Architecture 
and
Other Architectures
Mapping the Production of Insular Space in 
the Pearl River Delta (China) and Jakarta (Indonesia)
Inaugural Dissertation
zur Erlangung des akademisches Grades eines 
Doktor-Ingenieur (Dr. - Ing.) 
im Fachbereich Architektur Stadt-und-Landschaftplannung 
der Universität Kassel
Vorgelegt von
Ilya Fadjar Maharika
Temanggung, Indonesien
Kassel, 2007
II
Als Dissertation vom
Universität Kassel
Fachbereich 6 Architektur Stadtplanung und Landschaftplanung
Henschelstrasse 2 Kassel 34109   
Dissertation angenommen am: 5 Oktober 2006
Gutachter:  
Prof. Dr. phil. Hans Frei
Prof. Dr. Detlev Ipsen
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 22. Dezember 2006 
III
I clarify that the submitted work for the Doctorate Degree to the Faculty of Architecture Urban and 
Landscape Planning, University of Kassel, Germany  entitled “Architecture and Other Architectures, 
mapping the production of insular space in the Pearl River Delta and Jakarta”  is supervised by 
Professor Hans Frei and co supervised Professor Detlev Ipsen. 
I also declare that the work is completed and written without any aid from other party. I declare 
before this submission, I did not engage in any program or apply any work to pursue the doctorate 
degree in architecture either in homeland or in abroad.
Some parts of this study have appeared in the following publications and events:
1. “Projecting Identity: Mapping the Genesis of Diff erentiations in the Pearl River Delta“ chapter in 
Detlev Ipsen, Yo-ngning Li, and Holger Weichler (eds.) 2005. Genesis of Urban Landscapes: Th e Pearl 
River Delta in South China. Work Report No. 161 of Faculty of Architecture Urban and Landscape 
Planning. Kassel: University of Kassel, pp. 33-43.
2.“Urban Poverty or Proto Urban Condition Misunderstood”  in Jutta Hebel, Samadi and Dodik 
Nurrochmat (eds.), Poverty Alleviation: Policy and Experiences in Developing Countries, Proceedings 
of International Seminar and Series of Disscussion on Poverty Alleviation 2003. Indonesian Students 
Association (PPI) chapter Germany and Centre for Tropical and Subtropical Agriculture and Forestry 
Georg-August Universität Göttingen (CeTSAF), August 9, 2003, pp. 51-59. 
3. “Technology For “Small And Medium Enterprises” from Spatial Perspective: A Consequence from 
Shifting Concept on Space” in Heru Iswanto and Misri Gozan (eds.) Proceeding of Indonesian Students 
Scientifi c Meeting Berlin 2002, available at (http://www.bibcouncil.de/issm2002/Proceedings/index.
htm) and “On the Ephemeral: tactility and urban politics” in Misri Gozan (ed.) Proceeding on the 
Indonesian Students Scientifi c Meeting (ISSM) 2001, Manchester, August 2001. 
4. “Th e Politics of Virtual Spaces: Th e Cases of Ephemeral Architecture in Indonesia” in Proceeding 
on Conference IASI Indonesian Scholars Association, AOL Verlag, Marburg, Germany 2002. 
5. “Space and Politics” (original title in Bahasa Indonesia “Ruang dan Politik”) working paper presented 
in Workshop on Local Institution Empowerment II held by the Institute of Science and Technology 
Studies (Istecs) chapter Europe, November 2001 in Frankfurt am Main, Germany. 
6. “Negotiating Political Space: Otherness and Other Space” (original title in Bahasa Indonesia: 
Menegosiasikan Ruang Politik: “Otherness” dan “Other Space”) in Josef Prijotomo (ed.) Proceeding 
on Postcolonialism in Built Environment in Indonesia,  Dept. of Architecture Institute of Technology 
Surabaya, Dept. of Architecture Udayana University Bali, and Indonesian Institute of Architects, 
region Bali June 2001. 
7. “Pearl River Delta: the beauty of planned cities and beauty of the vernacular” (Original title in 
Bahasa Indonesia “Delta Sungai Mutiara: Keindahan Kota Terencana dan Keindahan Vernakular”)
Kompas, 7 November 2004.
DECLARATION
IV
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
It all began with a meeting with Professor Hans Frei and then with Professor 
Detlev Ipsen at the Department of Architecture, Urban and Landscape 
Planning (Fachbereich Architektur Stadtplanung und Landschaftplanung) 
at the University of Kassel in Germany. Since then I spent four years 
living in Germany peddling from Marburg to Kassel in order to explore 
the relation between the discourse of globalization and its manifestation 
within architectural space. 
My study strayed from the typical work of students from the “third-world” 
which tends to contrast local or traditional architectural identity with 
global architecture. Instead, my thesis is focused on the “really existing 
globalization” and how the term can spatialize through the rampant 
creation of “global” insular spaces which tend to infl ict confl ict not only 
territorially but also with the identity of the “local” community. Professor 
Frei’s guidance led me down a path of exploration that dealt specifi cally 
with architecture at the border of confl ict. Th rough the course of this 
study I found that architectural space may cross the border and at the 
same time express the signature of the confl ict itself. Architecture in this 
case is treated at a “diagrammatic” level not merely in terms of space, but 
a diagram that draws spaces like gated communities as the logic for place-
making in the contemporary globalizing world. Professor Ipsen’s direction 
on the German term verinsellung – insularity - and his insights about the 
Pearl River Delta later developed into my central investigatory theme. To 
both, I owe my greatest debt of gratitude.
While I never felt quite at home during my four-year stay in Germany I 
was strangely heartbroken when preparing for my fl ight back to Indonesia. 
Although parts of this dissertation were fi nished in my home country, the 
connection to Germany remained with me always.    
To Professor Antonius Busch for his continuous support, saying great 
thanks I feel is far from suffi  cient. To Professor Christl Drey and Dr. 
Herbert Glasauer, I give my utmost appreciation for our discussions as well 
as warm friendship especially during the Pearl River Delta excursion.
VTo colleagues and friends, especially Gunter Wehmeyer whose warm friendship cannot be forgotten, 
to Li Gang, Jaiyin Shou, and Yun Duan who allowed some of their materials to be quoted in this 
dissertation, to Meicai He, Anna Schoepf, Holger Weichler, Clemens Back, Hirofumi Ueda, Hamid 
Makerani, Nooradin Rashid, Ulrike - Uli - Reichhardt , Susanne Kosh as well as Peter Yongning Li 
for their kind friendship both in Germany and in China. My appreciation must also be given to Mrs. 
Erichson at the university administration, Mrs. Helga Kraekel, Mrs. Ingrid Loeffl  er, Mrs. Itter and 
Mrs Salzman without whom my study would not have been possible. 
I am greatly indebted to DAAD, Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst, and the Department 
of National Education, Republic of Indonesia, for supporting me in fi nishing this doctorate 
promotion. 
In Indonesia, my foremost appreciation is given institutionally to the Islamic University of Indonesia, 
to the Faculty of Civil Engineering and Planning and to all of my colleagues at the Department of 
Architecture. Th anks also for the great support from my research colleagues in Gated Communities 
Research Group. English proof reading done by Kate O’Shoughnessy, Anita from CILACS (Center 
for International Language and Culture Studies - Islamic University of Indonesia), Siskina Morinoue 
(CD Bethesda Volunteer), Brian Curren for his last minute proof reading, as well as Melanie Nertz 
from Freiburg whose help makes this book easier to read. My gratitude and appreciation goes to them 
as well for their work.  
Love and thanks to my parents and brothers who always support me with their prayers. To friends 
Lukman Baga, the Suparman family, the Wannurachmad family, Professor Isaak Eff endy and his 
family, the Mascizeck family, Asep Mulyana, Adhitya Wardhono, as well as the “Mar-Gie family”, 
without them living in Germany would have been rather lonely.  
Finally, to my wife Retno, and our sons Raka, Adhwa and Argha, my love and gratitude are beyond 
my ability to express in words. Th e fi rst two boys were with us throughout our wandering days of 
struggle in Germany. Argha’s birth made the completion of this writing, in our home country, even 
more cheerful.
ifm
VI
ABSTRACT
Globalization is widely regarded as the rise of the borderless world. 
However in practice, true globalization points rather to a “spatial 
logic” by which globalization is manifested locally in the shape of 
insular space. Globalization in this sense is not merely about the 
creation of physical fragmentation of space but also the creation of 
social disintegration. Th is study tries to proof that global processes 
also create various forms of insular space leading also to specifi c 
social implications.
In order to examine the problem this study looks at two cases: China’s 
Pearl River Delta (PRD) and Jakarta in Indonesia. 
Th e PRD case reveals three forms of insular space namely the modular, 
concealed and the hierarchical. Th e modular points to the form of 
enclosed factories where workers are vulnerable for human-right 
violations due to the absent of public control. Th e concealed refers 
to the production of insular space by subtle discrimination against 
certain social groups in urban space. And the hierarchical points 
to a production of insular space that is formed by an imbalanced 
population fl ow. Th e Jakarta case attempts to show more types of 
insularity in relation to the complexity of a mega-city which is shaped 
by a culture of exclusion. Th ose are dormant and hollow insularity. 
Th e dormant refers to the genesis of insular– radical – community 
from a culture of resistance. Th e last type, the hollow, points to the 
process of making a “pseudo community” where sense of community 
is not really developed as well as weak social relationship with its 
surrounding.
Although global process creates various expressions of territorial 
insularization, however, this study fi nds that the “line of fl ight” is 
always present, where the border of insularity is crossed. Th e PRD’s 
produces vernacular modernization done by peasants which is less 
likely to be controlled by the politics of insularization. In Jakarta, 
the culture of insularization causes urban informalities that have no 
space, neither spatially nor socially; hence their state of ephemerality 
continues as a tactic of place-making. Th is study argues that these 
crossings possess the potential for reconciling venue to defuse the 
power of insularity.
VII
zusammenfassung
Globalisierung wird weltweit verstanden als die Entwicklung hin zu einer grenzenlosen Welt. 
Tatsächlich aber zeigt sich die wahre Globalisierung eher in einer räumlichen Logik, bei der 
sie sich lokal in der Gestalt von insularen Räumen manifestiert. Globalisierung in diesem 
Sinne ist nicht nur die Erschaff ung von physikalischer Fragmentierung, sondern auch von 
sozialer Disintegration.  
Diese Studie versucht zu beweisen, daß globale Prozesse auch verschiedene Formen von 
insularen Räumen erschaff en, die zu bestimmten sozialen Verfl echtungen führen.
Um das Problem zu untersuchen, betrachtet diese Studie zwei Fälle: Das Pearl River Delta 
(PRD) in China und Jakarta in Indonesien. 
Das Beispiel des PRD macht drei verschiedene Formen von Verinselung deutlich: Die 
Modulare,  die Verborgene und die Hierarchische. Die Modulare zeigt auf eine Form von 
umschlossenen Fabriken, wo die Arbeiter aufgrund der Abwesenheit von öff entlicher Kontrolle 
angreifbarer sind für Menschenrechtsverletzungen. Dagegen bezieht sich die verborgene 
Verinselung auf die Produktion von insularen Räumen mit einer subtilen Diskrimination 
gegen bestimmte soziale Gruppen im Urbanen Raum. Als Drittes zeigt die hierarchische 
Verinselung auf eine Produktion von insularen Räumen hin, die sich in unausgeglichenen 
Bevölkerungsfl üssen formiert. Der Fall von Jakarta versucht eher, mehr Formen von Insularität 
in Beziehung zu der Komplexität einer Megastadt aufzuzeigen, die gestaltet wird von einer 
Kultur der Ausschliessung. In dem Fall eine schlummernde und eine hohle Insularität. Die 
schlummernde bezieht sich auf die Schöpfung von insularen radikalen Gesellschaften mit 
einer Kultur des Widerstandes. Die hohle Insularität zeigt auf einen Prozess der Gestaltung 
einer Pseudogesellschaft, in der die Wahrnehmung der Gesellschaft nicht richtig entwickelt 
ist und auch die sozialen Beziehungen zu Ihrer Umgebung schwach sind.
Obwohl globale Prozesse verschiedene Arten von Verinselungen erschaff en, zeigt diese 
Studie auch, dass es die sogenannte „line of fl ight“ gibt, die die Grenzen der Verinselung 
überschreitet. Vernakuläre Modernisierung im PRD ist ein Beispiel, wie Modernisierung 
sich durch Bauern unabhängig von staatlicher Kontrolle entwickelt. In Jakarta verursacht 
die kulturelle Verinselung urbane Informalitäten mit weder physikalischem noch sozialem 
Raum. Dieser Zustand der Ephemeralität setzt sich fort in einer Taktik der Schaff ung von 
Plätzen. Diese Studie argumentiert, dass diese Überschreitungen das Potential haben, Orte 
in Einklang zu bringen, um die Kraft der Insularität abzuschwächen.
VIII
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Declaration III
 Acknowledgement IV
 Abstract   VI
Zusammenfassung  VII
 Table of Contents VIII
INTRODUCTION
1. Architecture Th eory within Global Context    2
 1.1  Architecture as a signature of confl ict     4
  Divided architecture - divided society    4
  Critical Regionalism and the battle of identity    7
 1.2  Global shift: other architectures?      9 
1.3  On the research: mapping out reconciling space    14
  Point of departure   14
  Method: making explicit through mapping    15
  Shape of the report   17
PART I  ON DISCOURSE OF INSULARITY
2 Global Insularity   22
 2.1  Global space as the metaphor: the limits   23
  Cyber space: contested global agora   24
  Global cities - global fragmentation   32
  Postcolonial cities: hybrid and re-division of space   42
2.2  Insularity in the wilderness   50
  Concept of insularity   51
  Th eme park: consuming imagined places   58
  Gated communities: walling space walling societies    62
  Export Processing Zones: a mobile place of mobilization   72 
 2.3  Insularity leaks   78
  Non-places    78
  Junkspace   84
  Urban slum and desakota   86
PART II  CASES 
3. Case 1 Th e Pearl River Delta: on the creation of insular territories 102
 3.1  City as “enclave imagined territory”  103
  From agriculture to industrialization  105
  Towards a wild mega city  113
  Persistence of division: from architecture of wall to 
  ephemeral border  127 
 3.2  On the making insular spaces  137
  Modular space: dorm-factories   137
  Concealed insularity: Dongguan hidden urban life  149
  Hierarchical insularity: Shenzhen and Nansha “hub city”  158
IX
 3.3  Vernacular modernization: anti-insular territory in     
  the making  168
4.  Case 2 Jakarta‘s Culture of Insularity: on the production 
  of ephemeral spaces  184
 4.1  Jungle organisée: spatial explosions, social implosion 
  and the persistance of segregation  187
  Exploded cosmological orders  188
  Exploded infrastructure: exurbia of estate and kampung   193
  Imploded social space: cities within a city  201
 4.2  Kampung’s intangible insularity and 
  the creation of resistance  212
  Kampung as a social space  216
  Kampung as a contested site  227
  Kampung’s resistance identity  230
 4.3  Modern pecinan: on the making of hollow insularity  232
  Chinese and the pecinan as a symbol of insularization   234
  Kota Wisata: on the making modern “pecinan”  237
 4.4  Urban informalities: resisting insularity through
  the making of ephemeral spaces  246
  Kaki lima: depleting insular space  247
  Gardu’s struggle for democratic space  251
  Rukunan: virtual reconciling space   255
  Resisting insularization: necessity for representation  257
PART III ON OTHER ARCHITECTURES
5.  Other Architectures: border crossing   272
 5.1  Diagram of insularity   272
  Th e form and the meaning of insularity  272
  Th e meaning of insularity  276
  Spectrum of border  278
5.2  On border crossing: role of urban informalities in urban 
  development   281
  New strategies in architectural discourse  281
  Urban informalities and development  284
  Urban informalities: need for representation  287
 5.3  Summary    291
 References    301
 Curriculum Vitae   315
Erklarung  320
XTh is page is intentionally 
printed grey to memorize 
all the victims of the 26 
December 2004 tsunami 
in Aceh and 27 May 2006 
earthquake in Yogyakarta, 
my home town, to whom 
this study is dedicated.
Introduction
 CHAPTER 1 - 2
Writers of architectural theory are always in a delicate position 
namely on the border between architectural autonomy and its social 
context. In the current global environment, rather unfortunately, 
architecture is seen more as an arena of confl ict than a place of 
reconciliation. Th e collapse of World Trade Center on September 
11 of 2001, bomb explosions in Bali in 2003 and 2005, and the 
continuous fencing and bombing between Israelis and Palestinians 
are more than just proof that architecture in one way or another is 
involved in social dynamics and confl ict. On one side architecture 
may be seen – behind certain ideology and identity – as the “enemy” 
or a site that belongs to “other culture and behavior” thereby inviting 
resistance and retaliation. On the other side, architecture may also 
be the confl ict itself, a territorial confl ict, which may implicate a 
broader dimension. Consequently, we shall be more sensitive about 
what is happening in this global world, and what architecture can 
do in the context of that confl ict, which now fi nds that any confl ict 
– no matter how small it is - has potential to grow into a global 
one. Raising this sensitivity and fi nding a way for architecture as 
Architecture Theory 
within Global 
Context
1
‘While any theory that talks about architecture only – that 
does not relate architecture to the larger social, material 
fi eld – is practically useless, at the same time any theory 
that does not articulate the concrete specifi city and semi-
autonomy of architecture’s codes and operations misses a 
major medium of social practice’ (Hays 1998 p.xii).
Source of previous page: 
Imam Cahyono “Orang 
Miskin Bukan Angka 
Statistik” (Th e Poor is Not 
Statistical Numbers) in 
Kompas 8 August 2005).
3reconciliation platform are the primary tasks of this research. 
Th e underlying reason for conducting this research is to understand 
the more appropriate role for architecture especially in the author’s 
home country of Indonesia where urban development and identity 
are highly confl icting. In particular, the May 1998 Jakarta Riot was 
the most terrible post-independence urban incident ever experienced 
by the people of Jakarta. Th e rioting destroyed about 1,026 houses 
and 4,676 shops, supermarkets, banks and other commercial and 
government buildings.1 In those days the people of Jakarta could be 
divided into “us” against “them” meaning the mainstream society 
against such groups as the affl  uent Chinese, the ruling parties and the 
government. In more recent events, the “sweeping” of bars, hotels, 
discotheques, and similar so-called hedonistic venues for foreigners 
by radical Islamic groups is becoming more common. Th e claim that 
such places are not suitable for the “religious society” of Indonesia 
is used to legitimize this criminal action. Many kampung dwellers 
are also being radicalized by mushrooming gated communities 
that have crowded their living environments resulting in protests, 
demonstrations and resistance movements. 
While repressing the continuing tension and confl ict, developers and 
authorities in Jakarta have been gearing up for more development in 
order to once again become a prosperous and attractive city in the 
world market. Here, to be more global means to be more exclusive 
- excluding the multitude living in kampungs. For those who live in 
depreciated areas, development as such does not result in a better 
situation. While concentrating on richness, architecture makes a 
solid division between the rich and the poor. Th is spatial division 
maintains societal tensions which then cause people to segregate 
themselves through more physical and territorial boundaries. 
Th e city is trapped in a culture of walls which destroys other 
possibilities, culture of reconciliation in this case, to come. Th e city 
and its architecture continue to be mutually exclusive from their 
social setting; architects are not able to break away from a process 
of perpetual forgetting and of perpetual destruction of potential 
alternatives. Th e more architects construct; the more they forget. 
Omnipresent war: the poor 
versus the rich in Jakarta. 
Source: Above: Imam 
Cahyono “Orang Miskin 
Bukan Angka Statistik” 
(Th e Poor is Not Statistical 
Numbers) in Kompas 8 
August 2005). Below: 
apartment advertising in the 
same new paper.
 CHAPTER 1 - 4
1.1 Architecture as a signature of 
social conflict
Th e above brief provocation is an attempt to bring this architectural 
research into its social context. A pioneering attempt to link 
architecture with social context in our modern history can perhaps 
be traced back to the dynamics of world politics during European 
colonial times. European colonialism was a banal expression when 
architecture was utilized to justify the status of the colonized. It was 
the “other” which had a somewhat lesser degree of architectural 
traditions. More current is the discourse of critical regionalism, 
which sees architecture as the tension between local and global 
architectural identity. 
Divided architecture - divided society
In the past the world, and by extension space, was ordered into 
dichotomies. Profound Manichean oppositions drove the state-
based sovereignty of imperialism where Europe was the center of the 
world. Th e powerful and the powerless, the haves and the have-nots, 
the civilized and the barbaric, et cetera were instruments by which 
our world and space were colonized, spatially divided and organized, 
and then culturally changed. Cities such as Marrakech, Algiers, 
Mumbai, Singapore, Jakarta, Shanghai and Johannesburg were 
ordered into two macro-spheres.2 Walls were used to create and defi ne 
colonial cities that were dictated by divisions between colonizers and 
colonized as well as by race. In these cities, physical, racial and social 
identities were clearly defi ned, based on an imbalanced relationship 
between them. Space became an important instrument for creating 
separated territory by which identity was then constructed, and vice 
versa. Colonial architecture and space marked this stable hierarchy, 
in both blatant and subtle relationships.
Architecture in the colonial era was a cartography for the imbalanced 
relationship that was emblematically projected into “architecture” 
and “other architecture.” In the case of British India for instance, 
the awareness of the British that they had actually encountered one 
of the most refi ned architectural traditions emerged more than a 
5century after they had extensively jack hammered stone and marble 
temples and palaces to use as materials for building new roads. 
Norma Evenson, who extensively studied Indian cities, concluded 
that cities like Madras, Mumbai, Calcutta and New Delhi were from 
the very beginning “a theatre for the demonstration of European 
architectural and planning concept”3 rather than being seen as 
Indian architectural tradition. Often British building programs 
conducted in the colony did not include Indian architecture because 
they thought the culture was intangible. She expressed her view on 
that era of development: 
‘So intense were the British on the creation of a westernized ambience 
that, to their eyes, the large Indian district of the colonial cities seemed 
virtually non existent in terms of architecture.’4
Indeed, some architects did try to balance the relation and seek to 
reconcile between two worlds, although it was still ambivalent and 
maintained its subtle mastery. Le Corbusier’s work in Algiers from 
1931-1942 during the French colonial period was a clear example of 
this attitude. Algiers was a dual city consisting of Muslim quarters 
called Kasbah on one side and European quarters on the other. As 
Mary McLeod has interrogated, Corbusier saw Kasbah dwellings as 
“humane architecture” in contrast to the European quarters, which 
he considered “the disorder of the past fi fty years.” Corbusier’s plans, 
including Th e Obus A to E and Plan Directeur, postulated integration 
Le Corbusier’s works on 
Algiers: sketch of kasbah. Th e 
diagrams show concept of 
integration between Muslim 
and European world, and 
the complete Plan Directeur. 
(Source: McLeod 1998: 493, 
511, 513, 514)
 CHAPTER 1 - 6
between Muslim and European culture. However, the integration 
was merely in the shape of preserving the Kasbah and proposing 
the aesthetic image of a cité d’aff airs – the business center - as a 
symbol of unity. McLeod saw that this center lacked the economic 
integration that the Muslims needed. Hence, McLeod concluded 
that Corbusier did not actually examine the existing class structure 
but rather brought about “the revolt of human consciousness.” Th e 
result however was nonetheless merely a formal approach preoccupied 
with the visualization of a new society.5 Architecture that worked in 
a symbolic realm to bridge the two failed to mark a clear path for 
real reconciliation between confl icting parts. 
Th e International Colonial Exhibition in Paris in 1931 was 
ambivalent too. Here, other cultures were displayed by extracting 
them from their cultural setting in order to fulfi ll the European desire 
to know (and from a Machiavellian viewpoint, then maintaining 
its domination) as the pavilions presented were mostly replicas 
of the colonial buildings. However there was also an attempt to 
“incorporate” the colony within the European architectural tradition 
- somewhat the “raw material” of European creativity – as with the 
case of the Dutch pavilion. Following Frances Gouda’s historical 
interpretation, Abidin Kusno saw this pavilion as “a truly creative 
synthesis” of indigenous Indonesian architectures (Balinese Hindu 
temples, Javanese mosques and the Minangkabau-style rooftops of 
Sumatra) with the rationality and architectural tradition of Dutch 
representation. In this pavilion, the rational geometry of the whole 
negated the sacredness of the individual, indigenous buildings. Kusno 
nonetheless showed that from this formal relation the pavilion still 
conveyed a subtle sense of European mastery, along the interest and 
the will for “representing a humanitarian purpose” over its colony. 
Moreover, Kusno remarked on the underlying politics of the Dutch 
project when he said that “the collage seemed to suggest the rational 
form of colonial authority that, it claimed, had amalgamated the 
disparate cultures of the Nederlandes Indies (now Indonesia) into 
a coherent political whole.”6 Or in other words: architecture that 
works merely through form and order fails to accomplish the task of 
reconciling place. 
7Dutch Pavilion in Paris 
1931: rational form 
amalgamated the disparate 
cultures of the Netherlands 
Indies, now Indonesia.   
(Source: Nederland te Parijs 
1931 Geden le boek Van de 
Nederlandsche deelneming 
dan de Internationale 
Koloniale tentoonsfelling 
Uit gave Van de Vereeiniging 
“Oosten West” ten Bate Van 
Hef Steuncomite-Parijs as 
appeared in Kusno, 2000, 
p. 27) 
Critical Regionalism and the quest for identity
Architecture may also represent the more conceptual tension 
between the local and the global. As globalization is meant 
rather as internationalization of universal values in all spectrums 
of life, architecture that respects the local elements fi nds its 
momentum. “Regional architecture” is a reaction to the rampant 
internationalization and modernization brought in especially by 
International Style. Hence understandably, regionalism arises as the 
strategy of resistance against that tendency. 
Explored through cultural studies, regionalism centers on the 
vernacular. Initiated fi rst by Bernhard Rudofsky in his controversial 
book Architecture without Architects, this area of architecture has been 
rigidly framed by the concept that these architectures denote the 
local.7 Amos Rapoport’s House Form and Culture for instance, has 
become a classic reference that continues to generate a great amount 
of research worldwide to unravel the ideographic knowledge and 
wisdom of the local.8 Vernacular architecture as well as the prodigious 
urban manifestation is explored and discussed worldwide. Most of 
this research draws special attention to their encounters with modern 
(Western) architectural style. Studies in context of mud-architecture 
in New Gourna Egypt by Hassan Fathy,9 traditional Chinese 
architecture,10 Indonesia’s tectonic and traditional architecture, as 
 CHAPTER 1 - 8
well as its “living house” comprise just a short list of this tendency 
in architectural research.11 Some scholars have also applied the cross-
cultural interpretation in traditional settlements and in housing.12
Here the global magnitude of this particular architecture is evident. 
Vernacular became a “global architectural phenomenon” because it 
is very local but also heterogeneous compared to what is considered 
global but homogenous. Th e apex of this debate is on the term 
“critical regionalism.” Along with the quest for uniqueness of the 
locality, this approach extends the view that sees the local and its direct 
relationship with the global marking the birth of postmodernism. 
First initiated by Alexander Tzonis and Liane Lefaivre, the term critical 
regionalism only became famous after Kenneth Frampton extended 
it as a tool for resistance in his Towards Critical Regionalism: Six 
Points for Architecture of Resistance. Expanding on the Heideggerian 
view, Frampton saw that architecture must be rooted to the soil, to 
elements such as nature, climate, light, tectonics, and tactile objects 
instead of following the tendency toward mere iconographical 
images and visuals. According to Frampton, critical regionalism is the 
adaptation of modern architecture by balancing between its universal 
progressive qualities and its context-specifi c value responses. It ties 
architecture together with the existing and historical attributes of 
a region, to create “architecture of place, belonging and meaning.” 
It is understandable that critical regionalism served as a form of 
resistance due to the exaggeration of the spirit of International 
Style that became a globalizing and homogenizing force of built 
environments.13
Quite recently, however, Tzonis and Lefaivre recalled Lewis 
Mumford’s exceptional interpretation of regionalism, not as the 
opposite of the global, nor resistance to it as in Frampton’s position, 
but rather working within the global itself. Regionalism here is 
viewed as synonymous with modern. Th ey suggested that despite 
similar points of departure, Mumford’s idea of regionalism was in 
opposition to Heidegger’s Heimat and Volkarchitektur, which is 
criticized by Tzonis as anti-modernist. For Mumford, regionalism is 
not a way of resisting the global.14 Tzonis and Lefaivre have lucidly 
illustrated the role of regionalism within globalization. In contrast 
9to what has been widely understood, they argued that modern 
architecture, which was exemplifi ed by the Modern Movement, was 
actually rooted in the search for regionalism before it was twisted 
by internationalization and the quest for the universal. Regionalism 
seeks various tactics and strategies by which architecture can be 
approached from “bottom up” rather than “imposing narcissistic 
formulas from the top down.” Th e bottom up approach is reached 
whether it is through landscape (nature) or a sense of identity. 
Critical regionalism emphasizes the specifi c site as well as the new 
tactic and strategy of design. 
Th e name “critical regionalism” implies that the reverse practice of 
architecture is “uncritical” and merely recycles the traditional regional 
sources of form and order. But the relationship between globalization 
and architecture today is trapped by those tendencies. On one 
hand, globalization pushes architecture towards universalization. 
On the other, both “critical” and “uncritical” regionalism opposes 
it by positioning itself in the localities thereby representing a “desire 
for the sense of locality.” Th e relation between this approach and 
globalization, quite predictably, is merely a question of architectural 
identity, a sense of localities and places in the global world that 
tends to erase diff erences. Here the “local” must be constructed and 
reconstructed in order to survive within rampant interchangeable 
global identities. Tzonis and Lefaivre have quite clearly formulated 
the source of this tension: confl ict between globalization and 
international intervention, on one hand, and local identity and the 
desire for ethnic insularity, on the other.15 Unfortunately, it looks 
like no more than a statement - a “conceptual architecture” – that is 
unlikely to shorten the gap between these confl icting identities. 
1.2 Global shift: other 
architectures? 
‘In contrast to imperialism, Empire establishes no territorial center of 
power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentered 
and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the 
entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers. Empire manages 
hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through 
modulating network of command.’ (Hardt and Negri 2000: xii)
 CHAPTER 1 - 10
Th e major criticism of viewing architecture as a representation of 
world politics and a confl ict of identities between the local-global 
falls on the nature of current - “really existing” – globalization. As 
a continuation of the modernization process, globalization is not 
new.16 But it is now evolving into what Hardt and Negri have called 
a paradigmatic shift on the notion of hierarchy of power.17 Hardt 
and Negri believe that that the old division of imperialism based on 
state sovereignty has been shifted by the “Empire.” 
Intended as a concept, a nebulous all-encompassing spectrum 
of power, the “Empire” is marked by the blurring of distinctions 
between “inside” and “outside” (or alternately between inclusive and 
exclusive). More precisely it is the argument that there is no such 
outside but rather it is both “everywhere and nowhere.”18 Empire 
eliminates the rigid hierarchical relationships between parts of the 
world as well as its social relationships. Th e world is not governed by 
a single superpower but rather by continuous negotiation between 
the more powerful and the less powerful, between states and 
corporate, and so on. Instead of a stable hierarchy, this relationship is 
always a matter of degree. Identity is constructed not in Manichean 
terms anymore but rather as a degree of diff erences that functions 
ephemerally, but is no less violent. Th ey wrote moreover:
‘Empire does not think differences in absolute terms; it poses racial 
differences never as a difference of nature but always as a difference of 
degree, never as necessary but always as accidental. Subordination is 
enacted in regimes of everyday practices that are more mobile and flexible 
but that create racial hierarchies that are nonetheless stable and brutal.’ 
(Hardt and Negri 2000: 194)
In this new world, globalization cannot be reduced to a mere one-
sided concept that emphasizes the proliferation of barrier-lifting 
between nations and works mainly in the area of economy. But it 
must also be thought of as the proliferation of control mechanisms 
and the redefi nition of barriers between parts of the world, that 
appear and disappear based on any level of encounter. Both physical 
and cultural borders are deployed to create ephemeral diff erences, 
hence at once nowhere and anywhere. It may imply that the creation 
of borderless regions also entails the creation of another border in 
another dimension. It also means a small number of our society may 
11
enjoy the diminishing barriers but the rest will then encounter the 
increasing proliferation of walls in a variety of diff erent forms. Th e 
Empire has created a logic of globalization that seems contradictory. 
It creates the image of a borderless world in the mind yet on the 
ground it entails the massive creation of new walls that are easily 
multiplied worldwide. 
It is precisely within this contradiction that architecture is now placed, 
and here is where the actually existing globalization may be, or should 
be, dealt with. Within this view, posing architecture merely within 
the confl ict of architectural identities will lose its meaning as the 
border between global and local architecture appears and disappears. 
Similarly, merely posing architecture as a representation or criticism 
of global politics will end a battle of claims rather than create a real 
border crossing between the powerful and the powerless. 
We need one or perhaps many other routes, to place architecture in 
the global world. 
If we are looking at current architecture, digital architecture becomes 
a major discourse, which responds to globalization. A series of 
conferences arranged by Any Corporation for instance, gathered 
architects such as Ignasi de Solà-Morales, Benhard Tschumi, Rem 
Koolhaas, and Kenzo Tange as well as theorist Beatriz Colomina, 
globalist Saskia Sassen, and philosophers Elizabeth Grosz and Akira 
Asada. Th e conferences recognized what was new or previously 
unseen. One of the critical fi ndings is that what Davidson called 
the “new planar of computer.” Echoing Sassen, the meetings held by 
Any Corporation have constructed “new conceptual architectures 
in order to capture the new topographies of digital space” rather 
than being “the prisoners of older categories.”19 Similar points 
have also been made by leading architects such as Greg Lynn in his 
extensive studies on “new architecture”20 Zaha Hadid, Spuybroek’s 
NOX, Foreign Offi  ce Architecture, and others on the work of Latent 
Utopias.21 Zelner has also tried to employ the power of computer 
technology with the natural landscape in order to create what he 
calls hybrid architecture.22 Manuel Gausa and others have collated 
their ideas with an “a to z” Metapolis Dictionary of Advanced 
 CHAPTER 1 - 12
Architecture, which claims to be a discourse about city, technology 
and society in the information age.23 Th ey are just a few examples of 
how architecture is approaching globalization through the advent of 
computer technology. Architecture in this case however off ers merely 
an illusion of borderless space. It is like Adrian Forty’s criticism on 
the term “democratic space” exemplifi ed by the Royal Festival Hall 
in London. Th e hall, which is widely regarded as a democratic space, 
is actually merely an illusion of democracy, as Forty’s assertion, “Like 
in theatre, it dealt with perception and illusion, and its business 
was not to change the world but only to show how it might feel 
diff erent.”24 Chris Abel criticized also that such architecture in many 
cases is armored with complex conceptual approaches but end in 
simple forms. In our criticism, although it also has potential, the 
current approach on digital architecture barely touches what Hardt 
and Negri have anatomized.
Th e other way of seeing identity has radically changed after the 
desire to seek universal values found its end with pluralism. In 
this globalization, singularity is challenged or replaced by plurality 
of the masses, the multitude. Postmodernism, which denies rigid 
interpretations of modernization, proliferates along the rise of 
what Castells called the network society based on information 
technologies,25 world market of capitalism; or what Fredric Jameson 
called late-capitalism26 and time-space compression.27 Post-modern 
architecture then becomes fashionable throughout the world that 
both celebrate global values and local or regional forms. However, 
we may see that postmodernism has been reduced to merely the 
explosion of “Las Vegas style” architecture. Here Robert Venturi 
and Denise Scott Brown foreshadowed these developments as early 
as 1972 in Learning from Las Vegas.28 Claiming that architecture as 
space is dead, their interpretation of the vernacular architecture of 
Las Vegas led them to the conclusion that iconography has become 
the new tradition in architecture. Venturi’s shift to symbolism from 
his previous position on form in Complexity and Contradiction in 
Architecture has proven to be true on a broader scale. Koolhaas’ 
interview with both writers and his relearning of this city recalled the 
signifi cance of the fact that “Las Vegas architecture” has now been 
13
transformed from the “archetype of unreality” into a “real city.”29
Under the banner of shopping it has become a global architecture. 
Copied by many, its iconography has even been infl ated into 
buildings worldwide. Here the opposition between local and global, 
traditional and modern has become blurred if not meaningless. 
It is in this area that architecture needs once more a manifesto to 
relate it to the pressures and changes brought about by rampant 
globalization.
Here, Venturi and Scott Brown as well as Koolhaas touch some 
major part of what we see as really existing globalization, but not 
completely. Indeed, the “Las Vegas style” has multiplied throughout 
the world. If the style was a “virtual condition” grown some decades 
ago, the current mega cities would have become the real nest of this 
style. Looking deeper into this development, it has also caused the 
intensifi ed creation of enclaved territories such as malls and gated 
communities in most of the cities in the world. However, these 
shiny architectures in many parts of the world exist side by side 
with poorly constructed slum or squatter settlements like favela, 
gecekondu or kampung. In this site, the “iconographic” relationship 
of Las Vegas style blurs as the style can be utilized by both the glitzy 
malls and the ordinary houses in the kampung. What really appears 
as a confl ict is then very banal: territorial occupation and the brutally 
sharp distinction between the powerful and the powerless in space.  
Hence, the relationship between society and architecture in this 
view is not merely about showing how the space might feel diff erent 
or quarreling between the global and the local, but rather they 
are exacerbated by images and realities of the unavoidable “spatial 
invasion” of the powerful into the territory of the powerless. In 
this case, hypothetically speaking, we are not talking about the 
relationship between global and local architecture anymore, but also 
the dynamic of confl ict between two distinct “systems of cell.” Malls, 
gated communities and the like are “physical cells” that have their 
own logic based on their function of making gains. But the favela, 
gecekondu or kampung resistance may also be seen as a “cultural cell” 
that plays to defend themselves against the other’s infi ltration. 
 CHAPTER 1 - 14
Here emerge the central questions of this study: can we diagramatize 
the dynamic relationship between global processes and forms and 
their local, spatial and social implication through this system of cell 
allegory? What do they look like in an urban setting? And how they 
are produced? How do they interact in an urban setting? What is 
the implication of those spaces for the related society within and 
without in terms of confl ict of identity? How can they be bridged in 
order to reconcile between them? 
1.3 On the Research: mapping out 
reconciling space 
In tackling the above questions, there are several aspects that should 
be taken into account. Th e fi rst is the author’s standing position and 
aim. Th e second is the methodological aspect of this research and 
the third is the way the report is shaped. 
Point of departure
Current globalization deconstructs rigid polarities, which is replaced 
by ephemeral hierarchies. Similarly, in theoretical thinking there is 
also the tendency to deconstruct the rigid polarities between what 
is true and false in our society. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that 
to think is to connect between things, a sort of rhizomatic way of 
thinking. Th eir reading on Kafka, entitled Towards a Minor Literature,
indicates the importance of the minority, non-mainstream elements 
in our mind.30 In this sense, it is relevant to recall the postcolonial 
aspects in this discourse as a point of departure. 
Th e area of research for this study is the theory of architecture and 
urbanism; it is about writing theory, a text. Th us, it is not immune 
to the politics and subjectivity of the author. Originating with 
the so-called postcolonial country, the author’s thinking, hence, 
conscious or not, is diluted with attributes associated with that 
“locality.” In regards to this issue it is valuable to recall Anthony 
King’s comment: 
‘In regards to issues of racism, multi cultural ism, disputed heritage, or 
social equity, apart from addressing the conscious elimination, preservation, 
or restructuring of colonial space in its material sense, it is equally if not 
15
more important to address the unconscious persistence of colonial space, 
not only out there in the real world, but … in the colonial space in our 
heads.’ (King 2003, p.181)
According to Anthony King, colonial space in our heads is a ghostly 
complication that we should deal with carefully. His notions of 
conscious and unconscious colonial space, extending the idea of 
“actually existing postcolonialist” are also about how we understand 
the local–global relation. Th is invites us to a frontier of complication 
for the postcolonial world and current process of globalization where 
the latter is, in many ways, seen as the continuation of colonialism. 
For King, writing on postcolonialism is a matter of the politics 
of writing, of our personal knowledge and subjectivity, about the 
position of what we write and to whom and what we believe to 
be important. In regards to this study, the “postcolonial thinking” 
thus is an entry point rather than the aim. Th e thinking is anchored 
in a perpetual subject and intention that is perhaps desired by any 
human being, a decolonizing process of the continuation of power 
and hegemony – a “minority” in itself. Within this desire, “spatial 
invasion” is then - hypothetically speaking -  placed as a way of 
making this hegemony in a spatial sense. Finding a line of fl ight 
from it is then the underlying intention of this research. 
Method: making explicit through mapping
Methodologically speaking, phenomenology is conceived of as a 
“return to things” as opposed to abstraction and mental construction.31
But our phenomenology is not only in this sense. Rather, following 
Sloterdijk’s words as “making explicit of the implicit.”32 A map in this 
regard becomes the primary tool. Maps used here are deliberately 
constructed in order to show the problem that this study attempts 
to highlight. Th e term “map” here does not exclusively point to the 
specifi c form we are familiar with (a two dimensional picture of land) 
but refers also to a “mental map” produced by pictures and text. Th is 
mental map hence is not merely a mode for representing the form 
and process of spatial invasion we have discussed but is also what 
Paul Virilio called the archaeology of the future which includes a sense 
of continual evolution, a becoming that comes before history. Maps 
illustrate the becoming because they show connections between 
 CHAPTER 1 - 16
diff erent levels of reality or phenomenon. Th e phenomenological 
approach to the objects of this research will reveal the “things” of 
spatial invasion as a phenomenon of insularity, or more concrete 
insular territories and spaces, how they interact, what kinds of 
boundaries defi ne the territories, and how they become a “place.” 
Th e mapping here is then the whole eff ort to visualize and to render 
the interaction within the context of a mega city. 
In this attempt, two postcolonial sites are utilised as the case study 
to grasp the production of insular spaces in a specifi c site rather than 
any site. Th e Pearl River Delta is a fast growing urban aglomeration 
in South China. According to the 2000 National Census, the area 
has a population of 40.8 million people. But due to its policentric 
development which is not yet integrated into single urban entity, this 
region is often not considered a mega city. Jakarta in Java, Indonesia, 
is also an urban aglomeration whose neighboring towns and cities 
have already merged into single urban area called Greater Jakarta. 
According to the UN mega city list, it has now a population of 
about 12.3 million, ranking it as one of the 10 largest cities in the 
world.33
Despite their rather diff erent urban population characteristics, both 
the PRD and Jakarta share a colonial past that has had an impact 
on their development. Together with other cities in Asia like Kuala 
Lumpur and Singapore they inherit not only their colonial past but 
also imperial structures that worked before colonialism. In these 
regions the encounter between East and West produced a social 
structure which somehow retained both forces intertwined and as 
such were problematic.34 In these postcolonial sites, seeing from 
our insularity perspective, the task of architecture, which deals with 
determining inside-outside (thus exclusive and inclusive), will lead 
also to the complexity of identity: an island which belongs to “us” 
and other islands which refer to “others.” Hence the insularity here 
will perhaps be far more critical than in other parts of the world.
Shape of the report
Th is book is comprised of three parts. Th e fi rst part is intended as the 
theoretical grounds to develop the hypothetical concept of insularity. 
17
Th is part can be roughly split into three sections. Th e fi rst section 
is a discursive survey of various analyses on globalization and how 
globalization is written and thought about. Some major arguments 
are exposed in order to demonstrate their limitations seen from the 
production of space. Th e second section is a deep exploration on 
the term insularity. Developed as a specifi c concept of place-making 
this term is then applied to survey various spatial manifestations 
in the discourse of urbanism. Th e third section illustrates other 
phenomenon where insularity faces its limit. It shows that insularity 
is also subject to “leaking.” 
Th e second part consists of two empirical reports. Th e report from 
the Pearl River Delta, China excavates how global processes are 
now shaping the seemingly closed territory. Two major forces are 
encountered, namely global capitalism that is fl uid and fl exible and 
the socialist structure of the society that is relatively rigid and stable. 
Both regimes in fact have created total accelerated development 
carried out not only by the superstructure of society but also, perhaps 
more importantly, by the peasantry. Here insularity is deliberately 
shaped and reshaped by the dynamic relation of both forces. Th e 
second empirical case is on Jakarta, Indonesia. Historically built by 
the colonial Dutch, Batavia in 1618 was a purely European city and 
intended also purely for the European community. However, since it 
was located at a cultural crossroads, in a land where hybridization and 
encounters with foreigners was the rule rather than the exception, 
the purity of Batavia could not be maintained. Colonial Batavia, 
now known as Jakarta, continuously blends foreign elements from 
which the identity of self and other are purely constructed. Here 
there is no real “self,” as all people are foreigners and hence any 
attempt to establish “self in place” will result in confl ict. Here also 
“cultural insularization” is on the making and remaking. Sections in 
this part are intended to record those struggles. Th ese two examples 
are meant to be an excavation site where we may see our future 
space, an archaeological site of the future. Both sites are examples of 
mega cities where dualities between place and non-place, urban and 
rural, modern and traditional as well as the notion of identity may 
be translated into a patchwork of confl icting insular spaces. 
 CHAPTER 1 - 18
Th e third part is a reiteration of the concept of insularity in another 
venue namely development. If, as this research attempts to surface, 
globalization as  a production of island is true, we may also see 
somewhere a certain process in urban space which gives a line of 
fl ight for the society to bridge that trapping logic. An indication 
of how architecture may serve as a bridging platform to give a new 
meaning of development in urban setting is also proposed. 
In general, what I consider the term insularity to be is perhaps similar 
to what Brian Massumi has called “brick.” Elucidating Deleuzian 
plateaus, Massumi regards a brick as a metaphor of a concept; it 
is neither a subject nor an object. It is more like a “circumstance.” 
Hence this study is a way to affi  rm how the concept of insularity is 
– in Massumi’s words – the “holding together of disparate elements” 
in the global-local relationship.35
Notes
1  The ad hoc team was comprised of many elements (human rights commissions, 
non governmental organizations, the military) and concluded that the number 
of victims was inconclusive (Source: http://www.semanggipeduli.com). The event 
can perhaps only be compared with the bloody revolution against the communist 
movement in 1965. 
2  Extensive survey on this aspect sees AlSayyad, Nezar. 1992. Forms of Dominance 
on the Architecture and Urbanism of the Colonial Enterprise. Aldershot (Brookfield, 
USA): Avebury. As well as his new book AlSayyad, Nezar. 2001. Hybrid Urbanism: 
On the Identity Discourse and the Built Environment. Westport (Conn.): Praeger. 
3  Evenson, Norma. 1989. The Indian Metropolis: A View Toward the West. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. p.vii. 
4  Ibid., p. 65. For the complete panoramic view of Indian architecture see Christopher 
Tadgell 1990, The History of Architecture in India, From the Dawn of Civilization to 
the End of the Raj. London: Phaidon. Tadgell made extensive survey on Indian as 
well as British architecture including some attempts by British architects who tried 
to “incorporate” Indian-origin forms within European tradition such as George 
Wittet, F.W. Stevens and Robert F Chisholm, while the European eclecticism 
became a fashion. 
5  McLeod, Mary. 1998. “Corbusier and Algiers.” Pp. 487-519 in Oppositions Reader, 
edited by K. Michael Hays. New York: Princeton Architectural Press, especially p. 
514. 
6  Kusno, Abidin. 2000. Behind the Postcolonial: Architecture, Urban Space, and 
Political Cultures in Indonesia. London; New York: Routledge. For more elaborate 
description of the Dutch Pavilion can be seen in Gouda, Francis. 1995. Dutch 
Culture Overseas: Colonial Practice in the Netherland Indies 1900 – 1942. Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press.
7  Rudofsky, Bernard. 1964. Architecture without Architects. An introduction to Non-
Pedigreed Architecture. New York: Museum of Modern Art.
8  Rapoport, Amos. 1969. House Form and Culture. Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Toronto 
Prentice-Hall of Canada: Prentice-Hall.
19
9  Richards, J.M., I Serageldin, and D Rastorfer. 1985. Hassan Fathy. Singapore and 
London: Concept Media, Architectural Press.
10  Knapp, Ronald G. 1989. China’s Vernacular Architecture: House Form and Culture. 
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Lo, Kai-yin, Puay-peng Ho, and Yuxiang 
Li. 1999. Living Heritage: Vernacular Environment in China (Ku ch*eng chin hsi: 
Chung-kuo min chien sheng huo fang shih). Hong Kong: Yungmingtang.
11  Consecutively: Domenig, Gaudenz. 1980. Tektonik im Primitiven Dachbau, 
Materialien und Rekonstruktionen zum Phaenomen der Auskragenden Giebel an alten 
Dachformen Ostasiens, Suedostasien und Ozeaniens. Zuerich: ETH., Dawson, Barry, 
and John Gillow. 1994. The traditional architecture of Indonesia. New York: Thames 
and Hudson., and Waterson, Roxanna. 1989. Living House: The Anthropology of 
Architecture in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Oxford University Press.
12  Bourdier, Jean-Paul, Nezar AlSayyad, and International Association for the Study 
of Traditional Environments. 1989. Dwellings, Settlements, and Tradition: Cross-
Cultural Perspectives. Lanham, Berkeley: University Press of America - International 
Association for the Study of Traditional Environments. and Schoenauer, Norbert. 
2000. 6,000 years of housing. New York: W.W. Norton.
13 Frampton, Kenneth. 1983. “Towards a Critical Regionalism: Six Points for an 
Architecture of Resistance.” Pp. 16-30 in The Anti-Aesthetic, Essay on Postmodern 
Culture, edited by Hal Forster. Port Townsend, Washington: Bay Press. The work 
is then reframed in his book Frampton, Kenneth (1985) “Critical Regionalism: 
Modern Architecture and Cultural Identity” in Modern Architecture A Critical 
History, London: Thames and Hudson, pp. 313-327. Frampton book on tectonic 
is also his attempt to excavate the importance of the “poetic of construction” in 
architecture against mere image  Frampton, Kenneth, John Cava, and Graham 
Foundation for Advanced Studies in the Fine Arts. 1995. Studies in Tectonic Culture: 
The Poetics of Construction in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Architecture. 
Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.
14  Especially the Lefaivre”s chapter “Critical Regionalism, A Facet of Modern 
Architecture since 1945” in Tzonis, Alexander, and Liane Lefaivre. 2003. Critical 
Regionalism, Architecture and Identity in a Globalized World. Munich, Berlin, 
London, New York: Prestel.
15  Ibid. p. 10.
16  Many of the classic theorists such as Karl Marx, Immanuel Wallerstein, and Lord 
Robertson, agreed that the oldest notion of globalization started in the 1500s see 
the temporal dimension of globalization outlined by Nederveen Pieterse, Jan. 
1994. “Globalization as hybridization.” International Sociology June 9: 161-184. 
At this moment, as Enrico Dussel believed, the finding of the Amerindia Europe 
became the center of “world system” which was entirely new from “regional system” 
known before that centered on civilizations. Modernization that was then initiated 
was not exclusively European but it was a result of the position of being in the 
center see Dussel, Enrico. 1998. “Beyond Eurocentrism: The world-System and 
the Limits of Modernity” in The Culture of Globalisation, edited by Masao and 
Jameson Miyoshi, Fredric. Durham and London: Duke University Press. 
17  Hardt, M, and A Negri. 2000. Empire. London, New York: MIT Press, especially 
chapter “World Order” pp. 3-21.
18  Ibid. p. 190.
19  Appears at “After Word” by Cynthia Davidson in Davidson, Cynthia C., and 
Anyone Corporation. 2001. Anything. New York and Cambridge: Anyone Corp. 
and MIT Press. p:286. Anything is the tenth and the last conference, held in New 
York
20  See for instance Lynn, Greg. 1993. Folding in Architecture. London: Academy 
Editions. Lynn, Greg. 1998. Folds, Bodies & Blobs: Collected Essays. Bruxelles: La 
Lettre volée. Lynn, Greg. 1999. Animate Form. New York: Princeton Architectural 
Press.
 CHAPTER 1 - 20
21  Appears on www.latent-utopias.it accessed on 4 July 2005
22  Zelner, Peter. 1999. Hybrid Space Generative Form and Digital Architectures. 
London: Thames and Hudson.
23  Gausa, Manuel, Vincente Guallart, Willy Müller, Federico Soriano, Fernando 
Porras, and José Morales. 2003. The Metapolis Dictionary of Advanced Architecture. 
Barcelona: Institute for Advanced Architecture Metapolis.
24  Forty, Adrian. 2001. “Royal Festival Hall: A ‘Democratical Space?’” Pp. 201-212 
in Unknown Cities, edited by Iain  Borden, Joe  Kerr, Jane  Rendell and Alicia 
Pivaro. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. 
25  Castells, Manuel. 1996. The Rise of the Network Society. Oxford and Malden, Mass: 
Blackwell.
26  Jameson, Fredric. 1991. Postmodernism, or, The cultural logic of late capitalism. 
Durham: Duke University Press.
27  Harvey, David. 1989. The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins 
of Cultural Change. Cambridge (Mass.) and Oxford: Blackwell.
28  Venturi, Robert, Denise Scott Brown, and Steven Izenour. 1972. Learning from Las 
Vegas. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.
29  Chung, Chuihua Judy, Jeffrey Inaba, Rem Koolhaas, Sze Tsung Leong, and 
Graduate School of Design Harvard University. 2001. Harvard Design School 
Guide to Shopping. Köln and Cambridge (Mass.): Taschen and Harvard Design 
School, especially p. 589-618.
30  Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. 1986. Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
31  According to Norberg-Schulze, in this method, at least three levels of meaning are 
important to the structure place. The first is the distinction between man-made 
and natural. The second is a distinction between the categories of horizontal and 
vertical (earth/sky) and inside/outside in which boundaries are the basic element. 
The third is about character, which is determined by “how things are.” Norberg-
Schulz, Christian. 1980. Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture. 
New York: Rizzoli, p. 8-11.
32  Sloterdijk, Peter. 2004. Sphären III, Schäume. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. p. 75-76. His 
words: “Die Phänomenologie ist die erzählende Theorie vom Explizitwerden dessen, 
was anfangs nur implizit vorhanden sein kann. Implizir sein will hier sagen: im 
unentfalteten Zustand vorausgesetzt, im kognitiven Ruhezustand belassen, vom Druck 
ausführlicher Erwähnung und Entwicklung entlastet, im Modus dunker Nähe gegeben 
– noch nicht aus die Zunge liegend, nicht schon im nächsten Augenblick abrufbar, 
nicht vom Diskursregime mobilisiert und nicht im Verfahren eingebaut.”   
33  Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, United 
Nations 2004, World Urbanization Prospects, the 2003 Revision. New York: United 
Nations. 
34  For further elaboration of Asian cities in postcolonial discourse see Bishop, Ryan, 
John Phillips, and Wei Wei Yeo, eds. 2003. Postcolonial Urbanism, Southeast Asian 
Cities and Global Processes. New York and London: Routledge.
35  Brian Massumi “Translator Foreword: Pleasures of Philosophy” is the introduction 
to Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, he wrote in accordance to the 
chapters in the book as “Each section of A Thousand Plateaus tries to combine 
conceptual bricks in such a way as to construct this kind of intensive state in 
thought. The way the combination is made is an example of what Deleuze and 
Guattari call consistency – not in the sense of homogeneity, but as a holding 
together of disparate elements (also known as a “style”). Brian Massumi in 
Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. 1987. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, “Foreword”.   
PART I
Discourse of 
Insularity
 CHAPTER 2 - 22
Th e task of this chapter is to locate the phenomenon of insularity in 
the discourse of globalization. As the fundamental process for further 
interrogation, this chapter argues that our current globalization is a 
global insularity. To render the argument, this chapter is organized 
into three parts. 
Th e fi rst part points to the “space” created by globalization. 
Cyberspace, global cities, and hybrid space are metaphorical spaces 
which are inherently contradictive. On one side, they seemingly 
encompass all barriers of human relations. But on the other, they can 
also create an imbalance between parts and parties. Unfortunately, 
only one side can be represented at once, which consequently leaves 
the other side invisible. We think of this as the limit of globalization 
in its metaphorical meaning. Spatially speaking, in our opinion, this 
contradictory nature of globalization also creates the image of our 
cities and world as a wilderness rather than merely as a barrier being 
lifted from parts of our cities. 
Th e second part of this chapter explains the concept of insularity as 
the antithesis of that wilderness, or generally, the global wilderness as 
the perfect medium where global insularity is possible. Its production 
mechanisms are rendered and then followed by the exposition of its 
typology as well as its examples. Insularity, or proliferation of insular 
Global Insularity2
‘What counts as global needs to be re-assessed in light of 
the intervening process of place making. This is not to say 
that spaces are irrelevant, only that they become relevant 
only by hard work by actors who mobilize on behalf of 
them’ (Undheim 2002).
(Source of previous picture: 
Rosenau, 1983, p. 56).  
23
space, may then be a form of both “other” globalization and “other 
architectures” that needs our further attention. 
However, we believe that every form of containment is also subject 
to leaking including insularity itself. Th e third part explores the 
“line of fl ight” – the phenomena in which insularity escapes to a 
place where the new relation between insularity and wilderness may 
potentially be created. 
2.1 Global Space as the Metaphor: the 
limits 
Globalization is often discussed in metaphorical meaning leading to 
the awareness of an imagined global world. Th e image is created by 
various themes such as the use of spatial metaphor. Appadurai in this 
regard has proposed a lucid picture of globalization through spatial 
metaphor with the suffi  x scape. According to him, globalization 
consists of fi ve major changes to the scape. 1) Ethnoscape is the 
“landscape of persons” that constitutes the current world: tourists, 
immigrants, refugees, exiles, guest workers, and other moving 
groups and persons. 2) Technoscape is the “landscape of technology” 
that now reconfi gures the world into a high-speed movement and 
instant telecommunication making it possible to cross-impervious 
boundaries. 3) Finanscape is the “landscape of global capital.” 
Money is now “a more mysterious, rapid and diffi  cult landscape to 
follow than ever before” as stock exchanges, currency markets and 
speculations may easily move enterprises across national borders. 4) 
Mediascape is the “landscape of media” and its capability to produce 
and disseminate information and the images of the world created by 
that media. Th ey somehow create the imagined life that lies merely 
from the “strips of reality.” 5) Ideoscpace is closely linked with image 
but it is directly political and has to do with the ideology of states or 
movements.1 In this rendering, Appadurai’s metaphor allows us to 
pinpoint the imaginary of the fl uid, irregular shapes of globalization. 
As he has argued, globalization represented by those scapes is not 
objectively given relations, but rather it is a perspective construct of 
 CHAPTER 2 - 24
each subject level. Before we enter into more physical terms, we 
should discuss the meanings of globalization in this perspective and 
their limitations.  
Cyber space: contested global agora 
Th e metaphor of the global world that is commonly associated with 
globalization is about the rise of cyberspace - the world that is created 
by the wires and electromagnetic waves of computer technology. 
Later we may also see the “lack of global sense” as the service applies 
to only part of us, and creates moreover, new divisions instead of 
diminishing the border as it has promised. 
Marshall McLuhan with his famous term “global village” has 
envisioned the prospect that our society will be integrated through 
information technologies. According to him, current society will 
be as integrated as in the Neolithic Age because of simultaneous 
communication; albeit with technological gadgets.2 Manuel Castells 
also imagined the rise of a network society by examining the eff ects 
and implications of technological change on media culture. In his 
opinion our culture will be a culture of real virtuosity encompassing 
individuals in urban life and global politics.3 Th ose images of the 
world of connectivity inspire some global-centric parties to draw 
a picture of future society and how cyberspace is functioning. Th e 
vision invites deeper interrogation on this novel “abstract space” 
created by computer technologies particularly as it relates to “real 
space.” 
It is Michael Benedikt who excavated the notion of cyberspace as 
our extension of the real space. He wrote:
‘CYBERSPACE: A new universe, a parallel universe created and sustained 
by the world’s computers and communication lines. A world of global 
traffi  c of knowledge, secrets, measurements, indicators, entertainments, 
and alter-human agency takes on form: sight, sounds, presence never seen 
on the surface of the earth blossoming in the vast electronic light.
CYBERSPACE: Th e tablet becomes a page becomes a screen becomes a 
world, a virtual world. Everything and nowhere, a place where nothing 
and everything changes.
CYBERSPACE: Access through any computer linked into the system; a 
place, one place, limitless; entered equally from basement in Vancouver, 
25
a boat in Port-au-Prince, a cab in New York, a garage in Texas City, an 
apartment in Rome, an offi  ce in Hong Kong, a bar in Kyoto, a café in 
Kinshasa, a laboratory on the moon.’ (Benedikt 1991 p. 1)
Benedikt stressed the extended uses of computers by which systems 
can be easily accessed from almost everywhere, and can erase any 
diff erences. Instead of thinking of this as new, he believed that 
cyberspace was actually an “ancient project” that needed to be 
continued. Th e project evolved initially from language with its 
myths, then communication with its fi ndings on various media, then 
architecture with its use of spatial media and fi nally to mathematics 
which confl ates space and time with informational systems and creates 
a four dimensional system – somewhat a reality of the cyberspace.4
Th rough cyberspace, moreover, he idealized a new study based on 
the radical continuity between cityspace and cyberspace, which he 
called spatiology. Th is study addresses cityspace as “the physical space 
of our streets and buildings and natural landscapes” on one hand 
and cyberspace as “the electronic space of data and representations 
generated, organized, and presented consistently to all viewers 
connected to a set of globally-networked computers” on the other. 
Ultimately, one of the main features of continuity is information. 
Th rough this continuity, he argued, “cyberspace, like cityspace, can be 
inhabited, explored, and designed.”5
Like Benedikt, Paul Virilio, one of the leading theorists in this fi eld, 
agreed that in contemporary cities, the computer screen has become 
the new “urban agora” where all information and images meet. He also 
believes that cyberspace erases many distinctions. Th ere are no big or 
small events since they will be dissolved in the time landscape. Both 
have the potential to have a bigger eff ect. Information technology 
creates simultaneity, real time and reproduction of events. Th e global 
community is then created by this simultaneous interconnectivity. 
However, unlike Benedikt who stressed the pursuit of cyberspace 
- space that ought to be thought as having spatial qualities - into 
production of “real space,” Virilio in his work Overexposed City
warned us instead that cyberspace has a simultaneous impact on 
our life. He sees that now every image and human being has the 
potential to become a war machine. Cyberspace has indeed become 
Diagram of internet network 
in northern hemisphere of 
the world by Bill Cheswick / 
Hal Burch (Source: Sloterdijk 
2004 p. 253).
Image sketch of the rhizome 
by Kiyoshi Awazu: an 
attempt to diagrammatize  
the logic of the network 
(Source: Kurokawa 1991 p. 
33)
 CHAPTER 2 - 26
at once an urban agora as well as a war site, albeit an immaterial one. 
According to Virilio we cannot simply discriminate on a general basis 
– particular and global–local or abstract-real anymore, but rather 
we must critically asses how these spaces function in our society. 
He believes that our city functions not merely by physical borders 
anymore but rather increasingly by the proliferation of electronic 
surveillance. More generally, he concluded that the city itself is a 
phantom landscape, a “fossil of past societies” whose technologies 
are aligned with the visible transformation of matter.6
Along the idea of implanting cyberspace into our physical space, 
William W. Mitchell’s City of Bits produces broad lists and catalogues 
of what he calls recombinant architecture. It is based on the growing 
emergence of electronics that somehow manifest spatial qualities.7
He believes that the Net is the “new urban place” and in that digital 
city, the inhabitants have changed their habits and behavior. People 
are increasingly shifting away from depending on the neurosystem 
and physical body such as using their eyes and ears for television 
and radio, or muscles to activate electronic gadgets, or hands for 
tele-manipulation, or brain for artifi cial intelligence. Recombinant 
architecture also has dual qualities: façade/interface; bookshelf/bit-
shelf; prison/electronic surveillance; warehouse/online shopping; 
workplace/networkplace; and at home/@home, et cetera. A city of 
bits will also be the future of all cities which will be characterized by 
a shift from land’s lot to cyberspace, from the notion of Wild West 
to an electronic horizon, from human law to codes, from personal 
contact to plugging in, and from etiquette to netiquette. But in 
addition to seeing the optimistic side of those qualities, Mitchell 
also warns that there will be a debate on privatization and public 
sphere on the net. He also proposed an anatomy of what he calls the 
Digital Revolution. 
His later book, e-topia describes the infl uences of a Digital Revolution 
on space and architecture. He indicated fi ve points as the feature of 
our logic in looking at the relationship between digital, space and 
architecture.8 (a) Dematerialization. Virtual space will dematerialize 
the physical space that now supports human needs. For example, 
27
digital banking will soon replace physical branches; cyber shops 
will replace supermarkets and malls. Architecture will confront 
very fundamental questions, not about size or form but about 
material existence. (b) Demobilization. Information technology 
makes possible the more effi  cient movement of bits that replaces 
physical movements. As the world is being converted into bits, less 
is being required of humans physically. We do not need to go to 
the movie theater since we can easily download the fi lm from the 
server. Th is also applies to the purchase of goods.  Demobilization 
will change our logic when it comes to producing our cities. (c) Mass 
customization. Th e Industrial Revolution paved the way to a system 
of standardization. Th e Digital Revolution however will introduce 
possibilities for more personalized products. Th e result is obviously 
more effi  cient. Building construction will also change in the same 
approach. In the past revolution, buildings were designed to utilize 
standardized materials as well as methods. Th e Digital Revolution 
makes interactive interplay between function and design possible. 
Frank O’Gehry’s Guggenheim in Bilbao is one accurate example. 
Using software for building spacecraft technology, non-standardized 
materials could be mass-produced without losing precision. (d) 
Intelligent operation.  Similar logic also applies to consumables that 
fl ow through pipes and wires such as water, fuel, and electric power. 
Automatic watering systems will soon replace human operated 
nozzles in gardens. Air conditioning systems can interactively 
respond to the presence of human activity in the room. Th is type of 
intelligent system can learn the user’s habits and then respond with 
more suitable program that conserves power, and can be continuously 
updated.  (e) Soft transformation. Th e Industrial Revolution resulted 
in huge changes on how our cities were reconstructed. Streets were 
widened; rails systems cut through the heart of cities and brutally 
produced empty space occupied by dark and dirty machinery. Th e 
Digital Revolution, like Virilio’s account, for Mitchell is far from 
this reality. Th e insertion of cables and wires will not disturb the 
structures that we now occupy. He concluded that this revolution is 
“far gentler … less obstructive in its physical eff ects and … almost 
invisible.”9
 CHAPTER 2 - 28
But now let us take a close look at how this cyberspace is 
spatialized.
In the book entitled Mapping Cyberspace, Martin Dodge and Rob 
Kitchin presented a series of maps to provide a useful visual to track 
the spread of international network connectivity.10 Th e maps show a 
comparison between world connectivity in 1991 and 1997. In only 
six years, the patchy connectivity that was concentrated in Europe, 
North America and parts of South America, Australia, and some 
Asian countries (Japan, India and Malaysia) evolved into a global 
connectivity. Only small numbers of countries, mainly those that are 
extremely poor or are politically isolated still have no connectivity 
or only a low level of connectivity.11 From these pictures, many 
will conclude that cyberspace makes the notion of place turn into 
placeless, distance shrinks, and space becomes spaceless. Many also 
still believe that the world will become a real global village as Marshal 
McLuhan predicted. However, they also claim that these theories 
are completely wrong. Th e other side of Internet is the fact that we 
confront with asymmetric distribution of data, resource, investment, 
infrastructure, and connectivity that is clearly depicted by cyber 
geography. Although it is claimed as in the Middle Ages, the map of 
cyberspace gives us a good illustration of the discrepancies between 
areas involved in cyberspace. Th e cable and satellite infrastructure 
of global telecommunication corporations shows the real condition 
of global networking. In detail we may see that the major networks 
link only between Europe, North America, Japan, the east coast of 
China (Hong Kong) and Singapore and not to every place in the 
world, yet.12
Surveys on the Internet user also provide numbers showing the 
magnitude of this world. In the initial period of January 1993 the 
host count showed merely 1,313,000 users, but then increased 
exponentially to a total of 162,128,493 users in July 2002. Th e 
Internet Software Consortium considered that this number is a 
“minimum size of Internet” since they are not able to tell whether 
there are domains of hosts that they could not locate. In summary, 
it is not possible to determine the exact size of the Internet, where 
29
Cable Connectivity
1991
1997
International Connectivity
Internet
Bitnet but not Internet
E-mail only
No connectivity
Above: Th e maps of world 
conectivity. 
