton and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2012: 714).

3.1.5 Change processes and learning in the ITUC

The international labour movement has since its foundation at the beginning of the 20th century changed several times at a structural level and with regard to its mission. The latest big structural change took place when the ITUC was founded through the merger between the ICFTU and the WCL. This merger provided the ITUC with more collective power. However, the increase in declared membership meant not necessarily an increase in paying membership because many new members were from poor regions.

From 2000 onwards the Global Unions and the ITUC had already recognized that ‘...globalisation is a new paradigm which demands new strategies, tactics and organizational modalities’ (Munck, 2010: 219). However, the size and the variety of its members make it more difficult for the ITUC to change and to quickly develop adequate answers to new problems and situations (Lindberg, 2011). A challenge for the ITUC is to anticipate problems and not ‘...merely react to changing circumstances’ and ‘...to frame coherent policies; and to implement these effectively’ (Hyman, 2007: 198).

Learning within the ITUC is driven by individual actors but less so within the most important decision-making body which is the Congress. With regard to the latter representatives of trade union centres often exhibit a very diplomatic form of behaviour and contentious issues are rarely raised publicly (Croucher and Cotton, 2009).

The ITUC does not promote an explicit learning culture like the World Bank but the democratic structure provides a favourable context for learning. ITUC officials have diverse backgrounds and experiences which allow them to think in a reflexive and imaginative way and to develop new strategies and activities (Hyman, 2007). Officials working at the ITUC secretariat reflect their own experiences and get input from member organizations which provide them with insights regards political and economical developments at the national level. Nevertheless, in order that ITUC officials can cope with administrative tasks it is important that certain procedures are routinized. Such routines offer organizational mechanisms which help to resolve problems quicker, but they also hinder individual actors from learning and to use their own creativity (Howard, 2007).

In comparison to the IFIs change and learning is less influenced by leadership. The president and the general secretary of the ITUC do not have such a great influence on the general political orientation of the organization or its way to adapt to changing processes. Rather they have representative and administrative roles which are connected to the accepted organizational values.

At the collective organizational level the ITUC shows some commonalities with the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) which organizes trade union centres at the European level. In addition, both organizations have their offices in the same building in Brussels, but apart from this there is not much synergy. The ETUC is much better resourced and a number of additional staff do research within the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) (Cotton and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2012). One might argue that a stronger formal synergy between the two could be beneficial for the ITUC in terms of additional input.

3.2 Global Union Federations (GUFs)

The earliest GUFs, formerly known as International Trade Secretariats (ITSs), were already founded at the end of the 19th century (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2008). The GUFs represent national trade unions from the private and public sector at the international level. Each GUF represents a different sector(s) and has different issues of priority which are determined by their members to a great extent (Interview IMF [*now IndustriALL*], 2008). In the broadest sense each GUF is a kind of a ‘docking station’ for different sector trade unions (Traub-Merz and Eckl, 2007: 5).

Many GUFs deal with multinational companies and try to ‘... achieve material gains for their members’ (Abbott, 2011: 162). There have been two big mergers which led to the establishment of UNI in 2000 and IndustriALL in June 2012. The main goal of such mergers consists in gaining more weight in influencing employer organizations and governments and having more strength and building power across the supply chain at the global level. UNI was created through the merger of four international organizations: the International Federation of Employees, Technicians and Managers (FIET), the Media and Entertainment International (MEI), the International Graphical Federation (IGF) and the Communications International (CI). Nowadays the organization represents 20 million service sector workers around the world.

IndustriALL brings together the International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions (ICEM), the International Metal Workers’ Federation (IMF) and the International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers’ Federation (ITGLWF). IndustriALL now represents more than 50 million workers.

Currently there are nine GUFs in total. They include the International Transport Federation (ITF), the Building and Wood Workers’ International (BWI), the IndustriALL Global

Union (IndustriALL), the International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers' Association (IUF), the Union Network International (UNI), the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) and the International Arts and Entertainment Alliance (IAEA). They have in common that they focus on the private sector. The Education International (EI) and the Public Services International (PSI) deal with the public sector. The table 3.1 gives an overview of the sectors the different organizations represent and their membership numbers.

3.2.1 Structure


The headquarters office of most of the GUFs is in Geneva or in Brussels. Only the ITF has its headquarters in London. The headquarters offices employ different numbers of staff and are organised on the basis of issues the GUF works on.

All GUFs have '...well-developed governance systems and all maintain strict formal decision-making procedures based on their rules or 'statutes'' (Croucher and Cotton, 2009: 41). Every GUF has its own constitution and standing orders which determine the governing bodies, the rights and obligations of members as well as procedures for election processes. The governing bodies differ with regard to their names but generally the organizational structures are very similar among the GUFs.

The highest and key decision-making authority in each of the GUFs is the Congress which meets every four or five years. The Congress determines organizational priorities, long-term aims, strategies and organizational rules. It has the authority to amend the constitution and oversees the election of trade union officials including the president, the general secretary, the vice presidents and the members of different committees. The president chairs the meetings of the Congress and is the principal representative of the organization. The general secretary is the principal spokesperson and has an executive role. He or she leads the headquarters office (secretariat) supported by members of staff. His or her responsibilities include administration and management tasks such as handling of staff issues and the preparation of meetings. The administration of finances and the management of the general secretary are controlled by an auditor committee which is elected by the Congress.

Furthermore, the Congress makes decisions on motions and resolutions and determines the annual affiliation fees which are calculated on the basis of membership figures. Every organization which has paid the affiliation fee has participation rights and is entitled to send delegates to the Congress. Depending on each GUF the number of delegates is

Figure 3.2: Formal structure of a GUF (generalised)



Source: own illustration

determined by the constitution or by the affiliated organizations themselves. In the case of UNI for example, the constitution states that affiliated organizations with up to 5,000 members can send one delegate whilst affiliates with more than 50,000 members can send up to three delegates. For each further 50,000 members there is an entitlement to one additional delegate (UNI Statutes, 2010). Trade unions affiliated to the ITF can send up to 23 delegates and organizations affiliated to the EI can send a maximum of 50 delegates depending on their size (ITF, 2010; EI, 2011). In the case of the BWI and the IndustriALL affiliated trade unions determine the number of their representatives. The relatively high number of participants at congresses and the infrequency of meetings arguably result in a situation where the Congress is not a forum for effective strategy development (Croucher and Cotton, 2009).

Some GUFs have a governing body which is responsible for decision-making and policies in the periods between Congresses. The BWI, for example, names this governing body the 'World Council' (BWI, 2009). The World Council is responsible for general policies in the period between Congresses. It meets once a year and is chaired by the president of the organization. Furthermore, it elects the regional vice presidents and the members of the World Board. The latter is the executive body of the BWI which is responsible for the implementation of decisions from the Congress and the World Council. The World

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Board is also responsible for administration and affiliation issues, the annual budget and the planning of yearly activities. Other GUFs, such as for example EI and IndustriALL, do not have an additional decision-making body apart from the Congress but only an executive body. In addition to its governing bodies each GUF appoints different committees. These committees are, among others, responsible for finances, the equality of women and advice with regard to constitutional matters.

The executive bodies of the GUFs are supported by regional offices which develop policies on their own and play an advisory role to the respective GUF's executive body regards policies and activities undertaken in the region. The strategy of regionalisation and decentralisation of the GUFs '...reflect the differentiation and pluralisation of members' interests and needs which have gone hand in hand with geographical expansion' (Müller et al., 2010: 6).

The regional structures are developed in conformity with the respective constitution of the GUF concerned. In most GUFs the regions are Africa, North America and the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, and Latin America. In addition IndustriALL divides Africa into the Middle East & North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, and the ITF includes the Arab World and Tokyo. Each region has its own governing bodies including executive bodies and committees which are provided with executive power.

3.2.2 Organizational identity

Generally the identity of each GUF is shaped by its membership, the mission to defend the rights of workers and the sector within which they are active. Their work in different global sectors distinguishes them from each other and in this regard their specific knowledge and organizing capacity are central to their unique characteristics.

Similar to the ITUC the organizational culture of all GUFs is shaped by the values of democracy, solidarity and equality. Democracy refers to internal democratic procedures, the strengthening of democratic trade unions worldwide and the promotion of democracy through trade unions. The GUFs aim to create global and regional solidarity networks and to promote solidarity among their members. In this context equality among trade union organizations is important which means that trade unionists should support each other regardless of nationality or ethnic origin.

Collective values also guide individual behaviour and there is no explicit code of conduct for staff. Many trade union officials have a practical grounding and relationship to these

values as they have a lot of sector work experience and ‘...enormous understanding of particular industry-sectors’ (Croucher and Cotton, 2009: 44).

3.2.3 Organizational knowledge and expertise

The GUFs ‘...represent workers in their market role and seek to improve their bargaining power as sellers of labour-power’ (Munck, 2010: 227). In this respect the GUFs have increasingly orientated themselves around the activities of multinational companies (MNCs) and their global supply chains. GUFs provide support regards the defence of existing union rights by encouraging solidarity amongst national affiliates, sharing information, organising meetings and cross-border union campaigns, and lobbying national governments (Royle, 2005). In this context international framework agreements (IFAs) which are a form of voluntary agreement between MNCs and Global Unions arguably offer a possibility to regulate the behaviour of MNCs (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2008). However, IFAs are not comparable to ‘detailed collective agreements’ but rather ‘...these instruments are enabling frameworks built around commitments by the corporations concerned to implement and respect the core labour standards of the International Labour Organisation (ILO)’ (TUAC, 2005: 18). Unlike at the national level it is extremely difficult to get MNCs to make collective agreements at the global level (only one such agreement exists to date and that is in the Maritime sector, see Lillie, 2006). This is largely because the legal basis for collective bargaining is at the national level (Royle, 2010).

In order that the GUFs can do their work effectively, they rely on the contribution of specific knowledge by their affiliates and from the regions. The GUFs have a broad expertise regards legal and economic issues which is developed by their respective secretariat, and which arises from practical experiences regards company networks, IFAs and campaigning. In particular with regard to multinational companies the GUFs must regularly ‘...improve their knowledge of the internal dynamics of large corporations’ (TUAC, 2005: 14). This specific knowledge gives the GUFs an initiator role in respect of trade union policy at the global level (Cotton and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2012).

Furthermore, the GUFs are ‘information service providers’ (Müller et al., 2010: 9). The information provided on their websites relates to the latest events within the sectors including among other things the violation of worker rights and violence against trade union leaders. There is also information available about more general issues such as for example children rights, gender equality, and migration as well information on campaigns and solidarity appeals organized by the GUF or the regions.

3 The Global Unions: ITUC, GUFs and TUAC

The research and publication sections of the GUFs are however, much smaller than they are at the IFIs which is largely a result of their limited resources. Explicit knowledge is mainly disseminated to affiliates and the interested public via internet through websites, social networks (Facebook) and blogs as well as through microblogging (Twitter). One of the challenges facing the GUFs is in making available the tacit knowledge of trade union officials and workers. Whilst the World Bank Group has recognized the potential that tacit knowledge offers for future action and strategy planning this is not as yet an issue for the GUFs.

3.2.4 Power

One of the main power resources of the GUFs is their representativeness and ‘...their legitimacy as the global voice of the interests of individual trade unions’ which they achieve through a growing membership and geographical spread (Müller et al., 2010: 5). At the global level the GUFs have a ‘monopoly position’ in the sectors they represent (Ibid., 2010).

In terms of financial resources and staff, the power of the GUFs has always been limited. This is mainly due to the gradual decline of membership since the 1980s and problems in organizing workers which trade unions face at the national level. These trends have also ‘...been reflected in a reduction of payments to the Global Unions, and often an increased incidence of late payment of affiliation fees’ (Cotton and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2012: 7). Furthermore, the disposition of national trade unions to support international work is influenced by their own national conditions and organizational interests (Ghigliani, 2005). Some national trade unions for example struggle with unfavourable political environments and they have to put a lot of resources into their work at the national level (Müller et al., 2010: 5). One strategy to resolve such resource problems and to concentrate collective power has been for some GUFs to form mergers.

In respect of the distribution of power within the GUFs, some member organizations have the capacity to make higher contributions to the GUFs and as a result they have more influence regards agenda setting. In particular some individual European trade unions such as the IG Metall in Germany or Norwegian trade unions are quite well resourced and they are able to put more resources into international work. However, the fact that the European region has historically had far greater resources than elsewhere can also create problems for the GUFs as there is often a tendency for European trade unions to focus

on European issues at the expense of the international work of the GUFs (Cotton and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2012).

Regards intraorganizational decision-making informal negotiations between officials of key affiliates are also of special importance. For example, the Germans, Nordics, North Americans and Japanese unions are usually involved in informal negotiations. Their officials consult on core policies and strategies during committee meetings at the regional and international level. For that reason ‘... formal voting generally occurs only at the end of the decision-making process’ (Ibid., 2012: 9).

The structural power imbalances reflected at the collective level continue at the individual level. Leading roles are mainly taken on by trade union officials from developed countries (Cotton and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2012). This is related to the higher contributions from trade unions of such countries and to the high education standards and often the higher levels of language skills of these officials (Cotton and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2012).

3.2.5 Structural changes and learning

All GUFs noted a growth of membership since the 1990s when the political division into East and West came to an end. Through their geographical expansion the GUFs became for the first time real global players. These structural changes helped to ‘...strengthen the representativeness of federations and enhance their legitimacy as the global voice of the interests of individual trade unions’ (Müller et al., 2010: 5). Since the beginning of the 21st century several GUFs started to pool their resources and to expand their collective power through mergers. In this context the use of new communication technologies facilitated the connection of members and created ‘... an enhanced density of interaction among member organisations’ (Ibid., 2010: 7).

The core activities of the GUFs include the implementation of training and education programmes and the provision of information services for their members (Müller et al., 2010). The provision of these education and information services requires that staff of the GUFs are constantly up-to-date and that they follow the latest economic and political developments within sectors and at the global level. For example, the ITF commissions research reports and ‘... aims to step up its monitoring and gathering of data on job losses and union strategies to combat them, including the setting up of an ITF “hotline” and website areas with down-loadable resources, as well as quick distribution of economic crisis news’ (Global Unions, 2009a: 35). The members of staff of the secretariats receive and

collect information from member organizations and they are in contact with other organizations including for example the GUFs, the ITUC, the World Bank, governments and multinational companies.

Generally, democratic procedures and participation rights within the GUFs, supported by the use of communication technology, are a good basis for members to participate actively in policy discussions, to express concerns regards specific issues and to reflect on proposals made by members or the respective GUF itself. Within meetings story-telling is ‘... an integral part of information-sharing and comparing of experiences’ (Cooper, 2006: 40). In this respect the GUFs offer a favourable context for individual and organizational learning. The latter refers in particular to ‘... mutual learning or imitation of proven practices’ between the GUFs (Müller et al., 2010: 10). An example of this is the use of IFAs.

The staff of the secretariats analyses and reflects on the data and information they receive from member organizations and other organizations as well as on the success of organizational activities. This is not an easy task considering the limited numbers of staff within the secretariats in comparison to the velocity of economic and political changes at the global level and the increasing administration tasks. Even though the number of staff varies in relation to the size of a GUF, all GUFs face the problem that they are understaffed. Whilst UNI employs more than 100 staff, the IFJ only employs about 20 staff (Ibid., 2010). The small number of staff in comparison to the amount of tasks means that staff of the GUFs tend to draw on ‘... traditional routines and practices’ (Ibid., 2010: 7). These routines, however, make organizational changes and the testing of new ideas and approaches more difficult.

3.3 The Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD (TUAC)

TUAC works closely together with the ITUC, the GUFs, the ETUC and the ILO. It is an important interface for trade unions dealing with the OECD because it ensures their input into the sectoral work of the OECD. Furthermore, TUAC coordinates the input of trade unions to G8 economic summits and employment conferences and it informs its affiliates about what the OECD is working on or planning to do (Interview TUAC01, 2009). In this regard TUAC is ‘... a sort of continuing point of pressure of arguing what’s being done and we don’t agree with the OECD on many issues’ (Ibid., 2009).

3.3 *The Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD (TUAC)*

TUAC was originally set up in 1948 as part of the Marshall Plan's structure as a consultative mechanism for governments. After the establishment of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) in 1962, TUAC continued its work of representing trade union views from the industrialized countries. It does have a formal consultative status with the OECD and various committees. This includes that it has access to meetings, to some documentation and that it has consultation rights within different committees (TUAC, 2007 website⁴⁶).

Its members are trade union centres from industrialized OECD countries. Currently TUAC has 58 members in 30 OECD countries. They finance TUAC, make decisions about the priorities of the Committee and elect its officials. The formal decision making body of TUAC is the Plenary Session which meets in spring and in autumn. These meetings are attended by the representatives of TUAC's members and representatives of the Global Unions. The participants discuss and approve policy statements as well as its future work and priorities. The input for the plenary sessions is prepared by working groups which also prepare positions for consultation with the OECD. There are three working groups including Economic Policy, Global Trade and Investment, and Education, Training and Labour Market Policy which are open to all members and Global Unions. The decision making body is supported by an Administrative Committee which supervises the administration of TUAC (OECD, 2008).

TUAC has a relatively small secretariat with only eight members of staff including the general secretary. Most of them are policy advisors. Their focus of their work is on a broad range of issues which includes economic policy, employment, labour market policy, trade and investment, pension funds and so on (Ibid., 2008).

The general secretary of TUAC has regularly took part in the dialogue between the Global Unions and the IFIs since the early 1990s. This is because many issues which are covered by TUAC in discussions at the OECD are also relevant in the context of this dialogue between the IFIs and the Global Unions such as for example international finance and the promotion of inclusive growth (Interview TUAC01, 2009).

⁴⁶Source: TUAC, 2012 <<http://www.tuac.org/en/public/tuac/index.phtml>> [Accessed 30 June 2012]

3.4 The Global Unions – Weaknesses and strengths

Both the ITUC and the GUFs belong to the group of international non-governmental organizations. Their affiliates are trade union centres (ITUC) and sector trade unions (GUFs). All these organizations have their headquarters in Europe which is the region where trade union financial resources are concentrated (Cotton and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2012).

All organizations which belong to the Global Unions have in common that they try to ‘...provide an effective countervailing power to globalization’ and that they are ‘...at the junction of complex social and political interactions’ (Hennebert et al., 2011: 158).

(...), the mandate of international union organizations does not involve leading union action internationally on their own but rather ensuring the representation of a ‘voice of labour’ worldwide and fostering of discussions and the implementation of strategies for action coordinated between organizations at the different levels (Hennebert et al., 2011: 158).

The ITUC mainly takes on cooperation with international organizations such as the ILO or the IFIs, whilst the GUFs deal with the private and public companies in the sectors that they represent. Both, the ITUC and the GUFs are independent from each other with regard to their programmes, rules, priorities and structures (Fairbrother and Hammer, 2005). The ITUC notes in its constitution that it ‘...recognises the autonomy and responsibility of the Global Union Federations with regard to representation and trade union action in their respective sectors and in relevant multinational enterprises’ (ITUC, 2010a: 10).

The ITUC and the GUFs face the challenge of organizing and promoting the rights of millions of workers around the world. In this context they are connectors between the Global North where well-financed trade unions are concentrated within developed economies, and the Global South. The diversity of its members in terms of organizational priorities, cultures, national political backgrounds creates both advantages and disadvantages for the Global Unions. They have advantages in terms of knowledge and strategy development, but face considerable challenges in terms of trying to organize the solidarity of their members.

The Global Unions obtain their legitimacy and power through their great numbers of affiliates, their worldwide representation of workers and their democratic structures and the election procedures for their officials. Their weak points are in their financial resources and that they do not have a ‘...coherent strategy or the semblance of a practical program for organizing and raising the living standards of the additional 1.5 billion workers, mostly in

3.4 *The Global Unions – Weaknesses and strengths*

the Global South' (Howard, 2007: 69). In fact, in comparison to the amount of challenges the ITUC and the GUFs face, the low numbers of staff in their secretariats make it more difficult for them to cope with all tasks they have to deal with in successful manner.

In 2006 the ITUC, the GUFs and the TUAC created the basis for a more structured cooperation and coordination by ratifying a consensus agreement on the establishment of the Council of Global Unions (CGU). The council which had its first meeting in 2007 is not an organization in itself, but a '... mechanism for cooperation bringing people together for sharing information' (Interview ITUC01, 2008). Since 2012 all GUFs are members of the council which not always has been the case. The IMF for example, which now forms part of IndustriALL, did not become a member originally because its representatives feared an '... additional bureaucratic burden' (Interview IMF01, 2008).

With the help of this mechanism the Global Unions aim to '... promote growth in union membership and to advance the common interest of trade union members worldwide' (Global Unions, 2006: 1). The council meets once a year and its tasks generally relate to '... organising and trade union recognition' (Normark and Baker, 2009: 4). Its tasks comprise operational and cooperative tasks such as the consideration of joint political and strategic initiatives and activities which serve to defend the interests of working people.

Furthermore, the council supports information sharing among the Global Unions with regard to global economic and social developments and it facilitates and supports the operation of the Global Unions' office in their dealings and relations with the IFIs in Washington (Global Unions, 2006). The general secretary of the ITUC is the secretary of the CGU and forms part of the coordinating committee of the council. The work of the council is supported by different working groups including the 'Communications Task Force' which tries to find common ground amongst the different positions of the GUFs so that a common platform can be developed around strategically important policy issues. In 2009 for example this group published two reports under the heading 'Getting the World to Work' (Global Unions, 2012 website⁴⁷).

⁴⁷ Source: Global Unions, 2012 <<http://www.global-unions.org/council.html>> [Accessed 22 July 2012]

Table 3.1: The Global Union Federations

GUF	Affiliated organizations + total membership (millions.)	Sectors
BWI (Carouge)	328 organizations / 12m.	Building, building materials, wood, forestry, allied industries
EI (Brussels)	400 organizations / 30m.	Teachers, education employees
IndustriALL (merger of the IMF ^a , the ICEM and the ITGLWF) (Geneva)	817 organizations / 54m.	Extraction of oil and gas, mining, generation and distribution of electric power, manufacturing of metals and metal products, shipbuilding, automotive, aerospace, mechanical engineers, electronics, chemicals, rubber, pulp and paper, building materials, textiles, garments, leather and footwear, environmental services
ITF (London)	690 organizations / 4,5m.	Transport industry: seafarers, dockers, civil aviation, railways, road transport
IUF (Geneva)	336 organizations / 2,7m. (financial membership)	Agriculture and plantations, preparation and manufacture of food and beverages, hotels, restaurants and catering services, all stages of tobacco processing
PSI (Ferney-Voltaire Cedex)	650 organizations / more than 20m. in 148 countries and territories	Personnel employed in local, national and regional governments: social services, health care, municipal and community services, central government, public utilities (water and electricity)
UNI (Nyon)	900 organizations / 20m.	Cleaning & security, commerce, finance, gaming, graphical & packaging, hair & beauty, media, entertainment & arts, post & logistics, social insurance, sport, temp & agency workers, tourism industries
IFJ	161 organizations / 600.000	Journalists
IAEA	312 organizations / 800.000	Arts and entertainment sector

^aInternational Metal Workers' Federation

Source: Croucher and Cotton, 2009; Müller et al., (2010); own composition on the base of the data available at organizational websites (Accessed 28 June 2012)

4 The IFIs: the World Bank Group and the IMF

The World Bank Group (WBG) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) belong to the group of international governmental organizations (IGOs) which have become central actors in international politics acting as ‘...agents of global change’ (Carbone, 2007: 180). Both the WBG and the IMF have played an important role in governing the international economy and promoting development since the post-World War II period (Chorev and Babb, 2009). They were founded with the objective of providing global public goods (GPGs) for people across the world and to offer governments the possibility to participate in activities ‘...that required some separation from domestic politics in order to generate legitimacy and trust’ (Martinez-Diaz, 2008: 7).

Governments are both founders and members of the World Bank Group and the IMF. Although governments can be divided into money-lenders and borrowers all member governments are shareholders of these organizations (World Bank, 2001b). The level of financial support member governments are able to provide to the WBG and the IMF determines their political weight within these organizations and their influence on decision-making. Given the dependence of the IFIs on member government financial contributions, one might assume that governments would be able to limit the sovereignty of the IFIs as corporate social actors. However, the IFIs do have some autonomy, they are not fully controlled by their member governments and they do not necessarily do what their creators originally intended (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). In this respect the IFIs can be considered as sovereign corporate social actors, they have their own culture and agenda (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999), they have their own authority and competence (Oestreich, 2007; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004) and, they ‘...exercise power as they constitute and construct the social world’ (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 700).

The IFIs have a normative influence within the system of global governance and on their member governments which is mainly centred on the ‘...coercive diffusion of neoliberal economic policies’ (Torfason and Ingram, 2010: 357). The IMF for example provides

information about certain norms such as ‘austerity’ and has the ‘... hands-on expertise required to establish structures of conformity with those norms’ (Ibid., 2010: 357). Since the outbreak of the international financial crisis many European governments needed external financial support to rescue their banking and financial services industries. Those countries requiring help have not been able to avoid the policy advice of the “Troika”, that is the European Commission (EC), the IMF and the European Central Bank (ECB). This advice usually includes the administration and implementation of austerity measures at the national level. The outbreak of the international financial and economic crisis in 2008 and the support provided by the Troika in some European countries reflects the loss of influence of national governments in terms of shaping their own national policies and institutions. The influence of the Troika on labour market institutions in particular has tended to promote the weakening of employment protection and labour rights, which in turn has often had a negative affect on national and international trade union organizations.

The following subchapters describe and analyse some of the organizational characteristics of the World Bank, the IFC and the IMF which are important in relation to the dialogue with the Global Unions. Although the World Bank and the IFC both belong to the World Bank Group they have different objectives, target groups, structures and identities which means that an explicit differentiation of the these organizations is necessary.

4.1 The World Bank

The World Bank (WB) is at the heart of the World Bank Group and is made up of two development organizations: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA). The IDA was founded in 1960 as a result of the demands of a growing group of underdeveloped countries and was later incorporated into the structure of the IBRD (Darrow, 2003). Currently the IBRD has 188 member countries and the IDA 170 member countries and was originally created to help re-build Europe after WWII. The IBRD is generally referred to as the World Bank and is a central focus for the thesis because of its direct relations with the Global Unions. In contrast to the IBRD and the IDA, which lend to governments, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) which has 182 member countries works directly with the private sector (World Bank, 2011e).

The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) complement the work of the World Bank.

MIGA promotes foreign direct investment in the developing countries and the ICSID is an autonomous international arbitration institution which deals with international investment disputes. However, neither of these organizations plays a role in the dialogue.

As discussed above the members of the WBG and the IMF, which are also called shareholders, are national governments. In order to become a member of the World Bank a country has to apply for membership to the IMF. When a country applies to the IMF it has to provide data about its economy which will be compared with other member countries which are of similar size. Depending on the amount of a country's financial subscription to the IMF a quota is assigned to that country which determines its voting power within the IMF and the number of shares it has in the WB (World Bank, 2013 website⁴⁸).

Currently the five largest donor governments of the World Bank are the United States, Japan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom. The continuing dominance of the G7 countries within the IFIs and the under-representation of smaller and very poor countries undoubtedly raises questions about the legitimacy of the WBG (Interview WB01, 2008).

The current objectives of the World Bank are focused around providing financial and technical support to developing countries for public sector projects; the IBRD focuses on middle-income countries and the IDA focuses on the poorest countries worldwide. Both these World Bank organizations support development projects in the public sector. They work together with the central bank in a given country or a comparable national agency. The World Bank currently uses four lending instruments which include investment lending (IL), development policy lending (DPL), Program-for-Results, and the World Guarantee Programme (Peck, 2012). In particular DPL has been heavily criticized by external stakeholders such as trade unions due to the conditions attached to the loans and grants which have often a negative impact on poorest people in society and, have for example, included reforms of economic policies such as privatization of state-owned telecommunication and energy companies as well as trade liberalization (Eurodad, 2006).

4.1.1 Structure

The structure of the World Bank is made up of its organizational governing bodies and its technocratic apparatus. The latter includes departments and regional offices which are responsible for the daily business of the organization.

⁴⁸Source: World Bank, 2013 <<http://go.worldbank.org/AXK8ZEAD10>> [Accessed 10 January 2013]

4.1.1.1 **Governing bodies**

The main governing body and organizational supreme authority within the World Bank is the Board of Governors. All member governments are represented within this board, either through their finance ministers or their development ministers. The five largest shareholders of the World Bank are mainly represented by their finance ministers. Only Germany and the UK are represented through their development ministers. As the governors, these ministers, are ‘... the ultimate policy makers at the World Bank’ (World Bank, 2012 website⁴⁹). Despite the relative autonomy of the WB mentioned above, it can be argued that these ministers have a strong influence on the objectives, the organizational programmes and the agenda of the organization. The ministers represent the policies which have been formally decided at the national level (Bretton Woods Project, 2012). In the case of Germany, for example, the ministry is currently headed by the coalition partner of the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Christian Social Union (CSU). In line with the general policy of the CSU it is very likely that the German minister for Economic Cooperation and Development will represent a strongly focused free-market approach within the board of the World Bank.


The general tasks of the governors include the admission of new members, the increase or decrease of capital stock, arrangements concerning cooperation with other international organizations and the distribution of the net income of the World Bank. The board meets at least once per year, but additional meetings can be requested by member governments.

The following figure 4.1 shows that the Board of Governors is supported by an Advisory Council and Loan Committees. The members of the Advisory Council are selected by the board. They include representatives from different sectors (banking, commerce, industry, labour and agriculture). The Loan Committees report to the board on those loans which have been awarded to members.

The executive body at the World Bank is the Board of Executive Directors (EDs) which exercises ‘... the power delegated to them by the Board of Governors’ (IBRD, 2012). Since 2010 there have been 25 EDs which are appointed or elected every two years and which serve all organizations belonging to the World Bank Group. The five members with the largest shares, including the United States and Germany, appoint one ED each. All other EDs are elected. China, the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia elect one ED each; whilst the other EDs are elected by the rest of the member governments who represent different groups of countries, so called multi-country constituencies. The permission given to some

⁴⁹Source: World Bank, 2011 <<http://go.worldbank.org/HWEWI4KI00>> [Accessed 5 November 2012]

Figure 4.1: Formal structure of the World Bank



Source: own illustration

countries to appoint their own EDs is based on the the number of shares they hold and as such represents a power imbalance within the World Bank's structure.

In theory the EDs are individual actors and cannot exercise any power or represent the World Bank without the authorization of the board (WBG, 2013 website⁵⁰). However, according to a former executive director of the WB, an ED can have quite a strong influence on discussions within the Bank and as a result on the Bank's policy decisions. This influence depends on an ED's ability to communicate and to convince other EDs to a great extent. The management of the WB is very respectful with regard to opinions from EDs (Interview WB05, 2009).

The tasks of the EDs include executive and oversight functions. In this context the EDs consider proposals on IBRD loans, IDA credits and IFC investments; they decide on policies which impact on the World Bank's general operations; they select the president who serves as the chairman of the board; they also have the authority to remove him; and they have the power to interpret the constitution of the WB, the Articles of Agreement. These interpretations are binding for all World Bank members unless they are overruled by the governors. Former interpretations of the Articles included for example the valuation of the Bank's capital.

⁵⁰Source: WBG, 2013 <<http://go.worldbank.org/LHH0T1LSW0>> [Accessed 3 March 2013]

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Furthermore, the EDs receive the reports of two WB evaluation units which are the Inspection Panel and the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG). The Inspection Panel, which has been created by the Board of Executive Directors, provides a complaint mechanism for people and communities with regard to any adverse affects of World Bank projects (WBG, 2013 website⁵¹).

The IEG assures the accountability of the WBG. The IEG reports to the Executive Directors about the WBG strategies, policies, programmes and activities. The findings of the evaluation group provide new inputs to the EDs and their decision-making processes. Such decision-making processes include for example the evaluation of the WB's social and environmental safeguard policies. The WB's safeguard policies describe the Bank's social and environmental lending requirements for borrowers within projects supported through investment lending (World Bank, 2014). In July 2014 the Bank's EDs started to discuss a draft of new safeguard policies which includes for the first time labour standards requirements after the Bank's safeguard policies were criticized by governments, trade unions and other civil society organizations and the IEG for more than two decades (Bakvis, 2014a).

With regard to the safeguard policies IEG reports also lead to further consultation processes and continuing discussions within and outside the World Bank Group. Nevertheless, even though the IEG has some influence concerning the design of the policy of the WBG its range of influence is limited.

IEG's work helps to improve the understanding of Bank Group staff but there is less evidence of direct use of IEG's products to improve policies, strategies, and operations. More can and should be done to encourage learning from IEG's work(IEG, 2011: xii).

One factor which limits the influence of the IEG is the decentralized structure of the WBG in addition there are a considerable number of staff who work in regional offices covering specific areas of Bank activities. The offices are managed by country directors which have a lot of leeway in making decisions or initiatives themselves. It is therefore very difficult for staff working at headquarters in Washington to interfere in activities at regional level (Interview WB02, 2008).

The day-to-day business of the WB takes place under the leadership of the president, senior staff and the vice presidents which are responsible for regions and sectors. In 2012

⁵¹Source: WBG, 2013 <<http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/AboutUS.aspx>> [Accessed 3 March 2013]

Dr. Jim Yong Kim replaced Robert Zöllick as president. His main tasks include the day to day conduct of the ordinary business of the bank under the direction of the EDs and the supervision of the operating World Bank staff including the managing directors and vice presidents. The president's competences include the general organization, the appointment and the dismissal of staff and officers. With regard to the recruitment of staff members the geographical spread is important in order to meet staff diversity which is considered as strategic business asset. Other attributes are the educational background and the capacities of individual staff members with which the WB tries to secure '...the highest standards of efficiency and technical competence' (IBRD, 2012). The workforce of the WB is structured by 10 grade levels which reflect increasing responsibilities and skills. The three main categories are administrative jobs, professional and technical jobs, and managerial jobs. The last stream includes for example sector managers, country directors and vice presidents. The Bank's president Jim Yong Kim is currently promoting restructuring reforms within the organizations' headquarters which, amongst other things, includes a planned cut of several hundred jobs over the next three years. This is said to be creating a climate of fear among staff members (Provost, 2014).

4.1.1.2 Departments of importance for the Global Unions

The 'Organizational Chart of the World Bank' illustrates the broad range of departments and the structure of management positions within the Bank (World Bank, 2013 website⁵²). In terms of the dialogue three departments are of particular interest to the Global Unions. These departments are External Affairs, the Social Protection & Labour (SP&L) unit and the Procurement Policy and Services Group which are described in more detail in the following sections. Another department with which trade unions are not directly in contact, but which is responsible for setting the policies on conditionalities attached to loans is the 'Operations Policies and Country Services' (OPCS) department.

The department which organizes contacts with civil society is the access point to the World Bank for the Global Unions. At the global level the Bank engages with civil society through its Civil Society Team (CST) which replaced the former NGO unit in 2004. It includes staff members from the External Affairs department (EA) and the Social Development department, the Bank's offices in Paris and Brussels, and from the IFC and the MIGA. The CST is the '...institutional focal point for the Bank's engagement with civil society' and provides civil society groups such as trade unions with access to '... Bank information,

⁵²Source: World Bank, 2013 <<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/bank.pdf>> [Accessed 20 August 2013]

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personnel, and other resources (World Bank, 2011 website⁵³). The representatives of the ITUC/Global Unions office in Washington maintain a regular contact with the External Affairs department.

In addition to the CST, more than 120 ‘Civil Society Focal Points’ (staff members) work in country offices, the headquarters in Washington DC, regions, networks and other operational units (Ibid., 2011). At the headquarters in Washington there are 40 civil society focal points in place which work at the regional and the departmental level in various units and networks, these staff at the regional level provide regional vice-presidents with advice.

The Social Protection & Labour unit which forms part of the Banks’s Human Development Network (HDN) is of specific importance to the Global Unions. The objective of the HDN is to create equal opportunities for people which includes, amongst other things, ‘...to secure meaningful jobs’ (World Bank, 2013 website⁵⁴). In this context labour markets are considered to be, ‘...critical for a sustainable and inclusive development strategy’ (Vodopivec, Fares and Justesen, 2009: 45).

A well-functioning labor market is needed to guarantee the success of structural reforms, to maintain social support for those reforms, and to ensure that their benefits are widely distributed. Moving toward a well-functioning labor market will likely be crucial to a more effective implementation of poverty reduction strategies and hence progress toward meeting the Millennium Development Goals (World Bank, 2012e).

The foundation of the SP&L unit within the World Bank is intended to bring together various strands of social protection and labour activities and to overcome the lack of a coherent and ‘piecemeal’ framework in this area (Holzmann, Sipos and Social Protection Team, 2009: 1). In comparison to other units within the Bank the SP&L unit covers,

(...) a young, strong sector, accounting for a significant share of Bank lending and knowledge – and serving as a global leader in its work on evidence-based policy-making (World Bank, 2012e: v).

