What's wrong with globalization?: Contra 'flow speak' - towards an existential turn in the theory of globalization
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What’s wrong with globalization?: Contra ‘flow speak’ – towards an existential turn in the theory of globalization

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Abstract
The article attempts a reformulation of globalization theory. We identify ‘flow speak’ and the flattened ontology of the social that goes with it as a major limitation in contemporary globalization theory. Contrary to the prevailing overemphasis on mobility and deterritorialization, we suggest an existential turn that orients future globalization thinking more towards issues of belonging, choice and commitment, and the rhythmicity of social relations. To highlight the processual character of this shift of perspective, we shall draw on the paradigmatic figure of the ‘homecomer’. S/he, in our understanding, embodies the ambivalence between the lure of global options and the need for commitment to lasting bonds. Thus, we do not argue for a post-mortem on globalization theory, but maintain that a deeper understanding of globalization as a ‘way of being in the world’ would require a phenomenologically inclined repositioning of the concept.

Keywords
flow speak, homecomer, lived selectivity, relevancy, Schütz

Setting out the problem
Our article title, admittedly, plays on a kind of light-hearted casualness with regard to globalization theory. For one can pose this question in rather different ways. First, it
could mean, voiced with an undertone of surprise: is there actually something wrong with globalization? That would be the tone of the advocates of a hyper-globalist theory for whom the concept has become the quasi-natural outlook on the social world with no need for critical scrutiny any more. Second, one could raise this question with an undertone of refusal: what is it actually that globalization theory is trying to push, what actually is the core of the argument? That would be the slightly derogative tone of those who never really bought into the concept and are glad that its heyday seems to be over. But then of course there are the many who increasingly voice the same question with an undertone of concerned engagement: what has happened to globalization theory, why is it not really moving ahead any more? This would be the seriously concerned voice of those who once welcomed what seemed to be a innovative and ground-breaking concept, but increasingly ask themselves: can it actually sustain what it once promised, namely to provide the umbrella for the analysis of the society of the twenty-first century? While, for some, globalization theory still is expected to provide a powerful new synthesis for contemporary social theory (Robertson and Inglis, forthcoming), others lament its perseverance in a pre-paradigmatic state (Abu-Lughod, 2008). Yet despite an obvious sense of crisis, there remains some unease about joining in to the tune of ‘a post-mortem’ of globalization theory (Rosenberg, 2005). We would much rather propose a redirecting of globalization theory towards the existential agenda implied in globalization, but largely neglected by ‘flow speak’.

It has become a truism, that the dominant rhetoric of ‘global flows’ has become detached from the material and institutional conditions that underpin the reproduction of global culture. Supported by casual evidence from the arenas of tourism, electronic banking and pop culture, ‘flow speak’ conjures up the image of a ‘cut’n mix culture’ (Friedman, 2002: 33) that celebrates mobility and deterritorialized forms of social interaction in an overzealous way. Stated in more conceptual terms, ‘disembodied globalism’ (James, 2005) is conflated with global culture per se in a way that neglects the more embodied forms of social practice. Relatedly, ‘flow speak’ overemphasizes the technological annulment of spatial distance and thereby undervalues the cultural thickness of everyday territoriality (Tomlinson, [1999] 2008).

To be sure, by ‘flow speak’ we do not imply globalization theory as a whole, but certain argumentative strands within it that use ‘flow speak’ as a convenient short-hand for the complex ‘globalization problématique’ (Marinetto, 2005). It is our concern here that the prevalent ‘flow speak’ in globalization theory is supported by two paradigmatic shortcomings. First, we would agree with Friedman (2008: 114) in that it provides us with a ‘truly impoverished understanding of human life’. By simply including people in the landscape of flows via ‘ethnoscapes’, it precludes the question of social participation and the deeper meaning of social existence in terms of ambivalence, affect, as well as bodily involvement and rhythmicity. Human beings here come into view mostly as choosers and consumers of destinations, objects, localities and their respective sign values (Bauman, 1998: 79ff.). Second, globalization theory represents the spatialization of the social and social theory. In departing from the linear universal narrative of modernity, global culture is seen as an arena of different and divergent modernities, cultures, life styles. Here globalization theory is aligned with post-modern thinking in suggesting a networked world of simultaneity and juxtaposition of difference instead of a linear
progression in time (Foucault, 1991; Featherstone and Lash, 1995). This privileging of
the spatial over the temporal analysis of contemporary society has meant a focus on
extension and connectivity, thereby favouring a certain presentism and bracketing out
the complex rhythmicity of the social and the temporalization of the local. We would
therefore agree with those who argue that the ‘spatial turn’ has, perhaps involuntarily,
meant a ‘flattening out of social processes’, or our view thereof (Therborn, 2000: 154;
May and Thrift, 2001: 1f.).

To us, it seems that the most pressing problem resulting from this overemphasis on
spatiality and quasi-simultaneous connectivity, on the one hand, and a rather narrow
understanding of human existence, on the other, is not whether this scenario will eventu-
ally lead to homogenization or heterogenization of global culture. Rather, we would
argue that the two shortcomings of ‘flow speak’ converge into a particularly fundamental
problem: globalization theory has lost track of the idea of ‘limits’.