Below: Cable connectivity 
of some major network 
providers. Th ose two pictures 
of connectivity show the gab 
between what it has been 
talked and what it really has 
happened. 
(Source: www.cyberspace.net)
 CHAPTER 2 - 30
the hosts are located, or how many users there are.13 Another survey 
taken by eTForecasts, a market research and consulting company 
for the computer and Internet industries, shows that the number 
of Internet users will likely surpass 665 million in 2002. However 
the data also shows that the Internet users are still largely based 
in the northern hemisphere, especially in the United States and 
the Europe. In this case, the world is divided due to this digital 
network.14 In countries where Internet usage is growing, such as in 
Indonesia, Minges showed that the attainment is still exclusively for 
young people to get “information” like MTV and the desire to create 
a software industry instead of more rooted to Indonesian people 
and soil’s needs. Here, information technology and the Internet are 
still regarded as “a place out there” despite the growing number of 
warnets (internet cafés) in major cities.15  
From a theoretical point of view, Saskia Sassen gave asserted that 
there is nothing digital that does not have spatial consequences and 
there is no access that is entirely borderless. An e-market for instance 
still needs warehouses for the supplies that are subject to spatial rules 
and codes. Electronic communication needs both cable (or band) 
and access codes in order to be available. Th e Internet itself is also 
growing up the “fi rewall” that limits the notion of borderless itself. 
Hence, in spite of the borderless image and reality (to some), there 
is also a critical situation being created by the access blockade and 
limitation in that space, or what Sassen called cyber segmentation.16
Moreover, although believing that penetration of cyberspace in life 
is inevitable, there are also parties who believe it is impossible to 
create a singular cyberspace. 
Another artist unveiled the impossibility of creating singularity in 
cyberspace. Dara Birnbaum in her installation noted that the hacker 
culture is indeed part of the cyberspace community and that its 
primary function is to undo the universalizing power of cyberspace. 
Th is act, by comparison, is parallel with what we experience in “real 
public space” that any attempt to singularize that space will soon 
be contested.17 Th is virtual space indeed neutralizes geographical 
disparity, mobilization and the erasure of individualism. However, 
31
cyberspace in itself rejects the presence of space (in the sense of lived, 
real space) but presents “space” that can be accessed from anyplace 
which is invisible in its locality and its subjectivity, hence imaginary. 
For Birnbaum the term cyberspace still contains ambiguity. It seems 
including an assumption that this interactive communication of 
information technology “can and ought to be thought of as spatial.” 
She asserted instead that we should not take this assumption too 
quickly as fast as we consider that this space fulfi ls our desire to fi nd 
a place where the “other” is absent. Cyberspace in fact “can never be 
given as the existence of concrete, architectural (or even a conceptual) 
space.” Th e spatial quality of cyberspace for her must be articulated 
within and without, from inside of the system (cyberspace) and from 
outside the system (real space). In this regard, she revealed that the 
state of virtuality in cyberspace is very close with “virtual public 
space” in the meaning of its invisibility beside the visible offi  cial 
public space. She insisted the impossibility to produce any project 
that aimed to produce a singular, unifi ed public space. Th e notion of 
public space that is more formally characterized by “offi  cial” rather 
than everyday life of individuals, in fact can be occupied by the 
ordinary by sort of misusing or hijacking. For the ordinary, the real 
public space is the place that must be fought for rather than simply 
declared. 
Th e works of artists compiled in Unplugged of Ars Electronica 2002 
for instance revealed that the image of the networked world through 
the digital world might also be meant as “a global confl ict” and a 
digitally-divided world.18 However, in spite of being against that space 
and division they attempted to explore the benefi ts of that space for 
their projects. Although focusing on the African cases, the work that 
claimed to be “a network for the art of tomorrow” – a collaboration 
of art and digital environment – shows that “unplugged” means 
also a confrontation with the inability to enter into a networked 
arrangement with the other. Th e work itself then tries to expand the 
horizon as the interaction expands as well as becomes a “setting for 
a complex dynamic of a global reorientation.”19
Th ere is also plenty of evidence for the uneven development 
 CHAPTER 2 - 32
of digital transformation from a survey by the International 
Telecommunication Union.20 In short, the global space off ered 
by cyberspace is still limited to the metaphorical meaning for the 
majority of this world’s inhabitants. 
Global cities - global fragmentation
Unquestionably, our future will be the city not the rural. Th e UN 
has convincing evidence that our future will be total urbanization of 
the earth. But our future will also not merely show networking and 
integration of cities but also disintegrated urban societies. 
Th e immediate view on total urbanization is of course about world 
cities since they are still major contributors as the site for millions 
of city dwellers. Th ey are however not limited merely to New York, 
London or Tokyo but also Mumbai, Lagos, Buenos Aires or Jakarta. 
Th e United Nations reported that the world’s urban population 
reached 2.9 billion in 2000 and is predicted to rise to 5 billion by 
2030. While merely 30 percent of the world population lived in 
urban areas in 1950, the proportion of urban population will likely 
to rise to 47 percent by 2000 and is projected to reach 60 percent by 
2030.  In this demographic change, rural-urban migration and the 
transformation of rural settlements into cities are key determinants 
over the high growth of urban population over the next thirty 
years.21
Th e work of MVDRV under the title of Metacity / Datatown illustrates 
a clearer picture of how the urban population will dramatically 
increase along the sharp shrinkage of the rural population by the 
midst of 21st century. Metacity itself is a neologism that renders 
ever-expanding communications networks and the immeasurable 
web of interrelationships they generate. Th ese networks, the group 
has claimed, have not created merely an anachronism of a global 
village, but a more advanced form of Metacity. Th e book, which is 
based on a video installation for the Stroom Center for the Visual 
Arts, the Hague, presents an array of selections and connections of 
world numbers data, hypothetical prescriptions, and diagrams in 
order to show the “most extreme state” of Metacity’s enlargement 
33
of the urban condition. Th ey claimed that addressing the spatial 
implications of this global perspective could help to defi ne an 
emerging agenda for urbanism and architecture.22
In the introduction of Globalization and Its Discontents, Sassen argued 
that introducing cities in the analysis of economic globalization 
allows us to re-conceptualize processes of economic globalization 
and its culture “as concrete economic complexes situated in specifi c 
places.”23 Th e attempt to bring cities into the discourse of globalization 
was actually fi rst introduced under the term “World City” by John 
Friedmann and Goetz Wolff .24 Th ey outlined seven criteria of world 
city functions and characteristics in the world arena. As they see 
it, world cities must: be fi nancial centers, host headquarters of 
transnational corporations, be home to international institutions, 
promote business services, engage in manufacturing, have good 
transportation systems and have a signifi cant population. Th e term 
however becomes well known after entering into globalization 
discourse through Saskia Sassen’s work Th e Global City: New York, 
London, Tokyo.25 In this book, she defi ned global cities as not merely 
large, but functioning in the world economy in four new ways 
(a) as highly concentrated command points in the organization 
of the world economy; (b) as key locations for fi nance and for 
specialized service fi rms, which have replaced manufacturing as the 
leading economic sectors; (c) as sites of production, including the 
production of innovations, and (d) as markets for the products and 
World urban-rural population  
drawn by Metacity / Datatown 
- all fi gues in thousand.
(Source: MVDRV 1999 p. 17).
(fi gures are in thousand)
 CHAPTER 2 - 34
innovations produced. New relationships are developed whether 
they are between the global cities and their counterparts or within 
the global cities themselves.26
P.J. Taylor and his associates who attempted to measure the world 
city network made the pictorial image of globalization through 
the formation of global cities. Th eir map is based on the presence 
of the top 100 fi rms in each city. Th e fi rms are selectively chosen 
based on the rank on each in their fi eld and their offi  ce network 
around the globe. Th e “top one hundred” consists 18 accountancy 
fi rms, 15 advertising fi rms, 23 banking/fi nance fi rms, 11 insurance 
companies, 16 law fi rms and 17 management fi rms that constitute 
the global service fi rms that operate worldwide. Th ere are 316 cities 
included in the survey; hence they produced a 316x100 matrix. 
Th e matrix shows that the distribution of the global connectivity 
through the presence of those top fi rms lacks hierarchy in the 
structure. Th e arrangement of these cities is a “distinctively non-
hierarchical urban structure” in which New York and London are 
the exceptions rather than exemplars amongst the contemporary 
world cities. Th e measurement and the interpretation confi rm their 
previous suggestion that world cities constitute a complex network 
structure rather than simple hierarchy of the cities. A cartogram of 
123 cities is then produced. Taylor diff erentiated those 123 cities 
into inner wannabe cities, which are mostly in the United States, 
and the outer wannabe cities, which are basically the “old core” of 
world city networks. Taylor saw that the inner wannabe cities are 
about to change the hierarchy in order to come out from the shadow 
of the dominant local world city (such as Manchester from London, 
or Indianapolis from New York). For the outer wannabe cities, such 
as Jakarta and other “third world” cities, the reason for becoming 
world cities is primarily a development issue namely attracting global 
capital to become more central in the world city network.27
Nevertheless, Sassen insisted that the trends of this new geography 
of centrality-marginality are evident. In Globalization and Its 
Discontents, she asserted that globalization does not only decentralize 
and democratize space but also invites the concentration of new 
35
structures for power and capital.28 However, many aspects are leading 
to new sets of dynamic of inequalities. Th e space of global cities 
is divided into two sectors.  One part concentrates on specialized 
sectors, such as fi nance, that gain superiority and super-profi t. Th e 
other part, applies to more traditional sectors such manufacturing, 
and concentrates on businesses that suff er from inferiority and 
must struggle for survival through informal activities. Th e wealthy, 
highly educated workers are concentrated in certain parts of the city 
Figure: Cities Network,  (After Taylor,  notes on the abbreviation: AB Abu Dhabi; AD Adelaide; AK Auckland; 
AM Amsterdam; AN Antwerp; AS Athens; AT Atlanta; BA Buenos Aires; BB Brisbane; BC Barcelona; BD 
Budapest; BG Bogota; BJ Beijing; BK Bangkok; BL Berlin; BM Birmingham; BN Bangalore; BR Brussels; 
BS Boston; BT Beirut; BU Bucharest; BV Bratislava; CA Cairo; CC Calcutta; CG Calgary; CH Chicago; CL 
Charlotte; CN Chennai; CO Cologne; CP Copenhagen; CR Caracas; CS Casablanca; CT Cape Town; CV 
Cleveland; DA Dallas; DB Dublin; DS Dusseldorf; DT Detroit; DU Dubai; DV Denver; FR Frankfurt; GN 
Geneva; GZ Guangzhou; HB Hamburg; HC Ho Chi Minh City; HK Hong Kong; HL Helsinki; HM Hamilton 
(Bermuda); HS Houston; IN Indianapolis; IS Istanbul; JB Johannesburg; JD Jeddah; JK Jakarta; KC Kansas 
City; KL Kuala Lumpur; KR Karachi; KU Kuwait; KV Kiev; LA Los Angeles; LB Lisbon; LG Lagos; LM Lima; 
LN London; LX Luxembourg; LY Lyons; MB Mumbai; MC Manchester; MD Madrid; ME Melbourne; MI 
Miami; ML Milan; MM Manama; MN Manila; MP Minneapolis; MS Moscow; MT Montreal; MU Munich; 
MV Montevideo; MX Mexico City; NC Nicosia; ND New Delhi; NR Nairobi; NS Nassau; NY New York; OS 
Oslo; PA Paris; PB Pittsburgh; PD Portland; PE Perth; PH Philadelphia; PL Port Louis; PN Panama City; PR 
Prague; QU Quito; RJ Rio de Janeiro; RM Rome; RT Rotterdam; RY Riyadh; SA Santiago; SD San Diego; SE 
Seattle; SF San Francisco; SG Singapore; SH Shanghai; SK Stockholm; SL St Louis; SO Sofi a; SP Sao Paulo; ST 
Stuttgart; SU Seoul; SY Sydney; TA Tel Aviv; TK Tokyo; TP Taipei; TR Toronto; VI Vienna; VN Vancouver; 
WC Washington DC; WL Wellington; WS Warsaw; ZG Zagreb; ZU Zürich. (Source: Taylor et al 2000)
 CHAPTER 2 - 36
while the majority consisting of unskilled workers with low wages is 
clustered near the industrial centers. In conclusion, she argued and 
gave more empirical proof that globalization produces not only global 
cities such as New York, Tokyo and London, in which transnational 
fi rms and global fi nancial offi  ces are concentrated, but also poor 
labor and outsized economic discrepancies between the ones who 
can join in the global economies and the ones who cannot. Hence 
globalization in global cities produces not only concentration of 
wealth and power but also concentration of cheap labor, immigrants 
and “informalization of economies.” Sassen wrote, “Th e images we 
need to bring into their representation increasingly need to deal with 
contestation and resistance, rather than simply romance of freedom 
and interconnectivity.”29
Peter Marcuse and Ronald van Kempen proposed a rather refi ned 
approach to the global city concept. Th ey argued that globalization 
in cities can be best seen as the emergence of globalizing cities, 
rather than global cities. Globalizing cities refers more to the process 
towards globalization than a product of globalization inferred from 
the term global cities. In those globalizing cities there is no valid and 
strong proof that they are undergoing to radical change.30 Similar to 
this view Tim Hall argued that it would be truer to say that newer 
formations have begun to appear within a more traditional structure 
rather than an emerging new formation in our contemporary world 
system.31
Despite the interconnection that is built through world cities, global 
fragmentation also occurs. Th is view is built from the fact that 
globalization is merely limited to a small number of cities. What 
is called global here is merely “inter-nations” relationship as most 
Foreign Direct Investment actually stays within the thirty countries 
that belong to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). What is really global in our cities is actually 
the phenomenon of spatial fragmentation. 
More concerning change of the new cities, the Ghent Urban Studies 
Team (GUST) proposed to call the phenomenon that is shaping 
our contemporary cities a “global urban morphology.” Th e term 
37
refers to some confl icting tendencies in these cities. Our cities are 
increasingly integrated through phenomena such as McDonaldization, 
mallifi cation, privatization, and virtualization that are fostered by 
the use of media, cyberspace and information technology. Twentieth 
century cities, especially in Europe and North America, have been 
and are undergoing change both morphologically and spatially 
through suburbanization. Th is process has a great infl uence not only 
in terms of housing supply, demand behavior and spatial constellation 
but, most importantly the emergence of what they call post urban 
and post suburban. Th ose are characterized by at least (a) the 
eradication of the traditional hierarchy of center and periphery, (b) 
simultaneity that compromises two seemingly antithetical tendencies 
namely concentration and decentralization, (c) the emergence of a 
discontinuous urban landscape that is dominated by voids and (c) 
radical emergence of a chaotic mixing between functions that in 
the past became the program of modernist planners. Hence, on one 
hand this morphology leads to the more homogenous urban culture. 
On the other, it also nurtures internal confl ict in the city between 
privatization and “franchization” with local resistance who prefer 
self-help, autonomy and identity.32
But what is more tangible is the proliferation of walls. Indeed the 
wall is not a new phenomenon, as Spiro Kostof has thoroughly 
elaborated in his City Assembled. Th e city edge and spatial division 
are part of the rise and fall of cities throughout history, in the West 
or anywhere else. However, as his introduction makes clear, what is 
important to a city is not merely the physical or human activities 
alone but rather the process; the city as a physical frame that adjusts 
to changing exigencies.33 Here perhaps lies the distinction between 
the “old walls” of classical-ideographic cities, with our current “new 
walls” of modern-global-universal cities. For the fi rst, a wall was a 
conscious product of its people. Th ey were a deliberate choice, a 
concensus, responding to the fear of others or from nature. Th e wall 
integrated the whole city fabric and made stronger social cohession. 
But our new wall is not such a product. It is a symptom of our 
disjunction between the will to make the wall disappear and at the 
same time the pragmatic practice of disintegrating space into smaller 
 CHAPTER 2 - 38
parcels which are easier to control. It is a mechanism to recreate what 
we are imagining, either through physical-environmental control 
devices or social ones. Hence our city is far more fragmented due to 
our capability to create our own individual walls. 
It is Peter Marcuse who painstakingly convinced us that the feature 
of our city is not about post-modern or such but rather walls. In 
dissecting the post-modern city, drawing from a sociological point 
of view, he asserted that the fragmentation of our cities is growing. 
Marcuse distinguished between the modern and post-modern city 
in terms of their attitude toward chaos and order. Modernism uses 
order to tame the chaos. Th e post-modern alternatively, causes chaos 
to reduce the overwhelming order in city life and urban space. Th e 
current seemingly chaotic and fragmented urban space according to 
Marcuse is actually organized beneath those appearances. Th e city is 
divided but neither in terms of duality nor limited to plurality. Th e 
example of a quartered city (or more divisions) is a better way to 
describe the current disorder of the city shape and space. Walls and 
boundaries, albeit in a physical or cultural sense, are in this regard 
inherent for the city. Walls are part of the system of how our society 
is ordered whether modern or post-modern.34
However, what now appears to be a global tendency is that the 
meaning of walls or boundaries is shifting. Th e boundary itself is 
a neutral term and form. A wall does not reveal anything about 
those on opposing sides: they can be friends or enemies. What 
Marcuse worried over is not about the wall per se, but rather it’s 
the implication that it creates a sharp hierarchy in society. Walls are 
necessary in order to create identity and collectivism. But it may 
suggest a set of relationships between the parts; namely separation, 
distance, fear, tension, hostility, inequality or alienation. Acting as a 
“horizontal line of division” the current wall that proliferates in our 
cities diff erentiates people based mainly on power and wealth rather 
than characteristics such as religion, color or sexual preference. In 
this regard, the task of a wall may also be diff erentiated as either 
that of protecting wealth, power and privilege or defending survival. 
Th e wall creates patterns of diff erence in urbanization but these 
39
diff erences are not simply based on lifestyle or special needs but also 
“refl ect position in an hierarchy of power and wealth in which some 
decide and the others are decided for.”35
Spatially speaking, our city is more and more directed into 
segregation between commercial areas on one side and industrial 
areas on the other. Commercial spaces are growing solid and more 
attractive to the richer community, better-paid workers and better-
shaped urban space qualities. Th e industrial land acts as a magnet 
for the poorer community, informal activities and lowest rung 
population and has poor environment qualities. From the rising 
gap between those extreme conditions, the segregation of city spaces 
can be distinguished into some typologies (from the wealthiest to 
the poorest): (a) A Dominating city hosts an enclave of the elite 
economic, social and political hierarchy. It is increasingly luxurious 
and expensive as a result of the spending ability of these communities. 
(b) Gentrifi ed city. Th is city is occupied mainly by professional-
managerial-technical groups, young professionals without children. 
(c) A Suburban city, where many of the single parents with children 
reside. Th e concentration of families also appears in the city center 
in the form of apartment buildings. Th ey are inhabited mainly by 
skilled workers, mid-range professionals and upper civil servants. (d) 
A Controlling city points to the network of high-rises, mansions etc 
that host the top chain of the command whether in terms of the 
commercial chain or governmental hierarchy. (e) A city of Advanced 
Service. It is an agglomeration of professional offi  ces, which may 
be downtown but is not always in the city center. Th e downtown 
areas of Frankfurt and London Docklands are on the urban edge, 
La Defence is far from old Paris, Amsterdam is scattered with good 
public transportation. (f ) A city of Direct Production and Advanced 
Service is a city where various modes of mass production and 
manufacturers are agglomerated. (g) A city of Unskilled Workers and 
informal economy. Th is city is the host of small-scale manufacturers, 
warehouses, sweatshops, and technical services for unskilled customer 
services whether agglomerated or in scattered and separated areas. 
(h) Abandoned city, the “end of the trickle down” of the city, hosts 
the poorest social groups of urban communities. (i) Residual city. An 
 CHAPTER 2 - 40
abandoned city, an undesired place caused by industrial pollution, 
by crime, or a place for storage etc.
Marcuse also distinguished between the types of walls, which can be 
characterized as follows. (a) A prison wall: it defi nes ghettos, places 
of confi nement, control and re-education of those forced to leave 
life behind them. (b) Barricades: protection, cohesion and solidarity. 
Th is can be in the form of physical barricades but is mainly in the 
shape of social symbolism, language of street signs, spoken words 
etc. (c) Stucco walls sheltering gated communities and enclave 
communities. (d) Stockades: “walls of aggression” especially in the 
making of a gentrifi ed city. Finally, (e) Ramparts: castle walls for 
domination, mainly in the dominating city.36
Segregation and integration can be voluntarily or involuntarily 
shaped. As the tables have shown, those processes may create either 
a melting pot or an isolation of a society. Th e diff erence between 
voluntary and involuntary segregation and integration is diffi  cult 
to clearly distinguish. Th e separation of the black region of Soweto 
in Johannesburg is a mixture between voluntary and involuntary 
populations. Th e ghettos in Rio de Janeiro called favelas are much 
more an involuntary spatial concentration of the poor that resulted 
from economic pressure and the need to survive. But at the same 
time it is a voluntary population in terms of their choice to stay 
(Above) Pattern of spatial 
concentrations and their 
voluntary-involuntary 
process. 
(Below) “Types” of spatial 
concentration and their 
more-likely socio-economic 
background. 
Source: Marcuse’ lecture 
at the conference entitled  
Die Off ene Stadt: 
Globalisierung, Migration 
und Stadtentwicklung 
(Th e Open City: 
Globalization, Migration 
and Development), held 
by University of Kassel, 
Germany, 14 October 2002.  
41
in the favelas or in the villages or their homelands. Th us a broader 
frame of reference must also be considered in order to establish the 
condition of voluntary or involuntary spatial concentration. Th us 
the purpose of walls can be for protection or confi nement, insulation 
or limitation. Th e shape of walls can be tangible or intangible (e.g. 
in the form of a symbolic separation between communities). Th ose 
behind the walls may get protection or conceal the bad or unpleasant 
aspects of the community and that which is supposedly unseen. 
Marcuse concluded precisely that “One wall defends survival, the 
other wall protects privilege.”37 Walls are not rigid but dynamic and 
ambivalent since no wall has purely one meaning. For Marcuse, 
through space, our cities and towns are a refl ection of economic and 
social inequality. Or in other words, segregation has to do with the 
ability of people to occupy space and to develop space in terms of 
buildings and structure. Our problem is not merely with these walls 
but with the blatant hierarchical lines between people in a specifi c 
space.38
In reading about Los Angeles, Mike Davis made a clearer account, 
although perhaps rather exaggerated, of how this city is divided. In 
the City of Quartz he claimed that there are some important but 
interrelated features that correspond with the disintegration process 
of society. Th e fi rst is what he called a “new class war.” According 
to him, this antagonism can even be seen at the level of the built 
environment.39 In accordance to this war, the use of architectural 
defensive fortifi cations is proliferated. Sophisticated security systems, 
private security and police and other means are used to achieve what 
he calls a “recolonization of urban areas” through walling enclaves 
with fully controlled access.40 Furthermore, he saw the apex of this 
logic in the fortifi cation of affl  uent satellite cities, which is complete 
with perimeter walls, restricted entry points with guard posts, 
overlapping private and public police services, as well as privatized 
roadways. Moreover, he wrote that “[r]esidential areas with enough 
clout are thus able to privatize local public space, partitioning 
themselves from the rest of the metropolis, even imposing a variant 
of neighborhood “passport control” on outsiders.”41
 CHAPTER 2 - 42
Postcolonial cities: the hybrid and the re-division of 
space 
Globalization is not an entirely new phenomenon. With postcolonial 
societies for instance, colonization in the past may also be comparable 
with modern globalization in terms of rampant movement of 
migrants, resources, capital, images as well as culture. For them the 
recent debate on Postcolonialism is an important account along 
with the immense integration of most postcolonial countries into 
the global world. 
Th e postcolonial condition is a complex societal condition and 
feeling which resulted from historical ruptures, mostly traumatic in 
nature. If we believe that any identity is constructed, then this society 
writes their identity through an ambivalent attitude regarding their 
colonial past. Th e attitude appears in many ways. First, it may appear 
in the form of “historical amnesia” in order to forget the colonial 
past but in fact it is reproduced through more localized tensions 
(such as in Indonesia, and perhaps also Th ailand, Vietnam and other 
Indo-China countries). Second, it can be the process of integrating 
their past as the raw materials of their history (Malaysia, India, and 
to some extent also with Caribbean countries). Finally, it may be 
radically manifested by recalling the notion of new colonialism – 
mainly as political jargon – for the present asymmetric economic 
condition (such as Zimbabwe and many other African countries). 
Postcolonialism deals not only with the people in postcolonial 
countries but also relates to diasporic societies who reside in the 
world metropolis. In this case there is still a close link between the 
ex-colony and its former colonizer in our cities: London, Manchester 
and Bradford with Indians and Pakistanis, Amsterdam with South 
Africans and the Moluccans of Indonesia, and Paris with Moroccan, 
Algerian and West African communities. 
Postcolonial conditions appear furthermore as an ideological 
“othering,” infl icted by Postcolonialist discourse. Postcolonialism 
is initially a discourse that deals with the reading and writing of 
literature written in previously or currently colonized countries, 
or literature written in the ruling countries which deals with 
43
colonization or the colonized peoples. It addresses a broad range 
of analysis for the relationship between temporal dimension of 
the colonial-postcolonial period, spatial relevance (both in the ex-
colonies as well as imperial metropolis), and society and culture 
of the ex-colonies that to many extend concerns with the notion 
of identity.42 For the postcolonialist, the binary opposition of self 
and other is the essential argument for the discourse of identity, in 
which the opposition between the West and the rest of the world 
is on the forefront. Edward Said’s Orientalism for instance argues 
that the term Orient is a Western invention and its intention is to 
master, to rule, to classify or put them in hierarchies.43 In his sequel 
Culture and Imperialism, he even further elucidated the consequence 
of this Western-Orient opposition. According to him, imperialism 
did not end or become the past. He saw that imperialism keeps on 
its route, albeit in a general worldwide pattern of Western imperial 
culture. He also showed that worldwide there are always experiences 
of resistance against it.44
Homi Bhabha, the guru of postcolonialism, shifted the focus from 
the opposition between self/other and colonizer/colonized to the 
third term beyond this binary structure. He reintroduced rather the 
concept of hybridity as a grey area between colonizer and colonized 
culture, an ambiguous space of culture, an in-between culture. 
However, the concept aims not merely to that grey area, but it is more 
of a nominal spirit, spirit to deny root-ness as well as universalism. 
It celebrates the particularity of the individual that freed itself from 
abstract entity and teleological construction such as identity, class, 
gender, as well as preposition. Hybridity off ers a negative strategy 
that may be employed to “terrorize” the authority.45
From without, such as in China and the Middle East which in 
the past were not entirely colonized but now is shown as the most 
antagonistic in terms of it attitude towards the “thread of neo-
colonialism” of the West, Postcolonialism appears rather diff erently, 
and violent. It is widely believed that some kind of “Occidentalism” 
is being developed in Chinese circles and “pan Islamism” and is 
viewed as the thread and opposition for the “mature, post confl ict” 
 CHAPTER 2 - 44
Western civilization.46 Th ese conditions may lead to why Samuel 
P. Huntington says the clash of civilizations resulted from a tight 
lingering connection between world hegemony (capital, technology, 
cultural production and power) and identity (society, religion, 
civilization).47
Although post colonialists used the term space, the meaning is 
metaphorical. It is Anthony D. King and later Edward Soja and 
postcolonial-artist Okwui Enwezor who attempted to bring colonial 
- post-colonial discourse into real space. After their works, the 
discourse then covers not only literature but all modes of culture 
including architecture and city.48 Soja in his Th irdspace for instance, 
reformulated the key concept of hybridity as the third space that 
enables other positions to emerge. In this position this third 
space can also “sets up new structures of authority, new political 
initiatives.” It works to create “something diff erent, something new 
and unrecognizable, a new area of negotiation of meaning and 
representation.” He elaborated the meaning in spatial terms and 
showed its relevance in examining Los Angeles. For him, the city is a 
representation of what he saw as a hybrid between real and imagined 
space.49
Enwezor in Créolité und Kreolisierung published in connection with 
the series of discussions conducted by Documenta 11, critically 
assessed the connection of creolization, as one derivative of the 
term hybridization, with current urbanization and architecture. In 
his introduction, Enwezor identifi ed the notion of hybridity and 
cosmopolitanism as no longer adequate vocabulary to understand 
and articulate the critical diff erence and asymmetry of contemporary 
culture today. He reintroduced the notion of Creolization as a chaos 
produced by the history in the Caribbean basin. He referred to 
Creoleness/Creolization as sort of a mental envelope in the middle 
of which our world will be built in full consciousness of the outer 
world.50 Creoleness and Creolization are two distinct notions. 
Creolization refers to an ongoing process that leads to unknown 
consequences, impossible to foresee. It is a process of a productive 
experience of the unknown, which we must not fear to encounter. 
45
Rather than seeing chaos in its negative perspective, he sees that chaos 
is produced by a sense of global fl ux, fragmentation - a global battle 
of center and periphery, north and south and other oppositional 
attitudes resulting from globalization, is a salutary state. Creoleness 
means the fact of belonging to an original human entity, which 
comes out of the Creolization process. In other words we may see 
Creoleness as a process, an ethics that goes beyond the process and 
emerges out of Creolization. Placing the terms in the global and 
urban context, Enwezor invites the questions for the discussion on 
the Platform 3 Documenta 11:
‘Cities in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean, constitute a 
mosaic of fragmented spaces diff erentially articulated as a result of national, 
regional and global forces. New typographies have emerged. Cities are 
today’s sites of creolization. New diasporic formations have reconfi gured 
the urban space. Markets, dance halls, bars, and restaurants constitute 
spaces in which the strategies of creolization are played, deployed, and 
reworked. Is every post-modern city a site of Creolization?’ (Enwezor 
2002: abstract)
Many have reported the phenomenon of hybrid cities but as a third 
form of cities produced by close interaction between colonizers 
and the colonized. Çelik Zeynep reported in the context of how 
Algiers was partitioned into a traditional part with its labyrinthine 
Kasbah dwellings and well designed French quarter. Despite 
Corbusier’s claim that it was a real livable dwelling, the colonial 
authority saw the Kasbah as a poor dwelling. Continuous eff orts 
toward the implementation of European planning and architecture 
strategies on Algiers have created a dual environment as well as 
exchange of ideas.51 Norma Evenson has also reported that Indian 
cities like Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, New Delhi were initially a 
Western world’s implantation in Indian soil. Th ose cities, along 
the presence of Western educated Indian architects and planners, 
inevitably emerged then as a fusion between the Eastern and the 
Western architectural tradition. A more global and universal concern 
emerges in the products that juxtapose suburb, motorways, and lofty 
apartments with the Indian reality of high density housing. Th e fi rst 
is an expression of prosperity, universalism and the second is the 
Indian reality. Both pictures are now the shape of Indian cities that 
can be shown as a contradictive picture. For Evenson however, this 
 CHAPTER 2 - 46
picture is the result of a long process – and perhaps a continuous 
struggle - to receive Indian architecture and its culture in general as 
a valuable ingredient to the Indian cities.52
In Kuala Lumpur for instance, as Ramesh Kumar Biswas noted, 
Western infl uence was an important element, which nurtured its 
identity. In her early history, founded in 1857, Kuala Lumpur was 
a hybrid city as the result of British colonial policy. Th e city was 
comprised of Chinese immigrants who worked in the business 
community, Malays of mostly Indonesian descent who worked in 
agriculture and Indians from the subcontinent who worked on rubber 
plantations and as clerks for bureaucratic and technical services. Now, 
Malaysian students who fi nish their studies from abroad are able to 
combine local climatic designs with transnational languages. Biswas 
saw that the architecture of this city is like “karaoke architecture” 
that is all in maximum tone: color, contrast, brightness, and volume. 
Kuala Lumpur is full of projects loaded with superlatives that are 
fuelled for prestige to become bigger, higher, faster and better. 
Th e Petronas Twin Tower, Klang Valley Super Corridor, and the 
new mega airport designed by Kisho Kurokawa are some of these 
prestigious projects that have replaced the old symbols inherited 
from the British colonial power. Hence, for Biswas, Kuala Lumpur 
is one of the Asian cities whose shape is dictated by material welfare 
but its cultural identity has not yet been disturbed. Th e mixing 
between British colonial as well as Malaysian rooted ethnicities is 
the very identity of the city. Rojak, a Malaysian salad of vegetables, 
prawns, fi sh, chilies, fruit and nuts – is transformed into buildings. 
“KL is turning into a movie with lots of characters but no “hero” to 
identify with.”53
Diff erent with Bhabha, Soja, or Enwezor’s celebratory position 
toward hybridity, Anthony King saw that the discourse on 
postcolonial cities cannot be separated with an hierarchy of world 
economies and culture during the colonial era. In this period of 
time, it was true that economies and modernization produced a 
dichotomy between Europe as the center and rest of the world as the 
periphery. Colonial cities for Kings in this regard were “the mixed 
47
cities on the periphery of an empire which carried the core culture to 
other people.” Th ese cities functioned as starting points where new 
technical order could be practiced along with the disintegration of 
local culture and where the new interpretation of mind and society 
were developed. Spatially, colonial cities were a superimposition of 
an “orthogenetic city” which took the city from the moral order of 
the colonizer to the genetic city of the indigenous culture.54 In this 
regard, colonialism brought modern buildings and institutions to 
cities as well. Prisons, forts, barracks, and courthouses for instance 
are introduced as institutions of social order. Hospitals and asylums 
functioned as the institutionalization of moral order while schools, 
colleges, art galleries and museums functioned as the reconstruction 
of culture. Again, these institutions destroyed indigenous institutions 
resulting in spatial segregation systemized throughout the city.55
Modernization and the introduction of capitalist economics have 
created colonial cities with one thing in common: the segregation of 
urban space into the colonized and the colonizer. Cities with these 
two distinct spheres can also be labeled dual cities.56
Indeed the hybridization process occurs not only in situ but also 
through cultural forms that are detached from certain sites and then 
exchanged or translated into other sites. Here, the relation between 
the colonies and the colonial metropolis is both the producer and 
the receiver. What happened in the imperial metropolis of London 
for instance was also easily and readily available in Mumbai or 
Shanghai. And vice versa, what was developed for the context of 
the colony could be transferred to the imperial metropolis as well. 
However, as King has reported, this exchange was part of the function 
of the colony to be an experimental place. Th is can be seen in the 
bungalow case. It is a form of housing which was used previously in 
the colonies as plantation housing. It was then brought to London 
as a new type of suburban housing. Later this type of housing was 
exported back again to the colony as a new trend of upscale housing 
for the well-to-do.57 Th is phenomenon is an important element in 
current global culture in architecture.58
Moreover, King asserted that the indigenous elite maintain the 
 CHAPTER 2 - 48
colonial ideology of dominating and exploiting the grassroots people, 
the peasants and the poor. Th is internal colonization structure is 
confi rmed by Abidin Kusno. He showed that, indeed at the beginning 
the mainstream of postcolonialism discourse is related to the Euro-
centric domination. By using Indonesian postcolonial architecture 
as the object of his research, he proved that the postcolonialism 
does not necessarily relate to East and West. Rather in the case of 
Indonesia, the West itself is being erased in order to maintain the 
continuity of Indonesia’s grandeur past. And within this continuity 
the New Order regime of Indonesia maintained its domination. He 
showed here how the decolonization process emerges. But in this 
case, decolonization is not regarded only the dismantling of colonial 
attributes and lifestyles but rather reproduction of colonization itself. 
Th rough this work, within such hybridized cities like Jakarta, the 
practice of division fully exists. Unveiled by attempts for liberation, 
the postcolonial regimes continue to use colonial instruments to 
exercise their power.59
Th e studies of Southeast Asian cities compiled by Ryan Bishop, John 
Phillips and Wei Wei Yeo also show the local and distinct form of 
relations between colonizer-colonized as well as between the global 
and the local. Although indeed colonial history plays a determining 
factor of Asian urban and architectural tradition, nonetheless their 
forms of urbanism are not therefore reducible to Western urbanism. 
Th ey showed that the common assumption about the city as an 
elaboration of the Euro-American model is not entirely true. Cities 
like Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Hong Kong, Singapore and others 
from the so-called postcolonial world inherit not only their colonial 
past but also imperial structures that worked before colonialism. In 
these regions, the encounter between West (exemplifi ed by radical 
global capitalism) and the East (rigid government as the remains of 
Asia’s old imperials and kingdoms) produces a social structure that 
somehow retained both forces intertwined.60
Reporting from Port Moresby in Papua New Guinea, John Connel 
and John Lea revealed the post-modern condition of the city in 
a Melanesian context. Th e encounter between those who were 
49
urban (colonialist) and rural (colonized) became volatile. Port 
Moresby grew from a colonial legacy where the notion of city or 
urbanization was non-existent. Th e colonial city and traditional 
setting was constructed in fi xed opposition between permanence 
and non-permanence, between urban and rural settings represented 
by the urban squatter settlements, between discipline and order on 
one hand and the “exotic” on the other. Th e colonial city was a 
segregated city; distinctiveness was regulated; interracial marriage 
was discouraged and multiculturalism was wholly implausible. 
Th e modern city of Port Moresby however is nothing but more 
segregated. Globalization, in terms of penetration of industrialized 
economies and capitalism, brings new problematic infl uences and is 
an alien notion for the indigenous society. Th e city grows, as do other 
modern cities in the world, including the urban sprawl that engulfs 
the poor suburban Papuan communities resulting in a mosaic of new 
and old, modern and traditional, permanent and non-permanent. 
Th e elite and the well-to-do can aff ord to have a peaceful and “rural 
life environment.” Th e rest of the people however remain in the 
city’s squatter settlements. On one hand, the bureaucrats attempt to 
force those people back to the rural lands since the city is intended 
for those who want a trouble-free environment for their children. 
On the other hand, squatter settlements are punished as a source 
of crime and untidiness of the city. In this matter Connel and Lea 
saw that the elite of the postcolonial now cause the old divisions in 
the city. Globalization and post modernization in the city produces 
disarray, extraordinary diversity and incoherence in the physical 
form of the city as well as in the identity of its society. Most apparent 
in the opposition to urbanization and especially squatter settlements 
is the manner in which historic European colonial perceptions have 
become replicated in contemporary Melanesian perception. Th e 
elite of the postcolonial era have adopted some of the mores of the 
colonialists, thus reinforcing the old division within the cities.61
In conclusion, even in past form of globalization (i.e. colonialism), the 
hybridized cities were actually the perfect site for more diff erentiations, 
for another form of division. Both globalizations, past and recent, 
are the contested site for hybridizing and fragmenting forces. Hence 
 CHAPTER 2 - 50
despite the facts and claims of hybridity in postcolonial cities, what 
now really happens is also the practice of division, albeit in various 
localized forms by diff erent names and agencies. Th e hybrid space 
of colonizer-colonized fi nds its limit on the spatial practice that 
maintains the division. In this regard, perhaps what Spivak said 
was more accurate. Unlike postcolonialism which tends to erase the 
divisions, the discourse of post-coloniality must be inclined rather 
to the discourse of neo-colonialism – the new “imbalance relation” 
between parties. She wrote that “Neo-colonialism is not simply the 
continuation of colonialism; it is a diff erent thing. Th at is what I 
call “postcoloniality”, and I fi nd the word postcolonialism just 
totally bogus.”62 Moreover, as Ulf Hannerz has broadly examined, 
hybridity and the likes (such as collage, mélange, hotchpotch, 
montage, synergy, bricolage, creolization, mestizaje, mongrelization, 
syncretism, transculturation, third cultures) by themselves are terms 
which are far from unambiguous. Indeed we need this vocabulary 
that brings the discourse of globalization down into reality, or at 
large the metaphorical meaning of a globalized world. But it also 
suggests that the world is not necessarily becoming all the same. To 
conclude, his expression is worth quoting: “We need to have a sense 
of which words, and ideas, and interests, are “ours” and which are 
“theirs.” But our vocabulary does not inhabit a separate world of its 
own either.”63  Here the question has already opened: what if the 
vocabulary we use in fact also produces spatial separation, somewhat 
a creation of the “own worlds”?
2.2 Insularity in the Wilderness
‘“Wilderness” is now a symbol of the orderly processes of nature. As a state 
of mind, true wilderness exists only in the great sprawling cities.’ (Tuan 
1990 p.112)
Th e existing globalization is related to the picture of world violence.64
In an imaginary sense, it is a wilderness as our perception cannot 
cope with the confl icting images of the global world. In a more 
spatial sense, the existing globalization is also related to the cities as 
wilderness as Tuan has fundamentally turned our perception about 
51
the terms. In this regards it is important for us to fi nd a spatial 
vocabulary of this actually existing globalization. 
In this view, the term insularity is proposed to provide us with a 
way to represent the existing globalization in spatial terms. In 
short, insularity is a diagram, the gestalt of globalization. It is global 
since it works through the continuous production of globally 
interconnected insular territories: a globalization that “works” 
spatially. It is “architecture” since the word consists of the concept 
of place making. In this meaning, the built environment plays a 
crucial role by simultaneously incorporating apparatuses of physical 
barriers and controls to keep the division and separation between 
inside and outside working. It is social space because it manages 
the space for specifi c social relations both within and without. In 
a broader context, our current city is an agglomeration of insular 
territories where barriers and controls are fully enacted and at the 
same time a host to the production of the desire for an open city. 
Now it is necessary to render how insularity as our spatial vocabulary 
for globalization is conceptualized.
Concept of Insularity 
Etymologically, insularity is rooted from Latin insula, meaning island. 
It may relate to the state of being isolated or detached referring to 
physical entities such as an island which is surrounded by water. It is 
basically a permanent phenomenon of physical discontinuity. 
Vitruvius used the term to mention the private realm provided for 
building plots, together with coordinated streets and the regular 
market squares, with churches and town hall, in order to “give a 
sense of enclosure and harmony.”65 In planning it was used by Sir 
Th omas More in his Utopia that illustrated with a fi gure of “insulae 
utopie” depicting a city contained within geographical boundary, 
to signify his intention to create a perfect environment and perfect 
society.66
Sloterdijk conceptualizes insularity as intensifi cation of natural and 
social of “foam” as a conditio humana – the condition needed for 
 CHAPTER 2 - 52
human to life - as he has broadly examined in his Schäume. Th e 
foam can be found anywhere. In myth, foam is associated with a 
mother’s womb and fertility. In physics, the foam is the basic form of 
stone porosity, the Styrofoam, as well as biological cells. In sociology 
and culture, the household is human foam, the cell that forms a 
complex community. Th e foam exists through a basic principle 
that it makes the cells reciprocally connected to each other through 
co-isolation. It secures isolation, separation and immunization of 
its own environment needed to create a neighborly relationship. 
Neighborhood and separation in this way are indeed two sides of 
one thing.67
Co-isolation works in the process of making an island suitable for 
human living conditions. Sloterdijk distinguished three types of 
island: an absolute island, an atmospheric island and an anthropogenic
island.68 Th e absolute island is achieved through radicalization of 
the enclave development principle, a capsule principle. It needs 
three dimensions: isolation, horizontal and vertical, to guarantee its 
conditio humana. A space ship, a space station, and an astronaut’s 
suit as well as ordinary airplanes are like an envelope that is required 
for that purpose. Th e atmospheric island has the same principle 
of isolation but works primarily to stabilize the relative diff erences 
between inside the island and the outside environment. Th e 
dome of the Eden Project designed by Grimshaw and Partners and 
Biosphere 2 in Tucson Arizona are examples of how inner climate 
is manipulated in order to allow various forms of atmosphere 
management experiments, a protective-house. Hence, the capsule 
is environmental conversion of the outside world; the protective 
house is an environmental cut-off  of nature.69 Th e anthropogenic 
island refers to the human being as a spatial dimension. Sloterdijk 
anatomized the anthropogenic island as follows. (a) Chirotop is an 
island produced by the reach of our hand, the area of hand’s work. 
(b) Phonotop is an island produced by sound where the other may 
still hear (soundscapes). (c) Uterotop is the bubble island produced 
by motherhood. (d) Th ermotop refers to a group shaped by common 
hearth. (e) Erototop points to an island created by “erotic  fi eld” of 
a human (f ) Ergotop or also called phallotop is a bubble shaped by a 
Grimshaw and Partner: Eden 
Project in Cornwall 1991. 
Th e projects is classifi ed as 
the atmospheric island that 
creates designed climatic 
condition of inner space 
diff ers with its external. 
(Source: Sloterdijk 2004 p. 
356). 
53
sense of community such as by common priesthood. (g) Alethotop
or mnemotop allows people to gather within similar lessons or 
education. (h) Th anatop or theotop refers to an island or a group 
of people produced by common ancestors, totems or other beliefs. 
And the last, (i) Nomotop corresponds to the group that is produced 
by similarity of habit and custom. All these islands work primarily 
to make explicit what is considered the “world-models” to live in 
the world, or in his expression: “Inseln sind Weltmodelle in der 
Welt.”70  
Seen from the larger perspective, insularity becomes a process of 
“Utopiae Insulae Figura”, 
Island of Utopia, a fi gural 
description of  Utopia. 
Rosenau argued that More’s 
concern was to create both 
social and formal perfection. 
Although the irregular form 
of the insulae was rather 
diff erent with More’s textual 
description, it showed 
nonetheless an intention 
that in advance of its time. 
(Source: Rosenau, 1983, p. 
56)   
Vitruvius town plan: four 
suarters in the middle are 
called insulae encicled with a 
diagramatic protecting wall. 
(Source: Rosenau, 1983: p.14) 
 CHAPTER 2 - 54
place making suitable for human beings to exist. Like genius loci,
insularity in this sense is an act of place making. But unlike the 
genius loci which place is consecrated within local culture and natural 
features, insularity is embedded precisely within the fl uid “non-
places” of globalization, nowhere and anywhere. Th is latter place 
making, borrowing from Trond Undheim’s review on globalization, 
is a process of domestication71 rather than merely a sign of existence. 
Insular territory is an immediate formula that employs various degrees 
and forms of borders or topological apparatuses to materialize the 
distinction from the surroundings. In this way, we pose insularity 
as the opposite attitude of globalization as de-territorialization but 
works precisely within globalization itself. Th rough insularity, the 
notion of place thus must be consecrated within and be based on this 
fl uid and ever-changing milieu, producing a degree of diff erences 
rather than polarities. In this respect, the insular place and the fl uid 
“non-place” of globalization, echoing what Marc Augé has written, 
are opposite polarities where the fi rst is never completely erased and 
the second is never totally completed. In regards to the identity, 
like place and non-place, insularity is like “the scrambled game of 
identity and relations is ceaselessly rewritten.”72
Insularity is a further development of defensible space. As Oscar 
Newman has suggested, defensible space is developed by human 
beings in order to deter crime through supplying defi ned and 
clearly-marked territories. But in our globalization, insularity is not 
merely defensible space against crime. It is a deliberate projection 
and reinforcement of the “crime” outside through the creation of 
the “save environment” inside. It is a sort of walled space by which 
crime and unintended persons are not eliminated but rather merely 
being pushed out and then strengthened outside. Like a building, 
insularity is also a rejection of pluralism, or a creation of what Jencks 
termed mono-architecture. Mono-architecture for him is “building 
that is reduced, exclusive, over-integrated, perfected and sealed off  
from life and change.”73 Unlike a building however, insularity has 
to do with the masses. It is not a singular building, but it points to 
buildings. We cannot think of insularity only in singular terms. It is 
always plural. 
55
Insularity is also postulated by Foucault in what he refers to as 
disciplinary society. According to him, individuals never cease 
passing from one closed environment to another, which have their 
own laws. From family, school, barracks, factory, et cetera these 
contained spaces have been organized in order to concentrate 
or to distribute individuals in space and in time. Th rough these 
organizations, the order of the whole society can be secured. For 
Deleuze, though, our society will be societies of control, which 
are in the process of replacing the disciplinary societies. Th e logic 
of this latter society will not be based on enclosed environments 
but rather on the modulation of control, a self-deforming cast 
that will continuously change from one moment to the other. If in 
disciplinary societies we are organized as individuals within a mass 
(through signatures corresponding to the “number” of administrative 
numeration), in societies of control we have a code that works as 
a password. Although in societies of control the physical barriers 
have vanished, their signifi cance and function have been replaced 
by containment, namely the tracking of a person’s position through 
equipment, which he may or may not be granted access to. Th e 
modulation has transformed the concentration of functions (school 
or barracks for instance) into systems (like a prison system that say, 
prevents one from leaving his home for a while as a punishment). 
Unlike disciplinary society, where order is tangible, in the society of 
control the whole system works like a chaotic wilderness but in fact 
the systemic order nonetheless plays intangibly. 
In an urban setting, insularity is mutating. In traditional cities, 
division wall is erected to integrate the whole city space vis-à-vis the 
wilderness outside. In current modern cities is nonetheless the same, 
but the division is changed into omnipresent insularity namely 
urban spatial fragmentation of functions and societies as well as 
the creation of a fl oating “island within an island.” Th ere is some 
evidence to support the claim. 
High fragmentation of function and fear side-by-side can enhance 
the rise of separation. Sharon E. Sutton for instance has surveyed the 
impact of a fragmented urban situation and fear on the mental map 
 CHAPTER 2 - 56
of children. She showed two stories of an imaginary walk through 
the city by two diff erent children. Th e fi rst is by a boy who lives in 
an inner city impoverished community. Th e other is by an affl  uent 
boy who resides at a safe estate in the suburbs. Th e stories themselves 
were similar: about an awful, dirty and unsafe neighborhood where 
people kill each other. But the fi rst told of his experience while the 
second told about his dream. Th e stories are accompanied with a 
drawing that shows insular spaces created by a network of roads and 
functions and extensively determined by police stations. Moreover, 
Sutton premised that “socialization of children, especially well-to-do 
children into fear contributes to their increasing need to be separate, 
which in turn, leads the next generation of adults to engage in higher 
level of destruction of the physical and social fabric of society to 
maintain their separation.”74
It is not merely separation; our urban insular spaces may be also 
a site for social purifi cation of identity. A conference entitled 
Gangs, Crowds, City Enclaves: Political Violence in a Globalizing 
World addressed the increasing tendency of political mass violence 
in our cities. Th e conference suggests a link between globalization 
and transnational movement on the one hand and the increasing 
radicalization and purifi cation of cultural (ethnic, religious) identities 
on the other hand. Th is conference sees that city enclaves are indeed 
part of the phenomenon as a site for purifi cation at the very global 
openness of our cities.75
A drawing by an inner-
city fi fth grader child. Th e 
drawing illustrates a future 
city that is governed by 
the police and containing 
enormous roads that isolate 
each function. Here we may 
see that our city would be 
a network organization of 
insular spaces on one side 
and the city that fear of crime 
drives its spatial organization 
on the other (Source: Sharon 
E. Sutton 1997 in Ellin 1997 
p. 243).
57
Insularity may also seem to fl oat within ethereal space, all 
encompassing urban insularity. Echoing the account on the Los 
Angeles riot of April-May 1992, Derrida viewed insularization as 
both omnipresent and as a double-sided island: an island within an 
island or an island fl oating in another island. Th us it is not only the 
separation between inside and outside but also a political exercise of 
defi ning who is on the outside, who is the guest and who is the enemy. 
He wrote: “Insularity has always been a privileged and, by the same 
token, an ambiguous place, the border of all hospitalities as well as 
all violences.”76 Th e body in the insular habitat tends to defend itself 
against intruders. It may off er itself to some foreigners and regard 
them as the guest with its hospitality. But it may also oppose the 
other foreigners and regard them as the enemy and treat them with 
hostility. Th us, the concept of insularity also refers to the politics of 
place where the identity of self and foreigner is defi ned. Japan is the 
exemplary case of insularity – Derrida delivered his speech at the 
Anywhere conference held in Japan, where inside-outside was very 
clearly defi ned (spatially, nationally, culturally, linguistically and 
so on). But Los Angeles’s insularity, exemplifi ed by the riot, is not 
obvious. For Derrida, LA is paradoxically unclassifi able, but at the 
same time an exemplary kind of insularity. It is a “post-city age” and 
therefore “post-political,” not apolitical or depoliticizing but rather 
in terms of another sort of politics.77
In this regard, insularity is also the logic of reaction against the 
wilderness and not solely a creation of space. Domesticating the 
city’s wilderness is perhaps a more precise word for insularity as place 
making in today’s urban space. In the words of Yi-Fu Tuan, every 
environmental value requires its antithesis for defi nition. Home will 
be meaningless apart from journey and foreign country as well as “the 
virtues of the countryside require their anti-image, the city” and vice 
versa.78 Nature for Tuan has long been regarded as the antithesis of 
human domain, the city. However, its position is mutating. Neolithic 
and archaic societies regarded the secrecy of garden and village as the 
antithesis of the profane of the wilderness outside. Furthermore, the 
city was developed to consecrate the sacredness. It was encircled by 
less sacred villages and the profane world of the wilderness. By the 
 CHAPTER 2 - 58
mid 19th century, the split between city and nature had occurred 
resulting in the creation of an Eden-like “middle landscape.” Th is 
specifi c landscape then has transformed into a new Eden-like town 
in between urban sprawl as the “true wilderness” on one side and a 
“treated wilderness” of the recreational nature. Hence reformulating 
from Tuan the anatomy of the wilderness, this new town, which lies 
between true wilderness and treated wilderness, can be described 
as an insular territory that needs both forms of wilderness to exist 
and vice versa. Wilderness then becomes a perfect antithesis for 
insularity. Insularity is a materialization of the love of place, of a 
carpentered space, which is refl ected in the creation of the middle 
territories. At this point, it is no longer the city that is the antithesis 
of the wilderness. Rather, the city as wilderness is the antithesis of 
insularity. Hence insularization is an inevitable process responding 
to the sprawling expansion of cities. Th e impetus of insularity lies 
on the physical explosion of cities where at the same time the social 
space of the citizens implodes.
Now it is the stage to explore how insularity is manifested as spatial 
order in our global condition. 
Th eme park: consuming imagined places
‘Disneyland… It is the template of a privatized consumption-oriented 
theme park intended to simulate a shared middle-class structure, 
aesthetized social diff erence, and off er a reassuring environment without 
arms, alcohol, drugs, or homeless bums.’ (GUST 1999, p. 100)
In Th e Variations on a Th eme Park, Michel Sorkin has compiled 
various spatial phenomena called theme park development. He 
argued that the contemporary century city is increasingly more like 
an anti-geographical city meaning “a city without a place attached 
to it.”79 Th e theme park in this perspective is the ultimate expression 
of this new tendency. It articulates in three dimensions the “two 
dimensionality” (in the literal and metaphoric sense of the word) 
process and function of television, which comprises a seamless 
slide between programs and sponsors, erasing diff erences in the 
quest for homogeneity. Moreover, the structure of this new form 
“eradicates genuine particularity in favor of a continuous urban 
Previous page: evolution of the 
concept of wilderness. 
Above: the rise of “middle 
landscape” and the rift 
between protected wilderness 
or the nature and “true 
wilderness” or the city. 
(Source: above: redrawn from 
Tuan 1995, p. 144 and  p. 
105). 
59
Belle Vue, Manchester
River Park, Chicago
Alton, England
Warner Bros Germany
Adventure Island Tampa Anaheim California
Source: compiled from www.themeparkbrochures.com
 CHAPTER 2 - 60
fi eld, a conceptual grid of boundless reach.” Th is new form, to him, 
embodies at least three important characteristics. 
Th e fi rst characteristic of the anti-geographical city is that stable 
relations to local, physical and cultural geography are dissolved. 
Electronic and uniform mass culture replaces the uniqueness and 
anomaly of places, which instead are marked by a generic urbanism 
spread all over the world.  Th is anti-geographical characteristic implies 
that the city could be inserted into an open fi eld or in the heart of a 
town; neither context nor a predetermined site is necessary.  
Th e second characteristic, a result of increasing interaction between 
societies, is that security becomes the main consideration behind 
producing places, regardless of whether this consideration is 
supported by statistical evidence or merely an unfounded fear 
of criminality. Control equipment and border markers (either 
electrical, physical or both) are employed in order to make “places” 
where unwanted visitors are prevented from entering or other social 
groups are concealed within.
Th e third feature is that of a city increasingly fuelled by simulation. 
Disneyland, Wonderland, Adventureland et cetera are deliberately 
simulated spaces. Sorkin suggested that it is now a global phenomenon 
because they can be found virtually all over the world.  Th e theme 
park is not only simulated but also embodies all of those features as 
detailed above.80
Returning to Los Angeles, in Exopolis (also in Sorkin’s compilation), 
Soja has reminded us that the oldest theme amusement park in the 
world was Knott’s Berry Farm of Buena Park in Orange County Los 
Angeles. Its neighbor Disneyland, though, dwarfed it then. Th eme 
parks as such, diff erent from Umberto Eco’s reckoning of “absolutely 
fake,” Soja’s reading positioned it rather as “something being born… 
something that slips free of our old categories and stereotypes, resists 
conventional modes of explanation, and befuddles long-established 
strategies for political reaction.” Tending rather towards Baudrillard, 
the Exopolis of the theme park is for Soja “a primitive society of 
the future” which is not only increasingly regulated by absorbing 
61
simulacra but the original simulacra are themselves being simulated 
again and extending all over the map of its territory.81  
Th e expansion of this kind of space is, maybe, incalculable. Its 
reduplication is perhaps as fast as the adoption of the Disney cartoon 
in television albeit in more localized forms, myths and fantasies. Th e 
global dimension of Disneyland cannot now be regarded as merely a 
reduplication of this space by Disney but rather as a “Disneyfi cation.” 
Th e term refers to the process of transplanting the idea into other 
areas and by other parties. In the Internet we may see hundreds of 
brochures and maps of various theme parks not only in the US but 
also some from other parts of the world. Maps of Belle Vue theme 
park in Manchester (1931) and Lakeside, Denver Colorado (1950s), 
Disneyland in Anaheim, California (1989) and the newly built 
Adventure Island in Tampa, Florida (2003) are presented to provide 
a sense of its historical spectrum as well as its global dimension.82
In Building a Dream, Beth Dunlop showed the “design syntax” 
of Disney architecture through an examination of its historical 
development and the variety of amusement off ered by the 
Disneyland.83 In its early development Walt Disney used his 
animation skills to promote his dream. Th is animation orchestrates a 
sense of playfulness that merges history (legends, stories, memory of 
adventure) with a fantasy of the future. Hence, this design syntax uses 
old-fashioned features combined with forward-looking elements. 
Th e syntax is used in the spatial organization and the production of 
form of virtually all amusements, and also is employed extensively in 
representation strategy, from the early steps of planning of schematic 
designs to promotion brochures. A poster of Discoveryland for 
instance portrays a panorama of the 21st century city of New 
Orleans that employs new forms of Zeppelins and steamboats. Th e 
elements of a Bavarian Black Forest village or Old English Market 
town are also employed to create “town”. European Medieval castles 
are a frequently mimicked to create the castle a place specifi cally for 
the fairy tales of Snow White, Sleeping Beauty, and others. Th us the 
entire architecture of Disneyland is an assemblage of the real and 
imagined in order to provide a site for newly invented stories and 
amusement ideas.
 CHAPTER 2 - 62
Th e idea and its syntax are then easily reduplicated virtually 
everywhere. Disney and Disney-like parks have been spawned across 
the world. Countless parks such as these are now operating or being 
constructed, basically mimicking that which Disney has done. Th e 
source of its history is not place-specifi c and can be drawn either 
from local forms or from ideas/images/places globally circulated 
through television or fi lm. Th is Disneyfi cation has produced spatial 
formation, which can be applied in virtually all public space. Further, 
it can no longer be assumed that Disneyfi cation applies only to 
amusement parks, but the whole city.  
Gated communities: walling space walling societies
Blakely and Snyder have alerted us to the problems of gated 
communities in the United States of America. Th ey saw them as 
part of an American tradition of using physical space to create social 
space: physical boundaries to determine community.84
Since the 1980s million of people have secluded themselves behind 
the walls and gates in order to fi nd lifestyle, prestige and security. 
It was part of suburban utopia, whereby good form in the built 
environment may also form a good life and society. Although the 
idea originated long ago in the eighteenth century in Europe with 
such industrialists as Robert Owen and Charles Fourier, it became 
widely accepted and popularized in the US only after the infl uence 
of Frederic Law Olmsted and Frank Lloyd Wright. Th ey created 
utopian environments around curvilinear street or cul-de-sacs, 
buildings self contained and carefully constructed identities, which 
then television and movies consequently popularized and glamorized. 
Th ey made housing that at once created a lifestyle for the middle 
class American. Th ese earlier communities off ered housing quality, 
security, proximity to city amenities and exclusivity, and a quality 
that still captures the market today. 
Th e idea of a suburb brought into being through these communities 
stood as an antithesis of the city. Th ey used names borrowed from 
nature or to which had associative meanings such as “park,” “forest,” 
“view,” “river,” “hills,” or “valley.” Th ese suburbs were meant to 
Th e pre-opening celebration 
of Hong Kong Disney which 
was due to be opened in 
12  September 2005 and 
the protest against Disney’s 
products. Th e protesters 
condemed the product as 
they are made mostly in 
developing countries but the 
Disney does not aware the 
depriviated labor conditions. 
Source: http://park.
hongkongdisneyland.com 
(fi rst) and Kompas 12 Sept. 
2005 (two pictures below).
63
(Source: Blakely and Snyder, 
1997 p.13, 10, 103, 11, 43).
provide proximity to nature, safety, good education with good 
schools for children, shelter the residents from any social deviances, 
to be clean and friendly, and to keep out and limit anything that 
might disturb their physical environment. However, this utopia was 
quickly challenged by the realization that the suburb was no longer 
as sterile and ideal as their aspirations. Th e automobile, the rise of 
middle class minorities, and equal housing access laws have altered 
the suburbs into a mixed environment and society in which it is not 
easy for someone to fi nd refuge. 
Th e idea of gated communities thus off ers an alternative. In their 
book Blakely and Snyder identifi ed three types of gated communities, 
which correspond to the importance of specifi c social values for the 
residents: lifestyle, prestige and security zone gated communities.85
Th e lifestyle communities attract people who want separation, private 
services and amenities and seek a homogenous and predictable 
environment. Th is type is the main feature in the United States, 
responding to the growing leisure-consumer society. Th e trend 
drives the developers to emphasize and off er many more amenities 
than other types of communities, such as member-only golf and 
country clubs, as well as other recreational and social activities. 
Th ree subtypes are dominant, namely retirement community and 
golf and leisure community, which are more or less the same concept 
but with diff erent emphasis on provided amenities. Th e third is a 
new town that is aimed to provide residents with a complete living 
experience. Although providing public space, this town is entirely 
privatized and controlled as part of a safety device. Th e main aim of 
the measurement is to control and to avoid unwanted guests rather 
than crime.
Th ese prestigious communities focus on providing a stable 
neighborhood with more or less similar economic status of its 
inhabitants where their property values can be protected. Unlike 
the lifestyle communities, the prestige communities lack extensive 
amenities. Th ey are normally simple residential subdivisions. Th ey 
are divided into three categories based on income level: the rich 
and famous, the affl  uent and the middle class. All categories utilize 
 CHAPTER 2 - 64
a carefully controlled aesthetic in order to maintain their image. 
Protection and security are also employed but rather as a symbolic 
barrier of the status. Homes in these communities are symbols of 
success; gates provide privacy and protection from solicitors and 
strangers and relief from fear of crime. 
Th e third type is the security zone community that attempts to 
strengthen and protect their sense of community by which threats 
can be excluded and expelled. Diff erent from the two previous types 
that are normally built by developers, these communities are built by 
existing residents. Because of fear of crime and the need to redefi ne 
territory, residents install gates and barricades; some even hire guards, 
in order to defend their existing way of life. What Blakely and Snyder 
termed the “fortress mentality” is clearly discerned when ordinary 
residents turn their neighborhoods into gated communities, band 
themselves together and shut out their neighbors. Th is mentality 
is not exclusive to the city, and also turns the suburb and rural 
community into a barricaded, gated and secluded society. Th eir 
construction is primarily motivated by fear, whether it is a real threat 
or merely a feeling of fear. 86
Blakely and Snyder recognized that whether gated or not, all 
neighborhoods have the same ultimate goals, namely to control 
traffi  c, eliminate crime, protect economic position and maintain a 
stable quality of life. Gating is a rational choice from the household 
perspective but not from the city perspective. Gating in this instance 
does not in fact relate to the source and cause of the problem that 
it is supposedly responding to. Th ey argued that indeed we must 
face the problem of poverty, social disorder, and failing municipal 
services and infrastructure but not by simply fl eeing from them or 
walling them out. 
Nasser from USA Today reported that the phenomenon has now 
spread into the middle class and is not limited to the upper class 
anymore. Extrapolating from the Report of the Census Bureau’s 2001 
American Housing Survey, he showed that now more than 7 million 
households are developed behind walls and fences. Th is equates to 
about 6% of the total national number of households. Th ere is also 
65
a degree of ethnic tendency of living behind the fence.  For instance 
Hispanics are more likely live in such communities than Whites or 
Blacks. Especially for the Afro-American community, the symbolic 
meaning of the gated communities is also very strong and they are 
less likely to live in such communities. Gated developments are 
more common in Sun Belt metro areas such as Dallas, Houston and 
Los Angeles than in older urban areas in the Midwest and Northeast 
of the United States. About 40% of new homes in California are 
for instance now behind walls. But they are also becoming popular 
in places like New Orleans, Long Island, Chicago, Atlanta and the 
suburbs of Washington, D.C.87 Viewing this phenomenon from the 
perspective of macro policy, Klaus Frantz saw that gated communities 
are one element in US-American cities that refl ect the progressive 
trend towards privatization of urban services, and an increasing 
polarization, fragmentation and diminished solidarity within urban 
society.88  
William Goldsmith has warned that through social and economic 
connections, US cities, which are characterized by this spatial 
and social segregation, strongly infl uence other cities all over the 
world.89 European cities are often idealized due to their low levels 
of confl ict and poverty. Recently, this ideal has been threatened by 
an emergence of “racial caste” and urban segregation, which are the 
characteristics of their transatlantic counterpart. Goldsmith argues 
that the “patterns of residential racial segregation in US cities have 
pernicious eff ects on the cities outside the United States.” Although 
there have been some bridging projects that aimed to resolve the 
problem of racial segregation, essentially the quality of the US 
Metropolis in the last half of the 20th century has been that of racial 
exclusion and residential segregation. Quoting Manuel Castells, 
Goldsmith suggests that the exclusion of the other is not separable 
from the suppression of civil liberties and a mobilization against alien 
cultures. He also proposed that this attitude infl uences virtually all 
aspects of urban politics: 
‘Th e general failures at building cross-racial coalition in cities played and 
still play a major role in reinforcing the racism that exist at the deep core 
of US national policies. Big-city racial hostilities were developed and 
Gated communities in 
various countries. (Source: 
Glasze 2003). 