One subject area of the SP&L unit is called ‘Labor Markets’. Since the outbreak of the international financial crisis labour markets have gained an even more important position within the World Bank’s social policy agenda and are at the center of the Bank’s ‘Commitment to Poverty Reduction and Growth’ (World Bank, 2012 website⁵⁵). According to the

⁵³Source: World Bank, 2011 <<http://go.worldbank.org/8DJ82AMKB0>> [Accessed 20 April 2012]

⁵⁴Source: World Bank, 2013 <<http://go.worldbank.org/8TJ7JTJWJO>> [Accessed 10 February 2013]

⁵⁵Source: World Bank, 2012 <<http://go.worldbank.org/Q22VEAZ9D0>> [Accessed 16 March 2012]

World Bank, the functioning of the labour market influences the whole economy of a country. In this context the Bank stresses the importance of flexibility for employers regards the management of their human resources and that barriers which hinder the mobility of workers have to be removed. Such barriers may include ‘... stringent regulations or geographic, economic, and social constraints’ (Ibid., 2012). For that reason the sub-unit ‘Labor Regulations & Social Insurance’ has the objective of designing policies which facilitate labour mobility and which help to improve the matching of skills and jobs. The focus of this unit is on labour regulation including labour laws, collective agreements and on social welfare policies including unemployment benefits and health insurance. According to the Bank

The idea is to combine both to have more flexible and reliable contractual arrangements while expanding workers access to adequate and portable income protection programs (World Bank, 2012 website⁵⁶).

The World Bank considers flexible labour legislation as essential for the creation of new businesses and jobs. For that reason, the task of labour law ‘... is to balance the need to protect workers’ rights with the need to increase flexibility in the labor market’ (World Bank, 2012 website⁵⁷). However, the World Bank also admits that international trade and global supply chains have generated considerable concerns regards working conditions and the capacity of developing countries to regulate such conditions. During the last decade the World Bank has spent US\$ 7.14bn on job creation and worker protection activities more than two thirds of which have been lent through the IBRD (World Bank, 2011 website⁵⁸).

In 2007 Germany, Austria, Norway and Korea created the ‘Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) on Labor Markets, Job Creation and Economic Growth’. The objective is to promote ‘... effective policy-making in the area of labor markets and job creation in developing countries’ (World Bank Group, 2012 website⁵⁹). In this regard the MDTF is active in three areas: supporting the research of academics on key policy issues related to the creation of better and more jobs and the reduction of inequality; the capacity building of national policy makers in the area of labour market analysis; ‘good practices’ in labour market policies; and the support of country-level activities including the analysis of local labour market conditions (Ibid., 2012). For example research is focused on the diagnosis of labor market conditions, the connection between business environments and labour demands, and the benefits and costs of structural reforms for workers.

⁵⁶Source: World Bank, 2012 <<http://go.worldbank.org/E5QTFJWC0>> [Accessed 16 March 2012]

⁵⁷Source: World Bank, 2012 <<http://go.worldbank.org/GHJCSXK1W0>> [Accessed 16 March 2012]

⁵⁸Source: World Bank, 2012 <<http://go.worldbank.org/EEEEZ31R40>> [Accessed 16 March 2012]

⁵⁹Source: World Bank, 2012 <<http://go.worldbank.org/1GNNDFIY50>> [Accessed 18 March 2012]

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The procurement policy of the Bank is an important issue within the dialogue with the Global Unions. The procurement policy and guidance to borrower countries is provided by the World Bank's 'Procurement Policy and Services Group' which is focused on improving efficiency and fairness in relation to public expenditure. These guidelines are important in terms of large investment projects, especially in the construction sector. Infrastructure investments are the largest component of the World Bank's investment projects, making up 35 percent of the World Bank Group's total commitments. Lending commitments for investment projects of the IBRD and the IDA account for US\$ 10bn to 15bn a year (World Bank, 2013 website⁶⁰). The procurement guidelines of the Bank 'Procurement of Goods, Works and Non-Consulting Services under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits & Grants by World Bank Borrowers' inform borrowing governments about general procurement policies (World Bank, 2011b). The guidelines refer to the bidding process and the bidding documents which include the rights and obligations of borrowers and the providers of goods and works. At the national level the project implementing agency is always the borrowing government department; as such the Bank has only a limited oversight regards the implementation of their projects (World Bank, 2001a).

When major work contracts are involved (for investments greater than US\$ 10m) the Bank applies the 'Standards Bidding Documents – Procurement of Works & User's Guide' (SBDW) (World Bank, 2012f). The SBDW are based on the 'Master Bidding Documents for Procurements of Work & User's Guide' which has its roots in the International Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC) conditions originally termed the 'Conditions of Contract (International) for Works of Civil Engineering Construction'; these date back to 1957 (Glover and Hughes, 2011). The FIDIC was established in 1913. The organization has 99 member associations which are associations of consulting engineers, such as for example the American Council of Engineering Companies (USA) and the Association for Consultancy and Engineering (UK) (FIDIC, 2013 website⁶¹). FIDIC is concerned with the promotion and implementation of its members' strategic goals, such as the promotion of standards of ethics and integrity among stakeholders (like the MDBs) involved in infrastructure projects, and the dissemination of information and resources of interest to its members. In this context the organization publishes international standard forms of contracts for works and clients (FIDIC, 2014).

The WB and other MDBs have used the FIDIC 'Conditions of Contract for Works of Civil Engineering Construction' as part of their SBDs for many years. FIDIC's Condition of

⁶⁰Source: World Bank, 2013 <<http://go.worldbank.org/Q4W0IA2RL0>> [Accessed 12 January 2013]

⁶¹Source: FIDIC, 2013 <<http://fidic.org/members>> [Accessed 20 March 2013]

Contract is divided into two parts: *general conditions* and *conditions of particular application* (FIDIC, 2013 website). Within the latter, different MDBs normally included different additional clauses in order to amend the provisions contained in the general conditions which created uncertainty and inefficiency among the users of the documents. In 1999, in order to harmonize their tender documents, the MDBs modified FIDIC's Condition of Contract for the first time. In 2005 the first version of a harmonized construction contract was released by the MDBs (FIDIC, 2005) which was followed by two amendments, one in 2006 and one in 2010.

The FIDIC master document (contract) serves as a guideline for standard bidding documents. As indicated above the WB's SBDW is divided into two parts, 'general clauses' and 'particular conditions' (World Bank, 2012f). 'General Clauses' must be applied by all contractors and their contents cannot be changed by contractors. In other words the general clauses are much more mandatory than the particular conditions. In the first harmonized construction contract in 2005 only the four ILO core conventions related to forced labour and child labour were introduced in the general clauses (see subchapter 1.1.5). The other four ILO core conventions which are related to the freedom of association of workers, the right to collective bargaining, the elimination of discrimination and equal remuneration were only included in the particular conditions of the WB's SBDW from 2010. In 2009 the heads of procurement of several MDBs agreed to include these additional conventions in the general clauses of the FIDIC master document and as mentioned above, in 2010 an amended version which included these changes was published. In this context the WB was a key actor in terms of initiating and promoting this change process among other MDBs (Interview WB04, 2009).

As a result all eight ILO conventions (contained within the four principles of the CLS) have been included in the general clauses of the WBs SBDW 'Conditions of Contract and Contract Forms' (World Bank, 2012f: viii; 171–172). This means that in theory at least contractors now have to comply with labour law in relation to workers right to join a workers' organization and to bargain collectively. In countries where the national labour law constrains workers' organizations, contractors have to '...enable alternative means' through which employees can express their grievances (World Bank, 2012f: 171).

In summary it could be argued that for the Global Unions the WB's EA department and the SP&L unit are of particular importance. The SP&L team develops strategies for social protection policies which include the issue of labour. The EA department administers and coordinates contacts with civil society. Within both units individual actors determine the relationship with trade union representatives to a great extent. The attitudes of these

actors are influenced by their positions, educational backgrounds, qualifications and socialization.

4.1.2 Identity

The identity of the WB includes those characteristics which are considered as central, distinctive and enduring by organizational agents (individual actors) and which distinguish the organization from other corporate social actors. In this context one distinguishing property is the organizational culture. The organizational culture can be seen as a set of basic assumptions which allows an organization to deal with the challenges of external adaptation and internal integration (Schein, 1993). These basic assumptions are based on non-debatable organizational values which guide the behaviour of individual actors.

According to its own definition the WB is ‘... not a Bank in the ordinary sense but a unique partnership to reduce poverty and support development’ (World Bank, 2012 website⁶²). The Bank describes itself as ‘global development cooperative’ (World Bank, 2012a: 14). This development approach which is based on the notions of capitalism determines the basic assumptions of WB staff as the following statements of a WB representative of the EA department underlines.

Our paradigm [*capitalism*] is still the same. We believe that our main job is to promote economic development because without economic development you cannot have poverty reduction, you cannot have climate change funding... but we think that the kind of growth today has to be within a philosophy of more equity, social equity, environmental sustainability (Interview WB01, 2008).

According to the interviewee, the traditional neoliberal paradigm of the WB, which was strongly focused on trade liberalization and the opening of markets, has changed over time. Many members of the Bank are said to have become more sensitive to the criticisms expressed by civil society organizations, including trade unions and started to promote ‘country ownership’ regards policy changes (Interview WB01, 2008). In this context the WB expanded its ‘... definition of government’ and now works together with different ministries apart from the ministry of finance, including for example the ministry of agriculture and the ministry of health (Ibid., 2008).

I think a lot of our policies today are debt policies, are social and environmental safeguards, our gender policies, our participation policies, information and

⁶²Source: World Bank, 2012 <<http://go.worldbank.org/7Q47C9K0Z0>> [Accessed 18 March 2012]

disclosure – that has changed so much over sixty years and a lot of that has been because of civil society pressure in the last 20, 30 years (...) (Interview WB01, 2008).

Apart from the development approach the “bank approach” is important to the organization to gather financial resources. The IBRD is active in the global financial markets where it issues bonds and passes the low interest rates on to its borrowers.

The IBRD became a major player on the international capital markets by developing modern debt products, opening new markets for debt issuance, and by building up a broad investor base around the world of pension funds, insurance companies, central banks, and individuals (World Bank Group, 2013⁶³).

Through the return on equity and the margins made on lending the IBRD finances operating expenses and supports the IDA. The Bank is not tempted to maximize its own profits, however, its operations at international financial markets characterize the Bank as a bank in the ordinary sense and sometimes there is a dichotomy within the bank side of the Bank as money lender and the ‘development agency’ part of the Bank which ‘... wants to reduce poverty’ (Interview WB01, 2008). This dichotomy determines the organizational values which are, on the one hand, market and economy oriented, but on the other hand focused on social development.

The constitution of the WB, the ‘Articles of Agreement’ (IBRD, 2012) as well as ‘The World Bank Group Code of Conduct’ (World Bank Group, 2009) and the ‘Code of Conduct for Board Officials’ (World Bank Group, 2007) also define central norms and values for the corporate actor, staff members and government representatives. With regard to the first, Article IV is of particular importance because it stipulates that organizational agents shall base their decisions only on ‘economic considerations’ and they shall ‘... not interfere in the political affairs of any member’ (IBRD, 2012: IV). It can be argued that this limits the effective implementation of labour standards by the WB on the country level right from the beginning.

The World Bank Group Code of Conduct (2009) guides the behaviour of staff members within all five organizations belonging to the World Bank Group. It describes the responsibilities and commitments of staff members within an intra-organizational and an inter-organizational context. The objective of the code is to foster a sense of common purpose

⁶³Source: World Bank Group, 2013 <<http://go.worldbank.org/LAG4BZ1VD1>> [Accessed 13 November 2013]

and values among the diverse workforce and to build and to support a ‘...cadre of employees who uphold the World Bank Group’s ideals of ethics and integrity in everything they do’ (World Bank Group, 2009: 5). The upkeep and the respect of the values are intended to ensure that the World Bank can achieve its mission which is the fight against poverty and, to attract diverse and committed staff. The interests of the organization always take priority over individual interests and staff members are instructed to place ‘...the interests of the entire World Bank Group ahead of personal, intra-organizational, and inter-organizational interests’ (World Bank Group, 2009: 15). In this context political activities of individual actors must not interfere with the professional role and staff members have to avoid situations ‘...that could cause the public to believe the World Bank Group is politically influenced (Ibid., 2009: 17).

The World Bank Group’s Code of Conduct for Board Officials (2007) is valid for the EDs, the president of each organization, the advisers and senior advisers to the EDs and for acting temporary EDs. This code includes similar restrictions concerning the behaviour of staff members at the internal and external organizational level. However, under certain circumstances board officials other than the president can act on behalf of their governments as long as they respect the organizational rules and procedures of the World Bank (World Bank Group, 2007: 3). The fact that EDs act as representatives of the World Bank and at the same time can take actions on behalf of their governments illustrates a dichotomy of interests at the level of the organizational agents.

Nevertheless, the codes of conduct of the WB provide clear behavioural guidelines for organizational agents, outlining how agents should behave if a conflict of interests arises and how they can avoid such situations. The WB’s Ethics Committee also supervises the behaviour of the agents and aims to guarantee the dissemination of organizational values.

4.1.3 Creation of knowledge and knowledge management

With regard to the approach an organization has concerning knowledge development and knowledge creation, the organizational leadership can play a major role. In the case of the WB, the former president James Wolfensohn created the so called ‘Knowledge Bank’ (Bazbauers, 2012: 6). In his vision for the WB, the Bank would share its knowledge with other corporate actors such as its members and help to build up a worldwide capacity for knowledge and knowledge reserves. Since Wolfensohn knowledge has played a strategic role for the Bank and its development strategy.

In 2011 the World Bank published its first ‘Knowledge Report’ (World Bank, 2011d). This report has been led and managed by the WB’s Knowledge and Learning Council (founded in 2010) and provides an overview of the Bank’s knowledge work. The report serves as a foundation for improving the Bank’s knowledge work internally and externally. It states that the Bank seeks to produce knowledge which is ‘cutting-edge’ and ‘operationally relevant’ (Ibid., 2011b: 10). The fact that the Bank published such a report in 2011 suggests that knowledge creation and knowledge management is important for the Bank. This need for such knowledge creation can be traced back to the increasing necessity for organizations to provide expertise quickly on demand and the existing competition among the growing number of development agencies and think tanks. For that reason it is important for the Bank to consider, what is the best way to contribute to development debates and it has to learn from past experiences with regard to the evolution of development knowledge. In this context education, qualification and experience of WB staff are important elements in terms of fulfilling the expectations of clients (Ibid., 2011b).

Within the knowledge report the Bank describes itself as ‘producer’, ‘customizer’ and ‘connector’ of knowledge (World Bank, 2011d: 14). As a knowledge producer the organization gives for example technical assistance and training to borrowing governments and as a knowledge customizer it promotes collaboration among different banks, governments and civil society (Ibid., 2011b: 21). By the funding of six knowledge platforms the Bank aims to strengthen its role as a global connector bringing together practitioners and development specialist worldwide. The knowledge platforms reflect the Bank’s efforts to open the Bank’s data stores to the public. These platforms are selected by the Knowledge and Learning Council and include for example a jobs knowledge platform (Ibid., 2011b).

The WB’s explicit knowledge can be divided into three areas. It includes knowledge available for clients (such as technical advice, procurement guidelines), knowledge for internal use (such as code of conducts) and knowledge for the public (such as regular publications). With regard to the latter, the World Development Report (WDR) is a flagship publication of the World Bank. The latest report from 2014 focuses on risk management and its impact on development. The report from 2013 focused on jobs and development.

Knowledge is created by individual actors which store information in their minds and make part of this knowledge available to other individual actors. In this regard, the Bank is well aware of the importance of tacit knowledge developed by staff, clients and other organizations that they work with. For that reason there are ongoing discussions about how this kind of knowledge can be captured and codified and ‘...transmitted and developed from year to year and from staff member to staff member through mentoring, debriefing, and

peer learning' (World Bank, 2011d: 23).

Knowledge creation at the WB is carried out by WB officials (governors) and members of staff. The governors represent the ideas and perspectives of the governments they represent and members of staff deal with the implementation and the administration of projects. As development is one of the core elements of the WB, knowledge about development plays an important issue for members of staff and the organization as a collective actor. In the 1950s and 1960s the focus was on building and designing infrastructure in developing countries and less on sectoral work. During those decades most of the input came from engineers and financial analysts. In the following decades the Bank started to hire public policy experts, sector specialists and social scientists to address the increasingly complex development challenges (World Bank, 2011e: 10). In the context of neo-liberalism development knowledge has increasingly focused on the effective functioning of markets which includes the removal of market 'obstacles' by encouraging the privatization of public enterprises and reducing barriers to trade (Ibid., 2011a). The members of staff of the Bank have a broad range of explicit and implicit knowledge. Many of the staff working at the headquarters in Washington are involved in in-depth knowledge work on specific countries and issues related to those countries. They are supported by in-country members of staff who collect information about particular economies and social services systems. However, knowledge transfer between departments and country offices concerned with regional work has been very limited in the past. The WB's bureaucracy has created '...self-enclosed areas of influence' which '...keep people away from each other' (Kim, 2013). In an interview in 2014 Kim stated that the Bank works as six regional banks; a challenge which he has tried to overcome by the structural reform of the WB (Harding, 2014).

Furthermore, the new WB president promotes a more selective approach regards core areas the Bank is involved in. He stated that the Bank should stop '... continue working in areas in which others are better' (Kim, 2013).

What will we stop doing? (...) We won't enter projects for the sole purpose of meeting volume targets for the year. We won't take on projects just to plant our flag on the ground. And we won't tolerate behaviour that promotes individual interests over the common good (Kim, 2013).

Another factor which to some extent hinders knowledge development is the organizational climate of the Bank. In February 2014 a Bank staff survey revealed that only 46 percent of respondents agreed with the statement 'I can report unethical behaviour without fear of reprisal' (Provost, 2014). According to a Bank's senior manager an organizational climate

in which staff members are afraid to show their dissent has developed further under Kim (Ibid., 2014).

In addition to individual actors producing knowledge related to their own experiences and the collection of facts and data, departments and networks within the Bank also act as knowledge silos and aim to ensure the flow of knowledge at an intra-organizational level. The SP&L unit for example, focuses on five different core areas including labour markets, skills, labour regulation, impact evaluation and youth employment. This unit also developed the new SP&L strategy which was launched in 2012. Its main goals are to support the development of resilience (social insurance programmes), equity and opportunities for people in low-and middle-income countries and to harmonise SP&L programmes (World Bank, 2012e). The WB units strategically manage and disseminate information and knowledge using the newest technological developments. By 2003 for example the WB had three knowledge technology platforms which aimed at increasing interaction between members of staff and clients.

4.1.4 Organizational power

Organizational knowledge and expertise form part of the organizational resources. Generally, the World Bank possesses a great amount of material and non-material resources due to its size and its support by national governments. The IBRD raises most of its funds on the world's financial markets. The organization is able to borrow large amounts of money on the financial markets due to its financial strength and its standing in capital markets. It has a 'preferred creditor status' recognized by major rating agencies (World Bank Treasury, 2009 website⁶⁴). The capital the WB received from governments and the markets in 2009 was US\$ 205.4bn (Ibid., 2009).

The Bank's strength is based on IBRD's prudent financial policies and practices, which help maintain its AAA credit rating (World Bank, 2012a: 14).

One organizational objective of the IBRD is to maintain its financial strength in order to be able to accomplish its mission which is the reduction of poverty. In 2012 the lending commitment of the IBRD was US\$ 20.6bn (World Bank, 2012a). The IBRD also supports the IDA with transfers from its net income. The IDA lending commitment in 2012 was US\$ 14.8bn (World Bank, 2012a). The biggest share of lending of the IBRD and the

⁶⁴Source: World Bank Treasury, 2009 <http://treasury.worldbank.org/cmd/htm/financial_shareholder.html> [Accessed 20 March 2012]

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IDA goes into the 'Public Administration, Law, and Justice' sector followed by 'Energy and Mining', 'Transport' and 'Health and Other Social Services' (Ibid., 2012g: 14). Any decision to increase the stock of financial resources is taken by the board of governors.

Apart from its material resource the IBRD and the IDA have more than 9,000 members of staff from all over the world. Two-thirds of them work at the headquarters and one-third in the more than 124 country offices. The different cultural backgrounds and the broad range of professions of staff members – there are for example economists, educators, environmental scientists, financial analysts, foresters, agronomists, engineers, information technology specialists and social scientists – provide the World Bank with a large pool of expertise within the cultural and professional area. All organizational agents are meant to contribute to the extension of explicit knowledge and the accumulation of a large amount of tacit knowledge, which the WB is anxious to exploit in an efficient way. As a consequence of its standing in the capital markets and its reputation as an employer the costs of mobilizing its financial and personnel resources are relatively small.

At the inter-organizational level the WB's financial and personnel resources and its importance as a money lender for many governments give it the power to influence global policy as well as other corporate actors (such as governments) and allow it to disseminate its perspectives and its paradigm. In terms of the intra-organizational level of the WB, shareholders (national governments) and individual actors (such as managing directors, country directors and EDs) can be very influential and also provide opportunities for other individuals and corporate actors. In particular the EDs influence the strategic policy of the Bank (World Bank, 2011e).

For a long time the USA held 37 percent of the IBRD's voting power (Birdsall, 2007). After several internal governance reforms, the USA now only holds 15.7 percent⁶⁵ of the total voting power, whilst the voting power of Developing and Transition Countries (DTCs) has increased to 47.19 percent (World Bank Group, 2013 website⁶⁶).

However, for most countries the quality of representation depends on the practices within the multi-country constituencies through which they are represented (Martinez-Diaz, 2008). Only a handful of countries, which are the countries with the biggest shares, appoint their own ED including the USA, Japan, France, Germany and the UK. The other

⁶⁵Source: Table 'IBRD subscriptions and voting power of member countries' <<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027-1215524804501/IBRDCountryVotingTable.pdf>> [Accessed 30 December 2014]

⁶⁶Source: World Bank, 2013 <<http://go.worldbank.org/WDRT2IZSE0>> [Accessed 25 March 2013]

countries, apart from China, the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia which form single-country constituencies, are represented in multi-country constituencies which ‘... more or less represent geographic regions’ (World Bank, 2011a: 9). In 2011 for instance the ED from Spain represented the constituency consisting of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Spain and the República Bolivariana de Venezuela (Ibid., 2011e: 232). This is a clear illustration of the considerable geographical, political and cultural variation that may have to be covered by an individual ED and the unbalanced nature of representation within the WB.

EDs operate on the ‘principle of consensus’ this could arguably be advantageous for those countries which have their own ED, especially in the context in which ‘...there is no official record kept of the positions taken by EDs and no way for citizens to hold their representatives accountable’ (Bretton Woods Project, 2012). Consensus can be understood as an arrangement where the lowest common denominator becomes the basis for agreement resulting in a position or a view ‘...most people in a group can “live with for now”’ (Isaacs, 1993: 26). The weighted voting system and the representation of countries through multi-country constituencies create unequal power relationships between members from the northern and the southern hemisphere within the World Bank which tends to shape decision-making processes in favour of the countries from the northern hemisphere.

The power of individual actors such as officers and members of staff in senior positions is noticeable at the intra-organizational and the inter-organizational level. For example department directors have a direct influence on staff within their own department and they shape the opinion of staff concerning certain issues, such as for example trade union and labour issues. They help to create or prevent the space for the development of new organizational knowledge as well as its distribution within the organization which in the best case leads to organizational learning.

4.1.5 Is the Bank able to learn and to change?

Since its foundation in 1944 the Bank has been through several changes at the structural and institutional level, this includes the Bank’s identity, its knowledge and knowledge management. Important driving factors which have contributed to these organizational changes have been the development of the global economy including international and regional crises, technological developments and pressure from individual and corporate actors, such as civil society organizations or the G-20 (Interview WB01, 2008). Birdsall

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(2007: 52–53) relates the increasing pressure on the Bank to the ‘...erosion of the Bank’s legitimacy as an institution, loss of faith in its effectiveness (in reducing poverty and promoting “balanced and externally oriented growth”), and its apparent growing irrelevance’. The latter has been changed since the outbreak of the international finance and economic crisis when the WB started to renew its image as an influential political actor on the world stage. However, there is still the danger of ‘...creeping irrelevance’ as middle-income countries are now able to borrow cheaply on international markets (Harding, 2014).

In addition to factors in the organizations’ environment which sometimes trigger organizational change processes, organizational leadership can also play an important role. In the case of the WB a major rethinking and reform process was introduced by James Wolfensohn who was the president of the Bank in 1995 for ten years. He put the focus on fighting poverty and pushed for an expansion of the development dialogue with civil society. In particular most trade unionists have a positive memory of him because of his openness towards the dialogue and his effort to develop a relationship with trade unions (Interview ITUC03, 2009). His political point of view regards development and workers’ rights as well as his criticism of defence spending in the developed countries instead of development assistance put him in a favourable light with trade unionists.

Wolfensohn appears to have played a key role in deciding that the Bank should change its position, acknowledging that the anti-CLS stance was both untenable and a major obstacle to any improvement in relations with the labour movement. Beginning in early 2002, Wolfensohn made public pronouncements asserting that the Bank supported promotion of CLS (Bakvis, 2005: 635).

Wolfensohn was the president who initiated the idea of secondments of trade unionists to the WB. He made it possible that a small number of unionists, one at a time, became appointed by the Bank for a short period of time to follow the work of a particular department. This was an important step to foster the exchange between Bank staff and trade unionists, even though it only took place on a very limited scale (Interview PSI, 2008). Furthermore, he took a stand regarding the abolition of ‘institutional impediments’ to trade union involvement when he overruled influential individual actors, such as for example one of the former directors of the SP&L department (Interview ITUC01, 2008).

The presidency of Paul Wolfowitz (2005–2007) which followed was affected by two scandals. Accusations concerned the Bank’s violation of the neutrality principle and its political involvement in national affairs as well as the unethical behaviour of some of its

members of staff. With the arrival of president Robert B. Zoellick the Bank is said to have improved the situation, but like his predecessors he was also a strong advocate of free markets (Bazbauers, 2012). The former director of the SP&L unit commented on these two presidents as follow:

The Wolfowitz story surely was damaging for the WB's reputation. However, Zoellick is a better seller, even though he is a bare-knuckle republican with regard to the policy approach. He only sells things better which leads to better headlines in the news, but he is not very clear with regard to contents (Interview WB02, 2008).

In contrast to Wolfensohn, both Paul Wolfowitz and Robert B. Zoellick did not have much time for trade unions (Interview ITUC04, 2009; Interview ITUC02, 2011).

The new president Dr. Jim Yong Kim who has been the president of the WB since 2012, established two goals: to end extreme poverty by 2030 and to promote real income growth for the bottom 40 percent of the population (Kim, 2013). Kim is the first president who is not an economist, but held professorships at Harvard Medical School and School of Public Health. Furthermore, trade unionists see him in a positive light due to his former engagement within civil society. In the context of his appointment in 2012, the ITUC General Secretary Sharan Burrow called on the WB under the new president to '...develop a new balanced approach to labour market issues and in favour of decent work inspired by the recommendations of the World Development Report 2013' (ITUC, 2012).

However, his very strong rhetoric regards the combat of poverty has been followed by little action so far, which has lead to a considerable level of disappointment amongst many civil society actors (Falk, 2013). As the author mentioned earlier, in his attempt to make the WB more efficient in its combat against global poverty, Kim has embarked on the largest re-organize the Bank since the 1990s, with the aim of creating a more centralized structure (Financial Times, 2014). However, many staff members are concerned about these developments in terms of their jobs; which is said to have made the president a very unpopular figure in the organization (Provost, 2014).

Despite the limited success regards organizational change promoted by WB presidents, from the point of view of a member of staff from the EA department, the WB has changed a lot during the last 60 years. After its foundation in 1944 the WB was focused on re-building Europe. In this context the Bank focused on the development of institutional structures and economic institutions like ministries of finance and an independent central bank. Later on the Bank focused on the (structural) reasons for poverty in Africa, Asia and

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Latin America such as gender inequality and class differences. This led to an extension of the Bank's approach regards social policies which today includes safety nets, health (HIV/Aids, malaria) and education as well as the consideration of environmental issues. In addition the Bank has '... a much stronger evaluation mechanisms' (which is the IEG); '...safeguard policies which are in the form of legally binding policies'; '...compliance mechanisms' (which is the inspection panel and the ombudsman office at the IFC); '... a governance country system strategy' which considers accountability and transparency of governments, '... a strong anticorruption unit that investigates corruption of staff and of the governments around Bank policies' and a '... much more open information disclosure policy' including public information centres in about a hundred countries (Interview WB01, 2008). According to this WB representative, these changes came along with changes towards the neoliberal paradigm which today focuses less on trade liberalization and the opening of markets (Interview WB01, 2008).

However, even though there some organizational change has taken place over the course of the time, organizational change is still difficult to achieve for the WB. In the following sections the thesis considers some of the factors which are important in this regard.

One of the challenges regards organizational change is the decentralized structure of the WB which the current president is trying to change through structural reform. Decentralization makes simultaneous changing and learning processes among different departments and regional offices more difficult and requires an adaptation of communication channels to balance out gaps in knowledge dissemination.

According to a WB representative '...different parts of the Bank will change at different speeds' because of decentralization (Interview WB01, 2008). It takes a long time before a different way of thinking or focus of action introduced at the headquarters level gets through to the country level. For example, one trade unionist observed that after Wolfensohn declared human and labour rights as important for Bank activities there were still directors of WB country offices which argued against these rights (Interview ITUC03, 2009).

Another influential factor hindering organizational change is the intra-organizational power imbalance among WB shareholders which are key actors in this regard. The board of governors reflects a '...lot of political contradictions' (such as dictatorships, democratic governments, monarchies, and communist countries) which complicate negotiations regards policy changes (Interview WB01, 2008). In general, there are some countries which are more open to reforms than other countries particular so in relations to such issues as transparency, accountability and the elimination of corruption (Ibid., 2008).

(...) that's why it is so complicated for the Bank because we have everything. All these systems or governments right here; they are all on our board. So if you decide that you are going to promote democracy, you know, those countries which are not democratic they don't like that idea (Interview WB01, 2008).

In the past the left wing government of Norway took a lead on issues such as CLS, conditionalities, environment and debt relief (Minutes high-level meeting, 2009). However, from the point of view of a WB representative, a reform of voting power to make the IFIs more democratic involves the danger that the policies of the WB and the IMF become more conservative in the sense that countries like China, Russia or Saudi Arabia are arguably uninterested in greater transparency and accountability and are likely to be opposed to stronger reforms which might work against their interests (Interview WB01, 2008).

A third factor which is important in terms of organizational learning and change is the influence and leeway of individual actors and research groups in this respect (Oestreich, 2007: 11). Within the WB, members of staff are considered as '...users and producers of intellectual property' (World Bank Group, 2009: 20). In this regard they '...may draw on original analytical work, plus learning from operations and knowledge derived from external sources and partnerships' (World Bank, 2011d: 17).

Learning from operations is experienced based learning. This led for example to the review on conditionality which the Bank's operations policy and country services had undertaken with regard to the Bank's development policy-based lending documents. As a result the Bank changed its approach to conditionality in terms of flexibility and introduced good practice principles (World Bank, 2005). Among other things, these principles stress the importance of country ownership and the development of a coordinated accountability framework (World Bank, 2007a). Since 2005 the World Bank reviews the use of conditionality and the overall success of its lending instrument DPL on a regular basis.

Even though the WB offers a space which encourages members of staff to express their own views, to act in a proactive way and to develop strategies which help to deal with arising problems and to communicate such problems, learning of individual actors is channelled in a specific direction. The Bank supports learning of individual actors by the LEAD programme – Learn, Evaluate, Act, Develop a Plan – which provides some guidelines for proactive action (World Bank Group, 2009). With the help of this programme the WB tries to channel individual learning in the right direction that is according to its own organizational values and organizational mission. Spontaneous action is not desirable and

neither are actions which diverge from the organizational norms which could harm the Bank's reputation.

4.2 The International Finance Corporation

The International Finance Corporation (IFC) was established in 1956 and is one of the five organizations which constitute the WBG. In terms of its organizational structure and financial resources the IFC is independent from the other organizations within the group. It is owned by 184 members and membership is only open to those countries which are also members of the World Bank (IFC, 2013 website⁶⁷).

However, even though the IFC belongs to the World Bank Group it exhibits some clear differences in comparison with the WB, as the following statement from a staff member of the WB illustrates.

It seems a lie that the Bank and the IFC are partner units; both belong to the World Bank Group but they are steered in a completely different way. In my opinion the IFC is less conservative and more innovative than the World Bank, the IBRD, which gives loans to countries (Interview WB03, 2009).

An important aspect of the IFC in terms of innovation is the target group it works with. In contrast to the World Bank, the organization does not deal with governments, but with the private sector in developing countries.

The private sector is now recognized as a critical driver of and partner in economic development, a provider of income, jobs, goods and services to improve people's lives and provide them opportunity to overcome poverty. Demand for IFC's services continues to increase as the role of the private sector in developing countries grows, and IFC continues to strengthen its capabilities and innovate its product offerings. The current difficult market environment as well as substantial risks will require a readiness to respond to evolving client needs (IFC, 2012d: 1).

At the annual conference of the IFIs in 2013 the WB announced it would put a stronger focus on big projects which are likely to bring profit. This new strategy, which is supported by Germany, will mainly be promoted by the IFC (Falk, 2013).

⁶⁷Source: IFC, 2013 <http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/about+ifc> [Accessed 9 January 2013]

Like the WB, the strong economic focus of the IFC is supplemented by a development approach. The organization seeks to reduce poverty in developing countries by means of promoting the private sector (Taylor-Dormond, 2011). Its objectives are to promote productive private companies of all sizes in member countries, in particular in less developed countries and areas. In this context, the IFC is ‘... the largest multilateral financial institution investing in private enterprises in emerging markets, with activities in 130 countries’ (IFC, 2009a: 1). In the fiscal year 2012 the IFC invested more than US\$ 20bn in total of which almost US\$ 6bn was invested in 58 of the world’s poorest countries, these countries are also supported by the International Development Association (IDA) (IFC, 2012g: 2). According to a study by the IEG the performance of the IFC to date regards combating poverty is very limited (Falk, 2013).


The broad range of services offered to its clients includes different kinds of loans, equity investments, trade finance and advisory services. The IFC sums up its services within three business lines: investment services, advisory services and the Asset Management Company (AMC) which mobilizes and manages third-party capital funds. Through the help of these services the IFC supports companies in different sectors. At the same time the IFCs’ headquarters in Washington collects information related to developments within these sectors which it provides to its regional departments. The sectors include agribusiness, financial markets, manufacturing, health and education, media and technology, infrastructure, oil, gas and mining and private equity and investment funds.

The IFC’s vision and purpose is for people to have the opportunity to escape poverty and to improve their lives by ‘...catalysing the means for inclusive and sustainable growth’ (IFC, 2012d: 0). This suggests that the organization has to some extent the status of a development agency as well as a bank.

4.2.1 Structure

In comparison to the World Bank, the IFC is a relatively small organization with only about 3,400 staff members who are almost equally distributed between the headquarters in Washington and the field offices which are located in countries around the world. Currently the IFC operates 104 offices in 95 countries (IFC, 2012f). The most influential governing bodies of the IFC are the Board of Governors and the Board of Executive Directors. The former is composed of national ministers of finance or other senior officials with similar professional backgrounds. The governors and executive directors of the IBRD serve

Figure 4.2: Formal structure of the IFC



Source: own illustration

ex officio on the IFC Board of Governors and Board of Directors under the Articles of Agreement for the IFC (World Bank, 2011a).

The governors decide on such matters as the admission and suspension of members, the capital stock and the operations of the IFC. The ED's appoint an Executive Vice President of the Corporation who at the same time also holds the position of CEO.

Since October 2012 the CEO of the IFC has been Jin-Yong Cai who is a Chinese national and also a former chief executive of Goldman Sachs's China securities venture (Rastello, 2012). The WBG president Jim Yong Kim welcomed Jin-Yong Cai's appointment stating that he trusts in '...his extensive knowledge of global financial markets and investment climates' which will help the IFC '...identify sound, strategic private sector investments and public-private partnerships' (Rastello, 2012: 1). The Executive Vice President leads the overall strategic decisions of the IFC and is responsible for the supervision of officers and staff. He is supported by a management team which consists of the vice presidents of different departments such as business advisory services, global industries and the CEO of the Asset Management Company. The Independent Evaluation Group is responsible for the evaluation of IFC's projects and programs. Figure 4.2 below illustrates the structure of the IFC.

Similar to the WB, the IFC has a regional structure which includes East Asia and the Pa-

cific; Europe, Middle East and North Africa (EMENA); Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC); South Asia; Sub-Saharan Africa and Western Europe. The departments within these regions are responsible for strategy development, client relations as well as the relationship with governments, stakeholders (NGOs), media and communities. The objectives and the strategies applied vary from region to region.