A global culture where ‘people, information, money, and technology all flow around
the globe in a rather chaotic set of disjunctive circuits that somehow bring us all together’
(Friedman, 2008: 111), is a total social arena of unlimited options of connectivity.
Bauman (1998; 2007) early on in the debate, and repeatedly, has pointed towards the
inbuilt link between a society in flow and consumption as its fundamental operating
principle. Beyond its narrower meaning, consuming (of destinations, localities, goods,
and indeed relationships) has become the *modus operandi* of contemporary society. This
society of choosers has no limits just as there is ‘no obvious finishing line . . . for this
chase after new desires’ (Bauman, 1998: 79). The spatial turn in globalization theory
in our view has also fostered an understanding of a society without limits. Space is em-
tied out of its social significance in a world where any distance could potentially be com-
pressed into co-presence. Access to global space then implies first of all a multiplication of
options. Moreover, global space is predominantly seen as backdrop against which general-
ized projections of ‘constant availability’ and ‘technologically restored intimacy’ foster a
vision of ‘omnipresence’ and ‘all-at-onceness’ (Ray, 2007: 1; Tomlinson, 2008: 161ff.).

To be fair, in Albrow’s (1996; 2007) reading of ‘globality’ as a planetary frame of
reference for human existence, there is indeed a strong notion of limit and boundedness.
Here we find reference to the ‘undisputed materiality’ cum finitude of the globe, which
might even supplant the hubris of modern productive forces and thereby modernity’s
urge to transgress any given boundary. In that sense, ‘globality’ as the global human con-
dition ‘limits the open possibilities of the present’ (Albrow, 2007: 11). However, what
Albrow refers to are the collective condition and choices affecting humanity as a whole.
Globality in that sense does not necessarily filter through to the ‘being in the world’ of
ordinary individuals’ everyday reality, unless one happens to be part of the cosmopolitan
middle classes for whom questions of individual life style are translated into the question
of ‘what should we do?’ (Albrow, 2007: 16).

What we instead suggest at this point is a turn towards a notion of choice and limit that
is intrinsically constituting the lived reality of the ordinary individual. What we allude to
is a simple but fundamental fact, which in our understanding holds the key to the globa-
lization problématique. If the ‘being in the world’ of real individuals is indeed taken as
the point of departure for the analysis of the ‘concrete structuration of the world in which
we live’ – to recall Robertson’s (1992: 53) initial agenda of globalization theory, then
what we would call lived selectivity is the fundamental key to it. By that we refer to the simple fact that the irreversibility of life imposes limits on omnipresence and multioptionality. rather, the body-related life cycle forces the individual to structure the multitude of (global) options into a final life trajectory. Thus what we suggest here is an anthropological and phenomenological shift of perspective and emphasis, that analytically disentangles the ‘human condition’ from the ‘global human condition’. From this perspective it would seem that it is the finality of individual human life rather than the finitude of the globe that provides the ultimate ‘nexus of human experience’ (cf. Altbrow 2004: 37). To put it bluntly, globalization widens the field of spatial and consumptive optionality, but does not provide an escape from the daunting insight that we only have this one life to live.

A good base for the phenomenological reorientation of globalization theory is the work of Alfred Schütz. One crucial thing we can learn from Schütz (1971: 228) about the social actor’s being in the world is that the structure of ‘relevancy’ that guides his/her actions does not mainly derive from the choices offered but by the ‘fundamental anxiety’ imposed. It is the latent ‘primordial awareness’ of moving towards death that generates our ‘system of hopes and fears, of wants and satisfactions, of chances and risks which incite man within the natural attitude to attempt the mastery of the world, to overcome obstacles, to draft projects, and to realize them’. Here we are presented with a rather different concept of an actor in comparison to the picking and choosing of a consumer in an aestheticized global culture. We shall subsequently link the concept of relevancy to the idea of ‘life-conduct’ (Lebensführung) as developed by Helmuth Plessner (1975). We believe that Plessner gets to the root problem of human existence when he says that man as ‘half-opened being’ is structurally pressured to continuously solidify multiple options into a liveable existence. Interestingly enough, for him, this poses a universal human question rather than a unique issue of reflexive individualization in global society. We shall link these ‘classic’ accounts to the more recent writings of Zygmunt Bauman and Alberto Melucci, who, in our understanding, provide a lot of inspiration for the phenomenologically inclined analysis of the globalization problématique as attempted in this article. From the start of the globalization debate, both authors emphasized the inner directedness and circular character of human existence against the limitless array of possibilities offered by the global arena.

In the following sections of this article we shall attempt to further outline the proposed shift towards lived selectivity around the issues of mobility, territoriality, and belonging.

**The logic of total mobilization**

Anyone who engages with the exploding literature on globalization will sooner or later realize a common leitmotif. Globalization is more or less elegantly equated with growing mobility. In his attempt at ‘Encountering globalization’, Robins ([2000] 2007: 239), for example, makes that link in a rather straightforward manner:

Globalization is about growing mobility across frontiers – mobility of goods and commodities, mobility of information and communication products and services, and mobility of people.
We are being told that the paradigmatic experience of contemporary society is ‘rapid mobility over long distances’ enabled by ‘new forms of long-distance transportation and travel’ (Lash and Urry, 1994: 253f.). With initially impressive figures about the ‘fluid of travelling peoples [that] involves everywhere across the globe’ (Urry, 2005: 61), we should be convinced that the flows of people within and beyond national borders constitute the new agenda for sociology ‘beyond societies’ (Urry, 2001: 2f.). In a similar vein, Castles and Miller ([1993] 2003) have paradigmatically declared the global age to be the ‘age of migration’. They argue that ‘large-scale movements of people arise from the accelerated process of globalization’, while at the same time ‘international population movements constitute a key dynamic within globalization’ ([1993] 2003: 4, 1).