 CHAPTER 2 - 66
then sustained more and more by residential segregation as the nation 
urbanized throughout the 20th century. Th ese hostilities have aff ected 
the social formation of social movement, the selection of candidates, the 
conduct of elections, and the design and implementation of politics of all 
kinds.’ (Goldsmith, 2000 p. 40)
A workshop entitled Gated Communities as a Global Phenomenon
held in Hamburg in 1999 is one of a number of attempts to map the 
magnitude of this phenomenon globally. Many of the contributors 
agreed that the phenomenon originated in the US community 
and then through various modes of translation and transformation 
has been implanted in other countries and regions. One of the 
researchers, Harald Leisch wrote that “the basic idea of (gated) 
communities is hardly new, (and) can be found in many cultures. 
But it is also evident that modern gated communities are virtual 
imitations of those in the US.”90
Guy Th uillier reported the development of gated communities in 
Argentina particularly in the Greater Buenos Aires area. He traced 
the historical trajectory of the communities back in the 1930s, when 
the fi rst country clubs were developed for the use of the rich and 
famous for weekends. Although they then multiplied in the 1970s 
during the period of social violence and instability, the real boom 
was started in the mid 1990s, when gated communities became a 
large-scale form of permanent housing supply. Th ey were not only 
for the rich but also accessible to the middle-class. He estimated 
that today there are more than 300 of these closed neighborhoods 
that host an estimated fast growing 20 thousand residents. As a 
consequence, he argued, the suburban landscape of Greater Buenos 
Aires is now evolving into a class segregated urban fabric. But the 
development does not occur alone. Gated communities also spark the 
development of class-segregated malls and supermarkets. Th e fences 
and walls have reshaped the landscape into patchwork-disconnected 
slums and low-income, self-built neighborhoods as well as natural 
reserves.91
Examining South Africa’s development after the abolishment 
of apartheid, Ulrich Jürgens and Martin Gnad reported the 
development of gated communities that have become an alternative 
67
way for protecting and securing exclusivity. Th e post-apartheid 
city of Johannesburg has witnessed an increasing rate of crime and 
subsequent feeling of insecurity among its inhabitants. Th e people 
of this city call their community “security villages.” Th e structure 
of their population represents a combination of social and racial 
segregation elements. South African families who traditionally 
favored life in big estates and homes of their own are now choosing 
to live in more clustered townhouses or fl ats with shared use of 
amenities.92 Sub-urbanization of the upper class since the 1960s 
was the primary reason for the growth of gated communities in 
Spain. Although there are not as many of these communities as 
in North America, Rainer Wehrheim noted that the trend has 
rapidly increased, especially in the last twenty years. He classifi ed 
the communities according to their function, their leisure and 
commercial amenities, their degree of safety measurements as well 
as their degree of separation. He found that these new developments 
are now emerging almost exclusively in the coastal and mountainous 
areas of Spain for affl  uent retirees.93 Similar to the location-oriented 
development, Rita Raposo indicated that the development of gated 
communities in Lisbon and other cities in Portugal is closely related 
to location preference. Accessibility to central places and proximity 
to nature are the most sought after characteristics of the site likely to 
be developed. She also noted that gated communities in the Lisbon 
metropolitan area have varied amenities such as the presence of 
several levels of access control and perimeter impermeability as well 
as various private collective services and equipment.94
Examining the development in Russia and the Ukraine, a rather 
diff erent historical trajectory of gated communities is reported by 
Ala Al-Hamarneh. Th e tradition of gated places there has been 
ideologically rooted since the 1950s. Th ree types of gated places 
were commonly created by the authorities namely (a) the whole city 
(such as Vladivostok and Sevastopol) that were mainly for military 
purposes, (b) satellite cities that fulfi lled special secret functions 
(such as Arzamas 16 and Murmansk 99), and (c) Datcha settlements 
that were organized and built by the central and local administrator, 
the Party and the army, and professional unions for their offi  cial use 
 CHAPTER 2 - 68
(apparatchiks). After the glasnost policy, the subsequent dismantling 
of the Soviet Union and penetration of the global market, those 
closed places were opened. However, some Datcha settlements 
evolved themselves into gated communities along the development 
lines of the gated communities in the modern sense.95 Ernst Struck 
reported on three types of gated communities covering all income 
groups in Turkey. Particularly found in Istanbul and the south coast 
regions, the development of gated communities showed a strong 
correlation between the social status of the inhabitants and the degree 
of isolation and segregation. He broke it down into various types. 
Type 1 consists of small settlements that are very exclusive and well 
protected, but without shopping or other service facilities. Type 2 
consists of larger residential areas, partly luxurious but overall mainly 
for the upper-middle class. Th ey are well serviced with infrastructure 
but less gated. Most of them are located on private land with some 
degree of control, but open for everyone. Struck saw that they are 
“gated communities” but merely in terms of physiognomy. Meaning 
that they are segregated and isolated but without hard borders or 
fortifi cation. Type 3 consists of lower income housing in booming 
suburbs and former gecekondus or the areas of the in-migrant rural 
population. Th ey are normally simple fl ats or individual blocks but 
individually walled.96
Th ere are also various manifestations of the development in Arabic 
countries. Preferring the term gated settlements rather than gated 
communities; Georg Glasze examined the development in Lebanon. 
He argued that “settlement” is more appropriately neutral, since 
in the case of Lebanon these sorts of developments have no strong 
notion of community. Th ree types of upper level residential areas 
are found, namely (a) gated beach and mountain resorts which off er 
small apartments, (b) compounds which off er bigger apartments and 
are intended to be used as permanent residences and (c) gated villa 
and towns which consist of independent villas.97 In Egypt, Günter 
Meyer reported rapid expansion of luxurious gated communities 
located mainly around Cairo after the 1990s. Dreamland, Utopia, 
Garden City and Beverly Hills are the names given to some of the 
major projects where up to 3000 villas are expected to be constructed. 
69
Th ose names indicate the preference of elites who adopt global 
trends for themselves.98 Th is attitude is completely diff erent from 
the development of “temporary gated communities” in Saudi Arabia. 
Konrad Schliephake reported that although ideologically the Holy 
Quran warns Muslims not to become friends with non-believers there 
is however no actual separation concept applicable to modern town 
planning. On the contrary, the separation is conducted by expatriates 
(mainly Western) who are working in Saudi Arabia. Th e Saudis view 
the presence of these foreigners on their soil as a non-permanent 
phenomenon related to a certain period development. Hence the 
seclusion is also accepted as an ephemeral phenomenon. However, 
he found that the presence of these expatriates is continuing to grow, 
meaning that the demand is also growing. He predicted that the 
most probable outcome is that they would gradually be absorbed 
into the tradition of the Saudi upper class, whose members mainly 
reside in palaces which to some extent is no diff erent from the gated 
communities.99 Anton Escher reported the last survey in the Arab 
region. He argued that Syria is actually a “totally protected area,” 
a “gated community on a national scale.” However he also noted 
that some projects near Damascus and Aleppo are further becoming 
gated communities in its real meaning.100
Reporting from Mexico City, Angela Giglia studied the development 
of gated communities in this city. Comparing fi ve walled 
neighborhoods she saw that despite their morphologic diff erences, 
the development is indeed a complex social process which is not 
only the result of the fear of crime but also a way to escape from 
urban disorder, to establish islands of social homogeneity and to 
experiment with new forms of local government. She concluded 
that “the search for security is part of a more complex socio-spatial 
process, which includes three strategies: the search for security itself, 
the will of diff ering from the ”outside,” and the aim (or the illusion) 
to achieve internal homogeneity. All these strategies work together, 
and their eff ect is to reinforce one another.”101
Reporting on the phenomenon in Indonesia, Harald Leisch reckoned 
that the development was started about the mid-1980s but so far no 
 CHAPTER 2 - 70
adequate research has been conducted on this type of settlement. 
Th e majority of the inhabitants are young and middle class (with a 
predominance of ethnic Chinese), who choose this form of housing 
for security reasons. Leisch suggested that it is inappropriate to talk 
about gated communities in this context. Although they mainly have 
their own facilities such as schools, shopping centers, healthcare et 
cetera, they are nonetheless open to the public and largely located 
outside the housing clusters. Although the residents are surrounded 
by hard boundaries, they in fact know their neighbors neither better 
nor less than residents in open communities.102
My own survey on gated communities in Yogyakarta, a middle-class 
city in Java, proves otherwise. We found that many newly developed 
housing estates, especially built after the economic crises of 1998, 
shared characteristics with gated communities such as using gates, 
perimeter walls and security personnel as well as bearing names 
associated with nature. However, they proliferate not in large size. 
Rather, they proliferate in small-scale housing estates ranging from 
less than 20 units of houses to several hundreds units, but on average 
no more than 50 units. However their numbers are increasing 
rapidly. Within past 5 years more than 383 new estates have been 
built. Th e research indicates that the development of these “mini 
gated settlement” is a product of the interrelation between weak 
regulations concerning changes in land use, change in values of the 
community toward a more modernized one, strategy of the developers 
to avoid long bureaucratic processes on building housing estates (as 
there are more complicated requirements for housing estates with 
Th e multitude of small 
scale housing estates in 
Yogyakarta, Indonesia that 
share the characteristic of 
gated communities. (Source: 
author’s collection).
71
more than 50 houses), weak control and laissez-faire planning by 
the urban authority and the image of Yogyakarta as a safe city and 
city for pensioners. Th eir development however suggests serious 
implications namely the proliferation of small-confl ict between new-
comers who reside within the estate against the native inhabitants of 
the kampung where the “island of estate” is located on one side and 
highly fragmented urban development unwanted by urban authority 
on the other. 103
In conclusion, some motives are included as the impetus of the 
insularity of gated communities. First: there is a strong connection 
with history as was the case of the colonies in South Africa, or the 
“country club” phenomenon in Buenos Aires. (b) Avoiding violence 
and the insecurity of the city as was the case in Buenos Aires after the 
crisis in the 1970s and the Chinese in Indonesia after the 1998 Riot. 
(c) Seeking nature as in the case of housing developments on Spanish 
beaches. (d) Th e division of culture and religion as seen in Saudi 
Arabia and other Arab countries. (e) Th e desire for global association 
as demonstrated by the use of names such as Dreamland, Utopia, 
Garden City, Beverly Hills, and Amsterdam. (f ) Multi-dimensional 
factors that push the superfi cial adoption of global market as in the 
case of Yogyakarta. 
Perhaps Jan Wehrheim was right when he suggested that gated 
communities entrench segregation. Cities become more and more 
fragmented but simultaneously manifest themselves in a new duality 
of “safe” and “dangerous” spaces and cities.104 Th is duality is now a 
global phenomenon that many classifi cations of space and cities are 
based upon. Karina Landman has also concluded in conjunction 
with the principle of gated communities as the future of our urban 
space: 
‘Gated Communities are a growing phenomenon worldwide are not 
only restricted to developed countries. Increasingly, they are occurring in 
transitional and developing countries. It is a powerful idea, which has the 
potential to infl uence the urban future in the 21st century. It could just 
become the “new garden-city” model of the 21st century and the new 
paradigm for city planning and urban design.’ (Landman 2000)
 CHAPTER 2 - 72
Export Processing Zones: a “mobile” place of 
mobilization 
If we buy a pair of shoes or a computer, it is most probable that 
it was produced in one of the so-called “export processing zones” 
or EPZs. Th ese zones are territorial entities that under a special 
legal system have been granted special status by the government 
of a certain country where certain export-oriented companies and 
manufacturers are located. 
Th e concept of a free zone for trading was fi rst recorded in modern 
history when King Alfonso X granted certain commercial privileges 
to the city of Cadiz in 1929. Elsewhere in Spain, a free trade zone 
was also set up in Barcelona before the First World War although it 
did not really fl ourish until the Second World War. Th e fi rst modern 
industrial zone was set up in 1959 at Shannon, Ireland. In 1962 the 
concept was adopted by Puerto Rico and then spread to Asia. In this 
region, India was the fi rst to realize the concept at Kandla in 1966. 
By 1970, there were already ten host countries. Since then, such 
zones have been constructed in nearly half of the world’s countries 
and predominantly in the Th ird World. Th e latest fi gures from 
the ILO (International Labor Organization) and WEPZA (World 
Economic Processing Zone Association) show that there are now 
some 850 EPZs worldwide employing nearly 27 million people.
Not all of the EPZs are in the form of a clearly defi ned territorial area 
but in general, the term does refer to a clearly defi ned territorial area, 
albeit in various levels and sizes. Th e most common is in the form 
of an industrial estate or industrial zone, which may also be state 
or privately owned. In 1978 in Manila, the UN initiated WEPZA, 
a private non-profi t world association of economic processing 
zones and free trade zones and an organization of 29 governments 
participated in the development and operation of the zones. Th is 
board classifi es an EPZ according to its size. Th e “large zones” 
typically refer to an EPZ with more than 1000 hectares, sometimes 
with a resident population such as the Chinese Special Economic 
Zones or even in the form of new cities. Th e small zones are generally 
smaller than 1000 hectares and are surrounded by a clearly defi ned 
73
Above: Alias names of the Export Processing Zone worldwide (drawn by author, 
source: Legislation and publications of governments and EPZ authorities and 
Romero, 2000). Below, the estimated numbers of EPZ world wide (Drawn from 
ILO and WESPA data 2003).
 CHAPTER 2 - 74
barrier. Normally they have no residential population, although 
they may contain worker dormitories. In these zones, the investor’s 
industries must be located within the zone in order to receive 
the benefi ts. Industry Specifi c Zones are the third type created to 
support the needs of a specifi c industry such as banking, jewelry, oil 
and gas, electronics, textiles or tourism. An example of this type is 
India’s Jewelry Zones, or many off shore banking zones. Performance 
Specifi c Zones, the last type, only admit investors who meet certain 
performance criteria such as degree of exports, level of technology, 
size of investment, etc. Companies can be located anywhere but still 
receive the benefi ts. An example of this type of zone is India’s export 
oriented factories and the Mexico Maquila program.105
Th e Export Processing Zone is only one of many names as well as 
defi nitions which refer to a similar phenomenon. Ana T. Romero from 
the Multinational Enterprises Program of the International Labor 
Offi  ce for instance, defi ned an EPZ as “a delimited geographical area 
or an export-oriented manufacturing or service enterprise located 
in any part of the country, which benefi ts from special investment-
promotion incentives, including exemptions from customs duties 
and preferential treatment with respect to various fi scal and fi nancial 
regulations.”106 Romero noted that the associated names generally 
shared the word “free.” Th is word refers not only to the creation of 
free areas for the storage, trans-shipment or duty-free sale of goods 
but also most importantly to an agreement “to provide preferential 
conditions” for import equipment, components and raw material, 
to assemble goods, or provide services mainly for export. “Free” 
here means rather the privilege granted to the area to connect itself 
with the global market, overcoming the international barriers. Th e 
separation of the zones allows an EPZ to off er specifi c fi nancial 
incentives such as tax free import and export and tax holidays, 
exclusive infrastructure dedicated to certain industry or specifi c 
characteristics of the investors, secure and abundant cheap labor, 
strategic location and market access. 
An EPZ is based on a very simple basic concept. Whatever the name, 
the signifi cance of an EPZ lays in its “physical, social and economic 
75
separation from the rest of the country.”107 Th is separation is enforced 
also by modifi cation of the law, especially labor law such as the non-
implementation of national labor laws within the zone enclave. In 
India, South Korea, Taiwan and Philippines, to mention a few, the 
laws within the zones are created in order to set “confl ict-free zones” 
in terms of relations between enterprise and labor. Within the zones 
some countries even regard strikes as illegal and in many cases, even 
labor unions are banned.108
Many governments often choose EPZs primarily as a strategic 
instrument for economic and industrial restructuring. First, and 
perhaps most admirably, it is aimed at job creation. Particularly in 
depressed regions or less developed regions of the country, setting 
up an EPZ is one of many choices that promote development. In 
many cases, this choice has created a sudden landscape change as 
quiet villages are transformed into bustling towns that become 
the subject of massive migration. Pearl River Delta is one of the 
fascinating cases in this regard. Many governments also perceive 
the EPZ as a strategic development tactic that may attract foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in export-oriented industries and therefore 
increase foreign exchange earnings by promoting exports. Th rough 
the presence of foreign manufacturers, it is also expected that the 
transfer of new technologies and upgrading of workers’ skills will 
occur. Many governments also expect that the EPZ can stimulate 
related sectors such as information technology, research and 
development, tourism and human resources development and thus 
be strategically important for their economies. It’s not just a few who 
regard these zones as the kick-start of their economy as a whole. 
EPZs are credited with improving productivity and human dignity 
as well as “resolving cultural issues” as Robert Haywood, the Director 
of the World Economic Processing Zones Association has written in 
his notice. Especially applied to the “dual national free zones” both 
cultures can interact with each other through the exchange of free 
zones: 
‘Free zones can take the lead in improving productivity and human 
dignity. Culture issues are resolved in free zones.  Th e multi-national free 
zones such as the free zones that are started by the Koreans in Russia 
 CHAPTER 2 - 76
in order to help Korean companies understand how to do business in 
Russia, Japanese free zones in the Philippines, Singaporean ones in China, 
even the free zones in Jordan that deal directly with the U.S. and Israeli 
economy because of some of the political issues that have been going on 
in the Middle East, are at the center of cultural globalization.  Th ere has 
been a trend in free zones to try to help cultures interact with each other. 
It is an important trend.  In the last 3 to 5 years we have seen an enormous 
growth in the dual national free zones around the world.’109
However, not all agree with this view. 
A gray zone of total mobilization of workers is obvious not only 
in the Philippines but also virtually everywhere, from Mexico, to 
China, Indonesia, Vietnam and Cambodia, as well as African 
countries. Th e long-standing and painstaking struggle to criticize 
their condition has been made by Naomi Klein in her books No Logo
and Windows and Fences.110 She has demonstrated how problematic 
this kind of development has been worldwide. In the EPZ workers 
are normally subject to a similar system whereby total mobilization 
of workers occurs in the name of industrialization and export. A 
study was written about Cavite, an EPZ in Rosario, Philippines, 
about thirty kilometers south of Manila. Th is EPZ is a 276 hectare 
walled-industrial and housing zone with about 207 factories that 
produce goods strictly for export commodities. It is worth quoting 
one of her stories after visiting the area in 1997:
‘Manufacturing is concentrated and isolated inside the zone as if it were 
toxic waste: pure, 100 percent production at low, low prices. Cavite, like 
the rest of the zones that compete with it, presents itself as the buy-in-
bulk Price Club for multinationals on the lookout for bargains – grab a 
really big shopping cart. Inside, it’s obvious that the row of factories, each 
with its own gate and guard, has been carefully planned to squeeze the 
maximum amount of production out of this swath of land. Windowless 
workshops, made of cheap plastic and aluminum siding are crammed in 
next to each other, only feet apart.’ (Klein 2002a p. 203-204)
In relation to shoe production for instance, the EPZ has a very close 
relationship with global brands such as Nike and Reebok. Th ose 
brands have actually only sub-contractors, mostly from Korea or 
Taiwan, who then look for available factories in the EPZ to produce 
the shoes. In fact, the factories are producing any kind of shoe; 
only later they will be “swooshed” Nike or labeled Reebok after 
the large-scale buying has been done. With this system, the many 
77
branded-shoes are actually produced by the same factory without a 
specifi c brand. Hence the competition amongst brands that needs 
segregated space in shopping malls or even their own super-stores 
is all blurred into the same desk and sewing machine in Cavite. It 
is true that the operating zone has an abundant supply of available 
labor, which tends to keep wages down, and therefore also reduces 
the production costs. Th e extreme high cost of these branded shoes, 
compared to the non-branded but sewed with similar machines in 
Cavite, means an extreme gain for people on Wall Street in New 
York, but has its own meaning in Cavite. She concluded that the 
existence of this EPZ was based on a series of pervading fears: “Th e 
governments are afraid of losing their foreign factories; the factories 
are afraid of losing their brand-name buyers; and the workers are 
afraid of losing their unstable jobs. Th ese are factories built not on 
land but on air.”111
John Armitage and Joanne Roberts also wrote a report about Cavite. 
Th ey saw that such a place is a product of hypermodernity characterized 
by hypercapitalism, globalization systems and militarization.112
Inspired by Paul Virilio’s “archaeology of the future” they tried to 
fi nd the future of this development in terms of the mentality and 
materialism of our everyday life in the hypermodern city. Th ey 
called the military mentality the impetus of the phenomenon that 
leads towards the production of what Giorgio Agamben termed the 
“gray zone of total mobilization.” Th e hypermodern city, according 
to them, is “no longer governed by capitalism but by hypercapitalism 
and other globalitarian systems and perpetual deterritorialization 
and reterritorialization of people.” In this way, the civilian mentality 
is shifted into a more militaristic view that places the importance 
of naked power above all other factors of human relationships.113
Hypercapitalism is a product of the morphing forces of globalization 
(particularly with the development of information and communication 
technologies) and modern capitalism creating an excessive speed 
of capitalism itself. Hypercapitalism is then closely related to 
what Virilio has criticized with the development of a “totalitarian 
globalitarianism” where all systems of command are succumbed to 
the creation of speed. Globalization has also created a continuous 
 CHAPTER 2 - 78
movement of transnational corporations from one city to another, 
from one nation to another in order to fi nd the best labor source, 
tax reduction and any other privilege leading to the optimization of 
gain. Th is movement is however not without spatial consequences. 
It produces, in fact, disintegration of spatial, economical and social 
environments of the locals. It also pushes people to move, whether 
voluntarily or not, from one transnational corporate site to another; 
or away from their land due to the transformation of their land into 
industrial zones provided for the corporate enclaves. Th e space of 
these zones is, moreover, highly guarded, thus transforming them 
from a workplace to a “militaristic zone.” Th us for Armitage and 
Roberts, these characteristics have altered the hypermodern city not 
merely into the dark side of the instant and plug in city that has been 
already anatomized by Archigram in the 1960s but also into a gray 
zone of total mobilization. Th e zones are a “mobile city” by which 
the new mentality of emergency and disintegration and continuous 
transformation emerges.114
2.3  Insularity leaks
Non-Places 
‘Th e non-place is the opposite of utopia: it exists, and it does not contain 
any organic society.’ (Augé 1995)  
According to Marc Augé “place” has two sources of invention. Th e 
fi rst is a place that is founded by indigenous people who live in it. 
Th ey consecrate monuments, erect borders, defend the wholeness of 
the territorial entity, and make off erings to spirits who dwell in that 
place. Th e other is a place that is understood by the anthropologist, 
which is based on the organization of space. Th e later concept is 
constructed in order to clearly defi ne the fi rst invention, from the 
way the place is spatially organized. 
Th e anthropological place is the common ground for both the 
concrete and symbolic construction of space that corresponds to both 
inventions. Th e indigenous people imagine that their world is a closed 
one. Its history is never fully understandable, or more precisely, it does 
79
not have to be understood. People need only recognize themselves 
within this closed world. Within this closed world, not surprisingly, 
all those events tend to have spatial expressions, which moreover 
have an association with their identity. In this closed world, place is 
founded from the fantasies that spring from the concrete landscape. 
Th e place and the fantasies are anchored in territory but at the same 
time fragile, subject to readjustment and “doomed” by the recent 
phenomena of migration. Ethnologist’s illusions are, on the other 
hand, are so clear and transparent that they seem to be fully expressed 
in the most trivial features.  For the ethnologist, society is located in 
space and time, symbolically, like an island with its own totality, an 
example of an ideal setting of a cultural totality. Th us, its limitation 
is obvious: ignoring intrinsic problems and characteristics as well as 
the complexity of individuals within the society. Th us, essentially, 
A diagram produced by 
Xavier Creus (Archikubik) 
depicts  “Transpolis, Global 
Underground” (1999) that 
connects “global cities” in 
the Europe and United 
States. Th is diagram creates a 
mental map  that compresses 
the complexity into simple 
image of how global cities are 
connected. (Source: Xavier 
Creus in Gausa et al. 2003 p. 
266). 
 CHAPTER 2 - 80
anthropological place has a diff erent nature. Augé defi ned it as “a 
principle of meaning for people who live in it, and also a principle 
of intelligibility for the person who observes it.”115
Anthropological place has three common features; namely that 
people designate it to be a place of identity, of relations and of 
history. Birthplace for instance is widely regarded as the most 
important constituent of individual identity. “To be born is to be 
born in place.”  Frequently, and especially in traditional societies, 
particular names are derived from the landscape associated with the 
place where the birth took place. Moreover, individuals must coexist 
with others. Th ey share common space and tradition and thus, an 
identity constituted by the relations between these individuals. And 
fi nally, identity and relations that are unstable need to be memorized. 
Th us monuments, tombs, and memorials are built in order to create 
living history. Anthropological place is also based on a concrete 
landscape thus its geometry can be mapped. Th e basic geometrical 
forms are lines, intersection of lines and points of intersection. Th ose 
forms concretely correspond to routes, axes or paths to crossroads 
and open space, and to centers of more or less monumental style. 
All of these elements may constitute a larger and more complex 
space, and consequently, institution. Th ey may also depict power 
constellations, through their political symbolism. Th ese elementary 
forms of place are generally useful to describe traditional society and 
can be also applied to contemporary place. 
However, with the rise of modernity, place is then challenged by the 
space where identity, relation and history are missing: the non-place. 
Marc Augé distinguished two complementary but distinct realities 
of non-place. Th e fi rst is spaces that are formed in relation to certain 
“ends” and the relationship that individuals have with these spaces. 
Th e fi rst points to transport, transit and commerce and leisure 
spaces. Th e second is mediated by words be they either as texts or 
as images.  
However, the multiplication of these non-places may also return 
into diff erentiation. Trevor Boddy characterized these developments 
in our cities as the building of an analogous city. He perceived 
81
that our cities are increasing the separation between urban streets 
as a public domain and the development of “bridges and tunnels” 
between a network of transit systems to isolated islands of workspace 
without recourse to conventional street.116 From the birth of the city, 
in Babylon, Rome, China, Meso-America, and worldwide by the 
Christian era, the urban grid, which is composed of street patterns, 
has been used as the organizing framework of urbanity. In some 
areas, the street pattern is developed not only on one level but 
many, such as underground dwellings in China, hillside burrows of 
Cappadocia, stacked houses in Pueblo, and the English market place 
in the Medieval period. Th ese are just some of the areas that use 
multiple levels to expand living and movement space. Th e modern 
system of bridges and passages were developed in a more complex 
relation. Especially in downtown, a rift has been created between 
downtown streets on one side and bridge and tunnel (or covered 
passages) on the other. Th e downtown urban street is characterized by 
hurly burly and messiness while it contains not only movement but 
also great variation of people and activities. He calls this condition 
a “zone of coexistence” between many parties and classes in the city, 
which is useful as a place of dialogue as well as the friction vital for 
urban order. Bridges and tunnels however are designated only for 
the limited number of the urban community who prefer cleanliness, 
a controlled environment and safety away from that which one may 
fi nd in the urban street. But those bridges and tunnels are not entirely 
open since they are connections mainly between isolated islands of 
the modern city. Bridges and tunnels, for him, are an expression 
of middle class tyranny over the downtown street since they are 
fi ltering away improper urban communities and activities all in the 
name of escaping extreme climates. According to him, those are not 
merely value-neutral infrastructures, or only-infrastructures but they 
erase the last zone of physical contact between urban communities 
and create “monoclass, monoform, and decidedly monotonous 
hermetic archipelagos.” Arguing for resistance to the development 
of that analogous city he urged that: “We must quit the splendid 
surroundings of our new bridges to return again to the street … Or 
else, we must do all we can to bring the culture of the street into the 
 CHAPTER 2 - 82
Despite painstaking eff ort 
to express image as global 
city through fascination 
of highrise and highways, 
nonetheless, Asian cities are 
the site of what commonly 
called as informal sectors. 
Despite the “beauty” of 
those image, the reality on 
the street is indeed much 
more lively. Along the sense 
of order expessed by those 
images of global  city, the 
informal has its own order 
and live.  
Th e image of global city 
is normally expressed 
through depicting “bird eye” 
perspective that overrides 
complexities. Th ere are 
also another “life” to which 
globali city can also be 
perceived. (Source: from 
various internet site as  
stated in the pictures).
83
 CHAPTER 2 - 84
new realm, however dangerous or messy this might be.”117
Junkspace
Another dimension of non-place is where multiplicity inhabits space 
and is referred to as Junkspace by Koolhaas.118 He defi nes Junkspace 
as what remains after modernization has run its course or, more 
precisely, what coagulates while modernization is in progress, its 
fallout. He argued that the product of modernization is not modern 
architecture but this Junkspace. In contrast to modernization that 
had a rational program (whether or not it was approached from 
science), Junkspace is the meltdown of that rationality. Koolhaas 
estimated that in the 21st century we will produce more Junkspace 
than during the last century. 
Koolhaas indicated the characteristics of this space. First, Junkspace is 
a “product of the encounter between escalator and air conditioning, 
conceived in an incubator of sheetrock,” which is all missing in the 
history books.119 Koolhaas wanted to emphasize that continuity, 
from escalator, air conditioning, sprinkler, fi re shutter, hot-air 
curtain, is the essence of this space. In creating Junkspace, we exploit 
any technological inventions that enable expansion and continuity. 
Junkspace is therefore always inside, sealed “not by structure but 
by skin, like a bubble.” In Junkspace the logic that architecture 
separates buildings is turned around. Th rough air conditioning vents 
and escalators, buildings are united, creating architecture of endless 
buildings. Structure as previously dictated, became limited, a unit of 
architecture. Since this expansion and continuity, structure becomes 
in fact an infrastructure of the skin that continually envelops the 
ever-growing Junkspace. Not coincidentally that structural frame is 
adopted swiftly as it matches with continuity, making the installation 
of those utilities and infrastructure easy. Moreover, there is no wall. 
What exists is merely an array of partition walls. 
Junkspace is also composed as a module that may attract brands. 
Th is assemblage of modules merges all polarities. Old and new are 
merged; a panorama of Stone Age and space age can be presented 
at once. In producing this space, instead of considering wholeness 
Junkspace. (Source: 
Koolhaas, 2000 p. 402, 360)
85
fi rst, architects consider the partiality of these modules and then 
turn them into an enveloping skin or superstructure and then give 
them a name. Koolhaas wrote: “Architects thought of Junkspace fi rst 
and named it Megastructure, the fi nal solution to transcend their 
huge impasse. Like multiple Babels, huge superstructures would last 
through eternity, teeming with impermanent subsystems that would 
mutate over time, beyond their control.”120
Junkspace overrides typology, or rather makes a typology of the 
accumulation, of the random, and the shapeless. In classical 
understanding, typology relates to demarcation and identity. 
Typology limits form in such a way that wholeness is developed. Yet 
within Junkspace, this demarcation is blurred; it accommodates all 
diff erence at once. Junkspace thrives on diff erence-producing design 
but this design itself dies in Junkspace since we may see endless 
diff erence. 
Many defi ne Junkspace as space of fl ow. Koolhaas however regards 
this as mistaken because fl ow requires a disciplined movement. 
Junkspace is rather a web the where anarchy of the fl ow is the most 
intelligible characteristic to create freedom. Only certain parts of the 
movement are disciplined in Junkspace such as escalators, automated 
tellers or cashiers. Unlike place, which according to Norberg-Schulze 
is existential, Junkspace, Koolhaas wrote, is post-existential, “it 
makes you uncertain where you are, obscures where you go, undoes 
where you were.”121 Junkspace swallows anything and ultimately, 
may become universal, swallowing all places. Although originating 
from urban elements, Junkspace will reduce these elements into a 
single uniform urbanity, which can be placed anywhere. Junkspace 
Junkspace receipt. (Source: Koolhaas, 2000 p. 351)
 CHAPTER 2 - 86
is at once authorless and authoritarian, emancipative and dictating 
humankind internally, entertaining and policing. 
Th e concept of Junkspace has also infi ltrated workspace. Since 
work can now be done at home, the offi  ce is transformed into the 
next frontier of Junkspace, as an urban home. “Junkspace features 
the offi  ce as the urban home, a meeting-boudoir: desks become 
sculptures, the work fl oor is lit by intimate down lights.” It is not 
only existential in terms of its spatial orientation of humans, but in 
terms of the very existence of humankind itself, Koolhaas indicated 
that Junkspace may have already invaded all aspect of us including 
our bodies: through the vibes of the cell phone, Botox injections, 
collagen, silicon implants as well as liposuction. Even gene therapy 
is a total reengineering according to Junkspace. Bodies, as Koolhaas 
said, perhaps are a “mini-construction site.” Th e last frontier of 
Junkspace is humankind itself.122
Commenting on this theory, Jameson described Koolhaas’ Junkspace 
as an “a whole universe on the point of fusing into a kind of all-purpose 
indeterminate magma.”It is no longer confi ned to architecture or 
city anymore. It extends beyond standardization or Americanization, 
becoming “a virus that spreads and proliferates throughout the 
macrocosm.” Junkspace, for Jameson has been provided for the 
extraordinary expansion of desire around the planet, our future city. 
As a new vocabulary, Junkspace is “the new language of space which is 
speaking through these self-replicating, self-perpetuating sentences, 
space itself become the dominant code or hegemonic language of 
the new moment of History—the last?—whose very raw material 
condemns it in its deterioration to extinction.” 123
Urban Slum and Desakota
‘Th e late capitalist triage of humanity, then, has already taken place. 
Th e global growth of a vast informal proletariat, moreover, is a wholly 
original structural development unforeseen by either classical Marxism or 
modernization pundits. Slums indeed challenge social theory to grasp the 
novelty of a true global residuum lacking the strategic economic power 
of socialized labor, but massively concentrated in a shanty-town world 
encircling the fortifi ed enclaves of the urban rich.’ (Davis 2004)
City has its own myth. Developmentalists believe that urbanization 
87
has a positive impact on the poor. Th e city is the source of a trickle 
down eff ect to distribute wealth through producing workplaces. 
Habitat Debate however critically assesses this statement. Asad 
Mohammed for instance insisted on an oversimplifi ed view of that 
claim. He saw the claim was exacerbated by a liberalized global 
economy, which emphasizes the belief that a mega city is the solution 
to poverty, and disregarded the linkage between urban and rural 
issues.124 Moreover, for the poor who are mostly immigrants from 
rural areas, the city is a challenging place. For them, to be a citizen 
is not an easy process. High density, anonymity, mobility, separation 
from their land, having strangers as neighbors, competition for 
livelihood and resources are violent ingredients that are entirely alien 
to the ex-rural population.125
In contrast to gated communities, which are predominantly perceived 
as quarters for the well to do, there are some quarters found in the 
so-called developing countries that are entirely diff erent in terms 
of environmental qualities. Some even saw that these forms are not 
urban. Th ey could be the quarters for the lowest rung of society: slum 
areas as well as what actually originated from the rural: the urban 
village. Th ey seem to be similar in form, mostly slums, but in many 
cases they have an entirely diff erent meaning. A slum is an inevitable 
part of the urban dynamic. Th e urban village is a transformational 
stage into another urban form, which is perhaps yet unknown.  
In regards to the slum, perhaps there is no better work to provoke 
the way we see our planet than the work of Mike Davis. Unlike 
Hardt and Negri who envisioned a “super city” of the multitude, 
Mike Davis predicted a future “planet of slums.” Presenting statistics 
and reports from almost every corner of the world, Davis showed 
convincingly that the future of our planet is not that of tidy cities 
but rather a concentration of large slummy conurbation with no real 
distinction between urban and rural. Th e problem we face will not 
only be the takeover of slums but also poverty, the rising economic 
gap between the rich and the poor and at the same time the closing 
down of their physical distance, undiff erentiated between formal 
and informal and their derivates. Horizontal spatial expansion will 
 CHAPTER 2 - 88
take place either as slum-sprawl in developing countries or suburban 
sprawl in the developed countries, which will bulldoze sustainable 
ecology, infl ict legal and illegal land and space speculations and 
possibly lead to what has been termed the “poverty big-bang.” In 
the slum, Davis believes that the forefront of resistance against the 
nowhere and everywhere power of Empire is from those who are 
appointed as the real government in the grassroots of the informal 
proletariat.126 Th e poor quality of life in the slums from deprivation 
due to exclusion has spurred non-governmental organizations to 
mobilize the people against the power of the state and corporations. 
Worldwide, we are witness to the proliferation of NGOs that are 
concerned with mobilizing highly specifi c local, national, and regional 
groups on matters of equity, access, justice, and redistribution. Th ese 
NGOs have complex relations with the state, with the offi  cial public 
sphere, with international civil society initiatives and with local 
communities. Th ese interrelationships create as Appadurai called it, 
a “grassroots globalization” or “globalization from below.”127
Diff ering from Davis and Appadurai who analyzed this subject 
from a panoramic and global perspective, Koolhaas suggested two 
diff erent but sometimes confl icting angles in seeing this similar 
tendency in African cities like Lagos. Koolhaas in his Fragments of 
Lectures on Lagos used two diff erent perspectives to show the lack of 
validity in our perception of Lagos as a city of slums. In the act of 
viewing the diagram, we impose our own set of assumptions and 
preconceptions.  And the diagram itself is of course a reconstruction 
of what someone has seen. At the fi rst glimpse of this African city, 
it appears to be merely a messy, chaotic, dysfunctional city. But 
after one moment of more focused and closer inspection Koolhaas 
was astounded to see that all that chaos was indeed part of a larger 
mechanism of this city to organize itself. A diff erent vantage point 
also produces a diff erent interpretation of this messiness as he wrote 
after he rented a presidential helicopter: “From the air, the apparent 
burning garbage heap turned out to be, in fact, a village, an urban 
phenomenon with a highly organized community living on its 
crust. Our preoccupation with the apparently “informal” had been 
premature, if not mistaken.” Th e interweaving between traffi  c and 
89
humans, between infrastructure and bodies, is a very eff ective way, if 
not an intelligent one.128
In regard to the urban village, Asian urbanism is perhaps characterized 
by non-urban qualities and behavior, which is presented side-by-side 
with Western modern urbanism. Geographical studies, notably Terry 
McGee for the case in Taiwan and Indonesia129 and then echoed by 
Lin in the case of China,130 show plenty of evidence to illustrate the 
process, which has somewhat distinctive features when compared 
with development in the Western context. Examining Taiwan and 
Indonesia, McGee suggested that the distinguishing characteristic 
of Asian urbanism was in fact the lack of clear distinction between 
urban and rural regions. In urban areas we still fi nd the remnants of 
rural life not only in terms of social behavior but also in the physical 
environment. Vice versa, in the rural village urban infl uences are 
clearly visible.  With “urban and rural activity occurring in the same 
geographic territory,” the categories of urban and rural have become 
less rigid, replaced by these hybrids of urban and rural territories. 
Urbanization in these regions is in fact the proliferation of a kind 
of desakota (originated from Indonesian: desa - rural and kota – 
urban). 
Desakota hence is an exemplary case of the process of amalgamation 
of natural, rural and urban environments through global processes. 
Here we could not easily distinguish between slums and native 
villages since those villages have already been entirely urbanized. 
Perhaps it resembles the European experience where industrialization 
as well as the car and train reshaped the whole urban landscape 
into extensive development or, more recently, the suburbanization 
of American cities. Nonetheless it has also its own characteristics, 
namely a combination of Western modernization, which is perceived 
as the goal of development and the use of Asian cultural values, 
demographics and geographic determinants. 
In this setting, thus, architecture cannot be separated from juxtaposing 
forces and trends. On one side, the origins of Asian traditional 
architecture are deeply rooted in natural and social determinants 
inherited in the village. On the other, since its encounter with the 
 CHAPTER 2 - 90
91
West through colonialism, rationalized architectural tradition was 
also introduced through colonial cities. Th is encounter was like a 
ceaseless meeting between two spatial traditions, rooted from below 
and from above, or borrowing Norberg-Schulze’s term: between the 
vernacular which is immobile and the stylistic which is mobile.131
However in responding to this phenomenon it is not enough to 
merely recognize the elements of those forces and call them a hybrid 
identity and architecture. Th is attitude tends to end with only the 
recognition of the essential, of the “authentic” or the “Asia-ness” and 
the diff erences with the non-Asian model. It is also diffi  cult to explain 
the urban and architectural qualities of these hybrid territories only 
using Norberg Schulz’s concept of loss of place. In Genius Loci loss 
of place is characterized by a lack of spatial enclosure, density and 
monotonous characteristics of the current environment, as was the 
case in Europe after industrialization and the world wars. As he 
noted in regard to the character of lost space: “Lost is the settlement 
as a place in nature, lost are the urban foci as places for common 
living, lost is the building as a meaningful sub-place where man may 
simultaneously experience individuality and belonging. Lost is also 
the relationship to earth and sky.”132 Too much haste in attempts 
to defi ne and explain hybrid territories not only risks producing 
reductionist defi nitions, the approach itself is trapped within the 
Besides two previous images 
of the “global cities” there 
is also a forgotten reality 
namely the multiplicity 
of slum. (Left pictures are 
obtained from www.google.
com with a key word “slum” 
except Indonesia which 
obtained by the author). 
Above map shows the “alias” 
- although can be slightly 
diff erent meaning of this 
“planet of slum.” 
 CHAPTER 2 - 92
only quest for form and order that judges “from without.” 
Th e desakota of Asian cities are in fact a fertile soil for a complex 
relationship between architecture and its natural, social and cultural 
setting. Th us it is hardly a “lost space” in the Norberg-Schulzian 
sense, although admittedly the notion of enclosure sometimes 
does not exist or is a mixture between various levels of enclosures. 
Here, a hot and relatively humid environment provides a natural 
setting where architecture cannot be separated from exterior space 
as functional and social space. Th e exterior is used, and to many 
extents designed, with equal importance assigned to the interior 
resulting in a more permeable wall or other enclosing elements. In 
this aspect, Asian demography is also an important factor, which 
pushes urban architecture to its limit in providing space. Density is 
here regarded as a must rather than an alternative. Its manifestation 
however is varied, emphasizing a “horizontal arrangement” of multi-
functional uses and shared users rather than a vertical arrangement, 
which retains a division between user and functions. Again, enclosure 
vanishes amidst these shared spaces of desakota.    
Social and cultural values, such as feng shui or vastu purusha mandala, 
also provide a set of wisdom, which in many cases is unquantifi able 
and diffi  cult to rationalize but nonetheless works almost everywhere 
in the politics of space (urban politics and “micro politics” of the 
client etc). Here architecture is not merely about space and material 
but also a set of values and beliefs seemingly inherent in those spaces 
and building materials and at the same time in their production and 
reproduction of culture, tradition and identity. Th us, tradition here 
must be defi ned not in terms of preserved authenticity but rather 
as a continuous production and reproduction of that wisdom in 
almost every (new) context. For Asians, “logic” is not always rational 
but can also be a subjective lesson from a Chinese feng shui master, 
an Indian Brahman or Balinese undagi. Th e desakota, hypothetically, 
is a perfect site for real wilderness, perhaps another wilderness that 
diff ers from the great sprawling cities. Th is site opens, arguably, to 
another set of architectures that responds to multiplicity.
93
Notes
1 Appadurai, Arjun. 1996. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of 
Globalization. Minneapolis (Minnesota): University of Minnesota Press. See 
also Appadurai, Arjun. 2000. Globalization. Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press for the enlargement of the argument.
2 See McLuhan, Marshall, and Bruce R. Powers. 1989. Th e Global Village: 
Transformations in World Life and Media in the 21st Century. New York: Oxford 
University Press.
3  See Castells, Manuel. 1996. Th e Rise of the Network Society. Oxford and 
Malden, Mass: Blackwell.
4  Benedikt, Michael. 1991. Cyberspace: First Steps. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, p. 24.
5  Benedikt, Michael L. 1993. “Cityspace, Cyberspace, and Th e Spatiology of 
Information.” Pp. Lecture delivered at the “New Urbanism Symposium” 
Princeton University, School of Architecture and Planning, Princeton, New 
Jersey; October 17, 1992. 
6  Virilio, Paul. 1997. “Overexposed City.” Pp. 380 - 390 in Cultural Reader 
in Architecture, edited by Neil Leach. London and New York: Routledge, p. 
390.
7  Mitchell, William J. 1996. City of Bits: Space, Place, and the Infobahn. 
Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.
8  Mitchell, William J. 1999. E-topia : “Urban life, Jim--but not as we know it”. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, p.147-155. 
9  Ibid. p. 154. 
10  Dodge, Martin, and Rob Kitchin. 2001. Atlas of Cyberspace. Harlow (England) 
and New York: Addison-Wesley.
11  the pictures are available at http://www.cybergeography.org/atlas/atlas.html
12  http://www.teleglobe.com/en/our_network
13  Internet Software Consortium (http://www.isc.org). Th e information is taken 
from http://www.isc.org/ds/WWW-200207/index.html. 
14  Quéau, Philippe. 2002. “Th e world split in two. In search of ethics and a 
political economy for the Information Society.” UNESCO.
15  Minges, Michael. 2001b. “Kretek Internet: Indonesia Case Study.” International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU).
16 Sassen, Saskia. 1997. “Electronic Space and Power.” Journal of Urban Technology
4: 1-17, —. 2001. Th e Global City: New York, London, Tokyo. Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, p. 178.
17  Birnbaum, Dara. 1995. “Finding Any Place in Cyberspace.” Pp. 160-171 in 
Anyplace, edited by Cynthia C. Davidson. New York: Anyone Corp.
18  Traore, Aminata D. 2001. “Africa: A “Have” or a “Have-Not” in the Information 
Society?” Pp. 32-36 in Unplugged, Arts as the Scene of Global Confl icts, edited 
by Gerfried Stocker and Christine Schöpf Ostfi ldern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz.
19  Stocker, Gerfried, and Christine Schoepf, eds. 2002. Unplugged: Art as the 
Scene of Global Confl icts. Ostfi ldern-Ruit: Hatje-Cantz.
20  Minges, Michael. 2001a. “Internet Around the World.” International 
Telecommunication Union.
 CHAPTER 2 - 94
21  World Urbanization Prospects: the 2001 Revision is prepared by the United 
Nations Population Division. Th e document presents estimates and projections 
of urban and rural populations for major areas, regions and countries of the 
world for the period 1950-2030. It is available at www.unpopulation.org.
22  MVDRD. 1999. Metacity/Datatown. Rotterdam: 010 Publishers, p.17. 
23  Sassen, Saskia. 1998. Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays on the New 
Mobility of People and Money. New York: New Press, p.xix.
24  Friedmann, John, and Goetz Wolff . 1982. “”World City Formation: An 
Agenda for Research and Action”.” International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research 6: 309-344.
25  Sassen, Saskia. 2001. Th e Global City: New York, London, Tokyo. Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
26  Ibid., p. 180.
27  Taylor, P.J , G Catalano, and D.R.F. Walker. 2000. “Exploratory Analysis of the 
World City Network.” Urban Studies 39: 2377-2394, —. 2002. “Measurement 
of the World City Network.” Urban Studies 39: 2367-2376.
28  Sassen, Saskia. 1998. Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays on the New 
Mobility of People and Money. New York: New Press.
29  Sassen, Saskia. 1991. Th e Global City: New York, London, Tokyo. Princeton 
(New Jersey): Princeton University Press, p. 193-194.
30  Marcuse, Peter, and Ronald van Kempen. 2000. Globalizing Cities: A New 
Spatial Order? Oxford; Malden (Mass.): Blackwell Publishers.
31  See for instance Hall, Tim. 2001. Urban Geography. London: Routledge.
32  GUST, Ghent Urban Studies Team, 1999. Th e Urban Condition: Space, 
Community and Self in the Contemporary Metropolis. Rotterdam: 010 
Publisher.
33  Kostof, Spiro. 1992. Th e City Assembled, the Elements of Urban Form through 
History. London: Th ames and Hudson, p. 8.
34  Marcuse, Peter. 1995. “Not Chaos, But Walls.” Pp. 243-253 in Post Modern 
Cities and Spaces, edited by Sophie Watson and Katherine Gibson. Oxford and 
Cambridge (Mass.): Blackwell.
35  Ibid. see also Marcuse, Peter. 1997. “Walls of Fear and Walls of Support.” Pp. 
101-114 in Architecture of Fear, edited by Nan Ellin. New York: Princeton 
Architectural Press.
36  Marcuse, Peter. 1997. “Walls of Fear and Walls of Support.” Pp. 101-114 in 
Architecture of Fear, edited by Nan Ellin. New York: Princeton Architectural 
Press, p. 108–112
37  Marcuse, Peter. 1995. “Not Chaos, But Walls.” Pp. 243-253 in Post Modern 
Cities and Spaces, edited by Sophie Watson and Katherine Gibson. Oxford and 
Cambridge (Mass.): Blackwell, p. 249.
38  Peter Marcuse’s lecture on a conference entitled Die Off ene Stadt: Globalisierung, 
Migration, und Stadtentwicklung (Th e Open City: Globalization, Migration 
and Urban Development), held in Kassel, 14 October 2002. Th e similar 
account has also been addressed on Marcuse, Peter. 1997. “Walls of Fear and 
Walls of Support.” Pp. 101-114 in Architecture of Fear, edited by Nan Ellin. 
New York: Princeton Architectural Press.
39  Davis, Mike. 1992. City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles. 
London: Vintage. p. 228.
95
40  Ibid. p. 229-240.
41  Ibid. p. 246.
42  For a comprehensive account on the defi nitions of Postcolonialism (scholars 
use interchangeability with post coloniality) see Childs, Peter  and Patrick 
Williams. 1997. An Introduction to Post-Colonial Th eory. London and New 
York: Prentis Hall / Harvester Wheatsheaf Peter Childs and Patrick Williams 
re-framed the defi nitions according to temporal dimension of the postcolonial 
era, the location where postcolonial takes a place and the people included 
as the “postcolonial subjects.” Since the late fi fteenth century, the expansion 
of capitalism emanating from Europe and then more recently from the US 
has been a constant or the constant of world history in the sense that there 
is almost no part of the world left untouched by it. Peter Childs and Patrick 
Williams also noted that the current globalization plays as a continuation of 
an incomplete project of capitalism. Th e connection of postcolonialism and 
globalization, for Childs and Williams, is perhaps the key explanatory concept 
between history of colonialism, capitalism and current globalization. For the 
broad collection of important discourses on Postcolonialism see Ashcroft, Bill, 
Gareth Griffi  ths, and Helen Tiffi  n. 2002. Th e Empire Writes Back: Th eory and 
Practice in Post-colonial Literatures. London; New York: Routledge. 
43  Said, Edward W. 1994a. Culture and Imperialism. New York: Vintage Books 
and also Said, Edward W. 1994b. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books.
44  For Said, culture has two diff erent meanings. “All those practices, like the 
arts of description, communication, and representation, that have relative 
autonomy from the economic, social, and political realms and that often exist 
in aesthetic forms, one of whose principal aims is pleasure.” (p. xii). And the 
other “a concept that includes refi ning and elevating element, each society’s 
reservoir of the best that has been known and thought… culture is a sort 
of theater where various political and ideological causes engage one another” 
(p. xiii). Th rough this defi nition he showed various themes of this cultural 
imperialism and any resistance. He concluded that “It is more rewarding-and 
more diffi  cult-to think concretely and sympathetically, contrapuntally, about 
others than only about “us.” But this also means not trying to rule others, not 
trying to classify them or put them in hierarchies, above all, not constantly 
reiterating how “our” culture or country is number one (or not number one, 
for that matter).” Said, Edward W. 1994a. Culture and imperialism. New York: 
Vintage Books. p. 336 
45  See Bhabha, Homi K. 1994. Th e Location of Culture. London; New York: 
Routledge.
46  A Chinese postcolonialist Wang Ning suggested: “Like its counterparts, 
Occidentalism in diff erent places manifests itself in diff erent forms: [i]n 
the Middle East and the Arab countries where Islamic culture is dominant, 
Occidentalism manifests itself as an antagonistic form that strongly opposes 
Western hegemonies represented by the United States, and sometimes even 
evolves into large-scale armed clashes…Th erefore, Occidentalism as opposed 
to Orientalism has at one time been regarded as a “decolonizing” and even 
anti-colonialist strategy of discourses getting along with the local decolonizing 
movement… So it is not surprising that Occidentalism in Japanese culture 
manifests itself as a “decolonizing” tendency and a drive to reconstruct 
Japanese culture…” Ning, Wang. 1997. “Orientalism versus Occidentalism?” 
New Literary History 28: 57-67. See also Venn, Couze. 2000. Occidentalism: 
modernity and subjectivity. London; Th ousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage.  
47  Huntington, Samuel P. 1997. Th e Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of 
World Order. New York: Touchstone especially p. 310-311. For Huntington, 
Western culture must preserve its unique values and does not attempt to 
universalize. Otherwise, there will be the inter-civilization war.  
 CHAPTER 2 - 96
48  According to Anthony D. King, the study of Redfi eld and Singer (1954) 
is considered the fi rst to bring the term “colonial city” into discourse, see 
King, Anthony D. 1990b. Urbanism, Colonialism, and the World-Economy: 
Cultural and Spatial Foundations of the World Urban System. London; New 
York: Routledge. King, Anthony D. 1990a. Global Cities: Post-imperialism 
and the Internationalization of London. London and New York: Routledge and 
King, Anthony D.  2004. Space of Global Culture. New York and London: 
Routledge.
49   See Soja, Edward W. 1996. Th irdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and other Real-
and-Imagined Places. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell. 
50  Enwezor, Okwui. 2002. Créolité und Kreolisierung:  Documenta 11, Platform 3. 
Ostfi ldern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz.
51  Çelik, Zeynep. 1997. “Urban Forms and Colonial Confrontations: Algiers 
under French rule.” Berkeley: University of California Press.
52  Evenson, Norma. 1989. Th e Indian Metropolis: A View Toward the West. New 
Haven: Yale University Press.
53  Biswas, Ramesh Kumar. 2000. “Kuala Lumpur.” in Metropolitan Now!, edited 
by Ramesh Kumar Biswas. Wien: Springer p. 135
54  King, Anthony D. 1990b. Urbanism, Colonialism, and the World-Economy: 
Cultural and Spatial Foundations of the World Urban System. London; New 
York: Routledge p. 13.
55 Ibid. p. 32-33.
56 Th ere is opinion that these cities are not necessarily dual spheres, but that they 
could also be “tripartite” such as Peter Nas’ address on Indonesian colonial 
cities which were normally segregated into the indigenous colonies quarter, the 
European quarter of colonizers and the Chinese quarter that lies in between 
but does not belong to either the fi rst or the second. See for instance Peter 
Nas “Th e Colonial City” available at http://www.leidenuniv.nl/fsw/nas/pub_
ColonialCity.htm. 
57  King, Anthony D. 1995. Th e Bungalow: Th e Production of a Global Culture. 
New York: Oxford University Press.
58  King, Anthony D.  2004. Space of Global Culture. New York and London: 
Routledge.
59  Kusno, Abidin. 2000. Behind the Postcolonial: Architecture, Urban Space, and 
Political Cultures in Indonesia. London; New York: Routledge. 
60  Bishop, Ryan , John Phillips, and Wei Wei Yeo, eds. 2003. Postcolonial 
Urbanism, Southeast Asian Cities and Global Processes. New York and London: 
Routledge, p. 21.
61  Connel, John, and John Lea. “Distant Places, Other Cities? Urban Life in 
Contemporary Papua New Guinea.” Pp. 165-183. in Postmoden Cities and 
Spaces, edited by Sophie  Watson and Katherine Gibson. Oxford (UK) and 
Cambridge (US): Blackwel.
62  Spivak, Gayatri. 1991. “Neocolonialism and the Secret Agent of Knowledge.” 
Oxford Literary Review 13: 224, p: 224. 
63  Hannerz, Ulf. 1997. “Fluxos, fronteiras, híbridos: palavras-chave da 
antropologia transnacional.” Mana (Rio de Janeiro) 3: 7-39 in its English 
version: “Flows, Boundaries and Hybrids: Keywords in Transnational 
Anthropology.” 
64  See Baudrillard, Jean. 2003. “Th e Violence of the Global.” ctheory a129. 
97
For Baudrillard, the universal is actually about democracy, freedom, human 
rights that all cultures interpret diff erently. Th e global is about technology, 
information, tourists and money. As Baudrillard believed, globalization is 
violent since the West believes that their culture is universal and faces resistance 
from other cultures. Th is latter force is seen as “ugly” which invites resistance 
from other cultures to defend their cultural singularity against the process of 
this universalization/globalization.
65  Rosenau, Helen. 1983. Th e Ideal City, Its Architectural Evolution in Europe. 
London and New York: Methuen, p. 35-36.
66  Ibid. p. 55. 
67  Sloterdijk, Peter. 2004. Sphären III, Schäume. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
68  Ibid. especially p. 338-356. 
69  Ibid. p. 492.
70  In his expression, Sloterdijk anatomized the anthropogenic island as follows. 
(a) das Chirotop, das den Wirkungsbereich der menschlichen Hände umgeift… 
(b) das Phonotop (oder Logotop) das die vokale Glocke erzeugt, unter der die 
Zusammenlebenden aufeinander hören, miteinander reden, einander Befehle 
erteilen unde einander inspirieren, (c) Uterotop (oder Hysterotop) das der 
Ausweitung der Bemutterungszone und der politischen Metaphorisierung von 
Schwangershchaft … (d) das Th ermotop, das die Gruppe als ursprüngliche 
Vorteilsnehmer von geteilen Herdeff ekten … (e) das Erototop das die Gruppe als einen 
Ort der primären erotischen Ubertagungsenergien organisiert und als Eifersuchfeld 
unter Stress setzt (f ) dan Ergotop (oder phallotop), in dem eine gruppenweit 
wirksame väterliche oder priesterliche Defi nitionsgewalt einen sensus communis 
… (g) Alethotop (oder Mnemotop), durch welche eine lernende Gruppe sich als 
Hüter ihres Erfahrungskontinuums konstituirt und sich als Wahrheitssammelstelle 
mit eigenem Geltungsanspruch und eigenem Falsifi kationsrisiko in Form hält, 
(h) das Th anatop oder Th eotop (beziungsweise Ikonotop), das den Ahnen, den 
Toten, den Geistern und Goettern der Gruppe einen Off enbarungsraum … (i) 
dan Nomotop, das die Zusammenlebenden durch gemeinsame “Sitten”, durch 
Arbeitsteilung und reziproke Erwartungen einander bindet, wobei durch Tausch 
und Kooperationswartung eine imaginäre Tensegrität, eine Sozialarchitektur aus 
gegenseitig Erwartungen, Nötigungen und Wiederständen, kurzum eine erste 
Verfassung, entsteht. See Ibid. p. 362-363. All the spheres work primarily to 
make explicit what is considered the “world-models”(p. 311).
71  Undheim, Trond Arne. 2002. “Th e Role of Place in Th eories of Globalization.” 
in IKON-N11: Arbeidnotat.
72  Augé, Marc. 1995. Non-Places, Introduction to an Anthropology of 
Supermodernism. London: Verso.
73  Jencks, Charles. 1993. “Hetero-Architecture for the Heteropolis: Th e Los 
Angeles School.” Pp. 217-225 in Architecture of Fear, edited by Nan Ellin. 
New York: Princeton Architectural Press, p. 223.
74  Sutton, Sharon E. 1997. “Creating Landscapes of Safety.” Pp. 241-251. Ibid., 
edited by Nan Ellin Ellin. p. 241-251. 
75  Th e International Conference on “Gangs, Crowds, City Enclaves: Political 
Violence in a Globalizing World” is organized by the University of Amsterdam 
in cooperation with the University of Edinburgh, 28 - 30 August 2003, 
Amsterdam, Th e Netherlands. 
76  Ibid.
77  Ibid.
 CHAPTER 2 - 98
78  Tuan, Yi-Fu. 1990. Topophilia. A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes 
and Values. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 102.
79  Sorkin, Michel. 1992. Variations in the Th eme Parks. New York: Farrar, Strauss 
and Giroux. p. xi.
80  Ibid. p. xii-xiii.
81  Soja, Edward W. 2000. “Inside Exopolis: Scenes from Orange County.” Pp. 
94-122 in Variations on a Th eme Park, edited by Michel Sorkin. New York: 
Hill and Wang. 
82  see for instance www.themeparkbrochures.com
83  Dunlop, beth. 1996. Building a Dream,  Th e Art of Disney Architecture. New 
York: Harris and Abrams, Inc. 
84  Blakely, Edward J., and Mary G. Snyder. 1997. Fortress America, Gated 
Communities in the United States. Washington and Cambridge (Mass.): 
Brooking Institute Press and Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, p. 1.
85  Ibid. p. 38-45.
86  Ibid. p. 99.
87  Haya El Nasser “Gated communities more popular, and not just for the rich” 
USA Today http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2002-12-15-gated-usat_
x.htm.  
88  Frantz, Klaus. 2000. “Gated communities in US-American cities.” in Workshop 
Gated Communities - Global Expansion of a New Kind of Settlement, edited by 
Georg Glasze and Günter Meyer. Hamburg: DAVO-Nachrichten No 11.
89   Goldsmith, William W. 2000. “From the Metropolis to Globalization: Th e 
dialectics of Race and Urban Form.” Pp. 37-55 in Globalizing Cities: A new 
spatial order?, edited by Peter Marcuse and Ronald van Kempen. Oxford: 
Blackwell.
90  Leisch, Harald. 2002. “Gated Communities in Indonesia.” Cities 19: 341-
350.
91  Th uillier, Guy. 2000. “Buenos Aires: Gated communities in the Greater 
Buenos Aires: the new suburban utopia?” in Workshop Gated Communities - 
Global Expansion of a New Kind of Settlement, edited by Georg Glasze and 
Günter Meyer. Hamburg: DAVO-Nachrichten No. 11.
92  Jürgens, Ulrich, and Martin Gnad. Ibid. „Gated communities in the 
Johannesburg area—experiences from South Africa.“.
93  Wehrheim, Jan. Ibid. “Segregation as separation—gated communities as a 
new part of the ‘Quartered City’?”
94  Raposo, Rita. Ibid. “Gated communities in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area.”
95  Al-Hamarneh, Ala. Ibid. “From Government Datcha Settlements of 
the Apparatchiks to the Gated Communities of the New Russians—the 
Development of gated communities in Russia and the Ukraine.”
96  Struck, Ernst. Ibid. “Gated Communities in Turkey.”
97  Glasze, Georg. Ibid. “Gated Settlements in Lebanon.” —. 2003. Die 
Fragmentierte Stadt, Ursachen and Folgen bewachter Wohnkomplexe im Libanon. 
Opladen: Leske and Budrich.
98  Meyer, Gunther. 2000. „Gated Communities in Egypt (?).“ in Workshop Gated 
Communities - Global Expansion of a New Kind of Settlement, edited by Georg 
Glasze and Günter Meyer. Hamburg: DAVO-Nachrichten No. 11.
99
99  Schliephake, Konrad. Ibid.”Foreigners in a “Closed Society” - Gated 
communities in Saudi Arabia.”
100  Escher, Anton. Ibid.”Gated Communities in Syria.” edited by Georg  Glasze 
and Günter Meyer. 
101  Angela Giglia 2003, “Gated communities in Mexico City.” A paper presented 
in the conference “Gated Communities: Building Social Division or Safer 
Communities?”  held by the Department of Urban Studies, University of 
Glasgow 18th and 19th September 2003. 
102  Leisch, Harald. 2000. “Gated Communities in Indonesia.” in Workshop Gated 
Communities - Global Expansion of a New Kind of Settlement, edited by Georg 
Glasze and Günter Meyer. Hamburg: DAVO-Nachrichten No. 11, —. 2002. 
“Gated Communities in Indonesia.” Cities 19: 341-350.
103  Th e survey was conducted under research entitled “Gated Communities: 
Studies on Spatial and Social Implications and the Prospect on Spatial 
Management with the case of Yogyakarta. Th e research has been funded by 
the Ministry of Research and Technology for two years (2005-2006) under 
the program of Advanced Collaborative Research (Riset Unggulan Terpadu 
– RUT Batch XII) in which the author is the principal researcher. When this 
dissertation was written, the research was still in progress, hence, cannot be 
concluded yet.
104   Wehrheim, Jan. 2000. “Segregation as separation—gated communities as a 
new part of the ‘Quartered City’?” in Workshop Gated Communities - Global 
Expansion of a New Kind of Settlement, edited by Georg Glasze and Günter 
Meyer. Hamburg: DAVO-Nachrichten No. 11. 
105  Information available at http://www.wepza.org, the offi  cial website of WEPZA 
(World Economic Processing Zone Association).
106  http://www.transnationale.org/pays/epz.htm “Export processing zones: 
Addressing the social and labor issues.”
107  Raman, R. Anant. 1989. Review of Free Trade Zones in Developing Countries. 
New Delhi: Indian Institute of Foreign Trade. 
108  http://www.pria.org reports this kind of practice which is common in many 
countries. 
109  Overview of Globalization and the Impact of Free Zones, Robert Haywood, 
Director World Economic Processing Zones Association, available at http://
www.wepza.org. 
110  Consecutively Klein, Naomi. 2002a. No Logo. New York: Picador. and Klein, 
Naomi. 2002b. Windows and Fences. New York: Picador.
111  Klein, Naomi. 2002a. No Logo. New York: Picador, p. 206. 
112  see also Lütticken, Sven. 2001. “Parklife.” New Left Review July / August: 111-
118.
113  Armitage, J , and J Roberts. 2003. “From the Hypermodern City to the Gray 
Zone of Total Mobilization in the Philippines.” Pp. 87-101. in Postcolonial 
Urbanism, Southeast Asian Cities and Global Processes, edited by Ryan  Bishop, 
J Phillips and WW Yeo. New York and London: Routledge, p. 87. 
114  Ibid. p. 100. 
115  Augé, Marc. 1995. Non-Places, Introduction to an Anthropology of 
Supermodernism. London: Verso, p. 52
116  Boddy, Trevor. 1992. “Analogous City.” Pp. 123-153 in Variations on a Th eme 
Park, edited by Michel Sorkin. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, p. 124. 
 CHAPTER 2 - 100
117  Ibid. p. 153.
118  Koolhaas, Rem. 2001. “Junkspace.” Pp. 408-421 in Guide to Shopping, 
Harvard Design School Project on the City 2, edited by Jeff rey Inaba Chuihua 
Judy Chung, Rem Koolhaas, Sze Tsung Leong. Köln: Taschen. 
119   Ibid. p. 408.
120  Ibid. p. 410.
121  Ibid. p. 415.
122  Ibid. p. 421.
123  Jameson, Fredric. 2003. “Future City.” New Left Review 21: 65-79. p. 74.
124  Asad Mohammed “Th e Myth of the Megacity Solution” Habitat Debate 1997 
available at http://www.unhabitat.org/HD/hdjun97/view.htm
125  Jay Moor, “Learning to be an Urban Tribe” Habitat Debate 1997 http://www.
unhabitat.org/HD/hdjun97/view.htm. He is Coordinator of the UNCHS 
(Habitat) Urban Indicators Programme, which is part of the Global Urban 
Observatory.
126  Davis, Mike. 2004. “Planet of Slums.” New Left Review 26: 5-34.
127  Arjun Appadurai “Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination” in 
Arjun Appadurai (ed.), Globalization. Durham & London: Duke University 
Press, 2001, p. 1-21.
128  Koolhaas, Rem. 2003. “Fragment of a Lecture on Lagos.” in Under Siege: 
Four African Cities Freetown, Johannesburg, Kinshasha, Lagos, edited by Okwui 
Enwezor, Carlos Basualdo, Ute Meta Bauer, Susane Ghez, Sarat Maharaj, 
Mark Nash and Octavio Zaya. Ostfi ldern-Ruit: Hantje Cantz.
129  McGee, Terry G. 1989. “Urbanisasi or Kotadesasi? Evolving Patterns of 
Urbanization in Asia.” Pp. 93-108 in Urbanization in Asia, Spatial Dimensions 
and Policy Issues, edited by FJ. Costa, AK. Dutt, LJG. Ma and AG. Noble. 
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
130  Lin, GCS. 2001. “Metropolitan Development in a Transitional Socialist 
Economy: Spatial Restructuring in the Pearl River Delta, China.” Urban 
Studies 38: 383-406.
