

The historical relationship between extractivism and state weakness in Bolivia: a brief political and economic analysis

Guillermo Guzmán Prudencio

University Mayor de San Andrés



| The Author

Guillermo Guzmán Prudencio holds a PhD in Applied Economics and a Master's Degree in Economic Analysis of Law and Public Policy from the University of Salamanca (Spain). He also holds a degree in Economics from the Universidad Católica Boliviana. He has published several research articles on institutional economics and development, social class and ethnic vote, and sustainable development and mining. Furthermore, he is a professor at the Postgraduate Center in Development Sciences of the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés (CIDES-UMSA) Postdoctoral Researcher at the Universidad Privada Boliviana (UPB) and fellow at the Extractivism.de project.

DOI: 10.17170/kobra-2024051710158

Extractivism Policy Brief is an Open Access online publication downloaded freely at www.extractivism.de. Readers are free to share, copy, and redistribute this document in any medium or format for any purpose, even commercially, according to the [Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Germany \(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0\)](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). Conditions imply that no changes are made to the text, and writers and the www.extractivism.de project are referenced correctly as the original. Extractivism Policy Briefs publish on social-economic, cultural, political, and timely topics concerning extractivism in both regions. Extractivism.de team is responsible for reviewing, fact-checking, editing, and publishing the final policy briefs. The opinions expressed in each publication are exclusive of the respective authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the project. Extractivism.de cannot be held liable for any consequences concerning a policy brief following its publication.

© Extractivism.de, 2024, All rights reserved.

IN SHORT

EN

- Historical dependence on extractive rents has contributed significantly to the structural weakness of the Bolivian State.
- Ruling political coalitions direct the benefits of extractive rents to only part of society.
- The dynamic and shifting nature of the governing political coalitions traps the State in a constant (re)negotiation between actors seeking a greater share of extractive rents.
- Domestic political factors explain the process of rent capturing much better than external factors.

DE

- Die historische Abhängigkeit von Einnahmen aus dem Extraktivismus trägt zur strukturellen Schwäche des bolivianischen Staates bei.
- Diese Einnahmen werden selten massenwirksam umverteilt. Regierungskoalitionen begünstigen lediglich Teile der Gesellschaft.
- Politische Koalitionen in Bolivien sind wandelbar und dynamisch. Der Staat ist in einer ständigen Verhandlung mit Akteuren gefangen, die einen größeren Anteil an den extraktiven Einnahmen beanspruchen.
- Innenpolitische Faktoren erklären die Aneignung und Verteilung der Einnahmen aus dem Extraktivismus in Bolivien besser als externe Faktoren.

FR

- La dépendance historique aux revenus extractifs a contribué de manière significative à la faiblesse structurelle de l'État bolivien.
- Les coalitions politiques au pouvoir dirigent les avantages des revenus extractifs vers seulement une partie de la société.
- La nature dynamique et changeante des coalitions politiques au pouvoir piège l'État dans une (re)négociation constante entre les acteurs cherchant une plus grande part des revenus extractifs.
- Les facteurs politiques internes expliquent beaucoup mieux le processus de capture des revenus que les facteurs externes.

ES

- La dependencia histórica de rentas extractivas ha contribuido significativamente a la debilidad estructural del Estado Boliviano.
- Las coaliciones políticas gobernantes dirigen los beneficios de las rentas extractivas solo a una parte de la sociedad.
- La naturaleza dinámica y cambiante de las coaliciones políticas gobernantes atrapa al Estado en una constante (re)negociación entre actores que buscan un mayor porcentaje de las rentas extractivas.
- Los factores políticos internos explican mucho mejor el proceso de captura de rentas que los factores externos.

Introduction

The transformation of extractive activities worldwide, as a result of global warming and energy transition policies, is reshaping the productive structures of many developing countries. This, in turn, may have uncertain results on their institutional structures, creating important distributive struggles for the capture of extractive rents, but also possible spaces for the construction of certain institutionality (at least potentially). In this framework, it is interesting to study the case of Bolivia as an archetypal country where, on the one hand, there is a high historical dependence on the exploitation of raw materials and, on the other hand, a chronic state weakness, as its main political characteristic, concur. However, Bolivia is also a timely discussion now because it is at the dawn of one extractive cycle (that of natural gas) and the emergence of a new one (that of lithium) – both determined by complex global processes.