What this conjures up is the persistent image of a ‘borderless world’ (Ohmae, 1995) in which a ‘new global cultural economy’ (Appadurai, 1992) has emerged, consisting of a fluid and irregularly shaped landscape of ‘flows’. What was initially a plausible perspective on a society in the grip of new means of transport and communication, has increasingly turned into an ‘over-generalized claim that globalization includes every process of abstracting mobility across space’ (James, 2005: 195). James’s argument initially aims at the undifferentiated link between globalization and mobility. He argues that the mobility potential of social practices is inherently different, depending on their degree of their embodiment. More embodied ones will tie people more to vicinity and locality than the disembodied ones. In other words, the embodied relationships of a family do not travel as easily as the remittance cheque sent between distant relatives, the refugee does not cross a state border as easily as a digitally encoded message. Thus, what James proposes in his argument is not an ontologically flattened out world of ‘flows’ but an ‘uneven and contradictory layering of different practices and subjectivities across all social relations’ (2005: 194). However, the claim of over-generalization also refers to what Busch (2000) has coined ‘casual empiricism’. The figures that attempt to prove that society is globalizing because everyone is on the move, are not as impressive after all. For example, the figures for people living outside the borders of their homeland range between 1.7 to 3% of the world’s population (Faist, 2007: 365; Friedman, 2008: 115). Even if we take into account that there are a great number of illegal immigrants, and that each migrant affects other people too, generalizing claims such as ‘geographical mobility has rapidly increased throughout the world’ (Beck-Gernsheim, 2007: 271) are thereby somewhat curtailed in their argumentative drive. Instead, it seems apt to remember the counterargument put forward by Tomlinson ([1999] 2008: 9) early on in this debate: namely ‘not to exaggerate the way that long-distance transportation and travel figures either in the lives of the majority of people in the world today or in the overall process of globalization’.

One could be cynical about the small proportion of people on the move and ‘suspect that the globalizing visions are based exclusively on the experience of the academics and other movers who so identify’ (Friedman, 2008: 115). Or one could demystify those figures by asking, why is it actually that there are so few people on the move in this globalizing world? Why is it that our age is in fact more an ‘age of migration dreams’ rather than an ‘age of (actual) migration’ (Beck-Gernsheim, 2007: 277)? Of course, what comes initially to mind here are more recent tendencies of deglobalization such as the recent fuel crisis and a general tendency towards feelings of insecurity against
everything considered ‘foreign’ in the aftermath of 9/11 and related events, that have led to an ‘apparent flight from mobility’ (Urry, 2002: 67) and have simultaneously reinforced ‘immobility regimes’ in an emerging ‘enclave society’ (Turner, 2007). In this respect, Düvell (2006: 199) refers to a ‘migration paradox in the age of globalization’, constituted by the growing discrepancy between mobility as a technical possibility, on the one hand, and attempts at political governance that effectively immobilize unwanted migrants (Shamir, 2005; Salter, 2009).

However, beyond these more politically and economically inclined debates, there is a more existential dimension to this paradox between opportunity and realization, which Faist (2007: 368ff.) has pointed out with his notion of the ‘miracle of relative immobility’. It indicates the limits of simple ‘push and pull’ models of migration. Drawing on Hirschman’s ideal typical analysis of group dynamics within communities facing decline, he argues that next to migration (exit), there are at least two other routes a life project can take: improvement of one’s life by looking for allies in order to change things locally (voice), or resignation in the face of poverty and lack of resources (loyalty). Subsequently another point is worthy of consideration that links Faist’s argument with James’s earlier argument concerning the relative immobility of embodied social practices. He argues that in the light of everyday evidence of the principle of ‘insider advantage’, the potential migrant always faces the daunting insight of limited transferability of human and social capital. We get an idea here that option and choice are not always enabling, but that the gap between option and action can also mean immobilizing exhaustion.

Empirical studies support this line of argument. Taylor et al. (2007), in their analysis of Eastern Punjabi transnationalism, for example, draw our attention to the complex social and cultural contextuality of mobility. Here it transpires that mobility is still the privilege of certain caste groups, and that breaking out of the caste system via transnational mobility often means no return. Moreover, and quite contrary to the ongoing assumptions about the circular nature of transnational social spaces, it means a break in extended family ties once the immediate family has successfully migrated from the Punjab to the UK. We can sense from this case study that mobility has its social costs despite the dramatically improved technical infrastructure of long distance travel. And that seems to apply even to those who are normally celebrated and celebrating themselves as the ‘masters of the universe’. Ley (2004) impressively shows the ‘heavy social burden’ that is paid by those who on the surface claim they could live anywhere in the world as long as it is near an airport. He indicates that in fact their world is quite a contracted and contact-intensive subculture that congeals around bars and expatriate clubs, while at the same time facing the latent feeling of loss as far as family is concerned. In sum, their ‘apparent mastery of distance and sovereignty over space is much less than is apparent’ (2004: 158). Wallace (2002: 614f.), in her assessment of migration and mobility in East-Central Europe, gives us further insight into the complex set of factors that influence life strategies of mobility/immobility. She argues that many potential migrants stay due to ‘limitations of language’, ‘attachment to the land of origin’ and trust in proven survival strategies embedded in ‘social networks and family support . . . [that are] tied to the home base’. Most importantly, however, she argues that many respondents cited ‘faith that the future will be better’ as a reason to stay despite economic hardship. This indeed amounts to a ‘victory of faith over experience’ (2002: 614), as Wallace
argues, and point us towards the complex affectual ambivalences with which the tension between opportunity and realization is loaded.