131  Norberg-Schulz, Christian. 2000. Architecture: Presence, Language and Place. 
Milan: Skira, p. 12.
132  Norberg-Schulz, Christian. 1980. Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of 
Architecture. New York: Rizzoli, p. 190.
PART II
Case 1
The Pearl River Delta
  CHAPTER 3 - 102
Th is chapter attempts to demonstrate how insularity and social 
segregation is produced by global power and fl ow and the underlying 
spatial attitude exemplifi ed by the culture of walls in China as 
referenced above. Th is combination is the perfect birthplace for 
insularity and perpetuate the production and reproduction of social 
segregation. Th e Pearl River Delta (PRD) is well-connected with the 
global world. Th e region was previously granted status as an open 
harbor where international traders could open businesses. Today, the 
Chinese socialists allow capitalist industries to fl ourish in the region 
under the blanket name of “modernization” in order to maintain 
the rest of mainland China’s socialist structure rather untouched. 
Hence, the PRD in its broadest sense is an insular territory that is 
detached from the whole of China. But the spatial insularization 
is not alone. In the region, the society itself is also a subject for 
insularization as a segregated society from the whole. Th e argument 
tries to expand on the work of Koolhaas and his team in Project on 
the Cities about the Pearl River Delta which suggests that borders 
in China, both tangible and intangible, are directly related to social 
segregation. Th rough proposing a conclusive “copyrighted term” 
they noted: “Border© Boundaries in the Pearl River Delta that are 
drawn and redrawn, and opened or closed according to changing 
policies of inclusion or exclusion of the desired population.”1
The Pearl River Delta
On the creation of insular territories
Previous drawing is cropped 
from a poster presented in 
Shenzhen Exhibition Hall 
September-October 2003.
3
‘Enclosure and separation are basic elements of 
Chinese architecture whether expressed in the 
encircling of capital city or that of a single dwelling. 
The wall circumscribes and detaches the internal 
world from the world without, providing seclusion 
and privacy for those behind it’ (Knapp 1998 p. 9). 
103 
Taking both the studies of Knapp and Koolhaas we may start from the 
fundamental proposition that walls and borders for the Chinese play 
up the politics of both space and segregation. Th e fi rst subchapter 
provides a historical backdrop to show that fragmentation of space 
for the Chinese is an important measurement to manage both 
territory and society. Th is attitude can be found both in the classical 
planning of Chinese feudal cities and in modern planning despite 
the conscious process to integrate the region into a networked entity 
both within the region and with the outside world. Th e term “city” 
hence has a contradictory meaning. It is both a defi nitive territorial 
entity – somehow like an enclave – and an imagined territory to 
connect with the other – a somewhat borderless imagination. Th is 
contradiction is maintained over the historical trajectory of the 
Pearl River Delta, especially epitomized in the post Mao process 
of modernization. Th e underlying process of modernization itself, 
following Detlev Ipsen’s indication, is not a single phenomenon.2
Rather, it comprises numerous speeds of material and mental 
development, or in general, diverse processes of modernization. In 
the West they are distinguished by David Harvey as the phase of 
Fordism followed by the fl exible accumulation phase.3 Hence in the 
PRD, the global condition is a result of juxtaposed phases of these 
modernizations.4
In this chapter, the fi rst part attempts to indicate that this juxtaposition 
of modernizations produces not merely global interconnection of the 
region but also disintegration in the region, resulting in the image 
of wild interconnection and disconnection. Furthermore, various 
forms of insularity within the framework of the PRD will also be 
reported. Finally, the third part reports that the ”leaking” out of 
insularity has also emerged in the region.
3.1  City as “enclaved imagined 
territory” 
Th e Pearl River Delta refers to a territorial entity in the southern 
part of China where the Pearl River meets the South China Sea. 
Th e territory has been given status as a Regional Development Area 
which is administratively separated into areas; Guangdong Province, 
  CHAPTER 3 - 104
Hong Kong and Macau. Th e latter two hold a diff erent status as a 
special administrative region (SAR) due to their histories. Th ere are 
several key cities in the Delta. Hong Kong and Macau lie in the 
mouth of the delta. Th e other major cities, such as such Guangzhou 
(the provincial capital formerly known as Canton), Shenzhen, 
Zhuhai and Dongguan are part of Guangdong Province located in 
the mainland. Following the integration of Hong Kong and Macau, 
the Pearl River Delta as a development area evolved and became a 
unifying term to refer to the whole region’s patchwork of political 
authorities epitomized in “one nation two systems.”5
Th e whole region itself is a place in a state of continuing radical 
change and where experiments are allowed to occur. Two forces 
largely ignite these experiments, namely the Chinese desire for 
modernization on one side and the persistence of Chinese culture 
on the other. Th e fi rst refers to the path from agriculture to current 
industrialization and then to fl exible accumulation in the future. Th e 
second force points to the persistence of wall architecture in Chinese 
spatial restructuring. When those forces collide in the region they 
not only shape the agricultural landscape into a network of highways 
connecting booming cities and towns, but also create enclave 
territories of manufacturing and special economic zones to service 
the global market. Th e hybrid quality of the Pearl River Delta in this 
case must be seen as a mixture between a strict defi nition of territory 
and at the same time an open-ended territorial dispersion and global 
interconnection, an exopolis to use Edward Soja’s expression.6 
Not only does this collision produce what Marc Augé calls an 
intertwinement of place and non-place, or what Castells calls the 
network society, it also forms what Voula Mega in European context 
calls a “coexistence and superposition of three urban layers.”7
Following Martinotti, those layers point fi rstly to the morphology 
of a traditional city exemplifi ed by its physical and social institutions 
and entities, of the mid 20th century city where city is dominated 
by center and periphery gravities, and of the global city, where city 
is driven to be an open network with plural nodes.8 Mega believed 
that this superposition creates new social order that is undergoing 
a mutation. However, rather than following in the footsteps of 
105 
Europe’s experiences, in China this juxtaposition occurs in situ, 
simultaneously, due to the speed of development. Moreover, it 
is argued that this mutation induces what Tuan calls the “true 
wilderness,” an imaginary state of territorial perception.  Th is section 
attempts to portray that phenomenon.
From agriculture to industrialization
Th e history of this region cannot be separated from the history of 
Guangzhou, which traditionally was the capital of the region. It 
dates back to about 200 BC, known then as Panyu, the capital of 
Nanhai County during the Qin Dynasty. When the Qin Dynasty 
collapsed, a military administrator named Zhao Tuo in South China 
established a kingdom named Nanyue and Panyu was the capital 
of this local but sovereign territory. Soon after the establishment 
of the Han Dynasty, this kingdom became the vassal of the Han. 
Under the Han, Panyu enjoyed signifi cant development and became 
a trading center for the whole of South China, connecting that 
region to South East Asia and eventually to the Persian Gulf. In 
about 226 AD when Panyu was under the administration of the 
East Wu Kingdom, the county was divided into two parts, Jiaozhou 
and Guangzhou. It was the fi rst appearance of the name that is now 
the city’s offi  cial name. During the Tang and Song periods (618-907 
and 960-1279 respectively) Guangzhou again became a central port 
for overseas trading that reached as far as India, the Persian Gulf and 
North Africa.   
Th e Guangdong Province and Guangzhou as its capital was 
established during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1661). At the beginning 
of the Qing Dynasty Guangzhou was segregated with the poor in the 
north and the rich in the south, while the eastern part was mainly 
occupied by villagers and the western part by merchants including 
foreigners. After the Opium War only a limited number of sea ports 
including Guangzhou were left open to the Western powers.  Parts 
of this city were dedicated as British and French concessions (now 
around Shamian Park) along with some other Western trading 
companies. Facing Hong Kong, which was possessed by the British, 
and Macau by the Portuguese, Guangzhou was the gate as well as the 
  CHAPTER 3 - 106
outpost for the Chinese challenging those colonial powers. After the 
establishment of Western colonialism throughout South East Asia, 
Hong Kong and Macau respectively became the icons of the Pearl 
River Delta region. Th ey were the “colonized part” of the Chinese, 
and Guangzhou was the frontier for the Chinese in this unsettled 
confrontation. 
Guangzhou was also a capital for Modern China. It began when 
Dr. Sun Yat Sen, who originated from this city, set up the military 
government of the Republic of China after overthrowing the imperial 
rulers. After the civil war in China, the People’s Republic of China 
was founded and Guangzhou was liberated from the Nationalist Kuo 
Min Tang. After the Cultural Revolution that shaped modern China, 
the Pearl River Delta experienced unprecedented development and 
changes. Th ese are promulgated not only as natural forces but also 
mainly – by design – reinforced through governmental policies 
towards speedy development and modernization. 
China’s “fi rst modernization” can roughly be said to have started 
with the Mao era of industrialization.9 During this period, industries 
were developed along with the enlargement of towns and cities as 
the site of this industrialization. Although sharing the same ideology 
with the Soviet Union, the Chinese pattern of development however 
diff ered somewhat from the Western model. In the West, towns and 
cities became an agglomeration of industries as seen in England in 
the 18th Century, France and Germany in the latter 19th Century, 
and the Soviet Union in the 20th Century. In these countries the 
emerging industries were labor intensive – textile mills, steel works, 
chemical plants et cetera, using what many call the Fordism system 
of work following the Industrial Revolution. Th eir cities thus became 
a harbor for the migration of labor from the rural areas forming a 
center and periphery relation. 
Th e impetus of Chinese industrialization however laid in the 
commune system that was neither urban nor rural. Mao’s idea 
was based on the system by which people were grouped into 
independent and self-developed communities led by cadres called 
danwei. Mao’s danwei was one of many attempts to erase the sharp 
107 
distinction between city and rural, hence also erasing the center 
and periphery tensions. Moreover, whilst industrialization in those 
Western countries was based on capitalist enterprise (except the 
Soviet Union), the Chinese developed industry through the state 
owned enterprise working unit in the danwei. Th e people worked in 
the danwei and conversely the institution provided for the people’s 
needs including education, health care, housing and sometimes even 
their food supply. Furthermore, the development was accompanied 
by a household registration system (hukou) that restricted people’s 
mobilization from one area to the other, and was entirely foreign 
in the Western context. Th is era, commonly known in China as the 
Great Leap Forward produced major development comprised of large 
scale industries, mainly steel, and social housing based on socialist 
architecture and urban planning. Th e result of Mao’s ambitious 
political maneuver of modernization was however unfortunately 
disastrous. 
It is worth highlighting some important details from this period 
of upheaval. In his chronology of “One Hundred Years without 
Change,” Yuyang Liu listed the stages of China’s modernization that 
are mainly drawn from Jonathan D. Spence’s Th e Search for Modern 
China.10 After a series of major historical events, from the October 
Revolution in 1911, the founding of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) in 1921, the Long March in 1934, and the Japanese invasion 
and the defeat of the Nationalists, in 1949 Mao Zedong proclaimed 
the founding of People’s Republic of China. Th e aim of Mao and 
his colleagues after the great instability following the founding of 
New China was to reconstruct the nation and economy. Th ere 
were actually two opposing policies in regard to how China should 
develop. Th e liberal faction, represented by members such as Deng 
Xiaoping and Chou Enlai, emphasized the role of central planning 
and pragmatic programs for economic development. Th e other 
faction, the radical faction favored by Mao Zedong, centralized its 
focus on the removal of social class, including distinction between 
city and rural, as well as worker and peasant. Th e radicals pushed 
relentlessly toward a classless, egalitarian and agriculture based 
society. Under Mao’s leadership, in order to establish the national 
  CHAPTER 3 - 108
Source: www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/china.htm redrawn by the author
109 
Estimated in 2000 is 
habitated by about 50 
milion people
Estimated in 2010? is 
habitated by about 100 
milion people
  CHAPTER 3 - 110
111 
economy, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) promoted 
industrial-based development following the Soviet Union model. 
Mao also introduced land reform, the collectivization policy that 
redistributed the land holdings of the landlords to small tenants. 
Th is was intended to be an initial step toward the creation of the 
commune. In 1950, the land reform movement was given formal 
strength through the Agrarian Reform Law that abolished land 
ownership and feudal exploitation. Th en they adopted a series of 
“Five Year Plans” modeled after the Soviet reform initiatives. Starting 
in 1953, China expanded its modernization project. Th e fi rst Five-
Year Plan (1953-57) was focused on heavy industry in order to 
increase industrial growth, which was to be achieved by extracting 
surplus from agriculture. Th e plan was intended to balance the 
development between interior and coastal regions. Nationwide, the 
coastal regions produced 70 percent of industrial output although 
they occupy less then twenty percent of the land. Th e implementation 
of the Plan resulted a considerable increase of industrial site in the 
interior region, as from the 694 new major industrial sites, 472 
were in the interior regions. In the second Five Year Plan (1958-
62), the production balance nationwide had reached 56-44 percent 
in favor of the interior regions. To embolden the second plan, in 
1958 Mao launched a radical policy entitled “Great Leap Forward” 
that strengthened the power of mass mobilization. Workers that 
were previously reorganized into collective urban communes of 
danwei during the fi rst Five-Year Plan had been continuously hard-
pressed to decentralize economic decision-making. Each commune 
was planned as a self-contained community based on agriculture, 
small-scale local industry, and education. Separation of living and 
working units between men, women and children was introduced 
as well as sharing of kitchens, halls, and nurseries. Modern socialist 
architecture imported from the Soviet model was widely installed 
and celebrated as the new way of modern living. Th e commune 
system and other initiatives encapsulated in the Great Leap Forward 
Policy did operate only sometime. In 1959, the Chinese realized that 
the program generally failed. Shortage of food and raw materials, 
exhaustion of the population and deteriorated industry were the 
  CHAPTER 3 - 112
A sudden landscape 
change. Within 20 years, 
huge agricultural fi eld has 
transformed into gigantic 
urban agglomeration. In the 
left side are photographs of 
Pearl River Delta in 1979 
and the right are 2001. Th ese 
infrared photographs depict 
some important cities such 
as Shenzhen, Dongguan, 
Zhongshan as well as small 
prefecture of Shunde which 
show an extreme landdscape 
change. (Source: www.
geocarto.com)
113 
result of this exercise that brought an end to Mao’s position as the 
head of the People’s Republic of China (although he remained the 
chairman of the Chinese Communist Party). Since then, China has 
been, in various degrees, unstable, including the so-called Cultural 
Revolution that aimed to launch a complete attack on all rightist, 
capitalist, and bourgeois infl uences. Th e revolution however ended 
in plunging the country into a state of chaos. 
Th is instability lasted until 1972 when Mao allowed the moderate Zhou 
Enlai to reconstruct the nation. Favoring economic reconstruction 
rather than ideological, Zhou called for the modernization of 
industry, national defense, science and technology, later known as 
the “Four Aspects of Modernization.” In the fi fth Five-Year Plan, 
then, the concentration was directed not to the interior but to the 
eastern regions, which were to be boosted up as the locomotive of 
the Chinese industrial revolution. Th e designation of industries 
meant also that it was followed by the massive migration of rural 
workers into an urban setting, a complete change from agriculture 
into industry, from fi xed traditional places into “fl oating people.” 
In this stance, China entered into the next step namely toward the 
creation of an exopolis, the so-called postmodern state where fl exible 
accumulation has started. 
Towards a wild mega city
After the last confl ict between the Maoist elements in the CCP, Deng 
Xiaoping came into power. In 1978 he outlined further enactment 
of the “Four Aspects of Modernization” initiated by Zhou Enlai. He 
reoriented China towards decentralization and increased openness 
to foreign countries. Under his leadership, in 1980, Guangzhou 
was declared as one of fi ve pilot cities opened fi rst to the outside 
world. Since then the city has experienced a growth explosion. Th e 
neighboring towns such as Shenzhen, Dongguan, and Foshan grew 
fast. Together they shaped an agglomeration of cities in the Pearl 
River Delta (PRD) region. In 1980, two of four Special Economic 
Zones (SEZ) were established in the PRD, namely in Shenzhen 
and Zhuhai located on the borders of Hong Kong and Macau 
respectively.11 Since then the development has concentrated on 
  CHAPTER 3 - 114
Landscape of Pearl 
River Delta shows 
a juxtaposition of 
agriculture, industry, 
housing both old and 
new, the picturesque 
and the poor, as well as 
infrastructure. 
115 
acceleration of technology and management, contact with foreigners 
in the coastal regions and as compensation, development of energy 
and raw materials in the interior regions. Deng’s visit to the area in 
January 1981 marked a gesture of support towards the development. 
Again based on the strength of the Chinese government’s position, 
China can do almost anything to reach its goals, shaping the PRD as 
an icon for development and therefore attracting foreign investment. 
Th e SEZs were designated as fi lters for science and technology 
that were intended to help China “discard the bad and select the 
essential,” as the process was termed. 
In Guangdong Province in 1987, due to the pressure from rapid 
development, there was a major deregulation of property systems. 
Under this new law, the state was retained as the owner of the 
land but the right to use it was transferred or leased to developers 
through negotiation, tendering or auction. Hence, the state owned 
urban land and the collectives remained the owners of agricultural 
land. Th us, the law opened the possibility for the peasants to lease 
their land to developers transforming themselves into billionaires 
overnight. In 1989 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) issued the 
Law of Transfer of Land-Use Rights in Shenzhen. Th e law allocated 
one hectare of land to each household under a collective ownership 
system. Th e law boosted land speculation for real estate development. 
Th e law also caused the value of farmland located near the SEZs 
to increase dramatically. Th e result of these changes is what is now 
known as the “Shenzhen Speed.” Again, Deng’s visit to Shenzhen in 
late 1992 signaling “yes” for such capitalist development propelled 
the area into its development as one of the most dynamic urban 
agglomerations in the world. Since then, the PRD entered a new 
perspective involving global entrepreneurship and investment. Th e 
whole region was then integrated within the fl exible accumulation 
of a global economic network although the trajectory of Fordist 
industrialization also ran at its highest pace. Th is situation creates 
however a highly fragmented landscape. 
Writing in 1995, distinguished sociologist Manuel Castells 
demonstrated that the corridor of Hong Kong – Guangzhou was a 
“new spatial unit” characterized by considerable spatial discontinuity 
  CHAPTER 3 - 116
Mass production of 
space. Th e huge number 
of Chinese population 
pushes also the production 
of space in its extreme 
capacity. Both formal and 
informal, in designated area 
or not, their feature is the 
same: reduplication of the 
“paterned” space. 
117 
within the area: including rural settlements, agricultural land, 
underdeveloped areas separating urban centers, and scattered 
industrial factories all over the region. Writing in the context of 
network society, he stressed the importance of and substantial need 
for networks within the region and links with the outside world as 
the backbone of its further development.12
Drawing from the case of Hong Kong, Laurent Gutierrez and Valérie 
Portefaix indicated the presence of six qualities necessary to map PRD 
and ongoing projects here. From their observation, they proposed six 
interdependent vectors that shaped the urban phenomena in Hong 
Kong. Th ose were (a) A “fl uid machine” that suggests diff erent layers 
of fl ow. Th ey indicate that the urban dynamic of Hong Kong is 
continuously pulsed by the movement of “boxes” namely containers 
as vehicles of merchandise. (b) Related to spatial mobility, “running 
space” refers to the unending harbors, jumbled with crisscrossing 
network of highways, pedestrian networks and linear strips of new 
urban development. (c) “Chip planning” illustrates how urban space 
is planned. Like the tablet of a computer motherboard, elements 
of urban space can be replaced with more eff ective ones to achieve 
maximum performance. (d) Bewilderment over the labyrinths of 
pedestrian networks pushes individuals to fi nd their own personal 
routes as well as personalize their existence within the city. (e) 
Th e next vector is the “appropriated place” which constitutes a 
blurring of diff erences between public and private. Some places are 
neither public nor private or can be transferred into opposite usage 
according to certain circumstances, constraints and events. (f ) Th e 
last is “soft disappearance”. It illustrates a peculiar relation between 
sustainability and change, between destruction and construction. 
Continuous change and mutation occur as the order rather than 
continuity. A vacant lot caused by a demolition may be in that state 
only briefl y before it is translated into other uses and functions while 
waiting for the coming construction.13
In a research project entitled Great Leap Forward, Rem Koolhaas 
and his Harvard team have developed “copyrighted terms” 
accompanied by abundant pictures and maps to illustrate the 
urban phenomena of the Pearl River Delta. Th e book suggests that 
  CHAPTER 3 - 118
Density and fl uidity of people 
and commodity are the 
constant picture of PRD’s 
urban scenes.  Especially in 
Hong Kong and Guangzhou, 
the two major cities in the 
region, it can be said that from 
the visuality point of view, 
the urban scenery is poor. 
Th e density however provides 
variety of tactile impuls.  
119 
the basic and standardized terms on current urban discourse are 
insuffi  cient to understand the new urban phenomena like in the 
PRD. By adding copyright marks on them, the book suggests that 
the phenomenon must be seen in a new way, new terms and new 
methods epitomized in the a term “City of Exacerbated Diff erence 
(COED)©.”14 Th e book renders several key issues. Th e fi rst is about 
the contradiction between “one hundred years without change” 
– the political propaganda of Chinese socialism - and the speedy 
development practiced on the ground. Th e second issue retraces 
the Chinese ideological background of development. Mihai 
Craciun focused on the function of the “future” exemplifi ed by 
cities as a projection of social perfection and refusal of the present. 
Socialist cities were characterized by hyperboles such as expansion, 
overstatement and aestheticization of numbers by which totality 
triumphs over the individuals. Th e PRD in this regard is an example 
of how contradiction occurs. Th e classless socialist city dictum for 
instance has been translated into a fl exible “zone” for ideological 
manipulation, including the presence of capitalism within.15  Th e 
third issue unveils the PRD’s architecture. In a comparison between 
Chinese and American architects, Nancy Lin showed that a Chinese 
architect designs “fi ve times the project volume in one-fi fth the time, 
earning one-tenth the design fee” which implies effi  ciency of 2,500 
times that of an American architect. Architecture itself becomes 
closely related with the politics of resident permits and the “speed of 
development.” In Shenzhen, a house is advertised as “Buy a House 
and Get Registered” to fulfi ll the green card dream. In Shenzhen too, 
based on “architectural recipe” an architect could design a 30-story 
residential high-rise within a mere seven days.16 Further the book 
unravels how foreign funds and politics reshaped Dongguan “from 
a village to a city” including the system of corruption and bribery 
that lubricated the process. Moreover, the book highlights the 
infrastructure development that changes the landscape dramatically. 
Nearly one third of the report presents impressive pictures of ports 
and airports, highways, junctions, bridges, both the constructed and 
the planned. Th e landscape itself is then transformed into utopian 
parks such as golf courses, vast urban parks, “green areas,” as well as 
theme parks. 
  CHAPTER 3 - 120
Motocycle and mobile 
telephone, two accelerators of 
modernization in China and 
other Asian cities. Density 
of the traffi  c pushes the city 
infrastructure into its limit. 
Multilevel of fl yover admires 
both urban authorities as 
the “most probable” traffi  c 
solution as well as the 
pride of “being modern.” 
Th e pace of car based 
(private)  transportation  
system overstreches the city 
to provide better public 
transportation system. 
121 
In China, telephone celluler 
registration is not required. 
Th e cheap and “anonym” 
telephone is then used 
providing informal services and 
activities, both legal and illegal. 
Th e services boost the process 
of modernization through 
providing cheap products or 
services. 
  CHAPTER 3 - 122
A geographer named Terry McGee revealed there are at least fi ve 
characteristics that may be featured in the hybrid phenomenon 
between rural and urban in this region. First, this hybridism is 
mainly generated by non-agricultural activities, such as trading, 
transportation and industry, in the areas which were previously 
predominantly agricultural. Th e economic relationships within the 
area are perhaps as important as the dominance of the Megalopolis 
over their orbits in the American context. Second, this territory 
is characterized by extreme fl uidity and mobility by any means of 
transportation, especially cheap motorbikes to facilitate people and 
goods commuting both to urban centers as well as within the area. 
Th ird, the area is characterized by an intense blending of land use 
where agriculture, industry, and economic land utilizations exist 
side by side. In this area, the pressure from growing population is 
also considerably high and females increasingly participate in non-
agricultural activities. Fourth, this area produces an “invisible” or 
“grey zone” from the point of view of the state authorities. Urban 
regulations may not be applied in rural areas but at the same time 
application of rural policies is incompatible. Th e lack of authority 
encourages the growth of informal sectors and small-scale enterprises 
as well as the development of squatter housing in this area.17
In addition to those features anatomized by McGee, the author 
would add the role of telecommunication systems, particularly 
telephones and mobile telephones, noting both its function as an 
accelerator of the development and also the place-specifi c role of 
global telecommunication technology. In the Pearl River Delta, shops 
selling telephone services are everywhere making telecommunication 
widely accessible. Mobile telephones, in addition to being a trend, are 
widely used by rich and common people alike, not only for private 
use but also for economic and business purposes. In China urban 
graffi  ti is virtually non-existent, with the signifi cant exception of 
telephone numbers. Th ese numbers off er various kinds of informal 
service, both legal and illegal, from services in manufacturing, well-
digging, door repairs, the sale of traditional medicines, horoscopes, 
to the provision of fake passports, student certifi cates, and other 
offi  cial documents. And they are ubiquitous. But unlike some other 
123 
expressions of suburban culture, which function to resist authorities, 
the purpose of telephone graffi  ti is purely economical. In these 
fragmented territories, telephone numbers serve to translate identity 
into anonymity and push unorganized development to occur. 
Th e dynamic of this region is still far from conclusive.
In more architectural terms, in Shanghai Refl ections, Mario 
Gandelsonas indicated that the Chinese have developed a passion 
for achieving what he calls “alternative modernism” which has 
been recently forged as China opens itself to dialogue with the 
West. A series of collaborative studio programs between schools 
of architecture at Tongji University, Hong Kong University and 
Princeton University, have produced a better understanding of this 
dialogue. He compared the nature of development and the attitude 
toward the relation between modernization and tradition in Shanghai 
in the 1980s-1990s with what happened with Le Corbusier’s Ville 
Contemporaine and his Plan Voisin for the center of Paris in the mid 
1920s. Both of the projects heavily depended upon the economic 
and political involvement of the state. Both schemes proposed 
replacing the ugly, dreary and unhealthy fabric of the old historical 
city with the new modern green city grid-ironed with avenues and 
glittering Cartesian skyscrapers. However in regard to the historical 
elements of the city, they were divided. Corbusier on one hand 
included only the old monuments as the relics of the past making 
the city a museum. Shanghai on the other incorporated them as a 
vital site for the expression of Shanghai’s memory. Th ey are part of 
the city’s experience, a living site for the inhabitants, an attraction 
for tourists, as well as a stimulus for new development. One of 
most important conclusions achieved from the exchange programs 
was about translation. In regard to Chinese confrontation with the 
West (or local with global, traditional with modern) translation 
has always been accompanied with some degree of contamination. 
Modernization for instance becomes distanced from its original 
Western meaning. Th is is best illustrated by the capability of the 
Chinese to incorporate the presence of infrastructure within public 
space. Uplifted networks of freeways that cut through the urban 
fabric do not create the walls within the city as happened in the 
  CHAPTER 3 - 124
urban renewal in the American cities. Th e leftover spaces are utilized 
for inventive public space, from bicycle sheds and parking areas to 
sport fi elds. In their original form, the Western version, this modern 
inventiveness remains a dead idea. In this aspect, his conclusive 
remark is worth quoting: “Th e new modes of articulation do not 
just suppress existing modes, nor do they overlap them; rather, they 
morph them, launching a process of mutual implication in their 
wake.” In the case of identity and of the role modernization plays 
in the creation of modern Chinese cultural identity, Gandelsonas 
moreover concluded “the new city will be constructed through a 
process of modernization that moves back and forth between the 
West and China, between identifi cation and dis-identifi cation…”18
Zhang Shilling illustrated well the trajectory of the search for identity 
in modern China. China in the 1950s was the model example 
of the Soviet Union’s globalization project. Socialist design and 
industrialization were expressions of Chinese modernization, which 
detached China from the rest of the world. Shilling showed that 
globalization, as a discourse of Westernization, came into China in 
the course of the modernization since the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Th ere were parts of the so-called Four Aspects of Modernization 
that became the characteristics of Chinese modernization; namely 
industry, agriculture, science and technology and national defense. 
Th e appearance of fast growing cities in China implied a desire to 
copy the Western material world. Government offi  cials are fond 
of the current globalization process and eager to engage in it, but 
they lack the understanding that professional knowledge is the 
power behind future development of the city. China invited many 
international and star architects to be involved in their architecture 
projects. In Shilling’s view, three powers, namely globalization, 
the postmodern movement and an economic boom, have caused 
Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing and Guangzhou to look alike. Th us, 
Chinese cities have begun to lose their identity. Th e trend of so-called 
pseudo-neo-classicism has diff used in Chinese cities with superfi cial 
Disney and cartoon style. Th ere was even a plan to construct Beijing 
as world architecture fair, full of skyscrapers symbolizing its status 
as a modern international metropolis. Th e discourse of globalization 
125 
in China has in fact weakened the subject consciousness of Chinese 
architecture; Chinese urban planning is a refl ection of a situation of 
“urban planning without planning.” Th us for Shilling “[t]o develop 
a contemporary architecture theory, to design architecture with a 
critical meaning and to establish a position for Chinese architecture 
in the history of contemporary world architecture will be a very 
diffi  cult but urgent mission.”19
In the last 10 years there have been numerous competitions and 
schemes held in China for urban planning, urban design and 
architectural design. And facing the Olympic Games of 2008 
in Beijing and EXPO 2010 in Shanghai there will be more such 
competitions. Many International architects have been contributing. 
However during each of the competitions there are tensions and 
struggles to defi ne the Chinese identity wavering between global 
intention and local tradition. Shilling’s investigations included analysis 
about some of these signifi cant events. In the 1992 international 
competition on the urban design of the central business district 
in Lu-Jia-Zui in Pudong Shanghai, Richard Rogers, Dominique 
Perrault, Massimiliano Fuksas, Toyo Ito, SOM and others worked 
on designs for the Asian compact city. Th e fi nal master plan signifi es, 
as Shilling noted, the clash between the Chinese pragmatic city and 
the Western utopian city. SOM was commissioned for this project 
and considered successful in expressing that delicate message. Th is 
was followed by the Waterfront Redevelopment Urban Design in 
2000 and the Shanghai Xin-Tian Di Project in 2001. Luchao near 
Shanghai, designed by von Gerkan and Partners, is one of the design 
templates applied to new cities in China. As a new harbor, this city 
is designed for about 300,000 people, which is integrated with the 
13 million people of Shanghai. Von Gerkan used idioms of the Ideal 
City and applied the concept of “a drop falling into the water” that 
creates concentric ripples. Although he deliberately used European 
concepts as well as forms of the Ideal City, instead of employing a 
heavily dense center he centralized the city in a precisely circular 
lake. Th e result is a combination of the European Ideal City form 
and Chinese arrangement of landscape. Th e design expresses the 
search for modern Chinese identity but instead of merely lifting from 
  CHAPTER 3 - 126
Chinese formal tradition, von Gerkan’s proposal gives something 
else. Th e design shares universal and Chinese values. It appears as 
an attempt to express that idealizing the city is a universal concept 
to which Chinese architecture, urban design and planning tradition 
also attempt to achieve. Th is message is clearly expressed in the 
catalog of his exhibition.20
From the notion of shared attitude between Chinese tradition and 
modern ways, the new modern Chinese city is constructed. It is not 
merely in the formal aspect but deeper, on the delicate notion of 
identity itself. In this case, as in the case of Jinmao Tower Project, 
also for Shanghai, whether modern or traditional Chinese form 
should be used was at the forefront of discussion. In the Chinese 
view, modern forms, which are bound to other culture and may share 
values with the Chinese, cannot be easily accepted. Th is suggests, as 
Shilling concluded, that culture cannot be global even though it 
is universal. Th e key point in this change is to ascertain “how to 
create outstanding Chinese architecture, and [determine] how the 
new international style and plural architecture culture will aff ect the 
related localization under the impact of globalization.”21
Another frontier for new Chinese identity is the exacerbation of 
modernization itself. An architect named Chang Yung Ho, who was 
educated in the West, established his own offi  ce in Beijing called 
Fei Chang Jian Zhu (Unusual Architecture) in order to explore the 
transformational capacity of traditional architecture and urban 
planning. He proposed a “micro-urbanism” concept to negotiate 
between demand for space and a densely populated and complex 
urban condition. His exhibition at Apex Art in New York entitled 
“Street Th eatre” made clearer his intention toward connecting the 
contemporary urban condition with his interpretation of Chinese 
architecture, between New York as a context and Chinese tradition 
as the source of his architecture. From the artist’s point of view the 
attitude toward territory and identity takes a rather diff erent direction. 
Instead of celebrating modernization and rapid development, they 
express their sorrow over the exacerbation of their cities and a longing 
for more freedom and privacy.22
127 
Hence, we are now confronting a site where a total overview is 
impossible due to non-existent statistics. Th e strategy to show the 
PRD phenomenon, especially its urbanism and architecture, can 
only be depicted through a series of maps and pictures. Wholeness 
cannot be defi ned here.  Instead, these maps and pictures can only 
depict mere fragments of space, which are disintegrated, fragmented, 
segmented and always interrupted by other scenes,  a patchwork 
of multiplicities. Later, the way in which insular territories emerge 
within this wild site will be further explored.  
Persistence of Division: from architecture of walls to 
ephemeral borders
Since ancient China, the term “city” was perhaps one of the most 
important elements of managing its vast expanse of land and people. 
Consecration of new cities in many cases involved also a massive 
displacement of people and landscape changes. For the Chinese, 
cities were always constructed – or much more precisely maintained 
- by territorial borders. However, in the modern era, arguably, it is 
not the wall itself that segregates but rather the status of the citizens. 
Th us we are faced with an intangible form of insular territory – 
insularity in the mind.
Chinese modern architecture is also characterized by the shift in the 
meaning of a wall from its traditional defi nition. Th rough walls, as 
for Lao Tzu, the exercise of power is hidden behind. Lao Tzu’s text 
states: “Th e best of all rulers is but a shadowy presence to his subject,” 
or more explicitly, “Th e instruments of power in a state must not be 
revealed to anyone.”23 In his philosophy, the art of warfare is the art 
of deception, shadow and feigning in order to force the enemy out 
of its hiding place. Chinese urbanism is essentially an architecture 
of walls that segregates people. But unlike in the Western medieval 
context, Chinese walls were probably less meaningful in terms 
of formal appearance in producing the diff erences in landscape. 
Alan Balfour distinguished the quality of Chinese urbanism from 
its European counterpart by examining two paintings. Th e fi rst is 
the Kaifeng Scroll, a panoramic ink drawing of Kaifeng in the 11th
century drawn by Song artist Zhang Zheduan and the second is 
  CHAPTER 3 - 128
called Allegory of Good Government, a fresco in the Palazzo Publico, 
Siena, drawn by Ambrogio Lorenzetti in 1339. 
Although both of the works depict scenery of cities with walls, the 
pictures are strikingly diff erent. Th e fi rst shows a city that, as Balfour 
wrote, was occupied by people who were calm and not afraid of any 
enemy, in stark contrast to the disturbed and continuously frightened 
people in the Siena fresco. Th ere is no real distinction between the 
inner city of Kaifeng (right side) and the outside (left side), which is 
obviously diff erent to the sharp contrast between the scene of inner 
city (left side) and landscape of the outer wall (right) in Siena. In the 
Kaifeng scroll, both inside and outside are still the “human realm” 
whereas in the Siena fresco the city is the civilized human domain 
(city) which contrasts to the under civilized peasants of the outer 
city. Th e scroll and the fresco depict diff erent themes in relation to 
the wall. Inside, Kaifeng’s urban landscape is spacious despite its 
abundant inhabitants. In the Siena fresco, buildings are jumbled 
together creating an impression of density and compactness. Outside 
the wall, Kaifeng space has no real distinction from the inside. Urban 
qualities seemingly fl ow within and without, unobstructed by the 
city wall. In the fresco, landscape is dominated by agriculture and 
nature. Th e wall in the fresco delimits the town whereas in the case 
of Kaifeng, it is merely part of the continuum between the town and 
its rural surrounding. 
Th e presence of physical walls in feudal cities, according to Wu 
Liangyong, was both to safeguard the security of the state and to 
suppress potential internal uprisings. Th e loss of a capital city for the 
Chinese virtually meant the loss of sovereign power. He illustrated 
that in Chang’an during the Han Dynasty there were two layers 
of walls: the palace and outer periphery. During the Tang Dynasty 
this was even extended into three layers: the palace, the city and the 
outer periphery. Peking and Nanjing during the Ming Dynasty had 
four lines of walls that enabled the city guards to fully deploy their 
members and reach every corner of the city immediately. Th e social 
segregation was also maintained by locating the rich and the poor or 
“other nationalities” in strict division and containment.24
129 
Further distinction is manifested in the duality between capital city 
and non-capital city, and in China this is clearly delineated, as was 
the case through the ages. For nearly two millenniums there were 
six capital cities namely Xi’an (Xianyang of the Qin Dynasty and 
Chang’an of Han Dynasty), Luoyang, Hanzhou, Kaifeng, Nanjing 
and Beijing. Xi’an is the capital in the center of China, Beijing and 
Louyang in the north and the rest in the south; all of them are located 
in inland regions. Th ese cities are characterized by an idealized 
grid that physically and explicitly represents Confucian hierarchy, 
order and harmony enclosed by rectangular walls manifesting 
the consolidation of the emperors’ power. Th ese cities are always 
bordered with rectangular walls in shape, a strong north-south axis, 
and incorporate geographical features such as mountains and rivers 
as part of the composition. Th ese features, sometimes with massive 
“re-mocking” have produced picturesque gardens and parks in the 
city that look like artifi cial sceneries. 
  CHAPTER 3 - 130
Th e fi rst capital of unifi ed China, Xianyang (ca. 350-207 BC) 
was the capital of Qin Dynasty (present day Xi’an in the Shaanxi 
Province) but unfortunately not many remnants or records are 
available to reconstruct its form. Th e successor capital, Chang’an (ca. 
208 BC – 23 AD) was built southward from the old Xianyang by 
the Han Dynasty. Th e layout of Chang’an in the Han era was based 
on rectangular shaped quarters. Th ese quarters were not orderly 
but rather followed the topography of the site. It had a perimeter 
wall that spanned about 5,940 meters east-west and 6,250 north-
south, with nearly a 16-meter thick wall foundation, and three gates 
at each side of the wall. Th e Palace was located in the rather hilly 
area in the south (Dragon’s Head Plain), providing a perfect view 
all over the city. Th at position made it possible for the emperor to 
keep the whole city under control and to maintain surveillance over 
the north bank of the Wei River. Handcraft industries, markets and 
marketplaces were allotted in the nine market places. Markets were 
classifi ed according to specifi c trades. Th ey were housed in shops 
that were arranged facing each other like a passage. Th is pattern 
made control and supervision easy for the administrators. In terms 
of residential space, Liangyong determined that Chang’an had one 
hundred and sixty residential blocks. Each block consisted of houses 
and courtyards, which were connected and arranged parallel to each 
other. Th e block was encircled by walls and had gates on each side as 
well as a law enforcement offi  cial  for each street.25 One other integral 
part of a capital city was its gardens and parks. To the west of the city, 
a vast garden was constructed during the reign of Emperor Han Wu 
Di. Th e Jainzhang Palace was nearly 7 kilometers in circumference, 
and consisted of halls, pavilions, artifi cial islands et cetera. 
Th e other capital cities such as Luoyang (Tang Dynasty AD 618-907), 
Hanzhou, Kaifeng, and Nanjing also had nearly similar patterns that 
showed degrees of maturity as well as a tendency towards rigidity. Th e 
pattern culminated in Beijing during the Ming and Qing Dynasties 
(AD 1553-1644 and 1644-1911 respectively). Th e Forbidden City 
of Beijing and the strict grid pattern of its surroundings is the best 
physical representation of the offi  cial text of Zhou Li dating back to 
the 6th century BC. Th is text details the ordering system and behavior 
131 
for a capital city and palace. Diff erent from European cities in which 
continuous confl icts between religious authorities, aristocrats and 
tradesmen denied the domination of any group over the other, the 
Chinese emperor was free to do almost anything except violate 
religion. Th e attitude however may swing from egalitarian Mohism 
and familial Confucianism to harsh and strict rules based on the 
Legalist school of thought.26
Th rough these capital cities, the emperors of Chinese dynasties 
expressed their identity as well as hosted the power of the institution 
providing mechanisms to run the whole country.27 Modern day 
Beijing in this regard is an exemplary case as its form is relatively 
well-preserved. Th e map of Beijing depicts a dense, regularized 
composition of settlements and urban fabrics that is concentrated 
in magnifi cent institutional buildings and open spaces. Th e palace 
itself is the best representation of how regularity plays a central 
role in their system of land use. Its patchy, irregular, and organic 
composition of natural landscapes (lakes and open space) integrated 
with the strictly organized rectangular pattern shows the classic 
Chinese style of the above capital city. In the pre-industrial cities of 
China, functional and formal separation between parts was clearly 
seen. Political control and management were the main reason for 
this order. 
Aside from being overtly manifested, the centralization of power 
may also occur by hiding its presence. Th e Chinese “forbidden 
city” is an obvious and perhaps the most grandiose exercise of this 
style. Th e Chinese formal architectural expression of power is based 
on the Lao Tzu way of exercising power. Lao Tzu’s texts make this 
sentiment clear: “Th e best of all rulers is but a shadowy presence to 
his subject” (Lao Tzu, 1963: 73), or moreover, “Th e instruments of 
power in a state must not be revealed to anyone” (Lao Tzu, 1963: 
95).28 According to the Lao Tzu philosophy, the art of warfare is 
the art of deception, shadowing and feigning in order to force the 
enemy out of its hiding place. Taoism is the philosophy of paradox. 
For instance, the most eff ective action is non-action and the most 
eff ective word is the unspoken. It is also believed that leaders who 
use violence are poor rulers since the most successful leaders rule 
  CHAPTER 3 - 132
Two Chinese artists depict 
the current modern wall 
fragmenting and encircling 
urban spaces. Th e fi rst 
is proposed by Wang 
Jinson presented arrays 
of contemporary wall in 
Chinese cities, a juxtaposition 
of traditional and modern 
wall. Th e second, Wang 
Fen depicted an ambiguity 
concerning the presence of 
modern city wall. 
133 
without contention. Th is uncontested position is a product of the 
hidden power by which the subject is in no position to contest. 
Th is method of concealment is manifested widely in architecture 
through the use of gates and walls. Zhu’s spatial syntax analysis on 
the Forbidden City for instance, shows a highly segmented and 
hierarchical space formed by elaborate gates and walls.29 As Kahn-
Ackermann has surveyed, the Chinese virtually live behind various 
levels of walls, from walled houses, to walled neighborhoods to 
walled cities.30 Dovey also found that these walls refl ect the Chinese 
“passion for clarity of human relationships and status. Walls divide 
the citizens from the barbaric (as the Great Wall did), sacred from 
profane, safety from danger.” Th e wall and gate thus becomes a 
threshold between those realms. Chinese culture to many extents 
pays very careful attention to this conjugation. For the Chinese to 
rule is to “see but do not appear to see.”31
Th is classical attitude did not totally disappear even after Mao took 
power in China, although he blatantly switched the orientation 
of power from the segregated Forbidden City to the “liberating 
space” of Tiananmen Square. Dovey is able to show that amidst 
the seemingly democratic space of this plaza, the hidden power of 
Chinese leadership is transformed into an accumulation of history 
and politics of the people’s heroes. Th is process of historical and 
political legitimizing is represented and fi xed in forms such as the 
Mao Zedong Monument, the Great Hall of the People and the 
History Museum in Tiananmen Square. In spite of its openness, 
the continuous presence of guardians and the large scale of these 
edifi ces render the square a second “forbidden space” in the center 
of Beijing. Th e Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 was a grave 
reminder that any exercise to contest the unseen power of Chinese 
leadership sooner or later will face its border. It is not the form, as 
Dovey clarifi ed, that oppresses the people, but the people themselves. 
Yet buildings and places can serve as the tools of both oppression 
and emancipation.
Th e position of the Forbidden City is now replaced by the openness 
of Tiananmen Square. It symbolizes the liberation of China from 
the previous imperial regime. Th e function of this square however 
  CHAPTER 3 - 134
works perfectly like the closed nature and impenetrability of the 
Forbidden City. As Dovey commented, the Tiananmen Square 
Massacre in this regard unveiled the prevailing power structure and 
demonstrated that any attempt to contest the central power has its 
limit. Th e rigid walls of the Forbidden City are in fact less powerful 
than the intangible wall within the regime disguised by the openness 
of the square. 
Neil Leach also confi rms this thought in China :
‘For Chinese society depends upon a sense of division and exclusion, just 
as much as it depends upon a sense of unity and inclusion. If the Great 
Wall represents inclusion – a sense of unity against the outside world – the 
Forbidden City represents exclusion – a deep sense of division within its 
own internal world.’ (Leach 2004, p. 45)
In modern times, since 1978, there has been signifi cant change in 
Chinese urbanism. China established policies to increase the role 
of the commune system through the separation of its economic 
and political functions. According to the “No. 1 Document” on 
rural economic policy, peasants were allowed to move to towns to 
work or to operate their own business with their own food supplies. 
Consequently, they could apply either to be permanent or non-
permanent registered residents in that town. Th ere was then a need 
to adjust what is now termed a designated town. Th is was part of 
the registration system that categorized migrated people in towns 
into a non-agriculture population. Otherwise, the town would be 
considered a rural settlement as would the population. Since this 
policy was developed, many provinces raced to establish such towns 
in order to meet their regional development requirements. Such 
designated towns had various privileges such as obtaining more 
funds from the local and central government, more advantages in 
terms of employment and migration, as well as food and materials 
supplied by the state.
As a product of that policy and demographic controls, newly born 
towns and cities in the Pearl River Delta are characterized by a 
citizenship of “migrants” who have the ability to house themselves 
in urban areas. Cities are being developed massively, and thus invite 
the displacement of millions of people. “City” means not only an 
135 
accumulation of resources and power as was the case in the past, 
but is now also imbued with images of modern culture imported 
from anywhere. And it attracts people. “Floating population” is 
the informal term describing those peasants and workers, who in 
many cases clandestinely left their hometown danwei in the inland 
provinces.32 But what is trying to surface here is the mechanism of 
“attract and select” over those fl oating populations, in favor of the 
city’s development. 
Th e mechanism is done by continuing interaction between the 
attraction of the city and the registration system (hukou). With this 
system, only registered people can be regarded as citizens of a city, 
hence having all the rights of normal citizens such as access to hospital 
services, social security and other urban welfare. Many people from 
rural areas and other provinces are struggling to have a house in 
the city. As soon as they get one, they must follow the procedure of 
becoming a formal citizen. Depending upon their own merit as well 
as luck and chance, they will be given a residential permit as a new 
city resident. Th us many new cities in the Pearl River Delta have a 
very small local population (converted rural peasants) compared to 
the large migrant population who have already been “territorialized” 
by the construction of those cities. City, for the Chinese, has become 
a notion where the local inhabitants are being deterritorialized from 
their localities and where the migrants are being granted this territory. 
Th e creation of a modern city, for the Chinese is hence two-fold. 
Th e fi rst notion is to create an attractive city in order to establish the 
magnitude and importance of that city in the scheme of economics 
(providing jobs), politics (social welfare) and culture in terms of 
“modern life.” In the words of Project on Th e Cities, it is a green 
card dream that attracts people to reside in the city, especially in 
Shenzhen as the “capital of the dream” where all of those motives 
meet. In this case, the city center is always one of the important 
features. Instead of a result of historical accumulation as happened 
in Europe, the city center of Chinese cities is always a territorial 
construction, and many of them are new. Th e second notion, as 
the antithesis of this openness and attraction, is that cities in China 
develop rigid measurements to control the fl ow of people namely 
  CHAPTER 3 - 136
through the registration and residential permit. 
Th is mechanism, arguably, highlights the PRD’s cities as insular 
space projects. 
As we are aware that since the city is a purely abstract territory and 
since the city is expanding, some rural regions, which belong to the 
commune, are physically transformed into the city. But mostly, by 
law, the people and land are still rural by status, and only a relatively 
small number of these cases will be converted to city status. Th us, 
in many areas we can see the presence of these urban villages as 
well as that of urban-rural-peasant people. Since the landlords (the 
heads of the collectives) of these urban villages have great freedom 
in the usage of their land, this land becomes one of the central 
points of physical urbanization, which is beyond the control of 
the state. While they live inside the urban boundaries, they are in 
fact outsiders of the city’s original citizenship. Th is phenomenon 
creates an unclear physical distinction between urban and rural, 
or desakota, as was termed by McGee in the Indonesian context. 
But in fact, there is a strict division between urban-rural in terms 
of the administrative and social status of the residence.33 Th is is 
the process of urbanization of the rural: a suburbanization that is 
entirely foreign compared with what occurs in Western cities. Here 
suburbanization is created by the rigid border of the city on one side 
and extreme fl exibility of rural development on the other side. Th is 
is Chinese Suburbia, which Craciun commented was the “hybrid 
between city and countryside.”34 Th e designated town or city could 
not resist its physical shape, encircled by a shadowy “city” which 
grows much faster. Only the demographic control of the citizens 
could be maintained, a remnant of Maoist strategy to eradicate the 
duality. 
Indeed, Skinner seminal book on Chinese urban history, Th e City in 
Late Imperial China, breaks the well-established notion that cities in 
China were microcosms of empire, more or less uniform creations of 
an omnipotent state.35 In his way, the notion of city was identifi ed 
as an integral part of a regional economic network rather than as a 
dichotomy between city and countryside. His concept of an “urban-
137 
rural continuum” continues to infl uence further research towards 
understanding the late imperial cities and their social systems. 
But also, to newer researches on the modern Chinese cities, also 
provides a view that the continuum between city and countryside 
is diminishing, as the growth of spatial division, discontinuity and 
segregation between those parts is now also visible.
3.2  On the making of insular spaces 
Further, in an attempt to describe the relation between space and 
segregation, three types of insularization are proposed to characterize 
the process of insularization of the PRD.
Modular Space: dorm-factories 
Th e immediate form of insular territory in the Pearl River Delta 
is, without a doubt, thousands of factories located both inside and 
outside industrial sites spread across the country. It is a fl oating space
that can be installed anywhere. Its primary function is to perpetuate 
migrant workers’ deterritorialized status. Th e space is normally a 
self-contained assemblage of workspace and dormitory. It is however 
never intended to be a home in the Heideggerian sense – a house 
to be exist in the world. It provides merely a temporary shelter for 
further journeys. As this part will argue, although based on a similar 
concept, it is in fact an “inverted version” of danwei, the working 
unit promulgated since Mao’s dream of a classless society. If danwei 
invites a communal identity to its inhabitants, the dorm-factory 
transforms workers into a fl oating population, wandering from one 
dorm-factory to another. A migrant worker’s factory dormitory in 
suburban Guangzhou can serve as a case in support of this claim. 
A German investment manufacturer is located in the lot provided by 
Wanggang Village community. Th is village is located in an industrial 
zone of Xinshi town in the western part of Baiyun district. It belongs 
to the vast rural area in the suburbs of Guangzhou, characterized 
by interchangeable scenery of city and rural environment. Th e 
manufacture has several buildings for the tannery industry, an offi  ce 
building and a dormitory building for the workers including a 
football fi eld, a basketball court and a canteen as well as a German 
  CHAPTER 3 - 138
style “party house” for hosting guests and customers complete with 
a swimming pool. Th e manufacturer is located in a rectangular lot 
encircled by a wall where the front gate is guarded 24 hours. Th e 
company has 650 workers, of which 180 live in the dormitory, 
while the others rent rooms provided by farmers in the village. 
Th e dormitory is located nearby the main building, having its own 
gate but sharing the guardian post. A door equipped with presence 
cards and camera surveillance connects the dormitory and the 
manufacturing area. Th e dormitory has four fl oors. Th e ground fl oor 
is used for the kitchen and canteen. Th e fi rst to the third fl oors are 
used for workers’ rooms. Each room, about 24 square meters (4x6 
meters) is occupied by 8 persons with four double-deck beds and 
two shared lockers. Each fl oor has 5 rooms for males and another 
fi ve for females separated by a steel jalousie. Each part has centralized 
toilets, bathing and washing places. 
Wanggang is located on the outskirts of the city, about 15 kilometers 
from downtown Guangzhou. But physically, the village is in suburban 
Guangzhou hence is already a lively urbanized area. Nearly every 5 
minutes public buses regularly serve the connection to the nearby 
areas as well as to other parts of Guangzhou. Modi or motorcycle-
taxis are easily found serving a short trip to any place one could 
want to go at a reasonable price. Restaurants, shops and sweatshops, 
supermarkets, informal market places, telephone booths, telephone 
service shops and many other facilities are easily found on the major 
road connecting Wanggang with Guangzhou. Th is village and its 
industrial complexes are indeed a mature community where local 
people and migrants who dwell in the dormitories live side by side 
in rather close contact. Here the workers do not feel any isolation 
either physically or socially. 
Th rough interviews conducted by visiting university students, the 
workers expressed that they were generally satisfi ed with their living 
conditions and viewed living situation in the dormitory as standard. 
Although limited, they felt relatively happy because compared to 
other dormitories they had greater freedom to go outside during 
their free time and even had their own gate. In the other dormitories, 
especially those of the Taiwanese shoe manufacturers, the living 
139 
conditions were much tougher since the workers had to spend their 
free time in the manufacturing area (we can see how this opinion is 
in accordance with public campaigns against such practices later). At 
this German factory, the lower level workers were paid between 500 
RMB and 800 RMB according to their positions, which is a little 
higher than the Chinese standard of 450 RMB. In addition, the room 
was free of charge and the food was provided by the company. Hence 
they could live with minimal expenses in order to save money for 
other purposes, sending it to their parents or family in rural China. 
Th ey spent their free time in billiard halls and mah-jong parlors or 
telephoned their families in rural inland China. All of these services 
could be found nearby the factory provided by local the people of 
Wanggang. Some of them also went to downtown Guangzhou, to 
Beijing Road for shopping and sight seeing or watching movies at 
cinemas.36  
Although the average living standard of the migrant workers in 
Guangzhou seems better than in other Chinese cities, there are 
widening discrepancies between migrant dormitories and private 
housing for the original city residents. Compared to the stagnant 
conditions of a dormitory, a small statistical survey on private 
housing by Duan showed that by 2002 approximately 83.7% of 
the residents in Guangzhou had their own apartments with the 
occupancy increased by 27.7% compared to the year 1997. Th e 
average living space increases each year. In 2002 it was 15.57 square 
meters in comparison to a mere 4.78 square meters in 1997. Th e 
space for permanent residents has more than tripled in Guangzhou. 
In addition, residential urban environments are also improved each 
year either by governmental companies or private sectors and all 
newly built settlements now have good traffi  c connections as well as 
other infrastructure. 
Th ese conditions, in fact, are not the case for migrant workers. 
Although no statistical resource can confi rm the exact nature of 
dormitory conditions, we may see that many migrants still live in 
self-built temporary huts either completely without toilets or having 
only extremely limited bathroom facilities.  At construction sites 
migrant workers live mainly in plastic tents with limited access to 
  CHAPTER 3 - 140
Scenery of a factory in 
Wanggang  village and its 
dormitory: an enclosed 
industrial territory within 
agricultural landscape. 
(Courtesy of Dr. Herbert 
Glasauer).
Th e plan of the factory’s lot  
separates the lot into two main 
area: the factory itself and 
dormitory for migrant workers 
that being connected by a 
surveillanced gate. 
(Th e plan provided by Yun 
Duan who allowed me to use 
her project report materials. 
Th e plan is mere a simplifi ed 
lay out thus innacurate. Th e 
scale is approximate).
141 
Facade of the dormitory. 
Such appearance is a typical 
form of dormitory in Pearl 
River Delta. (Courtesy of Yun 
Duan).
Th e plan of the dormitory. 
Ground fl oor is used for 
common space. First and 
second fl oor are for lower rank 
workers and the top fl oor for 
higher rank workers.
Scenery of a room occupied 
by 8 male workers and the 
one meter wide corridor. 
Th e plan is mere a simplifi ed 
lay out thus innacurate. Th e 
scale is approximate).
(Courtesy of Yun Duan).
  CHAPTER 3 - 142
public toilets. Regarding the supply of space in dormitories, there is 
also no actual statistical report that can confi rm the true conditions. 
But one can be sure that there is nearly no substantial change in the 
system of production of space both in terms of policy and form. 
Th e main supply for space though dormitories is autonomously 
conducted by industries and the “private sector” of danwei. Hence 
up to now, there is almost no political interference to improve 
conditions or create a systemic production of this space. 
Th e volume of dormitories is virtually unrecorded. But their 
multiplicity can be determined by the existence of factories and 
industrial sites. An unoffi  cial survey done by the Consulate of 
the Netherlands in September 2002 shows that in Guangdong 
Province alone there are 31 big and small industrial zones. Th ey 
are agglomerated in major cities: Shenzhen has 5 zones, Guangzhou 
4, Foshan 1, Jiangmen 2, Zhongshan 5, Zhuhai 5 and Huizhou 3 
and Dongguan 4. Especially in Shenzhen and Zhuhai, which are 
dedicated as special economic zones (SEZ), nearly all of their parts 
are industrial zones. Shenzhen has the Longgang Greater Industrial 
Estate, the Shatoujial Bonded Zone, the Futian Bonded Zone, the 
Yantian Port Bonded Zone, the New and High Technology Industrial 
Park, and many other smaller areas. 
Juxtaposition of industrial and living space in one territory was 
actually initiated by Mao during the Great Leap Forward of the 
Cultural Revolution through the system of danwei. Danwei is the 
Chinese version of Datcha, an enclave of working and living units 
developed in the Soviet Union. Drawing from Bjorklund’s study,37
Clark illustrated the form and function of danwei as physical and 
social space. Diff ering from many Western theorists who believed 
that neighborhood association is the ideal mechanism to organize 
people; Clark regarded the danwei as the best way for “generating 
collective action within the modern Chinese society.”38 Danwei
and neighborhood association were actually developed at the same 
time, in the mid 1950’s, when the Chinese government needed to 
redistribute city populations and to limit population growth. At 
fi rst, both were administered fi rmly “from above” and intended 
to serve the population social benefi ts. Essentially the danwei was 
143 
a neighborhood association albeit centered on a workplace rather 
than merely a geographic community. Along with the liberalization 
of the Chinese economy, unlike neighborhood associations, which 
maintained repressive and strict regimes, the danwei loosened their 
ties with the restrictive communist party. Th e danwei then mutated 
itself into a fl exible form of organization in Chinese society and was 
receptive to changes brought by the open politics of Deng Xiaoping. 
Th e danwei in their new environment grew as the nucleus of China’s 
massive adaptation to capital and the modern living environment. 
Now Chinese people regard the danwei as a critical element in society 
for their day-to-day activities. Th ere is even a Chinese saying that 
says “one could be without a job, but not without a danwei.”39
Moreover, the danwei has also led to societal identity, or as Clark 
termed it the “culture of uniformity” which maintains them as the most 
eff ective form of organization in Chinese society. Clark believed that 
two essential features have created that culture, namely: the function 
of walls and the layout and combination of work and social space. Th e 
danwei community is normally encircled by an approximately three 
meter high wall. Th e wall not only serves security concerns but also 
represents a physical manifestation of solidarity. Its orientation faces 
inward rather than outward, suggesting its intention is not to isolate 
the danwei members, but to foster a sense of connection within. It 
works primarily by providing a visible expression of group’s identity 
and a clear-cut diff erentiation of the danwei from their surroundings. 
Th e danwei housing is a combination of workplace and community 
space. It is a social space, a lebensraum, its primary function is to 
provide an atmosphere that increases the amount of time employees 
spend with one another in the same way as communal housing. Th e 
danwei community is designed as a compact area where workplace, 
residential areas and social services are juxtaposed or intermingled. 
Th e facilities provided for the danwei may be quite elaborate, such as 
shopping centers, schools, and clinics or sports fi elds. An example of 
a danwei community in the Hebei Province comprises features such 
as: agriculture sites, social activities, residences, a school, meeting 
places, etc. In conclusion, both features, proximity to workplace, 
residence, and social places, and the function of walls produces, as 
  CHAPTER 3 - 144
Left side pistures depict 
some examples of dormitory 
found in PRD and its 
surroundings environment: in 
enclave  factories, in villages, 
juxtaposed with luxurious 
apartment and business 
centers, stand alone-isolated 
by walls, integrated in other 
function such as campus, etc. 
Right side pictures show 
variety of temporary 
dormitories, which normally 
located nearby or within 
construction site, or as an 
“extension” of “formal” 
dormitory. 
Photographs: courtesy of Prof. 
Christl Drey and Prof. Detlev 
Ipsen. 
145 
Chinese modernization 
cannot be separated with total 
industrialization promulgated 
by Mao Zedong that 
attempted to eradicate duality 
of urban-rural since the 
midst 1950s. Soviet model of 
communal work unit - datcha 
- had been mutated into 
Chinese context, danwei. 
Diff erent with neighborhood 
association, danwei focused 
rather on working space and 
spatially being designed based 
on certain recipe: juxtaposing 
working space (agricultural 
and industrial) and living 
space (settlement and its 
functional and social services).
Current factories are 
comprised normally by 
industrial buildings and 
dormitories. Th e recipe 
“industry + living space” 
seems to copy the danwei 
system, but socially it has  
an “inverted” intention. 
Unlike danwei which creates 
a cohessive group, factory is 
segregating the fl oating from 
the local population.  
  CHAPTER 3 - 146
Bjorklund has argued, a cohesive group.40
Th is danwei system is now administratively still in place, although 
practically the strict regulation embedded in the system has been 
gradually loosened. As this part attempts to argue, the system 
nonetheless becomes a platform for contemporary modern working 
places, the factories. Both systems are intended primarily for control 
by the authority. Th e danwei is controlled by the cadres up to the 
central political bureau and the factory by the local administration 
up to the headquarters of the transnational corporation). It works 
somehow through the “panoptic” function of this space. Both are 
also based on the architectural diagram in which the primary purpose 
is the multiplication of the system that homogenizes diff erences in 
order to gain total control over the multitude. However, the modern 
workplace is a rather mutated version of the danwei albeit in an 
“inverted” manner. As far as architectural form is concerned, the 
above condition has already become a template for dormitory 
development that has been implemented almost everywhere in 
the Pearl River Delta. Th e system has become a trap that prevents 
architecture from producing better living conditions for migrant 
workers. Th e lack of alternatives for workers has perpetuated this 
system of production of space. Indeed, factory and danwei share 
the idea of template architecture. If the danwei was a new living 
space in which industrial works were implanted, the current factory 
is industrial space in which living space is inserted. If the danwei was 
an act to create cohesion of the multitude in units of society, the 
current factory isolates and deterritorializes people into a fl oating 
work force. 
Indeed, barriers are required to separate humans from hazardous 
machinery. But in China these barriers also operate as disciplinary 
space, a super “panopticon”. Th e modular self-contained space 
and its continuous surveillance provide no chance for the workers 
to avoid various threats from the factory’s administration. Gated 
factories and dormitories perpetuate the circumvention of the law, 
since without social contact to the outside world; there is also no 
social control. Space can moreover be used to delineate wages. Lisa 
Rofel’s investigation of the work environment in a silk-weaving 
147 
factory in Guangzhou, reported that the layout of the factory also 
functioned as a disciplining space as workers’ wages were classifi ed 
according to their workspace in the factory.41
Many have commented on the workers’ situation. China Labor 
Watch for instance has extensively surveyed bad working conditions 
in Chinese factories. A report on a shoe factory in Dongguan for 
instance has been published stressing its violations of labor laws. As 
a Reebok, Fila and Clark contractor, this factory has 12 dormitory 
buildings laid out according to the level of the workers: two buildings 
for managers and 9 buildings for production workers. From these, 
only one building is for male workers and the other eight are for 
female workers. Included in this complex is one building for married 
couples. In these buildings, some rooms are less then 20 square 
meters and accommodate 8 workers. But the worst condition is that 
the workers are forced to work up to 60 hours a week, much more 
than the 44 hours a week including overtime allowed by Chinese 
Labor Law.42
Activists have been vocal in their criticism of working conditions 
inside the factory, as well as commenting on the weakness of 
authority to control beyond the wall. China Labor Watch reports 
containing comments such as “live in the empty warehouse, where 
factory parks the van” or “working 24 hours a day, seven days a 
week,” or “no weekends and no holidays” and alike are commonly 
released, although mainly outside China, to stress the conditions 
of factories as the site of mobilization. As reports indicate, the 
problem is perpetually silenced by the presence of “no picture zones” 
at certain global brand factories, such as Nike with their “Media 
Policy” making public control virtually impossible.43
Furthermore, public control is often nullifi ed by the workers’ fear to 
speak about their situation. Th ey are often threatened with retaliation 
if they do not lie during site visits from human rights agencies or 
government offi  cers. Th e apex of this silencing was during the SARS 
(Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) outbreak. Factory workers 
were one of the social groups in China who were not fully informed 
about the situation. China Labor Watch reported that knowledge of 
  CHAPTER 3 - 148
the plague was limited not only by the closed environment of the 
factory, but also by the prohibition of workers speaking about it. At 
the beginning of the epidemic, some workers who were suspected 
of being infected with SARS were simply forced to leave the factory 
without any medical treatment or fi nancial help. Later after this 
practice was prohibited by the authorities, the factory management 
and the police detained those people infected, and the rest of the 
workers, inside the factory. Hence, powerlessness is the issue: in a 
normal situation the wall of the factory functions to intensify the 
work. During the outbreak of SARS they transformed the factory 
into a prison with no escape.
Th e other problem of insularity is that the territory becomes socially 
disconnected from other areas. In the so-called ecological industrial 
park of Zhuhai for instance, many factories stand alone in the 
middle of vacant lots provided for future investment. It is called 
ecological because the lots have deep right of way for the purpose of 
plantation along the street as well as lower building density. It is also 
part of an ecological strategy of Zhuhai planning that utilizes distinct 
geographical features such as forests, hills, rivers, plantations, etc. as 
the border of development. Th is policy reserves some green areas as 
protected areas from any kind of industrial development. On one 
hand this policy was praised and Zhuhai was acknowledged as the 
city of landscape. But the social impact of this extensive development 
is that the industrial territory becomes simply too big. Th e nearest 
small town is about 10 kilometers away. Buses run irregularly, and 
the nearest modi station is about 2 kilometers away. Th ose factories 
are on the edge of an “ecological” industrial park. Many more are 
developing in the more remote areas. Th us many factories in these 
immature industrial parks and estates are in fact isolated territories; 
the industrial estate and park themselves are a bonded area which is 
not easy to access let alone to have some kind of living amenities. 
Th e whole system of planning in this region, deliberate or not, 
produces this kind of isolation. In this non-place, I would add, 
insular factories have victimized migrant workers, turning them into 
machines, “subaltern subjects” in the city space. In terms of social 
space, quite contrary to the seamless physical development between 
149 
urban and rural as we have already examined in the previous section, 
the duality between urban and rural still works vigorously to separate 
society. Here, being an urban citizen is a privilege and destiny, 
which is formalized by laws and the administration, and by social 
and cultural borders, rather than a right or a chance. Th e duality 
proliferates from the very large context of the politics of Chinese 
territorial diff erentiation to the politics of the individual. 