Under this context, the first part of this Extractivism Policy Brief presents the long tradition of extractive cycles experienced by Bolivia throughout its history (silver, rubber, tin and natural gas), showing some of their main effects on economic growth in the long term. In the second part, the paper explores extractivist rent

capturing as a political device enhanced by nationalist discourse and as an economic mechanism designed to finance the ruling political coalitions. It links these two elements to state weakness and argues that these internal political characteristics explain the occurrence of rent capture phenomena more than other potentially important factors, such as international markets. The third part presents some of the most relevant characterizations of the State in Bolivia, all of them tending to explain its precariousness, and which help us to contrast the main hypothesis of the research, which holds, precisely, that the historical dependence on extractive rents has contributed significantly to the structural weakness of the Bolivian State. This argument is supported by theoretical approaches that argue that Bolivia does not yet have a modern State (understood as a neutral, objective power), which determines that the ruling political coalitions direct the benefits of extractive rents only to a part of society (to their political supporters). Finally, the conclusions present some of the main findings along with important unknowns about the current extractive cycles facing the country. This whole framework proposes an understanding of statehood in a different way from that proposed by the main European theories on institutionality, democracy or extractivism.

The long tradition of extractivism and growth cycles

Extractivism is, without a doubt, a structural and persistent problem in practically all Latin American countries (Sinnott et al., 2010; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Burchardt, 2016; Burchardt et al., 2021). In Bolivia, extractivism has manifested itself with a high degree of intensity and has been able to shape economic growth, institutionality, culture and the very existence of the country. The discovery of silver in Cerro Rico de Potosí in 1545 was the cause for the establishment of the Audiencia de Charcas (as Spanish colonial administration) over the current territory of Bolivia; paradoxically, it was also the reason for its late independence, achieved in 1825 after 16 years of war, due to the Spanish refusal to abandon one of its main sources of wealth (Roca, 2017: 529). From a global perspective, Potosí silver financed Spain's main imperial wars around the world, such as that of Flanders, and

expanded the world's monetary mass, making possible the trade of Europe and America with Asia (specifically with China through the Philippines), possibly the first globalization in history (Barragán, 2017; Barragán and Zagalsky, 2023).


Within this framework, Bolivia (or actually Charcas) was the centre of an extractive process with global reach, which almost inevitably led to the creation and consolidation of a solid extractivist tradition among its inhabitants. This extractive tradition has determined a way of conceiving and reproducing productive relations in which a true extractivist culture reappears systematically and through cycles, with defined forms of production, linkages with international markets and recurrent capital accumulation processes.

Through a very long-term statistical review, it is possible to identify at least four cycles of extractivist production in Bolivian history associated with different raw materials and different geographic areas. First, silver extraction (1545-1900) in the Andes;¹ second, tin production (1880-1985),² also in the western Andean region; third and briefly, rubber extraction in the northern Amazon (1880-1915);³ and finally, the current natural gas cycle, whose production is mainly located in the south of the country (2000-act.).

Graph 1 shows the extractive production cycles of minerals and hydrocarbons, the raw materials that drove the booms and the historical events associated

with the main downturns. It shows, for example, the last silver production boom at the end of the 19th century, whose decline coincided with the peak of tin from the beginning of the 20th century. The negative effects of the New York stock market crash of 1929 and the significant reduction in national mining production after the National Revolution of 1952 can also be seen. Also evident is the end of the tin cycle in the mid-1980s as a consequence of the fall in its international price and the profound crisis of the national model. Finally, the beginning of the cycle associated with the export of natural gas at the beginning of the 21st century can be seen, together with its current decline.

FIGURE 1: SHARE (%) OF MINING AND HYDROCARBONS IN BOLIVIA'S GDP (1846-2022)⁴



These extractive cycles have largely determined the performance of the entire Bolivian economy and, naturally, the evolution of its GDP per capita (see Figure 2). Analyzing tin (the main Bolivian extractive export of the 20th century), the end of its cycle in 1985 led to a deep economic crisis, with serious external debt problems and galloping hyperinflation. The result was a dramatic reduction in GDP per capita, such that its 1978

level was not recovered until 2006, which represents 28 lost years. If we repeat this exercise of counting lost years, the National Revolution of 1952, with the nationalization of the mines, meant 16 lost years. Similarly, the crisis of the 1929 crash, with the fall in the international price of tin, caused another ten lost years. In total, it is possible to count 54 lost years in little more than a century.