This brief detour into case study material should serve to underline two analytical points that, following the argument made by Kaufmann et al. (2004: 749f.), we believe to be of crucial importance in the analysis of mobility in global society. First, the ‘geography of flows’ cannot be considered in isolation, or to put it more bluntly – as a disembedded phenomenon, but needs to be seen in specific regional and local forms of social embeddedness. By this we do not just imply local circumstance, but also the opportunity structure provided by the life cycle of individuals and families. Kofman (2004), in her analysis of family-related migration in this regard, refers to the opportunity windows of birth, marriage, divorce and retirement that shift several times with the individual’s unfolding life course. In this respect, mobility is always the outcome of a complex configuration of ‘access, competence, and appropriation’ (Kaufmann et al., 2004: 750). Second, and this particularly refers us further to the logic of appropriation, we need to understand the modus operandi of (potential) mobility, not just in its social and political but also existential dimension.

Bauman (2000: 38) perhaps points us to the existential core of the dilemma of mobility/immobility when he argues that in the end it all comes down to the balance between ‘self-assertion and the capacity to control the social settings which render such self-assertion feasible or unrealistic’. Mobility in search of self-assertion carries the intrinsic risk of ‘chronic disembeddedness’. For, as Bauman argues, mobility ‘promise[s] no fulfilment, no rest and no satisfaction of arriving, of reaching the final destination, where one can disarm, relax and stop worrying’ (2000: 34). This is the reason, one could continue in the line of Bauman’s argument, why all mobility carries to some extend the nostalgia for ‘home’, symbolizing the childhood setting of (in retrospect) unspoiled synchronicity between self and milieu. The logic of total mobilization ignores that when it reasons that there is always the possibility of a better life elsewhere:

In other words, why should I be poor, hungry, oppressed when people elsewhere have plenty to eat, have their own house and a motorcar, and can go to the doctor when they are sick? Why should I go on suffering here? Why not try to get there? (Beck-Gernsheim, 2007: 277)

The territoriality of thin relevance(s)

The relationship between globalization theory and space from the start has always been a troubled one. Globalization theory set out with the clear intention of a ‘spatialization of social theory’, away from the temporal framework of linear modernization models (Featherstone and Lash, 1995: 1). But it quickly turned globalization into a concept that is overly dependent on overambitious notions of ‘deterritorialization’ (Rosenberg, 2005). Pries (2001: 29) pinpoints the irony of this development rather well when he argues that ‘the mainstream of globalization discourse puts the spatial dimension on the agenda merely to demonstrate that it is no longer relevant’.

‘Flow speak’ has left behind the sophistications of early globalization debate. While in his agenda-setting account of globalization Giddens still insists on understanding the spatial restructuring of late modernity as irrevocably intertwined processes of
disembedding and reembedding, later accounts shift the balance towards the former. Giddens (1994: 64) refers explicitly to ‘lateral extension’ (disembedding) of social relations as intrinsically linked with ‘local transformation’ (reembedding). The core issue thereby put on the agenda of social research is how different forms of the social achieve and maintain ‘boundedness’ in the light of time–space distanciation (1994: 14). On the other side of the spectrum it was Appadurai’s (1992: 303) almost iconic image of a new ‘landscape of global flows’ that gave most prominence to the claim that globalization cum deterritorialization would impose a ‘new spatial ontology on us’ (Amin, 2004: 223).

This ‘celebration of deterritorialization’ (Mitchell, 1997: 107) implies a shift of emphasis from globalization as ‘transference’ and ‘transformation’ towards globalization as ‘transcendence’ – meaning the emancipation from previously known conditions of localized and territorialized existence into a global realm of supraterritoriality (cf. Bartelson, 2000).

As far as its vertical dimension is concerned, ‘flow speak’ shows a perpetual preference for the life of those circulating above the ‘threshold’ where one leads a life of moral detachment and absentee landlordship (cf. Tomlinson, [1999] 2008: 132, 137). This, as Pries (2005: 167) has argued, ‘is the condition enjoyed by only one tenth of the world’s population’. What follows from this is the need for stronger orientation towards mundane everyday life. Beneath that threshold, people will tell a different story of the waiting and caring involved in maintaining everyday life within a global society; a story of taking responsibility for existential priorities. They will tell a story of how ‘responsibilities curtail’ potentially global time–space geographies (Davies, 2001: 135). In other words, theirs (often it is women) is not a story of individualistic global omnipresence but of entangled ‘presence availability’ in the sense of ‘being able to meet the other’s needs in a spatio-temporal here-and-now’ (2001: 139).

Studies in transnational life among those living below the ‘threshold’ of hypermobility have, on the one hand, fostered a wider understanding of ‘being present’ in terms of household contribution across distance, but equally testified to the limits of life in spatial liminality due to the existential agenda set by the ‘here-and-now’ (Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 2004). Increasingly it transpires from these studies on transnational forms of life that a certain attempt to keep options open across distance is inevitably tainted with a tendency towards transclusion. By this we refer to the precarious balancing of opening and closure in a translocal landscape of opportunity and obligation. While this is certainly not a crude zero-sum constellation, at least for the more embodied practices of everyday life it means in the long run an alienation from the ‘there’ while (often unwanted) spiralling down into the everyday agenda set by the ‘here and now’. In sum, without neglecting the impact of the new configurations of social space on all strata of society, they will be ‘accentuated by pre-existing patterns of social life and inequality’ (Pries, 2005: 168).