In the fiscal year 2013 the LAC received US\$ 6.5bn to 129 projects, which means a 30 percent increase from the fiscal year 2012 when the IFC committed US\$ 5bn. Since the IFC started to support this region it has invested more than US\$ 30bn (IFC, 2014 website⁶⁸). The investments in Africa have also doubled over the last five years (IFC, 2012f: 4).

Since 2007 the organization started to promote a decentralisation process with the objective of providing ‘...targeted assistance in frontier and fragile markets’ (Development Committee, 2009: 8). By decentralizing staff and decision-making processes the IFC aims to improve client services. By 2009 more than half of IFC staff worked in country offices.

4.2.2 Identity

The IFC has its own funds and constitution (Articles of Agreement) (IFC, 2012a). The constitution has been signed by the members and provides a framework for organizational operations as well as for its basic organizational values. In 1984 the IFC became financially independent from WB support, since that time it has issued its own bonds in international capital markets (IFC, 2011 website⁶⁹).

The IFC is, in the first place a bank, but with some advantages in comparison to ordinary banks. One advantage is the immunity it has from taxation and customs duties which include its assets, income and property (IFC, 2012a). The IFC overall business lines include investment services, advisory services and asset management. The latter is dealt with by the IFC Management Company which is responsible for the investment of third-party capital.

The investments are funded by the capital provided by member organization (national government) contributions and from the profits made by the financial products and services

⁶⁸Source: IFC, 2014 <http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/REGION__EXT_Content/Regions/Latin+America+and+the+Caribbean/Investments/> [Accessed 29 December 2014]

⁶⁹Source: IFC, 2011 <[http://ifcext.ifc.org/ifcext/masterinternet.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/ifctFS.htm/\\$FILE/ifctFS.htm](http://ifcext.ifc.org/ifcext/masterinternet.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/ifctFS.htm/$FILE/ifctFS.htm)> [Accessed 20 January 2013]

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on offer (Ottenhoff, 2011: 1). The IFC seeks profitability (Taylor-Dormond, 2011), pays out dividends to its members (IFC, 2012a) and considers itself as a brand (IFC, 2009a).

As a bank the IFC offers a great variety of financial products and invests in private-equity funds in emerging markets. Currently the IFC invests more than US\$ 3bn in about 180 private equity-funds around the world (IFC, 2012g). From the perspective of the IFC, private-equity investment can play a 'significant role' concerning the '...development in emerging countries', in particular with regard to the support of jobs (Ibid., 2012d). However, this statement needs to be treated with caution, firstly because of the way in which the funds are actually used and secondly because of the kind of jobs which have been created or supported by this investment. Within the constraints of this thesis it is not possible to address these questions in detail, but the names of some of these funds alone might provide some indication of the likely outcomes and developments related to such investments. For example in 2011, the IFC invested a considerable amount of money (US\$ 100bn) into the Capital Release and Redeployment Fund managed by Christofferson, Robb & Company (CRC) which belongs to one of the so called 'shadow banks' (IFC, 2012b). This hedgefund is an insider tip among bankers because it decreases the risks for banks which can result from loans by offering them a higher fee and a decrease in their equity capital (capital relief trade) (Katzensteiner and Papendick, 2011). It sees itself as 'buy-and-hold investor' which follows purely commercial goals and is not committed to social responsibility (Robb, 2008: 7). In other words, this kind of investment made by the IFC is beneficial to the organization itself but is not interested in creating sustainable and decent jobs.

Even though the IFC acts as a bank to a great extent and gives priority to economic factors, one of its five strategic objectives is to address climate change and ensuring environmental and social sustainability (World Bank, 2011a). In this context the IFC's approach to development is partly interlinked to worker rights. An IFC representative acknowledged during the interview that 'Workers which are well treated, whose rights are respected, can contribute to a better efficiency in the factory or at the work place' (Interview IFC01, 2008). However, the aspiration of the organization to avoid environmental and social risks within financed projects is also related to the organizational objective to avoid reputational risks as financial institution which could result from financing companies that also '...have consistent track records of violating the CLS' (Ibid., 2008).

The focus on development and the different requirements of clients might be the reason why IFC staff members do not consider the organization as a 'commercial bank' (Interview IFC02, 2008). According to a member of staff all clients of the IFC have to balance '...how much they value reputations as a long term partner' and '...how much it is going to cost

them in terms of other things' (Ibid., 2008). This benefit or value addition which the IFC brings to a client defines its distinctiveness in comparison to other banks which is recognized as such by staff members. According to the organization this additionality '... is unique to the IFC' and '... cannot be filled by the client or any commercial financier' (IFC, 2009c: 3).

Furthermore, the specific organizational culture of the IFC is defined by 'The IFC Way' which influences the behaviour of officers and members of staff (IFC, 2009d). In this context organizational values are said to be focused on 'excellence', 'commitment', 'integrity', 'teamwork' and 'diversity' (IFC, 2012d). Apart from these organizational values the commitment to accountability plays an important role within the organization: 'We do what we say we will do, and we hold ourselves accountable' (IFC, 2009d: 4). This approach is applied regarding the integration of the CLS in the IFC performance standards. However, despite this quite holistic approach, the extent of implementation of the standards on the ground is open to question (Interview WB05, 2009).

In comparison to the WB the IFC might arguably have a stronger and more coherent culture because of its smaller size and its more centralized structure. This and the fact that the organizations deals with private businesses makes the organization more flexible in comparison to the WB (Ibid., 2005). The different cultures between the WB and the IFC and possibility to connect them closer have been discussed several times among the EDs (Interview WB05, 2009).

4.2.3 Organizational knowledge

The objective of the IFC is to promote progress in emerging markets and to help people to escape poverty. Its explicit knowledge builds on organizational expertise within the banking sector and the private sector. IFC staff are for example experienced in dealing with private-equity investments, public-private partnerships (PPP) and the privatisation of state-owned companies. In recent years the organization increased its expertise in relation to small and medium sized enterprises (SME's) and in 2010 the G-20 recognized the IFC as global partner in SME development.

The global industry departments of the IFC such as infrastructure, agribusiness, and oil, gas and mining are important knowledge producers. In addition, the IFC benefits from its affiliation with the WBG in terms of extra skills and experiences (IFC, 2009c: 1). In a similar manner to the WB, the IFC also offers advisory services to its clients, which mainly concern financial issues such as the access to finance and the improvement of

public-private partnerships (IFC, 2012f). Other advisory services include advice on sustainable business for companies, the improvement of investment climate for governments and Public-Private-Partnerships. Advisory services are carried out by nearly 1,100 IFC staff members working in 85 offices across 73 countries (IFC, 2013 website⁷⁰). Advice is based on specific organizational experiences and research. This knowledge is summed up in organizational guidelines, tools and reports addressed to client companies, governments and the public. With regard to sustainable business of companies, important organizational knowledge for external stakeholders is provided through the IFC sustainability framework and the IFC performance standards (PS). Furthermore, the investment climate within different countries is evaluated and analysed in the publication ‘Doing Business’ (DB). In particular the IFC performance standards and the DB publication are important for the Global Unions because the issue of worker’s rights is included in both documents. The documents and the issue of worker’s rights will be described and discussed in more detail in the following sections.

4.2.3.1 IFC sustainability framework and performance standards

The sustainability framework of the IFC, which was adopted in 2006 and updated in 2012 after an 18-month consultation process, includes the IFC performance standards (PS) (IFC, 2012h). Within this framework the IFC expresses the belief that ‘... an important component of achieving positive development outcomes is the environmental and social sustainability of these activities’ (IFC, 2012e: 3). The framework defines the roles and responsibilities of IFC’s clients in relation to environmental and social risk management.

The IFC performance standards include eight standards the second of which, the PS 2 ‘Labour and Working Conditions’, is the most important for the Global Unions because its requirements include the ILO core labour standards. The IFC clients have to establish an Environmental and Social Management System (ESMS) through which the implementation of the PS 2 will be managed. The PS 2 applies to workers which are directly engaged by an IFC client company as well as to contracted and supply chain workers (IFC, 2012f). This standard comprises 29 paragraphs and is based on the assumption that workers and companies can benefit from a healthy and ‘... constructive worker-management’ relationship and ‘... by treating the workers fairly and providing them with safe and healthy working conditions’ (IFC, 2012e: 16). According to the requirements, IFC client companies have to comply with national law when it explicitly stresses the rights of workers to freely

⁷⁰Source: IFC, 2013 <http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/as_ext_content/what+we+do/advisory+services/about+us/about+advisory+services> [Accessed 23 January 2013]

choose to form and join workers' organizations and to bargain collectively. Otherwise, if national law is restrictive and workers want to develop alternative mechanisms to protect their rights with regard to working conditions then companies should not influence or control these mechanisms (IFC, 2012f: 25).

(...), the client will not discourage workers from electing worker representatives, forming or joining workers' organizations of their choosing, or from bargaining collectively, and will not discriminate or retaliate against workers who participate, or seek to participate, in such organizations and collective bargaining. The client will engage with such workers' representatives and workers' organizations, and provide them with information needed for meaningful negotiation in a timely manner. Workers' organizations are expected to fairly represent the workers in the workforce (IFC, 2012c: 18).

Currently, when a company proposes a project for financing to the IFC the organization conducts a social and environmental review first. Among other things, during this review staff members look to see whether the company actually does meet the performance standards. Where there is a gap it will be highlighted and an environmental and social action plan will be agreed. According to the IFC policy these actions plans have to be disclosed. An IFC representative described the review and project management process as follow during the interview:

(...), we do our appraisal; we do a gap analysis between where we think our clients are at the time of the appraisal and where we'd like this performance standard compliance, and all of the standards that are relevant to achieve the project. We develop the action plans which will be designed to fill these gaps and then we monitor the outline performance against the action plans (...). (...), we do the monitoring through really two means: one is that we request annual reports from our clients and the other one is that they report to a template which will be designed for each project and it is customized to track the issues that are relevant for each individual project. [...] We visit the more complicated projects more frequently than the perceived less complicated projects, and if we see that there are clients who are doing not as well as others, we would try to go and see those people more frequently, that's really how we do it, it's a risk based supervision process (Interview IFC02, 2008).

The companies manage all activities and actions which are necessary to meet the requirements of the PS 2 through ESMS as mentioned above. Every IFC client company has to

provide ‘clear and understandable’ information to workers about their legally based rights (national labour and employment law) and existing collective agreements (IFC, 2012e: 17). If a collective agreement exists, this agreement must be respected. Otherwise, the company has to provide reasonable working conditions and terms of employment, for example they should orientate themselves towards work of the same character in the same sector, in relation to existing collective agreements or conditions established by national law (Ibid., 2012g). Furthermore, the company has to create a grievance mechanism for workers and their organizations which is easy to access, involves an appropriate number of managers and provides prompt feedback.

4.2.3.2 Doing Business

In contrast to the IFC performance standards which clearly support a more worker friendly behaviour in companies, the Doing Business project arguably has the opposite effect. The project which provides measures of business regulations for small and medium-size firms at the national level, is based on the ‘Index of Economic Freedom’ published by the conservative Washington based Heritage Foundation⁷¹. At the beginning of 2000 the then IFC vice-president for private sector development Michael Klein founded the investment climate advisory services, which developed the Doing Business indicators to assess the strength of national regulatory systems. Since its first publication in 2003, the Doing Business report (DB) became the World Bank Groups⁷² most highly circulated publication in the years that followed (Bakvis, 2009). Its main objective consists of benchmarking regulations which enhance or constrain firm activities. Countries were then ranked on the basis of different areas of regulation. During the last 10 years 180 countries implemented close to 2,000 business related regulatory reforms (World Bank, 2013: 1). Singapore maintains the top position in the ranking, which means the country is among the group of countries with the ‘...most business-friendly regulation’ (Ibid., 2013: 2).

The economies that rank highest on the ease of doing business are not those where there is no regulation – but those where governments have managed to create rules that facilitate interactions in the marketplace without needlessly hindering the development of the private sector. In essence, *Doing Business* is about SMART business regulations – Streamlined, Meaningful, Adaptable,

⁷¹The 1973 founded Heritage Foundation describes itself as ‘...a think tank – whose mission is to formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defence’. <<http://www.heritage.org/about>> [Accessed 5 October 2012]

⁷²The DB report is a co-publication of the World Bank and the IFC.

Relevant, Transparent – not necessarily fewer regulations (World Bank, 2013: 2).

Doing Business 2013, for example, emphasized as main worker issues apprentice wages and the use of fixed-term contracts focusing on the issue of youth unemployment. In this regard the report stressed amongst other things, that the Czech Republic, Portugal, the Slovak Republic and Spain in particular made employing workers easier by increasing the numbers of fixed-term contracts and/or reducing redundancy costs (World Bank, 2013a: 99).

A former ED of the WB describes Doing Business as a ‘two-edged instrument’. On the one hand it serves to motivate developing countries to improve their regulations for businesses in terms of facilitating business. On the other hand the instrument does not provide any kind of benchmark for the quality of change which has occurred in a country (Interview WB05, 2009). However, the WB refers to DB in the context of country assistance strategies which are designed to help countries to achieve economic growth. In this regard the DB rating is used as one piece of data to justify policy advice (Interview WB01, 2008).

Regards the economic assessment, Doing Business considers different areas on the basis of 11 indicator sets. These include starting a business; dealing with construction permits; getting electricity; registering property; getting credits; protecting investors; paying taxes; trading across borders; enforcing contracts; resolving insolvency and employing workers (World Bank, 2012e: 16). The indicators are based on standardised case scenarios and do not take into account variations within countries (Ibid., 2012b). By means of the employing workers indicators DB measures the flexibility of the regulation of employment (hiring, working hours and redundancy). In this context, ‘... only four of the 188 ILO conventions cover areas measured by Doing Business’ these include working hours at weekends and nights, holiday with pay and employee termination (World Bank, 2012e: 58). The ILO core labour standards are not taken into consideration. Another weakness of this approach is the use of a standardized case scenario which is applied by DB in order to make data comparable across countries. In this respect the DB team base their analysis on several questionable assumptions concerning individual workers and companies. For example, it is assumed that the worker resides and the company operates in a country’s largest business city. It is also assumed that the company has 60 workers or more, operates in the manufacturing sector and ‘... does not grant workers more benefits than mandated by law, regulation or (if applicable) collective bargaining agreement’ (World Bank, 2012e: 5) and that workers are ‘... not a member of a labor union, unless membership is mandatory’ (Ibid., 2012a: 5).

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For the international trade union movement, the employing workers indicators (EWI), which were developed by Botero et al. (2004), are a matter of serious concern. The research by Botero et al. (2004: 26) argued that ‘... heavier regulation of labor has adverse consequences for labor force participation and unemployment, especially of the young’. This conclusion underlines the general flexibilization tenor at the WB regarding business regulations.

The fact that Doing Business considers labour regulations as obstacles to investment and growth corresponds with the neoliberal way of thinking which is still wide-spread within the WBG (Chen, 2012). Since its first publication, Doing Business and the ‘... highly contradictory message the World Bank puts out with regard to its institutional position on labour rights’ have been criticized by civil society organizations and especially the Global Unions (Bakvis and McCoy, 2008: 8). The employing workers indicators have been criticised by external stakeholders such as the ITUC and the ILO, and internal stakeholders such as the IEG of the World Bank. In 2012 the ITUC argued that the indicators and the ‘... theme of labour’ should be removed from Doing Business ‘... once and for all’ (ITUC, 2012). The IEG revealed inconsistencies of the indicators regarding its wording and its real meaning.

The controversial *employing workers* indicator is consistent with the letter of relevant International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions, but not always their spirit, insofar as it gives lower scores to countries that have chosen policies for greater job protection (World Bank, 2008: xvi).

As a result of the ongoing criticisms, from 2009 to 2011 the World Bank worked with a consultative group to review the indicators which among others groups included trade unionists. During the consultative process the employing workers indicators were suspended and not used as a basis for policy advice. From 2011 onwards data from the indicators was provided in the annex of the DB reports but was not taken into account in the calculation of the DB ranking anymore. Doing Business 2015 does not include the EWIs chapter in the annex anymore. However, there is still a database on labour market regulation remaining in the report which has actually been expanded (Bakvis, 2014c).

In 2012 and 2013 more than 1,000 experts were consulted with regard to the employing workers indicators (World Bank, 2012e; World Bank, 2013). In October 2012, the World Bank also announced the appointment of an independent group of international experts, mostly economics professors, to review Doing Business (World Bank, 2012g). This group did not include any formal representation for labour. As a result the ITUC supported an

open letter from the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD) to the president of the Bank which was sent on behalf of 12 international civil society organizations (CAFOD, 2012). The main focus of the letter was to bring to the attention of the WB president that any panel created to review the employing workers indicators should include representatives from civil society organizations. Furthermore, the signatories of the letter pointed out that there are fundamental flaws in the design of these indicators which have yet to be fully addressed (Ibid., 2012).

The final report issued in June 2013 by the independent panel recommended maintaining the DB report as ‘an annual flagship report’ of the World Bank (Independent Panel, 2013: 4). The proposed changes included among other things the removal of the aggregate rankings, the changing of the title, reforms of the methodology and the elimination of the total tax rate indicator which attributed the best scores to countries with the lowest level of tax and social contributions by employers. Furthermore the panel recommended that the Bank continues its work on the revision of the employing workers indicators and that it continues to develop ‘...a comprehensive approach to labour-market policy, based on the quantification of the costs and benefits of a comprehensive range of labour laws and regulations’ outside the DB project (Independent Panel, 2013: 24–25). In this respect the panel also recommended that the ILO and other stakeholders be consulted (Ibid., 2013).

So far, the recommendations of the independent panel have still not been taken into consideration by the DB team as the release of the latest DB report in 2015 again confirms (Eurodad, 2014). One of the latest critiques also comes from the ILO calling for a cautious use of such indicators for research and policy advice (Aleksynska and Cazes, 2014).

4.2.4 Organizational power

In comparison with the WB, the IFC is a smaller organization with about 4,015 staff of whom 57 percent work in field offices (IFC, 2014 website⁷³). The organization is well equipped with financial resources and has a good reputation as an international finance organization. The organization issues its own bonds in international capital markets and since 1989 has had an AAA credit rating from the international rating agencies. In 1991 the IFC shareholders increased the organization’s capital by US\$ 1.2bn. This capital has been used to increase work in privatization, infrastructure finance and capital market develop-

⁷³Source: IFC, 2014 <http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/about+ifc/organization> [Accessed 12 December 2014]

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ment (IFC, 2014 website⁷⁴). In 2012 the organization invested US\$ 20.4bn in 103 countries and it doubled its advisory services expenditure in the last five years to US\$ 197m (IFC, 2012f: 26). Today the IFC holds a US\$ 49.6bn portfolio and is active in more than 100 countries (IFC, 2014 website⁷⁵). It can be argued that the fact that the IFC is the largest global development organization in the world which focuses exclusively on the private sector in developing countries and, the amount of financial resources it provides, the IFC is the one authority with the power to set standards for companies.

The IFC finances projects in all type of industries and sectors such as manufacturing, tourism, health, education and financial services. The latter are the largest component of the IFCs' portfolio. Primarily it finances private sector projects, but it may consider to provide financing for a company with some government ownership when there is some private sector participation (World Bank, 2011a). With regard to its loans the IFC applies, like other international finance organizations, an A/B loan structure. This means that the IFC allows other commercial banks to participate in its loan structuring. The IFC keeps one portion of the loan for its own account (A loan) and allows other banks to participate in the remaining portion of the loan (B loan). This way the organization can extend its financial resources and the commercial banks can share the benefits of the status of the IFC as international financial institutions (IFC, 2012d).

In terms of shaping the policy at the IFC some shareholders (member governments) are more influential than others, depending on the share of capital they hold within the organization. In this context 19 Western European countries hold almost one third of the organizations' capital. Another large donor is the European Commission with which the IFC maintains an ongoing strategic dialogue.

In 2010 the IFC increased the voting power of Developing and Transition Countries (DTC) by about 6 percent up to 39.48 percent. This decision was taken within the framework of the WBG agreement in 2008 to increase voice and participation of DTCs (World Bank, 2010c).

Within the WBG the IFC had a pioneering role with regard to the introduction and implementation of the CLS. It was the first organization which took the initiative to make sure that its rhetoric and practices concerning CLS were consistent (Bakvis, 2005). One of the main reasons for these developments appears to be the attitude of the organizational top

⁷⁴Source: IFC, 2014 <http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/CORP_EXT_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/About+IFC/IFC+History/> [Accessed 12 December 2014]

⁷⁵Source: IFC, 2014 <http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/CORP_EXT_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/About+IFC/IFC+History/> [Accessed 12 December 2014]

management who were interested in bringing forward social and environmental safeguards and in strengthening the organizational credibility of the IFC in this field with regard to the private sector (Bakvis, 2005). In other words it was the IFC which started to breathe life into the dialogue with the Global Unions in the sense of taking the necessary 'action'.

4.2.5 The change process and learning at the IFC

Since its foundation the IFC has gone through several change processes and is constantly looking for innovation and improvement in its services and its way of working. According to the IFC's Annual Report from 2012 there were several major organizational changes since 2007, including a redefinition of the IFCs' development finance, which helped to transform the organization into a leader in private sector development (IFC, 2012g).

There are different factors which can be considered as important with regard to the promotion of change and organizational learning within the IFC. These factors include the size of the organization, its culture and the role of the top management of the organization. In contrast to the WB, the smaller size of the IFC, its more centralized structure and its culture through which innovation is actively promoted, allow more flexibility regarding the introduction of change processes which comprise all organizational units. Furthermore, considering that the IFC deals with the private sector it is possible for the organization to raise certain issues such as the CLS on a project by project basis which gives it considerable leverage before it disburses its loans. The IFC does not face the problem which the World Bank faces when it deals with government agencies, that is that it is not allowed to get involved with domestic political agendas (Interview IFC01, 2008).

The important role of top IFC management became clear with regard to the promotion of the CLS in the IFC performance standards. Around 2004 the then CEO of the IFC responded in a positive way to the ITUC challenge to take up the entire CLS as something the IFC should apply to its investment operations and as something the IFC should advocate. In this regard there was a '... political commitment from the top from the beginning' (Interview BWI, 2009). The CEO gave instruction to staff members to look at the connection between the CLS and the IFC safeguard policy. The process of introduction of the ILO core labour standards in the IFC performance standards was accompanied by a lot of '... specific policy discussions with the labour unions' which also included the sector unions (Interview IFC01, 2008).

(...) we had significant engagement with the unions while we were putting the standards together. So I'd like you to remember that because that's probably unprecedented within IFC's history that we had so much specific policy discussions with the labour unions (Interview IFC01, 2008).

This period of policy formation was seen as a positive step by IFC staff members and eventually led to a continuation of the dialogue with the Global Unions into the operational and implementation phase of the standards. The IFC was the first organization of the WBG to integrate all of the ILO core labour standards in its performance standards and this has to a great extent been a success for the Global Unions through their ITUC/Global Unions Washington office. In this regard a representative of the ITF stated that the IFC has now become the 'benchmark' for the WBG and other regional development banks (Interview ITF, 2008).

4.2.6 Interim conclusion – WB and IFC

The WB is considered by its own agents and its members as a powerful corporate actor on global stage due to its resources and the authority given to the organization in its role as lender and fighter against poverty. The Bank includes the IBRD and the IDA which give financial support and technical advice to middle-income and the poorest countries worldwide. The financial strength of the IBRD is based on its standing on the global capital markets and the triple-A rating of its bonds which make it easy for the Bank to borrow money in the capital markets. The Bank as an international employer attracts people from all over the world who contribute their expertise to the Bank's broad stock of explicit and tacit knowledge.

The WB has characteristics which have an influence on its identity and culture, the creation of knowledge, the power of individual actors and its capacity to learn. It is argued here that the most important characteristics are the decentralized structure and the dichotomy of the WB as both a bank and a development agency.

The first gives power to some individual actors (staff and officers) and limits the power of others. The country directors are powerful actors for instance as they have a lot of leeway regards decision-making at the national level. By contrast, the power of the president is limited because it can take a long time before his reform efforts reach all departments and the country offices.

The new president Jim Yong Kim who took office in 2012 aims to change the Bank from a 'Knowledge Bank' (James Wolfensohn) into a 'Solutions Bank', giving more weight to the opinion of individual actors and communities in countries which ask the Bank for support (World Bank Group, 2012; Bazbauers, 2012). In order to accelerate progress in overcoming extreme poverty he wants to simplify procedures and processes, reduce the preparation time for projects and improve cooperation between all organizations belonging to the WBG. These new objectives could be considered as measures to renew and strengthen the legitimacy, efficiency and relevance of the Bank and to improve the Bank's adaptation regards economic and social challenges.

The second particularity, the Bank's dichotomy between bank and development agency suggests a paradox and a potential conflict of values. On the one hand, the Bank follows and fosters the paradigm of capitalism and is active on capital markets whilst on the other hand, it tries to make progress in reducing poverty worldwide. In other words the source of finance for the Bank, the world's deregulated capital markets and the neoliberal paradigm promoted by the Bank arguably foster exactly the kind of inequality and poverty that the WB is fighting against.

In comparison with the WB, the IFC has for a long time been a more centralized organization and began decentralizing only recently. It is a much smaller organization than the IBRD with a more centered activity focus, which arguably leads to a stronger team spirit among members of staff. The IFC sums up this spirit as 'One IFC, one team, one goal' (IFC, 2009d: 9). The IFC is a powerful organization in terms of resources and its position at global financial markets. Its focus on the private sector and its capacity regards innovation allow the organization to take the initiative on issues with which the Global Unions are concerned in a more coherent and flexible way.

4.3 The International Monetary Fund

The IMF is the third organization which participates in the dialogue with the Global Unions. It was founded at Bretton Woods in 1944 and came into formal existence in 1945. The purposes of the IMF are to promote exchange stability, the expansion and growth of international trade including the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions and to help its members tackle balance of payment problems (IMF, 2011a). The organization has 188 members which act as donors and borrowers and which receive support such as policy advice, research and forecasts, loans and technical assistance. At the same time the members

‘...bear ultimate responsibility for the IMF and its decisions’ (Boorman, 2007b: 25).

The main objective of the IMF is the protection of the “global good” financial stability (IMF, 2013 website⁷⁶). In this context, the advice to members on their economic policies is a major task of the IMF (Mountford, 2008). Prior to the outbreak of the global financial crisis the IMF was mainly focused on surveillance and struggling with the redefinition of its strategic role. Since the 1980s macroeconomic volatility had declined in advanced economies and many advanced and emerging economies were no longer engaging with the IMF. This changed fundamentally with the beginning of the crisis when the IMF became an important lender to advanced economies (IEO, 2013).

During the last few years the financial resources of the IMF were increased by over US\$ 430bn on a temporary basis (IMF, 2012e). The organization became important to powerful member governments to control the spread of the international economic and financial crisis by providing loans to countries which were and are suffering from balance of payments deficits (Chorev and Babb, 2009). The IMF employs about 2,400 staff, half of them economists. Most IMF staff works in the headquarters in Washington (IMF, 2014 website⁷⁷).

4.3.1 Structure

In comparison to the WB the IMF is a quite centralized organization. According to a representative of the Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF at this organization ‘...the show is run from the headquarters’ (Interview IMF02, 2008). The IMF’s structure was negotiated between the USA and the United Kingdom prior to the Bretton Woods conference. At that point of time the decision was made that each member of the IMF had to pay a quota according to its relative size in the world economy, this would determine its financial commitment to the IMF and its relative voting power at the same time. This created a power imbalance giving the greatest decision-making power to wealthy countries and in particular to the IMF’s biggest shareholder the USA. The USA has always had the largest voting share and a veto over major policy decisions (Chorev and Babb, 2009). However, in recognition of their growing economic power, the fourteenth realignment of quota shares in 2010 (which means a general review of quotas) made China the third largest shareholder of the IMF and put Brazil, India and Russia among the ten largest

⁷⁶Source: IMF, 2013 <<http://www.imf.org/external/about/whatwedo.htm>> [Accessed 6 May 2013]

⁷⁷Source: IMF, 2014 <<http://www.imf.org/external/about/staff.htm>> [Accessed 30 December 2014]


shareholders (IMF, 2012d). During the course of the international financial crisis China in particular has been trying to broaden its influence in the IMF through a greater level of financial support for the organization (Rulf, 2011). This, however, has not affected the strong role of the USA within the IMF.

The US has a major place in this institution but the US remains even after the crisis a major economy and if you build your measurement around something that reflects economic size the US is always big. What happened in the last year is a shift in voting power toward the emerging market countries. This was an important step but it was not the final step, but this is a difficult political process. I think its good there will be more change in the future, hopefully more significant change and its important to read the G20 Summit communicate because they lay out a pretty strong statement on the need for continued reform of the governments of this institution. Is it ideal? No. Is it fully representative, adequately representative of the emerging market countries? Most people would say no. Is the process of reform over? No. It is continuing. So sometimes in a place like this you have to look at the process of a period of several years and not just years (Interview IMF01, 2008).

Like the World Bank the IMF is governed by a Board of Governors which consists of one governor and one alternate governor from each member country. The Board of Governors is the highest decision-making body and delegates most of its power and authority to the EDs which take the majority of formal decisions. The duties of the governing bodies include for example the surveillance and the provision of financial support (Mountford, 2008). The governors of the IMF meet together with the governors of the WB on an annual basis. During these meetings governors make statements concerning developments in their own countries. In addition, governors have ‘explicit powers’ to decide on the acceptance of new members, the establishment and increases of quotas, amendments to the Articles of Agreement and the appointment and election of EDs (Mountford, 2008: 6).

The Board of Governors is advised by the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) which was established in this form in 1999 and by the Development Committee which also works for the IMF and the WB. The former gives advice regarding international financial and monetary questions whilst the latter gives advice regarding development questions. The IMFC has 24 members who match the country distribution to the distribution of the Board of Executive Directors. The members are governors, ministers or other individuals of comparable rank.

Figure 4.3: Formal structure of the IMF



Source: own illustration

The IMFC usually meets at the annual meetings of the IFIs which take place in October each year and the spring meetings which normally take place in April. Its semi-annual published communiqués are consensus documents which guide the policy of the organization and give ‘...greater legitimacy on initiatives previously developed in country groupings such as the G-7, the G-20, or the G-24 and which promote political ownership of policies developed within the Fund’ (IEO, 2008: 10; Shakov, 2008). In other words, the IMFC is ‘... the main source of ministerial-level advice, guidance, and feedback to the Executive Board on all the main issues facing the Fund’ (Mountford, 2008: 8).

In contrast to the IMFC the Development Committee gives advice on development issues and the resources required for promoting economic development, but it does not have that much influence at the IMF (IEO, 2008). The Development Committee also has 24 members who are also governors of the IMF and the WB, usually ministers or persons of comparable rank. The G-7, the G-20 and the G-24 are additional bodies which give informal advice to the Board of Governors, the ED’s and the Managing Director (Martinez-Diaz, 2008).

The organization’s day-to-day business is supervised by the Executive Board which has 24 members which represent all the membership. The Executive Board is decisive for the effective functioning of the whole organization (IMF, 2011c). There are eight ED’s which represent single countries (including the US, Japan, Germany, France, the UK as

well as China, Russia and Saudi-Arabia) and 16 EDs which represent multi-country constituencies. Within these multi-country constituencies more than 180 countries are represented. Multi-country constituencies have a large size which means that some ED's represent a great number of countries. Multi-country constituencies include between four and 24 countries which have come together voluntarily in a group and which elect one ED who votes for the whole group. Several challenges have emerged with regard to multi-country constituencies including for example the inadequate representation of the views of all members of a constituency by one ED and the possible dominance of a bigger country in economic terms over smaller members (Portugal, 2006).

The work of the executive directors is also guided by the IMFC and supported by its staff. The directors make important decisions and elect the managing director of the IMF who has a dual role as he or she is the chairman of the Executive Board and the head of staff at the same time (IMF, 2011a). In July 2011 Christine Lagarde displaced the former managing director Dominique Strauss-Kahn and is the first woman in this position. The managing director is 'the main public face' of the IMF (Mountford, 2008: 21). Whilst the head of the World Bank has historically always been an American, the role of managing director of the IMF has always been taken by a European. The election of Lagarde underpins the traditional balance of power in this respect and confirms the Europeans' well-established influence in the global system.

The decisions of the EDs are based on their perceptions and assessment of the organizational environment and they tend to be consensus-oriented. In the framework of their roles as 'strategic thinkers' the board of EDs develops strategies with regard to the adaptation of organizational goals and instruments (Martinez-Diaz, 2008: 8). Nevertheless, among other groups and individuals, the US Secretary of the Treasury is an important authority in directing the ED's position on particular issues (Darrow, 2003: 27). Furthermore, the board offers a space where representatives of member countries can interact with the technical staff of the organization and '...where political authorities give legitimacy to the staff's technical judgments' (Martinez-Diaz, 2008: 6). In this context at least some of the ED's can be considered as 'political counterweights' to the technocratic pool of the organization (Martinez-Diaz, 2008: 9).

The role of political counterweight assumes that executive directors act primarily or exclusively with their national interests in mind, as defined by the governments that appointed or elected them (Martinez-Diaz, 2008: 9).

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EDs who are appointed by single countries have a ‘... greater incentive to be politically attuned and responsive’ because their behaviour is more likely to be brought into question by national authorities such as by parliaments or the national central banks (Woods and Lombardi, 2006: 510). Governments assure the loyalty of appointed ED’s through frequent turnovers and short tenures. Most of the ED’s spend not more than one term (two years) on the IMF board.

The accountability at the IMF is promoted by its Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) which was established in 2001. The office is a very small office comprising of only 12 members of staff including the director. It is independent from the management of the IMF and its objective is to promote and strengthen learning and accountability at the IMF. The evaluation office evaluates the IMF, but there is no monitoring of the implementation of programmes. Staff of the IEO are allowed to see most of the internal documents of the IMF (Interview IMF02, 2008). The IEO also presents its studies at events organized by NGOs such as for example Action Aid.

The IMF has 18 departments which are subordinated to four general departments. They include the administration of the regions (area departments), functional and special services departments (such as finance, legal service, strategy etc.), information and liaison (such as external relations) and support (such as the HR department) (Organization Chart, 2014⁷⁸). Within the area departments every member country of the IMF has a team which is devoted to the respective country. Country teams are expected ‘...to the extent that it’s possible not just to interact with the government, but to interact with other players’ (Interview IMF01, 2008).

Most country teams have a great deal of freedom to interact but it is understood that this interaction occurs with the knowledge of the authorities and the support of the governments. So, we say authorities, governments are the same thing. There are cases where governments don’t care, go ahead, there are other cases where they care tremendously and there is always that small number of countries where the government will not want broader interaction. [...] (...) labour unions are very clearly defined and our country teams do interact fairly extensively at the country level with unions (Interview IMF01, 2008).

However, even though the IMF itself is a very centralized organization, the contact between IMF country teams and labour unions at the national level is a ‘...fairly decentralized

⁷⁸Source: IMF, 2014 <<http://www.imf.org/external/np/obp/orgcht.htm>> [Accessed 15 December 2014]

process' in the sense that these teams do not report to the IMF Public Affairs unit for example (Interview IMF01, 2008).

The department which coordinates the contact and the dialogue with the Global Unions is the Public Affairs unit. In 2006 the work with labour unions was moved from the division 'Policy Communication' to this division (Interview IMF01, 2008). Another department which works on labour issues is the Strategy, Policy and Review department. One person responsible for labour issues is from the deputy division chief level and is involved regular exchanges with the ITUC. People of this department also undertake research and present papers on labour issues at high level meetings (Ibid., 2008).

In addition to these two departments at the highest organizational level the managing director of the IMF and the three deputy managing directors also interact with the ITUC at senior levels. In 2009 the first meeting took place between members of the Executive Board and the ITUC; because of the crisis there has been the feeling that, '... there is a need for a dialogue' (Ibid., 2008).

4.3.2 Identity and culture

The IMF promotes international monetary cooperation and exchange stability (IMF, 2011a). In comparison to the WB the IMF does not emphasize development even though it does promote economic development indirectly through its financial support for countries, when such countries face difficulties with their balance of payments or in the context of financial crises (IEO, 2008). Hence, the IMF is not troubled by a dichotomy of approaches with regard to its mission. However, in trying to fulfil its mandate potential conflicts do arise in respect of its dual roles as 'global watchdog' and 'trusted advisor' (IEO, 2013: 11).

In order to fulfil its mandate the organization deals with financial authorities such as the finance ministries or the central banks of member countries. As a result, the organization employs a relatively homogeneous workforce which is largely made up of economists specialized in macroeconomics and financial policies. The very specific mandate and the need for specifically trained staff to fulfil the mandate arguably shape the organizational identity and culture of the IMF. Furthermore, the EDs usually come from central banks or finance ministries and '... therefore they largely share a particular approach to economic problems as well as a particular kind of organizational culture which mirrors that of the IMF' (Woods and Lombardi, 2006: 510). An important element of this culture is the consensus decision-making approach which is an 'informal tradition' (Portugal, 2006: 90). It

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can be understood as ‘... a large majority and the absence of explicit, significant and strong dissent’ (Ibid., 2006: 90).