¹ For a look at the silver cycle, see Garner (1988), or Arce (2003), for a study of mining history in Bolivia.

² Jordán (1999) studies the tin cycle in the 20th century in Bolivia.

³ Studies by Gamarra (2018) and Orsag (2021) investigate the rubber cycle in Bolivia.

⁴ Source: Herranz-Loncán and Peres-Cajías (2016), INE (2024). Note: Data from 2010 to 2022 are from INE.

FIGURE 2: BOLIVIA'S GDP PER CAPITA (1990 INTERNATIONAL GEARY-KHAMIS DOLLARS) (1890-2010)⁵



All these crisis events are directly associated with extractive economic cycles, specifically, with international commodity prices, natural resource tenure, the dispute for the capture of their rents and, finally, their consequent political conflicts. Thus,

Bolivia's extractive cycles not only determined the country's long-term economic growth but also explained its prolonged periods of recession, its "lost years", and, inevitably, its current low level of development.

Rent capture: a political necessity

Just as Bolivian economic history is the passing of its extractive cycles, Bolivian political history can be read as the dispute for the capture of rents. Without providing a detailed analysis of all the extractive cycles experienced by the country and their respective political processes, this paper analyses some significant events that will help us to illustrate the main characteristics of these phenomena in the country. Specifically, the 1952

nationalization of the mines will be analyzed, emphasizing the mechanism of rent capture and the political reasons behind it. Secondly, the successive nationalizations of hydrocarbons (1937, 1969 and 2006), seeking to understand the political cycles and their relationship with economic cycles, will be examined as well.

Nationalization of mining

The nationalization of the mines, as a result of the 1952 National Revolution led by the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR, in Spanish), was the most significant of the rent capture processes that Bolivia experienced, both for its economic and symbolic importance (Cajías, 2015; Dunkerley, 2017). The National Revolution was the consequence of long historical processes and the

successful construction of a nationalist discourse that pitted the Bolivian nation (with its inheritance in natural resources) against a foreignizing oligarchy (supposedly associated with obscure foreign interests) (Montenegro, 2016; Almaraz, 2017; Céspedes, 1971, 2002). The nationalization of the mines expropriated the three main companies of the so-called *tin barons*: Patiño,

⁵ Source: Herranz-Loncán and Peres-Cajías (2016).

Hochchild and Aramayo, and created, from them, the Mining Corporation of Bolivia (COMIBOL, in spanish), as a state company capable of capturing the tin rent for the benefit of the entire population.

In this sense, COMIBOL was conceived as an inclusive economic institution (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012 and 2019) which would make the entire Bolivian population share in the benefits of the exploitation of tin (at that time, the main and almost the only national export product).⁶ However, the nature of the State in Bolivia and the political needs of the revolution and of the MNR itself, altered this conception from its very founding moment. COMIBOL began its activities by hiring all the miners dismissed from the former private companies (because of their political or union affiliations), settling, in a way, the social debt of the state with the workers. However, in parallel, it also hired a huge number of new employees (Jordán, 2017: 233), all of them duly affiliated with the MNR and mainly destined to fulfill administrative tasks outside the mines. These new hires, guided solely by political reasons, immediately increased the company's operating costs, rapidly reduced its productivity and generated losses from its first balance sheets (Zondag, 1968: 111). Even worse, they reduced total tin production (Herranz-Loncán and Peres-Cajías, 2016: 117-118) and, with it, national mining production (see Graph 1).

Nationalization of hydrocarbons

On the other hand, the history of the nationalization of hydrocarbon resources is somewhat more complicated, but with important similarities, and will contribute to deepen the understanding of the relationship between political cycles and economic cycles. The first nationalization of hydrocarbons took place in 1937 under the government of Colonel Busch over the assets of Standard Oil, with the creation of Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB), when it was still an incipient industry without a large share in the country's GDP. The second nationalization took place in 1969, during the government of General Ovando, also a member of the military, this time over the assets of Gulf Oil, in a period in which oil was gradually becoming a significant component of national production. Finally, the third nationalization took place in 2006, which was actually a process of renegotiation of contracts with

Faced with this scenario, the MNR opted to grant credits to the newly created state-owned company through the Central Bank of Bolivia (BCB, in spanish) and by means of inorganic monetary emission (Peres-Cajías, 2015: 2014). Predictably, the result was an inflationary process that reduced the real salary of all Bolivians and functioned, in practice, as a tax to finance the salaries of COMIBOL employees. These employees became, little by little, and hand in hand with the party, a new elite provided with privileges that would be known as the popular union oligarchy of the MNR (Toranzo, 2017: 494).