Even when we put into brackets the vertical or social stratification of global society and culture, the horizontal view also suggest that the ‘deteritorialization’ thesis overplays the immateriality of global space and the technical annulment of spatial distance, while underlaying the socio-cultural thickness of territoriality. What is being bracketed out is the different ‘modalities’ of (overcoming) distance, and the fact that social space, predominantly understood as a ‘field of action’, is deeply embedded in a thickly layered ‘affectual field’ (Waldenfels, 1985). A point in case in this respect are processes of banal ‘rebordering’ in a ‘borderless world’. While nation state borders might disappear in the
form of fences and checkpoints, they continue to work in a preinstitutional sense as ‘spaces of narrative fidelity’ (Eder, 2006: 257). One might recall here Löfgren’s (2002: 259) middle-aged Swedish couple who like to go on holiday to Norway, but sigh with relief when on their return the Swedish prohibitory signs come in sight, indicating ‘back home again’. This narrative force of state borders comes to the fore in times of relatively intense transnational cultural connectivity, as the game of ‘communicating difference’ becomes even more important in order to stabilize identity on an everyday basis by assisting ‘in the reordering of global society into neat compartments and categories, distinguishing between those who belong and those who do not’ (Newman, 2006: 147).

Thus what opens up behind the simplistic formula of ‘deterritorialization’ is a research agenda that looks into the complex links between (technical) ‘connectivity’ and (cultural) ‘proximity’ (Tomlinson, [1999] 2008: 3ff.). Two analytical issues, in our opinion, should provide guidance in this. The first refers to what Alfred Schütz (1966) has called ‘relevancy of action’. According to Schütz, it is the system of practical relevances that structures the spatial and social layering of the life world. Things, activities and people are meaningfully linked via practical orientation through plans for the hour, the day or indeed the ‘life-plan’. Thus motivational and thematic ‘relevance’ deriving from the individual’s ‘biographical situation’ is quite a different modus operandi for generating territoriality than is ‘reach’, especially when in technological terms everything has come into restorable or obtainable reach. Moreover, still following Schütz, we could say that ‘relevancy’ provides limits to ‘reach’, or that the world in its existential dimension is available only within certain limits. Schütz (1966: 130) summarizes this argument as follows:

The world as a whole is, in principle opaque, as a whole it is neither understood nor understandable. By virtue of the systems of relevancy and their structures, sense connections, which to a certain extent can be made transparent, are established between partial contents of the world.

The point we want to make from this detour into phenomenology is the following. A perspective that almost exclusively looks at technical reach or connectivity fails to capture a crucial side of territoriality in global culture. To put it more bluntly, ‘flow speak’ and its emphasis on technological ease of mobility, provide us with a territoriality of thin relevancy. In contrast, a more phenomenologically inclined analysis would provide us with a landscape that looks beyond the technically possible towards the motivational, thematic restructuring of this optional field. It would open the view not just for scope, but also for the intensity of links, and it would provide us with a picture of the layered character of the social fabric that holds global culture. But, most importantly, it would force us to keep in mind the insight that expanding relevances pose a challenge to self-identity, of which having the relevances of action ‘in one’s grasp’ is a crucial feature (Schütz, 1966: 131). Thus lived selectivity has to be a crucial feature of the ‘ongoing constitution of the self’ and at the same time ‘one of the less obvious aspects of deterritorialization’ (Tomlinson, [1999] 2008: 177)

To map out the precarious territoriality of relevancy within global culture we need more research below the ‘threshold’ of deterritorialized forms of life. A good example of this is given in Kennedy’s (2004) study of the interpersonal networks of transnational
professionals in the building and design service industry. He reveals the shared feelings of crisis and degradation, but also points towards the glue of small-scale loyalties and mutual likings between professionals abroad who do not have the privilege of moving through global space in the non-place infrastructure of a large TNC. But most importantly, the study suggest the ‘crucial role of life cycle situation’ in generating what he refers to as ‘network sociality’, seen as a means to compensate for emotional vulnerability, among those foreign professionals abroad (2004: 168ff.). Linked to the Schützian analytic register, the study reveals age, non-parental status, and sense of relative social exclusion, among other factors, as relevancies around which these professionals made contact with the like-minded, with whom subsequently they were ‘compelled to construct their own interpersonal transnational social spaces in situ’ (2004: 164). In our view, Kennedy’s study (2004: 163) indeed reveals that beyond the circuit of deterritorialized ‘flow’, these professionals engage in the hard everyday task ‘to weave very different strands into the emerging tapestry of global society’.

Interestingly enough, Kennedy’s (2004: 176) respondents also claimed that their network sociality provided a ‘temporary substitute for family and friends left behind at home’. This makes us aware of another sociological problem flattened out behind ‘flow’ speak. The sociologically most intriguing problem with regard to ‘deterritorialization’ is not the technological potential for physical relocation, but the time–space bridging capacity of social relationships. In other words, we need clearer insight into the link between ‘connectivity’ and ‘mediated experience’ (Tomlinson, [1999] 2008: 150ff.). At an abstract level, one could argue that mediated experience enhanced by new means of communication has emancipated social relationships from the local context. Still, empirically inclined research is rather sceptical of the world-embracing capacity of social relationships. Ley (2004: 157ff.) argues that the ‘tyranny of distance’ continues ‘to unsettle agents with a putatively global reach’. Thus it would seem, as Hannerz (2002: 220) has pointed out in arguing against an overexcited embrace of ‘deterritorialization’, ‘bi-territoriality’ or at best ‘multi-territoriality’ is what the quotidian everyday life will allow. There are limits to the reproduction of local conditions of informality and intimacy across time–space. And this, according to Ley (2004), applies to the ‘contact-intensive subculture’ of top management as much as to the ‘family costs’ of ‘dual lives’ even among better off transnational migrants (Waters, 2002; Taylor et al., 2007).