The core ethical values of the IMF are said to be probity, integrity, impartiality and honesty (IMF, 2010a; IMF 1998). Members of staff are expected to follow these values and to protect the reputation of the IMF in this regard (IMF, 1998). The ‘Code of Conduct of Staff’ from 1998 which applies to all IMF staff clarifies rules which guide staff behaviour in general and in ethical matters (Ibid., 1998). According to this, the official conduct of staff must be guided by objectivity and professionalism and as such all situations which could cause conflict of interest should be avoided.

Ethical issues are promoted by the IMF’s Ethics Advisor who is appointed by the managing director and who heads the ethics office. The main responsibilities of the ethics office include the provision of advice (to the HR department, managers etc.) and responses to allegations. In 2011 the ethic office received 48 allegations which meant a considerable increase in comparison to 2010 (30 allegations). Harassment and the misuse of resources and non-public information have been the subjects of most of the allegations (IMF, 2011b).

Besides the code of conduct of staff, there is a code of conduct for members of the executive board which is also valid for their deputies, senior advisors and advisors. It was adopted in 2000 and the last revision took place in August 2012. Matters related to the code are considered by the Ethics Committee which includes five ED’s (IMF, 2000).

The IMF has arguably built its organizational identity partly on crisis management. Before the outbreak of the international financial crisis when crises diminished around the globe and countries such as Brazil and Argentina could pay off Bank and IMF loans the IMF lost some influence. The international financial crisis appears to have strengthened the identity of the IMF because it has a, ‘...whole new mission’ (Interview WB01, 2008). However, this mission is also based on the organization’s long-standing paradigm which it characterizes as ‘...an active promoter of the neoliberal agenda’ (Chorev and Babb, 2009: 468).

4.3.3 Knowledge

The IMF does not promote a knowledge culture like the WB does. Organizational knowledge is heavily determined by the organizational mission and for that reason the appointed and elected EDs have to have strong competencies in economic and financial matters. At

the IMF the ED's as well as technical staff memorise knowledge. For that reason the frequent turnover of the board of executive directors can cause a regular decline in expertise and human capital. This '...hinders the capacity of the Board to think strategically about the direction of the institution' (Martinez-Diaz, 2008: 18). Furthermore, the reduction of staff in 2008 led to a loss of 'considerable institutional memory' which cannot be easily replaced (Boorman, 2009: 3).

Other important sources of knowledge other than the EDs and staff are the advisory body IMFC and scholars and economic experts who produce knowledge on relevant matters. On a semi-annual basis the IMFC prepares communiqués which guide the work of EDs, management and staff. Scholarly knowledge helps to build the basis for IMF policies and the advice that the organization gives to its members regarding challenges and adaptation to changes in global economic development (Chorev and Babb, 2009).

The IEO plays an important role regarding the revelation of knowledge gaps. For example, the IEO analysed the IMF performance in the run-up to the international crisis and revealed some of the limits of organizational knowledge development and analytical capacity. According to this study the analytical weaknesses of the organization were related to 'groupthinking' as well as existing analytical approaches and knowledge gaps. They hindered the organization in identifying the risks relating to global financial markets (IEO, 2011).

The prevailing view among IMF staff – a cohesive group of macroeconomists – was that market discipline and self-regulation would be sufficient to stave off serious problems in financial institutions. They also believed that crises were unlikely to happen in advanced economies, where “sophisticated” financial markets could thrive safely with minimal regulation of a large and growing portion of the financial system (IEO, 2011: 17).

Furthermore, according to the study staff misinterpreted and ignored data and used long-known conceptual frameworks which were inadequate for the analysis of macro-financial linkages (Ibid., 2011). The flow of knowledge within the IMF was also problematic. Staff '... tend not to share information nor to seek advice outside of their units' (Ibid., 2011: 18). According to the same source this so called 'silo behaviour' seems to occur all over the organization that is, between and within departments and divisions. One result is arguably that individual and organizational learning is restricted.

Another obstacle concerning the development of new knowledge and learning is related to internal governance. Staff describe the organization as '... tightly-run, hierarchical or-

ganization, with clearly defined boundaries' (Ibid., 2011: 19). The reward of conformist behaviour and the punishment of staff holding alternative views by management and country authorities also appears to hinder the development of new strategies for solving problems.

4.3.4 Power

Prior to the crisis in 2007, the IMF had lost some importance, its role was being called into question and by 2008 the year the crisis began, its workforce was being downsized (Boorman, 2007a).

New lending by the Fund is negligible; its role as policy advisor to member countries seems diminished; and its oversight role in fostering stability in the international monetary system is uncertain (Ibid., 2007b: 2).

However, the above situation did not last long, the crisis prompted a re-evaluation of the IMF and despite being a much smaller organization than the WB (in terms of its workforce) the crisis made the organization one of the most powerful international actors within the system of global governance. It was also recognized that the previous downsizing had been a mistake and the number of its staff have since been increased to 2,503 and drawn from 144 countries (IMF, 2013g).

The IMF as corporate actor is powerful in itself, but is also used as an instrument of power by its members, the national governments. Both forms of power are acquired through the financial resources the IMF has available. The latter becomes particularly clear with regard to the issue of conditionality.

The reason is that the donor countries don't have resources to monitor what is going on in the countries and therefore they rely on the Bank and the Fund. In fact, (...) a lot of the conditionality in the Fund is imposed on the Fund by the donors. Let's say the EU has a big programme in a country and it doesn't have a way to monitor what is happening. So they ask the Fund to put all the conditionality that they want to put in, in its own lending and they therefore are using the Fund programme as a monitoring tool (Interview IMF02, 2008).

An example in this context has been the accession process of Eastern European countries like Romania and Bulgaria where EU members asked the IMF to put the whole *aquis communautaire* as a condition of their lending programmes. Some of the conditions concern

the core areas of the Fund such as macro fiscal policies and some aspects of finance, but many others refer to social sectors including health and education and social protection. Before 2000 ‘...more than half of the conditions, of structural conditions of the Fund, were outside of the core radius of the Funds knowledge. Now it’s only one third’ (Interview IMF02, 2008).

In contrast to the WB which is active within the global financial markets the IMF’s resources originate mainly from its members (IMF, 2012d). After the 2009 G-20 summit the IMF increased its lending capacity up to US\$ 750bn (Presbitero and Zazzaro, 2012). In order to increase resources in 2010 the Board of Governors approved a quota reform which doubled quotas to about US\$ 733.9bn (IMF, 2010b). If it is necessary for the IMF to supplement its quota resources because of increased lending, the organization can borrow additional resources. There are two arrangements to borrow which include a general arrangement (GAB) and a new arrangement (NAB). Both arrangements basically describe credit arrangements between the IMF and some of their members whereby the NAB provides additional financial resources up to US\$ 554bn. Since 2011 the NAB was activated three times (IMF, 2013h). Besides the quota system and the borrowing arrangements, the IMF can acquire additional resources through gold sales. The IMF is the third largest official holder of gold in the world, although the use of these resources is strongly limited by the Articles of Agreement. The last time gold sales were carried out was in 2010 (IMF, 2011c).

The IMF is a powerful corporate actor with regard to its members and with regard to its ability to influence economic global governance. Its power is mainly based on its financial resources and its centralized structure. Before the crisis the IMF had arguably been underfunded and for that reason was not able to respond adequately to the needs of some members which were heavily affected by the crisis from the beginning. With regard to decision-making which concerns the distribution of resources, the IMF Articles of Agreement stipulate that decisions are normally made on the basis of simple majority, but there are exceptions. This means that some decisions require special majorities.

However, even though the organization is very powerful in terms of resources, decision-making and the implementation of decisions, there are strong power asymmetries within the organization and there are external groupings of countries such as the G-7 which has considerable influence on IMF policies (Woods and Lombardi, 2006).

Within the organization itself there is a ‘power gap’ and a ‘peerage gap’ (Boughton, 2007: 41). These are conditioned by the influence of powerful members which due to their economic size and power receive larger quotas. The particular quota for a country is assessed

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with the help of a quota formula which takes into account a country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), openness, economic variability and international reserves. The quotas are reviewed at regular time intervals by the Board of Governors. Such reviews focus on two issues which are the increase of quotas and their distribution among members. The largest member is still the USA but China is now (along with Brazil, Russia and India) one of the 10 largest shareholders of the organization (Ibid., 2013b). These are important changes because the largest shareholders dominate '... the making and revision of rules' within the organization (Chorev and Babb, 2009: 464). With the reform package introduced in 2008 the IMF started to tackle criticism of its power structure. One of the main criticisms has been that the organization provides the US '...with the ability to pursue its own foreign policy objectives through the Fund, cloaked in the 'illusion of multi-lateralism'' (Darrow, 2003: 28).

The increasing membership of the IMF weakened its role as 'democratic forum' of the Executive Board (Martinez-Diaz, 2008). All multi-country constituencies have their own power relations which means that some of them are dominated by one country and others are more egalitarian such as for example the African constituencies. There are cases where the ED's of multi-country constituencies held the post for a long period of time which gives '...the whole constituency the advantage of long institutional memory and knowledge' (Woods and Lombardi, 2006: 484).

However, the EDs of multi-country constituencies are also much more involved in discussions and matters concerning national authorities and have less time to participate in internal policy discussions than the directors which represent only one country. Surveys of the IEO showed that many directors (67 percent) and authorities from low-income countries (56 percent) felt that they can 'rarely' criticize staff (IEO, 2008: 8). The constituency system, differences in voting power and voice as well as the personality and preparation of EDs leads to differences with regard to the representation of countries or groups of countries within the IMF. Furthermore, there are no rules adopted by the Board of Governors with regard to the conduct of directors. Neither single directors nor their alternates and advisors have to account for their actions to the members of the constituency or a governing body (Woods and Lombardi, 2006).

The asymmetric power distribution within and between country constituencies also has an influence on decision-making processes. Due to the fact that ED's are not accountable to the members of their own constituency and that they are not obliged to vote in accordance with the instructions and the views of their members, their vote is not necessarily legitimated by the majority of members.

Probably the most highly structured constituency consultations are undertaken in the Nordic-Baltic constituency which regularly consults and solicits input, views and comments from respective capitals, shaping common positions on strategic issues through dedicated high-level committees such as the Nordic-Baltic Monetary and Financial Committee (and its alternates) which ensures that high-ranking officials regularly communicate (Woods and Lombardi, 2006: 493).

Despite the very democratic decision-making processes in some constituencies and a jointly determined vote of the ED by all members, the general priority for ED's is to safeguard the interests of the organization as a whole rather than to defend the interests of the particular members (Ibid., 2006).

However, the Executive Board remains an important source of legitimacy for the organization because all members are represented (IEO, 2008). The IMF and in particular its Executive Board has power to set standards and influence economic policy within needy member countries.

In joining the IMF, members cede part of their economic sovereignty to the Fund, and receive certain rights and benefits in return. Members' most important general obligations are to pursue economic policies that are consistent with the IMF's purposes, and to collaborate with the Fund and with other members to assure orderly exchange rate arrangements and to promote a stable system of exchange rates (Mountford, 2008: 5).

The IMF is able to exercise power over those members who are reliant on financial support. Loans are connected with policy conditions which are distinguished as both quantitative and structural in nature. Quantitative conditions are related to macroeconomic issues such as the fiscal deficit of a government, whilst structural conditions refer to institutional and legislative policy reforms such as privatization, trade liberalization and judiciary reforms (Eurodad, 2006). Structural interventions such as privatization are difficult to reverse after they are implemented. With the conditions attached to loans the IMF diffuses 'neoliberal policies worldwide' and pushes a transformation of developing countries towards a strong market orientation (Chorev and Babb, 2009: 469).

4.3.5 Change and learning at the IMF

Since its foundation the IMF has undergone several changes and innovation processes. Only recently the managing director Christine Lagarde stressed in the Annual Report 2012 that the IMF ‘... continued to innovate over the period’ (IMF, 2012c: 4). Changes have been made in relation to the number of members of the organization which increased from 29 to 188 members, the adaptation of lending instruments as well as internal governance reforms including the voting structure.

Since the 1990s the IMF has made several efforts regards transparency. These efforts included organizational openness towards non-governmental organizations and disclosure policy. However, there are still further improvements necessary which shows that change processes advance slowly. In particular the fact that policy documents are not made public before they are discussed by the Board of Governors is strongly criticised by other stakeholders such as the Global Unions.

In 2009 the Fund established two new credit lines with the objective of make lending more effective and to prevent a decline in investors’ trust (Presbitero and Zazzaro, 2012). One year later in 2010 the Board of Governors approved a reform package with the objective of ensuring and maintaining that the IMF is ‘... representative, legitimate and credible’ (IMF, 2012c: 12). This package which builds on a reform package approved in 2008, includes quota reforms, a shift of quota shares towards emerging markets and developing countries and changes to the Executive Board which include for instance a better representation for multi-country constituencies (IMF, 2011c). However, the ‘... attempts to repair the Fund’s longstanding legitimacy deficit have so far been slow and insufficient’ (Mantega⁷⁹, 2011). For that reason internal governance in relation to the effective representation of members and the conditions attached to loans continue to be important areas for reform (Falk and Unmüßig, 2011a; Boorman, 2007a).

Important driving factor for organizational change processes within the IMF are external factors such as international economic and financial crises. On the one hand, during times of crisis the organization can confirm its expertise regarding macroeconomic relations and financial markets and can strengthen its reputation and legitimization by supporting its members (Boughton, 2007a). On the other hand, crises such as the Asian financial crisis at the end of the 1990s, the Argentina crisis in 2001 or the more recent 2008 crisis reveal the weaknesses of the organization. Indeed the 2008 crisis led to a discussion inside

⁷⁹Source: Statement of Guido Mantega, Brazilian Finance Minister, Meeting of the International Monetary and Financial Committee April 16, 2011

and outside the IMF about its mandate and its macroeconomic policies (Presbitero and Zazzaro, 2012). One trigger for these discussions has been the fact that the IMF was seen to have failed in several of its responsibilities regarding its work, its policy advice and in its organization prior to the crisis (Boorman, 2009). Surveillance which is one of the major responsibilities of the IMF, was identified as an important area for reform. Up to now surveillance was based on traditional macroeconomic analysis which did not take into account financial sector analysis in an appropriate way (Ibid., 2009). However, in the future the IMF states that surveillance will be strengthened in respect to risk assessments, financial stability and the legal framework (IMF, 2012c).

One aspect of organizational learning is ‘self-evaluation’, which in theory at least does play an important role within the organization. It is said to help assess the ‘... effectiveness of policies, strategies, tools and processes, and provides incentives for change by establishing a basis for accountability’ (IEO, 2012: 2). Evaluation is conducted by the departments themselves and the IEO. The evaluation carried out by the IEO aims to provide ‘... an objective perspective and frank assessments without being limited by internal dynamics’ (Ibid., 2012: 2). The IEO also conducts an evaluation on the self-evaluation processes of departments.

However, despite the fact that some self-evaluation takes place, the organization has not developed a real learning culture and does not provide staff with an environment which fosters learning. For example, decisions taken by the Board of Governors or the ED’s might be based on rational considerations and objectives such as the strengthening of credibility and legitimacy of the organization as a global player. However, the ‘silo’ behaviour of staff which appears to exist throughout the organization, fosters conformity with prevailing views and high staff and management turnover impedes cooperation and the exchange of ideas and makes it difficult for individuals to come up with alternative views (IEO, 2011). Other obstacles facing the development of an organizational learning culture are specific routines such as the practice among EDs of submitting written statements on agenda items ahead of meetings. This predefinition of positions does not give much room to EDs to learn something new or to develop alternative perspectives (Boorman, 2009).

4.3.6 Interim conclusion

In comparison with the WB, the IMF has a much more ‘... tight and centralized control over staff’ and a more compact management structure in general (IEO, 2008: 6). This structure facilitates the flow of information as well as the control of the organization which

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arguably ‘...permits adaptability while maintaining a significant degree of consistency’ (Ibid., 2008: 6). The formal structure of the IMF tends to result in a very efficient mode of operation in terms of implementing organizational routines and procedures.

With regard to decision-making processes the ED’s rely on staff and their reports which form the basis for the reviews and the approval of financing packages. The unequal distribution of power within the Executive Board also resulted in an asymmetric system of rule-making in which big donor countries make the rules for borrowing countries and in the ways in which they have to reform their economies (Boughton, 2007; Chorev and Babb, 2009). During the international financial crisis decision making was dislocated within informal channels which reinforced consisting intra-organizational power asymmetries.

The crisis mechanisms center on a small network of senior government officials – generally from the countries most closely involved (often the G-7 deputies). Fund management and staff work with these officials to formulate strategies and to raise financing or allocate burdens. To facilitate negotiations, discussions and decision making shift out of the Board and into a smaller group of policy makers who are not bound by voting arrangements or formal procedures; their dialogue takes place through conference calls and private meetings where official minutes are rarely kept (IEO, 2008: 6).

Since the 1950s borrowers have to commit to much stricter rules including macroeconomic policy reforms and structural reforms as a condition for receiving financial support. For that reason until the outbreak of the global financial and economic crisis in 2008 wealthy industrialized countries usually avoided borrowing money from the IMF. Since that time many Southern European countries began to depend on the financial support of the IMF allowing the IMF to enforce its role as a disciplining actor on these dependent member states (Falk and Unmüßig, 2011a). Strong donor countries such as the USA or Germany have also made use of their economic position to ‘...impose a relatively “pure” set of ideological principles on other countries without having to worry about domestic opposition’ (Chorev and Babb, 2009: 476).

4.4 World Bank and IMF – Common grounds and differences

The WB and the IMF belong to the United Nations system. Both organizations promote economic development worldwide but with different foci. Whilst the IMF focuses on macroeconomic and financial issues the focus of the WB is on social and development issues, in particular poverty reduction (Rowohl, 2007).

An important link between both organizations is their membership. Only countries which are members of the IMF can join the IBRD. Both organizations have a mandate from their members and they both ‘... can claim a virtually universal membership and accountability to governments across the world’ which gives them a special position within the global governance system (Woods, 2000: 823). They also have in common that their work is heavily influenced by preferences of their most powerful members and the politics of these governments as well as by their own bureaucracy (Presbitero and Zazzaro, 2012). The most influential member country in both organizations is the USA followed by some European countries and China. The fact that China’s influence has become stronger is illustrated by the IFC’s latest commitment within the ‘Managed Co-lending Portfolio Program’ which was launched in 2013. The Chinese government began supporting this programme with US\$ 3bn, it enables investors to co-invest together with the IFC in emerging markets (IFC, 2013).

The governing bodies of both organizations and the way they work are very similar. The Board of Governors and the Board of Executive Directors are the main decision makers in each organization. The annual meetings between the IMF and the World Bank Group bring all members of both boards together. During these meetings the boards make decisions regards important policy issues which are then implemented by the respective executive boards. In respect of development issues and the required financial resources the boards are advised by the joint advisory body the Development Committee (IMF, 2013d).

In comparison to other IGOs the World Bank and the IMF have very small executive boards and a relatively short mandated term for directors. Both organizations apply the delegate-and-control model which means that a lot of power and representation are delegated to the executive boards and that these bodies have considerable control over organizational activities (Martinez-Diaz, 2008).

The executive boards in both organizations struggle with an unbalanced distribution of voice, in particular because most of the EDs represent multi-country constituencies and

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only a few represent single countries. In other words, the economic power of countries within global economic governance still determines their votes and participation within the IFIs and creates imbalances amongst industrial, emerging and developing countries meaning that developing and transition countries still do not have adequate representation. These problems associated with the governance structure have led to a situation where both organizations have experienced a ‘... decline in their credibility, influence and effectiveness’ (Buira, 2006: 1).

Since its foundation the World Bank and the IMF have been challenged by external and internal criticism which is not only of concern for their internal governance structure but also for their policies and credibility. During the last ten years the IMF and the WB have arguably lost influence in the developing countries (Weisbrot, 2013). Since the 2008 global financial crisis the IMF’s surveillance programmes and its ability to fulfil its mandate satisfactorily have also been brought into question (Kelkar et al., 2006). Criticism from external stakeholders, especially civil society groups, has focused on the economic policy conditions which the IFIs attach to their loans and grants and which often increase poverty instead of reducing it.

With regard to their development programmes the IFIs follow the same neoliberal development paradigm. This paradigm became the dominant discourse promulgated by the Washington Consensus over the last three decades. The policies related to this paradigm including the privatization of state-owned companies such as energy and telecommunication, the privatization of banks, the liberalization of capital markets and public sector reforms including the deregulation of labour markets (Palast, 2001). The WB and the IMF pushed these policies in particular through their structural adjustment programs which were directed towards developing countries and the integration of these countries in the world economy. Both organizations were heavily criticized with regard to these programmes because they did not achieve the results they promised (BetterAid, 2011). The WB and the IMF were responsive to criticisms and did review the conditions attached to their loans. As a result both organizations introduced new conditionality guidelines. However, according to a study conducted by Eurodad the conditions attached to loans and grants which are related to privatization increased between 2002 and 2006 in both organizations (Eurodad, 2006). Furthermore, in many cases the WB and the IMF are pushing the same conditions regards privatization and work ‘collusively’. In other words, ‘...where one institution fails to persuade a government to implement a given reform, the other picks up this reform’ with same kind of recommendation (Eurodad, 2006: 24). Since the beginning of the crisis industrialized countries have increasingly been affected by the neoliberal poli-

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cies which the IMF promotes. In particular Southern European countries such as Spain have suffered from public sector and labour market reforms and have high numbers of unemployed people. Despite the very negative results of previous reforms, the IMF has continued to propose further labour market reforms in Spain in its concluding statement of the Article IV Consultation mission to Spain (IMF, 2013a).

Both organizations have undertaken further changes regards organizational transparency and accountability. In this context the WB has developed a broad disclosure policy. Since 1994 the IMF publishes background papers on economic developments in member countries and since 1997 it regularly publishes a so called ‘Public Information Notice’ in which the IMF gives information about the economic prospects of member countries (Woods, 2000).

During the last decade both organizations have further broadened interaction with other international organizations, NGOs and trade unions. In September 2010 the IMF and the ILO held a high-level conference called ‘The Challenges of Growth, Employment, and Social Cohesion’⁸⁰ in Oslo. This conference was described by the IMF as ‘historic’ or rather ‘ground-breaking’ (IMF, 2010c; Mark, 2011). As a result representatives of both organizations agreed to work together in three areas: the provision of a minimum of social protection for poor people worldwide; policies which create employment; and the promotion of social dialogue (IMF, 2010c). In March 2011 representatives from the IMF, the ITUC, the ETUC, national unions and the ILO discussed the global job crisis in Vienna (Mark, 2011).

The similarities between the WB and the IMF make cooperation at the management level and the staff level easier. Every year the board of governors of both organizations come together during the spring and the annual meetings. In addition, there are regular meetings between the managing director of the IMF and the president of the World Bank. This collaboration is reflected in the publication of joint statements and articles as well as joint visits of regions and countries. At staff level the assessment of the economic situation of a country by the IMF staff also supports WB staff in the development of their projects. Similarly the advice regarding structural reforms by Bank staff is also taken into account by IMF staff in their policy advice (IMF, 2013f).

Despite the fact that both organizations are quite similar in some respects and that they complement each other regards their support for countries, they also show some remarkable differences. These differences are mainly related to their size, organizational

⁸⁰Source: IMF – ILO Oslo conference <<http://www.osloconference2010.org/conference>> [Accessed 10 August 2011]

structures and missions, but also in relation to their organizational identities, knowledge, decision-making processes and the provision of resources.

In comparison to the IMF the WB is a much bigger and more decentralized organization. Decentralization allows for the possibility that within the WB country directors can have a considerable influence and leeway regards decision-making independently from the headquarters in Washington. With regard to the implementation of programmes within particular countries they have a lot power. Decentralization also makes it more difficult to introduce changes at all organizational levels and to exchange knowledge.

Finally, although both organizations belong to the group of international financial institutions they have different sources of funding. In contrast to the IMF which gets most of its fundings through its shareholders, the World Bank organizes its funding through the global financial markets.

4.5 The Global Unions and the IFIs – An organizational comparison

Superficially there would seem to be no similarities at all between the Global Unions and the IFIs, but on closer examination there are some similarities. This subchapter tries to illustrate both the similarities and differences between the organizations and provides a basis for the next chapter which analyses the dialogue between the Global Unions and the IFIs.

The starting point for the analysis of similarities and differences between these organizations is their categorization into international non-governmental and international governmental organizations. The Global Unions were founded by actors which are not governments; in this case trade unions, whilst the latter were founded by governments. Whilst the Global Unions are busy trying to hold their ground within the system of global economic governance, the IFIs have an increasingly influential and leading position within that system. Nevertheless, despite these fundamental differences both types of organizations have some things in common.

Similarities

Firstly, the IFIs and the Global Unions have large voluntary memberships of collective actors which include on the one hand national governments and on the other hand national trade union confederations and individual trade unions. Despite the different backgrounds and identities of their affiliates both organizations are pluralistic organizations. The IFIs and the Global Unions represent the interests of their members and have to deal with their expectations. Furthermore, the constitution of each organization defines rights and obligations for their members.

Secondly, all of these international organizations have developed formal decision-making procedures and bureaucratic structures which help them to administer their programmes and activities. The structures of all these organizations exhibit power imbalances even though these power imbalances are more clearly distinguished within the IFIs than they are within the Global Unions. Principally there are some governments and some trade unions which are more influential than others. The more powerful governments and trade unions are usually based in the industrialized countries and try to enforce their own social or economic interests. Within the IFIs the USA in particular has always been a very powerful and influential member and China and Saudi-Arabia have become more influential in recent years. Within the Global Unions policy is strongly influenced by the national unions in the Northern European countries owing to their strong national position. All organizations have in common that the bureaucratic structure and organizational routines slow down change processes and can be challenging regards organizational learning.

Thirdly, the IFIs and the Global Unions quite independent of their size and objectives depend on material and non-material resources for the realization of their missions. Both sets of organizations obtain at least some part of their financial resources from their members, which have to pay a quota or fee in relation to their size or economic power.

Fourthly, the IFIs and the Global Unions are influenced by their environments and interact with them. Global political and economical developments demand adaptation processes regards organizational objectives, strategies and ways of working. The most recent major example to which both sets of organizations have had to respond is the global financial crisis.

Fifthly, both the IFIs and the Global Unions aim to change their environments into more favourable ones for their members and the global population in general. They both recognize human and labour rights as important principles even though these rights are seen as playing different roles within their programmes and projects. Furthermore they orientate

their actions and decision-making processes around macroeconomic data which not only allow them to specify, refine and amend their organizational objectives but also provide a benchmark to measure their success.

Differences

In contrast to the named similarities, organizational differences have much more influence on the dialogue because they provide targets for criticism. Most criticism is directed at the IFIs by the Global Unions and not vice versa. This criticism reflects the power imbalance within the existing system of economic global governance which may often negatively affect workers and trade unions in particular. Nevertheless, despite having less power resources than the IFIs, the trade unions and other non-governmental organizations can play an important role as a form of alert system at the global level when they observe the negative implications of the development programmes implemented by the IFIs.

Organizational differences include the type of organizational membership and the organization of members, the organizational missions and objectives, acquiring legitimacy for policies and actions, decision making and voting structures, transparency and accountability, collective self-understanding, organizational culture, knowledge and the associated ideological paradigms and, material and non-material resources.

The IFIs and the Global Unions have an international pluralist membership although for the international trade union organizations the principle of democracy is a fundamental feature of its membership. In comparison with the IFIs the rules for membership of the Global Unions are much more developed, whilst the IFIs are willing to accept applications for membership from governments of all political colours whether democratic or otherwise. However, although the respect of democratic principles is a precondition for membership of the Global Unions, the unions are challenged by the heterogeneity of their members. This ‘...makes it more difficult to formulate generally agreed-upon demands and to mobilize a common willingness to act that flows from a notion of shared collective identities and mutual obligations of solidarity’ (Offe, 1985: 187).

The members of the IFIs are shareholders and this means that they “own” the organizations. Like corporations they have a top-down power structure which has implications for democracy within the organizations. Every member country pays a quota according to its economic power which in turn determines its influence within the organization. With regard to internal policies the executive directors are particularly powerful within the IFIs because they decide on the nature of the development projects and financial support available

4.5 The Global Unions and the IFIs – An organizational comparison

for members. At the same time power is distributed very unequally amongst the board of EDs partly because most countries are represented by multi-country constituencies which themselves often contain considerable power imbalances.

Decision-making processes within the Global Unions are generally based on democratic procedures and procedural fairness whilst within the IFIs the economic power of a member determines its voting power. The organizational structures of the IFIs are designed to offer a space for the enforcement of interests of their members which is not the case within the Global Unions. Trade unions in general, including the international organizations, are committed to internal democracy by their structure and purpose. Even though the international trade union organizations themselves are not constantly held to account by their members, they must justify the use of resources.

Furthermore, individual actors in leading positions within the Global Unions have much less power than individual actors can achieve in the IFIs. This is on the one hand related to the fact that structural power imbalances put some individual actors – such as the executive directors of the IFIs – into more favourable positions than others. On the other hand, the decentralized nature of the WB for example allows some departments and country offices to follow their own “rules” and some of the technocrats exploit their positions to exercise power over other staff or external stakeholders such as trade unionists.

The World Bank, the IMF and the Global Unions have completely different missions, objectives and priorities. With regard to the fulfilment of the missions they have over the course of time developed specific knowledge, organizational routines, programmes and strategies. However, knowledge is developed and based on certain ideological paradigms. The IFIs still follow a neoliberal agenda which was largely shaped by the Washington Consensus, that is a paradigm based on free-market orthodoxy. In comparison the Global Unions follow a paradigm which is based on global social justice following the guidelines and direction of the ILO and broader human and labour rights principles. Although there may be some subtle variations in outlook amongst the Global Unions, the predominant vision could be described as close to ‘democratic socialism’ (Abbott, 2011: 166).

The implementation of programmes and strategies is linked to particular organizational resources. In this respect the IFIs rely on their financial resources and support development or financial stability through loans and grants, they are also able to invest more in research.

The Global Unions have much less financial resources and staff available. They use their resources for administration tasks, capacity building and to a more limited extent for re-

4 The IFIs: the World Bank Group and the IMF

search. These more limited resources mean that the Global Unions already have to select issues which they can work on when they make their annual budget (Interview IMF(GUF), 2008). In general this leads to more 'practical' work and less flexibility in being able to react spontaneously to new or arising issues (Interview ITGLWF, 2008). The smaller amount of resources which can be invested in research is problematic in so far as it makes it more difficult to forecast economic developments and any associated problems at an early stage. This makes it more difficult for the Global Unions to develop new efficient strategies and to be able to act in a proactive way. The main instruments of power for the Global Unions are their member unions and the number of individual members affiliated to those unions. Individual members can affect the power balance for example by acting together during demonstrations or strikes, or to some extent through the fact of their membership.

The organizational resources determine the power of organizations and their ability to sanction or to influence the actions of others. In the case of the IFIs conditions are attached to loans and grants which borrowers have to implement. If borrowers do not act according to the conditions imposed by the World Bank or the IMF, the organizations can suspend their financial support. The Global Unions, however, depend on the willingness of their members to act. In other words, the activity of members such as for instance their involvement in strikes and demonstration defines the power potential of the Global Unions. At the regional and at the global level it is often difficult to organize coherent cross-border action for the Global Unions and it takes a long time to plan such activities. For that reason the IFIs, where a small group of executive directors can decide on sanctions and where financial flows can be stopped very quickly, have a much greater power, flexibility and quicker reaction time than the Global Unions in terms of sanctioning the activities of others.

5 The dialogue between the Global Unions and the IFIs – An analysis

The Global Unions have been concerned about the negative impacts of IFI policies on workers for quite some time, but particularly from the 1980s when the IMF and World Bank began implementing a new instrument in developing countries, the so called Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). These programmes (which are based on loans to the countries concerned) were intended to maintain growth and facilitate the balance of payments adjustment in developing countries. They were also designed to help countries avoid recession such as that which occurred in the USA after the second oil crisis of 1979.

The SAPs were based on the free market paradigm and obliged borrowing governments to adopt internal policy changes. These policy changes included economic and financial measures such as fiscal discipline, financial liberalization, trade liberalization, privatization of state owned companies, and deregulation of labour markets which in return for such loans governments were obliged to implement (Crisp and Kelly, 1999; Easterly, 2005). Up until the end of the 1990s loans were provided to a number of African countries, but also to several countries in Latin America and Asia. Many countries received these loans on multiple occasions between 1980 and 1999. Argentina for example received 30 adjustment loans, whilst Ghana and the Ivory Coast received 26 loans each. The macroeconomic outcomes were similar in each case, there were often negative effects on workers and no examples ‘... where growth was respectable ... and all of the macro-economic imbalances were under control for the adjustment lending period’ (Easterly, 2005: 8). Structural adjustment programmes promoted a ‘... shift in emphasis from the government sector as the engine of economic growth to the private sector as the dominant partner’ (Ratnam, 1996: 6).

(...) a combination of labor-market reforms, layoffs resulting from privatizations and civil service reform, and the shrinking of labour intensive productive sectors had severely undermined the position of workers (Abouharb and Cingranelli, 2008: 184).

Labour law reforms introduced by governments were aimed to make the economy more business friendly and limited the rights of workers, in particular the rights to organize (in trade unions) and to strike. Furthermore, structural adjustment reforms allowed employers more flexibility in establishing terms and conditions of work.

Despite the fact that the results of the structural adjustment reforms in the 1980s and 1990s clearly indicated poor economic outcomes and led to eroding workplace and welfare protection, the SAPs are still in place. The SAPs and the associated undermining of employment conditions around the world were the starting point for the Global Unions to express their concerns to the IFIs (Interview ITUC02, 2008). In the 1990s representatives of the ICFTU, the WCL and some GUFs started to discuss macroeconomic policies with IFI officials and took part in policy dialogue sessions at the WB where they criticized the SAPs (World Bank, 2007b). The beginning of the dialogue was supported by internal organizational changes within the IFIs including an organizational shift towards greater transparency, a provision of information to the public and an opening up towards civil society organizations in general. At the end of the 1990s meetings between the ITUC, the GUFs and the IFIs started to take place on a more regular basis. Around the turn of the millennium, in 2002, the Global Unions and the IFIs finally adopted an agreement concerning a regular enhanced dialogue and a formalized structure (World Bank, 2002b). This agreement was updated in 2013 by the ITUC, the IMF and the WB. The 2013 framework identifies the ITUC as a ‘core trade union interlocutor’ at the multilateral level and reaffirms the structure of the dialogue. In addition it stresses the importance of consultation between the IFIs and the labour unions on ‘...labour related issues in individual countries, regionally, or globally with regard to on-going and new projects, programs and policies’ (Framework for Dialogue, 2013: 1). The way in which this exchange of information and consultation should work are defined in more detail in the following sections.

The ITUC and staffs of the IMF and the World Bank agree that both trade unions and the IFIs can benefit by early exchanges of information about IFI projects, programs or policies, in particular those that affect levels of employment, social programs, and labour standards and conditions.

[...] Where feasible, consultations between the ITUC and IFIs could prove useful if undertaken before projects, programs or policies are finalized (Framework for Dialogue, 2013:1).

Although the above statements suggest a good degree of influence for the Global Unions in fact there is still enough leeway for IFI staff not to consult with trade unions on projects

which affect labour or to simply to respond too late for meaningful action to be taken. Nevertheless, this is the first time that these issues are so clearly formulated in an agreement between the Global Unions and the IFIs.

5.1 The structure of the dialogue

The agreement adopted in 2002 defined three levels of dialogue which can influence each other. At the top level there is the dialogue between the headquarters of the ITUC, the GUFs, the World Bank Group and the IMF, including organizational leaders, staff in high administration positions and representatives of member organizations. This thesis focuses predominantly on this headquarters-level dialogue.

The meetings at headquarters-level include high-level meetings which take place every two years and include a large delegation from the Global Unions as well as a broad representation of staff from the IFIs. High-level meetings normally take place over three days and focus on an agenda which includes topics which are not specific to any particular sector. The high-level meetings are supported by technical meetings and interim meetings which include smaller delegations of the Global Unions and the IFIs. During technical meetings which normally take place over a period of one or two days the focus is on very specific issues such as for example pensions or labour market reforms. During interim meetings a relatively small group of trade unionists and representatives of the IFIs regularly follow up the implementation of the commitments from the high-level and technical meetings.

The second level of the dialogue is related to the different sectors which are covered by the GUFs; this includes the private industry/sector and the public sector. This sector-level dialogue takes place between individual GUFs and the World Bank with the objective of establishing an effective exchange of information on policies and projects initiated by the World Bank. This is done through the establishment of so called ‘thematic focal points’ these are set up between a GUF and a department of the World Bank which works in the relevant sector which the GUF represents e.g. construction, transport, education and so on (World Bank, 2007b: 5). The first focal points were established in early 2004 between the WB and the Education International and the World Bank and the PSI. The main topics covered by these focal points were education and public sector reform. Since that time focal points have been established in the thematic fields of energy, external affairs, health, private sector development, social development, social protection and transportation (World Bank, 2007b). However, most of the bilateral contacts did not go beyond initial contact and did

not fulfil the objective of providing ‘...channels of regular and timely communication and consultation about new policies’ (World Bank, 2007c: 9). Many representatives of the Global Unions have actually been quite dissatisfied with the implementation of many of the focal points.