Although it is reasonable, from a political perspective, the MNR's need to co-opt the mining sector to ensure the success of the revolution, the fact is that practically, from its creation, COMIBOL abandoned its character as an inclusive economic institution. Instead, it quickly became an extractive economic institution,⁷ where the new popular union oligarchy of the MNR successfully established a mechanism to extract rents from the rest of the population. This way, it consolidated a system of privileges associated with party membership (jobs, contracts, goods, subsidies, among others) that was financed directly by extractive rents and through an inflationary tax.

private companies; this third process coincided with a boom in international energy prices, with large investments already made (wells and gas pipelines), and with two large export contracts previously signed with Argentina and Brazil.

In all cases, there was, first, a process of attracting foreign investment, with laws and codes aimed at encouraging it. Secondly, a process of development of extractive production (at different levels and with different results). Third, nationalization and the consequent capture of rents in favour of the state (in reality, in favour of the ruling political coalition). Fourthly, there was a process of disinvestment, lack of prospecting and falling production in the state-owned company. And finally, a new process of investment

⁶ Also see Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Acemoglu (2009), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005).


⁷ Again along the lines of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012 and 2019).

attraction, with privatization and new concessions.⁸ Moreover. In all cases, political benefits, distribution of jobs within YPFB to supporters, discretionary awarding of contracts, direct transfer of rents and political favours to loyalists were recurrent and helped explain the inevitable fall in production after the nationalizations reasonably well.⁹

The number and frequency of hydrocarbon nationalization processes in Bolivia are quite remarkable

– three in approximately every 30 years –. It would seem that the phenomenon of extractive rent capture responds more to national political cycles than to international economic cycles. In fact, Graph 3 shows that there is no clear relationship between the evolution of international oil prices and the occurrence of nationalizations. The construction of nationalist discourses and the need to finance the ruling political coalitions better explain the occurrence of rent capture phenomena and their surprisingly constant frequency.

FIGURE 3: INTERNATIONAL OIL PRICE (US\$) AND NATIONALIZATION OF HYDROCARBONS (1920-2020)¹⁰



Statehood and extractivism in Bolivia

Different academic disciplines such as history, sociology, political science, and economics have attempted to characterize the Bolivian State from their diverse analytical approaches. However, certain elements appear recurrently in all studies, namely the chronic weakness of the Bolivian State, systematically dependent on extractive rents and with a historical inability to establish sovereignty over its territory.

In this sense, the UNDP study (2007) characterizes the Bolivian State as a state with gaps (100-101). That is, a state with a non-uniform density and whose qualities (statehood) are distributed in non-continuous spaces. This approach relates State revenues and the provision of public services as a way of measuring State capacity,

which, of course, is limited. It posits the existence of a minimally functional social contract, where statehood is an intermittent phenomenon.

Similarly, the research by Barragán (2015) proposes the concept of the covenant State, corresponding to a weak political institution unable to impose itself on a highly organized society (102-103). This research exposes examples of the State's need to make pacts with all politically organized actors in the country to support this argument. Furthermore, it shows that this characteristic is observable throughout its history, from the founding of the Republic to the present day, without evidence of a positive consolidation of some institutional elements.

⁸ For the history of oil in Bolivia, consult Miranda (1999).

⁹ In this not very encouraging panorama, the poor management of state-owned companies should not be read directly as a structural failure of public management capacity, since in Bolivia the government and state-owned companies respond directly to private interests (partisan or those of the ruling political party), as will be seen below.

¹⁰ Source: Our World in Data (2024).

Following this line, the work of Just (2022) develops the concept of the fragmented State, where the aforementioned spatial discontinuity in the provision of public services would be associated with the temporary extraction of certain raw materials, whose production depends, in turn, on external shocks (257). In this analytical framework, it is shown how the Bolivian State expanded its presence and capacity, seeking alliances with local elites and through the provision of public goods, wherever extractive cycles capable of generating rents worthy of being captured developed. Similarly, the research shows how once a given extractive cycle ended, the Bolivian State quietly withdrew from the territory and, with it, the provision of public goods.