This is not to romanticize locality, home or family, but to problematize claims that communication technology can indefinitely extend the time–space distances over which intimate milieux can be maintained, and relatedly, that we should drop the hierarchy of primary (direct) and secondary (mediated) relationships (Albrow, 2008: 325f.; cf. Tomlinson, [1999] 2008: 156ff.). While we concur with the implication that the equation of near and close and far and distant becomes blurred, we would still maintain that there are limits to this disentangling. There is a continuing significance of ‘everyday territory’ that requires routine presence and practical recurrence, with in other words, a rather well-mapped out familiar space in which one is indeed ‘there, in touch, with all one’s senses’ (Hannerz, 2002: 219).

The projection of hope for a global omnipresence that is (involuntarily?) carried by the concept of ‘deterritorialization’, has features of a childlike escape into the promises of technologically induced globality – always in touch, never facing the emotional
burdens of absence and limit that come with decision (cf. Giddens, 1993: 38f.). It is interesting to observe at this point, that from (some strand of) globalization theory the argument of ‘infantilism’ and ‘arrested development’ has been levelled against any sociological thinking that maintains propinquity and emotional closeness as point of differentiation between different types of relationships. This accusation is based on the unwavering faith that ‘new communication technology . . . extend[s] to new extremes the distances over which intimacy can be initiated and maintained’ (Albrow, 2008: 325). It is certainly a truism that ‘absence makes the heart grow fonder’ and it is also undisputed that ‘absence is the normal condition of a human relationship’ (2008: 325). But still we would agree on this matter with Schütz (1964a: 109f.) when he argues that certain intimate face-to-face relationships such as marriage/partnership and family are of such a ‘recurrent character’ that enables them to ‘participate in the onrolling life of the other’. That simply means that co-presence has to be re-established with such frequency and immediacy that ‘to each of the partners the Other’s life becomes . . . part of his own autobiography’ (1964a: 111). Certainly, new means of communication have lessened this pressure of recurrence, but no mail or phone call can in the long run substitute for access to the Other’s personality ‘as a unit’ (1964a: 112).

This is by no means an argument against the possibility of couples living apart together or transnational family households, as extensively referred to in the previous sections. It is an attempt to recall the emotional costs and affective loss involved in these social trajectories, something which is largely ignored by much of globalization theory (cf. Ley, 2004).

**From routes to roots**

Over-emphasis on deterritorialization goes hand in hand with marginalizing issues of (local) belonging and home in comparison to other hotspots of globalization debate. While migration studies and cultural studies have always had an eye on the somewhat underrated dimension of ‘return migration’ (e.g. Wyman, 1993; Long and Oxfeld, 2004), sociology in the twenty-first century, on the other hand, has developed a somewhat lukewarm relationship to ideas of ‘home’ and ‘belonging’. Ever since Robertson (1992: 146ff.) authoritatively pinned down notions of home and belonging as being rooted in the angst-driven ‘nostalgic paradigm in German social theory’ and its concern for Heimat, the debate on home and belonging within globalization studies has inevitably carried a bit of a parochial if not an outright conservative image. In this context, it is not surprising that the renewed impulse to engage in a phenomenologically informed existential analysis of global culture around issues of ‘home, belonging’ and ‘place’ has emerged from cultural and social anthropology (Escobar, 2001; Hannerz, 2002; Friedman, 2008).

Reducing this complex issue to the ‘nostalgic paradigm’ is an analytic misconception. As Schwartz (1989) in his unassuming yet deep essay *In Defence of Homesickness* points out, though it is akin to nostalgia, the two are not the same. While nostalgia implies a backwards-directed ‘longing for’ bygone times and situations, homesickness, on the contrary, refers to a future-directed urge of ‘belonging to’ a specific context with its attached commitments and responsibilities. Unlike nostalgia, homesickness in Schwartz’s understanding does not equate with a yearning for a return to a bygone past but is more of an
active searching for a place in this world where one feels in sync with oneself. It is the urge to ‘really belong’, and ‘admitting the need for roots’ (Schwartz, 1989: 12, 14, 24, 32; cf. Bauman, 1995a: 97).

Globalization has certainly changed our sense of belonging in that it allows nested identities and loyalties, as well as multiple homes. However, belonging in the sense of quasi-natural embeddedness, unthinking attachment, committed engagement, is an accomplishment that cannot be continuously replicated by everyone and everywhere (Hedetoft and Hjort, 2002: XVIII). This ‘banality of belonging’ (2002: XI) is an essential part of the ‘concrete structuration of the world in which we live’ – to recall Robertson’s (1992: 53) initial agenda of a theory of globalization. One does not have to read these arguments pro roots in everyday life as a sibling of parochial closure, but instead as a complementary aspect of, or even a precondition for, being open to the world. Essentially, ‘globality can only constitute belonging in the most flimsy and liminal sense’ (Hedetoft and Hjort, 2002: XVI). Belonging is tied to a social bond, through commitment to a social entity, which by strong definition, globality is not.

Environmentalism, as the past few decades have shown, can only make for a weak substitute of global belonging. As Melucci (1996: 126) suggested quite early in the globalization debate, ‘environmental concern’ in the ‘West’ (meant in the most metaphorical sense of privileged global living) should be viewed as a discursive frame for more general apprehensions about new planetary complexities and the sustainability of the accustomed social order and life style. In other words, via the ‘environment’ we perceive the unresolved tension between omnipotence and limit as carried by modern society and its accidental status as a society positioned on a globe (Melucci, 1996).