The sector-level dialogue also includes the possibility for trade union officials to undertake a secondment working for a short period of time within a specific World Bank department. The idea of secondments at the WB goes back to the former WB President James Wolfensohn. The objective of these secondments is to give ITUC and GUF representatives the opportunity to experience the institutional culture of the WB and to improve cooperation at the organizational and individual level. The updated 2013 framework for dialogue also reaffirms the support for staff secondments and focal points (Framework for Dialogue, 2013).

Between 2003 and 2005 five trade union secondments took place. In 2003 a representative of ICFTU-AFRO worked within the Bank’s Social Protection unit for 11 month where he studied the role of trade unions in the formulation and implementation of PRSPs. In the same year a representative of PSI worked for three month in the WB’s public sector governance department. The objective of this secondment was to improve the Bank’s consultation processes with trade unions concerning public service restructuring programmes.

In 2004 a representative of the BWI spent two month within the Bank’s procurement department. She worked on the improvement of labour clauses within the Bank’s Standard Bidding Document for Procurement of Works (SBDW). Her recommendations had a major impact with regard to the revision of the SBDW. In 2004–2005 a representative of the WCL worked for six month with the Bank’s civil society team in the External Affairs department. Her research was focused on the communication between the WCL and the IFIs and aimed to improve relations between trade unions and the IFIs, in particular at the country level. In 2005 a representative of the ITF carried out a four month secondment with the Infrastructure and Energy Services Department of the Bank’s Europe and Central Asia Region (ECSIE). The topic was railway restructuring projects in which the Bank was involved and which had major implications for railway workers. The results of this secondment were presented at a conference held by the ITF in Washington in 2005. The conference was to be attended by railway union representatives from all over the world and was the start of a series of exchanges between the ITF and the Bank. The latter were mainly facilitated through the focal point between the ITF and the Bank’s Transport and Urban Development department (TUDTR).

5.2 The dialogue: social dialogue, lobbying or something different?

The third formal level of the dialogue is at the country level. This dialogue includes the exchange of information between WB country offices and national trade union organizations and between IMF country mission teams and national trade unions. Since 2002 the IMF has carried out regular surveys on the contacts between IMF country mission teams and trade unions. The 2006 survey revealed that IMF country mission teams meet frequently with trade unions and that there was a general increase in the number of meetings (World Bank, 2007b).

Beyond the formal dialogue, trade unions and IFI representatives also have contacts on a more informal basis which help to prepare the way for formal commitments. However, informal contacts mainly take place between representatives of organizational headquarters. These contacts are mainly developed out of regular formal contacts and help to build up trust in relationships.

5.2 The dialogue: social dialogue, lobbying or something different?

The dialogue between the Global Unions and the IFIs can neither be classified as social dialogue, nor as lobbying, even though there may be some similarities. Rather it is a specific type of dialogue which has some characteristics of social dialogue and lobbying but which requires its own definition.

Social dialogue takes places at European, national, sectoral, local and company level. Its history is rooted in the European continent and goes back to the 1950s when the concept of social dialogue was built into the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty. This included representatives of coal and steel producers, workers, consumers and dealers. In the early 1980s a bipartite dialogue between social partners started to develop and in 1987 the Single European Act gave EU-level social dialogue formal recognition (European Commission, 2012). The social partners are the main actors in social dialogue. Generally the term refers to both organizations representing employers (employers' associations) and organizations representing workers (trade unions). The dialogue exists in two forms. Either it takes place between employers' organisations and trade unions (bipartite dialogue) or involves the employers, workers, and governments or EU institutions (tripartite dialogue). The latter is also referred to as concertation. With regard to the scope of the social dialogue two levels can be distinguished. At the cross-industry level the dialogue covers all sectors and the whole national or European economy, whilst at the sector level

only one specific industry or sector is covered. Whilst bipartite social dialogue takes place at both cross-industry and sector level, tripartite dialogue mainly occurs at cross-industry level. In 1998 the European Commission decided to establish a number of sectoral social dialogue committees (SSDCc). These are central bodies for consultation, joint initiatives and negotiation of agreements (Eurofound, 2012). Since that time some 40 sectors social dialogue committees have been established. The EU commission must now consult social partners about issues relating to employment and social policy.

When it comes to matters of employment and social policy, the Commission has a duty to consult the social partners on possible EU action (such as legislation), giving them the opportunity to respond individually or jointly and, if they wish, to negotiate agreements on the issues in question, which may in certain circumstances be given legal force by an EU directive (European Commission, 2012: 11).

Social dialogue is therefore part of the European social model and it reflects the democratic principle which is included in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union. Accordingly, representative associations should be able to express their views and they should be involved in decision-making on issues that closely affect them (Ibid., 2012). In Europe social dialogue is considered as a key tool in addressing challenges such as ‘... enhancing skills and qualifications, modernising work organisation, promoting equal opportunities and diversity and developing active ageing policies’ (Commission of the European Communities, 2002: 4). Outcomes of social dialogue are said to include confidence-building processes, exchanges of views and information, joint studies and conferences as well as the agreement of joint texts. Issues addressed in joint texts include economic and sectoral issues, procedures and commitment to hold social dialogue, training and lifelong learning, health and safety, the promotion of employment, working conditions, working time, social aspects of EU policies, CSR, gender equality and sustainable development. So far there are four cross-industry agreements which became legally binding across the EU through the establishment of EU directives and which were then transposed into national laws. These agreements for example include parental leave, part-time work and fixed-term work (European Commission, 2012). Furthermore, there are five sectoral agreements which have been implemented through EU directives. These agreements relate to seafarers’ working time (1999), the working time of mobile civil aviation staff (2000), working conditions in the railway sector (2005), seafarers’ conditions of employment (2009), health and safety in hospital and healthcare sector (2010) (Ibid., 2012). These sectoral agreements are legally binding in the sectors they concern and are aimed at improving employment and working

5.2 *The dialogue: social dialogue, lobbying or something different?*

conditions for workers across the EU.

The dialogue between the IFIs and the Global Unions differs in several aspects from social dialogue. First it does not have a very long history and it exists in a much more narrow setting than social dialogue which in comparison is directly shaped and influenced by the broad European institutional, political, economic and social environment. The relationship between the Global Unions and the IFIs and their interaction is very different from the relationship the social partners have in social dialogue. The IFIs are inter-governmental organizations which do not represent the interests of a particular group or economic sector. For that reason the dialogue between the Global Unions and the IFIs is not about social actors on a bipartite level. It is also not a tripartite dialogue as there is no further public authority involved. In a broader sense, one level of the dialogue could partly be considered as sectoral dialogue as there are the focal points between the GUFs and the individual departments of the World Bank which concern specific sectors. The high-level dialogue meanwhile could to some extent be seen as a form of cross-sectoral dialogue as it covers issues which concern workers worldwide, such as for example core labour standards or the implications of privatization for workers. However, there is no legally binding force that trade unions can refer to in order to claim information from the IFIs, or the other way around, and there is no binding mechanism that could force the IFIs to consult trade unions on projects which have implications for workers. Furthermore, the agenda of high-level meetings mainly includes issues which concern workers indirectly such as for example the general policies of the IMF and the WB (IMF lending conditions, WB social protection strategy). Other important issues concern the commitment to the dialogue and the revision of its framework or the promotion of jobs (for example job-focused growth strategies in IMF lending programmes). The outcomes of the dialogue between the Global Unions and the IFIs are not legally binding which means they usually do not take the form of joint agreements and cannot be implemented as directives. There are, however, similar outcomes as in social dialogue in terms of confidence building processes and the exchange of views and information. This, and the fact that the dialogue between the Global Unions and the IFIs is focused on long-term gains and that it depends on the ‘... strong and enduring political will of all parties involved’ to achieve commitments and to implement them (Minet, 2008: 2) can be seen as points of intersection with social dialogue.

In contrast to social dialogue, lobbying is not based on the mutual exchange of information or negotiation, but reflects the attempt to exercise influence and can also be seen as a power relationship (Baumgartner et al., 2009). Lobbying relates to decision-making processes by public authorities and the motivation to influence those decisions by transmitting in-

formation, arguments or threats (Steven, 2002; Panke, 2012). Lobbying can be defined as

‘...the build-up of unorthodox efforts to obtain information and support regarding a game of interest in order to eventually get a desired outcome from a power-holder’ (Schendelen, 2010: 48).

Like social dialogue, lobbying takes place at different levels including the global, the regional, the national and the local level. Public authorities are for example ministries at the national level and EU institutions like the European Commission at the regional level. Another major difference to social dialogue is that lobbying includes the gathering of information about power holders and their issues in ‘indirect’ and ‘highly informal’ ways, and it is usually carried out ‘silently’ (Ibid., 2010: 49). It also is highly strategic and tactical whereas tactics are likely to change during the course of events (Burrell, 2001).

Lobbying is often related to business companies which try to exercise influence on national or regional legislation and the decisions of public authorities regarding the allocation of resources. They try to make legislation and resource allocation more favourable for their ‘...own goals or desires’ (Keffer and Hill, 1997: 1373). Businesses often use lobbying as a strategic tool to promote their own economic interests and may pay for professional lobbyists to act on their behalf, these lobbyists then communicate their aims and preferences and also advise companies on how to influence public policy and decision-making processes (Steven, 2002).

Besides businesses, there are other organizations such as NGOs, citizen groups, associations and trade unions which also use lobbying as a form of advocacy, targeting legislators and government officials. In this context lobbying activities include for example the submission of brief position papers to government officials explaining their position and the reason why the organization is lobbying for this position, they may also carry out research and data collection to support position papers, writing letters to individual politicians or signing and delivering petitions to politicians.

The dialogue between the Global Unions and the IFIs is only to a small extent about influencing specific decision-making processes. Rather, it follows a more general, long-term approach. The dialogue is based on a formal structure which includes meetings at regular time intervals. There is also a major difference to lobbying, in that (for different reasons) both the IFIs and the Global Unions take a continuing interest in the dialogue (Interview ITUC02, 2008). As the dialogue has an institutionalized structure, the characteristics associated with lobbying are that it is usually done silently and secretly; this aspect does not

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apply to the dialogue. The dialogue also does not include a third party which represents the interests of either the IFIs or the Global Unions. However, there are a few elements of lobbying, in particular the form of lobbying used by trade unions and NGOs in a different context, which do apply to the dialogue. Firstly, although the Global Unions do not specifically aim to influence particular decision-making processes within the IFIs during high-level meetings or technical meetings, they do aim to change their general policy approach and paradigm, so that in this sense they do aim to exert an influence on the IFIs. Secondly, representatives of the Global Unions collect information related to the IFIs and their policies, prepare their arguments before the meetings take place, and explain their positions to the representatives of the IFIs. In doing so, they draw on studies and research carried out by their own organizations or by third parties such as academic organizations. Thirdly, similar to lobbyists, representatives of the global trade union organizations do not have ‘... formal decision-taking competencies’ within the IFIs (Panke, 2012: 130).

Following the above definitions of social dialogue and lobbying and the similarities and differences with the dialogue between the Global Unions and the IFIs, the dialogue is defined by the author as follows:

The headquarters-level dialogue between the Global Unions and the IFIs is an institutionalized communication process which takes place on a regular basis. The dialogue can be classified as a form of international policy dialogue which takes place between organizations which are active at the global policy level. The organizations involved are different in terms of their organizational structures, resources, the members they represent and the political paradigms they follow. They do not act as social partners and do not negotiate specific agreements. Rather, this form of dialogue serves to exchange views, to develop a better understanding of each others approaches, and to identify possible areas of cooperation. From the trade union perspective the dialogue is also about acquiring policy commitments from the IFIs.

The dialogue between the Global Unions and the IFIs is based on the development of a long-term relationship between all the organizations involved and is aimed at creating more trust in the relationships amongst the organizational representatives. The dialogue includes information sharing mainly on a formal level, and to a minor extent, on an informal level. It is not about influencing specific decision-making processes to achieve advantages for an individual organization and its members, but has a more holistic approach. The agenda of the high-level dialogue covers economic and social issues concerning workers worldwide as well as the specific policy approaches followed by the IFIs. The Global Unions want the IFIs to commit to a more social global policy including the recognition of worker rights

in their development programmes and the conditions attached to their loans.

5.3 A decade of joint dialogue – Expectations and results achieved

In the 1990s the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), the World Confederation of Labour (WCL) and other international trade union bodies such as GUFs and regional organizations started to meet with IFI officials to discuss macroeconomic policies (World Bank, 2007b). The first officially recorded three day high-level meeting between the IFIs and a trade union delegation took part in October 2000. Trade union representatives met with the World Bank president, with the IMF managing director and the executive directors from the WB and the IMF. This first dialogue served to sound out possible joint issues and to initiate a discussion about the development of a workable future consultation mechanism. Furthermore, both the leaders of the World Bank and the IMF acknowledged the broad membership of trade union organizations worldwide and their clear representation mandate. In 2000, James Wolfensohn, the former president of the WB, welcomed the increased dialogue with the ICFTU and argued for a ‘... frank dialogue in order to determine areas of agreement and disagreement and how both institutions could move forward together’ (World Bank, 2000: 1). Wolfensohn was a driving force for the development of the dialogue. The former IMF managing director Horst Köhler, who was new in this position when it came to the first recorded high-level meeting with the Global Unions, also considered the dialogue with trade unions as ‘... necessary and useful’ (Ibid., 2000: 1).

At that time the ITUC was still divided into the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the World Confederation of Labour (WCL). The latter held separate meetings with the IFIs, but supported the views and demands expressed by the ICFTU (World Bank, 2001b). From 2002 onwards both the ICFTU and the WCL carried out their IFI related work jointly.

Since the first meeting with the IFIs, representatives of the ICFTU, the GUFs and their members argued for an institutionalized mechanism for dialogue. From their point of view this was essential in order to ensure that the dialogue became an organizational commitment which did not depend on any individual actor. Furthermore, they wanted to ensure that the rhetorical commitments of the IFIs could be implemented and followed up on a regular basis. This would mean a formal dialogue structure which would include meetings

5.3 A decade of joint dialogue – Expectations and results achieved

Table 5.1: Meetings between the Global Unions and the IFIs since 2000

2000, October	High-level meetings between ICFTU, World Bank and IMF
2001, March	Meeting between WCL, World Bank and IMF
2001, July	Meeting on selected issues between ICFTU, World Bank and IMF (initiatives on social protection and trade issues by the World Bank / conditionality by the IMF)
2002, July	Meeting on selected issues between trade unions and WB (labour issues related to privatization and restructuring of public enterprises)
2002, October	High-level meetings between Global Unions, WCL, WB and IMF
2003, May	Technical meeting on pension reform between WB and trade unions
2003, November	Interim meeting between World Bank, IMF and the international trade union movement
2003, November	Technical meeting on labour markets between World Bank, IMF and the international trade union movement
2004, October	High-level meetings between the ITUC/Global Unions , WCL, WB and IMF
2006, December	High-level meetings between the Global Unions, WB and IMF
2007, December	Interim meeting / Technical meeting on trade union – IFI dialogue between the Global Unions, WB and IMF (Development of a joint background paper reviewing the progress of the dialogue)
2009, January	High-level meetings between Global Unions, IMF and WB
2010, March	Technical meetings on pension reform between ITUC/Global Unions and the IFIs
2010, March	Interim meeting on dialogue between ITUC/Global Unions and the IFIs
2011, January	High-level meetings between Global Unions, IMF and WB
2013, February	High-level meetings between Global Unions, IMF and WB

Source: World Bank website and ITUC/Global Unions office in Washington; technical meetings since 2010 are not included

on a regular basis which should then help make the IFIs more accountable and consistent with regard to their policies and development programmes (World Bank, 2002a).

Since the 2002 high-level meeting when the formal structure of the dialogue was established, the relationship between the Global Unions and the IFIs has improved (World Bank, 2007b). The improvement of the relationship is also mentioned in the updated framework for the dialogue agreed in 2013 between the ITUC, the IMF and the WB. The updated framework describes a considerable increase of the type, number and depth of mutual ex-

changes and also states that the financial and economic crisis was an important trigger in increasing such exchanges (Framework for Dialogue, 2013). There are, however, still a lot of obstacles to overcome. The progress made so far and the expectations of both sides is analysed in the following sections.

5.3.1 Differing expectations of the dialogue partners: A path to convergence or divergence?

The interviews and the evaluation of the reports of the high-level meetings revealed that representatives of the Global Unions and the IFIs joined the dialogue with quite different expectations. On the one hand the IFIs saw the dialogue as an opportunity to develop and practice their diplomatic relationships with trade unions as part of a general opening up towards civil society. On the other hand as initiators of the dialogue, the Global Unions and particularly the ITUC (former ICFTU), pursued clearly defined objectives and had explicit expectations concerning the possible outcomes of the dialogue. In particular they were focused on gaining the full integration of the CLS in WB and IMF operations and the provision of a platform for the consultation of trade unions in the PRSP process (World Bank, 2001b).

The expectations of the different organizations which take part in the high-level dialogue can be divided into two areas: first the process of the dialogue itself in particular the mutual treatment of individuals during meetings, and second the outcomes of the dialogue. The expectations of the individual actors involved in the dialogue are influenced by a number of factors: first, the level of direct involvement of their organization in the dialogue; secondly, their own individual commitment and attitude towards the dialogue and finally; their own perceptions of the dialogue partners. Individual perceptions are determined by shared information and knowledge within an organization, the organizational rules, educational backgrounds and individual experiences of its members. This means that individual perceptions as well as expectations are not static; they can change over the course of time according to changes in information, knowledge and experiences.

For the Global Unions the dialogue at the headquarters-level was and is mainly promoted by the ITUC and the joint ITUC/Global Unions office in Washington. At the beginning or even at later stages many GUFs have not become heavily involved in the dialogue and unlike the ITUC did not pay much attention to the policies of the IFIs. This is largely due to the fact that the GUFs mainly follow an industry/sector approach which focuses on negotiations and bargaining with businesses, whilst the ITUC has a stronger political

5.3 A decade of joint dialogue – Expectations and results achieved

focus which focuses on the activities of international organizations and intergovernmental cooperation.

As the thesis will illustrate in the following sections the expectations of individual actors regards the dialogue and its outcomes varied greatly within both the Global Unions and the IFIs. There were a lot of reservations with regard to the course and the outcome of the dialogue among the Global Union representatives and particularly among the representatives of the GUFs which resulted in different levels of support for the dialogue.

From the beginning the Global Unions expressed their expectation that the IFIs should develop an understanding of the role and function of trade unions which are centred on the protection of workers and their rights (Salamon, 1998) and that the IFIs should start to consider trade unions as serious dialogue partners and stakeholders. There was a general expectation that the IFIs should listen seriously to trade union proposals (World Bank, 2002b).

Among trade unionists there were different opinions regards possible and probable outcomes of the dialogue. Some were concerned with the relationship with the WB, the IFC and the IMF, and the impact trade unions could actually have on their policies. In 2000 for example, the General Secretary of the ICFTU stated that the trade unions want to have a better relationship with the IMF and that they want to be seen as stakeholders whose views are taken into account (World Bank, 2000). The Global Unions also expected to achieve a stronger decentralization of the dialogue and an improvement of the dialogue at the national level. Furthermore, trade unions aimed to have a “seat at the table”.

With regard to the practical outcomes of the dialogue the Global Unions expected to have an impact on IFI policies particularly those around labour market policies and privatization. Furthermore, they expected that their efforts to promote the CLS would show positive results (World Bank, 2007b). However, the trade unions were also realistic in terms of the time frame. They expected that things would change very slowly within the IFIs because they are huge organizations and their policies are determined by some influential governments (Interview ITUC01, 2008).

The expectations of individual actors within the IFIs varied according to the level of involvement of the individual organizations in the dialogue. At the beginning of the headquarters-level dialogue the WB was much more involved in the dialogue than the IFC and the IMF. However, right from the beginning all the representatives of the IFIs had one thing in common. They consistently referred to their statutes to limit the expectations of the trade unions regarding the output of the dialogue. They made it clear that

there could be no political intervention; that is no involvement in the national affairs of their shareholders (national governments). This undoubtedly reinforced the asymmetrical power relationship between the Global Unions and the IFIs.

Another important point was that the expectations expressed by the leadership of the IFIs did not necessarily match with the expectations and perceptions expressed by staff members at lower organizational levels. For example, James Wolfensohn, the former president of the WB, had a very positive opinion of trade unions and their role in the world economy and he was a strong supporter of the dialogue. Furthermore, some of the Executive Directors, in particular from Scandinavian countries also supported the idea of working with the trade unions. However, outside formal meetings some staff members, particularly from the WB and the IMF, gave quite different signs to trade unionists. These individual actors influenced the course of the dialogue in a negative way as they often made cooperation and the exchange of information more difficult.

The director of the Public Affairs department of the IMF expressed his views about the development of the dialogue as follows:

The IMF expects a dialogue, a conversation, and that's not an easy thing to achieve always. (...) what we are doing is agreeing on having an idea, a focused discussion on relevant crucial issues. Now I think some years the issues are more crucial and more relevant than in other years. When things were going very well in the global economy earlier in this decade the discussion was maybe driven less by the imperative of immediate needs and concerns. There were always needs and concerns but the word is immediate (Interview IMF01, 2008).

In his opinion, if the IMF is listening to trade unions in the context of the dialogue, the organization is able to get a '...clear understanding of what's on the mind of the labour movement at the international level' (Interview IMF01, 2008). This will 'cause' the IMF '...to think about the issues' (Interview Ibid., 2008). Furthermore, the IMF recognized the need for a bilateral dialogue.

The point is that we think there is an important dialogue to be had outside of the context of the high-level dialogue because the high-level dialogue is fifty or sixty people and that's very different from ten people, twelve people. So we think one facilitates the other and hopefully it becomes a positive circle of contact where the high level dialogue generates other contacts which generates more constructive high-level dialogue (Interview IMF01, 2008).

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In 2009 there was a first meeting with the Executive Board of the IMF and trade unionists. There was also a meeting between Guy Ryder and Dominique Strauss-Kahn the former managing director of the IMF.

The IFIs appeared to have few specific expectations with regard to the outcome of the dialogue. In 2002, for example, the World Bank Managing Director, a South African, expressed her hope of identifying new areas of cooperation in the dialogue such as for example in health care and education (World Bank, 2002b). The more general perspective, however, was concerned with making the dialogue “work” and building friendly relationships with trade unions. This general and unspecific approach also affected the way the dialogue worked. For example, from the point of view of the IFIs there was not necessarily an ‘obligation’ to share information (World Bank, 2007c: 10). As one result the focal points which had been established between several departments of the WB and the GUFs later on did not function efficiently.

Although representatives of both the WB and the IMF stated during the interviews that their organizations take the dialogue ‘seriously’ (Interview IMF01, 2008), it took and still takes a long time for rhetoric related to changes of organizational programmes are reflected in practice. The gap between what organizations say they will do and what they actually do can be seen as a form of organizational decoupling. Organizational decoupling can have different grounds, for example the avoidance of major structural changes and changes in mode of operations and the protection of the status quo. Decoupling can help organizations to slow down profound organizational change or help to delay them.

Trade union representatives are aware of decoupling. In the early stages of the dialogue trade union representatives felt that they were, ‘...just going through the process once every two years’ (Interview TUAC, 2009). In other words, the dialogue was not really efficient because the representatives of the IFIs and their rhetoric bore little relation to the things which were really going on within individual departments at the headquarters-level and country offices at national level.

However, the high-level meetings every two years do play an important role in getting ‘public commitments’ from the IFIs (Interview ITUC04, 2009). The meetings serve to bring people together and trade unionists from different countries get the opportunity to meet with key actors from the WB and the IMF and to raise important questions and concerns.

5.3.2 Outcomes of the headquarters-level dialogue

Some of the most important outcomes of the headquarters-level dialogue are examined in the following sections, these are drawn from a combination of documentation, in particular the joint reports of the high-level meetings and technical meetings published by the WB and data from the interviews. The term “outcome” is used to describe the changes of attitudes and policies within the IFIs regarding the issues previously discussed in the context of the headquarters-dialogue. However, it should be noted that these changes cannot always be ascribed to trade union influence and the influence of the dialogue alone, as sometimes changes are the result of joint efforts including for example NGOs. Furthermore, changes have not only been achieved through formal dialogue at the headquarters-level, but also through informal conversations. However, the impact of such informal communication is beyond the scope of the thesis as it is very difficult to access such processes as a researcher on the ‘outside’ of the organization.

In general terms the dialogue between the Global Unions and the World Bank and the IFC includes more issues than the dialogue between the Global Unions and the IMF. This is mainly because the WB is active worldwide and is involved in many sectors which are also a matter of direct trade union concern. The WB is ‘...doing private sector lending, public sector lending, it is doing policy reform lending and also project specific lending and then also technical assistance, research and so’ (Interview ITUC04, 2009). In contrast, the IMF focuses on the international financial sector and mainly does financial and macroeconomic work. Arguably the trade unions have less expertise in terms of the international financial sector and macroeconomics. However, they do try to bring issues concerning workers to the IMF’s attention, this is because the IMF’s policy advice and borrowing requirements can have a major direct impact on workers.

The agenda for the dialogue is negotiated between the ITUC and the WB before the high-level meetings take place. Both sides introduce topics they want to discuss and then an agreement is made (Interview WB01, 2008). Agendas have included issues relevant to workers protection, social protection, the global financial architecture and the structure of the dialogue itself amongst others (World Bank, 2000). All these issues have been steadily promoted by the Global Unions and their members over a period of several years. An important reference document for the high-level meetings is the actual Global Union statement regards the annual meetings of the IMF and World Bank (Interview ITUC02, 2008). The Global Union statements represent the general position of trade unions to the IFIs, even though these statements do not necessarily reflect particular points of view of single GUFs.

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The following table 5.2 provides an overview of the main issues on the agenda during high-level meetings. The smaller technical and interim meetings which focused on specific issues that took place in-between the high-level meetings are not included here. All the high-level meetings included a broad range of issues. In most cases however, only one or two hours are allocated to each topic for presentations and discussions, which is not much considering the scope of the topics and the number of trade union and IFI representatives that are usually involved. The following sections examine some of the issues and results achieved results in more detail.

Table 5.2: High-level Meetings

Issues	Years						
	2000	2002	2004	2006	2009	2011	2013
Core Labour Standards in IFI Operations	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
WB Labour Standards Safeguard							✓
WB Social Protection / Labour Strategy	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓
WB Labour Issues / Sector Reforms					✓		✓
WB Pension Reform Policies		✓			✓		
Loan Conditonality / Lending Condi- tions			✓	✓		✓	✓
Privatization	✓	✓					
Poverty Reduction Strategy Process	✓	✓	✓				
Poverty Reduction/MDGs			✓				
Doing Business			✓	✓	✓	✓	
Governance IFIs		✓					
International Financial Architecture / Macroeconomic Stability		✓		✓		✓	
Financial Crisis					✓	✓	✓
Food and Energy Crisis					✓	✓	
Climate Change / Green Jobs					✓		✓
Decent Work				✓	✓		
Debt Relief			✓	✓			
HIV/Aids	✓	✓	✓	✓			
Framework for Dialogue	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓

Own illustration; table is based on agendas and joint reports on meetings between the Global Unions and the IFIs, these are available on the WB website

5.3.2.1 Labour standards within the IFIs

The integration of core labour standards in WB, IFC and IMF operations and their implementation has been a major issue for the Global Unions since the beginning of the dialogue. For a long time the WB and the IMF had been resistant to incorporating labour standards in their work. Against this background it is remarkable that in the course of the dialogue there were some major achievements on this issue, first of all in relation to the IFC and later on in relation to the WB.

According to staff of the ITUC/Global Unions office in Washington, the inclusion of the core labour standards in the IFC performance standards on social and environmental sustainability ‘...was one of the most important accomplishments of the dialogue between unions and IFIs’ (World Bank, 2009: 4). When the dialogue started in 2000, the IFC’s lending requirements – which are formulated in its performance standards – only included the ILO conventions on the prohibition of harmful child and forced labour. Other core ILO conventions which refer to the right of freedom of association and the right of collective bargaining were not included.

The awareness of the WB and the IFC regards core labour standards started to increase at the beginning of 2000 (World Bank, 2002b). During the high-level meetings in October 2002 it was specified ‘...that unions are not asking that the IFIs take on the role of monitoring the application of the CLS, but rather that they properly interact with the ILO when working on labour issues’ (World Bank, 2002b: 2–3). The Global Unions were always pushing the ILO forward into the field of global governance, stressing its expertise in labour standards and their application. They have tried to upgrade the image of the ILO and to strengthen its role within global governance, because the ILO is the only directly accessible organization within the UN system for trade unions and it is the only UN organization which represents labour alongside governments and employers.

In 2006 the IFC adopted its new performance standards which then included all eight core ILO conventions of the CLS including the conventions on freedom of association and the right of collective bargaining. The CLS are compulsory for each project supported by the IFC and, PS2 stresses that borrowing companies have to ensure that their operations do not violate the CLS. Before the adoption of the new performance standards, the IFC consulted trade unions, NGOs and other stakeholders on this issue but following the adoption of the new standards the IFC initiated a labour advisory group in which the ITUC participates. This group consists of practitioners from businesses and trade unionists which advice the IFC on specific labour issues (IFC, 2007).

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As such the IFC pioneered the issue of labour standards within the World Bank Group. This pioneering role of the IFC can be partly explained by the type of clients the organization deals with and partly by its organizational culture. The IFC supports private businesses and not governments as the WB does. The IFC's experience with private businesses is a point of intersection with the trade unions. This might explain why the IFC invited the ITUC and the GUFs to take part in the development process of the performance standards. They asked trade unions to provide proposals for the implementation of the standards and to alert them in the case of any violations (World Bank, 2007c). In this context one can understand why in 2006 the IFC President described the performance standards as a '... shared opportunity' with trade unions (World Bank, 2006: 10).

In the WB the CLS play an important role with regard to the organizations' procurement policies. The WB lends money to governments for investment projects, allowing countries to purchase goods and services and to undertake civil construction work. Goods can include raw materials, machinery, equipments and industrial plants, whilst services include for example transportation, insurance, installation, training and maintenance (World Bank, 2010a).

The WB provides the money to the government agency which deals with the project and concludes a loan agreement with the agency. The agreement includes a number of obligations for borrowing governments, one of these is that the government acts on the WB's procurement policies as specified in the procurement guidelines. The guidelines inform borrowers about WB policies which govern the procurement of goods, works and services. The procurement guidelines are based on International Competitive Bidding (ICB) which is intended to provide bidders with '... an equal opportunity to bid for the required goods and works' (Ibid., 2010a: 14). When a provider of goods and works has been chosen by a government agency on the basis of the competitive bidding process, a bidding document (a contract) is signed between both parties which sets out the rights and obligations of both parties.

The Standard Bidding Documents for Procurement of Works (SBDW) have played an important role within the dialogue with regard to the incorporation of the CLS. The SBDW has been revised several times, but for trade unions the most important change took place in 2012 when the ILO conventions on the right of freedom of association and collective bargaining were included in the general conditions of contract under section VIII. Subchapter six of this section is entitled 'Staff and Labour' and stipulates that:

(...), the Contractor shall not discourage the Contractor's Personnel from forming or joining workers' organizations of their choosing or from bargain-

ing collectively, and shall not discriminate or retaliate against the Contractor's Personnel who participate, or seek to participate, in such organisations and bargain collectively (World Bank, 2012f: 171).

It has taken a long time to move these basic worker rights from section IX (which only refers to 'particular conditions') to the general conditions of contract under section VIII. For a long time the WB only 'recommended' labour standards and did not consider them as 'mandatory' within their contracts (World Bank, 2001a: 2). During the course of the dialogue the Global Unions argued that the Bank should actively promote the CLS, for instance by systematically working with the ILO and the ban of loans in situations where the CLS were repeatedly violated. Nevertheless despite this progress some Executive Directors from the WB and the IMF still hold the view that the CLS should not be used as condition of policy-based lending.

From the beginning of the dialogue the Global Unions expressed their disappointment that the Bank did not see the need to integrate the CLS more fundamentally in its work (World Bank, 2003a). The Building and Wood Workers' International (BWI) in particular, which had been discussing procurement policy with the WB since the end of the 1990s, played an important role in developing effective labour clauses for WB procurement policies.

Over time the Global Unions and their members managed to raise the awareness and interest in the issue of labour standards amongst some Executive Directors, particularly those from Scandinavia and Germany. During the high-level meetings in 2004 the WB encouraged trade unions to bring to their attention any violations of CLS in WB projects and also assured the unions that action would be taken. The adoption of the new performance standards by the IFC in 2006 also stimulated change in the WB. During the high-level meeting in the same year, the Director of WB's Operations, Policy, and Country Services noted that the WB '... would soon adopt all four CLS in its SBD' and that the '... WB intended to harmonize the wording of its procurement standards to that of the IFC performance standards' (World Bank, 2006: 10). However, it took another six years before the announcement became a reality. Although representatives of the Global Unions considered this '... official policy move' as important, they have also been critical about its real impact on the ground (Interview PSI, 2008). In the opinion of a representative of the IUF, the incorporation of labour standards will not change the existing economic model nor the nature of economic globalization, but will just make them more 'palatable' (Interview IUF, 2008).

So far, the core labour standards have mainly played a role in connection with the IFC and the WB. Although the IMF has shown a positive attitude towards the ILO and labour

standards discussed within the dialogue, it has never committed itself to adopting labour standards in principle and therefore little has been achieved in practical terms with regard IMF policies.

5.3.2.2 Labour market issues and social protection

The practical effect of labour standards have been further undermined by the broader approach adopted by the the IFIs with regard to labour market policies and social protection. The labour market policies of the IFIs for example have tended to promote job creation and a re-regulation of the labour market which tends to undermine employment protections and consequently labour standards more generally (World Bank, 2013b). For example both the IMF and the WB make labour market recommendations in connection with their loans and development programmes, these were largely confined to developing countries, but since the financial crisis they have increasingly concerned advanced economies (Blanchard et al., 2013).

This paradoxical approach is nicely illustrated in the statements of both organizations. The joint report from a technical meeting on labour markets in 2003 included for example the statement of the World Bank that generous, ‘...unemployment insurance schemes, high employment protection, high minimum wages and non-competitive wage-setting can lead to both higher and structural unemployment’ and influence employment rates negatively (World Bank, 2003b: 1). In contrast, trade union representatives argue that protection mechanisms provide workers and the economy with benefits.

During the high-level meeting in 2004, trade unions argued that the WB should systematically monitor the impact of its own labour market policies and the labour market reform processes these lead to at the national level. They also ‘...urged greater consultation with unions on policies to promote a less disruptive restructuring of the labour market’ (World Bank, 2004: 2).

At the time of writing the trade unions and the IFIs still hold conflicting views regarding labour market regulation, with the IFIs still promoting more flexible labour markets and weakening employment protection legislation. The former director of the Social Protection and Labour unit of the WB for example stressed that in the context of labour market reforms the most important points are the ‘...strain on employers through severance payments’ and the difficulties around ‘...hiring and firing; which means how quick can I discard people’ (Interview WB02, 2008).

(...) we have countries where, if somebody has been given a job, this person cannot be dismissed ever again, and where a worker has been employed for one year, he receives half a year severance payment. This is something which is not suitable for achieving a more flexible labour market which really creates jobs. I doubt it. We doubt it (Interview WB02, 2008).

This position is not new for the WB. In a background paper for the World Development Report in 2005, for example, the authors stressed the importance of a ‘... well-functioning investment climate’ for the generation of a higher demand for labour (Pierre and Scarpetta, 2004). In this context they also pointed out that:

Overly ambitious labor regulations contribute to reduce the reallocation of labor towards productive jobs in the formal sector as they raise labor costs and curb incentives for firms to expand and hire more workers or to adopt new technologies (Ibid., 2004: 41).

Trade unions take the opposite view and stress the importance of worker protection and labour market regulations. In particular labour regulation concerning for example maximum working times, minimum wages, occupational health and safety and limitations on fixed-term contracts, these are considered to be ‘irreplaceable’ (Bakvis, 2012: 3).