China’s workers are not alone, as has been demonstrated by Naomi 
Klein in No Logo and Windows and Fences, the problems with this 
kind of development are a worldwide plague. In Cavite and Cebu 
in the Philippines, Tangerang in Jakarta, as well as other export 
processing zones in many developing countries, workers are normally 
subject to a similar system whereby total mobilization of workers 
is conducted in the name of industrialization and export. Again, 
Armitage and Roberts have also claimed that global capitalism 
exploits such mobilization to fi nd a territory where cheap labor is 
off ered. Hence it may easily move from one region or country to the 
other.44 Th is could lead, unfortunately, to a new subaltern society 
that has no representation in urban society, and is kept silent in the 
unseen factories. It means that over exploitation of the workers may 
occur without any control. Hence the module of dorm-factories may 
become a tactic of insularization, not making a perfect relationship 
between laborers, their working space, and their environment as 
a “place” but rather deliberately perpetuate the “placeless-ness” to 
create societal segregation. 
As it can be applied everywhere else where the logic of enclaved 
industries is enacted, at this point, we are not talking about traditional 
separation anymore, but rather a global process of insularization. 
Concealed insular space: Dongguan hidden urban life 
On a larger scale, the proliferation of factories has created not only a 
clear-cut territory, as is the case of industrial zones, but also produce 
a haphazard puzzle of industries, towns, villages and agricultural 
parcels. Th is indiff erent urban landscape, in fact, produces 
disconnected societies where cultural segregation is developed. Th e 
case is exemplifi ed by Dongguan city, where tangible and intangible 
  CHAPTER 3 - 150
Dongguan shape is a 
patchwork of water and 
green bodies, housing, 
infrastructure and industries. 
All  these features are 
juxtaposed in every level 
of spatial organization and 
barely distinguishable. Th ese 
pictures are a simulation as 
if those bodies are mapped 
and then separated. Here, 
the term “zone,” which 
somehow bears the spirit of 
zoning as planning system, 
faces its limit. (Source of the 
map: Dongguan Planning 
Academy, the simulation 
pictures are produced by 
author)  
151 
walls produce a socially separated migrant worker population vis-à-
vis the local population. 
Dongguan is an exemplary case where the fl exibility of this modular 
industry has created a “city” which, in fact, is built up from an 
agglomeration of factories. “A city of factories” as the Dongguan 
planners called it.45 Initially the area was not a city at all. It was 
merely an agglomeration of villages like the other areas in this delta. 
Since the beginning of the open policy in the early 1980s, the area 
was merely a scattering of industries developed privately through 
direct collaboration between investors and the landlords of the 
village communes. Th e buildings were mostly provided and rented 
by local peasants and located on their danwei land. Th e processing 
industries were the major manufacturers such as shoes and clothing. 
Activities occurred in a large room, which housed some hundreds of 
workers gluing and sewing the semi-fi nished materials, which they 
then assembled into one piece of shoe or cloth. Th e “factories” there 
seemingly defi ed all technological aspects of the term and merely 
served as a container for the workers. 
Since then, along with this industrialization, an “urbanization” process 
occurred in the shape of haphazard development of urban amenities, 
economic sectors as well as urban infrastructures and services, which 
in many cases were provided by the local village together with the 
industries. During that period, it was not considered important to 
centralize management let alone to form a city. But the year 1995 was 
the breaking point that turned the incremental and informal process 
into formal urbanization. Th e Chinese government recognized the 
importance of a city as the way to manage land use, infrastructure, and 
services as well as to control worsening environmental degradation 
as a result of industrial pollution. Th e Planning Bureau would then 
try to construct urban centers, which attempted to give a symbolic as 
well as spatial magnitude to the presence of this new city. Dongguan 
is then used as the name of this new center. Chronic problems were 
however faced by this new institution. For the planner, land use 
changes were not easy to control since in reality the landlord had the 
real power over their land and together with bigger industries “they 
can do whatever they like”.46
  CHAPTER 3 - 152
Dongguan planning is 
intentionally centered 
toward the creation of 
“urban environment” amidst 
haphazard industries. Th e 
planning is codifi cated through 
spatial derivation from “PRD 
context” (network of most 
important cities) and then 
Dongguan  level (network of 
town centers), down to the 
planned micro level. 
Here, architecture is designed 
to enhance the degree of 
centrality in each micro 
planning territory and  to give 
urban amenities into industrial 
zones. (Source: reproduced 
from Dongguan Planning 
Academy, during site visit 
September - October 2003)
153 
Beside a desire for urbanity, 
Dongguan planning 
is characterized by a 
metamorphosis process 
from juxtaposed sites of 
agriculture-industry into 
“integrated” industry-”green”, 
infrastructure, and urban 
amenities emphasising on 
“maximal result” of industrial 
sector without “loosening the 
natural landscape.”
Agriculture is here mutated 
into “urban landscape” to 
enhance centrality (central 
park) and as the “street 
facade” along of that industry. 
(Source: reproduced from 
Dongguan Planning 
Academy, during site visit  
September - October 2003)
  CHAPTER 3 - 154
Now this city is quite big – and fl at. It is considered formally as a 
middle city, but in fact, Dongguan’s dimensions are well beyond 
this classifi cation.47 Th e region transforms itself into a city, which 
is 2400 meters square, consists of 32 towns, 4 big industrial estates 
and more than three thousand factories. It has a huge population, 
about 6 million as of the year of 2000. From that number, a mere 
1.5 million are local or registered people and the rest are migrant 
workers, commonly referred to as the fl oating population. Planning 
in this unclassifi able agglomeration of factories faces two frontiers: 
establishing the existence of the center as a manifestation of the 
administratively-led city and constructing a new identity to replace 
the rather pejorative meaning of “city of immigrants”.
First, the existence of this new city is marked by a mutation of 
haphazard and informal factories and industrial zones into an 
administratively-led city symbolized by the presence of the city center. 
Project on the Cities by Koolhaas and team made a report concerning 
Dongguan’s city center that was moved many times depending 
on who was the city mayor. Hence the notion of center is highly 
political, and architecture is used to fi x its presence in a defi nitive 
place. Architectural projects of a public hall, governmental offi  ces, 
town hall, and a central park are planned and partially constructed 
to secure the centrality. Th e city administration has even proposed 
to construct expressways, which make it possible “to reach [all] areas 
and towns in 40 minutes”48 from the urban center. Th ese projects 
and proposals can be seen as an act to strengthen the spatial centrality 
of this haphazard agglomeration of factories – by strengthening 
the power of the administration and planning. For the planner, 
Dongguan will not be a city without the presence and visibility of this 
capital both on the map and in reality. Th is “centralization” matches 
with the desire to gain advantage over the powerful landlords and 
town administrators. In this regard “planning” can be interpreted 
as an eff ort to keep the balance between two extreme poles. Th ey 
are between the hyper-fl exibility of industries and the socially and 
geographically rooted danwei, between rich-local and poor-migrant 
population, between formal city center and haphazard development 
conducted by landlords and industries.
155 
Th is attitude is not limited to Dongguan but has become a strategy in 
China. Th e city center is always an important case. Instead of being 
a result of historical accumulation as experienced in Europe, the city 
centers of Chinese cities are always a territorial in construction, and 
many of them are new. Th e city center can be easily moved from one 
part to the other by developing a bigger and better magnitude of 
centrality and discharging the old one. Kisho Kurokawa’s proposal 
for Shenzhen’s city center is to replace the old Futian city center. Th e 
original town of Loahu is now a nearly deserted area. Th e western 
part of Guangzhou is now being developed as a new city center, 
including the proposal to replace the old business center with a 
new twin tower structure around Shamian Park and upgrade the 
deteriorating Qingpin Market on the opposite side of the river. 
Zhuhai’s old city center (in the 1980s) located on the coast nearby 
Macau is now being replaced by a new center further inland and to 
the west. All of these centers are not only centers in terms of physical 
development but also in terms of administrative establishment. As a 
result of this establishment the land and status of the people could 
also be changed. Th e “local people” who previously enjoyed their 
own land and properties will soon be transformed – with some 
compensation - into landless people. Although the compensation 
money could turn them into overnight millionaires they would soon 
become aware that they must pay rent to the developers for their 
living space. Although the law makes it possible for them to resist 
and they do have the right, the power of the government is not easy 
to confront.
Secondly, the current identity associated with Dongguan is that it 
is a city of migrants.  More than 60% of its population is migrant 
workers dwelling in dormitories. Th ey move from one factory to the 
other in order to fi nd the most profi table position for themselves. 
Indeed, this fact makes Dongguan look like an agglomeration of 
industrial estates rather than a real city.  Attempts have then been 
made to try to change this identity through a strategy repeatedly 
referred to as “urbanizing the industries.”49 Th e strategy involves 
promoting urban life in order to make the fl oating population settle 
into a fi xed place. In this aspect, the administration plans to insert 
  CHAPTER 3 - 156
Dongguan urban space can 
be slightly distinguished 
into two sceneries: the fi rst 
three rows are the tidy urban 
environment “shaped” by the 
planning. Th e lower two rows 
are the hurly-burly places 
for mingrant workers shaped 
indirectly by the industry. 
157 
“city-ness” between industrial areas in order to urbanize Dongguan 
and subsequently create a new identity. Th e planner of this city 
hopes that Dongguan will become a famous manufacturing city that 
can be “a good example for other towns and cities” in incorporating 
industry into the urban setting; or from the opposite view, inserting 
urban qualities into industrial areas. 
Th e strategy proposed by the planners is to promote urban life such as 
by implanting urban amenities and services in factory areas. Shopping 
streets and other commercial functions are inserted in industrial 
areas so that the industries are hidden behind those new urban faces. 
Along the creation of new housing and amenities, this continuous 
attempt to urbanize the industry is indeed leading to a new identity 
for Dongguan. However, two rather contradictory directions have 
emerged. First, the power of haphazardly “capitalizing” Dongguan 
has morphed the industry and workers into an urban form and 
society. Th rough this attempt, the new people of Dongguan will 
indeed be the urban society and not merely an agglomeration 
of migrant and fl oating people. Th e problem however lies in the 
widening gap between the locals who are powerful and wealthy 
and the migrants who are not despite the city’s spatial integration. 
Concealing the factories has created a new face for Dongguan and 
Dongguan’s inhabitants, namely the intangible, invisible side of 
Dongguan. At the planning desk, the dilemma is also confronted. 
Although the life of this city depends entirely on the presence of 
these fl oating people, the planning authorities are ambivalent toward 
them in creating public policy. Since the fl oating migrant people 
have limited access to city’s public services and amenities, they were 
each counted as “0.6” of a person instead of a whole “1” of the local 
people (the pure local as well as the settled and registered migrants) 
which comprise less than 40% of the population. Th us for them, the 
city infrastructure and amenities are for the purpose of the current 
minority population. Th e majority, the fl oating, by assumption, is 
served by the factories and not by the city. Urban space thus plays 
a role in fi xing the diff erent status of citizen or migrant. Th e “new 
face” becomes a new barrier that creates a spatialized distinction 
between hidden majority workers and minority local people. 
  CHAPTER 3 - 158
Moreover, the workers suff er from social stigmatization because they 
are seen as competitors against the local population in the workforce 
and blamed for both putting a strain on urban infrastructure and 
increasing the crime rate. On the other side, the media On the 
other hand, the local population is able to benefi t from the presence 
of migrant workers in their cities. Due to the “extraordinary 
phenomenon” of Chinese modernization, which adapts quickly 
to demographical shifts, urban infrastructure is subsidized by the 
infl ux of migrants. Th e local population thus indirectly exploits their 
presence by getting a reduction in transport fares through their legal 
status while the migrants who have limited access to urban goods 
and services are left mostly to fend for themselves. Hansen, who 
conducted an extensive survey of the positive and negative aspects 
of both receiving and sending these migrants, concluded that the 
migrants are largely excluded from urban welfare systems and urban 
infrastructure so they generally “fi nd their own solutions to their 
daily needs.” Th is stigma and system are nonetheless a “legacy of 
exploitation” towards migrant workers.50
Hierarchical  insularity: Shenzhen and Nansha “hub 
city”
Th is type of insularity points to the creation of “borderless territory” 
but works primarily to segregate people by controlling their fl ow. 
With the imagination of a “borderless China – Hong Kong” the 
city of Shenzhen takes an important role since it is a hub between 
the two. Like a double membrane, Shenzhen has two layers; namely 
the demarcation line between Shenzhen and Hong Kong and the 
separation between the territory of the Shenzhen Special Economic 
Zone (SEZ) and the land outside of mainland China. Both walls 
work in fact to fi lter what are deemed to be unnecessary or unwanted 
situations and people. Th e same structure is also applied to Nansha. 
Planned as a “hub city” since it is located in the crossroads of space of 
fl ow, it works spatially through creating an “imagined community” 
that distances itself from the surrounding situation.  Let me further 
explore this claim. Since it was dedicated as a special economic zone, 
Shenzhen has become a kind of gated city where its performance is 
159 
shaped by control over the fl ow of people instead of like an open 
city we normally understand. Hence the existence of Shenzhen 
cannot be separated from the presence of borders encircling the 
city. Th e south of the city is bordered by the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (SAR). To the north, it borders itself from 
mainland China outside of the city. Hence the city enjoys privilege 
and is treated formally as an enclave territory separated from the 
rest of the mainland area guarded with the resident permit system 
(hukou). 
Founded by the end of 1970s, this city was originated in Baoan 
County, with a population of only 30,000 people at that time. Th is 
new city grew rapidly especially in the 1980-1990s. Th e “Shenzhen 
Speed” was widely known as one of the quickest developments in 
human history. In the space of only about 20 years, the population 
of this city jumped to its current population of about 7 million 
people. Hence almost all of the new population was migrants. 
Great Leap Forward by Koolhaas has discussed this development in 
intricate detail so it is not necessary to repeat the facts.51 But the 
important point here is that the status as a special economic zone 
made Shenzhen available for massive development, and at the same 
time develop a standard of living as high as Hong Kong in terms of 
more freedom and opportunities. Th ese situations were Shenzhen’s 
main attraction for people from all over China. Th ey fought to 
migrate into the city but most of them were pushed back through 
the hukou, the permit system of this city. Th ere are no data however 
of how many people applied for resident permits and were rejected. 
It tells us that the mechanism of “attract and select” through the city’s 
development and system of resident permits has worked perfectly, 
fi lling this city with young talents and educated workers from all 
over China. Th ey were then swiftly captured by industries coming 
in from Hong Kong and other foreign investors making a new 
generation of white collar, middle class society in the city. Th is is one 
result of Shenzhen style modernization. GDP per capita in Shenzhen 
is about USD 5,238 (in 2001 USD), far beyond Guangzhou, the 
capital with USD 4,592 or other smaller cities (Dongguan USD 
4564 and Foshan USD 3863 or even Zhuhai USD 3541). As a 
  CHAPTER 3 - 160
Gates, walls and guardians 
are easily found almost in 
every cluster of habitation, 
especially the modern one. 
Gated communities are one 
of common features that 
structurize the urban  and 
suburban landscape into 
disconnected parcells albeit 
their global image.  
161 
Nansha new city is another 
“gated communities” albeit 
collecting housing and 
industry in one territory.  
Nansha from its general view 
can be an enlargement of 
dormitory-factory relation 
as the whole city is also 
separated with surrounding 
informal development 
  CHAPTER 3 - 162
result of this success story Shenzhen has received numerous awards 
at both the local and international level. For example, it holds the 
award for “Garden City of China” and “Example City” as well as an 
award from the UIA (Union Internationale des Architectes). Even 
Sara Topelson de Grinberg, the chairwoman of the UIA commented 
that Shenzhen’s “fantastic development” has resulted in both the 
ability to secure its environment and become an exemplary case for 
planning and design of the fast growing cities in the world.52 
Shenzhen shares a 24.5 kilometer-long border with Hong Kong. Th e 
border is the remains of the previously two separate countries (China 
and Hong Kong under British rule before 1997) but now functions 
to maintain the status quo of “one nation, two systems.” Th e border 
has four check-points namely Lo Wu, Lok Ma Chou, Sha Tau Kok 
and Man Kam To. Th ey are claimed to be the busiest crossing points 
in the world. Time Magazine in May 2001 reported that at least 
200,000 people per day crossed the border with approximately 100 
million crossings a year. On average 31,000 vehicles and 280,000 
people traveled across the boundary every day during the year of 
2000. Th is number is likely to triple by 2010. According to the 
Hong Kong Annual Report 2000, mainland China especially the 
Pearl River Delta region is still the most important trading partner 
for Hong Kong.53 Since January 2003 the check points are open 24 
hours. For both Shenzhen and Hong Kong people the opening was 
considered to be an “elimination of [the] psychological border” as 
the Xinhua has reported. To quote one of the legislative counselors 
of HKSAR: “Th e psychological barrier between the two sides has 
been removed, as has the physical barrier… I believe many people 
in the HKSAR will be traveling into the mainland, just as many 
mainland residents will be traveling into the HKSAR.”54
But was the image of a “borderless territory” practiced within 
this success story? Th e psychological border seems to have never 
disappeared. First, on the Hong Kong side, the border was still there 
as they have demonstrated through their ambiguity and reluctance 
to get closer to their neighbor. Th e 1 July 2003 Demonstration 
was regarded as the biggest social and political event after Hong 
Kong’s reunifi cation from British territory to the China mainland 
163 
on 1 July 1997. According to Hong Kong people, the problem was 
not only about “Article 23” – an anti-subversive law offi  cially called 
the National Security Bill that has been inserted into Hong Kong’s 
Basic Law in the aftermath of Tiananmen, but also about the general 
relationship of Hong Kong with Beijing. It was about the people’s 
desire for a more democratic rule and keeping the “one nation two 
systems” working as promised by Beijing.55 Th e demonstration also 
refl ected a deep fear that under Tung’s administration Hong Kong 
would soon loose its uniqueness and that he would turn the city into 
“just another troubled Chinese megalopolis.”56 Moreover, Pun, a 
Hong Kong scholar in regard to the relation between her home city 
and mainland China, has stressed the implications of the growing 
segregation between these two lands and systems:
‘Th e border, as a “physical and visible wall,” is still a crucial dividing line 
for cultural identifi cation between Hong Kong people and the Mainland 
Chinese. Th e border is only open unconditionally to Hong Kong citizens, 
not vice versa. Excepting a few talented professionals, the majority of the 
Mainland Chinese are still excluded by the border from working and living 
in Hong Kong. On the other hand, while increasing numbers of Hong 
Kong laborers have to work and form their families in Mainland China, 
mainly in the Pearl River Delta Region, the actual fusion of the realm of 
work and family in South China does not result in “cultural assimilation”. 
Instead, cultural segregation is further created and embedded in the daily 
experiences of the trans-border working class. General distrust, rigid 
stereotyping, value confl icts and diff erent social systems at large generate 
the confl ict and tension-ridden nature of this “trans-border space” in the 
making.’57
Secondly, the border was strengthened due to traffi  c control, especially 
for the ordinary people of mainland China. Th e demarcation line 
of Shenzhen with the mainland maintains full control over the 
population by selecting the migrants and travelers. Only for those 
with Chinese identity cards is this city actually open. Without such a 
card, deportation may be applied to anybody captured by the police 
according to the law of “Measures for Internment and Deportation 
of Urban Vagrants and Beggars” issued by State Council in 1982. 
Moreover, to migrate into this city people need a resident permit, 
meaning, only people with adequate education and skill may apply 
for such a permit. Otherwise, again, the law will also be applied.58
  CHAPTER 3 - 164
Th irdly, the border crossing becomes more of a unilateral crossing 
as opposed to entirely borderless. Indeed, the traffi  c of residents 
fl ows two ways but the fl ow is not equal because the same rules 
are not applied to everyone. Th e Hong Kong people enjoy greater 
advantage over the residents of Shenzhen. Th e border is crucial 
for both groups since the discrepancies between the two cities 
are apparent. Hong Kong has better education institutions, more 
comprehensive hospitals, better social welfare, and a sense of security 
as well as freedom of living. Th ese qualities attract the well-to-do 
from Shenzhen to purchase properties in Hong Kong despite the 
signifi cant price diff erence (the average apartment fl at in Shenzhen 
is about 700 Hong Kong dollars per square foot and about HKD 
2000 in Hong Kong). Yet the cheaper food, goods and services on 
the other side attract the people of Hong Kong to move to Shenzhen. 
Th e passageway for Hong Kong residents to move to Shenzhen is 
therefore a much easier transition than the reverse, giving Hong 
Kong the upper hand again. 
In conclusion, “borderless China – Hong Kong” is a line that Hong 
Kong people can cross freely but most mainlanders can only gaze 
at. With this one way traffi  c, the whole of Shenzhen itself is just 
another version of a border, albeit extended and solidifi ed in the 
shape of a city. Th e imagination of borderless creates the very point 
of spatial and social separation. 
Th is contradictory notion applies to the creation of “trans-border 
discourse” elsewhere. As an example we will examine a currently 
developing zone, Nansha, which is imagined not only as an 
important industrial estate but also as the site for “new community”. 
Nansha’s Information Technology Park is a joint venture between 
the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST), 
the Fok Ying Tung Foundation and the Guangzhou Government. 
Nansha is a small peninsula located in the mouth of the Delta. 
Nansha is planned and advertised as the “New Guangzhou”, a future 
southward extension of Guangzhou designated as an economic and 
technological development zone.59 Th e idea of developing Nansha 
came from Fok Ying Tung, a Hong Kong businessperson. Tung 
wanted to develop Nansha as a hi-tech city, which promised “a new 
165 
kind of prosperity.”60 In this idea, further he explained: 
‘At Nansha Residential Community, residents’ living area extends well 
beyond their luxurious apartments. We have created a neighborhood, 
where tenants can dine in style, take care of errands, enjoy walking with 
family and friends to charming shops, sidewalk cafes and restaurants in a 
pleasant ambience – all just steps from your door at Nansha Residential 
Community.’61
Th e proposed structure of Nansha is as follows. It is divided into three 
development areas: a preserved ecological area with rich agricultural 
fi elds, a network of rivers and a site for comprehensive harbor-related 
industry. Th e other area will be not only for industrial parks but also 
for a regional service center including living space where “not just a 
community” is supposed to be located. Th e planning area consists of 
about 796 square kilometers of which about 575 square kilometers 
have been designated as land area. Th e key development is about 212 
square kilometers consisting of a conference and training center, hi-
tech offi  ce park, and residential community of about 1036 units. Th e 
fi rst phase of the development was completed in 2002. Th e ensuing 
two phases will be development of further offi  ces. Its projected 
date of completion is 2008. Ricardo Bofi ll, who was appointed to 
design the center area, designed Nansha as a “hub city” based on his 
criticism of the “lack of planning” found in Hong Kong, Guangzhou 
and other cities in the Pearl River Delta. He noted: 
‘All around us, cities seem to suff er the same disease; disconnected and 
haphazard growth justifi ed by hypothetical urban planning which favors 
the spread of development over a wide territory. In most cases, these 
isolated interventions contradict the concepts of global town planning. 
Th is disconnected growth, made up of fortuitous aggregations, transforms 
the suburban area into a gigantic puzzle, the key to which remains totally 
unknown. If we focus our attention on the present situation in Asia, we 
will have to admit that this disease which characterizes western cities has 
here found especially favorable ground; one with strong economic growth 
and little experience in terms of urban planning.’62
Th us he proposed that Nansha be developed as a large hub city, 
connecting cities in the region both by land and water. Th is function 
will be the characteristic of this new city, which guarantees its identity 
as “a city of the future with the knowledge of the past.” Th rough 
this strategy, he has tried to avoid the mistake of reproducing 
  CHAPTER 3 - 166
mismatched, gigantic, puzzling cities like Hong Kong, Macau and 
Guangzhou. And indeed, it is supported by the image created in the 
city’s advertisements. According to its offi  cial website, the location 
is in the “heart and geometric center” of the Pearl River Delta, and 
therefore also claims to be the center of a network of connections. 
It is “encircled by 14 major cities and 420 towns … 7 domestic and 
international airports … and over 200 kilometers of freeway…” It 
has also fi ve highways leading to Guangzhou’s ring expressway, and 
an excellent water connection to both Hong Kong and Macau.
Th ere is however a paradox in this development. On one hand 
Nansha is advertised as a junction band designed as a hub city, thus 
its key function is connection. But on the other hand, in its focus on 
the production of community, a separation is created between social 
groups. Th is paradox is precisely the basic characteristic of the Pearl 
River Delta spatial development that most Chinese urban planners, 
as this chapter would argue, fail to consider, or merely acknowledge 
as a “problem”. Based on the results of our fi eld study, it is clear that 
the development of the Pearl River Delta cannot be separated from 
the incremental development undertaken by ordinary people. Th e 
“villas” of rural peasants are growing along with – if not faster than 
– the development of the key areas. Even in the very strict bordered 
areas like Shenzhen and Zhuhai’s industrial zones, the leaking of 
incremental development by ordinary people is visible. In nearly 
every industrial site, behind the row of factories, there are sites for 
farmers to build their villas accommodating both workers and new 
economies. Th is may produce the relationships that McGee and Lin 
have exposed, of the interlocking between urban and rural, global 
and local.
Nansha is merely one of many such postmodern global trends in 
creating enclave places by placing it in the midst of a network. It 
is a relatively new area and now many construction projects are 
still in the process of completion. A new harbor, new expressways 
and highways, apartments and shopping malls are all newly built 
or under construction. However the sophistication of Nansha’s 
planning will soon be “disrupted” by the presence of this incremental 
development. Here we are confronted with divergent constructions of 
167 
identity. In the offi  cial, legal vision, Nansha’s planning is developing 
an imagined place where wealthy, modern and global societies are 
constructed. It is an imagined place because it is built in the midst 
of a non-place environment, where traffi  c and mobilization run at 
their highest pace. However, in the incremental and unoffi  cial vision 
that will inevitably develop, Nansha’s surroundings presumably will 
continue to recycle old symbols and traditions through vernacular 
modernization forming a new vernacular identity (see the next 
section). Th e surroundings will be more localized places where the 
pace of life will slow down. Interface between both places will be 
very crucial. In this regard, Bofi ll’s plan still contains a key defi ciency. 
Creating Nansha as the hub without creating an interface between 
the core and its informal periphery will reproduce social enclaves 
leaving the area vulnerable to both social and spatial tensions and 
confl icts. 
Th e imagination of Nansha as a hub city that is segregated from its 
surroundings is not the only case. Th e delta itself has been used as 
an “imagined diagram” for development strategy through shaping 
the delta, which physically is a river system, into “real-delta-shaped-
space”. Th e strategy is conducted through creating direct physical 
links between Guangzhou – Hong Kong – Macau. Th ose three cities 
are planned to be connected with “super corridors” through a network 
of highways and railways. Th e diagram invokes the admiration, 
especially of the Zhuhai people, by proposing a 30 kilometer-long 
bridge to cross the Hong Kong - Macau strait in order to complete 
that “delta shaped” infrastructure. Th e diagram is now transforming 
the whole society into a network society in its most physical form. Th e 
sophistication of this network however is accompanied by other ill-
planned developments, which is actually the “origin” of the network 
namely the “economic corridor” formed by linear development. 
Especially at the junction between Dongguan and Shenzhen, the 
development occurs rather unintentionally along the non-highway 
roads. Th is economic corridor comprises street shopping, restaurants, 
cheap hotels, small industries with dormitories, illegal housing, et 
cetera, which then widened and became more sophisticated. Now, 
the highways and these economic corridors create dual systems of 
Above: the “Delta” has 
been transformed into 
diagrammatic - imagined 
territory. Th e imagination 
drives the planning to 
implement it through creating 
infrastructure interconnection. 
(Source: www.prdcouncil.org).
Below: the “realization” in 
term of road connection 
planning, including the 
proposed Hong Kong  - 
Macao bridge.
(Source: http://jmsc.hku.hk/
jmsc6030/bridgestory/dossier/
design/)
  CHAPTER 3 - 168
connection: the fast and the slow, the planned and the ill-planned. 
Th e fast serves the trans-regional connections and the slow generates 
the local one. 
Th is dual system, the openness of trans-border imagination and 
the closed permit system of fast-connection and slow traffi  c, is 
perhaps part of the larger imagination that helps to constitute the 
new network society of China. It is part of the re-mapping of Hong 
Kongese, Taiwanese, and even the Chinese living in overseas as part 
of a “Greater China” aimed at bolstering development and identity. 
Th e imagination of the “South China Economic Circle,” or the 
“Chinese Economic Community” or a “Border Free Trade Zone,” 
or “Triangular Growth” are introduced to present an imagined 
community of vibrant economic interactions between “parts” of 
China. But considering what has been experienced in Shenzhen and 
Nansha, it also provides proof of a deeply segregated China, where 
borders are solidifi ed rather than eliminated. Now we must wait 
and see whether the imagination of the “delta super corridor” will 
include informal development or not.  
3.3 Vernacular modernization: anti-
insular territory in the making
What we now are interrogating is the relationship between production 
of space and the mutation of society. Th e previous examples illustrate 
the production of insular space, which arguably is leading into new 
forms of societal segregations in China. Th e opposite direction, as 
this part attempts to show, is that an “anti insularization process” 
also emerges. It occurs namely in the form of what we can call a 
“vernacular modernization process”. Th is process is arguably a 
grassroots level of development responding to the massive need for 
space due to the huge size of the Chinese population. 
Especially in the Pearl River Delta where demand for space is increasing 
rapidly, the mass production of space, which is standardized, cheap, 
quick and fl exible, is the main characteristic of its production of 
space. Standardization is believed to be one of the most important 
characteristics of modernization, such as Fordism resulting from the 
169 
Industrial Revolution. In the production of housing, it appeared in 
Germany as siedlung, the mode of production for cheap, standardized 
housing that emerged in the 1920s and during post World War II 
reconstruction in 1950s. Architecturally speaking, it was a moment 
when standardization became a synonym with modernization in 
space production, modern planning and design as well as modern 
urban life. In this latter issue, in the West, the phenomenon is almost 
entirely an urban phenomenon as the most deserving area due to the 
devastation of the war. 
Th e phenomenon that occurs in Pearl River Delta however presents 
itself rather diff erently. Standardization happens at almost every 
level: from the planned apartments with sophisticated design 
standards to the vernacular houses built by peasants in rural areas. 
“Modernization” in this sense, hence, is applied not only by the 
planning and architectural offi  ces and building contractors using 
modern technologies and techniques but also by rural peasants. 
“Vernacular modernization” is a proposed term to decipher this 
informal, incremental development involving “partial modernization” 
done by ordinary citizens. Th is phenomenon is perhaps a result of 
two phases of modernization – fi rstly during the Mao period and 
secondly in the current open door era – that have created a rupture 
in architectural tradition. Traditional Chinese architecture is based 
on the evolutionary traditional systems of construction as well as 
stages of apprenticeship in order to become a master builder. Sudden 
development and the need for massive production of space have 
resulted in a more informal network system built by the ordinaries. 
On one hand, their awareness, skill and craftsmanship with the old 
methods of construction as found in classic and traditional Chinese 
architecture is disappearing. On the other hand, they are generally 
unable to adapt to the new construction methods in accordance with 
the process of modernization because their skill and engagement 
with new materials and techniques can’t keep up with the pace of 
development. Th e new vernacular architecture that grows amidst 
this modernization is seen as a rupture in tradition because it is 
generally characterized by poorer building construction and a lack 
of “beauty” in the classic Chinese architectural sense. 
  CHAPTER 3 - 170
171 
However, the speed of this development – the incremental 
and informal – is amazingly quick and quite fl exible. Based on 
governmental policies to reduce the discrepancies between urban 
and rural, the settlement itself is comprised of geometrically 
regularized patterns that refl ect a desire to bring about a rural-
urban convergence. However, the house itself is self-built with “self 
reference” producing a standardized appearance. During our visit, 
we realized that this development can be found almost everywhere; 
virtually every village is developing in this way. As an example, we 
visited a construction site in Wanggang village, located in suburban 
Guangzhou. Th e concrete and brickwork had just been fi nished and 
the façade and mosaic work was undergoing completion by some of 
the workers. A female worker who was actually the wife of one of 
these workers did the cooking for the whole group. Th e group stayed 
at the construction site as it provided a dry fl oor and secure roof so 
they constructed a temporary room for sleeping and cooking. Th ey 
would move as soon as the work was over into another construction 
site. As has been previously indicated, mobile telephones play an 
important role in this process. In places like Wanggang, where the 
distinction between urban and rural is blurred, plenty of telephone 
numbers could be found in the form of graffi  ti, stickers, painted on 
walls along with all kinds of informal announcements. Some of these 
telephone numbers off ered services in building construction. Th is 
included well-digging, concrete works, mosaic works, plumbing, 
roofi ng, digging and foundation works. Th us, when the owner 
of a lot needs to build a house, he or she could easily manage the 
whole construction by telephoning these nomadic worker units. Th e 
process itself could be “managed” not at once but rather in a step-by-
step process depending on the availability of money and needs. 
Wanggang Village is made up of a cluster of peasant people who 
according to the new land reform could stay on their “own” land. 
Th eir territory is divided into fi ve main areas. Th e fi rst is an area 
where the investor runs their factories. Buildings in these factories 
are built and owned by the community of Wanggang. Th e investors 
merely rent the buildings for the agreed period of time but this can 
be prolonged indefi nitely as is usually the case. Th e second part 
Th e cluster of Wanggang 
Village and its surrounding 
land uses. Th e picture is 
only a diagram of the area,  
the scale is approximately. 
Th e diagram is made by the 
author. 
  CHAPTER 3 - 172
Th e cluster of Wanggang 
Village: the house, the 
development, the “clearing”  
(vacant lot in the middle of 
the village compound), and 
a door house and the xiang, 
common space that used as 
alley to  adjacent houses. (All 
photographs are author’s)
173 
is farmland. Th e Wanggangs were farmers and some of them still 
continue their profession today. Crops, rice and fi sh are the main 
products of this agricultural sector. But since the area has already 
been engulfed by industrialization, there is no longer any massive 
production of agricultural products. Th e third is the business area 
consisting of shops and a marketplace, located along the main road. 
Th e fourth is the living settlement and the fi nal area is the old village 
of Wanggang.  
Th e whole settlement is composed of a gridiron of houses. Th e 
lots, ranging in size from about 60 to 80 square meters, are mostly 
rectangular. Each lot contains houses of three, four or more stories 
– sometimes referred to as the “villa” model. Houses along the main 
street, or Lu, have the option of using the ground fl oor for economic 
purposes such as sewing services, beauty salons, garages, electronic 
repairs, billiards and gaming, cell phone shops, et cetera. Th e fi rst 
fl oor and above are used for housing. Many of the owners build houses 
with more space than their family needs, renting the remainder of 
the space to migrants working in the factories, especially married 
workers. Wanggang cluster has two perpendicular Lu (main streets), 
and perpendicular to these Lus are four or fi ve xiang (alleys). Th ese 
xiang are more like a space in between the houses, no more than 3 
meters wide at the ground level and narrower at the fi rst fl oor level 
since many of these houses extend the fi rst fl oor beyond the width 
of the ground fl oor. But xiang indeed function as streets because the 
space in between houses that is not xiang is used for the drainage 
and sewage system. In this small alley space, people conduct outside 
activities like chatting with neighbors, nursing babies and feeding 
children, repairing bikes or motorbikes, washing clothes, playing et 
cetera. It is an exterior living space, an outer lebensraum. In a hot and 
humid climate, a shaded space produced by these rows of adjacent 
houses becomes the perfect place for many daytime activities. In this 
climate, exterior space is organized in accordance with its importance, 
equal to that of interior space.  Some lots inside the cluster remain 
empty, meaning the owner has not yet built upon the lots. Th ese 
“openings” create contrast scenery in the midst of the densely built 
houses, but are mainly left unused.
  CHAPTER 3 - 174
Although all of the buildings here are relatively new (mostly less 
than 10 years old) and the structure of this settlement looks like 
a modern intervention, they are nonetheless presumably rooted 
in the traditional Chinese style of village cluster. Architecturally 
speaking, Wanggang houses are neither modern nor traditional 
although many refer to them as villas implying the new infl uences 
in Chinese architecture. Th ere are a few “modern” buildings, the 
product of development brought by socialist ideology. Th e latter are 
a full copy of Western products – via the Soviet Union – rather than 
an adaptation of local architecture. Th ey are bulky, freestanding 
buildings, without any notion of ornament and any embellishment, 
and purely “utilitarian”. Th ese qualities are in direct opposition to 
the local architecture found in monuments, temples and vernacular 
architectures. Th e traditional structures are normally in the form of 
spatial composition between interior-exterior, full of ornaments and 
wooden tectonic vocabularies, as well as embody various symbolic 
systems. Th e modern uses of brick and concrete and fl at roofs diff ers 
with the old tradition which employs timber structure derived from 
the tou-kung of the Chinese branching system and is crowned with 
a bent-roof shape. Villa houses however may employ both features 
often exhibiting both eclecticism and individual preference. Th e 
bulky, single standing structure of the new building is indeed a 
direct opposition to the spatial arrangement of a traditional Chinese 
dwelling which is characterized by the presence of a tiangjin, 
meaning courtyard or “sky well” in various degrees of opening and 
shape. Th e villa however retains the spatial arrangement of the whole 
although individually it is a freestanding structure. Hence the whole 
arrangement is not unfamiliar to Chinese society. 
Ancient Chinese settlements were always developed within layers of 
walls providing security and privacy as the enclosure and separation 
are the basic elements of Chinese spatial organization. Here, the 
separation is conducted not by function but rather by hierarchy of 
the symbolic meaning and sacredness. Th e function itself is fl uidly 
organized. Th is fl uidity of function is necessary to keep the whole 
spatial confi guration in balance with a strict hierarchical regulation. 
Knapp asserted that this method is in direct opposition to the 
175 
modern Western way of organizing space such as the divisions of 
spatial use or the division of private and public usage of space. His 
notice is worth quoting:
‘[in Chinese houses] most space is undiff erentiated in function, 
multipurpose in its use, responding to practical and fl uctuating 
considerations of daily life. Even when the space’s function is designated 
by name, such as reception hall or bedroom, it is often altered simply by 
changing, even temporarily, the furniture. Th is fl uidity of room use is a 
counterbalance to the hierarchical ordering of overall space.’63
Th e villa however shows both degrees of arrangement. New elements 
of spatial division based on function are present but at the same time 
the use of xiang is more along the traditional lines of undiff erentiated 
use of space. Th e whole settlement and the intimate use of xiang
produces a specifi c kind of “place”. Here, presumably, the people 
have consecrated what Augé calls “anthropological place” using not 
only new forms and modern tradition but also recycling the old one. 
Tradition is reinvented in new places. Symbols and ephemeral edifi ces 
are used to strengthen the presence of territorial notion. Tao’s three 
deities or Cai Sheng Ye, a “money guardian deity”, or other house 
and village shrines are reintroduced to protect both the inhabitants 
and to secure happiness and prosperity. Th ey recall old notions of 
territory that are implanted in this new space, creating homes and 
localities amidst the ever-changing world and global processes. 
Put simply, despite the global process of insularization that segregates 
people, a “line of fl ight” emerges in its center. Th e vernacular 
modernization of Wanggang is one of them. Hence, there are two 
major forces that form the Pearl River Delta’s urban landscape. Th e 
fi rst is the fl exibility of global capitalist entrepreneurs combined 
with authority that shapes insular places whether they are the “real 
places” of mobile and mobilization, factory space or the “imagined 
place” of Nansha community. Th e other major force is the informal 
and incremental development involving incomplete features of 
modernization and its creative adaptation carried out by ordinary 
people. It has been demonstrated that both forces have their 
own (often opposing) trajectories, and thus may collide, thereby 
producing both spatial and social problems. 
  CHAPTER 3 - 176
Castells postulated the notion of a resistance identity that may be 
developed in the context of the rise of a network society in the course 
of globalization. In the Power of Identity, he distinguished three forms 
and origins of identity. Legitimizing identity is introduced by the 
dominant institution of society, to extend and to rationalize their 
domination. Resistance identity is generated by actors or subjects 
who are devalued and stigmatized by the logic of domination. As a 
result, trenches of resistance and survival apparatuses emerge on the 
basis of principles that diff er from those of the dominators. Th e last 
form is project identity, which builds a new identity that redefi nes 
the position of the dominated and seeks the transformation of the 
overall structure of society. In network society, Castells maintained 
that legitimizing identity, which leads to or produces civil society, is in 
the process of disintegration. Only communal resistance can produce 
project identity as the main potential source of social change and 
thus resist the dominant interest enacted by global fl ows of capital, 
power and information. However, not all resistance may result in 
project identity. Th e other trajectory is to transform resistance into 
“communal heaven in heavenly hell.”64  In this instance, sub-alternate 
subjects who dwell in dormitories and people who live outside the 
enclave may congregate in an imagined community whose purpose 
is to resist the “authoritative” subjects. Th us, here, identity hinges 
not on the notion of the Chinese against the Other (the West for 
instance) but rather on the degree of internal suppression that stems 
from exacerbated development and modernization. Questions of 
defi ning who is Chinese, or what constitutes Chinese-ness are now 
entirely subjugated to the issue of modernization and its attendant 
products, social class and separation.  Paradoxically, the socialist 
modernization project itself must be critically examined. 
Architecture, urban design and planning are used to cement this 
production of diff erentiation and domination, some of which is 
by deliberate intention of the designer, planner and/or authority. 
In this case, it can be argued that architecture and urban planning 
need to develop new vocabularies that can create a “line of fl ight” 
out of this situation. In certain specifi c cases, however, vernacular 
modernization exemplifi ed in the unique form of architecture in the 
177 
Pearl River Delta may presumably be a fruitful site of project identity 
leading to the creation of new Chinese subjects. Th is architecture 
functions to resist the dominance of state and capital and also 
project a new social identity interlocked between rural-urban and 
socialist-capitalists restructuring. It is the task for urban planners 
and designers to make provisions for this incremental development 
to continue its trajectory and at the same time redirect it toward a 
better living quality. 
Th is chapter suggests that re-integrating this vernacular modernization 
into the larger framework of the Pearl River Delta planning is the 
key factor for the sustainable development of this region both 
environmentally and socially. Some pilot projects which include this 
vernacular modernization to create improved quality clusters of villas 
may prove to be a more eff ective method than that of creating new 
“key projects” frequently used by planning bureaus in this region. 
Injecting this form of development in spatial–planned–enclave 
both with industrial sites and communities may strengthen the 
link between social groups and at the same time form an integrated 
spatial composition. As this part attempts to demonstrate, insularity 
that grows in bare territories has many facets. It directly connects 
spatial arrangement to the shape of society.
Notes
1  Chung, Chuihua Judy, Jeff rey  Inaba, Rem Koolhaas, and Sze Tsung Leong. 
2001. Great Leap Forward. Köln and Cambridge (Mass.): Taschen and 
Harvard Design School, p. 704.
2  Ipsen, Detlev, Yongning Li, and Holger Weichler (eds.) 2006. Genesis of Urban 
Landscapes: Th e Pearl River Delta in South China. Faculty of Architecture Urban 
Planning and Landscape Planning Work Report 181, Kassel: Infosystem 
Planung Kassel University. 
3  See for instance David Harvey’s argument in his seminal book Th e Condition 
of Postmodernity Harvey, David. 1989. Th e Condition of Postmodernity: An 
Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change. Cambridge (Mass.) and Oxford: 
Blackwell. especially part II “Th e political-economic transformation of late 
twentieth-century capitalism.” Th e part argues the background and transition 
from several preceding points of view. From Halal (1986) Harvey took the 
transitional process namely from the “old capitalism” (industrial paradigm) to 
“the new capitalism” (post-industrial paradigm). From Lash and Urry (1987), 
he notes the contrast between “organized and disorganized capitalism.” Taking 
from Swyngedouw (1986), Harvey restates the contrast trajectory between 
the “Fordist production” to the “Just-in-time production” (p. 174-179).   
  CHAPTER 3 - 178
4  Th is position is based on a sociological point of view. Giddens for instance 
states that globalization is a consequence of modernity meaning “action-at-a-
distance.” Hence, globalization is nurtured by the processes of modernisation. 
See Giddens, Anthony. 1990. Th e Consequences of Modernity. Polity.
5  A formula proposed by Beijing to maintain the two distinct systems, 
socialism in mainland China and capitalism in Hong Kong, within one 
political sovereignty. A comprehensive overview on this formula can be seen 
in Rohlen, TP, 2000, ‘Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta: “One Country, 
Two Systems” in the Emerging Metropolitan Context’ A/PARC’s paper 
available at http://aparc.stanford.edu. 
6  See Soja, Edward W. 2000. “Inside Exopolis: Scenes from Orange County” 
pp. 94-122 in Variations on a Th eme Park, edited by Michel Sorkin. New 
York: Hill and Wang.
7  Voula Mega, 1999  “Th e Participatory City Innovations in Th e European 
Union” MOST (Management of Social Transformations) Discussion Paper No. 
32 February 23, Volume 2, Number 11.
8  Martinotti, G. 1993. Metropoli: la nuova morfologia sociale. Bologna: Il 
Mulino. in Mega, Voula. 1999. “Th e Participatory City Innovations In Th e 
European Union.” MOST (Management of Social Transformations ) Discussion 
Paper Volume 2.
9  Th e Chinese scholars proposed the concept ‘fi rst and second modernization’ 
to divide the ‘course of modernization’ into industrial economy for the fi rst 
and intellectual economy for the second. Th e concept was proposed in the 
1990s and claimed that the fi rst modernization of China began in the 18th
century, as for instance in the www.china.org.cn/english/2004/Feb/86321.
htm “China Still at ‘First Modernization’ Period: Report.” Th is chapter 
however uses the more scientifi c claim backed by the study of Liu, Yuyang. 
2001. “Chronology: One Hundred Years Without Change.” Pp. 30-43 in 
Great Leap Forward, edited by Chuihua Judy Chung, Jeff rey  Inaba, Rem 
Koolhaas and Sze Tsung Leong. Köln, Cambridge, Mass.: Taschen, Harvard 
Design School. and Spence, Jonathan D. 1999. Th e Search for Modern China. 
New York: Norton & Co.
10  Spence, Jonathan D. 1999. Th e Search for Modern China. New York: Norton 
& Co.
11  Th e other two are Shantow and Xiamen, which share a tiny strait with 
Taiwan. 
12  Castells, Manuel. 1996. Th e Rise of the Network Society. Oxford and Malden, 
Mass: Blackwell, —. 1997. Th e Power of Identity. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
13  Gutierrez, Laurrent , and Valérie Portefaix. 2000. Mapping Hong Kong. Hong 
Kong: mapoffi  ce.
14  Koolhaas wrote in the introduction of the City of Exacerbated Diff erence 
(COED)©: ‘Th e traditional city strives for a condition of balance, harmony, and 
a degree of homogeneity. Th e CITY OF EXACERBATED DIFFERENCE© 
on the contrary, is based on the greatest possible diff erence between its parts 
– complementary of competitive. In a climate of permanent strategic panic, 
what counts in the CITY OF EXACERBATED DIFFERENCE© is not 
the methodical creation of the ideal, but the opportunistic exploitation of 
fl ukes, accidents and imperfections. Although the model of the CITY OF 
EXACERBATED DIFFERENCE© appears brutal – to depend on the 
robustness and primitiveness of its parts – the paradox is that it is, in fact, 
delicate and sensitive. Th e slightest modifi cation of any detail requires the 
readjustment of the whole to reassert the equilibrium of complementary 
179 
extremes.’ Koolhaas in Chung, Chuihua Judy, Jeff rey  Inaba, Rem Koolhaas, 
and Sze Tsung Leong. 2001. Great Leap Forward. Köln and Cambridge 
(Mass.): Taschen and Harvard Design School.  p. 29. 
15  Craciun defi ned Zone as ‘Zone© Imposes limits, but not spatial content. 
A vague term, ZONE© is preferred by the Chinese Communist Party over 
“city” because it is conceptually blank. A ZONE© is open to the impurities 
of ideological manipulation. It purges historical contents from territories 
where they have been imposed and replaces them with the dynamic of 
global economy. A ZONE© remains programmatically unfulfi lled, an urban 
condition that never achieves focus or intensity.’ Craciun, Mihai. 2001. 
“Ideology, Shenzhen.” Pp. 44-155 in Great Leap Forward, edited by Chuihua 
Judy Chung, Jeff rey  Inaba, Rem Koolhaas and Sze Tsung Leong. Köln, 
Cambridge, Mass.: Taschen, Harvard Design School. p. 87.
16  Lin, Nancy. Ibid.”Architecture, Shenzhen.” Pp. 161-255, especially p. 181.
17  McGee, Terry G. 1989. “Urbanisasi or Kotadesasi? Evolving Patterns of 
Urbanization in Asia.” Pp. 93-108 in Urbanization in Asia, Spatial Dimensions 
and Policy Issues, edited by FJ. Costa, AK. Dutt, LJG. Ma and AG. Noble. 
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
18  Gandelsonas, Mario. 2002. Shanghai Refl ection: Architecture, Urbanism and 
the Search for an Alternative Modernity. New York: Princeton Architectural 
Press.
19  Shilling, Zhang. 2003. “Chinese City and Architecture in Transformation 
between Yesterday and Tomorrow (11-19).” in Luchao – Aus einem 
Tropfen geboren, Architecture for China von Gerkan, Marg und Partner, 
Austellungskatalog, edited by Museum für Kunst und Gewerbe Hamburg. 
Altenburg: DZA Verlag.
20  Pastuschka, Bernd. Ibid.”Th e Ideal City as Refl ected through the Ages.” Pp. 
28-39.
21  Shilling, Zhang. Ibid. “Chinese City and Architecture in Transformation 
between Yesterday and Tomorrow (11-19).”
22  Hanru, Hou. “Chang Yung Ho.”. Th e exhibition was curated by Hou Hanru 
and Evelyne Jouanno, April 22 to May 22, 1999. 
23  Both appear in Dovey, Kim. 1999. Framing Places: Mediating Power in Built 
Form. London; New York: Routledge.
24  Liangyong, Wu. 1986. A Brief History of Ancient Chinese City Planning. 
Kassel: Kasseler Schriften zur Geography und Planung. stated the Chinese 
saying regarding this separation “Th e poor at the east gate, the rich at the west 
gate, and the beggars live in the south” as well as the development of ‘cities-
within-cities’ pointed to the Manchu-cities, the non-Han ethnic in China. 
See page 123.  
25  Liangyong wrote “houses located closely side by side, like the teeth of a comb; 
lanes and entrances were straight and regular” Ibid. p.19.
26  Balfour identifi ed at least four prominent schools of thought that have 
infl uenced the shaping of Chinese society namely Confucianism, Daoism, 
Mohism, and Legalism. Confucianism is based on the concept of fi lial piety 
namely respect and obedience of the children towards their parents. With 
this order, the structure of the society will be maintained. Th e Ideal for 
Confucianism is the quality of jun zi (son of a prince) that is acquired not 
in a hereditary sense but from personal development to attain fi ve virtues: 
benevolence, virtue, good behaviour, wisdom and trustworthiness. Daoism is 
concerned much more with the private realms of becoming an element of the 
  CHAPTER 3 - 180
society (particularly as a person in governmental position) “like water” which 
fl ows everywhere, seemingly weak, but potentially strong and more pervasive 
then anything else. Mohist philosophy regards everyone, regardless of class, as 
having the ability and chance to be in a governmental position. Th ey believe 
that “All are equal in the sight of heaven”. Legalist thought on the contrary 
sees human beings as selfi sh by nature. It is the duty of the government 
to impose strict rules in order to maintain social order. Th ey believe that 
the ruler alone possesses power. Balfour indicates that Mao Zedong’s harsh 
politics was probably based on this belief. (Balfour, Alan, and Zheng Zhiling. 
2002. Shanghai. London: Wiley Academy. particularly page 12-3).
27  Balfour moreover stated that for the Chinese the city was “a rational instrument 
perfected not just to support the imperial court and administration but also 
to provide the context in which the full cultural character of the dynasty 
would be nurtured” Ibid. p.15).
28  Both appear in Kim Dovey, 1999, Framing Places, Mediating power in built 
form. London and New York: Routledge, p. 71. 
29  Zhu, J. 1994. “A Celestial Battlefi eld.” AA [Architectural Association] Files 28: 
48-60.. Zhu, J. 1994, ‘A Celestial Battlefi eld’ AA [Architectural Association] 
Files 28: 48-60. 
30  Kahn-Ackerman, M. 1980,  China: Behind the Outer Gate. London: 
Marcopolo as cited by Dovey, 1999 p. 72-77). 
31  Wu, H. 1991,  ‘Tiananmen Square’ Representations 35: 84-118 quoted in 
Dovey, 1999. 
32  A descriptive report of this phenomenon has been proposed by Yongning Li 
(dissertation material proposed to the Department of Architecture, Landscape 
and Urban Planning, University of Kassel, in progress).
33  Zhuhai’s planning bureau offi  cials for instance have even claimed that since 
the separation between urban and rural are clearly defi ned, there is thus 
no “sub-urban development” that should be taken into account, although 
physically such development exists (discussion with Planning Bureau Offi  cers 
at 29 September 2003). 
34  Craciun, Mihai. 2001. “Ideology, Shenzhen.” Pp. 44-155 in Great Leap 
Forward, edited by Chuihua Judy Chung, Jeff rey  Inaba, Rem Koolhaas and 
Sze Tsung Leong. Köln, Cambridge, Mass.: Taschen, Harvard Design School, 
p. 7.
35  Skinner, G.W., ed. 1977. Th e City in Late Imperial China. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press.
36  Based on personal interviews and surveys conducted by University Kassel’s 
students under the Pearl River Delta Excursion on 24 September – 15 
October 2003. 
37  Bjorklund, E.M. 1986. “Th e Danwei: Social-Spatial Characteristics of Work 
Units in China’s Urban Society.” Economic Geography 62.
38  Clark, Jonathan. 2002. “Th e Danwei as a Means of Political and Practical 
Collective Action in Modern Chinese Society.” in Neighborhood Association 
Research.
39  Lu, Xiabo, and Elizabeth Perry. 1997. Danwei: Th e Changing  Chinese 
Workplace in Historical and Comparative Perspective. London.: M.E. Sharpe. 
in Clark, Jonathan. 2002. “Th e Danwei as a Means of Political and Practical 
Collective Action in Modern Chinese Society.” in Neighborhood Association 
Research.
181 
40  Bjorklund, E.M. 1986. “Th e Danwei: Social-Spatial Characteristics of Work 
Units in China’s Urban Society.” Economic Geography 62.
41  Rofel, Lisa. 1997. “Rethinking Modernity: Space and Factory Discipline 
in China.” Pp. 155-178 in Culture, Power, Place: Explorations in Critical 
Anthropology, edited by and Gupta A. Ferguson J. Duke: Duke University 
Press.
42  Available at its offi  cial website www.chinalabourwatch.org.cn
43  Nike, among others is the main target for worldwide anti-sweatshop 
campaigns. Th e “No camera zone” is merely one aspect of contention. Th e 
concerns are described in detail in Cox, Sarah. 2000. “Behind the Swoosh, 
Facts about Nike.” Global Citizens for a Global Era November.
44  See elaboration of this criticism in Chapter 2 especially “Export Processing 
Zones” p. 72-78.
45  Group discussion with Dongguan Planning Academy, September 2003.
46  Group discussion with Dongguan Planning Academy, September 2003.
47  According to Shunzan Ye, Chinese cities are classifi ed according to their 
population. Th e categorization is as follows: (1) a small city has a population 
between 100.000 to 199.999 inhabitants, (2) a medium-size city has 
200,000 to 499,999, a large city from half a million to 1 million and (4) 
the metropolis has a population of over 1 million inhabitants. (Ye, Shunzan. 
1989. “Urban Development Trends in China.” Pp. 75-92 in Urbanization in 
Asia, Spatial Dimensions and Policy Issues, edited by Frank J. Costa, Ashok K. 
Dutt, Laurence J.C. Ma and Allen G. Noble. Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press., p.90). 
48  Such as Changpin-Humen expressway, Guangcheng-Changan highway, 
Guancheng-Zhangmutou Guangcheng-Shilong highway as well as Dongguan-
Shenzhen highway (www.tdctrade.com) 
49  Discussion with Senior Planner and Director of Planning Academy in 
Dongguan, September 2003. 
50  Hansen, Peter. 2001. “Long March, Bitter Fruit:  Th e Public Health Impact 
of Rural-to-Urban Migration in the People’s Republic of China.” Standford 
Journal of East Asian Aff air 1.
51  Chung, Chuihua Judy, Jeff rey  Inaba, Rem Koolhaas, and Sze Tsung Leong. 
2001. Great Leap Forward. Köln and Cambridge (Mass.): Taschen and 
Harvard Design School.
52  Translated freely from “Shenzhen hat sich in seiner phantastischen Entwicklung 
eine angenehme Umgebung erhalten und ist Vorbild für die Planung und 
Gestaltung schnell wachsender Städte in der Welt” in Peng, Wang. 2001. “Die 
Entwicklung der Stadt Shenzhen.” in Dialoge über den öff entlichen Raum in der 
Volksrepublik China und Deutschland, edited by Eduard Kögel: Stadtkulture 
International ev.
53  Hong Kong 2000, available at http://www.info.gov.hk/hk2000 (accessed on 
5 November 2004)
54  Miriam Lau Kin Yee in the inverview with Xinhua 26 January 2003 in www.
china.org.cn/english/China/54551.htm (accessed on 3 November 2003). 
55  Allen Lee, the outspoken Hong Kong delegate to China’s National People’s 
Congress addressed the Congress stating that “It’s not just about Article 23 
[…] Beijing’s leaders must look at the whole question of governance. Hong 
Kong people want democracy.” In April 2004, Beijing dismissed Hong Kong’s 
  CHAPTER 3 - 182
direct elections for its mayor. Reported in Time Asia http://www.time.com/
time/asia/covers/501030714/story.html (3 November 2003).
56  Mark L. Cliff ord, Bruce Einhorn, Frederik Balfour, Dexter Roberts, Miguella 
Lam “Behind the Revolt” BussineesWeek Online. 21 July 2003 http://www.
businessweek.com/magazine/content/03_29/b3842007_mz046.htm
accessed on 11 November 2003.
57  Pun, Ngai. 2000. “Locating Trans-border Subjects: Hong Kong Working 
People in Mainland China.” Pp. 61-72 available at www.lit.osaka-cu.ac.
jp/geo/pdf/frombelow/0308_frombelow_pun.pdf accessed on 10 January 
2007. 
58  A national debate on this issue occurred after an incident involving Sun 
Zhigang, a migrant worker in Guangzhou who died in police detainment. 
Sun’s case became a trigger for debate concerning the validity of the 
holding system and the as the legal basis of such detainment, internment 
and deportation by security authorities. Sun Zhigang (male, 27 years old) 
a graphic designer worked for the Dagi Garment Company in Guangzhou. 
On 17 March 2003 he left his room as usual spending time in an Internet 
bar. On the way he was held by local police since he was not able to show his 
temporary residence permit, the “ID”. Th ree days later he died at a clinic for 
holding vagrants and beggars.  Th e cause of death was reported as cerebral 
haemorrhage and heart attack. After fi ghting for truth his family discovered, 
with help from Zongshan University medical experts who conducted the 
autopsy that his death was caused by frail cell tissue, through injuries and 
traumatic shock. Th e media widely exposed this tragedy. Th e reaction from 
Central and Provincial Government however satisfi ed the local public. China 
Daily reported that in total 12 people were sentenced for the crime, ranging 
from three years in prison to the death penalty for six civil servants. Th e 
People Daily exposed this judicial decision in great detail (http://english.
peopledaily.co.cn/200306/27/eng/20030627_119007.htm “Court Reaches 
Final Decision on Sun Zhigang Case” accessed in 12 November 2003) and 
http://www1.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-06/10/content_168514.htm 
“Sun Zhigang’s brutal killer sentenced” accessed at 12 November 2003 as 
well as the report from Amnesty International “China: migrant worker dies 
in custody” Th e Wire July 2003 in http://web.amnesty.org/web/wire.nsf/
July2003/China accessed at 12 November 2003.
59  http://nansha.ust.hk (accessed on 4 November 2003).
60  http://www.nsitp.com/NITP/index.htm (accessed on 4 November 2003).
61  http://nansha.ust.hk (accessed on 4 November 2003).
62  http://www.bofi ll.com/website-ingles/proyectos/nansha.htm (accessed on 4 
November 2003).
63  Knapp, Ronald G. 1989. China’s Vernacular Architecture: House Form and 
Culture. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
64  Castells, Manuel. 1997. Th e Power of Identity. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell. 
Case 2
Jakarta
 CHAPTER 4 - 184
Jakarta‘s Culture of 
insularization
On the production of ephemeral spaces
4
In the fi lm titled Th e Year of Living Dangerously, Jakarta is presented 
in a spectral dimension. Th e fi lm tells a story about two intermingled 
worlds: a Western reporter and his native partner covering the 
political unrest of 1965 in Jakarta. Th e city itself is represented by 
alternating between the two extreme sites: back-alley slums and the 
business district. Th e slum scenes were actually shot in the Philippines 
and the cozy environment of Sydney, Australia. Within this fi lmic 
imagery, Jakarta appears in a spectral dimension, as a wild mosaic of 
those two extreme milieus. 
Unlike the Pearl River Delta, whose wild quality was formed by 
its sudden change, Jakarta was formed by a long, historical process 
of mixture. Located at an intercultural crossroads, this city has 
experienced abrupt spatial contractions that have shaped its urban 
culture. Th e territory of Jakarta exploded by means of kampung
and housing estates and infrastructure. But this city also imploded 
by means of “cities within a city” development. Its urban space 
has evolved to become an urban wilderness with such fusion that 
notions of authenticity, boundary, originality and singularity are 
Cover picture: 
Hervé Dangla’s Jakarta 
mosaic of pictures reveals 
many facets of Jakarta 
urban event and space. 
Through photographs, he  
has also showed Jakarta 
as an organized jungle, 
jungle organisée, where two 
extremes – the poor and 
the decent architectures 
and bodies – lie side 
by side. (Source: Hervé 
Dangla, Belantara Jakarta, 
1996, Jakarta: Pusat 
Kebudayaan Perancis di 
Jakarta - Centre Culturel 
de Jakarta - France 
Cultural Center in 
Jakarta).  
‘The presence of an alien culture inevitably leads to new 
questions being asked about their own cultural identity. 
The alien culture too views the neighboring culture as a 
whole, an entity, and the portrayal of deeper meanings 
begin to be discovered about the identity of both cultures. 
The ensuing dialogue between the two cultures does not 
result in a merger or mixture or blending of the two into 
one. Each culture retains its unity and uniqueness and 
both cultures get enriched. Each culture reinforces its own 
integral nature. Conversely such a process could work the 
other way and cause deep and intense antagonism within 
an urban setting.’ (Romi Khosla, 2002)1
185
losing their meaning. As in the fi lm, this city can only be seen in 
fragmented polarities: colonial-colonized, West-East, rich-poor, 
good-bad, beautiful-ugly, old-new, traditional-modern, et cetera; 
which provide a perfect yet simplifi ed representation of Jakarta. 
Urban politics is a contest to claim those polarities and hardly seeks 
to reconcile space between the two. Insularity then appears as a spatial 
tactic to exercise those claims. Here, insularity is a rule rather than 
an exception. Christopher Alexander was perhaps right as he saw 
that the most favorable kind of city is one with a “mosaic of culture” 
rather than being overly heterogeneous or entirely ghetto. Th e overly 
heterogeneous city leads to a bland city with unidentifi able places. 
Th e city of ghettos segregates urban space such that it would be 
impossible to improve societal relations within.2 In the context of 
Jakarta, the author would argue that what is now being developed is 
a mosaic of polarities, which is no less harmful than a heterogeneous 
city or a racial ghetto in Alexander sense. Here, the urban culture 
developed by the continuous spatial-societal segregation since 
European colonialism has produced a culture of exclusion. It points 
to the tendency of people to segregate themselves through spatial 
apparatuses to seek refuge from urban disorder and at the same time 
they create the “other” based merely on spatial or territorial related 
information.  
Jakarta metropolitan 
area as depicted by 
this infrared satellite 
camera. It expands 
rapidly along main trunk 
of transportation that 
links to its neighboring 
regencies, the leap frog 
of real estates and the 
mutation of rural village 
into urban kampung as 
well as new informal 
settlements of squatter 
kampung. 
Courtecy of JAXA.
 CHAPTER 4 - 186
Th is chapter intends to trace how this entrapment logic has been 
developed and how the people of Jakarta may cross beyond it. Th is 
fi rst subchapter attempts to argue that the wilderness created by those 
extremes is a result of a constant clashing between the privileged and 
the marginalized. Following Denys Lombard’s conclusive chapter 
stating that according to Javanese mentality – generally viewed as the 
dominant regime in Jakarta - to secure social stability is to maintain 
the reconciliation between the powerful and the marginalized.3
However, as this subchapter will show, in spite of reconciling the 
marginalized, the city of Jakarta is a site where continuous exclusion 
of the marginalized is enacted. Th e city plays merely as a mandala, 
or arena, where social hierarchy is concentrated and secured but not 
as a space for the nomads where social exchange is performed. In 
Jakarta, the nomads must consecrate their own territory in order to 
survive. 
Zooming in on the proposed claim of insularity, in the second and 
third subchapters two more forms of insularity are proposed. Th e 
fi rst is a dormant insularity. Th e kampung has long been regarded as 
the “origin” of the city as space for the nomads. Th eir formless yet 
latent existence is always within a race toward extinction, exclusion 
or mutation to other identities. Kampung is, in this regard, a process 
of space occupation, a living organism in a form of place rather than 
merely a form of place. Kampung hence needs to be understood and 
represented in a proper way in order to give it a chance at becoming 
“other.” It is dormant since this meaning is continuously interrupted. 
Th is entity hence needs to be understood and represented in 
appropriate way to give it “a form” visible for discussion. However, 
current urban developments, which take insular space as the dogma, 
squeezes many kampungs into tiny blocks of resistance that nurture 
unfortunately a radical community.
Th e second form is hollow insularity. Across the history of this city, 
in contrast to the formlessness of kampung, a well-planned spatial 
entity i.e. housing estates is seen as the “other.” People tend to see 
this kind of environment through a “screen of symbols” making this 
mechanistic form problematic. For instance Indonesian-Chinese 
people are always regarded as “foreigners” since they tend to 
187
cluster themselves in pecinan (Chinese quarters) whether forced by 
external power or voluntarily so. Consequently, their fi ne and well-
defi ned environment is read mechanistically as being anti kampung
formlessness. Identity and territory are juxtaposed by which 
cultural identity is suppressed. Modern development of pecinan
- exemplifi ed by gated communities and corporate cities – suff ers 
also similar reading. Th ey are also seen by the kampung community 
as the new pecinan although it is not really a pecinan community. 
Here, they exist “by consent” where sense of community is not really 
developed due to this mechanistic way of space production as well as 
the weak social relationship with their surrounding. Th e perimeter 
wall blockades the settlement entirely, creating deep fragmentation 
without.
Th e last subchapter attempts to report the struggle of reconciling 
space amidst the wilderness created by those fl oating insularities. It 
points to ephemeral spaces created by urban informalities that exist 
intermittently but grow from the very tradition. 
4.1 Jungle organisée: spatial 
explosions, social implosions and 
the persistence of segregation
‘…the division of the city into fragments of modern metropolis enjoyed 
by the well-to-do, and the vast maze of jerry-built kampung is clear to 
anyone. Judging from the urban and national policies pursued so far, there 
seems no prospect that the gap between those divergent sections of the 
city, or the gap between Jakarta and the rest of the country, is likely to be 
narrowed.’ (Abeyasekere, 1987: 263)
Th is subchapter elucidates historical contexts showing Jakarta as a 
site where continuing production of segregation comes about despite 
its very position within cultural crossroads. Jakarta’s history is a story 
of cultural exchanges where nearly all civilizations meet. Native 
Javanese and other Indonesian peoples, Indian, Chinese, Arabic 
as well as Western civilizations have intermingled in this city from 
its early development. In general, Jakarta experienced two types of 
spatial contractions that shaped its current urban space. 