Consequently, one could argue that the human affinity with the fragile ‘spaceship earth’ is first of all a symbolic re-appropriation of the world as a whole. Before any explicit environmental concern, the experience of reflexively looking at the globe might indeed open up an ‘Archimedean point’ from which feelings of wholeness, unity and embeddedness might arise (Bauman, 1995a: 197). However, another uncomfortable paradox opens up here. For the price we pay for the pleasure of comprehensibility is yet again simplification. Ultimately, looking at the world from a distance produces a world upon which we can reflect but not act, thereby effectively taking the juxtaposition of nature and society to its extreme (Urry, 2001: 45f.). The image of the ‘globe’ provides us with a powerful visual bridge to an intuitive grasping of a shared ‘global environment’ that is otherwise hidden behind scientific formula and contradictory scientific claims. However, this at the same time implies making the ‘environment’ a reified entity that has lost all traces of human involvement. Urry (2001: 44 ff.) has pointed out the core of the problem – the conflation of the planetary and the spherical notion of the globe in the notion of the ‘global environment’. The globe as a uniquely shaped planet does not surround us, while the environment is something we are deeply interwoven with via our daily practices and via our bodies, but which in its complexity cannot be put into a single opaque entity such as the globe. And yet, this is what we permanently do: imagine and visualize the still largely unknown complex interconnected elements of an environmental crisis in the metaphor of the ‘globe’ or the image of the ‘spaceship earth’ drifting out of control. And this, still following Urry’s (2001: 46) line of argument, means that the persuasive power of the metaphor of the globe helps ‘to collude in a privileging of the global ontology of attachment over the local ontology of engagement’.
Consequently, we would argue that the theory of globalization needs to (re)discover the more mundane notions of home and belonging without immediately suspecting parochialism. Paraphrasing Schwartz (1989: 14) again, one could say that instead of rewriting the critique of (the sociology of) nostalgia, what a theory of globalization needs is an ‘ethnography of homesickness’. If pushed to give this argument a more personalized and prosessual note, we would argue for a non-biased reassessment of the social figure of the ‘homecomer’, as initially introduced by Schütz for the phenomenological analysis of home and belonging in a mobilized modern society. To us the ‘homecomer’ stands for the insight that ‘home may be open to the globe ... but the globe is not our home’ (Hedetoft and Hjort, 2002: XX). The ‘homecomer’ is not a figure of backwards nostalgia but of growing up. S/he embodies the realization of the limits of global omnipresence. Homecoming does not need to equate failure and alienation from a global arena, but symbolizes the insight that to play in this global arena, one needs a place to rest and a departure point that cannot be taken for granted. Instead it needs continuous care and maintenance work. Homecoming is the search for the ‘null-point of the system of co-ordinates which we ascribe to the world in order to find our bearings in it’ (Hedetoft and Hjort, 2002: 107). Moreover, caught between the lure of travelling the field of global options and the need to structure them into a life-trajectory, the ‘homecomer’ testifies to the social burdens of mobility and the dilemmas of deterritorialization. Looked at on a more positive note, unlike the social figures of the ‘absentee landlord’ or the ‘player’, that for Bauman (1995b) embody the ‘travelling light’ attitude of liquid modernity, the ‘homecomer’ stands for social authorship in that, in the midst of global opportunity, s/he is prepared to get entangled in local networks of commitment and responsibility. Thus, the homecomer stands for a research agenda that sees the paradigmatic experiences of globalization not only in outbound mobility and deterritorialization, but takes seriously the in-bound consequences of the same. Homecoming is an unsettling experience not only for the homecomer, but also for those who have not been away. How much of the outside world the homecomer can successfully transplant can indeed serve as a test of the openness of place. Moreover, the ethnography of homecoming is a good exercise against the ‘metonymic freezing’ of local life in globalization studies (Mitchell, 1997: 108). For, it is one of the paradigmatic insights in Schütz’s description of the ‘homecomer’ that things have moved on in his absence even though everyone else might have stayed put. In Schütz’s (1964a: 114) words, the homecomer learns to appreciate ‘the irreversibility of inner time’.

Agency between opportunity and responsibility

Alfred Schütz (1964a: 115) once said that sometimes it is ‘useful to show that the analysis of a concrete sociological problem, if only driven far enough, necessarily leads to
certain basic philosophical questions which social scientists cannot dodge by using unclarified terms’. The sceptical gaze over the core assumptions of ‘flow speak’ almost unwittingly revealed a hidden agenda of existential issues behind the spatial rhetoric. Rather than ‘converging in a common spatial register’ (Rosenberg, 2005: 51), these existential issues seem to drive us towards an agenda that registers with the ‘human consequences’ of globalization. In short, we found that mobility has its cost, distance matters, and the ‘global environment’ is not the ideal resting place for the fragmented self. Each of these core issues boils down to fundamental existential questions: are you a stayer or a leaver?; can you sustain absence from the nearest and dearest?; where do you belong on this globe? Of course, in reality we will long ponder these issues, and, due to the seeming omnipotence of technological developments, eventually make compromises between mobility and situatedness, presence and absence, roots and routes. Nevertheless, we are forced to be clear about what is important to us. In the most basic fashion we continuously have to answer the question: ‘how shall I live?’