In recent years the WB has started to conduct more research on labour market regulation. This research was, amongst others, supposed to give the Bank a better basis for arguments in the dialogue with trade unions and other external stakeholders. On a regular basis the WB organizes a two week core labour market course to share its knowledge and research results with different stakeholders (website WB e-institute⁸¹). Stakeholders include policymakers, researchers from academic institutions, trade unions, employer groups, NGOs and operational staff from the WB and donor agencies. Most of the contributions to the courses come from WB economists and WB consultants, but some courses also include trade union perspectives on particular issues these include for example globalization and working conditions (2008) and the protection of workers (2012/2013); these were presented by the ITUC/Global Unions office in Washington. In 2012, the Director of the ITUC/Global Unions office in Washington referring to the World of Work Report from the ILO (2012) and an OECD publication (2011) argued that labour markets require adequate regulation and social protection and that such regulation is not an impediment to economic growth and job creation. The empirical data underlying the ILO study suggest that ‘... there is no clear link between employment protection legislation and employment

⁸¹World Bank e-Institute <<http://einstitution.worldbank.org/ei/search/node/labor>>

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levels' (ILO, 2012: 36). The data in the 2012 report suggests that '...decentralized (but coordinated by social partners) systems of collective bargaining or centralized and coordinated bargaining systems' have the highest employment rates (Ibid., 2012: 36).

The 2011 OECD publication 'Divided We Stand' addresses increased wage and earning inequality within OECD countries. The report argues that the declining redistributive capacity of tax-benefit systems has led to a widening of household-income gaps. Furthermore, the benefit level cuts and the tightening of eligibility rules in many countries in order to limit social protection expenditures, have exacerbated inequality. In addition it is argued that the weakening of employment protection legislation for workers with temporary contracts does not have a positive impact on the employment rate (OECD, 2011).

In comparison with a decade ago, the WB now tries to adopt a more moderate view with regard to labour market institutions and rights at work. A joint synthesis report published by the ILO and the WB in 2012 summarizes a few results and conclusions based on data, which has been gathered by a joint survey on policy responses to the financial and economic crisis between 2008 and 2010. The report states that measures which have been taken during the crisis with regard to rights at work, working conditions, social protection and social dialogue mechanisms '...seemed to have been in line with ILO instruments' (ILO and WB, 2012: 46). The report further stresses that

(...), it is important to increase vigilance to avoid violations of fundamental principles and rights at work. It should be recalled that lowering labour standards, in particular in times of crisis, can encourage the spread of low-wage, low-skill, and high turnover industries (...) (ILO and WB, 2012: 46).

However, the statement of a WB member of staff from the labour market and social security department during the 2012 core labour market course again made clear that such perspectives are still questioned by more deeply rooted notions surrounding labour market 'flexibility'. This member of staff argued in his presentation that empirical evidence shows that '...minimum wages reduce employment' and that '...dismissal procedures impede labor reallocations' (Kaplan, 2012: 3, 24). He argued that in order to achieve and maintain high productivity it is necessary that the '...costs of labour reallocation', in other words the costs for businesses for hiring and separation of workers, are low, and that '...minimum wages well above productivity' should be avoided (Ibid., 2012: 27). This kind of perspective suggests that labour market flexibility and the lowering of labour standards are still promoted by WB staff. It is therefore quite clear that cooperation with

the Global Unions and the development of a coherent strategy around the promotion and integration of labour standards within the IFIs is far from straightforward.

One of the key issues on the agenda of the dialogue from the very beginning and which is strongly connected with labour market reforms and the issue of employment protection is privatization. As early as September 1999 in a meeting with representatives of the international trade union organizations, the WB committed itself ‘...to increase dialogue and establish a more formal structure for information sharing between the Bank and trade unions on privatization’ (World Bank, 2001a: 1). The PSI and the ITUC in particular have been involved in several discussions about labour issues in privatization and public enterprise restructuring (World Bank, 2007b).

In the debate about privatization the Global Unions argued that ‘...relevant unions must be involved right from the beginning’ in privatization processes (Interview PSI, 2008). In particular the PSI has been pushing this debate for almost 20 years, but the WB still refuses to involve unions in the privatization process. Instead the WB only encourages dialogue between governments and trade unions once the basic decision to privatize has already been made. A PSI representative stated that there never have been ‘...satisfactory outcomes’ on any of those things (Interview PSI, 2008). It is interesting to note in this regard that for more than a decade the WB has been pushing the privatization of water for example. In recent months This has become a hot political issue in the Republic of Ireland as the IMF and Troika made water privatization a requirement for emergency lending during the financial crisis; it has since met with considerable opposition from the Irish public (McEnroe, 2014).

Another issue related to labour market reforms is the annual WB publication ‘Doing Business’ which ranks each country according to its level of employment protection. The less the employment protection regulation a country has, the higher its overall ranking in terms of ‘Doing Business’. Trade Unions have criticized this employment protection ranking since it was first published as was discussed in chapter 4.

Apart from labour market reforms, social protection issues such as national pension systems, health care and education also play an important role within the dialogue. These issues have also been covered in focal points between the World Bank and the Global Unions which have been established in 2004.

Pension systems have become an increasingly important issue in many developed countries in recent years. Many countries are faced with ageing populations, low birth rates, limits on public spending and in some cases underdeveloped welfare systems. Trade unions are

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particularly concerned that the number of workers likely to receive an adequate pension in order to retire on a decent income is getting smaller, whilst the number who may receive no pension at all is increasing. High unemployment rates and lower wages also make it more difficult for workers to contribute to pensions. Another matter of concern for trade unions is the problem of pension coverage for migrant workers. The WB has been involved in pension reforms in more than 90 countries (WB 2014, website⁸²) and supports contributory pension schemes, but emphasizes a multi-pillar approach. The WB is generally supportive of the idea that privately managed pension schemes should also be included, in which much of the responsibility for amassing a pension pot is placed on the individual.

The Global Union representatives always have been very critical of the approach of the Bank even though the Bank has become more flexible in the last decade. At the technical meeting on pensions in 2003 the WB agreed to consult more frequently with trade unions concerning pension reforms and that the involvement of social partners in reform processes have to be on the top of the agenda (World Bank, 2003c). During the interim meeting in 2007 trade unionists pointed out that many workers do not have access to pensions at all (World Bank, 2007c). In 2010 the Global Unions and the IFIs held a one and a half day in-depth technical meeting on pension reforms. However, the director of the ITUC/Global Unions office in Washington reported that his office had only been contacted once concerning pension reform and stated that consultations with trade unions at the national level have been ‘inconsistent’ (World Bank, 2010b: 2). The sector director of the WB’s Social Protection & Labour unit considered the meetings with trade unions as a ‘...very fruitful and important exchange’ and saw many areas of agreement.

One positive change for ITUC/Global Unions staff is that the new director of the SP&L unit which took over in 2011 has a more positive attitude towards trade unions than that of the former director. This case demonstrates again that the dialogue depends strongly on the behaviour of individuals. However, the director of the ITUC/Global Unions office in Washington still has many concerns, amongst others things, the high administrative fees associated with private pension funds. The ITUC has asked the Bank for a formal directive to make sure that trade unions are regularly consulted on pension reforms with regard to their design and implementation (Ibid., 2010c).

Universal health coverage and education are, according to the current WB president, strategic priorities across the World Bank Group (Kim, 2014). The WB considers both health care and education as fundamental to development, growth and poverty reduction. However, health care and education do not play a major role in the headquarters-level dialogue

⁸²WB Pensions Overview <<http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/pensions/overview>>

even though these are important issues with regard to public services.

The GUF Education International (EI) represents education employees worldwide and works alongside other civil society organizations to follow up developments in the education sector around the globe. One of its main objectives is the promotion of public education which is free and accessible for everybody. In the view of the EI education is a human right and it is a public good which has to be protected from privatization and commercialisation (EI, 2012). This view is in contrast to the advice and measures promoted by the World Bank Group and the IMF.

The WB Group for example is involved in a number of national education sector reforms across the world and since 2001 the IFC has financed private projects in the education sector. Such private projects have been increasingly promoted by the IFC in recent years (Bretton Woods Project, 2014b). In effect the IFC is supporting the ‘... growing role of the private sector in education’ something which was acknowledged by the WB and the IFC in their 2011 document ‘Education Strategy 2020’ (World Bank, 2011c: 3). At the same time the IMF, in the context of its lending programmes, promotes a reduction in public spending which often affects the education sector in a negative way (Rowden, 2001). The cutback in public spending and the promotion of private sector engagement often leads to more inequality and less opportunities for poor people.

5.3.2.3 Loan conditionality

The WB and the IMF attach different conditions to their loans and grants which often include economic policy reforms. Borrowing countries have to comply with conditions such as privatization, trade liberalisation, public sector reforms and labour market reforms to receive funding. Studies from Eurodad and ActionAid have shown negative impacts on workers and populations in general. For example, a study from ActionAid (2012) examined the impact which a several million IMF loan had on Kenya’s development. ActionAid came to the conclusion that even though poverty reduction is one of the performance criteria of the programme ‘... there are no direct programs, targets or outcomes (relating to poverty reduction) that have been embedded in the program design’ (ActionAid, 2012: 4).

Both the WB and the IMF revised their conditionality guidelines several times in an attempt to reduce the number of conditions attached to their loans. According to a WB representative of the External Affairs department ‘... the Bank numerically and in quality has reduced its conditions substantially’ (Interview WB01, 2008). The former director of

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the WB SP&L unit confirmed this reduction and explained that these changes happened on the basis of the Bank's '... own thinking and experiences' (Interview WB02, 2008). In his view WB conditions are only useful when a government leads the change process itself '... without pressure' (Ibid., 2008). The latter is difficult to achieve because many governments have reservations about conditions in sensitive economic policy areas, but often they do not have a choice. This statement makes two things clear: firstly, WB staff have internalised the existence of the WB's role as development agency and therewith related (relatively new) concepts such as 'ownership' of the governance of loan programmes. Secondly, some staff understand the meaning of these concepts only in terms of the acknowledged organizational paradigm, which is still based on neoliberal economic policies.

With regard to the IMF the concept of ownership is also questionable. The IMF usually only has five or six people who deal with IMF loans programmes to national governments. Much then depends on the opinion of these 'technocrats' to what extent conditions attached to a programme are actually implemented. Even though the implementation of conditionality does not necessarily mean that '... it will be sustained' (Interview IMF02, 2008), it is of critical importance that only a small group of people are normally involved in major economic decisions. An example is the former Portuguese finance minister who was solely responsible for the implementation of a tough austerity programme in his country. His commitment and engagement with the principles of neo-liberalism, the Troika lending programme and its conditions were so strong that he was considered by many people as the 'fourth member of the troika' (Bretton Woods Project, 2014c: 1). After his resignation in the summer of 2013 he was appointed as director of the fiscal affairs department of the IMF in 2014 (Ibid., 2014b). On the one hand this could be seen as an example of recruiting staff who are truly dedicated to the IMF's organizational principles, allowing the IMF to nurture and maintain the predominant organizational mindset. On the other hand it could be seen as protecting the interests of unpopular politicians who have remained loyal to IMF principles. Regards the latter a former senior official of the World Bank stated that:

In former times you could get rid of unwanted politicians by giving them a job in a state-owned electricity company or something similar, but this is now more difficult because of privatization. Nowadays you have to dispose of them in a different way. One way of disposal is to give them a job in an international organization (Interview WB02, 2008).

With the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008 some governments (WB shareholders) started to raise the issue of conditionality and argued that a further reduction of conditions was necessary (Interview WB01, 2008). In retrospect this seems to have had little

effect as there have been no major changes. The IMF also started to reduce its structural conditions, but new research from Eurodad suggests that ‘... the IMF is going backwards’ (Bretton Woods Project, 2014a: 1). The managing director of the IMF Christine Lagarde made a press briefing during the IFIs spring meeting 2014 which negated the existence of structural adjustment conditions as part of IMF lending policy.

We provide lending, and, by the way, structural adjustments? That was before my time. I have no idea what it is. We do not do that anymore. No, seriously, you have to realize that we have changed the way in which we offer our financial support. It is really on the basis of a partnership. There is always in partnership a bit of hardship to go with it. If the Fund is called upon to help, it is that the country feels that it cannot decide certain things on its own. It needs backup support, financing to make sure that it has access to enough funding to finance itself (IMF, 2014).

However, according to Eurodad since 2008 the number of conditions per IMF loan has increased notably. In the period 2011–2013 the conditions required by the IMF included several sensitive economic policy areas such as public sector wages (freezes or reductions), welfare programmes (e.g. cutbacks in pensions), the reduction of trade union rights and the privatization of public enterprises (Bretton Woods Project, 2014a).

One official at the IMF gave the impression that the IMF does not necessarily concern itself too much with the real outcomes of its required conditions (policies) at the national level. The representative of the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the IMF commented on the problem of evaluating achievements of conditionality. He stated that a better evaluation approach would be ‘... evaluating by results and not by goals’ (Interview IMF02, 2008).

What is not specified is: What are you trying to achieve? What are the steps that you think will lead you there? And then monitor whether those steps are taken and they lead to where you want to go. That is what is missing. The most important thing is the result on the ground. A friend of mine always said that “if you don’t know where you want to go, you never get lost”. So you go to a country, you suggest to do 10 good things, and then some of those things are done, others are not done. Those that are done some have good results, others don’t have so good results, and at the same time in the country some good things are happening. You can always say “well, this is what I achieved” (...). And if you don’t specify what you want to achieve then you can take credit for all the good that came out (Interview IMF02, 2008).

5.3 *A decade of joint dialogue – Expectations and results achieved*

Both the WB and the IMF regularly express their concerns with growing inequality and poverty reduction, but their own labour market policies and respective conditions attached to loans often require adherence to neoliberal policies which often result in a worse levels of inequality in the countries concerned. In March 2014 the director of the Global Unions/ITUC office in Washington expressed⁸³ his concerns about the impact of IMF conditionality and stated that there is ‘... a serious disconnect between words and action’ at the IMF (Bakvis, 2014b).

In its statement to the 2014 Spring Meetings of the IMF and World Bank the Global Unions called for a ‘... review and major changes in the Fund’s labour market policies’ (Global Unions, 2014: 1). They again criticized IMF and WB rhetorics and stressed that the negative consequences of inequality are simply not being reflected in IMF and WB development programmes and their policy advice at country level.

Concerning labour conditions, the IMF’s advice and loan conditionality have ranged from reducing or freezing minimum wages, relaxing dismissal procedures, reducing severance pay, and weakening collective bargaining arrangements. In contrast to rhetoric about “protecting workers, not jobs”, measure to limit and reduce benefits for the unemployed have taken place simultaneously with changes making it easier and cheaper to dismiss workers (Global Unions, 2014: 4).

The Global Union’s criticism can be related to the IMF’s goal driven evaluation mechanism mentioned by the IMF IEO representative above. The Global Unions could go further in requiring a change of rhetoric by demanding the definition of specific goals and goal related achievements in particular countries. The problem is, however, that the capacity of national trade unions to follow the reforms and to respond immediately to national stakeholders implementing those reforms is limited.

Many conditions concerning public sector reforms and labour market reforms have negative impacts on workers and their families. For that reason the Global Unions regularly raise the issue of conditionality within high-level meetings and in their statements to the IFIs meetings in spring and autumn. Nevertheless, so far, the Global Unions along with other civil society organizations, who also raise these issues, have not managed to change the policies and actions of the IFIs. It can be argued that the constant challenging of the IFIs regards the negative impacts of their conditions as well as the many case studies conducted by different civil society organizations to support their arguments, have raised the

⁸³The statement was made on a panel organized by the Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND), Eurodad, Oxfam and the ITUC.

awareness of both the WB and the IMF regards the issue of conditionality. However, the pressure to change the policies of these organizations must be built up by trade unions and civil society organizations on the ground and then applied to national governments. This is because national governments which as shareholders of the IFIs are responsible for agreeing or not agreeing to conditions attached to loans and for their implementation. As members of the IFIs they are also able to demand or initiate changes within the IFIs themselves.

5.3.2.4 International financial architecture and global governance

International financial markets have become an increasingly important issue for the Global Unions and their members. Although this is not a new topic on the agenda for high-level meetings, since 2008 it took on a new level of intensity than ever before. Financial volatility affects workers deeply as it has an impact on jobs, earnings and protection measures.

Since the early years of the dialogue the Global Union representatives demanded regulation of hedge funds and private equity firms and control of unregulated speculation (World Bank, 2006). The impact of the international financial crisis which had dire consequences for hundreds of thousands of workers worldwide across all economic sectors turned the warnings and earlier theoretical forecasts of the international trade union movement into stark reality.

One result of the crisis has been that the international trade union movement has started to place more attention on the activities of the IFIs and other international institutions like the G20. The Global Union Federation for the hotel, food, restaurant, catering and agricultural workers, the IUF, for example demanded that the World Bank and the IMF must start to ‘...act as the market’s regulators’ (Oswald, 2009: 13). From the point of view of the IUF a sustainable global economy is needed and the World Bank and the IMF may provide the basis for its creation if they take up a regulatory function (Ibid., 2009). However, when one considers the latest policy recommendations of the IMF and the on-going annual publication of the ‘Doing Business’ rankings by the WBG, the IFIs are far away from taking a regulatory approach. According to the IUF lobbying the IMF and the ‘...periodic conclaves of governments’ is not helpful in building a new financial architecture (Oswald, 2009: 12). In the context of the on-going deregulatory policies promoted by the IMF, the influence of the international trade union movement and other civil society organizations on IMF policies seems to be quite limited. This suggests that

some kind of intervention on behalf of global civil society would be required to change the status quo (Chapple, 2013).

5.4 The factors which promote and obstruct the dialogue

In the following section the thesis analyses the headquarters-level dialogue between the Global Unions and the IFIs and considers the factors which help to promote the dialogue and those factors which obstruct its effective operation. The analysis of the dialogue includes individual perspectives regards the dialogue from staff from the Global Unions and the IFIs as well as joint positions which are reflected in written documents such as statements and minutes. The thesis aims to provide insights into the way in which the dialogue has been promoted by individual actors and organizations. The analysis in earlier sections of the thesis has illustrated that the dialogue between the IFIs and the Global Unions is very particular in its nature. As a consequence the results of this study cannot be generalised with regard to other forms of dialogue such as social dialogue at the European level for example.

The preliminary hypotheses and research questions introduced in chapter 2 are the starting point for the analysis. The hypotheses and research questions refer to both the individual and the collective level. However, it should be made clear that the answers to the research questions do not always provide a clear separation between the individual and collective levels as both levels are interrelated in practice.

5.4.1 Hypothesis (I): Individual actors and communication processes within the dialogue – Attitudes and perceptions

The attitudes, opinions and perceptions of individual actors influence whether or not cooperation takes place with other actors and the way in which cooperation and communication is conducted within the dialogue.

An attitude is a predisposition of an individual actor to respond in a particular way to other individual actors and their ideas, or events. For example individual actors may have positive or negative attitudes towards the high-level meetings. Attitudes are a driving-force

for behaviour and as such they ‘... guide the form and manner of behaviour into particular channels, encouraging some actions and deterring others’ (Oskamp and Schultz, 2014: 8). Attitudes are related to individual beliefs; individual actors can have different beliefs with regard to the same object, which in this case is the dialogue between the Global Unions and the IFIs. Within the organizational context individual attitudes may also be shaped and restrained by organizational rules and guidelines.

As individual attitudes are constructed by individual actors and are not behaviour per se they cannot be directly observed. In constructing their attitudes individual actors draw on a large database of information which includes for example their understanding of the issues in question, their past behaviours, experiences, and moods. Furthermore, the broader context and the interview context in which the questions are asked can also have an influence on the construction process (Ibid., 2014). In the following sections individual attitudes are understood as individual positions and feelings with regard to the dialogue and its participants which have been verbally expressed. Opinions are closely related to attitudes of liking and disliking and can be seen to represent a value judgement about an object (Ibid., 2014). As attitudes and opinions are often indistinguishable the author uses both terms in a synonymous way.

In contrast to attitudes and opinions which are based on established individual beliefs, individual perceptions refer to the processes of gathering, organizing and interpreting social information. In fact, perceptions are one of the cognitive components on which individual attitudes are based. There are perception processes such as selective perception or stereotyping which individual actors use in order to simplify interactions with others. These processes and other issues related to the interpretation of information are evaluated in more detail in the context of the second research question.

The following three research questions are related to the first hypothesis. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that communication processes are influenced by individual attitudes and opinions which, in turn, are partly shaped by the experiences individual actors have already had in the dialogue. The author assumes that positive attitudes contribute to the further enhancement of mutual communication. It is furthermore assumed that positive individual attitudes can be related to the change of individual perceptions towards more positive ones, in terms of openness for example, and vice versa. Positive perceptions might help to build relationships which are based on trust.

In this context it should also be noted that trusting relationships are more likely to develop in an informal context. With regard to the dialogue this means a context outside the institutionalized dialogue structure. The director of the ITUC/Global Unions office in

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Washington for example stressed the progress made outside of formal dialogue structures regards the issue of HIV/Aids. Staff of the WB was very supportive of trade union concerns and both sides discovered ‘... a lot of commonalities’ and possibilities for further joint work in that area (Interview ITUC02, 2008). However, as already mentioned earlier, informal structures and cooperation are very difficult to investigate for the researcher on the outside. For this reason informal structures are not taken into account in the following questions.

- *What opinions and attitudes do individual actors in the participating organizations have towards the dialogue? In what ways do attitudes influence communication within the dialogue?*

In relation to the headquarters-level dialogue most communication and information is channelled through specific organizational departments and processed by individual actors. For the Global Unions the ITUC/Global Unions office in Washington and the ITUC office in Brussels play a major role in the dialogue. The work of the ITUC is supported by the GUFs, although some GUFs are more heavily involved in the dialogue than others. The degree of involvement depends to a great extent on organizational resources and the priorities of particular GUFs. For example within the GUF formerly known as ICEM (it is now part of IndustriALL) the dialogue was not a priority for the organization, this is despite the fact that the then general secretary stated that the dialogue with the WB and the IFC at sectoral level would be of potential interest to the organization. He also stated that ICEM would like to be informed and consulted regarding projects initiated or implemented by the WB and the IFC which concern employees in the sector that ICEM represents (Interview ICEM, 2008). There are also other small GUFs such as the IFJ which have comparatively few resources which means that the organization can only focus on very specific issues concerning journalists on a worldwide basis.

Whilst the staff of the ITUC/Global Unions office in Washington largely focus on the relationship with the IFIs and their policies, within the GUFs the dialogue with the IFIs is only one issue among many others that the organizations have to deal. In that sense the dialogue is not the only priority for the GUFs.

As far as the IFIs are concerned both the WBG and the IMF coordinate their relationship with the Global Unions through their external affairs offices. The trade unions are seen as just one group of stakeholders in what the IFIs see as broader ‘civil society’ and they are dealt with by individual actors in the IFIs who are considered to be experts in their respective fields. However, in contrast to the IMF, the WB and the IFC have in addition to the

external relations department several other departments which are involved in the dialogue with trade unions. Through these additional departments, a greater number of individual actors with different organizational responsibilities become involved in the dialogue at the WB and the IFC and they work on a number of issues which are relevant for the sector and cross-sector level.

The interviews with both the Global Unions and the IFIs suggested that there is a wide agreement between the different actors involved that the dialogue on all its different levels is essential and important. However, these “positive” opinions about the importance of the dialogue are not necessarily reflected in positive individual behaviour and action regards the dialogue. The following section presents some of the opinions and attitudes of the Global Union and IFI representatives with regard to the dialogue which will be reflected with regard to communication processes.

First, the thesis will consider some of the aspects of the arguments put forward by individual actors from the different organizations in terms of how they see the importance of the dialogue.

For the ITUC, the importance of the dialogue with the IFIs is conditioned by its perspective of the dialogue as a ‘strategic instrument’ which is aimed at achieving a change in the IFIs policies. According to the director of the ITUC/Global Unions office the Global Unions engage in the dialogue with ‘... very specific objectives of changing policy’ and not ‘... for the purpose of simply discussing each other’s point of view’ (Interview ITUC02, 2008). The objective of achieving change with regard to IFI policies has been consistently shared by those representatives of the GUFs whose organizations are more actively involved in the dialogue. The interviews revealed several factors which are closely related to the achievement of organizational change within the IFIs, some of which can be actively influenced by trade unions and their members whilst others cannot.

One factor which is considered to be important for the trade unions involved in the dialogue is *time*. It is widely acknowledged that a change of policy within the IFIs cannot be achieved in the short-term. However, according to a senior adviser of the EI the dialogue ‘... will bring changes in the long term’ (Interview EI, 2008). Time is also influential in respect of the different phases through of the dialogue. There are times when progress is made and other times ‘... when things move more slowly’ (Interview ITUC01, 2008).

A second factor which the trade unions consider as relevant with regard to the achievement of change is the *persistence* of their demands. Independently from the immediate feedback that trade unions receive from IFI staff and from the output they achieve in the short- and

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medium-term, it is also important for the unions to have a constant voice and presence. A constant presence for the trade unions and their members, their active engagement in following up on the policy developments of the IFIs and their attempts to have their voices heard within the high-level meetings with the IFIs, gives the clear message to the WB and the IMF, they are there and cannot be ignored, as a PSI representative put it, ‘...look we are here, you’ve got to talk to us’ (Interview PSI, 2008). While the unions have little influence over the time required to make changes in IFI policies, the persistence of unions can have an effective influence. The strength of such influence is connected to the persistence of individual actors and also depends on both collective and individual resources. The former include the resources trade unions have available to promote certain issues and the priorities which have been set through the unions’ corporate democratic decision-making processes. On the individual level, an important factor is the positive individual attitude towards the dialogue and the ability to deal with the setbacks resulting from bilateral communication with IFI staff.

A third factor which plays into the promotion of organizational change and which has been mentioned by trade unionists is *leadership* within the IFIs (Interview IG Metall, 2008). Leadership is connected to the attitudes of specific individuals and the political will to initiate and promote change. Due to the fact that the presidency of the WB is only for a five year period under normal circumstances, it can be argued that the space the WB offers for “reformers” and their ideas is to some extent cyclically shaped and dependent on the attitude of the president. Thus, a president who is more open to the idea of organizational reforms and to trade union concerns creates a window of opportunity for the Global Unions in the sense that their concerns and proposals are more likely to be heard.

Leadership in the IFIs cannot be directly influenced by trade unionists. However, trade union leaders can adapt and develop strategies to deal with different personalities at the highest organizational level in these organizations. These strategies have arguably been quite successful since the dialogue began, with the result that the trade unions are recognised as important partners in the dialogue. The General Secretary of the ITUC is well respected within the IFIs because he is seen to have legitimacy (Interview WB01, 2008). When the interviews were conducted a former Executive Director of the WB described the then General Secretary of the ITUC as ‘...one of the most clever guys’ he has known in terms of presenting arguments regarding global political problems (Interview WB05, 2009). On the basis of this kind of mutual recognition the high-level meetings between the leadership of the Global Unions and the IFIs can help to shape the attitudes of organizational leaders and to initiate change processes.

Apart from the importance of the nature of the dialogue itself and the objective of achieving change in the IFIs policies, the headquarters level dialogue is also seen by some trade unionists as a relevant and important ‘...pattern for others’ (Interview ITGLWF, 2009). One example which emerged in the interviews was the introduction of the CLS in the performance standards within the IFC, which goes back to the strike action and labour law infringements at the beginning of 2000 involving the company Grupo M which operates in the Haitian textile sector. The IFC had learned about the incidents which had taken place within the company from the ITGLWF⁸⁴. The IFC then put considerable pressure on the company, which led to an improvement in the respect of labour standards within the company and also to the introduction of the core labour standards in the IFC performance standards in 2006. From that point onwards the core labour standards applied to all companies across all sectors which applied for a loan from the IFC.

There are several arguments made by trade unionists for what they see as the importance of the dialogue with the IFIs, but the achievement of change with regard to IFIs policies is undoubtedly ranked in first place. In the following section the thesis presents some of the perceptions of IFI representatives regards the dialogue.

Representatives of the IFIs also see the the dialogue with the Global Unions as important, though for them it is not about achieving change. For the IFIs the dialogue is primarily about legitimizing their own policies with civil society in general and trade unions as important stakeholders of global civil society in particular. In this context a senior communication officer from the WB’s civil society team pointed out that the dialogue with trade unions is ‘...very important’ to the Bank because ‘...trade unions are a key constituency within civil society’ (Interview WB01, 2008). In his opinion trade unions differ from other civil society organizations because they have a large membership and democratic procedures which gives them considerable legitimacy. In the past this legitimacy was questioned by WB staff, but this is not an issue anymore. Furthermore, the WB accepts that the recognition of organizational legitimacy and different organizational roles is a precondition for a respectful dialogue (Ibid., 2008). The participation of the WB in the dialogue with trade unions, however, is not only driven by the recognition of their legitimacy, but also by issues where WB staff identified points of intersection. According to the senior communication officer the Bank is concerned with many issues which concern workers and is active in different industrial sectors, it also for this reason that the Bank attaches particular importance to the ‘...policy dialogue’ with trade unions (Ibid., 2008).

⁸⁴The ITGLWF did not approach the IFC directly but through the ITUC/Global Unions office in Washington.

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The deputy chief of public affairs at the IMF also suggested that the dialogue with the unions was increasingly important in view of the current level of serious economic challenges worldwide (Interview IMF01, 2008). Since the beginning of the dialogue the number of consultations at the national level between IMF country teams and trade unions has constantly increased (World Bank, 2007b). This would seem to reinforce the statement by the IMF deputy chief of public affairs that the dialogue with trade unions is taken ‘seriously’ at the IMF. During the high-level meetings in 2013 the managing director of the IMF Christine Lagarde ‘... expressed her appreciation to the ITUC for the dialogue’ and the commitment of the IMF to the ‘Jobs and Growth’ agenda and confirmed the willingness of the organization ‘... to listen, engage in dialogue and change its views’ (World Bank, 2013b: 4–5).

Statements from individual actors all stress the importance of the dialogue. Although these are based on different grounds and related to different organizational objectives, there are also some points of intersection which are related to the nature of the dialogue itself. First there is the notion of ‘... mutual understanding’. By developing ‘mutual understanding’ individual actors refer to the broadening of their knowledge around the way the organizations of the interlocutors work, the policies these organizations promote and the organizational positions the interlocutors represent (Interview WB01, 2008; Interview IMF01, 2008; Interview ITF, 2008; Interview ITGLWF, 2009). In the opinion of the senior communications officer from the WB’s civil society team, mutual understanding can lead to a greater acceptance of each other’s roles amongst the dialogue partners and to the definition of a common ground.

Now I think we accept, we understand the role of trade unions and we understand that they have their positions. I personally think that there is much more common ground then we even think there is today (Interview WB01, 2008).

Mutual understanding can improve the relationship between staff of the different organizations. However, trade unionists also stated that another important aspect of mutual understanding is the way in which it helps the actors to understand how organizations (here the IFIs) function. This is important for staff from the ITF because it enables the staff from this GUF to explain to its affiliates how the IFIs function. Even though national affiliates are only partly involved in high-level meetings or technical meetings, the understanding of the functioning of the IFIs can be important for their work at the national level. Training and capacity building for ITF affiliates with regard to the policies of the IFIs and their organizational functioning enables them to deal more effectively with governments and

employers with regard to issues where the IFIs operate behind the scenes (Interview ITF, 2008).

The widely acknowledged importance of the dialogue among representatives of the Global Unions and the IFIs, however, is also accompanied by more critical voices which in particular question the outcomes of the high-level meetings. The BWI's director of health and safety, for example, described the high-level meetings as '...extremely weak'. In her opinion they are weak because there is a lack of a clear focus and because the trade union delegations sent to such meetings are not adequate (Interview BWI, 2009). This point of view is based on her own personal experience when on secondment in the WB's procurement department. This secondment played an important role in integrating the CLS in the WB's SBDW. From the point of view of the BWI director of health and safety this integration which is described in more detail in chapter 4.1.1.2 was the result of a tightly focused determination to achieve a specific objective and supported by '...considerable technical expertise', which was provided by the BWI (Ibid., 2009). The unfocused nature of the headquarters-level dialogue and the high-level meetings in particular has also been stressed by a representative from the ITGLWF.

We need to focus a bit more clearly on some of the key issues. If you look at the two days here [high-level meetings 2009] there is a wide range of issues. I understand that different people have different interests, but they almost appear to be lacking any focus on labour standards (Interview ITGLWF, 2009).

The outcome of the headquarters-level dialogue has also been questioned by an international officer from the former International Metal Workers Federation (now part of IndustriALL). In her opinion the international trade union movement has not been able to gain a significant influence over the policies of the IFIs (Interview IMF, 2008). During the interview she stressed the problem of the lack of '...consultation rights' on the side of the Global Unions. However, this problem appears to have been addressed in the updated framework for the dialogue between the Global Unions and the IFIs from 2013. The new framework which has been signed by the IFIs and the Global Unions acknowledges that it is important for the IFIs to consult with trade unions on labour-related issues in on-going projects and with regard to new planned projects. However, it is too early to judge the real impact of this framework on the dialogue.

With regard to the impact of individual attitudes on communication processes within the dialogue it can be argued that there is not always a direct correlation between individual attitudes and communication, particularly with regard to long-term communication. This

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means that positive individual attitudes do not necessarily lead to better communication and negative individual attitudes do not necessarily deteriorate communication between individual actors on the long term either. Regards the WB for example, a former Executive Director stated that there has been a general ‘... openness towards trade unions which is not tactical but serious’ (Interview WB05, 2009). However, this general organizational openness which has been translated into more individual willingness to communicate with trade unions, does not for example sufficiently promote labour markets as cross-departmental issues (Ibid., 2009). Communication on this issue seems to be mainly limited to the SP&L unit and its staff. At the SP&L unit the former director showed a very positive attitude towards the dialogue during the interview, arguing that in his opinion the WB has a ‘... very productive dialogue with trade unions and that generally speaking the dialogue with the trade unions is one of the best structured dialogues the WB has with civil society organizations (Interview WB02, 2008). His positive attitude, however, does not often appear to be translated into positive action and the promotion of communication within the dialogue. In fact the opposite was the case until 2011, according to union officials in the Washington office, the former director of the SP&L unit often complicated the exchange of information and delayed responses to requests from trade unionists.

The director from the ITUC/Global Unions office in Washington for example described him as rather ‘unhelpful’ and appear to be, ‘...opposed to trade unions’ (Interview ITUC01, 2008). In his opinion individual actors at the IFIs which have leading positions are quite able ‘... to make things difficult’ for trade unions, even though they are not able to stop the communication processes entirely (Ibid., 2008). Another example in this context is the current leadership of the IMF under its managing director Christine Lagarde who has not been very supportive with regard to trade union demands. Despite the positive sounding rhetoric of the IMF with regard to the dialogue with trade unions (World Bank, 2013b), since 2011 the quality of the dialogue at headquarters and country-level with the IMF has diminished. This is because IMF staff have particularly with reference to Europe ‘...reverted to an attitude where it sees labour market rules and institutions essentially as obstacles’ (Email ITUC02, 2014). Even though this generally prevalent opinion towards the function of labour market institutions among a great number of IMF staff might influence communication with trade unions in a more negative way, it should also be noted that some IMF staff share the same opinion as the ITUC and other trade unions that the current IMF approach needs to change.

On the Global Unions side, the negative attitudes of individual actors are often unrelated to the dialogue with the IFIs as such, but to its achieved outcome and the behaviour of

some IFI staff. However, these negative attitudes do not necessarily impact on the effort to maintain communication with IFI staff and to convince them of the trade union perspective, as the example of the BWI has shown above. It can be argued that the strong objective focused approach of the Global Unions, which is aimed at achieving a change in IFIs policies and reducing the negative impacts of IFI policies on workers, is the reason that the attitudes of individual actors do not impact negatively on communication processes within the dialogue. Insofar as the Global Unions are concerned individual actors apply an “open door” approach which gives more importance to signalling a readiness to talk and to further promote communication in order to achieve the organizational objectives, rather than giving significance to individual attitudes.

The opposite is the case with regard to the IFIs. The IFIs less precise approach towards the dialogue and the lack of clear organizational objectives mean that the attitudes of individual actors can have a greater influence on communication within the dialogue. It can be argued that the absence of an overarching organizational goal at the IFIs regards the dialogue is one of the main factors which promotes decoupling between individual rhetoric and the actions of individuals in terms of communication in the IFIs. Another factor which is quite influential in this respect is the organizational structure. In a decentralized organization like the WB, which has several power centres, decoupling can happen at different organizational levels and staff have to some extent the opportunity to develop their own way of interacting with trade unions. In a centralized organization like the IMF decoupling is mainly constrained to the highest organizational management level as the only power centre. This means that staff at lower levels have less or even no leeway to act outside the framework marked by the organizational objectives and mission and little opportunity to find acceptance for individual opinions which are not in line with these objectives.

Finally, after presenting and analysing a number of individual opinions and attitudes regarding the dialogue and their impact on communication within the dialogue, the author concludes that hypothesis (I) could be amended by taking into account the influence of organizational objectives connected with the dialogue and with regard to the attitudes of individual actors in the respective organizations. For example the Global Unions and their representatives pursue clear objectives regards the dialogue, with the effect that attitudes of individual actors are less relevant in terms of communication. In this sense the author’s original assumption regarding the relationship between attitudes and communication is incorrect.