Finally, the concept of the subjective State of Suárez (1999) stands out, or the absence of an objective State of Guzmán and Rodríguez (2015) and Guzmán (2022). Within this approach, Bolivia would not yet have a modern State as a public and neutral power; and, instead, there would exist only governing political coalitions capable of taking power and administering the public, following their particular and subjective interests. In this scenario of little or no institutionalality, the recognition of rights, the distribution of jobs, access to health care, the construction of housing, the administration of justice, and any other allocation that may be made is done in a discretionary manner. In the subjective State, the members of the ruling political coalition are favoured first and foremost, and the rest of the population is left, as far as possible, out of any benefit. In a way, the subjective State works as a partial State, functional only for the members of the ruling

Conclusions

This Policy Brief exposes some elements of Bolivia's long tradition and culture of extractivism, which, unfortunately, has systematically repeated several extractive cycles. This dependence has determined the country's long-term economic growth and, more profoundly, its current underdevelopment. The study also shows the relationship between the capture of extractive rents and the financing of the governing political coalitions as subjective powers in a scheme where the nationalist discourse, which advocates the participation of the population in the benefits of the extraction of a given raw material, is transformed –in practice– into a perverse and particular mechanism of rent extraction. In this context, it is reasonable to think

political coalition (which may be more or less broad), and, on the other hand, the rest of the population perceives it as an absent or particular State (Guzmán and Rodríguez, 2015: 195).

The problems associated with extractivism and the capture of its rents, as an essential part of Bolivia's political and economic history, help to understand this chronic State weakness. The absence of an objective State would lead the governing political coalitions (always particular and subjective) to direct the benefits of rents –only or preferentially– to their supporters or political acolytes, who sustain their coalition and to whom they are beholden (Guzmán 2022: 152). Moreover, the nature of governing political coalitions –dynamic and shifting– traps the State in a constant negotiation between actors seeking a greater share of extractive rents, a covenant State. In this sense, the provision of public services (as a proxy variable of State capacity and spatial presence) also depends on the existence of nearby extractive activities; the Bolivian State is not present where there are no rents to capture (fragmented State), or where there are no supporters to give perks to. In this way, it is natural that a state with gaps is configured. In fact, it is a premeditated result. As long as there is no social contract that contemplates all citizens, only a part of them are members of the ruling political coalition. The result is, inevitably, a weak State, with a partial legitimacy circumscribed to a part of the population, and where the capture of extractive rents strengthens the ruling political coalitions (subjective), preventing the consolidation of neutral State power (objective State).

that the country's State weakness can be explained, at least partially, by its high dependence on extractivism and by the characteristics of its subjective and particular State.

Following the historical evidence, the end of the current gas cycle may translate into a new economic crisis, although its severity is difficult to determine. In any case, it is very reasonable to think that this phenomenon will jeopardize the continuity of the current ruling political coalition since the rents needed to finance political perks and favours are running out.

On the other hand, the possibility of undertaking a new extractive cycle around lithium is not entirely clear. In the first place, it is necessary to implement a productive structure, with millionaire investments and complex technological processes, and not simply a capture of its rents (nationalization), as in previous cycles. Secondly, a new governing political coalition may need to be structured, which does not necessarily coincide with the current one; in fact, it will probably involve other actors (regional, union, peasant, business, etc.); these new actors, with certain power over production decisions, will seek to play a predominant role and, therefore, will

displace some current actors, reconfiguring the coalition or forming a different one.

In any case, there is no reason to foresee that the end of the gas cycle and the potential new lithium cycle will favour the institutional strengthening of Bolivia since the conception of the public sector in the country is far from a modern vision where the State acts as a neutral and objective power, independent from private powers. It would seem that the country as a whole clings, more or less unconsciously, to its long extractivist tradition instead of proposing an alternative economic and political model.