 CHAPTER 4 - 188
Th e fi rst was an urban explosion. Reaching the cosmological limit 
of references to Javanese towns and the European concept of an 
ideal city, pre-colonial and colonial contraction was initiated by 
the spread of indigenous kampung and Dutch mansions and estates 
called landhuis. Consecutively, the tremendous pace of infrastructure 
development drove post-independence Jakarta resulting in 
leapfrogging developments of new settlements. Th is extensive 
development expanded the Jakarta area engulfi ng the neighboring 
towns into the single urban exopolis known as Jabodetabek (Jakarta, 
Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi). Th e second was an urban 
implosion. Beginning with the property boom in the early 1990s, 
Jakarta’s social space has shrunken because of mushrooming mega 
structures, super-blocks and enclave developments under the “cities 
within a city” concept. New large-scale malls, apartments, offi  ces, 
mixed-use facilities, and walled or gated settlements have proliferated 
and are connected by toll-roads. Th e combination of these enclaves 
with high-speed but limited transportation routes has immensely 
reduced social interaction with the rest of the city. 
Th ese ways of expansion and implosion create a dual system of 
spatial organization comprising the “center of development” as 
exemplifi ed by a Dutch mansion; modern real estate or super block 
on one side and the marginalized kampung on the other.4 It infl icts 
somehow a perpetual opposition between those with privilege and 
those who must struggle to survive in the city. Urban space is the 
site of contention between the two by which the image of Jakarta as 
an urban wilderness evolves. Jakarta is a site where unsettled cultural 
mixture and segregated society are being fabricated.
Exploded cosmological orders
Th e pre-colonial history of Jakarta fi rst surfaced in the geopolitical 
map of the 15th century when it was known as Sunda Kelapa and was 
part of the Hindu kingdom ruled by Pajajaran. After a long history of 
contact with India and China, the fi rst encounter with the West was 
from Portuguese expeditions in early 1500s.5 To them, Sunda Kelapa 
was only known by the work of Tomé Pires called Suma Oriental that 
reported the presence and importance of this small portal town as a 
189
stepping stone to the spices in the Maluku Islands (Moluccas). On 
22 August 1522 Pajajaran gave the Portuguese permission to build 
a fort in the harbor. After becoming stronger, the Portuguese posed 
a threat to the local Javanese kingdoms. One of them, an Islamic 
kingdom in Demak on the north coast of Central Java, sent an army 
to expel the Portuguese. Under the lead of Fatahillah, on 22 June 
1527, Sunda Kelapa was captured and the town was then renamed 
as Jayakarta. It lasted for about one hundred years as a Javanese town 
before ending with abrupt destruction. 
On 28 May 1619, Jan Pieter zoon Coen, the Governor-General of 
the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC or Dutch East India 
Company) of the Netherlands, burned down the original town 
of Jayakarta and began to build Batavia. Mr. Coen’s dream was to 
transform Batavia into the headquarters of a new Asian empire, 
spanning from South Africa to the Moluccas under the rule of the 
Netherlands. 
Simon Stevin, a prominent 17th-century mathematician and scientist, 
was commissioned to design a comprehensive plan for Batavia. He 
was an outstanding engineer experienced with fl oods, canals and 
drainage - an ability that was well-suited Batavia’s fl ood-prone and 
watery environment. He developed his design based on the concept 
of the ideal city. Th e city was shaped as a rectangular walled city 
spanning in a north-south direction. Enclosed by an outer fortress, 
Batavia consisted of Fort Jacatra, Dutch settlements, business and 
political offi  ces as well as warehouses. Th e whole inner town itself 
was ordered into a gridiron pattern of streets and canalization. Th e 
area outside the wall was empty swamp land. 
In the early 1700s, the area outside the wall became secure terrain. 
Th is vacant land attracted both the native and the Dutch to occupy 
the land. Th e native transformed it into kampungs. Th e Dutch built 
grand mansions called landhuis. At this point, Batavia entered a 
rapid spatial expansion. In the 1740s Batavia had already expanded 
in star-like form with some smaller military posts in the outermost 
area. Since then, the gravity of its development moved outside the 
wall. Moreover, on January 1, 1800 the VOC was offi  cially dissolved 
 CHAPTER 4 - 190
and handed over to the Dutch government. Th e situation struck 
inner Batavia and it began to deteriorate. Soon after, the Dutch 
realized that the wall had become unnecessary. Its original purpose 
to isolate the city from the wild outside was already insignifi cant 
since the outside was already fully occupied with kampungs and 
other Dutch settlements. Its function was then to separate between 
races, to protect the European dignity so that they felt at home in 
the midst of their town. Entering the twentieth century, Batavia 
experienced rapid growth both with its population and its physical 
development. Th e Netherlands designed a new administration 
and European residence further south in Weltevreden and around 
Koningsplein. Th e Chinese gathered in Glodog on the west side of 
town while depreciated kampungs multiplied around and in-between 
those centers. By the 1930s Batavia’s population exploded to nearly 
half a million in the core city (the remains of walled Batavia area and 
Weltevreden) and another half million on its fringes. Th e whole city 
itself evolved along the development of kampungs where majority of 
natives lived. On 17 August 1945, the name of Batavia was changed 
to Jakarta, as the Independence Proclamation for the new state of 
Indonesia took place. 
Th e above rather lengthy pre-colonial and colonial history of Jakarta 
invites two critical but intertwined accounts namely architectural/
spatial and social interpretation.  
Architecturally speaking, based on de Haan’s illustration, Jayakarta 
was re-built as a Javanese urban structure consisting of a central 
square (alun-alun), a mosque at the western side and a palace (kraton)
in the southern part of the square.6 Th e town is ordered, although 
it lacks strict geometrical order, through an hierarchy of sacredness. 
Th ose elements are the core and the dwellings of the aristocrats and 
religious leaders encircling them. On the peripheries were housing 
for craftsmen and those who worked or had close relationships 
with them. Traders and foreigners lived outside together with the 
peasants and the poor. Th ose who live closer to the centre are the 
more powerful and prestigious – although not necessarily richer; 
and as one moved further from the center, the infl uence of this 
concentration of the sacred gradually weakened.7
Reconstruction of Jayakarta 
based on De Haan 
illustration (in Abeyasekere, 
1987). 
191
Lombard saw that the spatial and social confi guration of such a town 
was infl uenced by the Indianization process. In a concentric city, as 
Lombard called it, the heart of the city is the palace. Th e city itself is 
merely the envelope.8 Th e arrangement is also duplicated at a lower 
level, namely in aristocrat’s houses (called dalems). At this level, the 
core is the house encircled by peasants. Th is system, called magersari, 
creates a subtle relationship between the two that is characterized 
by a complex and delicate trade off  between loyalty and protection. 
Th e whole Javanese city is actually composed by the core structure of 
the city (walled palace, square and mosque) and dozens of dalems - 
“walled communities” and garden and kampungs that fi ll in between. 
Th erefore this composition looks more like an agglomeration of a 
village than a city in the Western sense. 
Although there is seemingly no strict spatial order, the entire city 
is coherently orchestrated by a cosmological sphere centered in the 
palace. Th e center and the city are linked in a delicate relationship to 
form a balance of the whole. Socially speaking, social segregation is 
enacted through continuous negotiation between the appropriation 
of the sacredness, the sublime in the center on one side and the 
entire wilderness of city as the marginal on the other. Th e wall is 
used to hide the power in order to keep the relation between the 
ultimate sacredness of the center and its periphery alive and not 
solely to segregate people. Although this intangible system is no 
less authoritative in segregating society, for the Javanese, walls 
are less important than this cosmological relation. It is somehow 
totalitarian in segregating society but with a high degree of porosity 
and fl exibility. 
As a European city, Batavia has a rather diff erent interpretation. 
A picture from 1754 shows a busy sea as the foreground of this 
town and an idle hilly landscape guarded with military posts in the 
background. Perhaps rather exaggerated, it represents a sense of order 
as the essential concept of an ideal city and exposes the beauty of this 
new town – the Europeans later honored Batavia as “Th e Queen 
of the East.” For military reasons, walls isolated the town entirely 
from the land and made Batavia only accessible by sea. Socially, for 
Ideal city of Batavia is  
designed by Belgian Simon 
Stevin. The regularized 
plan shows a perfect 
geometry  of Batavia 
expressing its primary 
purpose as the military 
frontier of the colony. 
Source: Archipelago, 1996, 
Indonesian Heritage. 
Singapore: Archipelago 
Press.
 CHAPTER 4 - 192
political reasons, the Dutch enacted various legal measurements, such 
as diff erent laws to diff erent race, to ensure European domination 
over the Chinese and Arabs as well as natives.9
Th is ideal city concept of Batavia and the politics of segregation 
involved in the town marked the domination of the Mannerist attitude 
rather than what Helen Rosenau called the “high Renaissance” ideal 
city concept. Unlike its predecessor, which based the concept of ideal 
on a socially oriented pursuit of the urban environment rather than 
merely perfect form, the Mannerist phase took a diff erent attitude. 
For the latter, the aim of the ideal was not to provide a town for 
all classes but rather a homogeneous one. Th e Dutch in Batavia 
defi ned the ideal city with reference to merely military purposes and 
developed a “circumscribed and formalized” type of architecture in 
which the fortifi ed township was dominated by a perfect geometric 
pattern.10 Furthermore, socially speaking, not only did they have 
diff erent laws and rules,11 Batavia was an exemplar of a colonial town 
where its space was fragmented along racial segregation. Broadly 
speaking, virtually all colonial towns and cities have one thing in 
common - they are divided into two spheres: the foreign (colonizer) 
and the indigenous (colonized). But in the context of Batavia, a 
considerable “foreign oriental” constituent - meaning the Chinese 
– emerged as one element making it a tripartite town.12
Jayakarta’s holy city and Batavia’s ideal city are arguably the fi rst 
characterization of Jakarta’s space as a manifestation of what Tuan 
referred to as a space of transcendence, produced by a cosmic 
diagram and based on ethnocentrism.13 In the language of Norberg-
Schulz it would be “cosmic architecture” which is understood as 
a logical system and seems to be both “rational” and “abstract” in 
the sense of transcending the individual concrete situation.14 Th is 
attitude caused supremacy of the city (the center) over rural life 
(the marginal). Th e city was the place for citizens while serfs and 
villains lived in the countryside. Further development of indigenous 
kampung settlements and Dutch mansions has collapsed those 
cosmological boundaries forming a more open environment but 
nonetheless created more intangible social orders. 
193
In the Javanese sense, Jayakarta had a sacred center where the degree 
of sacredness decreased the further out one moved. At this level, 
“geometry” was based on abstract Javanese geomancy or “social 
geometry” rather than the geometry understood now. Th e wall was 
used to hide the sacred from society and its relation to its surroundings 
was maintained through rituals. Batavia was also a result of societal 
perfection where the distinction between people was physically 
delineated. Th e city was the realm of civilized Europeans and the 
countryside that of the uncivilized natives. Th e cosmic diagram and 
the wall functioned simultaneously but diff erent in meaning and 
porosity. Th is unseen order is the fi rst “machine” that segregates 
people and fosters the current fragmented space of Jakarta. Social 
geometry is manifested spatially in the kampung. Th e “image of 
beauty” of the strict geometrical-abstract order of the mannerist ideal 
city nurtures the mechanistic attitude of the post-colonial regimes. 
Exploded infrastructure: exurbia of estate and kampung
Since the Independence Proclamation on 17 August 1945, the 
post-colonial past of Jakarta is a history of what is generally known 
as “development.” However, the fi rst two presidents of Indonesia, 
acknowledged as the founding fathers of this new nation, had 
two contradictory attitudes in interpreting the term, which were 
represented well in Jakarta.
During Sukarno’s presidential term (1945-1966), Jakarta developed 
as a modern city that stressed the importance of a national identity 
in an international circle. Politically speaking, Sukarno initiated 
the Asia Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955 marking the 
political struggle for identity of the ex-colony countries and Non-
Aligned Movement. In urban space, Sukarno razed all temporary 
structures in Koningsplein then renamed the square as Lapangan 
Merdeka (Independence Square). He built a tower – Monument 
Nasional (Monas) - a structure “like the Eiff el tower in Paris.” He 
was actively involved in the city planning and aimed to create an 
axis of development free from colonial remnants. In 1960s he 
commissioned the building of a modern shaped mosque, the largest 
in South East Asia at the time, dwarfi ng the Gothic cathedral on 
Above: Koningsplein 
which then razed for the 
site of Monas (below). 
This linggam-yoni-shaped 
articulates the symbol of 
dominance over Dutch-
built buildings surrounding 
(Weltevreden). 
Source: Batavia/Djakarta/
Jakarta, van Diessen et al. 
1997 (above) and Indonesia 
from the Air, PT Humpuss 
and Times Edition, 1996 
 CHAPTER 4 - 194
Pre-colonial Jayakarta and colonial city of 
Batavia are compared to post-colonial Jakarta: 
spatial explosion. The first explosion was 
resulted from massive expansion of the city 
marked by road and housing due to massive 
increase of its inhabitant. The second occured 
in the form of incorporating neighboring 
regions. Real estates and toll roads become the 
major elements of this expansion. (Maps are 
arranged in approximate similar scale. Maps 
of Jayakarta to Jakarta 1970s are taken from 
Abesayekere, 1985, the last, drawn by the 
author based on Holtorf 2001 map).
195
the other side of the square. Considering the “Dutch axis” of Old 
Batavia – Molenvliet - Weltevreden to Misteer Cornelis in the 
southeast, Sukarno directed Jakarta to another axis, namely to the 
southwest. Th e axis spanned from Lapangan Merdeka, to the newly 
constructed Hotel Indonesia (HI), to a roundabout occupied by the 
Welcome Monument (Bundaran HI –Selamat Datang Monument), 
onto a clove highway interchange in Semanggi and fi nally ended at 
the entrance of the Kebayoran Baru new settlement.15 Along with 
the extravagant development of these monuments, some kampungs 
were evicted; the rest were simply left in their deprived condition. 
Unlike Sukarno, who had outward looking politics, the following 
president, Suharto (1966-1998) re-oriented the development of 
Jakarta as a national symbol. As a native Javanese, his background 
caused him to be more traditional – and Javanese in particular. His 
wife developed a small theme park called Miniature Park of Beautiful 
Indonesia (Taman Mini Indonesia Indah). Th is theme park consists of 
the traditional architectures from Indonesia’s 27 provinces, religious 
buildings of the fi ve offi  cial religions and some museums. Although 
rejected by university students who saw the project as too expensive, 
the project went on and was completed in 1980. Taman Mini was 
propagated as a manifestation of the Indonesian slogan of “unity 
in diversity.” Another project was executed nearby commemorating 
his 30 year presidency. In 1993 Suharto formalized a Purna Bhakti 
Pertiwi Monument, commonly known as the Suharto Museum. It 
has an impressive complex of conical towers resembling tumpeng
(cone-shape Javanese ceremonial dish) covering about 25,095 square 
meters within a 19.7 hectare landscape. Such shape for the Javanese 
symbolizes thanks-giving, salvation and immortality. Based on the 
style of Javanese mosques, Suharto designed a mosque layout, which 
was then implemented as the offi  cial pattern for building mosques 
throughout Indonesia. 
Both Sukarno and Suharto’s urban architecture tends to be an 
ideological propaganda. On one side, Sukarno’s dream was to 
create a city comparable to other metropolitan cities. On the 
other, Suharto wanted Jakarta to be a representation of Indonesia’s 
diversity. Sukarno’s source of formal preference was mixed. On one 
 CHAPTER 4 - 196
hand he assertively rejected the notion of the native and favored the 
modern form and aesthetics. But on the other hand, he also rejected 
ideas that re-enacted the “colonial articulations” as a representation 
of neo colonialism. Sukarno’s Monas was a lingga-yoni structure of 
Hinduism’s sacred monument. Th is insertion symbolized a struggle 
for the identity of a new nation within an old colonial site. Th e 
monument itself used modern form but deeply excavated the very 
nature of tradition. Monas in this regard was a symbol of that 
“freedom and identity.” Its presence was able to dominate the very 
center of the Dutch central power of Weltevreden. Its re-rooting 
back to the lingga-yoni structure re-actualized the very identity of 
native architecture. 
Dual-systems of 
expansion: jumbled 
kampung and well-
ordered housing estate. 
The former is considered 
as the “background” of 
the latter to which is 
considered as the center 
of development of 
Jakarta. In wider sense 
this dual-system refers 
also to the creation of 
sophisticated “bridge 
and tunnel”  of toll roads 
linking those centers, 
and the dual-existence 
of urban informalities 
along the well-established 
business.  
197
Suharto outlined a path showing how Indonesians must interpret 
their cultural diversity. Taman Mini became a site for “education” 
in teaching people of this interpretation. However, this message of 
unity and diversity excluded Chinese representation amongst the 27 
traditional buildings and Confucianism and many other religions 
from the 5 offi  cial religions. Th e partition between cultures and 
ethnicity based on the provincial entity, rather than the coherence of 
ethnicity itself, establishes and materializes fabricated yet fragmented 
cultures. Th is partition does not heed the fact that many provinces 
actually have similar culture. In the current era when new provinces 
are founded and dismantled, this provincial “representation of 
cultures” is problematic too. Th e act has not only ended in separation 
and fabrication of “native cultures” within, but has also cemented 
the separation of the Chinese who, of course, have no province. 
However, identity is merely part of the propaganda. What really 
triggered further explosion is the infrastructure development during 
Suharto’s era along with the development of new estates and, in the 
case of Jakarta, kampung. Especially during the oil boom of 1980s, 
streets and cars “eliminated” the signifi cance of being in the city or in 
the countryside as the city of Jakarta expanded into its neighboring 
regencies forming an agglomeration of Jakarta-Bogor-Depok-
Tangerang-Bekasi (Jabodetabek). New toll roads and streets connect 
those regencies to Jakarta. In between these cities, the landscape 
was drastically changed from paddy fi elds to new housing estates. 
In south-eastern Jakarta for instance, some small real estate projects 
appear haphazardly. Based on Holtorf ’s map, the author’s survey 
found that these small estates are disconnected from each other as 
well as from kampung surroundings, creating isolated islands.
Th is rush development of real estate marked the Suharto era. Th e 
business steadily grew since the 1980s, boosted in fi rst half of the 
1990s and reached its peak from 1995-1997, although it declined 
after the 1998 crisis. Th e holding of suburban Jakarta and housing 
location permits was said to be generally monopolized by a small 
number of developers including Metropolitan (Ciputra Salim 
Lippo Group), Bumi Serpong Damai (Ciputra, Salim and Sinar 
Mas), Pembangunan Jaya (Ciputra), Lippo (James Riady). Known 
 CHAPTER 4 - 198
199
Real estates and tollroads 
are a mutualistic symbiose   
to produce extensive 
development of Jakarta’s 
urban space. Infrastructure 
is here meant not only 
to connect between parts 
but also to “disconnect” 
them from the wholeness, 
to create an illusion of 
modern city.
Pictures are taken 
from various housing 
advertisement in national 
newspapers to show how 
the logic is practiced.  
 CHAPTER 4 - 200
collectively as the Big Ten, together they possessed 41,243 hectares 
in land holdings that equaled 67% of the total housing permits. 
Th e monopoly was possible due to close connections, nepotism, 
between the conglomerates (who were mostly Chinese), and 
Suharto’s nepotism policy.16 Th is connection created a somewhat 
“modern pecinan” namely exclusive real estates having low social 
integration with the surrounding environment, although not a gated 
community. 
Considered the fi rst major such estate, Kelapa Gading was relatively 
new. In 1970s the land was still swampy, a deserted land due to 
continual fl ooding. In the 1980s it started to become a prosperous 
district as the land was entirely privatized by certain developers 
(especially to PT Summarecon Agung Tbk as the major developer). 
Th e settlement was rapidly built and marketed especially to the 
Chinese. Offi  cially the district is now occupied by around 100,000 
people and almost 65 percent of them are ethnic Chinese, a very 
high concentration considering the national percentage is not more 
than 10%.17 Th e rapid pulse of Jakarta transformed this swampy 
land into a prosperous area subject to social jealousy by the deprived 
kampung surrounding.18
Th e infrastructure of the city infl icts further segmentation. A 
report on how the fl yovers work as a display of social segregation is 
presented by Danisworo et al in their contribution to the Rotterdam 
Biennale. Th ey showed that private cars increasingly dominate the 
fl yovers. Motorcycles, in ever increasing numbers, public buses, and 
other public urban-transportation, congest the streets below. Th is 
situation implies a rift between the haves and the have-nots in the 
street.19 In this aspect, the author saw that the fl yover becomes a 
medium for establishing the exclusiveness of real estates and private 
towns. Property and fl yovers are interdependent elements since the 
fl yover connects those exclusive real estates and creates a borderless 
network of elite enclaves with high-speed connections. However, 
they are disconnected from the messiness of the ground level below. 
In the suburbs of Jakarta, the function of fl yovers is to connect 
newly developed private cities and estates with Jakarta’s network of 
enclaves. Hence, for this “machine” there is no distinction between 
201
inside and outside the city. Flyovers and toll-roads, as Trevor Boddy 
has illustrated, work as the “underground and overhead” that 
segregate and produce unintentional but real stratifi cation within the 
social composition.20 Th is attitude was easily replicated. All cities in 
Indonesia tried to mimic Jakarta, an ideal type of city in Indonesian 
context, a symbol of pride and proof of a prosperous Indonesia. 
Now Jakarta is connected further with Depok, hence the name 
“Jabodetabek.” It spans nearly 60-kilometers north-south and 40 
kilometers east-west. Its population is now estimated to be around 
17 million, toppling Manila as the most densely populated city in 
South East Asia. Although expanding spatially, recent development 
shows the social space of this city is shrinking. 
Imploded social space: cities within a city 
Marked by the urban riots of 13 – 15 May 1998, Jakarta entered an 
era when social space is imploded into fragments of privatized and 
corporate spaces.21 Space in this era is context-less, a phenomenon of 
what Sorkin has called an “a geographical” city.22 New super-malls, 
super-blocks and gated communities mark the new trend of having 
less and less contact with their surroundings. Th e doctrine of property 
development is to produce superlatives: “the biggest, the tallest, the 
largest and the wealthiest” properties. Propagated by the corporate 
world, this credo transformed Jakarta into a jungle of privately built 
super-blocks and walled environments. Th ese lucrative projects 
were instigated with several goals in mind. Firstly they are part of 
marketing strategy to keep up in the race to be globally competitive. 
Secondly, as an impact of the May 1998 urban riot, these enclaves 
are also manifestations of the “right” to create detached space where 
desire for security is justifi ed and prestige, value, and lifestyle are 
accumulated. Th ey are a retreat from wild urban space.
Jakarta’s city core is transformed into an agglomeration of super 
blocks. Th e master plan of BNI City, designed by Zeidler Grinnell 
Partnership, covers more than 140,000 square meters of mixed-
use super-block development situated on a 14.9 hectare site. Th is 
super-block also includes a 46-storey offi  ce tower, presently the 
tallest structure in Indonesia. Th e tower, offi  cially called Kota BNI 
 CHAPTER 4 - 202
Superblock becomes an 
architectural strategy. 
Firstly it enhance the 
picture of becoming global 
city. Second, it “simplifies” 
the picture of urban scene. 
The bold mega-buildings 
and landscape “erase” 
the existence of jumbled, 
organic kampung, which 
is impossible to be drawn. 
(Source: from various 
newspaper and magazine 
advertisement). 
203
(meaning City of BNI) has a distinguished roof mast, with an exterior 
of granite and refl ective curtain walls that makes this offi  ce building 
the most distinguished landmark of the Jakarta skyline. Included in 
the master plan is a 716-room luxury hotel and future residential and 
commercial developments. Altoon and Porters designed the Ciputra 
Mall super-block, a new mixed-use project of about 286,000 square 
meters in size. Th e project includes a 296-room 5-star Peninsula 
Hotel, a 604-room 4-star Ciputra Hotel, and a retail center designed 
as a theme park amusement center. Th e super-block is located on a 4.5 
hectare site within the most prestigious area of the Golden Triangle 
District in central Jakarta. Another new prestigious complex, Taman 
Anggrek, is also a mixed-use center including retail, entertainment 
and amusement facilities and is designed as one of the largest in 
Southeast Asia of its type. For this complex, RTKL -   a well-known 
American architecture fi rm – designed a 140,000 square meter 
platform for retail shops and supports a 2,900 unit condominium 
complex in eight 36-story residential towers. Th e Four Seasons 
group has developed a fi ve-star hotel in a garden setting namely the 
Regent of Jakarta designed by Skidmore Owings & Merrill (SOM). 
Th is building is the latest Four Seasons-Regent International hotel 
in Asia, which is planned as an “island oasis” within the larger city. 
It claims to off er a full range of amenities and services. Another well 
known US architect and developer, John Portman, has designed the 
Sampoerna Tower Offi  ce, 130m or 36 fl oors high. Moreover, some 
postponed proposals (to name a few) include Kuningan Persada, 
designed also by Skidmore Owings & Merrill (SOM) to be 451.1 
meters high with 70 fl oors and the BDNI Center designed by Pei 
Partnership Architects with a planned spire reaching 317 meters 
and 62 fl oors. However, not only in the city core does this “city 
within a city” development grow. In suburban Jakarta the concept 
has been translated into the expansion of new corporate towns, most 
of them are gated and fenced. Peresthu reported such developments 
in Jabodetabek. Some of the most prominent are Bumi Serpong 
Damai covering 6,000 hectares, Tigaraksa New Town covering 
3,100 hectares, Lippo Village Karawaci covering 2,600 hectares, and 
Pantai Indah Kapuk with 800 hectares is mainly the result of land 
reclamation from Jakarta’s off  shore.23
 CHAPTER 4 - 204
Pattern of isolation. Real estates become the 
engine of haphazard development as well 
as fragmentation of urban space. It is easily 
found that between neighboring estate, there 
is no spatial connection, let alone an integrated 
spatial formation. The 1 - 14 cases are found 
in southeast part of Jakarta. Further, they 
are real estate in western Jakarta, including 
the Lippo Karawaci, the apex of insolated 
real estate. (Drawn by the author based on 
Holtorf ’s street map, 2001).
205
Flyovers become part 
of urban space politic. 
Indeed there are  
transportation problems 
in Jakarta such as severe 
traffic jam and heavy 
pollution. On one side 
the development of these 
flyovers temporarity 
resolves the problem. 
But soon, they invite 
also more private cars 
since there is no strategic 
policy towards bettering 
public transportation. 
Only in recent three 
years, the bus way system 
is implamented in some 
major transportation 
trunks. On the other, 
they also invite the 
development of urban 
squatters in the vacant 
lands created by the 
development. 
 CHAPTER 4 - 206
207
Some of major 
“cities within a city” 
developments. The 
data are obtained from 
advertisements in Kompas 
daily newspaper (period of 
January - August 2005). 
The names stated here 
are original meaning 
that most of these new 
developments prefer to 
use “global expression” of 
English instead of Bahasa 
Indonesia, to suggest their 
“connectedness” to the 
global world. 
 CHAPTER 4 - 208
209
J a b o d e t a b e k j u r
Administrative Area Large (sq.km) Inhabitant
Jakarta Province 661.52 8,356,489
Bogor City 118.50 743,086
Bogor Regency 2,388.93 3,489,096
Tangerang City 184.00 1,311,585
Tangerang Regency 1,110.38 2,775,325
Bekasi City 210.49 1,639,042
Bekasi Regency 1,065.35 1,642,875
Cianjur Regency 3,467.12 1,931,006
Total 9,206.29 21,888,504
Source: Laporan Akhir Tahun 2005 Metropolitan - 
Metropolitan Report End of the Year 2005  (Kompas 19 Dec. 
2005)
 CHAPTER 4 - 210
Th e spatial implosion is also exacerbated by the decentralization 
policy that replaced centralization as the result of political reform in 
the aftermath of the 1998 crisis. Th e policy empowers municipalities 
resulting in hundreds of new “small centers” but with little control 
from the central government and from weak and corrupt local 
legislatives. Decentralization ignites sharp competition between 
regencies and townships. Development operates completely un-
orchestrated setting off  free competition to increase local revenue 
while there is almost zero coordination between the administrative 
bodies. Because of this phenomenon, space and architecture once 
more regain signifi cance. All of these small centers try to exercise 
their sudden new power by re-tracing their territories to seek out 
any related resource to increase local revenue. Territory becomes 
valuable since it can be directly linked to foreign investment as well 
as to collect taxes from commodities passing through the territory. 
Spatially, this decentralization initiates three forms of spatial 
development. Th e fi rst is an increasing pace of development to 
nearly all administrative towns and cities. Small towns grow bigger 
as investments are made and sometimes introduce a bubble policy 
to attract new investments. Th e second is in the form of privately 
planned and developed residential and retail areas. Especially in 
the suburbs of major cities like Jakarta and Surabaya, this type 
of development can be as large as a thousand hectares utilizing 
211
well-planned infrastructure and settlements, sometimes adopting 
modern and international standards of living. Some of these private 
developments come complete with theme parks, golf courses and 
“business district centers” containing offi  ces and markets. On a 
smaller scale, especially in secondary cities, gated communities 
and walled settlements are also proliferating.24 Th e third is in the 
form of informal development. In-between administrative and 
privately developed residential areas, informal development occurs. 
Pioneered normally by street vendors, settlements are sporadically 
built up along major roads and streets. Diff ering from the well 
planned and facilitated corporate cities, these “in-between cities” are 
usually ill supplied and tend to be haphazardly and incrementally 
developed. However, all of the above developments are subject to 
a lack of control. Th ey also bring about environmental problems 
such as pollution and uncontrolled land transformation (from 
forest or agriculture into an urbanized area). Along the north-coast 
of Java for instance an economic corridor has been built linking 
cities and towns into a single linear development. Spanning from 
Merak, Jakarta, to Cirebon in West Java, to Semarang in Central 
Java and to Surabaya in East Java, it extends for more than 1000 
kilometers. Th e agglomeration of those town and cities creates a 
sense of wilderness. 
Jakarta is at once a city, a province, and a part of the agglomeration 
A metaphor of chaos 
produced by the 
decentralization policy has 
been performed by the 
author by “exploding” all 
the names of important 
town, city, municipality 
and regencies in a single 
map. The overlap between 
the names create “density” 
by which “Java” is 
constructed. 
 CHAPTER 4 - 212
of cities in the so-called Jabodetabek region, the unoffi  cial name for 
the combination of Jakarta with its neighboring regencies of Bogor, 
Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi into a single megalopolis.25 It is big 
and fl at and has no natural border except to the north where the 
coastline physically limits development, but continues to be subject 
to reclamation. A checkerboard pattern of real estate and land 
occurs that is a result of sprawling developments to which Firman 
referred to as “haphazard development.”26 Development beyond the 
administrative border shows a sprawling development of real estates 
creating a checkerboard pattern between the estates, industries, 
kampungs and agricultural land. Th e dual-system of spatial ordering 
is still at work with little awareness of seeking reconciliation. Here, 
segregation is blatantly displayed as the wealthy and the poor live 
side by side without real integration. Th is is reminiscent of the classic 
concept proposed by Cliff ord Geertz addressing the “social history” 
of the Javanese town in his book Hollow Town. He wrote: 
‘…the town was more a loose collection of estate-like social groups than 
an integrated municipal unit. It was a composite of self-contained status 
communities whose real basis was regional and interurban, not local and 
intraurban, a collection of impermeable strata living, one might almost 
say, side by side, rather than a structure of interrelated classes engaged in 
continuous interaction.’ (Geertz, 1975, p. 4)27
Th e developing megalopolis is but a hollow city, where negative 
polarities are easily mounted up. If there is no signifi cant change, 
will it also eventually evolve into a space where confl ict will be a 
daily rather than exceptional event? It seems that Abeyasekere’s 
conclusive remark quoted in the beginning of this subchapter points 
in that direction. 
4.2 Kampung’s dormant insularity 
and the creation of resistance 
‘If not we, who should defend our Kampung?’28
Kampung (also sometimes written as kampong) may generally be 
translated to village in English. Th e Webster Dictionary for instance, 
describes this Malay word as “a native hamlet or village in a Malay-
speaking country.”29 Kampung in this regard is understood more 
213
The origin of kampung 
is rural village. As the 
city expands, this village 
is swallowed becoming 
“village in urban setting” 
or kampung. Or the village 
transforms itself to become 
densier and expanding. 
Village (above) and urban 
kampung (below) share 
way of living of their 
inhabitants, a community 
in which agriculture-
originated traditions are 
still maintained. (Sources: 
First picture: Abeyasekere, 
1987. Second: Guido 
Alberto Rossi in Indonensia 
from the Air p. 62. Third: 
book cover of Nas (1986). 
 CHAPTER 4 - 214
Kampung from above. 
It seems a homogenous 
entity. But at closer look 
we could find high degree 
of variety. Kampung is a 
heterogenous both socially 
and architecturally.
(Second and third row 
pictures are taken from 
internet address as stated at 
the photographs, otherwise 
are author’s collection).
215
as a rural phenomenon. Further meanings are developed in the 
discourse. Jelinek and Korff  distinguished kampung into three types: 
kampung in the city, in transitional areas and in the urban fringes. 
Hence, the term has gradually come to be understood as an urban 
phenomenon.30 Jeff  Kenworthy has proposed a comprehensive 
defi nition of kampung:
‘Kampungs are the traditional form of indigenous urban development 
in Indonesia, which have grown organically, and incrementally over 
many years without planning guidance or regulations, building codes or 
centralized, coordinated service provision. They are do-it-yourself, self-help 
human habitats. Kampungs are the result of urban expansion, densification 
and agglomeration of villages, eventually forming contiguous towns and 
cities.’31
Consequently, as this sub chapter prefers to use, the term may then be 
discussed entirely as an urban phenomenon but one that nonetheless 
has a close linkage with village. Cliff ord Geertz saw that kampung
people are normally landless working class, and in transition from 
agriculture to non-agriculture work forces. In the city, kampung
is located off  the street away from well-defi ned neighborhoods or 
quarters. Kampung is an atomized form of village.32
Th is sub chapter attempts to argue that kampung is a process. It is 
a stepping stone for urban dwellers from village life to urban life, 
which retains social integration. Exemplifi ed by Betawi, who claim 
to be “the natives” of Jakarta, kampung nurtures a sense of a home 
for this urban proletariat people. But kampung is also a site where 
resistance to identity is built up due to the city’s marginalization. 
Th e above statement is a banner message hung in some corners 
of Jakarta. Th is short message contains a unique expression “we,” 
which Indonesian people understand refers to the Betawi who used 
to inhabit the majority of kampungs in Jakarta. Th e message is clear 
that the sense of identity, both spatial and communal, is intertwined 
with sentiment of resistance to the other. 
Th e argument is developed from what the author calls kampung
logic. Kampung is not merely a form of urban dwellings. Rather, 
kampung is a fl uid site wherein a process towards a more established 
urban dwelling takes place. Hence, the area is actually a dynamic 
yet heterogeneous society and can retain their social solidarity as the 
 CHAPTER 4 - 216
Some kampungs may solidify 
and be more established 
forming a compact, 
high density and mature 
settlement both in term of 
its inhabitant and building. 
In this compact kampung,
along newly constructed toll 
road in South Jakarta, open 
space is barely found.    
essence of village-hood. Kampung is able to connect natives and new 
comers in the city within the newly integrated society. However, 
kampung in many cases ends with isolation and eviction. Kampung
is still understood as a village in a city rather than a form of urban 
settlement. It is under constant pressure from city’s development. 
Th ey are the background of the development, which squeezes their 
territories leading to erasure. Th is continuing pressure causes the 
kampung society to resist. Kampung, in this regard, evolves into a 
dormant insular territory within the city while its real meaning and 
function is always concealed within the glamour of the city. Th e 
following section renders more to this logic. 
Kampung as a social space 
Kampung is a dynamic site rather than a well-established area of living, 
signifying the dynamic of Indonesian cities in general and Jakarta in 
particular. Seen from several fl oors above the ground, it looks like 
a coarse carpet spread and fi lled in between the space of high-rise 
217
offi  ce buildings, of hotels and apartments and super-blocks, of malls 
and supermarkets. Th e view is dominated mainly by dense one-
story buildings, covered by brown tile roofs, in some parts spotted 
with pitched grey aluminum and concrete roofs as well as the scarce 
greenery of trees. Both tiny and huge roofs jumbled up against each 
other, this carpet spreads like giant cancer cells out to the end of the 
horizon. In some parts we can see a more uniform shape of the fabric 
but for the most part it is perhaps the diff erence itself that becomes 
the uniform and universal language of this gigantic, enigmatic urban 
fabric. Some parts are arranged in linear fashion along the river or 
major streets, or in compounds surrounded by blocks and high-rise 
buildings, or griddled by strict patterns of building types, but the 
remainder, which is the majority, seems to be unplanned, unordered 
and chaotic forms of dwelling. Viewed in this way, kampung can be 
easily perceived as informal housing or unplanned residential areas, 
as the offi  cial categorization now labels it.33
However, looking to the ground, kampung is a form of process rather 
than a product. Kampung refers, in this sense, to a process of land 
occupation and formalization of empty space into a certain level of 
formality and establishment. From the name of kampung itself, in 
many cases, we can see the origin of its earlier condition. Kampung 
Kebon Kosong for instance, literally meaning “empty land,” gives 
a hint of its earlier situation as an empty land although is now 
crowded by a hundred families. From hundreds of kampung, there 
is more than 40 kampungs listed in the Holtorf map using the word 
bulak that has a similar meaning. Another name, Kampung Sawah, 
signifi es its earlier land use as paddy fi eld; or Kampung Rawa, a 
swamp.34
Initially kampung consisted merely of a small number of pioneer 
houses. Along the expansion of the area, kampung becomes more 
elaborate. Public spaces and facilities, such as mosques, multiuse 
open spaces (such as for badminton and children’s playground) and 
schools (sometimes informal) are developed. Commercial spaces are 
also built up such as shops, food sellers, and temporary marketplaces 
supplying goods and services. Along the extension of the area, its 
 CHAPTER 4 - 218
Kampung scenes. Above 
are sketches of activities 
done outside the house, in 
“clearings” between the houses 
or in throughfares. Below is 
sequential sketches of a jamu
seller (traditional medicine). 
Below left is the “house” where 
she lives and works (Source: 
Harjoko, 2004).
219
Above pictures: 
Kampung Penjaringan, near 
Kampung Kolong Rawa 
Bebek is one of “legal” 
kampungs. In 2005 this 
kampung was destroyed by 
fire due to electricity short 
cut. Now the kampung 
is about 90% rebuilt by 
its inhabitant to show 
its degree of “livability” 
and the speed of the 
development. 
Middle and below pictures: 
The layout of one lot of 
properties in kampung. A 
partition of the lot owned 
previously by a family 
with five children. Now it 
becomes parcels of small 
“rooms” (including the 
lands) belong to many 
parties, not only the five 
children and their families 
but also the tenants as 
well as other families who 
bought some of the rooms 
here.  
I thanked to Hari Prasetyo, 
my correspondent who 
lives in this kampung and 
showed me this case. 
 CHAPTER 4 - 220
density increases. Not only newly built, houses are often divided 
into two or more small living areas sometimes for diff erent families 
or households. Some share the kitchen (and even the utensils) or 
other utilities due to the limited space. Showing the limitation of 
space, Harjoko’s reported a case where a sixteen meter square house, 
consisting of one bedroom and a multi-use living room (which also 
acts as the kitchen) was occupied by a family of four.35 However, in 
general kampung has a great variety of houses as well as inhabitants. 
A report states that houses may vary in size from less than 20 square 
meters to up to more than 200 square meters.36
Th e house itself is incrementally constructed. Along with wealth 
gained, it may transform from a tiny core house into a more elaborate 
structure. Th e core itself can be merely a room used for all household 
activities but mainly as a place for woman and children to sleep. 
Additional rooms such as the kitchen, bathroom, extra bedrooms 
and a fi xed living room will be built later. A more elaborate core 
house will come complete with kitchen, bathroom, and fi xed living 
room and this living room can also be transformed into a sleeping 
room at night. When receiving guests, it will swiftly be adapted into 
a guest room. Furthermore, the house will have a fi xed bedroom and 
a guest room. With those rooms, a modest but “complete” house is 
fi nished. However, in a hot and humid climate and limited space, the 
exterior may be treated like interior especially for shared utilization 
of space. Sleeping for instance can be done outside the house (on 
a terrace or veranda). A family with two children normally needs 
only one sleeping room for the mother and the small children while 
the husband will simply lie down anywhere in the living room or 
outside the house. 
Due to this density, space between houses consists of small alleys or 
thoroughfares that connect one house and place to the others. Th ese 
labyrinthine alleys are sometimes only wide enough for pedestrians 
or motorcycles to pass through. However, these thoroughfares keep 
their function as a shared space for various household activities 
(from baby sitting to washing, cooking and motorcycle reparation). 
Th e density also creates the ability to for the residents to monitor the 
newcomers or guests. Th is neighborhood surveillance keeps kampung 
221
a secure community compared to other parts of the city. Kampung is 
hence a “growing living space” rather than fi xed and planned. Th is 
way of development is a tactical response toward fl uctuation of its 
inhabitants. Kampung in general is a “nomad space” since there is 
no fi xed or reliable way to count its inhabitants. Here people come 
from the countryside, work for only certain periods of the year, and 
return to the countryside during harvest season. Out of those who 
live in rented housing, many move from one area to another with 
relative ease and frequency whenever they can upgrade to a better 
place.37
Kampung is not merely a special characteristic of a place. Rather, it 
embodies a village-like social life because kampung inhabitants are 
normally bound into a coherent and integrated community. Th is 
social side of kampung can be seen in its rituals, such as funerals 
for instance. A funeral, or death procession, is not an individual 
ceremony but always a social process. In Indonesian rural society, 
which is based on an agrarian societal structure, the death procession 
may take considerable time and involve several stages. On the day of 
the death, preparations for the burial or cremation, involve not only 
family but the whole village. Since small kampung homes cannot 
accommodate hundreds of guests, the closest neighbors will support 
the family of the deceased by providing their homes to be used and 
the street nearby will be temporarily blocked to allow the procession. 
Furthermore the ad hoc organization team will be formed quickly. 
Th e women of the village work together and cook for the guests and 
the team. Th e men prepare the burial site, receive guests, and make 
speeches to the public. Th e young boys help set up for the ceremony 
by organizing chairs, tables and sound systems whereas the girls will 
help to prepare food and beverages. Th e day of ceremony, the village 
leaders are seated in the front rows while the women stay inside the 
home near to the deceased. Th e men and guests who have no close 
relation with the family of the deceased are seated further back. At 
this point the procession has not yet ended. Normally the duration is 
seven days, with additional events on the 40th, 100th and 1000th day 
after the date of passing. On the 1000th day a selamatan is performed 
which is a village gathering remembering the death and also acts as 
 CHAPTER 4 - 222
Kampung Kolong 
Penjaringan and in its 
neighboring location, 
Rawa Bebek. Most of the 
inhabitants work informal 
sectors. Most of them have 
at least motorcycles. Some 
other have even cars for 
their businesses. These 
kampungs are more as an 
expression of “poverty of 
space” rather than poverty 
of money as normally 
understood. 
223
a medium for social contracts between the family and the whole 
village. In a kampung these traditions are still practiced although 
becoming less elaborate and being adjusted to conform to the local 
situation. 
Th e above is an illustration of how a kampung works as social space. 
As a case, we now examine one of the kampungs in Jakarta to see 
how it was formed. Located in Penjaringan district in North Jakarta, 
Kampung Kolong meaning “kampung underneath” is a slum but 
acts like a normal settlement in many ways. Th e area is about two 
kilometers in length, 25 meters in width, and occupied by about 
1500 to 2000 inhabitants. As in a real estate development, the 
settlement is divided into alphabetized blocks in order to create their 
own address system. What makes this settlement diff erent from other 
settlements is its location, namely beneath an elevated toll-road to 
which this kampung owes its name.38  
Th e house is normally a single room of about 15 square meters. It is 
built using cuts of thin board or aluminum-sheeting scavenged from 
the waste at construction sites. Th e walls and ceilings are patched with 
cement and newspapers which suffi  ciently protect the inhabitants 
from wind and prying eyes. In the hot and humid tropical climate, 
particularly in Jakarta where the average temperature is 26 degrees 
Celsius, cross ventilation is the best way to fi nd comfort. Nevertheless, 
it is still far from comfortable since the concrete stores heat and the 
road produces a steady waterfall during the rainy season.
Like any other kampung settlements, this settlement has its own 
infrastructure. Th e water supply is maintained by sellers who circle 
the neighborhood with their carts. Th e water is of course not free; 
residents must pay about 1000 Indonesian Rupiah for about 150 
liters. Th e fact is that  similar to the poor in other regions and 
countries, they pay more for their water than the haves who obtain 
water through public supply.39  For their sanitation needs, they rent 
the use of the facilities in the neighboring legal kampung settlement 
or use the small river nearby. Th e cost of taking a bath is about equal 
to the price of water. To wash their clothing, they can either do so 
in those neighboring wells or water pumps or in the river nearby. 
Electricity is generated by accumulators, which measure usage every 
 CHAPTER 4 - 224
week must be charged in private accumulator charger stations or 
simply stolen from the public lines. 
Th eir daily life is not entirely diff erent from the other kampung.
Th e inhabitants are occupied with informal jobs, normally the 
lowest paid ones: street vendor, street newspaper seller, housemaid, 
construction coolie, car washer, petty trade merchant, sweatshop 
worker and restaurant helper, laundry worker, scavenger, market 
helper, driver, as well as illegal activities such as prostitution and 
gambling.40 Th e father, mother, working age children must all 
work in order to survive. Here, there is almost no notion of gender 
preference or children-free jobs for a family. 
Although relatively new, socially the inhabitants of this kampung 
were organized through an informal association. Th e Association 
of Families Living Underneath the Rawa Bebek Toll Road (Ikatan 
Keluarga Besar Kolong Tol Rawa Bebek) has a headman, a secretary 
and a treasurer. Like other kampungs who have local administrators41
they organized people in Kampung Kolong to conduct births, 
marriages, death ceremonies, Independence Day celebrations, as well 
as weekly religious gatherings (mostly for those who are Muslim). 
Kampung Kolong is one of the excesses of development. In 1991 the 
city evicted hundreds of families from the area in order to build the 
toll road. Without proper compensation and housing replacement, 
these victims simply spilled over into neighboring kampungs and 
other informal settlements. Th e toll road commenced operation 
in 1995 and the land underneath started to become an illegal 
dumping site for waste. In 1997 it was still a swampy, neglected area 
full of waste. But profi ting from the loose law and order following 
the economic and political crises of 1998, some people started to 
clean the waste and fi ll the land with soil. After preparing the land 
they marked their occupation and soon many more came. Some 
more long-standing residents who occupied larger areas started to 
rent their occupation to the new comers for fi ve to eight hundred 
thousand Indonesian Rupiah (approximately 45 to 70 Euro) per 
year for a room (bilik) about fi fteen square meters. One of the early 
occupiers who “reclaimed” and cleaned block A from waste, called 
225
these tenancies his “business” aside from waste scavenging. 
Indeed, there was also awareness and fear that some day the 
government would take the land back. In 2002, the Housing and 
Settlement Infrastructure Department sent a brief emphasizing the 
illegal status of the kampung as the land was “not designated for 
settlement.”  Th e occupants had already prepared for another move 
and displacement. However, since no real action took place, more 
people then came. Now the settlement is considerably strong with a 
huge population, and more permanent housing being constructed. 
As a result, the occupants have closer social relationships creating 
more of a neighborhood structure, albeit in an informal form. Th e 
settlement’s standing as a community made attempts at eviction 
problematic. In 2003 this kampung was partially burned, allegedly 
as part of an eviction program, but quickly regenerated. In early 
2005, the urban authority issued an eviction warning mentioning 
the illegal status of the housing. Life here however continues on as 
usual.  
Kampung as a contested site
Using the above description and examination of Kampung Kolong, 
we can see kampung as a process and understand how it rises, falls 
or mutates. Th ere are at least three evolutionary stages of kampung. 
Th e fi rst is kampung in its nature stage. Streets, water and electricity, 
and the administrative structure of the kampung are developed 
mainly by full participation of the inhabitants themselves. Th e 
overall development of this kampung can be called “organic” and 
“natural” as it is in a village, hence poor in terms of urban quality. 
Urban authority is minimally involved in its development. Th e 
presence of this kind of kampung in urban space indicates the 
irregularities of land status, as is the case for illegal settlements on 
river embankments, along railroads, or underneath elevated roads 
like Kampung Kolong.42 Th e second type is the mature kampung. 
Th e well-known Kampung Improvement Project (KIP) is the typical 
approach to the gentrifi cation process. Here, streets were widened 
and paved, basic utilities such as water and electricity were provided 
and installation improved. Th e project also provided funding for the 
 CHAPTER 4 - 226
poorest population in order to build better houses. Th e gentrifi ed 
kampung is considered an established or mature kampung, backed 
by legal land status. Th e third is mutated kampung. It refers to non-
kampung housing area (low cost housing estates for instance), which 
is changed into a kampung-like environment due to the explosion of 
population and haphazard housing arrangement. It is a process of 
“kampungization.” 
In general, kampung may change into two divergent trajectories. On 
one path, kampung can be matured, and either retains or loses its 
“kampungness,” as it is gradually incorporated into a metropolitan 
setting. Its inhabitants may also change from homogenous villager 
into heterogeneous urban inhabitants, due to the arrival of new 
settlers who are normally far richer than the original residents. On 
the other trajectory, natural and mutated kampungs may fail at being 
incorporated into an urban setting and thus kept within their poor 
Kampungs in Jakarta and its 
outskirt. The line is Jakarta’s 
ringroad.  (Drawn based on 
Holtorf map 2001) 
227
environments. Kampung Kolong is an example of how the needy 
could actually have endogenous power to fulfi ll their housing supply 
even without the state’s involvement. It shows that urban proletariats 
have a sense of community to resist urban pressure, and can learn 
how to live in an urban setting.  
Indeed Kampung Kolong shows how extinction is the most likely. 
Since the 1970s, urban authority continues to evict kampungs as 
part of their plans for modernization. Th e authorities saw this type 
of dwelling as “kampungan” meaning poor, uneducated, outmoded 
and déclassé. Th us cleansing Jakarta of such kampungan is one of the 
tasks of the city authorities in order to shape a more modern Jakarta. 
A recent survey made by McCarty in 2003 estimates that 20 to 25 
per cent of Jakarta’s residents live in kampungs, with an additional 
4 to 5 per cent squatting illegally along riverbanks, empty lots and 
fl oodplains. However, despite Jakarta’s speedy development, McCarty 
saw that in the past 20 years the land area occupied by kampungs
gradually reduced by 50 per cent. Many kampungs disappear as the 
result of the city’s solidifi cation. Many new malls, super blocks, or 
offi  ces are located in former kampung locations as the inhabitants 
voluntarily sell their land and move out to the other locations or 
are involuntarily pushed out after losing legal battles. Consequently, 
Evicted kampungs. 
(Compiled from Urban 
Poor Consortium 
publication, Declaration 
of “Academic Forum 
Bereavement” concerning 
continuous evictions in 
Jakarta of 11 November 
2003, and Kompas January 
- August 2005). 
 CHAPTER 4 - 228
nearly half of the families have been relocated to Jakarta’s outlying 
areas rather than being absorbed. Th ey are squeezed by skyrocketing 
land prices and land speculation.43
Not all kampungs end in sudden extinction through eviction, but 
rather are in the process of being isolated by others. As indicated 
on the newest street map of Jakarta produced by Günther Holtorf, 
which is believed to be the most complete and detailed, kampung
appears on the map shaded in pink. In this color, unlike other areas, 
which their nooks and crannies are mapped in detail, the shade 
signifi es the impossibility to draw its real pattern. Houses, alleys and 
open spaces are intermingled to produces a labyrinthine lebensraum. 
Th ere are no strict street hierarchies and types. Th ere is no defi nitive 
form, type, spatial arrangement or size assigned to a kampung house. 
Th e map shows many islands of kampung trapped by commercial 
areas or housing estates. Kampung Karet for instance is located just 
a few hundred meters from the central business district area of Jalan 
Sudirman and Kuningan, the highest concentration of Jakarta’s 
skyscrapers. Kampung Rawa Buntu is enclosed within the corporate 
town of BSD City. Nearby, a new hyper-mall and central business 
district are being planned. Now, Kampung Buntu can only be 
229
accessed through two narrow alleys connecting the entire kampung
with one of the streets in the BSD City. Kampung Setu near Depok 
is encircled by Emeralda Golf Course and Real Estate leaving only 
one small street to connect it with outside world. Th e golf course 
enhances this isolation, as the whole kampung seems to disappear from 
city’s scene. All this isolation may lead to kampung extinction, and is 
allegedly part of the developer’s political scheme to acquire kampung
land. Th e isolation pushes the land price down and forces kampung
inhabitants to sell their properties to the developer. Th e picture of 
this spatial and social isolation is well depicted on TV. In the popular 
television series Si Doel, the main character, an intellectual young 
Betawi native, can only get to his poor kampung through a small 
thoroughfare between wealthy estates. Si Doel himself is described 
as always being marginalized and victimized by “the big people” 
signifying them as the powerful people. Bajaj Bajuri, another popular 
series, is set in a rumah petak (literally meaning “block house”) that 
is encircled by the high walls of other building perimeters. Si Doel 
and Bajuri are presented as a parody of a marginalized community in 
a metropolitan area. Kampung in the world of television is imagined 
as an isolated place, encircled by housing estates, high-rises, and 
urbanized well-to-do people. Th e scenario dramatically highlights 
Kampungs and their 
current problem: they 
are mostly located in 
northern part of Jakarta. 
The kampungs’  problem 
are varied from city waste 
dumping location that 
too close to the kampung, 
high rate of drug abuse 
and prostitution as well as 
disputed land status. 
(Compiled from Urban 
Poor Consortium 
publication, Declaration 
of “Academic Forum 
Bereavement” concerning 
continuous evictions in 
Jakarta of 11 November 
2003, and Kompas 
January - August 2005). 
 CHAPTER 4 - 230
the image of marginalized poor kampung communities. Television, 
to some extent, is a documentation of reality, albeit an exaggerated 
one. 
Kampung’s resistance identity
In a broader context, Kampung Kolong may also show how kampung 
becomes a contested site. Indeed, kampung may lead to extinction or 
isolation, however kampung can also become a site where resistance 
is built up.
Exemplifi ed by Betawi people who claimed to be the natives of 
Jakarta, kampung is a site where “becoming Betawi” takes place. 
It is a place where identity is continuously being produced. For 
Betawi, kampung is their home. Since the colonial city of Batavia, 
Abeyasekere, illustrated that the Betawi had certain characteristics 
strongly connected to this city. Th ey were Muslims and had a 
reputation for being fanatically Islamic. Th e Betawi spoke their own 
language and had their own customs although they were encircled 
by the dominant and strong cultural ethnicity of the Sundanese. 
Mainly they settled in kampung, occupied the lowest rung on the 
social ladder and maintained their rural way of living.44
In the contemporary era when open political space combined with 
harsh economic competition, Betawi’s communal awareness grew, 
and attempts to regain their rights as Jakarta’s natives increased. Th e 
aforementioned slogan “If not we, who should defend our kampung?” 
was written by people who strongly identifi ed as Betawi and formed 
a network of groups.45 Some of these groups have considerable 
political power. Forum Betawi Rempug (FBR) for instance, founded 
on 29 July 2001 has branches in nearly every kampung in Jakarta 
and claims to have more than 400,000 members. Th e members are 
mainly tukang ojek (drivers of motorbike transportation service), 
bus and public transportation drivers, and small street vendors. Th e 
leader claimed that, “many Betawi benefi t from [the forum] since 
they fi nd jobs in factories and companies.” Th ey want to be “master 
in their own Kampung.”46 Another large Betawi community is Betawi 
House’s Consultative Body (Bamus), founded in the early 1980s 
and now a parent for 65 local Betawi community organizations. 
Three types of isolation: 
(a) isolated by housing estate 
with limited access but still 
socially connected;
(b) isolated by wealthy-
business center: socially 
interconnected but 
highly subjected for land 
speculation;
(c) total isolation while 
social relation with outside 
community is difficult to 
perform. (Source of maps: 
Holtorf 2001, isolated 
kampungs are highlighted)
231
Opposed to FBR, which tends to be very practical, the Bamus is 
more concerned with the political position of Betawi people. In the 
gubernatorial election for the period of 2002-2007 this organization 
recommended “8 candidates who are genuine native Betawi.” Th e 
head of this organization warned that if the coming governor were 
not a native Betawi, the organization would not support him. Th e 
reason behind the candidacy and the warning had to do with the 
Betawi people feeling politically marginalized by the non Betawi 
communities. Nevertheless, the attempt failed. Th e elected governor 
was Sutiyoso, a non-Betawi who was backed by another Betawi 
community, the FBR.47
Kampung for Jakarta as well as Betawi continues to be problematic. A 
recent study conducted by Harjoko reported on Jakarta’s social and 
spatial areas of confl ict. Investigating kampung as part of a sustainable 
urban life-cycle space of diversity, he argued that continuous evictions 
driven by the governance system and its associated rational planning 
approach and mechanism have created two levels of confl ict. Th e fi rst 
is on the societal level whereby confl ict is produced and reproduced 
by incongruent or confl icting values and norms among social actors. 
Th e second level is also manifested spatially within confl icting spatial 
formation and how the image of the city is produced.48
Looking from a wider angle, here we may see that extreme fl uidity 
of kampung development makes any mode of representation 
diffi  cult. Unfortunately, urban authorities took an instrumentalist 
and mechanistic response towards this lack of representation. For 
example, the Jakarta Province is currently planning a conservation 
program for traditional Betawi houses and constructing new 
“traditional houses” in Kampung Setu Babakan, South Jakarta, a 
place where Betawi people are actually a minority. Th is project is 
only the beginning of an ongoing project planned to occupy around 
200 hectares for a new “Kampung Betawi Culture” prepared for 
about 300 traditional houses.49 Like Taman Mini, however, the 
project fabricated the ethnicity of the Betawi in order to revive its 
identity.50 Th e project focuses merely on Betawi style but disregards 
the kampung aspect which is arguably the most important goal. 
Hence kampung is kept virtually formless in an architectural sense. 
 CHAPTER 4 - 232
Moreover, kampung is a site where identity is nurtured and where 
the basis for resistance against opposing powers is developed, 
hence it is real in a social sense. Kampung is not merely a habitus,
but a dynamic representation of a mutation from village hood to 
urban living, a proto-urban condition that needs more adequate 
architectural representation. We may indeed see Jakarta as a modern 
city, but its very existence is bound by its roots namely the existence 
of kampung itself. Such meaning of kampung in urban politics is 
unfortunately now dormant. 
4.3 Modern pecinan: on the making of 
hollow insularity 
‘Without [Dutch] protection the Chinese would probably have swallowed 
up the natives, but on the other hand they might themselves have been 
assimilated within a single homogeneous society’ (Furnivall, 1944, p. 47). 
In contrast with the jumbled kampung, which is considered the native 
of Jakarta, a well-planned housing development cannot be separated 
from the notion of “other.” During the colonial administration, 
Dutch mansions (commonly called landhuis) and their new estates 
were intended entirely for the European community.51 Th e Chinese 
had already come to settle in the region long before the Westerners. 
Traditionally they clustered in pecinan (Chinese quarter). Both the 
Dutch estates and Chinese pecinan quarters were the most sanitary 
housing clusters in the area compared to kampung surroundings. 
Within both clusters however grew the Creole community. In Dutch 
houses, the Eurasians spoke coarse Dutch, wore sarongs and ate rice. 
Th ey were much more like natives than the Dutch. In pecinan, the 
peranakan, or Indonesian-born Chinese, were not allowed to speak 
Chinese and adopted Indonesian customs for daily life rather than 
their own Chinese traditions.  
In modern times, wealthy housing estates also appear as “other” to 
some extents. Seen from the poor hustle and bustle of daily life in 
the kampung surroundings, the wealth and the well-ordered housing 
estates can easily be viewed as a foreign element. Th e persistent 
history of segregated urban politics produced a society that tends 
233
Pecinan in Banten as it was described 
by de Houtman expedition. Encircled 
by palisade, the quarter contained fi ner 
houses than native kampung’s. (Source: 
Source: Mollema 1935:222 in Nas 
1986 p. 24)
Pecinan in Batavia as drawn by van 
Aken showing architectural character 
easity identifi ed. (Source: Abeyasekere, 
1987)
Late - colonial pecinan in Grogol. Th e 
bent-roof shophouses are one of the 
distinctive characteristic of Chinese 
architecture. (Source: Abeyasekere, 
1987)
More modern pecinan in Grogol 
around 1970s. Its Chinese expression 
was generally unseen as the politic of 
segregation existed Th e economy was 
however still dominated by the Chinese 
peranakan. (Source: Abeyasekere, 
1987)
Recent development of pecinan in a 
form of new town. Th e “central business 
district” of Lippo Karawaci town seen 
from secluded golf course as the hearth 
of Lippo’s territory. In the booklet is 
seen as an “urban landscape.” Here is no 
symbol exept territorial “occupation.” 
(Source: Lippo fl ier) 
 CHAPTER 4 - 234
to see within myopic Manichean dualities: native/foreigner, poor/
rich, and inferior/superior. Th e community is segregated before 
they spatialize and spatial fragmentation is merely an extension 
of this social segregation. Th is argument perhaps reasserts Geertz’ 
comment about Indonesian cities as the products of seeing space 
through a “screen of symbols.”52 A modern estate is a signifi er of a 
social gap resulting from an unbridgeable economic gap between 
the haves and the have nots. In modern Jakarta, much like insular 
space in the colonial era, housing estates may create and support a 
mixed society. Chinese and natives may live together in one area 
having close contact with each other. However, as this subchapter 
attempts to argue, these estates primarily work within an economical 
realm rather than forming an integrated community. Th ey produce 
an economically homogenous community within. Since they are 
located alongside poor kampung, a deep rift without is built up. Th e 
Manichean duality is kept alive meaning that this insular space is 
not an ideal place for assimilation. 
Chinese and the pecinan as a symbol of insularization
Th e distinction between native and foreigner is always problematic, 
especially within a region located at cultural and racial crossroads. In 
an Indonesian setting in general, and in Jakarta in particular, Indian, 
Chinese, Western and even Islamic cultures are foreign to the so-
called “native culture”. According to Furnivall, the Chinese, like the 
Hindus are foreign to the Indonesian culture and civilization that was 
already established. Hindu culture formed, as was the case in India, 
a superstructure above the original Indonesian community. Th ey are 
“not arising spontaneously out of that community but maintained 
above the village economy by the authority of the Hindu princess.”53
Th e Chinese are concentrated in the trading sector and adhere to 
some kind of economical superstructure which they maintain to this 
day. In terms of the city or town this situation is represented by 
constellations. Th e Hindu superstructure forms the general idea of 
spatial cosmology and the Chinese, in practice, fl oat in the trading 
network of the city.54 Lombard confi rmed that Hindu, Chinese 
and then Islam are foreign cultures, which had already mixed and 
integrated with native Indonesia when the Dutch came. 
235
Th e coming of the Dutch destructed this integration and social order 
and overturned the balance between the Chinese, aristocrats and the 
natives. Especially with the Chinese, the Dutch encouraged them to 
establish a trading network in the East. By appointing a headman, 
well-known as the Chinese Captain (Kapitein China) for each of the 
Chinese settlements, the Dutch granted them monopoly rights to 
trading commodities which separated them further from the native 
populations. Th e Chinese were also given diff erent laws to segregate 
them from local people such as being required to possess a special 
passport for traveling, having to keep their traditional appearance 
(manchu long hair and Chinese clothing) and being made to reside 
only in pecinan.
Pecinan is the Indonesian term for Chinese quarter. Th e presence 
of pecinan in the early development of Indonesian cities was fi rst 
reported back during the expedition of de Houtman who docked 
in Banten on 23 June 1595. As the fi rst Dutch contact with the 
region, he reported the presence of a Chinese colony laid outside 
the town’s guarded wall surrounded by a palisade but containing the 
fi nest and most sanitary houses in town. Th eir homes were mostly 
brickwork buildings compared to the timber and bamboo structures 
of the traditional houses in the town. In Jayakarta the pecinan
was located in the northern part of the town near Ciliwung River 
together with nearby European, British and Dutch fortresses.55 After 
Batavia expanded, the traditional location of pecinan was expanded 
to nearby areas such as Glodog and Jembatan Lima, then later to 
Mangga Dua and Mangga Besar. As Chinese traders settled into the 
area, the land to shifted from agriculture fi elds to housing and the 
farmers were displaced to suburbs in the western and southern parts 
of Jakarta. As Jakarta expanded further, new clusters of housing 
estates were also developed as Chinese quarters. Kelapa Gading, 
Sunter, Green Garden for instance are located within Jakarta’s core 
development that was completed in the 1980s and 1990s. In recent 
developments, the Chinese cluster in new gated communities such as 
Lippo Karawaci, Pantai Indah Kapuk, and Pantai Mutiara as well as 
in suburban areas such as in between the neighboring administrative 
cities of Tangerang, Depok and Bogor. 
 CHAPTER 4 - 236
After independence, the Chinese were not easily assimilated. Th e 
new government made it diffi  cult for the Chinese to hold Indonesian 
citizenship. Even many Indonesian born Chinese, the peranakan, were 
registered as foreigners and those who were awarded citizenship were 
categorized only as Indonesian citizens “by descent.” Both Sukarno 
and Suharto maintained this segregation policy. Both prohibited any 
symbolic appearance of Chinese ethnicity. Chinese names had to be 
changed into Indonesian; Chinese writing was prohibited; Chinese 
ceremonies and traditions were banned; Chinese religion was not 
included within the “fi ve offi  cial religions,” and Chinese were not 
allowed to reside in villages. In general, as Abeyasekere concluded, 
all measurements possible were used to suppress the Chinese identity 
both publicly and formally.56 Since then, the Chinese community 
has created an ambivalent culture and living space. On one side, 
they did not try to develop any symbolism or traditions that may 
be easily associated with their Chinese ethnicity. Th e resistance by 
“native” Indonesians toward the Chinese as “other” was considered 
far too volatile for such symbolism. On the other side, the Dutch and 
postcolonial rules made them dwell merely in towns and cities and 
more specifi cally in pecinan. Th is rule made it even more diffi  cult for 
the Chinese to assimilate with the whole community. Th is was not 
the case for Hindu and Islam, which were also foreign cultures but 
could easily assimilate and settle partially because no such spatial 
segregation rules applied to them. Hence, colonial and postcolonial 
regimes had created Chinese without their Chinese culture and a 
Chinatown without Chinese writing or any other symbolic identity 
except its inhabitants. Like the Betawi resistance, the Chinese 
identity is symbolized by their domination in the economy and by 
occupying certain spaces. Here we see the production of identity 
through purely territorial occupation. 
After political reform in 1998, this politic of segregation was 
administratively lifted. Th e peranakan (Indonesian born Chinese) 
are treated like Indonesian citizens. Chinese writing and language 
are widely practiced. Private television stations even use it as one 
offi  cial language for their news. Most of peranakan speak Indonesian 
and have “Indonesian culture”. However, identity and space cannot 
237
be separated. Chinese cultural symbols can easily be mobilized to 
create a dialog between cultures, especially through the media. But 
space is immobilized as pecinan and native territories cannot be inter-
changed. Th e rift between Chinese and native can perhaps be closed. 
But the intangible wall between pecinan and the rest of the city is 
not easy to cross. Th e proliferation of gated communities is not an 
accident. Th e wall is located in the crisscrossing between desire for 
identity amidst repressed symbols and the reality of their existence as 
a minority but at the same time a powerful social group. Although 
inside the wall a bi-racial community may exist, the tension is 
mutated into another frontier: the rich inside and the poor outside. 