– *How do individual actors perceive each other? Which factors influence perception?*

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Actor's perceptions within the dialogue are important because they describe the process by which individual actors interpret information provided in certain situations and how they perceive other individual actors. Furthermore, perception guides and determines behaviour (Wilson and Rees, 2007), which suggests perceptions determine the way individual actors behave within the dialogue. The individual perception process is linked to several dimensions within the context of organizational characteristics such as organizational culture and identity and organizational learning. The interpretation of information is highly subjective, often unconscious and related to personal experiences, beliefs, knowledge and attitudes. In addition, the limited cognitive ability of individual actors and individual and organizational goals can to some extent limit the perception process, for example leading to selective processing of information or stereotyping (Heijden, 1992). Selective perception describes the process of categorizing and interpreting information in a way that favours one specific interpretation over another. As a result individual actors tend to selectively perceive information in ways that are congruent with their own goals, values, attitudes and beliefs and tend to scrutinize information which is not in accordance with their beliefs (Sullivan, 2009). Stereotyping describes assumption making and judgements by individual actors about other actors based on generalizations about the groups to which they belong (Wilson and Rees, 2007). Both selective perception and stereotyping can be an obstacle to the dialogue process and make communication more difficult.

Perceptions of individual actors and their attitudes are related to each other. Perception processes form the cognitive basis of attitudes, and as such they determine the formation of attitudes and opinions as well as changes in this regard during the course of time (Oskamp and Schultz, 2014). For example, positive perceptions can have a favourable influence on attitudes of individual actors which could then result in a more positive conduct towards the dialogue partners. In the following section, the thesis will examine a number of factors which influence the perception process of individual actors participating in the dialogue. In this context the thesis will provide some examples where the outcome of the interpretation process is articulated in different forms of perceptions and, in some situations leading to errors in judgement based on stereotyping and selective perception. Factors which influence the process by which information is interpreted can be separated into factors relating to the individual actors themselves and factors relating to organizational characteristics, in which the latter is to some extent reflected in the attitudes of individual actors.

An important factor which influences individual perception is related to organizational characteristics and the organizational context in which individual actors are embedded. All

IFI representatives who were interviewed perceive the Global Unions as large and democratic membership organizations (Interview WB01, 2008; Interview IMF01, 2008). They relate these organizational characteristics with a broader legitimacy related to trade unions in general and perceive the organizations as representing ‘... people with a strong interest in the economy, economic policy and economic outcomes’ (Interview IMF01, 2008). As a result, these IFI representatives, at least in terms of their rhetoric, are supportive of the dialogue at all its different levels including the national level where the ‘... voices of trade unions’ are ‘... essential in the country’s economic dialogue’ (Ibid., 2008).

Apart from the perception of trade unions as legitimate actors at the national, regional and global level, interviewees from the IFIs perceive that IFI staff and Global Union representatives draw on different uses of economics. From the point of view of a WB senior communication officer, WB staff have a different approach regards the use of economics than trade unions. At the WB there is more emphasis and use of economics as ‘... theoretical research’, even though there is a practical component at the country level where it is often used for policy advice. From his point of view trade unionists generally have ‘... more of a practical approach’ even though they undertake research activities in terms of economic forecasts (Interview WB01, 2008). The former director of the WB’s SP&L unit described the approach used by the WB as ‘evidence based’, in other words, the foundations of all WB programmes are based on strong empirical evidence (Interview WB02, 2008).

The fact that IFI staff assume that the unions adopt a more “practical” approach can be seen as a kind of stereotyping. IFI staff often assume that all trade union organizations follow a more practical approach because they mainly see their activities at the national level, above all their activities around collective bargaining. Many staff are not aware that trade unions also do extensive theoretical research and forecasts through joint organizations such as TUAC and the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI). During the high-level meeting in 2009, for example, the General Secretary of TUAC already warned IFI members about the dramatic increase of the unemployment level in Europe in the same year (Minutes high-level meetings, 2009). At this point in time the IMF was still not focusing on the employment issue.

In addition to these international research institutes, some of the larger trade union organizations at the national and international level also have the capacity and resources available to do research. Stereotyping by IFI staff in this regard often results in a devaluation of the knowledge of trade unions. In the opinion of the WB’s communication officer, WB staff sometimes, ‘... don’t understand the value or rather don’t value enough this practitioner perspective within the economy’ (Interview WB01, 2008). In practice this means that

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information and expertise provided by trade unions is often not awarded the same importance by IFI staff as information produced within their own organization. This was also clear in the statement of the former director of the WB's SP&L unit who considered it necessary to offer training to trade unionists so that they could get a better understanding of the WB's economic approach (Interview WB02, 2008). This in turn might to some extent also explain their limited efforts in consulting with trade unions.

The perceptions of IFI staff regarding the information provided by trade unionists changed slightly during the international financial crisis, since then information provided by the trade unions is treated more seriously. When unemployment figures dramatically increased the WBG and the IMF put job creation on the top of their agendas and even though the quality of the dialogue diminished after 2011, the exchange of information with trade unions did increase (Email ITUC02, 2014). This increase in the exchange of information can be ascribed to two factors.

Firstly, the IFIs and trade unions now had one important objective in common that of job creation. In this regard, the expertise of trade unions as well as their legitimacy became more important to the IFIs and stereotyping took a seatback. The lower quality of the dialogue, however, can be explained by the attitude of the IMF which as discussed earlier still sees labour market rules and institutions as obstacles to be overcome.

Secondly, the pressure to succeed with their financial support programmes increased on both the IMF and the WB. This, amongst others things, involved the search for more organizational legitimation by external actors, particularly because the crisis also exposed the limitations and organizational capacities of the IFIs. Limitations were revealed in the course of the crisis regarding both the capacity to forecast economic developments and the measures applied as a response to the crisis. Both the WB and the IMF failed to predict the economic recessions into which many countries have fallen (Harford, 2014). In addition the IMF has admitted that were a number of systematic errors in its forecasts which it published in its 'World Economic Outlook' in 2012 (IMF, 2012a). Furthermore, a report released in November 2014 by the independent evaluation office of the IMF (IEO) criticized fiscal austerity as a measure promoted by the IMF, stating that, '... The call for fiscal consolidation proved to be premature, ...' (IEO, 2014: 33).

The impact of these limitations and criticisms can be interpreted as a challenge for the IFIs in general and the IMF in particular, as they call into question its legitimacy as a reliable economic forecaster. This, in the longer term, could again question the extent of its ability to fulfil the mandate of efficiently preserving the stability of the international monetary system.

The perception process of staff in the Global Unions has also been driven by the organizational characteristics of the dialogue partner. In this respect, the neoliberal paradigm which the IFIs still follow has had a considerable impact on the perceptions of trade unionists. The perception that the IFIs are very much focused on a neoliberal vision and policies has not changed for trade unionists during the course of the dialogue. On the contrary, this perception has been reinforced by the international financial crisis and the programmes adopted by the IFIs in attempting to tackle the crisis both within and outside Europe (Interview ITUC02, 2008; Interview EI, 2008). The neoliberal paradigm has to a great extent continued to determine the policies of the IFIs. With regard to the common objective of job creation for example, the IFIs promote the deregulation of labour market institutions and employment protections at the national level with the objective of increasing wage and employment flexibility (World Bank, 2004).

Trade unionists however, have a very different perspective on the crisis and would prefer a different policy approach. They argue that a better implementation of labour standards, a rise in wages and productivity levels as well as a more balanced relationship between government and the economy are amongst other things, necessary to develop a new model of growth (ETUI, 2011). The different paradigms and economic approaches which IFI representatives and trade unionists follow often lead to selective perception amongst staff in the sense that these paradigms determine the interpretation of received information. Selective perception might explain trade unionists' underlying impression that IFI representatives do not perceive trade unions as '... a source of information, a source of knowledge about the kind of work they are carrying out' (Interview ITUC04, 2009). The impression of selective perception on the side of the IFIs is also emphasised by a statement of the director of the international department of the German IG Metall trade union. He stated that, at least at the beginning of the dialogue, trade unionists often felt as if they were being treated as 'economically illiterate', especially when for example they did not agree with the policies and measures applied by the IFIs. (Interview IG Metall, 2008).

The perception processes of some trade unionists have also been shaped by the experience of secondments at the WB. Trade unionists state that they found that the behaviour and attitudes of WB staff were quite hostile and felt that their arguments were not being taken seriously (Interview BWI, 2009; Interview PSI, 2008). These negative attitudes can again be related to an underlying selective perception of IFI staff. Another example which supports this argument is the experience of one representative from the BWI who spent several weeks at the WB procurement department in 2004 and worked on the incorporation of CLS within procurement contracts. She perceived WB staff as showing little flexibility

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and not being open to the views and arguments of her Global Union Federation. According to the BWI representative, staff of the WB's procurement department were looking for somebody '... who would just fit in nice and quietly' and '... not someone who is going to run around to trying to persuade everyone that the inclusion of labour clauses in standard bidding documents was a burning issue' (Interview BWI, 2009). In her experience, WB staff in this department had been quite reluctant to the secondment in the first place which at least at the beginning, made it very difficult for the BWI representative to get some attention and feedback on these issues. In particular the then director of the procurement department was '... very much opposed to trade union rights' (Interview Ibid., 2009). The perceived reluctance of WB staff has also been confirmed by a member of staff in the same department. According to this procurement officer the secondment had originally only been accepted because staff of the WB's procurement department had come under pressure from the trade unions. By accepting the secondment the WB hoped to remove this pressure but there was no intrinsic desire to consider any policy changes (Interview WB03, 2009).

Nevertheless, over time, the information provided by the BWI representative, was gradually taken more seriously by WB staff. As discussed above in the years following this secondment the BWI did achieve the incorporation of all four CLS in the WB's SBDW and the GUF also managed to extend its involvement in the area of procurement within the WB more generally (Ibid., 2009).

We have been able to kind of elbow our way in and make a little niche. This is not a formalized thing; it is entirely a grace and a favour arrangement by the Bank itself. Now we are beginning to be more involved. I think that we are beginning to be more recognized as having expertise. But it has been quite a long process actually (Interview BWI, 2009).

In the case of the BWI it can be argued that selective perception of WB staff framed by organizational objectives and goals had been overcome during the course of time. WB staff actually started to acknowledge the knowledge and expertise provided by the BWI with regard to the construction sector. This has been partly the result of the persistence of BWI staff and a changing perception process amongst WB staff.

Representatives from other GUFs, however, have not been that successful during their secondments. For example, a PSI representative who spent some time at the WB's public transport department felt as if he was treated, '...just as an extra office boy to do some photocopying for them' (Interview PSI, 2008). His complaint was taken seriously by the

then WB president, but it did not result in an improved relationship with the staff in that particular department. The complaint led to the establishment of a formal contact point between the PSI and the Bank which never worked in practice (Ibid., 2008). This example illustrates the strength of the existing organizational paradigm at the IFIs which appears to be rarely questioned by IFI staff.

(...) frequently you were meeting with people [*at the WB*] who were pretty true believers in what they were doing, who were prepared to know that sometimes things didn't work out exactly as they had intended, but still they felt that that was just a matter of tidying the policy up rather than ditching it and starting on a different basis (Interview PSI, 2008).

The so called “true believers” at the IFIs are even more likely to process new information selectively. This has implications for organizational learning in the medium and longer term in the sense that this form of processing information by individual actors can actually hinder or prevent the learning process.

In summary at this point it can be said that the interviews revealed different perceptions and perception processes among individual actors. It can be argued that individual perception is largely shaped by the paradigms and approaches of the organizations within which individual actors work. Due to the persistence of these paradigms and approaches which can also be seen as forming part of the organizational identity, it can be argued that individual perceptions are quite static, consequently making organizational learning often more difficult. An example in this regard is the WB's annual publication ‘Doing Business’ which has been widely criticized by trade unions because (as discussed earlier) it ranks countries on the basis of their ‘business-friendly’ environment, in effect promoting weaker employment protections and standards. It is interesting to note for example that the latest report which was published in October 2014, ignored all the recommended methodological changes made by the Independent Panel in June 2013 (Bakvis, 2014c).

However, experiences and knowledge gathered outside the organization by individual actors can also influence perceptions and the way that information is processed. Individual actors may be more open to new information provided by the dialogue partner and can help to reduce selective perception based on organizational assumptions which form part of the respective organizational culture. For both the Global Unions and the IFIs, there are individual actors who are quite open to new information. For example, in the view of a representative of the PSI some staff of the WB are ‘...quite receptive’ to some of the things trade unions are saying (Interview PSI, 2008). A representative from the ITUC

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stated that on some occasions some Bank staff have been very supportive to the ideas from trade unions and advised them on how to formulate papers around these issues so that they can commit other policy makers at the WB to change their minds (ITUC01, 2008).

Generally there seems to be a greater openness among staff of the WB and the IFC than at the IMF. This could be ascribed to the size and organizational structure of the organizations (the WB is much bigger and quite decentralized for example), the organizational culture and to the variety of educational backgrounds among staff members, particularly at the WB. These different educational backgrounds are partly translated into different ways of thinking within the framework of the dominant neoliberal paradigm of the WB. In this regard some staff of the WB can be considered as ‘hardliners’ who do not question the neoliberal paradigm and connected longstanding principles, and those who are more open to new ideas and approaches and might be considered as ‘reformers’ (Interview WB01, 2008).

The characteristics of the organizations to which the individual actors belong, can also shape the perception of the dialogue partners. In this regard, as it has been suggested earlier, staff at the IFIs see the trade union movement as having legitimacy. However, perceptions like this do not necessarily lead to more positive attitudes or actions of individual actors in relation to the dialogue partner. For example, despite the statements surrounding the legitimacy of trade unions amongst IFI staff members, there seems to be little initiative from this side regards the further development of the dialogue. It has always been representatives of the Global Unions who pushed for a stronger formal dialogue structure and the institutionalization of the dialogue. There has also been a stronger initiative on the side of the Global Unions regards the development and implementation of the secondment of trade unionists at the WB. As yet no secondments have taken place the other way around. It can be argued that in terms of the dialogue the broader organizational objectives and interests of of the Global Unions are much stronger than that of the IFIs and, are more influential with regard to shaping the the development of the dialogue than the perceptions of individual actors. In other words the hypothesis should be amended to include the influence of organizational characteristics, including organizational objectives and the organizational paradigm as part of the organizational culture with regard to perception.

– *How do individual actors evaluate the inter-organizational exchange of information with regard to the dialogue?*

The efficient exchange of information between the dialogue partners plays a significant role for the functioning of the dialogue at all levels. In this context efficiency is related

to the pace and frequency of the information exchange, the scope of information which is exchanged and the regularity of follow-ups on specific issues. The exchange of information is related to the perceptions and attitudes of individual actors and as already been shown these are determined by organizational characteristics and objectives.

The interviews revealed that the dialogue partners have different expectations with regards to information exchange. On the one hand there are well defined expectations on the side of the trade unionists, which are linked to their organizational objectives which are pursued through the dialogue. On the other hand expectations on the side of the IFI representatives are poorly defined or not defined at all. In the following sections the author examines some of these expectations and provides an evaluation of the fulfilment of these expectations from the point of view of the individual actors concerned. Due to the uneven spread of expectations among the dialogue partners, the answer to the question above is more strongly focused on the trade union perspective.

IFI representatives state that during the course of the dialogue, the headquarters-level dialogue has moved away from an ‘...ideological debate to a more constructive one’ (World Bank, 2006: 1–2). This new “constructiveness”, however, seems to be little related to a better provision of information from IFI staff to trade unionists. On the contrary, Global Union representatives regularly ask for more information about planned IFI projects and programmes which concern workers with enough time for them to process information and to take a position on the issue (Interview ITUC02, 2008). For that reason the constructiveness of the dialogue seems to be, as far as IFI staff are concerned, more related to the exchange of arguments during meetings than to the provision of information in between such meetings.

The exchange of information between the IFI and Global Union representatives is limited during the high-level meetings largely due to the nature of the meetings themselves. In a relatively short period of three days they discuss a broad range of topics. In order to facilitate a mutual understanding this kind of meeting is translated into five languages and trade unionists have an allocated speaking time of just three minutes (Minutes high-level meeting, 2009). The time pressure and the amount of different issues often only allow a verbal expression of individual opinions and organizational positions rather than a profound exchange of information. During the high-level meetings in 2009 for example, Phil Jennings from UNI claimed, amongst other things, that trade unions ‘...have to have a seat at the table’ (Ibid., 2009). The then president of the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) who is now the General Secretary of the ITUC, stated that the international financial crisis is a good starting point to promote a partnership with the ILO (Ibid., 2009).

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A senior adviser from the IMF responded to these statements by stating that the IMF strives for more international cooperation, even though this is difficult for the organization due to a lack of available resources (Ibid., 2009).

Another weakness which makes the exchange of information more difficult during the high-level meetings is the lack of knowledge-ability of the Executive Directors of the IFIs. In many cases the ED's are not well informed about the issue of labour standards in general and their introduction into WB's activities in particular (Ibid., 2009). The high-level meetings are also determined by time constraints which leave very little space for more in-depth discussion. Communication is based on "formal diplomatic" presentations by IFI staff and the exchange of facts and individual and organizational points of view without deeper interaction between the dialogue partners.

The technical meetings offer a better opportunity for information exchange. The number of participants is smaller and the dialogue is focused around one specific issue which allows more in-depth discussions between the dialogue partners. In 2009 for example, a two day technical meeting about gender questions took place with the WBs gender team in which the author took part. The meeting was the first time the Global Unions had had discussions on this subject with the WBs gender team. Its objective was to investigate and define some areas of cooperation between the dialogue partners in relation to this issue of gender. The meeting included an update on the implementation of the WBs gender action plan by WB economists and an update on women's advances in the trade union movement by several trade unionists from the ITUC and the Malaysian Trade Union Congress. Further presentations were held by researchers of the Rutgers University and the Institute for Women's Policy Research who presented findings related to the impact of labour market regulation on women workers. Other issues that were discussed were affirmative action and non-discrimination in WB infrastructure projects and IFC investments, adolescent's girls transition from school to work and gender equality in public sector restructuring. The result of this specific dialogue on gender has been the creation of a focal point on gender between the ITUC equality team and the WB gender and development team (Minutes technical meeting, 2009).

The author has no up-to-date information with regard to the success of this specific focal point on gender which was created in 2009, however, the past has shown that the success of focal points depends a lot on staff of the WB. Focal points aim to promote a quick transfer of information between a specific WB department and a Global Union. In those cases where staff of the involved WB department are committed to having regular contacts with trade unions, then regular contact and information exchange does take place within

the framework of the focal point. If this is not the case the contact and the dialogue is only 'sporadic' or does not exist at all (Interview ITUC02, 2008). When the interviews were conducted there was no Global Union representative who could report on a satisfying exchange of information through a focal point. In the following section, the functioning of two focal points will be considered in more detail.

The focal point between the WB sector department education and Education International was formally established in 2004 (World Bank, 2007b). It was one of the first focal points created between a WB department and a GUF. According to the Deputy General Secretary of EI the work through the focal point is important because this structure offers the possibility to achieve results directly. It furthermore corresponds to the EI's preferred way of working which is a more '...punctual and direct way to what is happening today in the field' (Interview EI, 2008).

However, the overall functioning of the focal point has been rather disappointing for the EI representative. On a few occasions successful meetings and discussions took place, such as for example in 2007 regards the HIV/Aids programme in Africa where the education sector had become increasingly important in terms of the prevention and reduction of the stigma associated with the illness. In this case both organizations agreed on some areas of collaboration although these were never fulfilled by activities on the ground. Another form of cooperation took place in the context of action taken against hiring unqualified teachers in Uganda. Up until 2008 the WB and the EI financed a joint programme which included different activities such as meetings and seminars. However, the the outcome of the focal point structure was very limited, as the EI representative put it, '...usually the relationship with the World Bank is more a relationship of opposition' (Interview EI, 2008).

The second focal point considered is the focal point between the ITF and the WB in the field of transportation which was established in 2005. Since that time more meetings have taken place between ITF representatives and WB staff. However, in 2007 a joint review of the dialogue conducted by IFI and Global Union representatives revealed that ITF representatives described the application of the focal point as '...patchy for communicating information about new transport strategies and restructuring projects' (World Bank, 2007c: 8). Nevertheless, it did also reveal some positive examples of successful cooperation between the ITF and the WB such as the joint development of the WB's 'Transport Business Strategy' in 2006. In this context the WB department responsible for transport also contributed financially to an ITF meeting in London which made it possible for the ITF to invite more ITF representatives from developing countries. An ITF consultant who was

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interviewed with regard to the relationship between the ITF and the WB responded that the ITF has been ‘... very successful in getting the attention of the World Bank and the World Bank now treats the ITF as a very serious interlocutor’ (Interview ITF, 2008). However, he went on to say that:

Now we know that the World Bank transport sector chief understands our concerns very well. But is he able to educate the World Bank people about our concerns? Well, that will depend on a whole range of issues. To what extent is it a priority for him to do so? Probably it is not a very big priority. To what extent is he able to do so? Probably he is not able. That’s not his background. He is a transport engineer, he is a transport specialist, he is a World Bank official. Is he in a good position to train the World Bank people about our concerns? He is in a better position now than he was before when we met with him for a day, but he is still not able to convey it very clearly. There is a lot of loss from him downwards. There is a lot of loss of understanding of our concerns (Interview ITF, 2008).

The statement reveals two things. Firstly, it emphasizes the importance of individual perceptions and attitudes of WB staff with regard to communication. Secondly, the mentioned “loss of understanding” of trade union concerns at lower organizational levels within the WB can slow down the exchange of information from the side of the WB and makes it less likely that WB staff will take the initiative.

At the third dialogue level, the country level, trade unionists experience very different frequencies of meetings and information exchange (Interview ITUC02, 2008). The WB leadership recommended to the directors of its country offices that they should meet and consult with trade unions on a regular basis, but as this is only a recommendation the ultimate action depends on the directors themselves and their attitudes towards trade unions. According to a civil society specialist of the WB who referred to a country level survey from 2007⁸⁵, the exchange between IFI staff and trade unions is widespread. IFI staff also find the information exchange useful but they criticise inconsistencies in trade union positions (Minutes high-level meetings, 2009).

The director of the ITUC/Global Unions office in Washington ascribes quality differences regards consultation between staff of WB country offices and trade unions to the different attitudes of individual actors. For example the exchange of information can improve or

⁸⁵The Joint Background Paper of the Global Unions and the IFIs from 2007 presents more detailed results of the surveys (World Bank, 2007b).

deteriorate when a new country office director takes over. In the opinion of a representative of the Trade Union Confederation of Americas (TUCA), country directors who work in the field and make decisions regarding the implementation of programmes are the staff who have the ‘...real power’ at the WB (Interview TUCA, 2009).

There is a similar picture with regard to consultation between IMF country mission teams and trade unions. According to the IMF Deputy Chief of Public Affairs ‘...some country team leaders are very involved in dialogue’ and others, ‘...see it as a box that has to be ticked off’ (Interview IMF01, 2008).

Since the beginning of the dialogue the IMF has improved the frequency of consultations with trade unions, but the meetings are brief and the quality of these consultations is still ‘...quite low’ (Ibid., 2008). Besides, it is not really about a mutual exchange of information as IMF people, apparently ‘...seem more intent on telling the trade unions what they think’ and do not seek out the trade unionists’ point of view (Ibid., 2008).

At this point it can be concluded that the quality of information exchange varies at the different dialogue levels. At the headquarters-level the technical meetings offer the possibility for more in-depth discussions and information exchange than the high-level meetings because they are centred around one specific issue. In contrast the high-level meetings are more formal diplomatic events which, due to the great number of issues and the very tight agenda, leave little leeway for real information exchange.

A common factor for all the levels of the dialogue is that individual actors and their attitudes towards the dialogue partner have a major influence on the information exchange. This particularly concerns consultation between WB country offices and trade unions because WB country office directors have a lot of leeway in determining the relationship.

– *Revision of hypothesis (I) according to the results of the analysis*

The extent to which communication processes within the headquarters-level dialogue are determined by the attitudes and perceptions of individual actors depends on the particular organization. In those organizations where individual actors have some power (especially some autonomy) regarding decision making such as at the WB, positive or negative attitudes of individual actors can have a stronger impact on communication processes. In this case individual attitudes are more influential regarding the exchange of information and the resources provided for the dialogue.

However, the analysis has also shown how important organizational objectives are with regard to communication within the dialogue. It is argued that in organizations like the

ITUC and some GUFs which connect very precise objectives with the dialogue, attitudes and opinions of individual actors have much less impact on communication within the dialogue. In contrast, within the IFIs, which do not have clear objectives connected with the dialogue, individual attitudes and opinions have more influence over the behaviour of individual actors and a much stronger impact on communication.

5.4.2 Hypothesis (II): Organizational learning and the dialogue

The second hypothesis is related to organizational learning initiated through the dialogue. Although the thesis has already illustrated that individual actors play a vital role regards initiating organizational learning processes, the main focus in the following sections is on the organizations as corporate actors and not as individual actors. A different number of departments and units is involved in each organization which participates in the dialogue, these department also capture, store and disseminate information in different ways. Huber (1991: 89) suggests that it can be assumed that an organization learns ‘...if any of its units acquires knowledge that it recognizes as potentially useful to the organization’. This suggests that organizational learning takes place, even if not every unit learns the same thing. Organizational learning is broader when more units ‘...obtain this knowledge and recognize it as potentially useful’ and also when the same units ‘...develop a uniform comprehension of the various interpretations’ (Ibid., 1991: 90). The latter suggests that organizational units develop a shared understanding on particular issues or events such as the dialogue and particular issues connected with it. A precondition for this is the wide distribution of information among organizational units, including the provision of information through varied resources and in this context information technology is one of the main storage mechanisms for organizational memory.

Institutionalization processes which embed new knowledge in organizational routines and strategies play a minor role in the following analysis as these processes are difficult to observe for the researcher on the outside.

- *Which factors support and/or hinder organizational learning initiated through the dialogue within the organizations involved?*

There are several factors and organizational characteristics which influence organizational learning in both positive and negative ways. A positive influence on learning would suggest that organizational learning is promoted within the organization and that learning takes

place across different departments. A more negative influence suggests that organizational learning and learning success are avoided or hindered.

The factors which will be considered in more detail include the size and nature of an organization, the organizational structure, the scope of different issues dealt with by an organization, organizational knowledge and the sources within which knowledge is stored and made available within the organization. In this context reference is made to the chapters in which the individual organizations have already been described and where organizational learning has been discussed in more general terms.

There are some major differences between the Global Unions and the IFIs in terms of the factors which influence organizational learning. In comparison to the WB and the IMF, the ITUC is a relatively small organization not only in terms of the number and size of its departments but also the number of staff working for the organization. At the ITUC headquarters in Brussels the Economic and Social Policy department is responsible for the dialogue with the IFIs. This department works closely together with the ITUC/Global Unions office in Washington. From a theoretical point of view the involvement of only two units of the ITUC in the dialogue with a clear focus on intergovernmental cooperation facilitates organizational learning for the whole organization. This is because these two units constantly acquire new knowledge in relation to the IFIs and their policies; this is something which is considered essential for the organization. In the case of the ITUC, learning does not necessarily result in changes of visible behaviour amongst individual actors, but in terms of changes in the collective understanding regards the dialogue partners. The dialogue enables the Global Unions for example, to develop a better understanding of the differences between the Global Unions and the IFI organizations and the way in which the IFIs work (Interview ITUC02, 2008). With regard to the latter for instance, during the high-level meetings in 2009, representatives of the ITUC aimed to explore the views of IFI representatives regards their own future involvement in global governance (Minutes high-level meetings, 2009). In this regard it can be argued that the ITUC learns *about* the IFIs through the dialogue, even though learning *from* the IFIs may be limited to only ‘...some instances’ (Interview ITUC02, 2008).

In the following section the breadth of organizational learning in terms of the amount of organizational learning occurring at the ITUC will be examined. The ITUC has a democratic structure and follows democratic procedures in which as highest decision-making body, the Congress facilitates a high degree of formal participation to all its affiliated organizations. In this regard the Congress creates a forum for discussion, negotiation and exchange of information among its organizational affiliates. The democratic structure of

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the ITUC allows information to be disseminated to all its members on an equal basis and to allow them the possibility to reflect on this information. In other words organizational learning with regard to the dialogue is not necessarily limited to the ITUC headquarters and the ITUC office in Washington.

However, the transmission of knowledge about the IFIs to the ITUC's regional organizations and their affiliates does not necessarily mean that these organizations "learn". This is because not all organizations are likely to consider the disseminated information as useful or relevant for their own work. Resources within these organizations may in any case be limited and their resources may be focused on other priorities than the dialogue. As a result evaluation of and reflection on the information related to the dialogue in these organizations might be limited or non-existent. This being the case, it can be argued that organizational learning at the ITUC is mainly limited to its units which are more directly involved in the dialogue and which gradually develop expertise regards the dialogue with the IFIs and other related issues in this context.

With regard to the GUFs one could ask whether organizational learning through the dialogue takes place at all. As suggested earlier, the involvement of a GUF in the dialogue mainly depends on its priorities and its financial resources. Both are determined by affiliated member organizations. Some GUFs are more heavily involved in the dialogue than others such as the BWI for example. Others such as the ITF are involved to a much smaller extent. Both the activities of the BWI and the ITF have been analysed in relation to the first hypothesis. In the first case the secondment of a BWI official to a particular WB department and in the second case a well- functioning focal point was established between the ITF and the WB, both of these activities helped the BWI and the ITF to gather useful knowledge related to WB procedures, programmes and organizational culture. The knowledge acquired has also been useful for the GUFs concerned in terms of determining their further interaction strategy with the specific WB department.

In these cases where a secondment or a focal point has been successful, organizational learning within the relevant GUFs and WB departments has occurred. However, it has to be noted that organizational learning through secondments and focal points is unlikely to take place on a constant basis because both forms of communication have their limitations. A secondment for example only takes place for a limited period of time and focal points often only work well regarding specific issues and at certain points in time. It can be argued therefore that organizational learning of the GUFs through the sector level dialogue and learning from the IFIs occurs on an occasional but not a constant basis.

Regards the breadth of organizational learning, the relatively small size of the headquarters

of most of the GUFs such as the BWI and the ITF makes it easier to disseminate newly gathered knowledge among different organizational units. However, similar to the ITUC organizational learning may not necessarily be associated with changes in the behaviour of individual actors nor affect established organizational routines and strategies.

Newly gathered information is considered and reflected on by all the Global Unions in relation to their organizational missions. Even though the international trade union organizations differentiate in their organizational mission and objectives to some extent due to the different sectors they represent, they have one overarching mission in common which is to fight for workers' rights and social equality worldwide. In general terms international trade union organizations perceive themselves as a, '...social response to the advent of industrialisation and capitalism' (Salamon, 1998: 86) and follow a paradigm which is opposed to neoliberalism. The paradigm of the Global Unions could be described as a social and collectivist global governance approach based on internationally recognized human rights and labour standards. In this regard international trade union organizations refer to the international labour standards and rights which are promoted by the ILO and the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The different paradigms and organizational "languages" connected with these paradigms (language of justice for the Global Unions vs. the language of shareholder value for the IFIs) can be considered as an impediment to organizational learning for both sides (Minutes high-level meetings, 2009).

In contrast to the Global Unions, organizational structures and bureaucratic procedures of the WBG and the IMF provide a platform for some influential and economically strong shareholders (governments) to enforce their own policies and ideas. Some of these shareholders, such as the USA or Germany for instance are particularly influential regards the determination of the overall organizational strategy. Both the WBG and the IMF do not have democratic structures which give all the shareholders the same weight within the Board of Governors.

It can be argued that the organizational structure and organizational culture of the IFIs are decisive regards determining the extent to which organizational learning will occur. The WB is a large and complex organization. Its decentralized structure and the range of different issues dealt with in its different departments can be advantageous for organizational learning in the sense that organizational units have more autonomy in determining which knowledge should be gathered. However, knowledge which is regarded as useful by one organizational department is not necessarily awarded the same value in other departments. In this respect the breadth of actual organizational learning may be limited in decentralized

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organizations. Furthermore, decentralization can also lead to contradictions between the different departments of the WB because there is ‘...no central controller’ who can determine a coherent organizational approach within the WB regards trade unions and their concerns (Interview ITUC01, 2008). It can be argued that in a highly decentralized organization, learning through the dialogue is confined to those organizational departments which are in regular contact with the Global Union organizations such as for example the WB’s SP&L unit and the External Affairs department. As the influence of both departments on other departments of the Bank is limited (Interview ITUC02, 2011), it can be argued that the breadth of organizational learning which is related to the dialogue with the Global Unions is also limited. The limited scope of organizational learning regards specific issues – such as for instance labour markets – therefore makes it difficult to establish cross-departmental engagement within the Bank on issues which concern trade unions (Interview WB05, 2009).

However, apart from the limited breadth of organizational learning within the WB, it can also be argued that there is a greater likelihood that organizational learning takes place in the WB in the first place. The higher number of WB departments involved in the dialogue and the autonomy of these departments increases the likelihood that at least one department gathers useful knowledge at any given time.

The IFC which forms part of the WBG has arguably always sought a good relationship with the trade unions (Minutes high-level meetings, 2009). The culture of the IFC is reflected in the openness of its individual actors towards the ideas of trade unions (Interview WB01, 2008), leading to an organizational culture, which according to one WB representative, is arguably less conservative and more innovative (Interview WB03, 2009). This culture also has an influence on its approach to organizational learning. In contrast to the WB the IFC is a much smaller organization which focuses on private sector development. Organizational learning is based on experiences within project implementation and feedback from stakeholders such as the trade unions. It can be argued that organizational learning takes place in a more holistic way at the IFC than it does at the WB and which goes beyond organizational borders. For example, the IFC shares its expertise in applying the Performance Standards through the IFC’s Community of Learning⁸⁶.

In contrast to the WBG, the IMF is a relatively small organization which has a centralized structure. It has a more conservative culture than the IFC and focuses mainly on one issue

⁸⁶Source: IFC, 2014 <http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/Topics_Ext_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/IFC+Sustainability/Learning+and+Adapting/Learning+Events/>

which is to ensure the stability of the international monetary system. The macroeconomic work that the IMF focuses on, offers less points of intersection with the work of the Global Unions. There are not many departments at the IMF which are involved in the dialogue with the Global Unions. Furthermore, there have been no secondments of Global Union representatives to the IMF and no focal points developed between a Global Union organization and any IMF department (Minutes high-level meetings, 2009). The main access to the IMF for the Global Unions is through the IMF's Public Affairs division which occasionally organizes contacts for trade union representatives with influential individual actors. With regard to organizational learning the managing director of the IMF plays a greater role, because he/she '... can take essential decisions' which can be '... implemented throughout the organization quite quickly' (Interview ITUC01, 2008). In this regard, a positive attitude from the managing director towards trade unions and their concerns can be favourable for the recognition of trade union expertise across the IMF. The Global Unions can use the meetings with the managing director of the IMF during the high-level meetings to present their concerns and to send the message throughout the organization that trade unions are very representative and legitimate organizations. There are also meetings at the national level between IMF country mission teams and trade unions, but these meetings have little effect on organizational learning as their output depends to a great extent on the attitudes of country mission team leaders.

In summary it can be argued that the likelihood that organizational learning takes place at the IMF is generally less than it is at the WB, partly because there is really only one department involved in the dialogue. However, the breadth of organizational learning in terms of the dissemination of knowledge can be potentially broader because of the influence of the organizational leadership throughout the whole organization.

– *To what extent has organizational learning taken place in the different organizations which participate in the dialogue and, in particular within the IFIs?*

Organizational learning can be related first to the dialogue process itself and secondly, to the issues discussed within the dialogue. It can be argued that organizational learning related to the dialogue process itself occurs to a greater extent than learning related to specific issues within this process.

With regard to the former, learning occurred on both sides the Global Unions and the IFIs and this is still an on-going process. At the beginning the relationship between the Global Unions and the IFIs was dominated by '... mutual speechlessness and cultural reservations' (Interview IG Metall, 2008). These reservations have to some extent been overcome in the

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course of time, but there are still energies and efforts required on both sides to keep the dialogue going.

Some of the learning output concerning the dialogue has become institutionalized through the framework for the dialogue in 2002 (and revised in 2013). Within those organizations more heavily involved in the dialogue some organizational representatives have developed a considerable expertise regards the organizational characteristics of the dialogue partners. It can be argued that the establishment of the ITUC/Global Unions office in Washington has been the result of a learning process on the side of the Global Unions. The ITUC and the GUFs recognized the increasing importance of influencing the decision-making processes of intergovernmental organizations in order to achieve a global governance system with a stronger social component. The establishment and funding of the office in Washington can be interpreted as the result of a learning process in terms of it being a more efficient way to deal with the IFIs. The jointly financed ITUC/Global Unions office in Washington supports all international trade union organizations and their members to increase their expertise with regard to the IFIs and their policies. In this context, the director of the ITUC/Global Unions office in Washington stated that trade unions in some instances may learn from the IFIs, and that trade unions are willing to adjust policies if they are on the wrong track (Interview ITUC02, 2008).