References

- Acemoglu, Daron. (2009). *Introduction to modern economic growth*. Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Acemoglu, Daron and Johnson, Simon (2005). "Unbundling institutions." *Journal of Political Economy* 113 (5): 949-995.
- Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A. (2012). *Por qué fracasan los países. Los orígenes del poder, la prosperidad y la pobreza*. Barcelona: Deusto.
- Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A. (2019). *El pasillo estrecho: Estados, sociedades y cómo alcanzar la libertad*. Barcelona: Deusto.
- Acemoglu, Daron, Johnson, Simon and Robinson, James. A. (2005). "Chapter 6. Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth". In Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf. (Eds.), *Handbook of Economic Growth*. Amsterdam: Elsevier-North Holland.
- Almaraz, Sergio (2017). *Obra reunida*. La Paz: Biblioteca del Bicentenario de Bolivia.
- Arce Álvarez, Roberto (2003). *Desarrollo económico e histórico de la minería en Bolivia*. La Paz: Plural Editores.
- Barragán, Rossana (2015). "El Estado pactante: pensando en la fortaleza de la sociedad organizada". *Tinkazos* 37: 101-112.
- Barragán, Rossana (2017). "Working silver for the World: Mining Labor and Popular Economy in Colonial Potosí." *Hispanic American Historical Review* 97 (2): 193-222.
- Barragán, Rossana and Zagalsky, Paula C. (2023). *Potosí in the Global Silver Age (16th-19th Centuries)*. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill.
- Burchardt, Hans-Jürgen. (2016). "El neo-extractivismo en el siglo XXI. Qué podemos aprender del ciclo de desarrollo más reciente en América Latina". In Hans-Jürgen Burchardt, Rafael Domínguez, Carlos Larrea and Stefan Peters(editors). *Nada dura para siempre Perspectivas del neo-extractivismo en Ecuador tras el boom de las materias primas*: 55-88. Quito: Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar.
- Burchardt, Hans-Jürgen; Dietz, Kristina and Warnecke-Berger, Hannes. (2021). "[Dependency, Rent, and the Failure of Neo-Extractivism](#)". In Aldo Madariaga and Stefano Palestini. (Coords.), *Dependent Capitalisms in Contemporary Latin America and Europe*: 207-229. Londres: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cajías, Magdalena (2015). "La Revolución Nacional: actores sociales y políticos en alianza y disputa (1952-1964)." In Magdalena Cajías (Coord.), *Bolivia, su historia. Tomo VI: Constitución, desarrollo y crisis del estado de 1952*: 19-94. La Paz: Coordinadora de Historia.
- Céspedes, Augusto (1971). *El presidente colgado*. La Paz: Juventud.
- Céspedes, Augusto (2002). *El dictador suicida: 40 años de historia de Bolivia*. La Paz: Juventud.
- Dunkerley, James (2017). *Rebelión en las venas. La lucha política en Bolivia 1952-1982*. La Paz: Biblioteca del Bicentenario de Bolivia.
- Gamarra Téllez, María del Pilar (2018). *Amazonía norte de Bolivia economía gomera (1870-1940). Bases económicas de un poder regional. La Casa Suárez*. La Paz: Biblioteca del Bicentenario de Bolivia.
- Garner, Richard L. (1988). "Long-term Silver Mining Trends in Spanish America: A Comparative Analysis of Peru and Mexico." *American Historical Review* 93: 898-935.
- Guzmán Prudencio, Guillermo. (2022). "Las instituciones (capturadas) y el Estado (subjeto) de Bolivia: del Estado republicano al nacional." *Umbrales* 39: 129-158.