Th e judgment as to whether a community is a pecinan or not is 
made entirely by consent and has nothing to do with the “statistics” 
of the inhabitants. 
It can be argued that in current context the word pecinan does not 
refer to a Chinese enclave but is rather a symbol that represents 
insularization of a space produced by a long history of segregated 
identity. Th e function of architecture in this case is to rearticulate 
that segregation spatially and materially. It maintains a perpetual 
tension. Th is will be discussed in more detail with the ensuing 
analysis of contemporary pecinan through analyzing a newly opened 
satellite town named Kota Wisata.
Kota Wisata: on the making of new pecinan
Approximately 30 minutes drive from the Jakarta city center to the 
south, a new town occupies around 750 hectares of land. About 300 
hectares has already been developed in the fi rst stage. Th e development 
is virtually independent, without any involvement of authorities 
except in land-zoning permission. Th is new town is planned and 
owned by four multinational enterprises: one local development 
company owned mostly by ethnic Chinese Indonesians (PT Duta 
Pertiwi), and three global investors (Marubeni, LG Group and Land 
and Houses Public Company Ltd.). In its initial stages, houses in 
this town were planned to capture niche markets from the wealthy 
ethnic Chinese.57 Some extravagant exhibitions in 1998 and 1999 
were held in Jakarta amidst the economic crisis gripping Indonesia. 
 CHAPTER 4 - 238
Kota Wisata, the city 
of leisure. The site 
plan consists clusters 
of housings, city’s 
“economic center” in 
the form of kiosks and 
shophouses as well 
as amusement theme 
park. The “cluster” or 
the gated community 
is formed by the house 
type, and identified by 
the name taken from 
world cities. Each of 
the cluster is walled and 
gated as well as the whole 
site is also bribe-wired 
and walled.  
The “European 
Center” is composed 
by “European style” 
shophouses which 
entirely made by concrete 
and brickwork for the 
fachwerk construction.
239
Th e results were astonishing. When other property businesses had 
already collapsed or were on the verge of doing so, the sale of the 
houses in this new town took off . At least two situations caused 
this paradoxical phenomenon. First, people wanted to secure their 
investments and, thanks to its marketing strategy, saw this particular 
property as more convincing than securing their money in stocks or 
highly fl uctuating foreign currency. Th e second was that the off er 
was diff erent from other properties in Jakarta or anywhere else in 
Indonesia because it included a clustered layout and a “world cities” 
concept.
As indicated by the name of Kota Wisata, which means “city of 
leisure,” the city off ers an atmosphere of major world cities. From 
the gate, the major boulevard has is 55 meters wide giving a spacious 
and luxuriant feeling. Streets are well planned and fi nished with a 
promenade as well as bike and pedestrian pathways. Houses are built 
without fences, a very marked contrast to houses outside this new 
town in Jakarta that are mostly gated and walled. World cities such 
as Paris, Kyoto, Amsterdam, Vienna, Florence and Beverly Hills are 
the names of some of the clusters off ered. Th e “cluster” itself refers 
to a housing compound containing about 50 houses. It has a gated 
and fenced perimeter allowing the houses within to stand freely. Th e 
Paris cluster is marked with a miniature Arc de Triomphe, while 
Amsterdam has a small wind mill, and Kyoto has a torii gate to 
give a sense of identity. Th e Beverly Hills cluster is occupied by a 
strip of American post-modern houses. With regards to security, 
each cluster has a perimeter wall, gate as well as personal security 
guards. Inhabitants hold an exclusive pass-card. Any visitor must 
show an identifi cation card, leave it at the security gate, and receive 
a visitor card in exchange. Some visitors are requested to have some 
kind of recommendation from the occupants or at least provide an 
exact name and address of the person they intend to visit in order 
to be allowed to enter. Th e security system is enforced 24 hours per 
day and applies to everyone including inhabitants who visit their 
neighboring clusters.
Th is new town also has its own shopping center and shopping 
street called “Center of Europe” - a central business district albeit a 
Kota Wisata’s architecture: 
tower marketing office 
designed a la La Sagrada 
Familia, a replica of 
“Collosseum” for a park, 
an “Arc d’Triomphe” for 
Paris Cluster, Japanese 
temple for Kyoto Cluster 
and “European style” street 
houses for “European 
Center.”
 CHAPTER 4 - 240
miniaturized one. Here, the façade, shops, and offi  ces as well as the 
ambience mimic old European town centers. Part of it, a traditional 
German building of fachwerk timber construction is copied using 
concrete construction and named as the German section. However, 
unlike medieval European labyrinthine alleys, streets in this center are 
arranged in an organic pattern. In the site nearby, an “International 
Village” section is planned for kiosks. Th ey are named according 
to country such as “Chinese Kampung,” “American Kampung,” 
“Japanese Kampung,” as well as “Indonesian Kampung.” Th e 
Chinese Kampung is operationally ready for about 200 kiosks. 
Each is about 12 square meters and costs about 146 million Rupiah 
(around 15,000 Euros). Th e price surely can only be aff orded by 
relatively established enterprises, not the informal entrepreneurs 
such as street vendors. Th e whole section of this commercial and 
amusement center occupies around 10 hectares and is planned to 
include 1500 to 2000 kiosks. Th is does not only serve as a facility for 
the inhabitants, it is also proclaimed as a tourist destination to enjoy 
“atmosphere of the old Chinese quarter.”58
Th e town provides its inhabitants with a theme park Fantasy Land 
within a newly constructed artifi cial lake. Surrounded by a replica 
of Th e Great Wall of China the land is connected with the whole 
complex through a small copy of London Bridge. A “River Walk of 
New Orleans” and “Amazonia” are stretched along the lake. Seen 
from a distance, the marketing offi  ce, which is the only “high-rise” 
building in the area, is built with architecture a la Antonio Gaudi’s 
La Sagrada Familia.  
From Kota Wisata three critical aspects can be examined. 
First. Immediate analysis upon such gated communities leads to 
deeper understanding about the use of those kitsch and hybrid forms. 
Images of world cities are put in the façade and the name. Th e rest are 
local inventions, employing eclectic, kitsch and pragmatic designs. 
Th e juxtaposition between them produces a hybrid environment 
where, architecturally speaking, authenticity is not the issue. Perhaps 
more importantly, this hybrid quality is followed by ethnic, religious 
and racial hybridity. As we know from the earlier description, the 
241
market niche of this property is wealthy ethnic Chinese peranakan
and a small number of foreigners. Th e facts however show that half of 
the buyers are native Indonesians who are Muslim.59 In the original 
master plan of this city there was only a church and a Christian 
school provided. Th e reality then pushed the management to review 
the master plan and built a mosque as well as an Islamic school. 
In 2001 both facilities were completed; named “Hagia Sofi a” to 
conform to its world city image.
Socially, the cluster names such as Paris, Kyoto, Amsterdam and 
other are indeed not without infl uence. From developer’s point 
of view, the names were used entirely as a marketing strategy. Th e 
eff ect of this strategy was not only successful in terms of marketing 
but also in shaping the inhabitant’s attitudes. Th rough replication, 
the inhabitants individually made their environment conform to 
its cluster. Some inhabitants of Amsterdam cluster hung Holland’s 
traditional shoe, the clog, and installed carved-wood tulips in their 
gardens. In the Kyoto cluster, a café hung a banner using Japanese-
like font for its menu list. Collectively, the Paris cluster called 
their neighborhood chairperson the “Mayor of Paris.” Th ere is a 
strong eff ort made by the inhabitant’s to show their involvement 
with the names used in these clusters. Th ey tried to develop their 
neighborhood by borrowing the associative power of the names, 
which for some of the inhabitants is indeed a memory of their either 
living in or visiting those places. Th e memory of Paris, Amsterdam 
and Kyoto, in many forms and ways, became a new connection of 
the displaced community to this newly constructed neighborhood. 
On Indonesian soil, Harald Leisch argued that the mixture of three 
American types of gated communities and a marketing strategy 
are the reason behind such gated communities. Th e middle and 
upper classes see that prestige and lifestyle are becoming more 
important. Th e marketing strategy points to this particular socio-
cultural background and imbuing their strategy with images of the 
community as a global community provides fertile ground for the 
development. In Indonesia, he added, “land developers partly create 
the tastes of the customers and, almost without interference from 
the government, form new landscapes, with elements that often have 
 CHAPTER 4 - 242
An even more lucrative 
example of the enclave  
than Kota Wisata is Pantai 
Mutiara (Pearl Beach) 
Resort Estate. It is one 
of the most lucrative 
estates in Jakarta located 
in Jakarta bay. The house 
is individually designed 
employing newest trends. 
Houses are arranged within 
“cluster” in which personnel 
guards are deployed. The 
whole estate itself is also 
fenced and gated.  
243
more symbolic meaning than practical use.” Reporting from two 
communities, Lippo Karawaci (Lippo Village) and Bumi Serpong 
Damai (BSD City), he saw that the growth of gated communities 
in Indonesia was based on three main aspects. Th e fi rst was that the 
growing accumulation of wealth leads to income gaps. Th is situation 
results in resentment and the consequent danger of burglary and 
robbery pushes the rich to protect themselves. Secondly, people 
belonging to the upper or upper-middle classes emphasize prestige 
in their consumer and spatial behavior. Th ey want to be part of the 
“modern world” especially associated with the United States. Th ird, 
the Chinese population in general diff ers from the indigenous 
population, partly because of a greater accumulation of wealth and 
partly because of religion. Th is is mainly the case in Indonesia, where 
the Chinese are a real minority. Th rough occupying the territory of 
the wealthy, the Chinese can manifest their presence as a symbol 
of their strength. Th e development of such territory is a form of 
production which Bourdieu called symbolic capital. It is a collection 
of luxury goods to demonstrate the taste and distinction of the 
owner and a kind of money capital albeit in other form. Symbolic 
capital works to conceal economic distinction, through culture and 
taste. For Bourdieu, the production of symbolic capital reproduces 
“established order” and guarantees “perpetuation of domination” 
but remains hidden.60 Here the symbol refl ects a condition of 
being exclusive amidst the ordinaries. Its primary function is to 
create distinction from the multitude, or using Marcuse’s words, 
“maintaining privileges.”
Second. Further analysis may show that such gated communities 
are sites where production of hybrid yet homogenous communities 
takes a place. In terms of social integration Leisch found that both 
Lippo Karawaci’s and BSD City’s residents showed no signifi cant 
evidence of communal integration. Further he saw no signifi cant 
diff erence between social integration of the residents within the gated 
communities and people who live outside.61 Indeed, in the case of 
Kota Wisata, society developed in this cluster is heterogeneous in 
terms of its socio-cultural composition (at least bi-racial or Muslim 
- non Muslim). Th e native Indonesians and Chinese children played 
 CHAPTER 4 - 244
together and learned their behavior and customs without any of the 
stereotypical obstructions that often arose from the tension between 
indigenous and non-indigenous terminology. Houses without fences 
give the children a chance to study each other closely. Th is contradicts 
the situation outside where they would learn from embedded 
stereotypes that can easily fl ourish based on the distance between 
the two groups who are separated by walls.62 Nevertheless, the 
society built in this homogeneous environment is also homogeneous 
in terms of economic status. Considerably high prices and no real 
distinction between house types produce a uniform community. 
From outside, this uniformity is easily perceived by ordinary people 
as a “rich ghetto” entirely foreign to the whole society. 
Here, the reason behind gating and fencing is normally the feeling 
of insecurity. Th is feeling is arguably another form of the “need to 
segregate” desired by inhabitants who seek an oasis away from the 
brutality of the city wilderness. Th e “rich ghetto” of Kota Wisata 
is protected by continuous surveillance to guarantee the feeling 
of security. Th e failure of any one of these security elements will 
negatively impact this atmosphere. Th is can be shown by one of 
the new inhabitants living in “Monaco” who expressed her view 
concerning the security issue in this city. She wrote in the city 
newsletter “…some broken fences and holes in the outer ring fence, 
provide a chance for the passers by to trespass.”63 A home without 
a fence is indeed a celebration of this feeling. But in fact the fence 
has just been moved, rather than removed, to the cluster’s perimeter 
walls and main entrance. Th e border itself is not reduced but on 
the contrary, enlarged and multiplied. Th ere is no guarantee that 
the perimeter wall could maintain social tensions developed from 
another side of the wall.  
Th ird. Although technically speaking gated communities such as 
these are designed with highly developed infrastructure, they lack 
innovation as seen from an urban perspective.  Referring to Hogan 
and Houston’s analysis on two private cities in Jakarta, Lippo Karawaci 
and Lippo Cikarang owned by Lippo Group, its is also doubtful if 
such development expresses a kind of urban innovation. 64 Lippo 
Karawaci is an entirely private city owned by Mochtar Ryadi. It is 
245
occupied by eclectic, post-modernist European or American style 
houses, has a Spanish retail center called “Piazza del Espana”, and a 
super-mall called “Star of Asia,” an international standard hospital 
called Siloam Gleneagles centered in a golf course. Located around 
thirty minutes west of Jakarta, Lippo is considered one of the most 
modern towns designated entirely for the well-to-do community. 
Koolhaas et al has also reported that Lippo is a result of a “global 
network” of Indonesia-born Chinese with their Chinese partners 
from mainland China, Singapore, the United States, and other 
parts of the world. It could also be connected to the Lippo Gate 
involving donations to the former president Bill Clinton during his 
presidency. 
Urban innovation, referring to Peter Hall’s Cities and Civilizations is a 
marriage between technology and culture toward producing a better 
urban environment. Reduced traffi  c, well-designed infrastructure 
(communication, water supply, sewage and drainage, safety and 
security), and adequate public and community facilities are part of 
this innovation. Th ese elements contribute to form-changing lifestyle 
and an intensifi ed pattern of consumption. In the case of Lippo, and 
arguably Kota Wisata as well, these sophisticated corporate cities 
unfortunately do not show such urban innovation. Th ey still rely 
on private cars. Although there is sophisticated and well-designed 
infrastructure, but it is all for the sake of creating market attraction and 
does not address the larger ecological concerns. Hogan and Houston 
wrote, “Th e environmental consciousness of these developments is 
about lifestyle, not ecological sustainability. Golf courses are not 
good examples of nature at work.”65 It is also fashionable for real 
estates to off er various “beautiful atmospheres” in order to attract 
new costumers for their housing stocks. Famous “Western” cities 
(Amsterdam, London, Vienna etc.), famous neighborhoods or 
settings on television fi lms (Beverly Hills for instance) and fabricated 
landscape such as golf courses and theme parks are a strategy to 
create an attractive and marketable atmosphere.66 Th e creation of 
borders between communities and within private cities and their 
surroundings, or between fabricated sceneries and the actual urban 
environment is also about marketing. Seen from a larger perspective, 
 CHAPTER 4 - 246
especially from urban politics, fencing and gating are endemic in 
a democratic urban society. Insular space is far more durable than 
merely cultural symbols in segregating or assimilating societies.  
4.4 Urban informalities:  resisting 
insularity through the making of  
ephemeral spaces
‘From chaos, Milieus and Rhythms are born.’ (Deleuze, 1987, p. 313)
Th e habit of people who share the same religion or ethnicity to 
group together is not only applicable to the Betawi or Chinese, 
but is common amongst society in general. Betawi kampungs are 
relatively integrated communities compared to the modern pecinan. 
However, pecinan are becoming further integrated although they are 
also becoming more economically homogeneous as well. Both are a 
process of insularization as a reaction against the growing wilderness 
of Jakarta. Kampung as an incremental process of social geometry 
works to resist the ever-expanding mechanistic urban expansion. 
Pecinan grows in another direction, towards the “other,” despite the 
hybridization process.   
Alexander’s work distinguishes between mechanistic order and “life.” 
To him, the mechanistic order, which is based on the Cartesian 
system, merely emphasizes procedure; a method to think about 
as opposed to the reality itself. Life, on the contrary, regards built 
environment as something whole in and of itself. It is based on the 
concept of life. Rather than seeing within the mechanistic mindset 
of true or false, built environment must be seen as a living organism 
which has a relative degree of life and wholeness, hence potentially
true or false.67 Habraken also distinguished between explicit and 
implicit form. Th e explicit form is normally dictated by explicit 
laws, codes and orders. Th e implicit pattern is developed through 
unspoken rules, agreements and consensus. He saw that the implicit 
bonds form in much more coherence than the explicit.68
Seeing from these points of reference, our urban spaces can be 
distinguished into two structures. A kampung is characterized by 
247
“order of life” and guided by implicit rules. Th e current housing 
estates in pecinan are driven by rational, geometric order and 
guided by clear, explicit rules in the form of design engineering. 
Th is duality can also be extended to say that the fi rst structure is 
incremental as opposed to the latter structure which is simply 
“designed” space. Th is duality shows more of the process itself, not 
merely the result of that process. Th e incremental indicates a less 
rational, more organic order. It is the bottom-up process of space 
making, being organized by interactions between people rather than 
dictated by institutions. In many cases, the incremental process 
points to occupation fi rst, followed by some measurements of spatial 
regulation through interpersonal refi nement and adjustment, a kind 
of social geometry. Designed space tends to be rational, regulated 
and normalized by certain geometric and explicit order. Th is is the 
top-down process of space making. Modern practice uses geometric 
tools as the pretext for territorial occupation. Designed space needs 
to consider the land as empty or if not, all of the previous occupants 
are clearly demarcated and represented. Both are like their own 
“island”. Jakarta’s urban space is arguably a perfect example of how 
both incremental and designed formal structures collide making a 
perfect urban wilderness. It can be seen that urban informalities 
are the spaces in between both islands as well as intruding upon 
them illegally. Th e question now is, how the people of Jakarta do to 
reconcile that collision?  Perhaps it can be found in the vary nature 
of Jakarta’s urban informalities. Th e space of informalities serves to 
contest growing insularity causing the city to function not only as 
a mandala (arena) but also reconciling space with the nomads. Th is 
section intends to show how the above informalities are translated 
into a method for resisting total insularization of urban space. Th ese 
urban informalities are the “architecture of excess” in the process of 
insularization.
Kaki lima: depleting insular space
Jakarta is a volatile arena. As a consequence of being both the capital 
city and an open city, Jakarta has received fl ood of immigrants from 
all over Indonesia, especially from neighboring provinces. As part of 
“occupying land” according to kampung logic, these new inhabitants 
 CHAPTER 4 - 248
Kaki lima occupy indeed 
generally in ‘illegal space’ 
where the sign of authority 
is void such as unattended 
parking zone or underneath 
a flyover. Some of them 
however are located ‘legally’ 
as the house of kampung.
Kampung people can be 
transformed into a small 
shop.  
Many more of these kaki 
lima are gathered in certain 
hoki streets. Here, they 
are ordered by themselves 
into a compact, simple and 
mobile system of service. 
249
attempt to occupy the “grey territories” where authorities are void. 
Illegal dwelling is one of the most common claims of this informality. 
Th e other is in the shape of informal street vendors popularly called 
kaki lima (meaning “fi ve feet” because of the two legs of the seller 
and the two wheels and leg of the cart). Like illegal dwellings, which 
occupy river embankments, areas surrounding sewage and drainage, 
strips of space along train tracks, underneath fl yovers, or any 
unclaimed territories, the kaki limas are virtually everywhere. Street 
junctions, pedestrian walkways, terminals, alleyways, train stations, 
commercial facilities and other idle spaces are all common territory 
for these vendors. 
Modern space (more specifi cally Western urban space) can be more 
or less easily divided into buildings and the space in between, or the 
fi gure and its grounds. Nolli’s map is perhaps a clearer representation 
of how the duality (interior and exterior, public and private realm, 
building and space) is diagrammatized. Th is map deploys the duality 
in order to distinguish the grey area between the two: the interior 
which has a strong relation with its exterior, an enclosed building 
which is considered a public space, the space within the building 
but has a spatial connection with the area outside. Th is grey space 
therefore gains its identity. It can be thought of, discussed and 
manipulated. It exists and is as permanent as the building and the 
ground.  
In Indonesian cities, urban space also comprises a grey area. However, 
unlike Western permanence and Nolli’s way of representation, the area 
is occupied by temporary structures. “Shopping streets” are made of 
various informal street vendors and kaki limas are the most common 
feature of this temporality. Sidewalks, sewage and drainage canals, 
train tracks, bus stops, spaces under fl yovers, alongside of parking 
areas, unoccupied land areas and other under-designed spaces are 
their favorite places. For them space has a diff erent meaning. Th e 
diff erentiation between public space and privately owned territory 
disappears. For them the in-between area (between the public and 
the owned territory) is a convenient space to claim because of its 
ambiguity. Th ey hover between the ignorance and control of public 
authority upon public space and the generosity of the owners of 
 CHAPTER 4 - 250
the land. Hence, the case is diff erent from Nolli’s problem. It is a 
rather illegal occupation of public and private ground for creating 
alternative public spaces for the poor who have no access to space. 
Kaki limas are widely perceived as tarnishing the image of a world 
city like Jakarta as they are normally associated with poverty and 
messiness. People tend to believe that these slum-like shops are an 
expression of poverty. But this is not always the case since in their 
native regions, (the peddlers mostly come from small, remote cities 
or rural areas), they live in relatively nice homes. Th eir occupation of 
these in-between areas is more or less an expression of fear since they 
know that they have no rights upon those spaces and are reluctant 
to engage in the bureaucratic process to claim those rights. Th us, 
they rely on the ambiguity of those spaces in order to have a pseudo-
security. Hence from their point of view, it is not about fi nancial 
poverty but powerlessness and lack of access to space. Th ey are an 
example of the poverty of space in urban space.
For street stall owners such as warung tegal (fast-food shops) 
and gerobag-dorong (wagon peddlers) which compose the urban 
informalities, aesthetics is not important except for the sign. Th e sign 
is the identifying characteristic which attracts customers. Trees, high-
rise buildings, fl yovers and bridges most often signify the location to 
offi  ce workers, laborers, or students so they can fi nd and remember 
it. Th ese areas provide them with not only a place to install an easily 
recognizable sign but also provides their customers with a sense of 
shelter and security besides the rudimentary structure of wrapped 
bamboo poles and tarpaulins. Here the term building has a diff erent 
meaning. In our urban world, it means well-built structure with 
a rigid and walled edifi ce. For them it means a temporary, simply 
constructed, fragile, and easy-to-dismantle construction. Th ey must 
be easy to take down in case they have to run away from the police 
and urban authorities who are continuously raiding their businesses. 
Th us, the sense of strength and permanence is borrowed from the 
main building such as those high-rise buildings, bridges, fl yovers, 
and trees. After developing a sense of security and if the place brings 
enough hoki (profi table gains/good fortune in Chinese expression), 
then they begin to set up a stronger shelter made from better quality 
251
materials. In this case, tactility works in this “choosing pattern” and 
they can “feel” the present through these sorts of aesthetics. Space and 
time is very meaningful for them. For the kaki lima vendor, sooner 
is better when occupying a favorite space, a hoki space. To be left 
behind means they could be deserted by their customers. Sometimes 
an agreement between the peddlers is made, either by themselves 
or by the gang that controls the space. Th e kaki lima vendor then 
must pay money in order to be protected and guaranteed that he 
can occupy the space without any disturbance from unrecognized 
peddlers or other gangs. Finding a new place means fi nding new 
customers which could take time, energy and patience since it is 
a trial and error process without any  formula or no guidelines 
whatsoever.
Th ese kinds of structures are not part of the designed element of 
building or urban space, yet they are also not entirely incremental. 
Precisely because they are claimed to be outside of architecture, 
their existence in urban space is problematic. On one side, the 
authorities tend to label them as a problem of urbanization. Th e 
case of “designing” requires clearly demarcated and represented 
territory; however it is precisely these informalities that are lacking. 
Architecturally speaking, these informalities need an adequate 
method of representation to uplift their existence into account. From 
a larger perspective, informalities are inevitable in Jakarta, not only 
because of its historical roots, but also within the very concept of 
the way informalities grow within globalizing cities such as Jakarta. 
With their fl exible accommodation to any authoritative body in 
space, these kinds of urban informalities could potentially deplete 
rigid insularity. 
Gardu’s struggle for democratic space 
On the eve of the reformation struggle in 1998, thousands of simple 
structures called gardu mushroomed throughout Indonesia. Th ey 
were small, temporary bamboo structures built along the roads and 
streets. No one knew precisely who built these edifi ces; however, 
a marginal political party called the Indonesian Democratic Party-
Struggle (PDI-P) claimed them as their creation.69
 CHAPTER 4 - 252
Nevertheless, the rapid multiplication all over Indonesia of these 
structures and in a relatively short period of time, built by ordinary 
people, was an extraordinary architectural phenomenon. In the 
beginning of this event perhaps it was true that this phenomenon 
was triggered by PDI-P’s idea to demonstrate their power through 
building the gardu in some places. But then the idea was duplicated 
vastly and perhaps the planners, if they existed, lost control over 
them. Th us more gardu were built by other parties as well as non-
partisan groups to demonstrate their existence. In these events, the 
gardu became a formal, architectural and spatial language of political 
competition in the Indonesian political grassroots space. 
In a political realm it reveals a diff erent picture. Th e gardu (sometimes 
called posko - post command, posko gotong royong - post command 
for co-operation), was not only a space of political tools that 
functioned horizontally, or between political groups in society, but 
also vertically, between ordinary people and the political elite or the 
State. Th e leaders of political parties hoped and claimed that they 
had control over them by giving them a social role. PDI-P Jakarta 
for instance hosted fund raising event and designated the gardu as 
frontier posts to deliver the funds to the society in remote areas. Th ey 
were also assigned as security posts for the community. In the event 
of the general election, the gardu had been given a role as “service 
provider” for the society concerning the election information. Th e 
PDI-P leaders created a position called “Coordinator of Control for 
Posko Gotong Royong PDI-P” in their organizational structure. 
Nevertheless, whether they could really control these gardu was 
hardly proven. Th is inability can be seen from uncontrolled events 
such as the burning of the posts in certain communities,70 “improper 
use” of the posts71, or the uncontrolled spread of gardu.72
From the governmental point of view, these gardu were seen as political 
propaganda. Th e Government struggled to dismantle and disregard 
their presence. Such eff orts were made and backed by variety of legal 
reasons, from claiming that they were illegally built to “built in state 
owned spaces.” In the event of the general election, it was obligatory 
for the parties to dismantle all equipment that could be associated 
with their presence surrounding the election pools. Th is regulation 
253
thus placed some gardus in a confl icting position. Some partisan 
and non-partisan groups rejected the action to dismantle. Th e case 
elevated tensions between those groups and the government because 
they disputed about whether these gardu should be painted white or 
simply dismantled.
Paradoxically, the gardu is virtually always used to present a 
democratic space. Some television programs use these street vendor 
and gardu as a site for their talk shows. A television program called 
Th e People Speak (Rakyat Bicara) from the TPI channel uses gardu as 
the site for a talk show with invited guests, encircled by food stalls 
and ordinary people. Th ere, the exchange of knowledge is performed 
directly between the community and the urban authorities as well as 
experts. A similar program called Gardu, led by one of the leading 
political artists Emha A. Nadjib on Indosiar channel presents the 
structure as a freedom to speak area. It was defi nitely initiated and 
triggered by the above events and architecture. Inside the gardu,
invited guests including government offi  cers, are considered to be 
speaking informally outside of their offi  cial ranking. Hence, this is 
potentially very critical for them as well. Th is program is a setting 
where political debates can be parodied. 
Th e architecture of gardu actually has a long history. Etchings 
on a bronze pot found in Yunnan Province, South China where 
Indonesian culture is thought to derive from 2-1 century BC, depicts 
such a simple structure. Another simple structure which functioned 
as open veranda is also depicted in a relief on the Buddhist temple 
of Borobudur, near Yogyakarta (8th century AD). Such a system 
of construction to some degree is still used in current gardu.73 Th e 
structure is used as a public space where people gather, play music, 
receive guests, and even conduct court. Such functions, as well as 
small gatherings for kampung security, preparing ceremonial off erings 
in paddy fi elds and so on, in kampung and village communities 
are still performed in current gardu. Th is kind of structure and its 
related functionality can be found amongst almost all ethnic groups 
in Indonesia. 
Gardu in general plays an important role in society. Architecture of 
 CHAPTER 4 - 254
Above: A model of an open 
veranda. Bronze pot  found 
in Yunnan, South China 
which is thought to be the 
origin of Indonesian culture 
(2 -1 century BC). (Source: 
Domenig 1980 p. 87). 
Below: A simple structure 
with simple construction 
depicted in one of relief 
in Buddhist temple of 
Borobudur, near Yogyakarta 
(8 century AD). (Source: 
Domenig 1980 p. 42). 
Right: Various models of 
gardu found in east Jakarta.  
255
current gardu is not accidentally found, but rooted from tradition. 
It is a proto democratic space in Indonesian communities. For this 
reason, any claim of identity is problematic. Contemporary gardu 
reveals that many problems emerged when a party tried to claim 
this societal tradition as their invention. Th e claim produced a 
confrontational, politically segregated and partisan society replacing 
the tradition in the society. Politically speaking, at the same time, 
their multiplicity makes the structure a truly democratic space.  
Rukunan: virtual reconciling space
Th e rukunan points to the reconciliation of space between public 
and private tension. Th e term originates from the Javanese word 
rukun, meaning a state of harmony between two or more people 
or families in a neighborhood. In kampung, as the land between 
houses is not clearly defi ned, it becomes a space of rukunan. It can 
be in the form of a thoroughfare or open space and can function 
interchangeably depending on the needs of the neighborhood itself. 
On normal days, the space can be occupied by various daily activities 
such as children’s playground or space for drying clothes. But when 
there is a community event, such as a death or a marriage, the space 
is used by the family hosting the ritual. As stated previously, the 
area used will also include the adjacent houses. Here the interplay 
between public and private functional occupation makes the land 
status rather meaningless. Hence, the notion of territorial borders 
can only be realized through this temporary functional occupation 
rather than in a fi xed physical form. 
Indeed, at the neighborhood level, such as in a kampung, the concept 
of rukunan space can be rather easily consecrated. However, this 
is not the case at the urban level in order to reconcile the tension 
between the citizens and the authorities. Perhaps this sort of virtual 
space used by the Urban Poor Consortium is a way to assist Jakarta’s 
citizens to speak out. Under the name of “Ruwatan Kota Ruwatan 
Kampung” (meaning City’s Salvation and Kampung’s Salvation) an 
event took place on April 22, 2002 offi  cially as a celebration of Earth 
Day and of 475 years of Jakarta. In Javanese culture ruwatan (meaning 
salvation) is a holy communal congregation for salvation, in order to 
avoid disasters and to “re-establish order.” Normally ruwatan takes 
 CHAPTER 4 - 256
the form of a shadow puppet performance with the central feature 
of a backlit screen and some traditional puppet fi gures. 
Th e puppet show tells the story of Kala, a demonic monster, the 
son of Durga, the queen of the underworld in Hindu mythology. 
Because of his passion for the world life and his hunger, he arrogantly 
swallows the sun as a symbol of life. As the world suddenly darkens, 
the people do not give up. Th ey bang anything they can to make 
noise to shock Kala. Indeed, Kala is shocked and throws back the 
sun. As the light fl ares, so the life returns.74 In Javanese mythology, 
Kala has a very specifi c role in shadow puppet plays because he is 
a central fi gure in ruwatan. Kala is a symbol of evil that must be 
challenged. Although shadow puppet performances originated from 
the Indian Mahabharatha and Ramayana narratives, the ruwatan
episode is perhaps an entirely Javanese invention. Th is episode 
illustrates the apex of confl icts against evil and how human beings 
can actually tame it. 
Th e Urban Poor Consortium’s performance uses both art and 
politics. It is art because the performance itself involved the complete 
practice of shadow puppetry, albeit with a new interpretation. It is 
also political because the presence of Kala and the people’s resistance 
can be associated with societal confl ict appearing in daily life. 
According to Javanese beliefs, ruwatan is a metaphysical approach 
to overcome disastrous happenings for certain individuals or places. 
Th e ceremony held by the Urban Poor Consortium served this 
belief, working as a salvation for the whole city. Th e event was held 
after a series of kampung evictions. Between the hopeless reality and 
a hope for “metaphysical” salvation, the community caricaturized 
the confl ict of the city, interpreting this continuing threat as Kala. 
Instead of confronting the urban authorities who were conducting 
the evictions and feeling despair in the face of the fl oods, the message 
was sent implicitly and metaphorically to off er a rukunan space 
between the citizens and the authorities. Th is event suggests that the 
claim for a space in urban confl ict may appear in its most delicate 
form, almost spaceless.  
Ruwatan: kampung’s
salvation. Source: Urban 
Poor Consortium
257
Resisting insularization: necessity for representation
Th e above three phenomena are indeed non architectural elements 
although they are spatial in various degrees of (real) space-ness. 
Th ey are ephemeral space. Th is phenomenon however is not 
uncommon in Indonesia. Home architecture, a sign of existence in 
phenomenological view, is in this setting merely a sign of a gradual 
process of construction toward a more established form. Th ere will be 
no fi xed house except that reaching the imagined form of “traditional 
house”, hence, a monument rather than house in the Heideggerian 
sense. Th us, it is common for the well-to-do, especially those who 
hold political power, to want to build an existential home using their 
own traditional architecture. According to the Javanese for instance, 
the sign of existence is pendapa, an open pavilion for receiving 
guests. Mangunwijaya suggested that a pendapa, as one of the most 
important elements of the Javanese house, is philosophically merely 
a parasol, a movable element, planted in the middle of courtyard.75
Hence for the Javanese, what is considered important is not the fi xed 
structure but rather the space created by the ephemeral. Further, this 
system applies not only to the Javanese. Anthropologist Rosanna 
Waterson in her book Living House noted that houses in most ethnic 
groups in Indonesia are, as showed indirectly on the cover of the 
book, considered a moveable and detachable structure.76 In sacred 
architecture in Bali, ephemeral space plays a major role too. Despite 
the rigidity of the temples, penjor (bamboo banners) and off erings 
laid on wooden and bamboo benches cannot be left behind in order 
to protect the secrecy. Without the ephemeral, the main edifi ce, the 
temple, is considered an idle structure. Th e rukunan space is also 
another of ephemeral urban element, albeit in a virtual stage. We are 
now confronting the border area between architecture and the “excess 
of architecture,” between real and imaginary space, between insular 
territory and what is “outside.” Th is position is perhaps similar to 
the Javanese architecture, which during colonial rule was labeled as 
“non architecture.” Stephen Cairns discussed this issue well. 
In the early 1900s the Dutch architects kept the Javanese building 
traditions out of their designs and plans. Indeed there was a debate 
concerning an Indo-European style, including the most refi ned 
 CHAPTER 4 - 258
of Indonesian architecture found in the kraton (Javanese palace). 
Mainstream Dutch architects and engineers placed the kraton
outside of architecture, as they understood it. Wolff  Schoemaker, 
the professor of architecture in the Dutch Technical High School in 
Bandung rejected the discourse that the Javanese has any architectural 
tradition. But they did not hesitate to regard the Indian building 
traditions as a mature architectural style, as it was the design of 
the temples found on Java.77 Th e other position however emerged 
through the arguments of Th omas Karsten and Henri Maclaine Pont 
as well as the Dutch architect H.P. Berlage who journeyed to the 
colony in 1923. Th ey argued that a distinct style could be found in 
late Javanese architecture, which “still relates to the ancient art but 
has developed into an independent style.” Th is could be seen in the 
pendapa type of buildings and perhaps most clearly refi ned by the 
kraton palace.  In his paper, Cairns identifi ed that Berlage’s rejection 
can be fruitful for interrogating the discursive space of architecture. 
He pointed to Gottfi ed Semper’s conception, and the infl uence of 
this notion to Berlage, that the origin of architecture is found in the 
use of woven fabric. Woven fabric is primary in architecture rather 
A movable house structure. 
It shows how ephemeral 
structure like gardu or 
kakilima  is the origin of 
architecture which then 
mutates into something 
more established form of 
architecture such as the 
vernacular architecture of 
Indonesia. It is a “living 
house” not mere as a 
living habitus but also its 
form lives and grows into 
something else yet to come. 
Source: Waterson 1989, 
cover page).  
259
than structural concerns. Semper’s tectonic notion deliberately turns 
the preceding hierarchy up side down. Karsten, Macleine Pont and 
Berlage noted that the pringgitan (space for holding puppet shows) 
functions in this way, as the site of a screen. Cairns postulated that 
the presence of a screen in this space invites “another space” for 
architecture both in the discourse and its formal approach. Cairns 
concluded: 
‘If there is no authentic space outside this fabricated condition then 
another space of resistance must be constructed from within its weave. 
The refusal of Schoemaker to concede the “Javanese house” the status of 
architecture opens such space. From this kind of space – a space within 
the boundaries of architectural discourse – the threat of an architecture of 
radical difference can be reconceived. The form of this radical differences 
is, paradoxically, almost formless: the two dimensional ornamental surface 
of the wayang screen and the wayang puppets that occupy it.’ (Cairns, 
1997, p. 88)
Th is section has shown how the above urban informalities are 
translated into a politic of resisting the total insularization of 
urban space. Like the Javanese wayang screen, they are ephemeral 
elements of architecture and urban space. Like Javanese architecture, 
precisely because they are claimed to be outside of architecture, their 
existence in urban space is very real and problematic. On one hand, 
the authorities tend to dismiss them as a problem of urbanization 
because they lack precise representation. On the other side, seen 
from a larger perspective, informalities are inevitable in Jakarta, 
not only because of their historical roots, but also within the very 
concept of growing informalities within globalizing cities such as 
Jakarta. Th eir presence is virtually always subjugated, stigmatized 
as a problem instead of understood as a phenomenon of becoming, 
a mutation process toward something else, which is more suitable 
for new urbanities. Kaki limas, gardus and the rukunan space are an 
expression of the poor respecting the minor culture – the expression 
of fear as well as hopes and dreams. Th ey are not entirely a result of 
fi nancial poverty, but rather evolve from powerlessness and a lack 
of access to space. Th e ephemeral nature of kaki limas, gardus, and 
rukunan space places architectural boundaries in contesting positions. 
It is the “almost formless element” of architecture, a virtual territory 
that needs to be actualized by creating new modes of representation. 
 CHAPTER 4 - 260
However this is not an argument to anesthetize the poor, but rather, 
owing to Charles Correa’s expression that we should “help generate 
[an] urban context” for them.78  
As seen from more specifi c point of view, those ephemeral spaces 
have little connection with urban art; they nonetheless share an 
attribute as an object that can be detached from urban space. In this 
case, Rosalyn Deutsch was perhaps right when she saw urban art and 
politics as a confl ict between paradigms rather than merely a dispute 
over objects of art.79 In our case, the contestation of ephemeral space 
is due to its multiplicity. One or two kaki limas or gardus or rukunan
space will not aff ect urban space. But if we talk about a thousand 
units of them, the problem as well as their potential for reconciling 
space can be easily seen. It is not about art, but about the multiplicity 
of ephemeral space in the city. It is about the ephemeral space, which 
is continuously rejected, alien to the territory of architecture and 
urban space. From the above descriptions, it can be seen that the 
kaki limas, gardus and rukunan became a political tool too, or rather 
a hijacked public space for political negotiation between the ordinary 
people with the elites and the State.80 It is also a democratic space 
in its very real sense and not only an illusion as in the “democratic 
architecture.”  Th ese spaces create a spatial position for the ordinary 
to negotiate within the wider context of politics. Intentionally, 
the ephemeral space may also be a generator for creating “other” 
space where political tensions and confrontation can be parodied 
and negotiated. Th e doubling strategies of these spaces presumably 
work as the dialect between space and meaning. Kaki limas, gardus,
and rukunan as architectural spaces and forms are used with various 
intentions. Th e ephemeral space is a space in a virtual state. It is a 
pre-lived space in its state of virtuality that waits to be actualized. 
Culture, as believed by Romi Khosla, an Indian architect and a 
United Nations envoy for urban development, makes people have 
choices to live. In the very beginning of this chapter he showed that 
two neighboring cultures could live harmoniously side by side or 
end up at a volatile juncture. It is not merely about the opposition of 
rich and poor. Th e urban riot of 1998 in Jakarta was proof as well as 
a sign that Jakarta actually has many cities within, each representing 
261
the polarities between insular spaces and what lies outside. Th rough 
ephemeral space, there are plenty of chances to reconcile between 
those polarities. However there is also a possibility that ephemeral 
space fails to grow due to our stubborn insularity. In this case, the 
author worries that Jakarta’s urban space gives little chance for such 
reconciliation to develop.  
Notes
1  Khosla, Romi, Sikandar Hasan, Jane Samuels, and Budhi Mulyawan. 2002. 
Removing Unfreedom, Citizens as Agents of Change, Sharing New Policy 
Frameworks for Urban Development. London: DFID. Th e paper appears in 
www.removingunfreedoms.org (accessed on 11 February 2006)
2  Alexander, Christopher, Sara Ishikawa, and Murray Silverstein. 1977. A Pattern 
Language: Towns, Buildings, Construction. New York: Oxford University 
Press. p. 42-50.  According to Alexander, a city will be showed as mosaic 
of subculture as it is made of by a large number of subcultures, relatively 
small in size, each occupying an identifi able place and separated from other 
subcultures by a boundary of non-residential land. People can choose the 
kind of sub culture they wish to live in and still able to fi nd diff erent life other 
from their own. Within the sub-culture people can also grow since support 
and strong shared values are kept. 
3  Lombard, Denys. 1996. Nusa Jawa: Silang Budaya. Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka 
Utama. Especially book 3, p. 133. Illustrating from wayang shadow puppet 
plays as one of the most important cultural performances representing the 
mentality he showed. Th e knight (ksatria) who holds the power can only 
be a real leader after he could reconcile with marginalized, ordinary people 
exemplifi ed by four disabled persons (punokawans). Th e knight must also 
take a journey to the marginalized lands with them and be a nomad for a 
while before bearing his social task as the authority (to become a king or to 
accomplish certain task). In an urban context Lombard saw on one side that 
the Javanese city functions as a mandala where power is centralized and social 
hierarchy is established. On the marginal side (village), there are nebulous 
unknown spaces – the wilderness - where sub-proletarians travel from one 
place to the other, a space for the nomads. Th e “ideal city” for the Javanese 
hence must balance the tension between mandala and this space. 
4  Gumilar Rusliwa Somantri saw Jakarta as a “gigantic kampung” that has 
many hierarchical centers. Kampungs are spilled throughout these centers 
and connect them as “the continuity of the development pattern” throughout 
Jakarta’s history. Since colonial times this city experienced continuity in its 
way of development; namely the integration of the main city with new centers 
simultaneously through physical connections (streets) and kampung. Many 
kampungs were comprised of migrants, especially around 1920 during the 
industrial boom in Batavia under the Dutch administration Somantri, Gumilar 
Rusliwa. 1995. Looking at the gigantic kampung, urban hierarchy and general 
trends of intra-city migration in Jakarta. Bielefeld: Forschungsschwerpunkt 
Entwicklungssoziologie.
5  A seminal historical excavation on Java has been performed by Denys Lombard 
Lombard, Denys. 1996. Nusa Jawa: Silang Budaya. Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka 
Utama., translated from his Lombard, Denys. 1990. Le Carrefour Javanais. 
Paris: École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales.. Th ese three volumes 
 CHAPTER 4 - 262
of lengthy historical surveys on Java unveil cultural processes, including 
the Indianization, Islamization, and Westernization that have shaped Java’s 
cultural mixture. He noted that the region (in general to the South East Asia) 
for about a thousand years (the 5th to 15th century) was a site where nearly all 
civilizations met but were still able to maintain their homogenous identity 
– the fact that he claimed no other part of the world may be compared 
except perhaps Middle Asia (p. 1-2). Th e center of this process was Java and 
Sumatra. All information related to Lombard writing here is originated from 
Indonesian volumes and freely translated into English by the author.
6  Th e form of Jayakarta, illustrated by Abeyasekere, Susan. 1987. Jakarta: A 
History. Singapore ; New York: Oxford University Press, p. 10, is reproduced 
from de Haan, F. 1922. Oud Batavia. Batavia. It is perhaps the only spatial 
description found so far. Th is composition has similarities with the form of 
the two coastal cities of Banten (Bantam) and Demak in central Java as well 
as other inland Javanese cities such as Yogyakarta and Solo. Early Banten 
(or Bantam) as described in Nas, Peter J.M. 1986. “Th e Early Indonesian 
Town.” in Th e Indonesian City, edited by Peter J.M. Nas. Dordrecht-Holland/
Cinnaminson-USA: Foris Publication. 
7  See for instance Behrend, TE. 1983. Kraton and Cosmos in Traditional Java: 
Th esis at the University of Madison. He illustrated the function of Javanese 
city as imago mundi, the center of the world. In some traditional cities in 
Java, such as Yogyakarta and Solo in central Java, the remnants of the city as 
cosmos and its spatial division of sacredness can still be seen even today. 
8  Lombard, Denys. 1996. Nusa Jawa: Silang Budaya. Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka 
Utama.; book 3, “Warisan Kerajaan Konsentrik” (translated from L’heritage 
des royaumes concentrique). Its Indonesian expression: “Di jantung kota berdiri 
istana yang merupakan intinya; kota hanyalah bungkusnya” p. 108. 
9  Abeyasekere listed that in 1673 Batavia was inhabited around 2,024 Dutch, 
726 Eurasian, 2,747 Chinese, 5,362 Mardjikers (Indo-Portuguesen), 1,339 
Moors (Arabs) and Javanese, Malayans 611, Balinese, 981 and huge number 
of slaves, 13,278 people out of the total population of 32,068 (41%). Hence 
in terms of population, the Europeans were the minority. See Abeyasekere, 
Susan. 1987. Jakarta: A History. Singapore; New York: Oxford University 
Press.  
10  Helen Rosenau surveyed the concept of Ideal Cities in Europe starting from 
the Greco-Roman tradition, to the Renaissance and to Utopian Socialism 
and Futurism. She showed that the concept of “ideal” is mainly based on the 
pursuit of the more socially oriented urban environment rather than merely 
perfect form. In Rosenau’s view, the concept of ideal means providing “the 
solution to a particular problem in a perfect manner” rather than the creation 
of a prototype of a supranational normative character and ideal plan. In 
particular regarding city life, she revealed that despite the fact that the notion 
of the ideal city appears strikingly in its formal matters, the concept of ideal in 
fact implies a conscious eff ort to enhance the life expectation of the ordinary 
man and worker. In this development Filarete played a very important role as 
the fi rst architect who tried to include a peasant colony in his fi ctional town of 
Sforzinda. Th e aim was to provide a town for all classes. In the high Renaissance, 
the designs of Albrect Dürer in Germany and Sir Th omas More’s Utopia 
in England had a social tendency, which was ahead of their time. Rosenau 
concluded that the ideal city was marked by “the regularity of plan combined 
with a concern for a better society which characterized and enhances ideal 
planning.” Th e shift in political orientation from republics back to hereditary 
monarchies, the threat of wars, the impact of the Reformation, as well as 
growing economic competition mainly between France and the Netherlands 
led to social perfection being defi ned with reference to merely military 
263
purposes. In brief, the Mannerist planners narrowed the social purpose of 
the preceding Renaissance. Since they were working for the aristocracy, they 
developed a “circumscribed and formalized” type of architecture in which the 
fortifi ed township was dominated by a perfect geometric pattern. With regard 
to the shifting concept of the ideal city in Europe, which was surely behind 
the formal aspect of Batavia, Rosenau concluded that in the Early Renaissance 
the concept of the ideal city tried to free town-planning from medieval, chiefl y 
religious and symbolic interpretations. In the high Renaissance, it was even 
further directed to dissolving the unity of the town and emphasized clarity 
and accuracy of observations and formal consideration of symmetry. In the 
Mannerist phase however, in complete contrast: “the unity of the town is 
re-established by a more restricted, purely formal, approach, coupled with 
material, namely military, considerations, thus creating a dichotomy which 
led to easily applicable, but socially sterile, formulae” Rosenau, Helen. 1983. 
Th e Ideal City, Its Architectural Evolution in Europe. London and New York: 
Methuen, p. 66. 
11  Population control was really the issue for the Dutch. Furnivall reported that 
in 1740s the VOC began to be aware of the superfl uous number of Chinese 
in Batavia. Afraid they might become a powerful party, the company tried 
to send them to Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and to South Africa where they have 
posts and plantations. Th e rumors around the Chinese were that they would 
be dumped in the sea during the journey. Many of them thus began to arm 
themselves to resist. Th e clash was unavoidable resulting some 10,000 Chinese 
being killed, while Chinese homes and shops were burned down. After that 
tragedy, the Chinese population remained only 3431, consisting of 1442 
merchants, 935 cultivators and gardeners, 728 workers in sugar and timber, 
and 326 craftsmen. Th e Dutch regarded all of them as “which number was 
considered not too large but very necessary” Furnivall, J. S. 1944. Netherlands 
India: A Study of Plural Economy. Cambridge (UK), New York: Th e University 
Press, Th e Macmillan company. (p 46). Later, the population could not be 
controlled anymore. Th e European population, including the Eurasians, went 
from a mere couple of thousand in 1800 to nearly ten thousand in 1900. Th ey 
were outnumbered compared to the Chinese population that doubled from 
twelve thousand to about twenty-fi ve thousand, and the soaring number of 
natives. In the early 1800s the number was about thirty thousand and in 
1900 nearly eighty thousand. Within these statistics, Arabs, Malays, Javanese, 
Balinese and other smaller ethnic groups were regarded as natives since they 
could not distinguish the ethnicity of those people. 
12  Peter J. Nas suggested that this opposition of spheres was rooted in the 
suppressing nature of the colonial society and because of this; colonial cities 
were often characterized as dual cities. In Indonesian context however, Nas 
described that colonial cities and towns were even more complex. Besides 
having indigenous and Western spheres, a considerable “foreign oriental” 
(especially Chinese) population presented another element making these 
towns tripartite. As seen in Batavia, the Fort and colonial wards marked 
the Western part while shop-houses marked the Chinese quarter of pecinan
and kampung for the indigenous. See Nas, Peter J.M. 2003. “Colonial City” 
available at http://www.leidenuniv.nl/fsw/nas/pub_ColonialCity.htm. 
13  Tuan, Yi-Fu. 1990. Topophilia. A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes 
and Values. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 31.
14  Norberg-Schulz, Christian. 1980. Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of 
Architecture. New York: Rizzoli, p. 71. 
15  Kebayoran Baru itself was initiated by the Dutch. However, the planning was 
cancelled due to the hand over of sovereignty to Indonesia. Th e planning was 
then continued by Mr. Susilo, the fi rst Indonesian urban planner. 
 CHAPTER 4 - 264
16  Winarso, Haryo. 1999. “Private Residential Developers and the Spatial 
Structure of Jabotabek.” in Urban Growth and Development in Asia: Volume I: 
Making the Cities, edited by Graham P. Chapman. Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate. 
17  Kelapa Gading for the ethnic Chinese is identifi ed as “head of dragon”, 
particularly a sea dragon Hai Lung Wang. In the fengshui (Chinese geomancy) 
it is believed that if one area is located in such constellation it brings luck and 
prosperities. Th at’s why although Kelapa Gading is one of the most fl ooded 
areas in Jakarta (the Chinese believe that, of course, dragons dwell in swampy 
land!), the Chinese seem to be reluctant to move away from this area and also 
continue to invest in further development. 
18  In the year 2002 alone there were two major confl icts that were highlighted 
in the national newspaper. Th e fi rst confl ict was the eviction of “illegal 
housing” on a piece of land in Kelapa Gading. Th ey were “illegal” due to 
invalid documents (many of them hold permits allegedly issued by urban 
authorities under Suharto’s regime thus regarded simply as invalid). About 
700 houses occupied by more than 1500 inhabitants were destroyed for 
planned offi  ces and shopping centre of “Mediterania Square” including the 
Gading Mediterania Residence apartment tower. Th e second confl ict was to 
protest the development of a new mall. People issued a petition against the 
plan for “Kelapa Gading International Sport Mall and Basket Ball Arena.” 
Th e confl ict was caused by contradictory interpretation of appropriate land 
use. Th e city master plan stated that the land was dedicated to the public and 
social facilities. Th e urban authority however gave the permit for such a “sport 
mall” considering it a “public facility.” Th e residents (neighborhood of RW 
06, 07, and 11) rejected the mall since it did not refl ect such usage. 
19  Danisworo, M. Herni Poerbo, Ahmad Tardiyana, Aji Bimarsono, Laksmi 
Tunggadewe. 2002. “Jakarta” in Mobility A Room with a View. Edited by 
Francine Houben and Luisa Calabrese. Rotterdam: NAI Publisher.
20  See Chapter 2 especially p. 81-83 as Boddy criticized the development of 
“bridge and tunnel” in our contemporary cities that detached from urban 
streets. 
21  Th e riot was regarded as the most terrible post-colonial urban experience 
ever. Th e event perhaps can only be compared with the bloody revolution 
against the communist movement in 1965. Th e riot was followed by political 
turmoil, which pushed Suharto to step down. See chapter 1 for casualties and 
damages caused by the riot.   
22  See Chapter 2 especially p. 58.
23  Moreover to add the list, there are Alam Sutera (700 hectares), Kapuk Naga 
(8,000 hectares), Bintaro Jaya (2,300 hectares), Citra Raya New Town (2,000 
hectares), Modernland (770 hectares), Citra Grand City (1,000 hectares), 
Villa Permata (700 hectares), Palm Spring Village 100, Pun Jaya City (2,000 
hectares), Citraland New Town and Gading New Town. In Bekasi Regency: 
Bekasi Integrated New Town (1,300 hectares), Cikarang baru New Town 
(5,400 hectares), Bekasi 2000 New Town (2,000 hectares), Lippo Cikarang 
(5,000 hectares), Legend New City (2,000 hectares), Bekasi new City 
planned for (3,000 hectares), Bumi bekasi baru New Town (1,500 hectares). 
In Bogor Regency Jonggol Asri is planned to cover 33,000 hectares, Citra 
Indah City (1,200 hectares), Royal Sentul New City (2,000 hectares), Lido 
Lake (1,700 hectares), Rancamaya New City (550 hectares), Cariu New City 
(2,000 hectares) Peresthu, Andrea. no year. “Jakarta’s “Exurbia” Kampongs.” 
ETSAB-UPC, Barcelona Research Paper available at http://www.etsav.upc.
es/urbpersp/num01/index.htm
24  See note on my own survey in Yogyakarta in Chapter 2 p. 70 and its 
endnote. 
265
25  Th e discourse to turn Jabodetabek into a single administrative “megalopolis of 
Jakarta” is growing recently. Th e discourse proposes also to include Cianjur 
Regency, hence Jabodetabekjur. 
26  Firman, T. 2000. “Rural to Urban Land Conversion in Indonesia during 
Boom and Bust Periods.” Land Use Policy 17: 13-20.
27  Hollow Town is proposed referring to a Mojokuto, a small town in East Java. He 
proposed the  concept of a “hollow town” which contains four characteristics. 
(A) Social group is the basis of spatial division. Geertz saw that those “estate-
like social groups” are composed by interrelation of religion, ideology, race, 
occupation, social and economic status etc. In the case of Mojokuto, pious 
Muslim santris are concentrated in a certain part of the town and is not 
mixed with its “opposition” namely abangan. Th e priyayi, aristocrats and state 
offi  cers, are also agglomerated in certain area separates with traders (Chinese 
for instance). Th ose factions are clearly expressed in spatial division. (b) It 
is based on independent entities and the link between them. A village is 
an independent entity. It has its own social structure, has its own supply 
of basic commodities, as well as workforces. Exchange of commodities may 
also happen in the village. Inter-village relation happens mostly during the 
market day. Th e town is not only a collection of these entities albeit in the 
compressed form as Geertz described as “a composite of self-contained status 
communities” that their basis is regional and interurban and not local and 
intraurban. (c) Th e diff erence of strata living produces a barrier between 
groups. Although it may not always produce a social grouping and spatial 
division but the gap between the strata may be apprehended and may appear 
in certain limited interaction, “side by side and not in the solid structure.” 
Geertz, Cliff ord. 1975. Th e Social History of an Indonesian Town. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, p. 4. 
28  Translated freely from “Kalau bukan Kite Siapa Lagi yang Menjage Kampung 
Kite” – a banner message hung in many corners of Jakarta. Th e word kite, 
instead of kita (literally means we), expresses the message that the “we” refers 
to the Betawian people, the so-called ethnic natives of Jakarta. 
29  Webster Dictionary www.websters-online-dictionary.com 
30  Jellinek, Lea. 1991. Th e Wheel of Fortune: Th e History of a Poor Community 
in Jakarta. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. and Korff , Rüdiger. 1986. 
Bangkok: Urban System and Everyday Life. Breitenbach: Bielefelder Studien 
zur Entwicklungssoziologie Saarbrücken.
31  Kenworthy, Jeff . 1997. “Urban ecology in Indonesia: Th e Kampung 
Improvement Program (KIP).” Institute for Sustainability and Technology 
Policy, Murdoch University. 
32  Geertz, Cliff ord. 1975. Th e Social History of an Indonesian Town. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, p. 106-107. 
33  In Center for Statistics Bureau for instance kampung is offi  cially termed as 
“unplanned residential areas” (Perumahan Tidak Teratur). 
34  Th e Javanese language has a special term, babad, meaning both land clearing 
and historical book. Babad Ngajogyakarta for instance narrates the land 
clearing that was to become the city of Yogyakarta in central Java. From the 
Javanese point of view, kampung is also a process of land occupation, a claim 
of empty or deserted land for the purpose of settlement. Th e city itself is 
merely an established form of these clearings. 
35  Based on an account taken Harjoko, Triatno Yudo. 2004. “Penggusuran or 
Eviction in Jakarta: Solution Lacking of Resolution for Urban Kampung.” 
in Th e 15th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia. 
Canberra 29 June-2 July 2004. My own investigation, based on household 
 CHAPTER 4 - 266
surveys conducted by the Central Statistic Bureau (2001), revealed that 
around 20% of the 2.2 million households in Jakarta have a house smaller 
than 20 m2. As a family in Jakarta comprises between 3-5 persons (the average 
is offi  cially 3,75 persons per household), thus most people have less than 5 
m2 for their living area. Kenworthy even reckoned that kampung could reach 
as dense as over 1000 people per hectare, compared to typical fi gures of 10 to 
15 per hectare in the US and Australian cities. See also Kenworthy, Jeff . 1997. 
“Urban ecology in Indonesia: Th e Kampung Improvement Program (KIP).” 
Institute for Sustainability and Technology Policy, Murdoch University.
36  Funo, Shuji, Naohiko  Yamamoto, and Johan Silas. 2002. “Typology of 
Kampung Houses and Th eir Transformation Process - A Study on Urban 
Tissues of an Indonesian City.” Journal of Asian Architecture and Building 
Engineering 1: 193-200. See also Funo, Shuji , Naohiko Yamamoto, Mari 
Tanaka, and Yosihisa Wakita. 1997. “Utilization of Common Space in Rumah 
Susun Sombo (Surabaya, Indonesia).” Journal of Architecture, Planning and 
Environmental Engineering No. 502. 
37  Aiko Kurosawa surveyed that RT in the Lenteng Agung, located between 
Pasar Minggu, a large market town from the olden days, and Depok town. 
Dwellers of this kampung include day-to-day construction workers, handy 
men, peddlers, open-air shop operators, home-made food sellers, or owners 
of small-scale shops attached to their houses. Th e results were that at the ward 
offi  ce, there were cards for 105 households, and at the RT head’s offi  ce, there 
were household-cards for only 44 households. Th ere are 153 households in 
the neighborhood. Th e reason why I say “at the very least” is that there are 
many families from the countryside who are living with friends or relatives, 
so that the actual number of households would most likely be more than 153. 
Kurasawa, Population Statistics for the Indonesian “Kampung” research paper 
Faculty of Economics, Keio University, Japan. 
38  Kompas 7 March 2003 “Suara Keprihatinan dari Kolong Tol (Th e Voice of 
Sorrow from Underneath the Toll-road) illustrated the settlement as a residue 
of “ill-planning” concerning the space underneath toll-road.” Urban planners, 
in particular the planner of an elevated toll road, perhaps do not consider the 
potential of the place underneath as a settlement. Th e stability and stiff ness 
of concrete slabs act as a perfect roof of their house as well as pieces of triplex 
board for the wall. Th e urban authority itself was inter-mingled. On one 
hand, the toll-road management enterprise (Jasa Marga) declined its function 
for settlement. On the other, they built their own offi  ce and kiosk in such a 
place. http://www.properti.net/berita/?q=3123.
39  Th e Second Asian and Pacifi c Region Water Utilities Data Book produces 
a report for the Asian Development Bank showing that the poor actually 
pay more to have the services compared to those who are in “formal” 
neighborhoods and are able to aff ord public services. Th is compilation reports 
that Bandung’s poor buys water from informal vendors paying 50 times more 
than the population getting water from the city’s water distribution network 
(US$6.05 in comparison to only US$0.12 for 10m3/month.) In Jakarta the 
poor there pay 1.97 times more than the supplied families (US$ 0.31 to US$ 
0.16). See http://www.unescap.org/huset/urban_poverty/poorpaymore.htm.
40  Although this refers to Jakarta in general, Murray’s survey shows that in 
kampung approximately 70 percent of the inhabitants are new-comers and 
mainly work in the shadow economy, primarily in the informal sector Murray, 
Alison J. 1991. No Money No Honey: A Study of Street Traders and Prostitutes in 
Jakarta. Singapore ; New York: Oxford University Press.. 
41  A local community has two levels of organization. Th e RT (Rukun Tetangga) 
comprises 20 – 30 households. Th e RW (Rukun Warga) comprises about fi ve 
RTs covering about 100 households. Both levels have an administrator (a head 
267
person) who is responsible for recording people’s movement (move in and 
out), marriage, birth, death. Th is locally elected administrator has to report 
the record to the lowest level of city authority of district level (kelurahan). 
Informally the administrator organizes also local ceremonies such as death, 
birth, marriage or Independence Day celebration at 17 August.     
42  Andrea Peresthu rendered the phenomenon of Jakarta’s “exurbia” of kampungs. 
Rather diff erent from American cities where the term exurbia is applied to the 
proliferating private towns, in the context of Jakarta, Peresthu argues that 
kampungs are proliferating. He distinguished two types of kampungs namely 
“old kampung” and “squatter-kampung.” Th e fi rst was originally a village but 
then was incorporated into city fabric and continuously marginalized and 
isolated. Th e second refers to the newly developed, informal  settlements. 
Peresthu, A., Jakarta’s “Exurbia” Kampongs, ETSAB-UPC, Barcelona Research 
Paper available at http://www.etsav.upc.es/urbpersp/num01/index.htm.
43  McCarty, Paul. 2003. Urban Slums Reports: Th e case of Jakarta, Indonesia. 
London: Earthscan. 
44  Abeyasekere, Susan. 1987. Jakarta: A History. Singapore ; New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
45  After political reform of 1998, many Betawi communities are formed into 
a legalized entity. Some of them are in very localized in kampungs such as 
Betawi Youth Forum (Forum Pemuda Betawi – FPB), Tanah Abang Big 
Family (Ikatan Keluarga Besar Tanah Abang - IKBT), the radical Islamic 
Defender Front (Front Pembela Islam - FPI), Association of the Original 
Betawi Families (Ikatan Keluarga Betawi Asli - Ikaba), Undercurrent 
Communication Forum (Forum Komunikasi Arus Bawah PDIP), Th e 
Resurgence of Betawi Community Alliance (Aliansi Kebangkitan Masyarakat 
Jakarta), Betawi People Unity (Persatuan Orang Betawi - POB), Betawi 
Community Movement (Gerakan Masyarakat Betawi), Betawi Children’s 
Forum (Forum Anak Betawi - Forkabi), Betawi Rempug Forum (FBR), 
Forum of Betawi Brotherhood (Forum Persaudaraan Masyarakat Betawi - 
FPMB).
46  Kompas, 30 March 2002, “Betawi Menjadi Tuan di Kampung Sendiri” 
(Betawi Becomes the Master in Own Kampung).
47  Kompas, 17 June 2002, Dua Ormas Betawi Berbeda dalam Pencalonan 
Gubernur DKI (Two community organizations have diff erent opinions on 
the Jakarta’s governor candidacy).  
48  Harjoko, Triatno Yudo. 2004. “Penggusuran or Eviction in Jakarta: Solution 
Lacking of Resolution for Urban Kampung.” in Th e 15th Biennial Conference 
of the Asian Studies Association of Australia. Canberra 29 June-2 July 2004.
49  Pelita, 6 February 2006, Pertahankan Setu Babakan, 300 Rumah Betawi 
Dibangun (To Conserve Setu Babakan, 300 Betawi House built). 
50  A doubtful view has also been expressed by Gunawan Tjahjono who saw 
the development as nostalgia rather than an attempt to revive the Betawi 
tradition and culture into “new” Betawi in urban and globalization context. 
See Tjahjono, Gunawan. 2003. “Reviving the Betawi Tradition: Th e Case of 
Setu Babakan, Indonesia.” TDSR XV: 59-71.
51  One of them was Menteng. Th e fi rst stage of the planning,, about 1910, 
was made my PAJ Moojen covering the north part of Menteng area (Nieuw-
Gondangdia, now well known as Gondangdia). Further development was 
made by FJ. Kubatz (about 1918). Th e layout was marked with a large open 
space Burgemeester Bisschopplein (now Taman Surapati) in the intersection of 
two major boulevards. Th e third stage was to the further south of the area. 
Th is Nieuw Menteng was intended to the lower income and was planned 
 CHAPTER 4 - 268
with smaller blocks. As the land was formerly a kampung, the residents were 
completely displaced and then spilled to the outskirts beginning to set up 
new kampungs. Living in Menteng since 1960, a Dutch historian Adolf 
Heuken saw Menteng as the fi rst “Garden City” in Indonesian context. His 
book tells that the planning of this garden city was done by Dutch offi  cers 
seriously, architecture of houses was designed and constructed under strict 
regulation of Bataviasche Bouwverordening 1899, the fi rst building code in the 
land of Indonesia (Kompas, 22 Juni 2001 “Menteng Kota Taman Pertama di 
Indonesia” (Menteng the First Garden City in Indonesia). G.E Jobst, one of 
Dutch architects wrote “only proper houses are permitted” in the area (G.E 
Jobst “Stedebouwkundige Ontwikkeling van Batavia” Indisch Bouwkundig 
Tijdschrift, No. 6, 1926 p. 91. in Abeyasekere, Susan. 1987. Jakarta: A History. 
Singapore; New York: Oxford University Press, p. 90.
52  Geertz, Cliff ord. 1975. Th e Social History of an Indonesian Town. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, p. 204.
53  Furnivall, J. S. 1944. Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy. Cambridge 
(UK), New York: Th e University Press, Th e Macmillan Company, p.7.
54  It is rather interesting that the “trading only intention” of Chinese has lesser 
attention by the Portuguese. In Malaka after they defeated the Sultan in 
1511, they appointed a captain for each of the racial communities including 
one for the Hindus, one for the Moors, and one for the Javanese. Th e Chinese 
settlement had no captain (Furnival, p.16). But the Dutch attitude is diff erent 
because they “gave” the Chinese much more responsibility within the colony 
by appointing captains and leaving the other race out. 
55 Th is system was somehow retained up to more contemporary development. 
In Yogyakarta for instance, the cluster of pecinan were located side by side 
with Pasar Gede, the central market. Both were in the north part of the city 
center and further more developed into the current modern commercial 
area of Malioboro. In the more modern towns and cities – which are less 
“Javanese” in terms of their traditional meaning, the Chinese pecinan are also 
normally clustered nearby the city center, lining the major roads that lead to 
the commercial area.
56  Th e New Order under the President’s Instruction (Inpres No.14-1967) 
forbade for instance all public appearances that related to Chinese ethnicity. 