Organizational learning in terms of gathering of useful knowledge by single organizational departments can be related to the outcomes which have been achieved through the dialogue and which have been described in subchapter 5.3.2. Major achievements such as the integration of all four CLS in the IFC Performance Standards and the WB's SBDW to begin with came about with the acceptance of new knowledge in single WB departments and later as a process of organizational institutionalization of the knowledge in terms of changes in organizational routines, which then affected other departments.

With regard to successful organizational learning through the dialogue the smaller sister organization of the WB, the IFC, has taken on a pioneering role. The IFC has introduced changes in programmes and policies such as the IFC Performance Standards and has been consulting with trade unions on a much larger scale than the WB had been doing for a long time. A member of staff of the ITUC/Global Unions office considered the IFC as '...one of the best outcomes in the dialogue process' and on both sides, the IFC and the Global Unions, a '...better learning process' has taken place (Minutes high-level meetings, 2009).

However, regards the issue of labour market development the extent to which organizational learning has taken place has been limited at the IFIs. Since the beginning of the

dialogue there have been disagreements between the IFI and the Global Unions, particularly for example on issues such as the deregulation and privatization of state owned companies which provide central services. These disagreements have come to the fore once more since the 2008 international financial and economic crisis. During the crisis the IMF with the conditions it attached to its loans arguably contributed further to social inequality and a weakening of employment protections (often through a degradation of labour market institutions) in many European countries. The General Secretary of the ITUC, Sharan Burrow, noted during the high-level meeting in 2013 ‘...that the attacks against workers’ rights were not based on any factual evidence that such measures will contribute to economic recovery’ (World Bank, 2013b: 2). The increasing attachment of structural conditions and conditions to loans in areas which are not related to the core expertise of the IMF such as labour market reforms (Ibid., 2009) could be interpreted as the result of limited organizational learning through the dialogue with the Global Unions or a lack of interest in, or weakness of the dialogue where the IMF is concerned.

This, however, does not mean that trade union expertise is not acknowledged by the IMF. In the context of the international financial crisis consultations with trade unions have gained in importance for the IMF because the organization appears to be interested in getting information about how economic developments influence labour (Minutes high-level meetings, 2009). Furthermore, during the high-level meetings in 2013 an IMF representative commented that the IMF has established a working group on jobs and growth which prepares papers and tools to support different IMF departments and its staff in dealing with issues related to jobs (World Bank, 2013b). For example, one toolkit is aimed at facilitating IMF country teams’ access to relevant literature and results of research projects and to transfer ‘best practices’ to IMF economists to improve their capacity in the areas of growth, employment and income distribution (IMF, 2013c). However, the ITUC has not been consulted on the IMF’s strategy regards jobs and growth (World Bank, 2013b), even though the strategy paper explicitly states that the IMF ‘...should collaborate with other institutions as appropriate, in line with respective mandates and areas of expertise’ (IMF, 2013c: 46).

It can be argued that in particular with regard to the IMF the extent of organizational learning in terms of real outcomes through the dialogue with the Global Unions has been very limited. Global Union representatives are aware of these limitations and admit that the rhetorical commitments from the IFIs within the dialogue have little impact in terms of achieving real changes (Interview ITGLWF, 2009). This is one of the main challenges for the Global Unions. In this context the dialogue and its further development may offer

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an appropriate mechanism and space to overcome this challenge in the future.

Finally, it can be argued that there has been no case where the dialogue provoked such a profound change of organizational knowledge that it lead to a change of organizational identity. It is unlikely that the Global Unions will be able to change the fundamental policy of the IFIs and the associated identities of these organizations in the near future.

– Revision of hypothesis (II) according to the results of the analysis

Despite some organizations considering themselves to be learning organization the assumption that the dialogue is likely to have a greater impact on organizational learning in these organizations is not supported, as the example of the WB illustrates. Rather the size of the organizations and the organizational structure as well as the nature of the knowledge gathered in relation to the organizational paradigms are decisive factors regards the promotion of organizational learning. On the basis of the analysis it can be argued that in general terms the smaller the organization and the less conservative, the greater the likelihood that organizational learning will occur. It is also more likely that organizational learning occurs when the dialogue partners have experience and expertise in dealing with similar organizations, as has been the case between the IFC and the Global Unions.

The assumption that the development of a shared understanding regards specific issues can lead to the development of a more coherent policy approach within the dialogue is supported to some extent as the example of the IFC performance standards has been shown. However, with regard to labour market issues there are still major differences between the dialogue partners and this is unlikely to change in the near future.

Conclusion

In the 2000 study ‘Contesting Global Governance’ conducted by O’Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams the authors investigated the relationship between the multilateral economic institutions (the WBG and the IMF) and the global social movement as one aspect of global policy (O’Brien et al., 2000). The study described the possibilities for interaction between the ICFTU and the IMF and the World Bank as limited, due to the diverging aims of these corporate actors, even though the report noted that the relationship between the trade unions and the World Bank had started to improve during the investigation period (Ibid., 2000).

This thesis has also examined the relationship between different international corporate actors, with the objective of examining the dialogue between the IFIs (WBG and IMF) and the Global Unions (ITUC, GUFs and TUAC). This dialogue was formalized in 2002 and was originally initiated by the Global Unions, in particular the ITUC. This form of dialogue is different to social dialogue and lobbying and so far there is no comparable type of dialogue at the global level.

The dialogue takes place at three levels, these include the headquarters, the sector and the country level and all three levels can be considered as important for the Global Unions who aim to use the dialogue to promote a stronger social component within the system of global governance by persuading the IFIs to change their policies. The analysis focused on the headquarters-level of the dialogue, which includes high-level meetings and technical and interim meetings, but also considered the dialogue relating to the sector level and national level work of the Global Unions. The original proposal for the thesis also aimed to investigate the impact of the IFC performance standards at the national level, in particular PS 2. However, this was dropped after initial inquiries to the IFC and to a social compliance officer involved in the project. Confidentiality commitments on the side of the IFC and the information policy of the chosen company lead to this decision.

The data for the analysis of the dialogue derives predominantly from 34 expert interviews which were conducted with representatives from the Global Unions and their affiliates as

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well as the World Bank, the IFC, the IMF and the ILO. Furthermore, the author also undertook a period of indirect participant observation as an observer at one technical meeting on gender related issues and one high-level meeting between the Global Unions and the IFIs in 2009 in Washington. This data was also complemented by an analysis of documentary materials which included various reports and the minutes of a number of meetings.

The analysis of the dialogue between the Global Unions and the IFIs has shed light on the decision-making process within intergovernmental organizations (the IFIs) and the way in which trade union organizations have tried to influence this process. In this respect the thesis focuses on a field of enquiry which has not received any systematic attention before (Koch-Baumgartner, 2011). The first major contribution to knowledge provided by the thesis is therefore the analysis of the dialogue itself which is as yet unique in that no other in-depth qualitative research study has been carried out on this issue to date. Furthermore, the analysis of the dialogue contributes to research on the international trade union organizations whose global actors have also received little attention especially with regard to the concept of global governance.

The theoretical framework for the thesis is based on organization theory and the concept of global governance. A number of organizational theories have been used to analyse the characteristics of the dialogue partners, these characteristics are important with regard to the understanding the relationship between the dialogue partners and their communication within the dialogue. Organization theories were also used to support the analytical dimension of the global governance concept. In this regard, the theoretical contribution of the thesis is in developing a stronger connection between organization theory and the global governance concept. For example organization theory helps us to understand that the IFIs are not globally inclusive organizations, their organizational characteristics (such as the culture and learning) constrain the opportunity for a more in-depth exchange with trade unions and limit their ability to reflect on and learn from the expertise provided by the Global Unions.

At the global level social policy is not a clearly defined policy-field, but rather it can be understood as a cross-organizational responsibility. In this regard the establishment of a global social order requires cooperation between different international actors. The need for such cooperation and more political coherence has become even stronger in the course of the international financial and economic crisis. The crisis has raised a number of questions, in particular how inclusive growth and the creation of new jobs and the quality of such jobs can be achieved.

Both the WBG and the IMF belong to a group of intergovernmental organizations, whilst

the Global Unions are representatives of international non-governmental organizations. These different international corporate actors are founded on different grounds, even though they have one commonality which is the promotion of ‘...elements of international and transnational policies of social development’ (Kohlmorgen, 2005: 295). The findings suggest that there is more intersection regards specific issues between the WB, the IFC and the Global Unions than there is between the Global Unions and the IMF. Whilst the IMF focuses on macroeconomic issues and financial markets, the WB and the IFC promote both economic and social issues related to labour and part of their mandate is the reduction of social inequality. An important point of intersection between the Global Unions and the IFC in particular is their focus on private sector businesses, which helps to bring together the different corporate actors within the dialogue more quickly. Within the WBG, the IFC had a pioneering role with regard to the introduction and implementation of the ILO’s CLS. It was the first organization which took the initiative to make sure that its rhetoric and practices concerning CLS were consistent when it introduced the CLS in its performance standards (Bakvis, 2005). The IFC performance standards form part of the organizations’ sustainability framework which defines the roles and responsibilities of IFC’s clients in relation to environmental and social risk management

With regard to the promotion of the CLS the cooperation with the ILO is important for the Global Unions. The ILO is a UN organization and it is the only intergovernmental organization where trade unions have direct access. The Bureau for Workers’ Activities (ACTRAV) links trade unions with the ILO and ensures that all their concerns are incorporated into the activities of the ILO. In other words, trade unions and their members have a seat at the table within the ILO. One of the objectives of the Global Unions in the dialogue is to achieve a permanent seat at the table within the IFIs so that the concerns of workers regularly find their way into policy discussion within these organizations.

The Global Unions are not only concerned with promoting the CLS, but also the protection of these standards which are increasingly being questioned by some employer groupings. For example the discussion between the employer’s and the worker’s group on the international right to strike at the International Labour Conference in 2014 illustrates this point. The employer’s group argues that convention 87 on freedom of association and the protection of the right to organize should be interpreted without the right to strike (IndustrieAll 2014, website⁸⁷). In other words employers want to separate out the right to strike from the right to organize.

⁸⁷Source: IndustrieALL, 2014 <<http://www.industrial1-union.org/employers-deny-the-international-right-to-strike>> [Accessed 15 October 2014]

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For the Global Unions the dialogue with the IFIs is mainly organized and coordinated by the ITUC which has an important bridging function between the GUFs and the ITUC on all of the IMF and World Bank related issues (Interview ITUC02, 2008). As one part of the general mission of the ITUC, the work of the ITUC/Global Unions office in Washington is dedicated in particular to following up on the policies of the IFIs, to coordinate the dialogue between trade unions and the IFIs and, to work together with other civil society organizations with regard to WB and IMF policies.

The involvement of each organization in the dialogue depends to a large extent on their basic objectives and missions, their priorities and the resources they have available. Moreover, the findings suggest that these organizations participate in the dialogue for different reasons. While the Global Unions initiated the dialogue with the explicit objective of trying to change IFI policies which impact on workers, the IFIs have become involved in the dialogue in order to become more transparent to civil society in general and more responsive to trade union criticism in particular. This move towards greater transparency has arguably become more important for the IFIs from the 1980s onwards; since that time their legitimacy has been increasingly questioned as their policies often have failed to deliver expected outcomes regards poverty reduction.

The analysis also suggests that there has been a cultural shift in the IFIs with regard to their understanding of engagement with civil society organizations since the dialogue was formally established in 2002. In addition there appears to have been a general increase in awareness amongst IFI staff with regard to labour issues since that time. However, the relationships between the Global Unions and the IFIs are very complex. On the one hand, the increase in awareness amongst IFI staff does not necessarily mean that IFI staff regularly engage with trade unions. This depends to a great extent on individual attitudes and personalities. On the other hand, if staff from the IFIs are genuinely interested in engaging with trade unions they do not always find trade unions at the national level as effective interlocutors.

The analysis of the dialogue between the Global Unions and the IFIs in this thesis has revealed a complex interaction of different factors, some of which promote the dialogue and others which tend to hinder its function. These factors can be found at both the individual and corporate level and they determine the positions and perspectives of the corporate actors in the system of global governance.

Factors related to individual actors include individual attitudes and perception regards the dialogue and the dialogue partners. Factors, which are related to the organizations as corporate actors are their size, nature (such as focus on services for members or forum for

discussions), the organizational structure (such as the degree of centralization), the scope of different issues that a particular organization deals with, its identity, its power resources in terms of material and non-material resources (such as knowledge) as well as its capacity to learn.

The thesis revealed that the way in which the dialogue works depends on the attitudes of individual actors who can have a major influence, especially in these organizations where individual actors have a greater autonomy in decision-making. This is the case in the WB for example, which is divided into different power centres at its headquarters, and where at the country-level, directors of WB offices are relatively autonomous regards decision-making; particularly with regard to the frequency of meetings with national trade unions. Furthermore, the attitudes of individual actors with regard to the dialogue and their capacity to learn through the dialogue are to some extent determined by the organizational culture and organizational routines. With regard to organizational characteristics there are major differences between the organizations belonging to the IFIs. The IFC for example promotes a much stronger culture of innovation than the IMF or the WB. As a result the IFC has shown a much greater openness towards trade unions than is the case at the WB or the IMF. Indeed it can be argued that the IFC has taken on a pioneering and innovating role with regard to the dialogue.

The analysis also suggests that individual actors are also influenced by the organizations' paradigm. The organizational paradigm influences the perceptions of individual actors and therefore the way in which they interpret the information they receive through the dialogue. In this regard it has been revealed that the paradigms which the Global Unions and the IFIs follow are an obstacle to the development of the dialogue as these corporate actors promote different and often contradictory economic approaches related to their particular paradigm. For example, both the WB and the IMF in particular, have carried on with the promotion of deregulatory labour market policies which often lead to the reduction of labour standards, something which has been heavily criticized by the Global Unions since the the dialogue began. For example five years after the beginning of the international financial crisis, the statement of the Global Unions to the 2013 annual meetings of the IFIs was titled: 'Three Years of Destructive Austerity and Labour Market Deregulation are enough' (Global Unions, 2013). In this statement the Global Unions repeated their claim that the WB and the IMF should no longer support, '...destructive and inequality-enhancing labour market deregulation' but a '... coherent set of labour market policies for more inclusive growth' (Ibid., 2013: 1).

As the thesis has argued the dialogue has, however, had a major impact with regard to

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the promotion of the CLS in IFI policy documents. This includes the SBDW of the WB and the performance standards of the IFC. Apart from this, the dialogue and its development in the last decade is arguably a success in itself. The dialogue has helped to avoid mutual silence or 'speechlessness' between the dialogue partners and helped to develop a sustainable basis for a constructive exchange of arguments which can support the convergence of the positions of the international actors regarding global policies. In this regard, the communication of the three different dialogue levels have helped to improve the mutual understanding of the dialogue partners and develop some common ground. For example, by the end of the high-level meeting in 2002, the WB vice-president stated that supporting the United Nation's Millennium Development Goals and the objectives of job creation and poverty reduction were common grounds for the WB and trade unions (World Bank, 2002b). These common objectives have since been reaffirmed in the course of the dialogue.

With regard to the output of the dialogue, the analysis suggests that the dialogue undergoes different cycles, in other words there are times when trade union representatives are more successful in gaining a response to their demands and other times when they can only prevent things from going backwards.

One challenge is the provision of information from IFI staff and their departments. At the high-level meetings trade union representatives consistently argued that they should be consulted regarding the development of new programmes and the conditions attached to IFI loans on issues which concern labour before they are implemented. The Global Unions argue that it is essential that their expertise contribute to the development of such programmes. However, as yet they often do not receive sufficient information in enough time from the IFIs to be able to have any influence on policies. There have been cases when Global Union representatives only found out about new IFI projects which concern their sectoral work through the public media.

Other challenges associated with the dialogue are that the IFI's positive sounding rhetoric are often not translated into action, similarly there are continuing and stark contradictions between the policies promoted by the IFIs (such as the IFC performance standards which now incorporate the CLS and the Doing Business index which undermines those standards). There are also problems regarding the implementation of results achieved at the headquarters-level dialogue at the national level due to the limited resources of national trade union organizations (such as monitoring the implementation and evaluating the impact of the IFC performance standards).

The 2013 amended framework for the dialogue is intended to tackle some of the existing

challenges, in particular ensuring the provision of information within the dialogue to the Global Unions in a reasonable timeframe. The failure to implement the positive rhetoric of the IFIs is partly due to the fact that there is only an agreed protocol which records statements and future objectives for cooperation after each meeting. However, there is no written document which clearly provides commitments and steps which should be taken with regard to specific issues. The lack of explicit guidelines for IFI staff regarding the implementation of agreements achieved during the headquarters-level dialogue considerably weakens the potential impact of the dialogue at the sectoral and national level.

The analysis shows that in comparison with many other civil society organizations which maintain contact with the IFIs, the dialogue between the Global Unions and the IFIs is quite advanced at the formal level, even though the asymmetric distribution of power at the global level remains a continuing problem. Nevertheless, the fact that the Global Unions have at least achieved a regular dialogue with the IFIs is arguably a success in itself. This success can be related to the organizational characteristics of the Global Unions as corporate actors, in particular their strength as member organizations and their conviction and persistence regarding their demands. However, disagreements and conflicts between the Global Unions and the IFIs with regard to fundamental policy strategies are likely to remain in the future, largely because of the different organizational cultures and the different paradigms which exist in these organizations. From the point of view of a representative of the ITUC the dialogue cannot eradicate all the disagreements between the dialogue partners; in any case it is also not its function (Interview ITUC04, 2009).

In the current system of global governance trade unions face several major problems with regard to gaining a '... broadened labour participation' in the efforts to reform the system at the global and national level (Turner, 2004: 2). The dialogue as a strategic instrument can be considered as a tool through which the Global Unions can have an influence on the present global logic; at least in terms of partly transforming this logic. However, this process is very slow and for the Global Union organizations in particular it is difficult to ensure sufficient and continuing support from their membership basis unless the dialogue is seen to provide concrete results. Due to the limited resources which trade unions at all levels have available, issues of priority and resource distribution are partly determined on the basis of the possible success of trade union intervention. In the point of view of some trade union representatives the dialogue at the global level is not very promising in terms of its concrete and sustainable impact on the policies of the IFIs. This and the fact that the implementation of the outcomes of the headquarters-level dialogue at the national level take time and are difficult to monitor and evaluate for national trade unions, tends

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to reinforce the existing distribution of priorities within and among most GUFs and their national union affiliates and, limit the amount of resources provided for the dialogue by these organizations.

Overall this situation contributes to the maintenance of the existing power asymmetries between the corporate actors within the dialogue, because one of the power resources which trade unions have, that is the mobilization of their members, can only be used to a very limited extent in this context. However, the international economic and financial crisis has led trade unionists to place even more attention on the idea of economic democracy and the idea of trying to ‘...create new links between different levels of regulation and different issues on the regulatory agenda’ (Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2010: 371). This could have an impact on the shaping of the agendas of the Global Union organizations and their affiliated unions and lead to a strengthening of the dialogue as a strategic instrument.

Current economic and social challenges caused by the international financial and economic crisis revealed once more the increasing need for cooperation between different international actors and the need for a stronger coherent social and economic policy at the global level. Despite all the challenges involved, the formal dialogue between the Global Unions and the IFIs offers a mechanism to explore common grounds for the actors involved allowing them to exchange arguments on a regular basis. When one considers the increasing influence of WB and IMF policies in terms of their impact on labour issues internationally, influencing the decision-making processes of these organizations is very likely to remain an important issue for the Global Unions in the future. Given the current climate and context at this moment in time there seems to be no other option than the dialogue.

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A Appendix

A.1 List of interviewees

Interviewee	Position
BWI, 2009	Global Director of Occupational Health and Safety
DGB, 2008	Director of the International Department
EI, 2008	Senior Advisor to the General Secretary
ICEM, 2008	General Secretary
IFJ, 2008	Deputy General Secretary
IGM, 2008	Director of the International Department
IMF, 2008	Director of International Relations
ITF, 2008	Consultant to the ITF
ITGLWF, 2009	General Secretary
ITUC01, 2008	Director of the Economic and Social Policy Department
ITUC02, 2008	Director of the ITUC/Global Unions Office in Washington
ITUC02, 2011	Director of the ITUC/Global Unions Office in Washington
ITUC03, 2009	General Secretary (former President of the Australian Council of Trade Unions)
ITUC04, 2009	Research Officer (ITUC/Global Unions Office in Washington)
IUF, 2008	General Secretary
PSI, 2008	Assistant General Secretary
TUAC, 2009	General Secretary

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TUCA, 2009 (interview of two people)	General Secretary / Secretary for Policy, Education and Associations
WB01, 2008	Senior Civil Society Specialist
WB02, 2008	Director SP&L unit (until 2011)
WB03, 2009	Senior Procurement Specialist
WB04, 2008	Senior Economist (SP&L unit)
WB05, 2009	Former Executive Director (then Chair of the OECD Development Assistance Committee)
IFC01, 2008 (interview of two people)	Head of Policy and Standards Unit, Environmental and Social Department / Environmental Specialist
IFC02, 2008	Chief Strategist Global Manufacturing and Services Department
IMF01, 2008	Deputy Chief of Public Affairs
IMF02, 2008	IEO Deputy Director
ILO01, 2008	Chief Employment-Intensive Investment Programme
ILO02, 2008	Consultant to the ILO (Washington)
ILO03, 2008	Senior Adviser on Rights at Work (office of the ILO Executive Director for Standards)
ILO04, 2008	Representative to the Multilateral Institutions in Washington and Director of the ILO Office for the United States
ILO05, 2008	Senior Specialist Programme on Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy

In total 34 interviews with representatives from the Global Unions and their affiliates, the IFIs, and the ILO were conducted in Brussels, Geneva, London, Berlin, Frankfurt am Main and Washington.

A.2 Interview schedules Global Unions

Introduction

- How long have you been working for [...]? Can you tell me something about your tasks?

My research project is about the dialogue between Global Unions and IFIs, particularly the headquarters-level dialogue.

- How would you define the “dialogue”? Is it a strategic instrument for the Global Unions?

Do the Global Unions distinguish between dialogue and lobbying or is the dialogue a part of lobbying?

- When did the dialogue start and, what was the trigger for it? Who was the initiator?
- Who (or what) initiated the dialogue in your organization? Did the ITUC have a leading role in relation to this?

What importance does your organization attach to the dialogue today?

- Have you ever participated in one of the high-level meetings?

Aims

- What aims do the Global Unions pursue with the dialogue?
- There are different levels of the dialogue. What importance does each of them have for the Global Unions?

Do thematic meetings or secondments have more importance (for example more than high-level meetings) for the Global Unions?

- What have been the most important issues in recent years for the international trade union movement and particularly for your organization within the Headquarters-dialogue (points of intersection)?
- Do the GUFs have different priorities with regard to the issues and the dialogue in general?

A Appendix

- How would you assess the importance of the dialogue for your own organization? (How is it communicated in your own organization?)
- Are there differences of opinion in your organization about the necessity or the sense of the dialogue?

Process of the formation of opinion

- How does the coordination between the member organizations of the Global Unions work with regard to the issues and its own positions within the headquarters-dialogue?
- Which organization is leading the process of the dialogue?

Are there meetings before the dialogue takes place where representatives from the GUFs present the position of their own organization?

Is it possible that single representatives from organizations or single departments can bring in their own opinion?

- Which department or person in your organization is responsible for the dialogue or the connection with the ITUC in this respect?
- Does your organization express its own position with regard to the dialogue (or does it work closely together with the ITUC)?

From where does your organization obtain the expertise?

- How does the exchange with your member organizations work? Does your organization inform them about the results achieved in the dialogue?
- What role does TUAC play?

Topics

I am interested in the issues of the CLS and the reduction of loan conditionality, which the Global Unions promote within the dialogue.

- What importance do these topics have for your organization? What's your own opinion or the opinion of your organization with regard to the importance of these issues?

- Are there differences between the Global Unions and the IFIs concerning its importance?

If yes: What differences? Why?

If no: When did both actors find a common position and which contextual factors were important in that respect?

- How does your organization deal with the IFIs?
- What progresses have been made by the Global Unions since the signing of the protocol? Has there been a convergence with regard to positions / perception of problems between Global Unions and IFIs?

Have both actors reached common positions? Did they develop a mutual understanding?

- Why are the IFIs looking for cooperation with trade unions in your opinion?
- Are there different reasons for the World Bank as well as for the IMF?

Results

- What factors have an impact on the dialogue, particularly with regard to the two issues I mentioned earlier? (effectiveness)

Certain political / economical / social circumstances

Changes in the structure of the organizations

Persons (individual perception of problems)

- What role do informal contacts, or rather secondments for trade union representatives play?
- What is your perception of the conversations between trade union representatives and IFI representatives during the high-level meetings (or what have you heard about this)?

Particularly with regard to the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Global Unions have been able to make some progress concerning the integration of the CLS in recent years. Since 2006 the IFC has required compliance with CLS in its promoted projects (Performance Standard 2) and has prepared implementation guides, has undertaken staff

training and has responded to trade unions which have provided information about actual or potential violation of the standards.

In 2007 the WB integrated the CLS in its Standard Bidding Documents for procurement of works, which apply to projects financed by the IBRD and the IDA. The current challenge for the WB is establishing a mechanism to monitor and enforce the standards. The Global Unions have offered their assistance in implementation and monitoring of the CLS.

- How does your organization deal with this issue? Is there a close cooperation with the ITUC in questions of implementation and monitoring of CLS? How does the exchange with your member organizations on this issue work in practice?
- Are there some other GUFs which are strongly involved in this issue?

Do you believe that the Bank would recall an investment, if the CLS have been disregarded?

Do you know something about the participation of the ITUC within the “IFC labour advisory group”?

- What role does the cooperation with the ILO play with regard to the implementation of CLS?

Over recent years, the IMF and the WB have adopted policies for reducing loan conditionality, responding to criticism that such conditions hinder the attainment of certain social and economic impacts. In 2002 the IMF revised its conditions and the WB introduced ‘Good Practice Principles’ for the application of conditionality in 2005. The evaluation of these “reforms” suggests that both organizations abide with most of the conditions. The Global Unions call for “an end to economic policy conditions and, instead, limit obligations to those concerning respect for internationally agreed standards, including CLS” (Global Unions 2008).

- What relevance do you attribute to this issue? Do you believe that the Global Unions can achieve a real change concerning loan conditionality?

In this context, an important issue for Global Unions is the labour market policy conditions, which require borrowing countries to relax protections for workers. Every year the WB compliments countries with a low level of workers protection in its Doing Business publication which is highly criticised by the Global Unions.

- Could the Global Unions achieve any progress concerning the abolishment of these labour market flexibility indicators?

Advances / Obstacles

“The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have become more open to dialogue and social measures are, in some cases, given serious consideration” (ICFTU (2004): A Trade Union Guide to Globalisation S.34).

- Do you agree with this statement?
- Would you say that the Global Unions were successful in exerting their influence on the IFIs through the dialogue? Does a form of evaluation exist with regard to the dialogue?
- Would you say that the WB and the IMF have taken the criticism of the Global Unions seriously?
- Do you see another, maybe more successful means for Global Unions to influence international organizations other than the dialogue?
- Do you think that one of these organizations is more accessible than others?
- Where are the problems or obstacles of the strategy instrument “the dialogue”, in your opinion?
- What importance / impact do you think the dialogue will have in the future?

A.3 Interview schedules IFC

Introduction

- How long have you been working for [...]? Can you tell me something about your tasks?

My research project is about the dialogue between Global Unions and IFIs, particularly the headquarters-level dialogue. But I am also interested in the sectoral and the national level dialogue.

Aims

- What importance does the dialogue/ exchange with trade unions have for your organization? Which is the responsible department/ who is the responsible person?
- Since when has the IFC been in touch with trade unions?
- What was the trigger for the common exchange?
- What does the IFC expect from the dialogue with trade unions? What in your view should be the aim of the dialogue?
- What do IFC staff think about trade unions? (Are trade union leaders prepared in economic matters?)

Process of the formation of opinion

- Is there an exchange with other WB organizations (IBRD, IDA) about the dialogue (with trade unions)?
- How does the back coupling with your country offices work?

CLS

- Why did the IFC introduce the CLS in its Performance Standards in 2006? (What were the reasons for this decision?)
- Do you think that there is a direct relationship between economic growth and the protection of workers rights? (Improvement of labour productivity, prevention of social conflicts – higher economic growth...)
- In 2007 the WB introduced the CLS in its Standard Bidding Documents for Procurement of Works. Concerning the application of the standards, the IFC is much more advanced (has undertaken staff training etc.) than the other organizations. Why does the IFC have such a pioneering role in this context?
- How does the IFC labour advisory group work and how are trade unions involved in this group?
- Which role does the cooperation with the ILO play with regard to the implementation of PS2? (IFC staff training etc.?)

Case Study

- What impacts do the Performance Standards have on clients?
- Do you know cases where the IFC did recall an investment because the PS 2 was violated?

Within the context of my PhD thesis I want to realize a case study with regard to the application of the IFC Performance Standards. For that I work together with the BWI. We have chosen the case of the Soravia Real Estate Development GmbH which realizes real estate development projects in different Eastern European Countries.

- Until now I didn't receive any answer to the formal request I made at the end of September. What do you recommend in this case?
- Is it possible to speak to the Social Compliance Officer who is situated in the Serbian IFC office?

One important element of the Environment and Social Development Department (CES) management system is the Environmental and Social Review Procedure (ESRP).

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- Is this procedure conducted by the national IFC offices? How does it work? To what extent is there a discussion of social risks?

Following the ESRP the company has to develop a: *Social and Environmental Management System*

- Process of Social and Environmental Assessment (consider potential social and environmental risks):

How do the companies ensure objectivity within the Assessment?

Is there a catalogue of criteria from the IFC?

What insights on this process does the IFC have?

- Does the assessment take the selection of contractors into consideration?
- What are decisive factors for a full-scale, a limited or a focused environmental or social assessment?

Each client establishes a Management Program depending of the findings of the Assessment. Within the program some of the clients prepare an Action Plan which specifies specific measures and actions to meet the Performance Standards.

- Which measures do require such an Action Plan?
- Does the IFC supervise the training of employees and contractors which are responsible for the projects social and environmental performance?
- How do companies monitor their management programs and their contractors?
- Are companies controlled by the Environment and Social Development Department (CES)? How many people work for this department?

Advances / Obstacles

- Despite of the introduction of CLS, the WB still gives best ratings to countries with low labour regulation (DB labour indicators). What's the opinion of the IFC with regard to the Doing Business report?
- Would you say that the WB and the IMF have addressed the criticisms of the Global Unions?
- What are the problems or obstacles with regard to the dialogue?

A.4 Interview schedules IMF

Introduction

- How long have you been working for [...]? Can you tell me something about your tasks?

My research project is about the dialogue between Global Unions and IFIs, particularly the headquarters-level dialogue. But I am also interested in the sectoral and the national level dialogue.

- What importance does the dialogue with trade unions have for the IMF? Which is the responsible department/person?
- When did the IMF start to speak with trade unions? What was the trigger for the dialogue?
- In what way is your organization interested in trade union issues?
- Are the consultations with trade unions helpful for your organization?
- How does IMF staff consider trade unions? (Are trade union leaders prepared in economic matters?)
- Is there any cooperation with the ILO?

Aims

- There are different levels of the dialogue with trade unions. How important is each of them for your organization?
 - Are thematic meetings or secondments more important than High-level meetings?
- Which issues have been important for the IMF within the Headquarters-dialogue (points of intersection)?
- What does the IMF expect from the dialogue with trade unions? What should be the aim of the dialogue?
- Are there different priorities between the Global Unions and the IFIs with regard to issues and the dialogue in general?

Process of the formation of opinion

- How does the exchange with the WB regards the trade union dialogue work?
- Does the World Bank have a more decentralized structure than the IMF?
- Why haven't there been any ITUC secondments to the IMF up to now?

Advances / Obstacles

- What progress has been made since the signing of the protocol in 2002? Has there been a convergence with regard to positions between the Global Unions and the IFIs?
Have both actors reached common positions? Did they develop a mutual understanding?
- Have the IFIs suffered from a loss of importance in recent last years? Is there now more cooperation between the countries of LA, or Asia. . .
- Would you say that the WB and the IMF have addressed the criticism of the Global Unions?
- What are the problems or obstacles with regard to the dialogue?

Topics

I am interested in the issue of the “CLS” as well as the reduction of loan conditionality.

- What importance do these topics have for your organization? What's your own opinion with regard to their importance?
- How does the exchange with your country offices work?

Results

Loan Conditionality

In the 1980s the IFIs began attaching conditions to their loans. That often required the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP).

Over the past several years, the IMF and the WB have adopted policies for reducing loan conditionality, responding to criticism that such conditions hinder the attainment of certain social and economic impacts.

- What relevance does your organization attribute to this topic? Do you believe that Global Unions are right if they do criticize economic policy conditionality (structural conditionality)?
- Has the number of conditions actually declined since the adoption of the Conditionality Guidelines in 2002?
- How does the monitoring of these guidelines work? Is there cooperation with civil society organizations?
- Has state ownership increased?
- I have heard the criticism that the IMF now bundles several policy actions into one condition. What do you think about that?
- How does the test of “criticality” work? (whether IMF conditions are necessary or not)
- Does the IMF co-ordinate its conditions with the World Bank conditions?
- Do the trade unions criticize the political advice of the IMF?

A.5 Interview schedules World Bank

Introduction

- How long have you been working for [...]? Can you tell me something about your tasks?

My research project is about the dialogue between Global Unions and IFIs, particularly the headquarters-level dialogue. But I am also interested in the sectoral and the national level dialogue.

- What importance does the dialogue with trade unions have for your organization? Which is the responsible department/person?
- When did the WB start to speak with trade unions? What was the trigger for the dialogue?
- In what respects is your organization interested in trade union issues?
- Are the consultations with trade unions helpful for your organization?
- What do World Bank staff think about trade unions? (Are trade union leaders prepared in economic matters?)

Aims

- There are different levels of the dialogue with trade unions. What importance does each of them have for your organization?
 - Are thematic meetings or secondments more important than high-level meetings?
- Which issues have been important for the WB within the headquarters-level dialogue (points of intersection)?
- What does your organization expect from the dialogue with trade unions? What should be the aim of the dialogue?
- Are there different priorities between the Global Unions and the IFIs with regard to issues and the dialogue in general?

Topics

I am interested in the issues of the “CLS” and the reduction of loan conditionality.

- What importance do these topics have for your organization? What’s your own opinion with regard to the importance of them?

Results

Core Labour Standards

In 2007 the WB integrated the CLS in its Standard Bidding Documents for procurement of works, which apply to projects financed by the IBRD and the IDA. The current challenge for the WB is establishing a mechanism to monitor and enforce the standards. The Global Unions have offered their assistance in implementation and monitoring of the CLS.

- Has the WB adopted all four CLS? (Prohibition of forced labor, child labor... Freedom of Association, Equality?)
- How does the cooperation between the WB and trade unions work with regard to monitoring and implementation work?
- How does the exchange with your country offices work?
- Are there some training courses for World Bank staff?
- Does the Bank cooperate with the ILO with regard to the application of these standards?

Loan Conditionality

In the 1980s the IFIs began attaching conditions to their loans. That often required the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP).

Over the past several years, the IMF and the WB have adopted policies for reducing loan conditionality, responding to criticism that such conditions hinder the attainment of certain social and economic impacts. In 2005 the WB introduced “Good Practice Principles” for the application of conditionality.

- Who is responsible for the monitoring of the application of these principles?

A Appendix

I am interested in the principle of “Criticality”:

- Who decides which policy and institutional actions are critical for achieving the results of the program? Can you give me a brief example?
- What relevance does your organization attribute to this issue? Do you believe that Global Unions are right when they criticize economic policy conditionality (structural conditionality)?
- The thematic focus of conditionality is on public sector governance and social sectors. Why?
- Are there cases or decisions where the WB has consulted trade unions? For example when it comes to privatization. . .
- The implementation of the good practice principles should be strengthened through the “issuance of a revised good practice note for poverty and social impact analysis and related internal training”. What does this mean exactly?
- Has the number of conditions reduced since the adoption of these principles?

Within this context, an important issue for Global Unions is the labour market policy condition which requires borrowing countries to relax protections for workers. Every year the WB praises in its Doing Business publication countries with a low level of workers protection.

- Why does the WB promote the CLS on the one hand and yet engage in this assessment of employment protections on the other hand?

Process of the formation of opinion

- How does the exchange with the IMF regards the trade union dialogue work?
- Does the bank have a more decentralized structure than the IMF?
- Why haven’t there been WB secondments to the ITUC up to now?

Advances / Obstacles

- What progress has been made since the signing of the protocol in 2002? Has there been a convergence with regard to positions between the Global Unions and the IFIs?

Have both actors reached common positions? Have they developed a mutual understanding?

- Would you say that the IFIs suffered a loss of influence in recent years? There is now more cooperation between the countries of LA, or Asia. . .
- Would you say that the WB and the IMF have addressed the criticisms of the Global Unions?
- What are the problems or obstacles with regard to the dialogue?