- Guzmán Prudencio, Guillermo and Rodríguez López, Fernando. (2015). "La ausencia de un Estado objetivo en Bolivia." *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, 170: 187-212.
- Herranz-Loncán, Alfonso and Peres-Cajías, José Alejandro. (2016). "Tracing the Reversal of Fortune in the Americas. Bolivian GDP per capita since the mid-nineteenth century." *Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History* 10(1): 99-128.
- Herranz-Loncán, Alfonso and Peres-Cajías, José Alejandro. (2016). "Tracing the Reversal of Fortune in the Americas. Bolivian GDP per capita since the mid-nineteenth century." *Cliometrica* 10 (1): 99-112.
- INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadística) (2024). Producto Interno Bruto anual por actividad económica. <https://www.ine.gob.bo/index.php/estadisticas-economicas/pib-y-cuentas-nacionales/producto-interno-bruto-anual/producto-interno-bruto-por-actividad-economica/>
- Montenegro, Carlos (2016). *Nacionalismo y coloniaje. Su expresión histórica en la prensa de Bolivia*. La Paz: Biblioteca del Bicentenario de Bolivia.
- Orsag Molina, José Octavio (2021). *Circuitos económicos durante el auge de la goma en Bolivia*. La Paz: CIS.
- Our World in Data (2024). Data: Oil price - Crude prices since 1861. <https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/crude-oil-prices>
- Peres-Cajías, José Alejandro (2015). "La dinámica económica del capitalismo de Estado (1952-1985)". In Magdalena Cajías. (Coord.), *Bolivia, su historia. Tomo VI: Constitución, desarrollo y crisis del estado de 1952*: 209-259. La Paz: Coordinadora de Historia.
- UNDP (United Nations Development Program) (2007). *El estado del Estado en Bolivia - Informe Nacional sobre Desarrollo Humano 2007*. La Paz: PNUD.
- Jordán Pozo, Rolando Felipe (1999). "Minería. Siglo XX: la Era del Estaño". In Fernando Campero Prudencio. (Coord.), *Bolivia en el siglo XX. La formación de la Bolivia contemporánea*: 219-239. La Paz: Harvard Club de Bolivia.
- Jordán Pozo, Rolando Felipe (2017). "Capítulo V. Minería. Paradojas del proceso de construcción del capitalismo en Bolivia". In Iván Velásquez-Castellanos and Napoleón Pacheco Torrico. (Coords.), *Un siglo de economía en Bolivia (1900-2015). Tópicos de historia económica*: 221-273. La Paz: KAS.
- Just, Marcus (2022). *El Estado fragmentado. Dependencias externas, actores subnacionales y servicios públicos locales en Bolivia*. La Paz: Plural, trAndeS.
- Miranda Pacheco, Carlos (1999). "Petróleo. Del descubrimiento petrolífero a la explosión del gas". In Fernando Campero Prudencio. (Coord.), *Bolivia en el siglo XX. La formación de la Bolivia contemporánea*: 241-267. La Paz: Harvard Club de Bolivia.
- Roca, José Luis (2017). *Ni con Lima ni con Buenos Aires. La formación del Estado nacional en Charcas*. La Paz: Biblioteca del Bicentenario de Bolivia.
- Sinnott, Emily, Nash, John and De la Torre, Augusto. (2010). *Los recursos naturales en América latina y el caribe ¿Más allá de bonanzas y crisis?* Washington: Banco Mundial.
- Suárez Ávila, Manuel (1999). *Nación y teología política. La estatalidad en Bolivia*. Madrid: Sequitur.
- Toranzo, Carlos (2017). "Capítulo X. Élités económicas en los siglos XX y XXI". In Iván Velásquez-Castellanos and Napoleón Pacheco Torrico. (Coords.), *Un siglo de economía en Bolivia (1900-2015). Tópicos de historia económica*: 469-506. La Paz: KAS.
- Zondag, Cornelius (1968). *La Economía Boliviana 1952-1965*. Cochabamba: Los Amigos del Libro.

EXTRACTIVISM

| The Project

The collaborative research project ***extractivism.de*** links the Universities of Kassel and Marburg. The project scrutinizes the extractivist development model and proposes new economic, political, and sociological conceptions of extractivism. It preliminarily focuses on Latin America and the Maghreb patterns. The project researches the conditions under which these patterns affect the persistence and transformative capacity of extractivism and its respective institutional settings. Finally, it explores how extractivism affects cultural processes and habitual routines and questions under what conditions and how far the development model extends into institution-building and social practice, i.e., everyday life.

The project aims to understand extractive societies not as deviants from the Western trajectory of development but in their own logic and their own particularities. The project, therefore, combines a strong empirical focus with theoretical work. It links both broad field research and data gathering of primary data and the qualitative and quantitative analysis of available secondary sources with a stringent transregional comparison. It develops methods in cross-area studies and investigates whether and why similar patterns of social change emerge in different areas and world regions despite significant cultural, social, or religious differences. Finally, the project intends to translate the findings for politics, society, and development cooperation.

Please visit www.extractivism.de for further information.

GEFÖRDERT VOM



Bundesministerium
für Bildung
und Forschung

U N I K A S S E L
V E R S I T Ä T

Philipps  Universität
Marburg