A Circulated Letter (Surat Edaran No.06/Preskab/6/1967) forbade the usage 
of Chinese names and instructed all Chinese to use “Indonesian” names. 
Th e usage of Chinese language was forbidden under Ministerial Decision 
No 286/KP/XII/1978. Surveillance is conducted by a special intelligence 
agency called the Coordination Body on Chinese Issues (Badan Koordinasi 
Masalah Cina - BKMC) which is part of the national Coordination Body of 
Intelligence (Badan Koordinasi Intelijen - Bakin) Abeyasekere, Susan. 1987. 
Jakarta: A History. Singapore; New York: Oxford University Press. 
57  Personal interview with operational manager of Kota Wisata, February 
2002. 
58  Appears in the advertisement available at http://fp.mediaproperti.com/news/
kota%20wisata%20luncurkan%20kampoeng%20wisata.htm accessed on 16 
January 2003.
59  So far, no statistical data has been supplied by the management of this real 
estate. 
60  Bourdieu, Paul. 1977. Outline of the Th eory of Practice. Cambridge.
61  Leisch, Harald. 2002. “Gated Communities in Indonesia.” Cities 19: 341-
350.
269
62  Th is phenomenon is perhaps similar to the phenomenon in the Tenth District 
in Los Angeles. In the 1960s this area had a considerable number of wealthy 
Afro-Americans together with a wealthy and majority white community. 
Because of their similar economic and social status, this district became “a 
bridge between two worlds.” Th is condition paved the way for Tom Bradley 
to become the fi rst African-American city mayor elected in the City Council 
(Sohenshein, 1993 in Goldsmith, William W. 2000. “From the Metropolis 
to Globalization: Th e dialectics of Race and Urban Form.” Pp. 37-55 in 
Globalizing Cities: A new spatial order? edited by Peter Marcuse and Ronald 
van Kempen. Oxford: Blackwell.
63  Wisata Newsletter October/November 2001.
64  Hogan, Trevor and Christopher Houston (2002) “Corporate Cities: Urban 
Gateways or Gated Communities Against the City?” Th e Case of Lippo 
City, Jakarta dalam Critical Perspectives on Cities in Southeast Asia, editor: 
Tim Bunnell, Lisa Drummond and Ho Kong Chong. Tokyo: Brill Academic 
Publishers. About Lippo more can be seen on Benton, Gordon (1999) “New 
Town Developments in Indonesia: a Rare Example” Strategic Intelligence 
Indonesia Report, June, 1999. Benton, Gordon (2000) “Lippo Karawaci: An 
Indonesian Edge City” in Model Cities: Urban Best Practices, Volume I. Ed. By 
Ooi Giok Ling. Singapore, Urban Redevelopment Authority and Institute of 
Policy Studies, Singapore. Hogan, Trevor , and C. Houston. 2002. “Corporate 
Cities: Urban Gateways or Gated Communities Against the City? Th e Case 
of Lippo Jakarta.” in Critical Perspectives on Cities in Southeast Asia, edited by 
Tim Bunnell, Lisa  Drummond and Ho Kong Chong. Tokyo: Brill Academic 
Publishers. 
65 Rather lengthy quotation from Hogan and Houston: “…to view these 
corporate cities as urban innovations which marry culture to technological 
change, these two Lippo cities model how private companies can provide 
more effi  cient and reliable infrastructure than previously achieved in Jakarta: 
communications, sewerage, water, solid waste disposal, security and so forth. 
Th ey also provide an integrated community life-structure for its residents: 
recreational, shopping malls, health and educational facilities of a world-class 
standard. Th is infrastructure also models the world’s best practice in terms of 
zone planning, green belting, traffi  c calming, etc. As we have already noted, 
however, order and cleanliness in a picturesque setting are on off er at a price: 
the thematizing (through pre-packaging) of aesthetics and the exclusion of 
those who cannot pay the price of joy on the market … Th e only way in which 
corporate cities can claim to model the new city to the urban poor is to fall 
back on the pieties of the multiplier and trickle down models of development 
theory. In practice they are models for emulation - in cultivating the desire 
of future middle class participants” (Hogan and Houston, 2002, emphasis 
added). In addition, the statement that golf courses are not a good example 
how nature works refers to the tendency that the center of estate development 
is usually a golf course instead of a public park for instance. 
66  Robert Cowherd, in his dissertation shows how Mr. Ciputra, the owner of 
Ciputra Group one of the biggest real estate companies, Jayaland, and the 
president of REI (Association of Real Estate in Indonesia) dismissed the 
American designer Kaplan-McGlaughin-Diaz’s (KMD) proposal, which 
employed “the traditional Indonesian form” for his real estate project in 
Tangerang. Th e reason was simple: “it is not marketable” Cowherd, Robert. 
2002. Cultural Construction of Jakarta: Design, Planning and Development in 
Jabotabek 1980-1997: PhD dissertation at the MIT (unpublished).
67  His word: “… the crucial thing which Descartes understood very well, but 
which we most often forget, is that this process is only a method. Th is business 
of isolating things, breaking them into fragments, and of making machinelike 
pictures (or models) of how things work, is not how reality actually is. It is a 
 CHAPTER 4 - 270
convenient mental exercise, something we do to reality, in order to understand 
it. Alexander, Christopher. 2002. Book One: Th e Phenomenon of Life. Berkeley, 
California: Th e Center for Environmental Structure. p. 16.  In regard to the 
life, see p. 22. 
68  Habraken, N. J., and Jonathan Teicher. 1998. Th e Structure of the Ordinary: 
Form and Control in the Built Environment. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. p. 
228. 
69  “Instruksi Ketua Umum DPP PDI Perjuangan No 57/DPP/IN/XI/ 1998 
perihal Pendirian Posko Gotong Royong” (Instruction Letter of the Head of 
PDI-P regarding the construction of the gardu).
70  Kompas, 20 Februari 1999 “Posko Gotong Royong PDI Dibakar Cilacap” 
(Posko Gotong Royong – Gardu – burned in Cilacap).
71  Kompas, 12 Januari 1999 “Gus Dur Komentari Posko Gotong Royong PDI 
Jakarta” (Gus Dur comments on the Gardu).
72  Kompas, 17 Desember 1998 “Posko Gotong Royong PDI Terlalu Banyak” 
(Too Many Posko Gotong Royong PDI).
73  Both picture are depicted in Domenig, Gaudenz. 1980. Tektonik im Primitiven 
Dachbau, Materialien und Rekonstruktionen zum Phaenomen der Auskragenden 
Giebel an alten Dachformen Ostasiens, Suedostasien und Ozeaniens. Zuerich: 
ETH, p. 87 and 42 respectively.
74  Urban Poor Consortium web: http://www.urbanpoor.or.id/index_ruwat.htm 
accessed on 2002-12-04, translated freely by author. 
75  Mangunwijaya. 1987. Wastu Citra. Jakarta: Gramedia. Moreover, Ilya 
Maharika and Revianto B Santosa elaborated the signifi cance of parasol-like 
structure as a manifestation, symbolically of permanence Maharika, Ilya, 
and Revianto B. Santosa. 2000. “Tectonic and Spirituality: Understanding 
and Beyond.” in Symposium on Tectonic Dimension in Islamic Architectural 
Tradition in Indonesia, edited by Ilya Maharika and Revianto B. Santosa. 
Yogyakarta: Dept. of Architecture Islamic University of Indonesia. Here a 
paradoxical tectonic language of parasol, which is ephemeral, and the sense of 
permanence are interesting to study in an urban spatial context. 
76  Waterson, Roxanna. 1989. Living House: Th e Anthropology of Architecture in 
Southeast Asia. Singapore: Oxford University Press.
77  Jessup, Helen Ibbitson. 1989. Netherlands Architecture in Indonesia, 1900-42. 
London: PhD Dissertation, Courtauld Institute of Art, University of London. 
and further Cairns, Stephen. 1997. “Re-Surfacing: Architecture, Wayang, 
and the “Javanese House”.” Pp. 73-88 in Postcolonial Space(s), edited by 
Chong Th ai Wong and Gülsüm Baydar Nalbantoglu. New York: Princenton 
Architectural Press. 
78 Correa, Charles. 1989. Th e New Landscape, Urbanisation in the Th ird World. 
Singapore: Concept Media and Butterworth Architecture, p. 115. 
79  See Deutch, Rosalyn. 1996. Evictions: Art and Spatial Politics. Cambridge, 
Mass. and London,: MIT Press. 
80  As a comparison see Birnbaum, Dara. 1995. “Finding Any Place in 
Cyberspace.” Pp. 160-171 in Anyplace, edited by Cynthia C. Davidson. New 
York: Anyone Corp. p. 160-171.
PART III
On Other 
Architectures
 CHAPTER 5 - 272
Th e primary purpose of this last chapter is to off er diff erent angles for 
examining globalization as a process of insularization within urban 
development. Th is chapter also provides some speculation to extend 
the formal aspect of insularity to a more paradigmatic view to see 
the leakage of insularity in urban setting. It is argued that the leakage 
plays a specifi c role in breaking down the rigidity of insularity and 
may provide a more sustainable way to development in general.
5.1 Diagram of Insularity
Th e form and the meaning of insularity
From the explored cases we have noticed the complexity of 
the production of insularity in mega cities. But is it possible to 
diagrammatize it in order to delineate its relation with architecture 
as a place-making body of knowledge? To do this, perhaps 
we can start with Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon as one of the 
diagrammatical descriptions on how architectural space works 
to reinforce prevailing patterns of privilege and to assert power. 
Foucault called this a “machine” that could produce the relationship 
of power and subjection. It can be applied in a variety of forms of 
architecture such as schools, hospitals, asylums and workshops that 
“Architecture in itself doesn’t interest me. No more, I may 
add, than art for art’s sake. Whether a house is built of glass 
or concrete, or is a little bit like this or a little bit like that 
… is this relevant in comparison with the organization of 
the city? … Architecture … is the organization of space, of 
a space, of juxtaposed spaces, or superposed spaces. The 
organization of a city and refl ection on social organization 
are things that I think are basic. (Rémi Zaugg, 2004 p. 
229)1
5 Other Architectures:
Border crossing 
(Previous page picture) 
Branch offi  ces of Artha Graha 
Bank throughout Indonesia. 
Th e architecture of a bank 
“without identity” in contrast 
to the pursuit of corporate 
identity through architecture 
as done by majority of banks 
in Indonesia. Th e bank is 
owned by Tommy Winata, 
one of the richest Indonesian 
Chinese conglomerates.
Unlike other banks which 
normally try to express 
their corporate indentity, 
architecture of these branches  
expresses the “informality,” 
just like the gardu way. 
(Source: all pictures are 
obtained from www.
arthagraha.com). 
273
control the distribution of individuals in relation to the “other” and/
or the hierarchy of organization. Spatial topology has to do with 
maintaining the prevailing power relations. Like the panopticon, 
which works in distributing bodies and organizational hierarchy, 
insularity works primarily to segregate bodies and to organize people 
along a certain social fault line. Here, the hierarchy is clearly defi ned, 
whether it is voluntarily or involuntarily. Like the panopticon, a so-
called machine which can be applied almost anyplace where control 
is needed, insularity is used primarily to distinguish localities within 
its surroundings, in order to create a “determined space” within 
an “undetermined” space. If the panopticon works purely from 
“within” (can “see” anything inside),  then insular territory works 
from “without”, enhancing layers of concealment in order to protect 
the unseen inside and to free specifi c social behavior from external 
responsibilities. Th e panopticon is an asylum, a trap for bodies 
while insular territory is the “liberation” of those bodies from any 
outside social considerations. Th e panopticon can be represented 
by the center (the surveyor) while insular territory is decentralized 
and emphasized by borders. Th e panopticon is singular and self-
contained and insular territory is ad infi nituum, always plural and 
ever expanding. 
Rendering the case of the Pearl River Delta in China, we have at 
least three forms of insularity. Th e modular islands emphasize the 
recognition of physical borders and multiplicity. A house with a high 
wall will be simply an island in its environment. But if we found 
hundreds of them with the same pattern and dwelling within each 
and there are two diff erent social groups (the master and nanny for 
instance), then the phenomenon could be an insularity that calls for 
more careful interrogation of its social impact on the urban scale. Th e 
concealed insularity can only be grasped by careful inspection of the 
society rather than merely the physical aspect. Barriers are formed by 
values, traditions, or behavior which are considered lower or déclassé
compared to the common society. Th ese are hidden social groups, 
although not necessarily the minority considering their numbers. 
Th e hierarchical emphasizes the “door” by which the insider gains 
control of the fl ow of people. It can be a mall, a “city within a city” 
 CHAPTER 5 - 274
development, a superblock, a corporate-town, or an entire city like 
Shenzhen. 
Th e case of Jakarta shows two more forms of insular space. Th e 
dormant island points to its instant occurrence as a reaction against 
“other” invasion or infi ltration. It is basically a concealed insularity, 
which erupts into a radicalized sense of community. Th e last form 
of this logic, hollow insular space, points to a “weak island”, with its 
primary function not to develop a strong sense of community but 
merely a loose social relationship within. Similar to the dormant 
insularity, hollow insularity also has a latent potential for confl ict 
with its outside. Generally, if we look back at Sloterdijk’s anatomy of 
cell, the modular will be the absolute, the concealed, the dormant, 
and the hollow will be anthropogenetic. Th e hierarchical is the 
atmospheric cell.2
Diagrammatizing social space as such is not entirely foreign in 
theoretical discourse, especially art. Anselm Franke, the curator and 
editor of the catalogue of an art exhibition entitled Territories, held in 
Kunstwerke Berlin, presented the works of architects and artists who 
examine the territorial spaces produced by current social and political 
transformations.3 In a broader context, the catalog Territories depicts 
various kinds of maps, a diagrammatic view of social space. Th e 
exhibition aimed to examine the development of new topographical 
tools and techniques of representation of space that increasingly attract 
interdisciplinary interests. Th e physical form and environment, as 
well as architecture, become a focal point in representing forces that 
shape our social space. Th e plural term of “territories” suggests not 
only plurality but also, and more importantly, the fragmentation of 
territorial space itself and its widespread exclusive island of space 
that is used as a mode of production of space across the world. Since 
territory is related directly to power, examining it means also looking 
down into the anatomy of power itself.4
Axel John Wieder in die Tageszeitung reported the new strategy 
of using cartography to raise social issues. Wieder cited a French 
group Bureau dEtudes, that held an exhibition in Kunstwerke Berlin 
in 2002, that demonstrates how “the graphic representation of 
275
all social relations, as they are depicted through information and 
documentation, may ideally manufacture a map that also depicts 
the global social space. Th us a map, after its social relations and 
space are drawn, may help us to determine our location, to recognize 
what is happening and then to decide what we can do.”5 Another 
exhibition entitled Die Sehnsucht des Kartografen or Th e Longing of the 
Cartographer delivered a similar idea, albeit in a diff erent expression. 
Th e editor and curator, Stephan Berg, asserted that maps always 
produce a gap between signifi er and signifi ed. Th e longing to bridge 
the gap however may only be a one-to-one map: the coincidence 
of signifi er and signifi ed. But at the same time, this image replaces 
what it should really be. He noted that “by completely covering 
the area being laid hold of, the map also causes it to disappear and 
thus reveals itself to be an instrument for extinguishing reality. Th e 
signifi er no longer points toward the signifi ed but instead covers it 
over, thereby appropriating for itself the practical potency of the 
real.”6 Our attempt to map globalization as a process of insularity 
may not entirely replace the previous meaning of globalization. 
However, through the mapping of insularity, we hope that a new 
paradigm and perspective of the city, especially the mega city within 
the Asian context, can be nurtured leading to more balanced view 
and spatial practices.
Moreover, as Deleuze saw, a diagram might serve as something 
novel. For him, a diagram does not represent the reality but it is 
instead a new reality. “Th e diagrammatic or abstract machine does 
not function to represent something real, but rather constructs a 
real that is yet to come, a new type of reality.”7 From this point 
of view, diagram of insularity perhaps gives also something new to 
rise up for the future. Th is sense of “writing the future” is perhaps 
similar with what Francoise Choay called instaurational text. Choay 
distinguished theoretical writing on architecture and urbanism 
into commentator and realizer. Th e fi rst is about commentary - to 
criticize, to represent, to imagine and to many extents to judge a 
certain urban phenomenon. Th e realizer genre attempts to raise a 
dialogue concerning the materialization process, to implement, to 
solidify and to produce architecture. Choay saw the aim of the second 
 CHAPTER 5 - 276
as “developing an autonomous conceptual apparatus in order to 
conceive and build new and unknown forms of space.”8 Th e realizer 
text has a “meta-mythic operator” which is useful in avoiding the 
mistakes of two extreme forms of theory namely the rule and the 
model. According to Choay, the rule tends to be hegemonic and the 
model becomes totalitarian. Christopher Alexander has also defi ned 
the role of the diagram as he noted that “[a]ny pattern which, by 
being abstracted from a real situation, conveys the physical infl uence 
of certain demands or physical forces is a diagram.” For him, the 
diagram is the starting point of synthesis.9 Precisely in this position, 
the diagram of insularity may be positioned as a base to develop 
architecture as a reconciling platform.
Th e meaning of insularity
Meaning of a built environment, according to Amos Rapoport, 
can be distinguished into three levels. Th ey are lower, middle and 
higher meaning. Th e lower meaning points to practical usage; the 
middle meaning has to do with behavior. Th e higher meaning is 
about  ideology, beliefs and principles.10 Although there are many 
implications in the lower meanings, in this framework insularity 
may be more related to the higher meaning, namely how we see our 
urban space and its social complexity.
As has been discussed, our cities are now transforming into a 
wilderness in our minds or, as Yi Fu Tuan has described at length, 
into great sprawling cities.11 Insularity, the natural human response 
toward wilderness, is the obvious way to tame it. For humans in 
pre-historic times, wilderness was truly an untamed natural world 
outside their territory. Th eir caves and homes were a sanctuary, an 
Eden-like realm, and a secure place to dwell. A cave is architecture, 
a proto-built environment whose primary purpose was to oppose 
the wild. Th e notion of existence is based on this understanding. 
Heidegger’s Das Sein, or being-in-the-world, has inherited from his 
experience a clear distinction between the enclosed human realm of 
Freiburg and the Black Forest. Norberg-Schulze crystallized it into 
the very existence of architecture, where dwelling signifi es the Sein. 
In modern day, as Tuan has argued, the opposite is true. Nature 
277
has become the Eden, a place for leisure, and a place for fresh air to 
escape the wild city environment. Today’s wilderness is not an object; 
it is much a state of mind or how we describe nature. Wilderness is 
a symbol of the orderly processes of nature. Parks and golf courses 
are the experiments of modern human beings trying to re-create the 
wilderness in an urban setting. Th e city as a great architecture has 
transformed itself into an untamed gigantic world just like nature in 
the pre-historic world. Space explodes beyond human imagination 
as well as the territorial ability to cope. Humans are seeking a new 
cave in this unsettled environment. Th ey have found it in insular 
space: a gated city like Shenzhen to gain full control of people, a 
gated community to distance themselves from urban crime and 
“ordinary urban people,” and an export processing zone (EPZ) for 
the multinationals to protect themselves against the possibility for 
labor unrest and protest. Urban islands like malls are designed for 
urban fl aneur to omit “unwanted” conditions and people; and theme 
parks for fully predictable adventure. Hence insularity fl oats amongst 
the society’s desires. Insularity is a diagram of that desire; the “Eden-
like” architecture as we may call it, whose primary purpose is to limit 
the unpredictability and fear that proliferates in city life. It is much 
more like a concept, not the space itself. It is a mechanism to exclude 
us from the wholeness, a cell, an extension of our body.
For us then insularity produces a “chain  of meanings” related to 
space and identities. 
Every insular space embodies some extended function, namely a 
representation of personality or a collective personality of the society 
within. But because of the border,  insularity can only “fabricate” a 
corrupted representation of these, which is based rather on opposite 
duality of the signifi er (the outsider). If we are part of a poor outside 
community we will view the insiders of island architectures as the 
rich who do not belong to the same environment as we do. 
People dwelling in insular space is not simply a voluntarily or 
involuntarily process. It is rather the forced response to a “no-other-
choice” situation. As for the migrant workers in modular islands, 
Chinese factories and Jakarta’s pecinan as well as kampung resistance, 
 CHAPTER 5 - 278
people “voluntarily” dwell inside but at the same time they have no 
other choice. Chinese migrant workers need jobs and Indonesian 
Chinese need “safety” for their presence in the city. Kampung people 
have no other place in the city to live as the city is dominated by 
insular development. Indeed in its pure meaning as the production 
of enclave space, insularity is barely a new phenomenon. However, as 
a means to distance self from the social complexity by creating fully 
controlled place amidst an uncontrollable outside, or as a reaction 
against the imagination of the outside wilderness, insularity is in fact 
a recent phenomenon. It is especially a tactic that sprawling mega 
cities makes possible. 
Spectrum of border
From the cases, insularity may be shaped by two major types of 
borders, namely physical and cultural. Physical borders refer 
especially to walls, gates and any signs or physical barriers that block 
accessibility to an area. But these borders are not alone. Th ey are 
strengthened by cultural walls that distinguish between the values 
of the insider and the outsider. Stefano Boeri was keen to dig deeply 
into the anatomy of borders as well as the methods and strategies to 
cross and overcome them. His careful study revealed various types 
and forms of borders, walls, fences, thresholds, signposted areas, 
security systems and checkpoints, virtual frontiers, specialized zones, 
protected areas and other areas under control, or in general “border 
devices.”12 A border functions not only to protect territory in a 
physical sense but also identity, as he noted when he said, “[b]orders 
– observed as three-dimensional devices, as symptoms and results of 
the dialectic between the energy of fl ows and the enduring power of 
local identities – could become revealing keys for rediscovering the 
present.” Boeri’s anatomy of borders however may give us more clues 
of how other types of insularity may be reckoned within mega city 
development. 
Boeri examined two cases, the Mediterranean Sea and the Palestine-
Israeli confl ict. Boeri utilized the phenomenological approach 
to unveil spatial boundary devices, the nature of fl ow, and the 
identifi cation and characterization of the subject. His study on 
279
the Mediterranean Sea showed an image of the sea as a cradle of 
civilizations. Th ere are many religions, languages and ideologies 
that circle the sea while fl ows of people and goods also occur. Th e 
work Mediterranean: Solid Sea reveals that various subjects cruise the 
sea, such as fi sherman, tourists, the navy et cetera, have their own 
funnel. Th ey are somehow alien to each other although sharing the 
sky above and the sea below. Th ere, the rigid borders are created 
within a medium that is seemingly fl uid and permeable. Th e sea is 
much more like various levels of networks that cause it to undergo 
solidifi cation. 
Based on these examinations Boeri suggested a list of spatial 
confi gurations for border devices consisting of at least six general 
forms: 
Enclosure. Th is is a perimeter boundary around a system of activity, 
either group or individual. It is considered to be an impermeable 
device that demarcates two territories or situations. It implies 
isolation, exclusion, security, insecurity and enclosure. Th e control 
is unilateral in that only one party possesses it. 
Pipe. Pipes cover a long and circular area, enclosing a fl ow with only 
an entrance or exit at their extreme ends in order to channel a fl ow 
through another territory. Th e pipe isolates fl ow, avoids contact with 
the ground and surroundings where the pipe runs. Control may be 
unilateral or bilateral but only at either the very end or beginning 
of the pipe. 
Funnel. Th is is a form of boundary that selects and directs fl ows within 
a certain threshold. Funnels orient and or measure the canalization 
of the fl ow from one side to the other. Th ey may also fi lter and 
redirect a specifi ed element. Its diameter defi nes its permeability. 
One or both parties can have control of the funnel. 
Fold. Also called “sack” is a boundary that emerges from the principal 
line separating two parties. It is a “third area,” a “not-one-man’s-land” 
an interstitial or residual space characterized by its void condition. 
In that fold the fl ow is trapped between parties as either a third party 
or no one has control over it. 
 CHAPTER 5 - 280
Sponge. Th is is a border device that actually replaces the old border. 
Its task is to attract fl ow and program in order to bring the parties 
involved back into the state of permanence. Th e sponge can be 
developed as a border-generating strategy when one side has 
accumulated advantage and can then cut the fl ow thereby isolating 
the other party. 
Phantom limb is generated when a physical border disappears, often 
in the shape of memory that regenerates the border. Th ese remnants 
are sometimes translated into physical terms. It creates a territory 
where fl ows are continuous but diff erences are enacted. In this area, 
control is usually not held by any of the parties.
Boeri’s anatomy of border. 
(Source: Boeri  2003 in Franke 
2003, p.54). 
281
5.2 On Border Crossing: Role of 
urban informalities in urban 
development
New strategies in architectural discourse
It is perhaps too early to try to theorize whether architecture will 
react against insularity or determine its strategy for border crossing 
in a prescriptive manner. What we are going to do instead, is to 
collect examples of where architecture of “border crossing” occurs.
Romi Khosla, the UN envoy for housing reconstruction in Kosovo, 
made a proposal for the Arab-Israeli confl ict reconciliation over 
Jerusalem. He saw that the city is actually divided into two spheres, 
or two separate cities. Th e old city, enclosed within ancient Ottoman 
walls belongs to the Arabs. Th e New Jerusalem outside the wall and 
expanding to the suburbs belongs to the Israelis. Between those 
cities lies a blurred space, a buff er zone, where both communities 
hesitate to make a radical change. His proposal lies exactly in this 
undistinguished space, a square-shaped site currently used as a car 
park to be used as a Jerusalem station. Th is station is one of ten 
stations strung along a new railway stretching from Haifa through 
Nazareth, Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and 
Beersheba to Gaza. In regards to Jerusalem station, he wrote:
‘Th e Jerusalem station represents a kind of celebratory architecture that 
could provide alternative humane solutions to the hastily sketched military 
response to a divided city. Th rough this proposal we believed that the 
future of these two worlds is to integrate of both parts rather than towards 
separate Lilliputian nations.’ (Khosla 2001)13
Th e train moves “across the physical and ideological barriers” to 
connect both people and economy. Th e stations will be the site for 
economic and social exchange, to let the individuals from both parties 
be acquainted with one another. Th e stations are the leaking point 
in the severe division created by both the physical and ideological 
walls of this city. 
Another attempt to cross the border of insularity was made under 
the title “Crossing Architecture.” Architecture often comes in at the 
very end of confl icts on political or ideological interests. Architecture 
Two sides of Palestinian-
Israeli confl ict: Palestinian 
territory of Ramallah (above) 
and Israeli’s Psagot (below). 
(Source: Weizman, 2003 in 
Franke, 2003 p. 141).
 CHAPTER 5 - 282
is a symbol signaling the winning or losing of the battle between 
the parties. Th e confl ict is neither changed nor mutated, but rather 
slightly diff erent from one to the other ending with the immortal 
antagonism between rich and poor. Considering this proposition, a 
group of students at the University of Kassel, under the supervision 
of Prof. Hans Frei, initiated a program that they called “crossing 
architecture.” Th is architecture is basically a simple diagram of a place 
with two doors. Each door belongs to one of the parties involved in 
the confl ict. What is important to explore is not the diagram itself 
but rather the translation of this diagram into certain contexts of 
confl ict. Architecture in this way is treated as both a signature of 
confl ict and a reconciling place. Firstly, it makes the confl ict visible 
since many are still invisible or diffi  cult to grasp (in this role the 
work of Eyal Weizman on the “politics of verticality” is convincing 
proof that even the well-covered Palestinian – Israeli confl ict still 
lacks understanding at an architectural level, the very end of the 
confl ict itself ).14 Secondly, it is also reconciling since architecture 
is a social intersection of those involved in the confl ict. Hence an 
understanding of the border area created by the confl ict is essential 
because it is in this border area where crossing architecture may be 
consecrated. Th e cartography of confl ict as well as the social space of 
both parties must be drawn and it is precisely at the intersection of 
those spaces that this architecture must operate.  
Th eir statement is worth quoting: 
‘Architecture has specifi c possibilities to reach what is nearest at hand 
(without political subordination): to build places – they might be very 
small - which are open to the other (the stranger). Architectural projects 
with two doors, deals with bringing together instead of separating. Armed 
confl icts are possible, where people are hindered to do what is the nearest 
at hand for them.’ (Course Program)
 Connecting between social production and aesthetics, Arie Graafl and 
among others, tried to engage the issue of politics from a diff erent 
angle namely the masses.  In his Socius Architecture, he situated 
deconstruction in the landscape of the postmodern condition, and 
criticized deconstruction that has failed to make a real connection 
between architecture and society.15 According to Mark Wrigley’s time 
frame, deconstruction is rooted in Russian Constructivism from the 
283
1920s-30s. Graafl and saw that the main aim of the movement was 
to make a relationship between social production and architectural 
production. Architecture in this regard is a vehicle for social change 
and revolution. Dom-komunas was designed to prevent the bourgeoisie 
from totally transforming society. Citing Deleuze and Guattari, 
Graafl and showed that Russian society in the 1920s was a socius. 
It was also refl ected in architecture which Lewis Mumford called 
a mega-machine yet it worked as a social machine. As exemplifi ed 
by Eisenman’s works, Graafl and saw that the architectural works of 
deconstruction now merely end with the production of aesthetics, 
of making “face,” which lacks a real connection with the production 
of society. Architecture ends in political powerlessness, into galleries 
and journals. Recalling back to the spirit of the socius, Graafl and saw 
that the real challenge is on the architecture of poverty. A home for 
the masses, such as homelessness in New York, dwellings for laborers 
in Tokyo, and dwellings in the rhizomatic city of Amsterdam, is 
one of major issues that must be tackled by architecture or more 
precisely, political will of architecture. For him, instead of making 
face, architectural aesthetics should come back to the sublime. But 
diff ering with Eisenman who saw the sublime as grotesque, Graafl and 
turned to “bareness-faceless” architecture. Rather than seeking the 
destabilizing force of deconstruction for the sake of constructing 
beautiful architecture, he looked toward something other as his 
note: “My understanding of the sublime uses the same references 
as Deconstructivism, but searches for the specifi c eff ects of linearity, 
regularity, and order, and their critical paraphrasing.”16
In Indonesia, migrant workers in an urban setting like Jakarta are a 
dilemma. Commuting creates serious traffi  c problems; however they 
cannot fi nd adequate housing in the city. Many of these migrant 
workers can be absorbed into kampungs but there are many that 
cannot. Andra Matin took the problem seriously and translated it 
into a sensitive response by creating his temporary Rental House 
for City’s Commuters exhibited in Bintaro, Jakarta 2002-2003. As 
reported by Achmadi, the prototype was exhibited in a kampung
in Bintaro, next to a housing estate enclave. It was comprised of 
four dwelling units with a shared kitchen, toilet and laundry. Th e 
 CHAPTER 5 - 284
design gave a bold image, socially and aesthetically, showing it as a 
possible alternative accommodation for the low-paid workers who 
are generally forced to live in rudimentary and extremely depreciated 
shared housing situations.17  
Th e above architecture may be part of the answer of our enduring 
question on seeking the leaking of insularity. However, these 
architectures are rare examples in their respective contexts. In the 
end, architecture must confront its outside surroundings, the other 
architectures, and the ephemerals, as the leaking of our will to 
design.
Urban Informalities and development
Border crossing architecture alone is perhaps not enough to defuse 
the power of insularity. Although insularity in certain aspects can 
nurture identity, and produce shared values which are important 
for a stronger sense of community, it is, however, generally not 
sustainable. Physically, insularity produces uncontrollable urban 
landscape changes due to its fl exibility. It entrenches infrastructure 
as insular spaces may easily be located everywhere. Socially, insularity 
is not sustainable because it preserves latent potential to confl ict. As 
the cases have revealed, insularity needs a counterbalance namely 
Rental House for City’s 
Commuter of Jakarta, 
designed by Andra Matin. 
(Source: Patrick Bingham-Hall 
and Geoff rey London, 2004, 
p. 31) 
285
the anti-insularity processes which may work in more sustainable 
way in a mega city. Th e Pearl River Delta’s vernacular modernization 
becomes an interlocking space between the rigid insular space of 
factories, industrial estates and cities. Th e ephemeral space of kaki 
lima, gardu and rukunan is also needed to fulfi ll the need of space 
for the poor and the ordinary within the puzzle of insular spaces of a 
mega city. Th ese are what we will generally call urban informalities.
For de Soto, informal activities in general are not only about capital 
poverty but, more importantly, status. Most of the problems faced 
by informal actors are either the void status of their property or the 
lack of legal assistance to turn their property into liquid capital. Th is 
is the stubborn problem of why capitalism triumphs in the West and 
fails everywhere else. According to de Soto, what we should develop 
is a practice that can actualize the property rights of the informal 
actors.18 In this aspect, as the case urban space is one of coexistent 
media. Rendering from Michel de Certeau, Margaret Crawford 
showed that urban space is actually a coexistence of two diff erent 
models of operation. Th e fi rst is based on strategy which focuses on 
spatial operation. Th e second is tactic which is based on temporal 
operation. Strategy is practiced by the powerful who see a place as 
their own, which then serves as the base from which relations with 
others can be managed. In opposition of that view point, tactic is an 
operation in urban space that does not need a specifi c place but is 
very dependent on time. Tactic is an “art of the weak”, which sneaks 
around the network of authoritative places. In many cases, they slip 
into an urban space as urban development creates residual spaces, 
terrain vague or marginal spaces19 suitable for them to grow. Th e venue 
for architecture and urban planning, hence, is responsible to balance 
between these two operations, to create a meta-culture on top of 
them. Th e primary task of architecture, in more general context, is 
to treat our environment to make it suitable for a sustainable and 
higher quality of life. Th en, “architecture” and “other architectures” 
also have a similar responsibility. But for the latter, in Deleuzian 
terms, it works as a minor literature within the mainstream discourse 
of architecture. Its primary task is to destabilize the authoritative 
meaning of architecture we normally understand. Our urban space 
 CHAPTER 5 - 286
actually has many architectures. Th ere is not only the architecture 
of spectacle, which is easier to see and to represent, but there is also 
transient architecture that covers all sorts of urban ephemeralities 
that are more formless. Th ey can perhaps only be experienced using 
haptic senses rather than the visual, the “smooth space” in Deleuzian 
terms. Hence, architecture and architectures are two distinct systems 
of space. Th e fi rst one in general is inherently insular. Th e other is the 
fl ow, the urban ephemeralities that leak out from that insular space, 
the en fuite or escape. Urban space is the site where both systems of 
space are entangled.
However, this chapter does not intend to oppose both systems. Instead, 
it attempts to connect them with another frontier – development, 
the magic word in the so-called less developed, postcolonial world 
like the author’s home country of Indonesia. Th e duality of insularity 
and its leakage may not always be discussed under the blanket of 
“prosperity versus poverty” as we normally do, but following Romi 
Khosla’s thinking, rather in regards to freedom. Rendering Amartya 
Sen’s seminal work Development as Freedom, Khosla urged us to shift 
how we should defi ne our goals for development. Sen’s conclusive 
remark – “Freedom is the primary end as well as the means to 
development” - directs us to understand that the developmental 
goal is to enhance individual freedoms.20 Within this frame, every 
individual has the right to live the life that he or she prefers to live. 
Individuality, deeper than community or even household, is the 
most important component and ultimate agent of change. Hence 
it is urgent to remove the constraints of freedom, or what Khosla 
called unfreedoms.21
Seen from this point of view, the narrow meaning of globalization as 
insularity can be seen, arguably, as another kind of “unfreedom.” Too 
often, especially in the so-called postcolonial world, development 
is thought of much more from an economical perspective rather 
than social or political. Many governments and urban authorities 
regard the increase of gross national product, local revenues and 
the amount of foreign direct investment, as the “ends” that must 
be achieved through development. Implemented with mechanistic 
planning and design in spatial terms, globalization in this way 
287
translates into a narrow and skewed meaning of development 
that focuses on the number of malls, amount of city development 
projects, or number of industries in their export processing zones. 
In short, development and the proliferation of insular space seem 
identical. Individuals are then silenced within this all-encompassing 
discourse of development. Development in this way also means the 
development of “unfreedoms.”
Hence it is the task of architecture to connect the basic view 
of development with spatial practices. It is imperative that we 
develop a tool for balance in seeing other architectures as the 
potential for becoming the other, as the “means” toward freedom 
or lifting the “unfreedoms.” If architecture is about creating islands, 
then architectures serve to cross and overcome those islands. If 
architecture’s whole idea is insularity or the creation of insular space 
within the wilderness, our other architectures may then be seen as a 
means to create a third-space between them, a meta-culture as Ipsen 
calls it, where balance, insularity and its porosity is maintained.22
Urban Informalities: Need for representation
Th e logic of insularity becomes an insular space only when it has 
settled into a specifi c site, and hence becomes an insular territory as 
soon as it is consecrated and demarcated. An insular space becomes 
a specifi c space with a specifi c social relation. Th is space transforms 
the above desire into social space, hence a fi xed cartography of 
human desire. It is a machine, an “instrument,” and perhaps the 
only instrument, for the authorities to think about urban space and 
to develop the city. Th is unchallenged instrument of development, 
backed by the authorship in this way is arguably also another kind 
of “unfreedom.” 
Th us, what is the role of our urban ephemeralities, the other 
architectures, and the en fuite of insularity, in our cities regarding 
this development? 
Vernacular modernization in the Pearl River Delta, the kaki lima’s
tactic for spatial occupation, the gardu’s proto democratic space, 
the spatial reconciliation of rukunan, and the kampung as a process 
 CHAPTER 5 - 288
of land occupation in Jakarta, point to the city in its bare form: 
unshaped, unorganized, and non-stratifi ed. Th ey deal directly with 
the individuals, not the bodies or agencies. Th ey are the “individual 
politics of space” in an urban setting. Th erefore, they inherently have 
the potential to remove the “unfreedoms,” as the people then have 
optional instruments to think about and can act accordingly. Th ey 
are not imaginary, since their presence is very real in daily life, nor 
are they symbolic as they may speak in various degrees and ways to 
represent themselves. 
In this regard, it is useful to remember Deleuze and Guattari’s 
reading on Kafka. Th ey believe that Kafka politics are “neither 
imaginary nor symbolic.”23 Th ey are pragmatic, avoiding both 
psychoanalysis and theology. Th eir intention is to make connections 
between things - between disciplines.24 As a discipline, owing from 
Kojin Karatani’s view, we may think that architecture in its bare 
meaning can be distinguished into “the will to architecture” of the 
Western philosophy and Eastern philosophy that the will does not 
exist.25 Looking back on the case studies of the Pearl River Delta 
and Jakarta, it has been shown that through various strategies and 
tactics, insularity continuously encircles the ephemerals in order to 
give them a shape, as the means of this “will to architecture.” If we 
think in this way, we will be trapped in a circular way of thinking. 
Insular space produces ephemeral space, the en fuite which is hard 
to control. Th e will to architecture pushes the ephemeral to have 
a form, to be insular, which then infl icts en fuite. Th e logic is an 
illusion of beautifying our world. Th e case studies have shown that 
whenever insularization is enacted, the ephemerals always fi nd their 
line of fl ight. Trying to separate them, as a consequence of the will 
to architecture, contradicts the fact that they always actually exist 
within the insularization and vice versa. Th e ephemeralities take 
another role in development as agents of change that undermine the 
power of insularity. As such, the “will to architecture” embodied in 
urban bodies and agencies is challenged by “the en fuite logic” of the 
urban ephemeralities. If the insularity is “unfreedom,” the freedom 
is outside the wall we build. Hence, what we call development is to 
cross the border of the insular space we build. 
289
It is then necessary to design the path towards their representation. 
Diagrammatizing the line of fl ight, the en fuite, as Deleuze has 
pioneered can be started from what he called the Body without 
Organs (BwO). Rendering this philosophy, R.G. Smith thought 
that BwO was one attempt to visualize the city as a process of 
continuous combination, as the “chains of machines that facilitate 
endless fl ow and fl ux” as is the case for our urban ephemeralities. 
BwO is perhaps a way to visualize them as they are also unformed, 
unorganized, and non-stratifi ed. Ephemeralities are also seen as the 
process of formation and deformation rather than a fi xed product. It 
is a transient nomad of space and time. Moreover, for Deleuze and 
Smith, Bodies without Organs has no form or function, not as a 
subject or an object. Rather it is an “actor-network.”26
If the capitalist network as the formal entity relies on a system of 
commands of the agencies, then the socialist network relies on the 
multiplication of the masses. Th e capital runs with hierarchy: from a 
head offi  ce somewhere in the global cities out to the other world cities 
and down to every corner of our cities such as McDonald’s restaurants 
or Nike factories in Dongguan. Th e urban ephemeralities tend to 
globalize in terms of numbers. Th is socialism points to informalities, 
which rely on the “para network” involving human relations: kinship, 
ideology, religion, friendship, personal agreement, etc. What an 
Islam leader preaches in a Jakarta kampung is similar with what is 
preached in Mecca or Afghanistan without any real network. Th ey 
share a common text but can have diff erent translations, not only 
in terms of textual translation but more importantly its contextual 
translations. It applies also to the common: what is sold by peddlers 
in Jakarta is, in many cases, directly related to the culture, as pizza 
is attributed to the Italians and kebab to the Turkish. Global money 
must land in China with guanxi, meaning that kinship and “good 
relations” rooted in the local culture are inherently crucial for global 
processes, in Jakarta with familial nepotism. 
Th is para network of urban informalities actors also has their place 
and hence their own cartography. Kaki limas in Jakarta, for instance, 
prove that the logic of spatialization follows the logic of resistance 
or of hijacking space in order to temporarily make their place. Th is 
 CHAPTER 5 - 290
ephemeral place-making is a cartography of struggle, a social and 
political contestation instead of a mere economic relation. It is also 
a pinnacle of diametrically confl icting structural understandings of 
urban space, an opposition between “the good” and “the bad”, which 
depends merely on who makes the statement. Th e real problems, 
however, do not lie within this opposition but in the very place itself: 
a pragmatic question of where the informal grows, who they are 
(are they really poor or just disguised as such by corporate entities 
to make their presence “informal”?) as well as how they build the 
construction. Hence it is a matter of translation of how the informal, 
the ephemeral and the leakage of insularity is translated into place 
through architecture.
Finally, our other architectures hence may play a dual role. From 
within it works as panopticon; from without as insularity. It is like 
a mall as a perfect combination between the two. Th e people inside 
represent insularity through their desire to be seen and at the same 
time being watched by a security system representing panopticon. 
From the urban wilderness, it is an isolated sanctuary. Th e mall 
is the phenomena of freedom and suppression working at once. 
Our architectures of urban ephemeralities however work the other 
way around. From within it works as insularity; from without as 
panopticon. Wanggang vernacular-modernization architecture, 
kaki limas, gardus and rukunan space become insular only when 
we are inside their system. Otherwise, with their multiplicity, their 
panoptic space presents to “other” as a show of power of the weak. 
Like the diagram of panopticon, which has already been translated 
into our daily architecture, the diagram of insularity perhaps must 
also be translated in some other places. For further task, to fi nd their 
architectural translations is a question of where, rather than what or 
how, they have been implemented. 
5.3 Summary
Th is study focuses on the interrogation of the place for architecture 
in the global world. Globalization is widely thought of as the 
phenomenon of diminishing borders, a blurred relation between 
291
parts and the whole, a creation of in-between space. However in 
practice, the really existing globalization somehow works with the 
“spatial logic” of insularity which manifests locally in the shape 
of insular space and territory. It detaches certain spaces from the 
wholeness of the environment. Globalization to some extent is global 
insularization. Export Processing Zones, theme parks, and gated 
communities are some examples of this practice. Th ese territories 
make global interconnection possible but only through local 
disconnection. To many extents, it is not merely about physical space 
but also social space leading to spatial and social fragmentation. 
In the book Empire Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have theorized 
that our current global era is marked by a fundamental shift in the 
notion of hierarchy by which new borders are proliferated rather than 
lifted as promised by our current understanding of globalization. In 
the past, the world, and by extension our urban space, was ordered 
into dichotomies, or more profoundly, Manichean oppositions 
driven by imperialism. Th e powerful and the powerless, the haves 
and the have-nots, the civilized and the barbaric, et cetera were 
the logic by which our world and space were colonized, spatially 
organized and then socially and culturally changed. Urban space 
was accordingly divided into those two major parties that involved 
both physical and social borders. Identities were clearly defi ned, 
unfortunately, based on the imbalanced relationship between them. 
Our current global world however, is governed by the degree of 
diff erences that functions ephemerally rather than the above stable 
identities. Th erefore, within this nebulous identity, insular space 
plays to create diff erences through creating separated territory by 
which then identity is constructed and vice versa. Th rough insular 
space and territory, the “we” and “they” can be easily delineated.  
Th e central problem addressed by this research is then whether it 
is true that this spatial logic of insularity is characteristic of a really 
existing globalization through which we have the  potential to give a 
clearer understanding of globalization in general. If it holds true, or 
at least has the potential to be true, in what form does this insularity 
manifest spatially? Moreover, we could raise a more pragmatic 
Foucouldian question: how do these insular spaces work? Does 
 CHAPTER 5 - 292
insular space infl ict a new way of “spatial equilibrium”? Here lays 
the fundamental challenge for architecture and planning – as the 
discipline that creates borders which in turn delineate the insular 
space. 
Etymologically, insularity is rooted from Latin insula, meaning island. 
Sloterdijk conceptualizes insularity as an intensifi cation of natural 
and social “foam” as a conditio humana – the condition needed for 
humans to live. Like genius loci, insularity in this sense is an act of 
place-making but embedded precisely within the fl uid “non-places” 
of globalization. Insularity is more than merely a defensible space 
to deter crime however in our view of globalization it is a deliberate 
projection and reinforcement of the crime outside through the 
creation of a safe environment inside. Like a building, insularity 
is also a rejection of pluralism as it provokes a reduced, exclusive, 
over-integrated, perfected and sealed off  environment. Insularity 
is not a singular building, but it points to buildings or territories. 
Insularity has been postulated by Foucault as individuals who never 
cease passing from one closed environment to another each with 
their own laws. For Deleuze though, our society will be societies of 
control which are not based on enclosed environments but rather 
on the modulation of control. In the society of control the whole 
system works like a chaotic wilderness but in fact the systemic order 
plays intangibly. Insularity plays ephemerally nowhere and “now-
here.”
Th is study maps the “mechanisms” of how the above logic of insularity 
is produced and works in a more practical manner. Two cases are 
explored namely the sudden development of the Pearl River Delta 
(China) and the postcolonial development of Jakarta (Indonesia). Th e 
fi rst case attempts to demonstrate how the imagination of globalized 
territory becomes the perfect site for the creation of insular territories 
and moreover infl icts the production and reproduction of social 
segregation. Th is part outlines three forms of insularization which 
characterize globalization in the modern Pearl River Delta (PRD). 
Th e fi rst form is the modular space of dorm-factories. Th ousands of 
factories located both inside and outside industrial sites spread across 
the country is the major characteristic of the PRD. In this area, a 
293
factory contains both working space and living space for migrant 
workers. Th e pattern is like a fl oating space as it can be installed 
anywhere. Its primary function is to perpetuate the migrant workers’ 
deterritorialized status. Th e second is concealed insular space. On a 
larger scale, the proliferation of factories has created not only a clear-
cut territory, as is the case of industrial zones, but also a haphazard 
puzzle of industries, towns, villages and agricultural parcels. Th is 
indiff erent urban landscape in fact produces disconnected societies 
where cultural segregation is developed. Th e case is exemplifi ed 
by Dongguan city where tangible and intangible walls produce a 
socially separated migrant worker population vis-à-vis the local 
population. Th e third, hierarchical insular space, points to the creation 
of the imagination of a borderless territory but works primarily to 
segregate people. Th e double membrane of Shenzhen city acts as a 
demarcation line with Hong Kong and mainland China. Th is city 
is conceptualized as a hub between the two, but in fact works to 
fi lter what are deemed to be unnecessary or unwanted situations and 
people.  However, insularity is formed and leakage occurs. Vernacular 
modernization is then the term proposed to describe the grassroots 
level of development responding to the massive need for space due 
to the huge size of the Chinese population. Th is case suggests that re-
integrating this vernacular modernization into the larger framework 
of the Pearl River Delta planning is the key factor for the sustainable 
development of this region both socially and environmentally.
Th e second case, which looks at postcolonial Jakarta, traced how 
the culture of exclusion has been developed throughout its history. 
Colonial and postcolonial regimes crystallized this culture, which 
radicalizes the already segregated society. Physically, Jakarta has 
formed through the territorial explosion of kampungs, large housing 
estates and infrastructure. Th e latest development occurs in the 
shape of social space implosion associated with the development 
of “cities within a city” dogma. From this phenomenon,  a further 
fourth form of insularity occurs as many kampungs are squeezed 
by the latest development. Kampung then mutates into a dormant 
insularity as radical resistance identity of the community mounts. 
Th e fi fth form of insularity occurs in the shape of hollow insularity. 
 CHAPTER 5 - 298
It is applied to the Indonesian Chinese ethnicity as they normally 
cluster in modern pecinan (Chinese quarters) in the form of gated 
communities. Although clustered in insular spaces, they do not form 
an integrated society inside as well and have a weak social relation 
with the outside. Th is hollow insularity is merely a pure territorial 
identity which infl icts more segregation and resistance from kampung
surroundings. 
However, in the midst of this haphazard development and 
radicalization of the space-identity relationship, the space of urban 
informalities grows to counter the fl ow of insularity. Th is non-spatial 
entity arguably has the potential to be a reconciling space between 
the seemingly far-reaching gap developed by the above insularity.
Th e last part of the study is intended to be a connection between 
architecture as a body of knowledge and practice of space-making 
with the discourse of development. Taking development as a means 
to enhance individual freedoms, this study sees that every individual 
has the right to live the life that he or she prefers to live. Seeing 
from this view, the current basic idea of architecture as a production 
of insular space  is merely a one-sided point of view. Th is study 
proposes another path to make the “other architectures” visible, with 
its primary function to cross the border of insularity. Architecture 
must also confront its outside surroundings, the other architectures, 
as they are the leaking of our will to design. 
Notes
1  “Architecture in Itself Doesn’t Interest Me. An interview with Rémi Zaugg by 
Philip Ursprung” in Philip Ursprung (ed.) Herzog and De Meuron: Natural 
History. Canadian Centre for Architecture and Lars Müller Publisher, p. 228-
235. 
2  See Chapter 2 page 52-53. 
3  The exhibition was held 1 June – 25 August 2003, curated by Anselm Franke 
with Eyal Wiezman, Rafi Segal and Stefano Boeri. The catalogue is published 
under Franke, Anselm. 2003. “Territories.” in Territories, edited by Anselm 
Franke. Berlin: KW - Kunstwerke. 
4  Ibid. p.11.
5  Wieder, Axel John. 2004. „Suche nach dem eigenen Standort.“ in Die 
Tageszeitung. I am  thankful to Dr. Glasauer for showing me this article. 
299
The article appeared on www.die-tageszeitung.de. The complete version in 
German: “Die bildhafte Darstellung aller sozialen Beziehungen auf der Welt, wie 
sie durch die Informationen, die sie dokumentieren, aufgezeichnet sind, würde im 
Idealfall eine Karte des globalen sozialen Raums herstellen. So eine Karte, nach 
den Beziehungen gezeichnet, die den sozialen Raum gestalten, kann uns helfen, 
unseren Standort festzustellen, zu erkennen, was gerade passiert und – tatsächlich 
– zu entscheiden, was wir tun können.”
6  Berg, Stephan, and Martin Engler, eds. 2004. Die Sehnsucht des Kartograpfen 
(The Longing of the Cartographer). Hannover: Kunstverein Hannover, p.18. 
The exhibition was held in Kunstverein Hannover, 13 December 2003 – 1 
February 2004. 
7  Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. 1987. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 142. 
8  Choay, Françoise, and Denise Bratton. 1997. The Rule and the Model: On the 
Theory of Architecture and Urbanism. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, p. 6. 
9  Alexander, Christopher. 1964. Notes on the Ssynthesis of Form. Cambridge 
(Mass.): Harvard University Press, p. 85. 
10  See Rapoport 1982, The Meaning of the Built Environment: A Nonverbal 
Communication Approach. Beverly Hills: Sage Publication.
11  Tuan, Yi-Fu. 1990. Topophilia. A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes 
and Values. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 109-112 also figures in 
p. 104 and p. 144 and see the elaboration back in Chapter 2, p. 57-58. 
12  Boeri, Stefano. 2003. “Border Syndrome, notes for a research program.” Pp. 
52-60 in Territories, edited by Anselm Franke. Berlin: KW - Kunstwerke.
13  see also Khosla, Romi. 2000. The Loneliness of the Long Distant Future. New 
Delhi: Tulika Press.
14  The research conducted by Eyal Weizman and Rafi Segal was published in 
Eyal Weizman and Rafi Segal, (eds.), 2003 A Civilian Occupation, The Politic 
of Israeli Architecture, Babel and Verso: 2003. The study appears also at http://
www.opendemocracy.net/debates/article-2-45-801.jsp  
15  Graafland, Arie. 2000. The Socius Architecture. Amsterdam; Tokyo; New York; 
and Rotterdam: 101 Publishers.
16  Ibid., p. 61.
17  Achmadi, Amanda. 2004. “Indonesia: The Emergence of a New Architectural 
Consciousness of the Urban Middle Classes.” Pp. 28-35 in HOUSES FOR 
THE 21ST CENTURY, edited by Patrick Bingham-Hall and Geoffrey 
London. Sydney and Hong Kong: Periplus Editions and Pesaro Publishing, 
figure in p. 31.
18  “The Poor are Not the Problem but the Solution - An Exclusive Interview with 
Hernando De Soto” di www.stephenpollard.net accessed 9 Mei 2005. See also 
de Soto’s seminal book De Soto, 1989. The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution 
in the Third World. New York: Harper & Row and De Soto, 2000. The Mystery 
of Capital, Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else. New 
York: Basic Book.
19  See about aspect in Shane, G 2003 “The Emergence of Landscape Urbanism” 
Harvard Design Magazine, Fall 2003/Winter 2004:19.
20  Amartya Sen’s work is Sen, Amartya. 2002. Development as Freedom. All these 
quotations and elaborations are taken from London School of Economic 
(LSE) colloquium entitled ‘Removing Unfreedoms, Amartya Sen’s Freedoms 
Approach and Shifting the Paradigms of Development’ held at the LSE, 7th
 CHAPTER 5 - 300
July 2003 available at www.removingunfreedoms.org.   
21  Rendering from Sen’s work, Khosla proposed at least five clusters of 
“unfreedoms.” They are: (1) Obstructions to Political Freedom such as any 
measurement that hinders citizens to know who should rule them and to 
criticize the authorities. (2) Obstructions to the Freedom to access Economic 
Facilities to provide housing opportunities and trade and access for sellers and 
buyers of labour, goods, property and finance in their locality. (3) Obstructions 
to Social Opportunities that hinder access to education, health care and other 
community, social and religious facilities to live a better life. (4) Obstructions 
to Transparency Guarantees that give the citizens free access to information 
on matters that affect their lives. (5) Obstructions to Protective Security. 
Citizens expect institutional arrangements to protect and support them in 
times of dire need from the consequences of man made and natural disasters. 
Khosla’s proposition at the ‘Mumbai Workshop Report 2003’ available at 
www.removingunfreedoms.org and Khosla, Romi, Sikandar Hasan, Jane 
Samuels, and Budhi Mulyawan. 2002. Removing Unfreedom, Citizens as Agents 
of Change, Sharing New Policy Frameworks for Urban Development. London: 
DFID.
22  Meta-culture according to Ipsen is a third culture developed by interrelationship 
between dominant and minority cultures. It “transcends” both cultures 
and contains both elements of cultures. It is a precondition of the open-
city concept. See Detlev Ipsen, 2005, “The Socio-spatial Condition of the 
Open City: A Theoretica Sketch” International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research 29.3, p.644-653. 
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315
CURRICULUM VITAE
Ilya Fadjar Maharika
Born in Temanggung, Indonesia 2 April 1968
Postal Address
Jalan Kaliurang Gg. Pandega Bakti 13 Yogyakarta 55281 Indonesia. Phone/Facs : +62 - 274 - 56 20 
30 Email: maharika@ftsp.uii.ac.id 
Education
01/1975 – 06/1981 Elementary School SD Netral C in Yogyakarta
06/1981 – 07/1984 Secondary School SMP 12 in Yogyakarta
06/1984 – 07/1987 High School School SMA 1 in Yogyakarta
08/1987 - 01/1993  Sarjana Arsitektur (BA degree) in Architecture at the Gadjah Mada 
University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.
10/1997 - 07/1999 Master of Arts in Architecture (MA by research), Institute of Advanced 
Architectural Studies, Department of Archaeology, University of York, 
United Kingdom. Funded by Th e Engineering and Education Development 
Project – Asian Development Bank.
Working Experiences
1993 – 1997  Titimatra Tujutama, Co. Ltd. Part time employment. Private consultant 
fi rm, responsible for designing and planning works as architect and project 
coordinator.
1993 – Present  Islamic University of Indonesia. Full time employment. Lecturer in the 
Department of Architecture. Responsible for teaching and tutorial of 
Architectural Design Studio and Th eory of Architecture.
Writings and Publications  
1.  “Centre for Industrial Estates: Environmental Designing Approach“ (in Indonesian), unpublished 
thesis BA degree at the Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, 1993.
2.  “Guidelines for Industrial Building Design“ (in Indonesian), seminar paper, Faculty of 
Engineering and Planning, Islamic University of Indonesia, 1994.
3.  “Public Space in Yogyakarta’ (in Indonesian), seminar paper, Faculty of Engineering and Planning, 
Islamic University of Indonesia, 1994.
4.  “Deconstruction, from Philosophy to Architecture: some applications in Islamic Architecture” 
(in Indonesian), seminar paper, Faculty of Engineering and Planning, Islamic University of 
Indonesia, 1995. 
316
5.  “Finding Edge Character for Kaliurang Street’ (in Indonesian), seminar 
paper Faculty of Engineering and Planning, Islamic University of 
Indonesia, 1995.
6.  with M. Iftironi, “Th e Role of Ijtihad (Islamic thought) in 
Architecture” (in Indonesian), Working paper of National Seminar 
for Islamic Architecture held by Gadjah Mada University and Islamic 
University of Indonesia.
7.  “Mosque Architecture: Understanding Th rough Deconstruction” 
(in Indonesian) Teknisia, Journal of Th e Faculty of Engineering and 
Planning, Islamic University of Indonesia, vol. II No. 6 – 1997 (ISSN 
: 0853 – 8557)
8.  “Architecture and Spirituality: Exploring Javanese Sacred Text 
and Space” dissertation submitted for the degree of Master of 
Arts in Architecture, Institute of Advanced Architectural Studies - 
Department of Archaeology, University of York, United Kingdom. 
9.  “Javanese Text: on the possibility to read as an architectural 
representation” Teknisia, Journal of Th e Faculty of Engineering and 
Planning, Islamic University of Indonesia, vol. II No. 9 – 1999 (ISSN 
: 0853 – 8557)
10.  “Tomb, Garden and Mosque: some parallel on archaic mythology 
representation” (in Indonesian), Teknisia, Journal of Th e Faculty of 
Engineering and Planning, Islamic University of Indonesia, vol. II 
No. 11 – 2000 (ISSN : 0853 – 8557)
11. With Prodjosaputro, S. as editors (1999) “Th eory Architecture: A 
Teaching Material“ unpublished teaching material on architecture 
theory (in Indonesian), Funded by Department of Culture and 
Education. 
12. With Revianto B. Santosa (1999) “Considering Topological Entity As 
Th e Basis of Spatial Syntax in Java and Bali Settlement,“ in Tjahyono, 
G. (editor) Vernacular Architecture, Jakarta: University of Indonesia 
Press. 
13.  With Revianto B. Santosa as editors, (2000) Tectonic Dimension in 
Islamic Architecture in Indonesia, Dept of Architecture, Indonesian 
Islamic University, Yogyakarta (in Indonesian and English). 
14.  “Negotiating Political Space: “Otherness” and “Other Space”” (in 
Indonesian with original title: “Menegosiasikan Ruang Politik: 
’Otherness’ dan ’Other Space’) in Josef Prijotomo (ed.) Proceeding 
on Postcolonialism in Built Environment in Indonesia,  Dept. of 
Architecture Institute of Technology Surabaya, Dept. of Architecture 
Udayana University Bali, and Indonesian Institute of Architects, 
region Bali June 2001. 
15.  “On the Ephemeral: Tactility and urban politics” in Misri Gozan (ed.) 
317
Proceeding on the Indonesian Students Scientifi c Meeting (ISSM) 2001, Manchester, August 
2001. 
16.  “Space and Politics” (in Indonesian with original title: “Ruang dan Politik”) working paper 
presented at the Workshop on Local Institution Empowerment II held by the Institute of 
Science and Technology Studies (Istecs) chapter Europe, November 2001 in Frankfurt am Main, 
Germany. 
17.  “Th e Politics of Virtual Spaces: Th e Cases of Ephemeral Architecture In Indonesia” in Proceeding 
on Conference IASI Indonesian Scholars Association, AOL Verlag, Marburg, Germany 2002. 
18.  “Technology For “Small And Medium Enterprises” From Spatial Perspective: A Consequence 
From Shifting Concept On Space” in Heru Iswanto and Misri Gozan (eds.) Proceeding of 
Indonesian Students Scientifi c Meeting Berlin 2002 available at (http://www.bibcouncil.de/
issm2002/Proceedings/index.htm)
19.  “Urban Poverty or Proto Urban Condition Misunderstood”  in Jutta Hebel, Samadi and Dodik 
Nurrochmat (eds.), Poverty Alleviation: Policy and Experiences in Developing Countries, 
Proceedings of International Seminar and Series of Disscussion on Poverty Alleviation 2003, 
Indonesian Students Association (PPI) chapter Germany and Centre for Tropical and Subtropical 
Agriculture and Forestry Georg-August Universität Göttingen (CeTSAF), August 9 2003, pp. 
51-59. 
20.  with Yulianto P Prihatmaji, “Junkschool and Junkspace: Decomposition of social space“ 
in Proceeding Seminar on Spaces for Learning, Dept. Of Architecture Islamic University of 
Indonesia, August 2004. 
21.  “Problematizing Trends, Towards House for All“ (in Indonesian with original title: “Menyoal Tren, 
Menggapai Rumah Untuk Semua“) in Henry Feriadi (ed.) Proceeding of Seminar on Housing 
for All, held by Christian University of Duta Wacana Yogyakarta and Habitat International, 
October 09, 2004.
22.  “Th e Diagram of the Dynamics of Informality“ (in Indonesian with original title: “Diagram 
Dinamika Informalitas“) in Jurnal Kampung, Yayasan Pondok Rakyat – Ford Foundation, 1: 
3.
23.  “Projecting Identity: Mapping the Genesis of Diff erentiations in the Pearl River Delta“ chapter in 
Detlev Ipsen, Yo-ngning Li, and Holger Weichler (eds.) 2005. Genesis of Landscape Urbanism: 
Th e Pearl River Delta in South China. Work Report No. 161 of Faculty of Architecture Urban 
Planning and Landscape Planning. Kassel: University of Kassel, pp. 33-43.
Other Writings
1.  “Pearl River Delta: the beauty of planned cities and beauty of the vernacular” (Original title in 
Indonesian “Delta Sungai Mutiara: Keindahan Kota Terencana dan Keindahan Vernakular”) 
Kompas, 7 November 2004. 
2.  “Learning from China” (in Indonesian, original title: “Belajar dari China” Sinergi Indonesia, No. 
23 Vol. 02 January 2005. 
3.  “Art and City: Looks for Parameters“ (in Indonesian “Seni Kota Mencari Parameter“) invited 
speech on Th e 16th Yogyakarta Arts Festival Seminar“ (Festival Kesenian Yogyakarta – FKY), 
July 2005. 
318
4.  “Resisting the Flow of Insularization” (in Indonesian, original title: 
“Melawan Arus Insularisasi” Kompas, 17 September 2005. 
Researches 
1.  “Policy Research on Cultural Heritage Villages“ with Yogyakarta 
Heritage Trust. Funded by Culture Offi  ce, Department of Education 
and Culture. 10/1999 – 2/2000. 
2.  “Th e Role of Mataram Kingdom”s Principal Mosques in the Discourse 
of Historic Urban Networking” with Dr. Drajad Suhardjo and Ir. 
Revianto B. Santosa, MArch. Co-funded by Research Centre Islamic 
University of Indonesia and Mataram Yogyakarta Kingdom. 08/1999 
– 2/2000. 
3.  “Gated Communities: Spatial and Social Implications of the 
Development and the Prospect for Spatial Management: the case of 
city of Yogyakarta“ as principal researcher, with Ir. Saifudin Mutaqi, 
MT (architect) and Drs. Purwanto, M.Phil. (sociolog), funded by 
Research Grant of Riset Unggulan Terpadu (Advanced Collaborative 
Research) of the Ministry of Research and Technology, Batch XII 
2005-2006. 
Plannings and Designs
1. Building Design for the Department of Music, Th eatre, and Dancing, 
Faculty of Art, Institute of Indonesian Art, Yogyakarta as architect 
assistant in Titimatra Tujutama, co. ltd. 02/1993 – 12/1994. Built.
2.  Planning and Design for Hospital Master Plans: State General 
Hospital at Bantul and Wonosari as architectural programmer and 
project coordinator. Project held by Department of Health, 06/1993 
- 02/1994.  
3.  Detail Plan for Industrial Zone in Kulon Progo District as project 
coordinator. Planning Project held by District Offi  ce of Kulon Progo. 
10/1994 - 04/1995. 
4.  Master Plan Review and Design New Campus Complex of Islamic 
University of Indonesia (UII), Yogyakarta as project coordinator. 
Project held by UII, 10/1994 - 08/1995.
5. Detail Plan for Small Towns (Panjatan, Girimulyo and Kalibawang) 
in Kulon Progo District as project coordinator. Planning Project held 
by District Offi  ce of Kulon Progo. 02/1995 - 04/1995. 
6. Design for Gallery and Library Building for Institute of Indonesian 
Art, Yogyakarta as architect in  Titimatra Tujutama, co. ltd. Built. 
04/1995 -  07/1995.
7. Study of Local Building Regulation for Wates and Wonosari Secondary 
319
City, as project coordinator. Planning Project held by Department of Public Works, 09/1995 
- 02/1996.
8.  Campus Design for Civil Engineering and Mechanical Engineering Polytechnic campus 
buildings and library for Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, funded by Asian Development 
Bank as principal architect with Titimatra Tujutama, co. ltd. Built. 02/1997 – 05/1997.  
Prize
Graduated with Distinction Student (“Mahasiswa Berprestasi“), Faculty of Engineering, Gadjah 
Mada University Yogyakarta.  
Social Activities
1. Member of Yogyakarta Heritage Trust, an NGO that concerns to conservation of Yogyakarta 
cultural and historic areas. Member since 1995 and appointed as secretary on 1998-1999. Its 
activity includes hosting discussions on conservation issues between government and local people, 
radio broadcasting on conservation rubric and giving award for well conserved buildings.  
2. Founding ATAP (Architecture at the Periphery – Architecture as Interdisciplinary Platform), 
Research Group in the Department of Architecture, Islamic University of Indonesia. 
320
ERKLARUNG
Hiermit versichere ich, dass ich die vorliegende Dissertation selbständig 
und ohne unerlaubte Hilfe angefertigt und andere als die in der Dissertation 
angegeben Hilfsmittel nicht benutzt habe. Alle Stellen, die wortlich 
oder sinngemäss aus verlöff entlichten oder unverlöff entlichten Schriften 
entnommen sind, habe ich als solche kennlich gemacht. Kein Teil dieser 
Arbeit ist in einem anderen Promotions oder Habilitationsverfahren 
verwendet worden.
Kassel,  21 Januar 2007
Ilya Fadjar Maharika