Consequently, we find ourselves directed towards the realm of Philosophical Anthropology in the tradition of Kant who once famously summarized the quest for human nature in three questions: What can I hope for?; What can I know?; and What shall I do? Most notably Plessner ([1928] 1975) developed this tradition, and has linked these issues of human nature and quest for certainty with an analysis of modern society via the notion of ‘life conduct’ (Lebensführung). He argues that, as a cultural being, man is not determined by an instinct-driven milieu. Though as a bodily existence always deeply entangled in the here and now, man is also ‘ahead’ of himself in terms of reflexive distance towards the here and now. Structurally he lives in an open horizon of possibilities, pressured to solidify some of them into existence by his ultimately final life trajectory (Plessner, [1928] 1975: 343). It is this unalterable human condition of ‘eccentric positionality’, or as one might also refer to it, as a ‘half-opened being’ (Metcalfe and Ferguson, 2001), which forces him to ‘lead’ a life in the most literal meaning of the word (ein Leben ‘führen’).

Two things of the utmost importance follow from this with regard to a perspective on globalization that is informed by an existentialist position. First, the issue of choice is deeply inbuilt into human existence in this world and leads to a continuous transcendence of the here and now. Second, this need for basic structuration of worldly existence is prior to any quest for the ‘concrete structuration of the world as a whole’ in relation to the ‘global-human circumstance’ (Robertson, 1992: 53, 61). It is worth quoting Plessner (1975: 309, our translation) at this point:

And those questions, which each human being has to place before itself a thousand times during his life: what shall I do?, how shall I live?, how do I cope with this existence? – refer to the (despite all historic contextualization) species-specific feature of brokenness and eccentricity, from which no epoch of human nature could unwind itself, be it ever so naïve, nature-bound, authentic, affirmative and traditional.

To dwell on this point, Plessner refers us here to an ‘inbuilt’ constitutive homelessness that is prior to the displacement referred to in terms of global migration and displacement, and even prior to the ‘homeless mind’ (Berger et al., 1973) of fragmented modernity. Choice, looked at it from this perspective, has not only become an issue in the wake
of the ‘new individualism’ of global culture and its consumerist multi-optionality (Lemert and Elliott, 2006). It has always been the key to the human condition. The global human condition is no exception to this. The potential to effortlessly travel global space pales into insignificance in the face of the existential void that derives from the structural difference between possibility and limit.

Unsurprisingly, the issue of existential choice has been taken up by two authors who have never pushed the spatial agenda in globalization research, but rather maintained a post-modern stand. For Bauman (1995a), the Plessner theme of ‘brokenness’ resurfaces in the metaphor of the ‘broken middle’, deemed characteristic of life strategies in contemporary society. In a world that ‘has more crossroads than roads’ but provides no ultimate proof that we have taken the right turn, the ‘authorship of choice’ effectively turns us into ‘sad alchemists of the middle’. Concerned with keeping all our options open, we reflect on missed chances in the past and are hesitant to mortgage the future. Thereby we have to witness how ‘the gold of freedom [converts] into the base metal of necessity’ (1995a: 72). In daily life, this dilemma is evidenced in the over-valuation of keeping fit, the urge for ‘identity’ as ‘the thought escape from uncertainty’, preference for ‘non-binding commitments’, but at the same time ‘nostalgic yearning’. Thus Bauman further reveals ‘brokenness’ as an ongoing process, epitomized in the prevalence of the (missing) ‘quality of life’ discourse among those allowed to choose – or forced to keep their options open.

Similarly, Melucci (1996: 44) has argued that ‘choosing is the ultimate fate of our time’. Postmodern planetary has left people, on the one hand, with ‘the most exalting and dramatic legacy of modernity’ – namely the ‘need and duty to exist as individuals’ (1996: 42), and, on the other, through high speed differentiation and frequency of change, it confronts us with an unprecedented plethora of opportunities – without reliance ‘on the end-directedness of time’ as was provided by modern notions of progress or revolution. Subsequently, our epoch is characterized by a ‘paradox of choice’ (1996: 44) which is in fact a twofold one. It is impossible not to choose and, therefore, the extension of our range of opportunities has turned choice into an obligation or ‘new destiny of choice’ (1996). Moreover, as the field of opportunity is much wider than what can actually be seized, this tends to leave us with a feeling of uncertainty and frustration. This in turn, and in resonance with Bauman’s argument, might lead to ‘disown[ing] the present’ as we are caught between the fear of missed chances in the past and anxiety about the future. In sum, then, Melucci (1996: 43) metaphorically captures the frustrated inhabitants of decision-prone postmodernity as ‘nomads of the present’ who aimlessly travel the planet in search for anchors that hold.

Could it be that here we find the deeper meaning of Massey’s often quoted formula of globalization being ‘the spatialization of the story of modernity’ (cited in Escobar, 2001: 165)? When Bauman aptly summarizes that the (post)modern individual caught between potentiality and actuality ‘finds the world unliveable when he is finally allowed to enter it’ (1995a 72f.), then this metaphor might well be extended into the global arena of postmodern society. For Bauman (1995b: 144), the ‘urge to transgress’ and to fill the void between the possible and the realizable is the anthropological core of Western modernity and has led to its ‘global hubris’. For others (Ray, 2007: 1; Tomlinson, 2008: 161ff.), it suggests the dream of a generalization of a ‘global village’ mythology of ‘omnipresence’
and ‘all-at-onceness’. Time–space compressing devices (from this perspective) not only promised to remove the constraints of face-to-face interaction, but temporarily induced the dream of ‘constant availability’ and the ‘technological restoration of intimacy’ across distance, at least for those who had moved beyond the ‘threshold’ of cosmopolitan ‘hyperspace’. In other words, initially it might have seemed as if there was a spatial and technological solution to the modern dilemma of choice – by dissolving it into space and spatial mobility. The consumer ideology of global culture only complements this dilemma on a symbolic plane. The dominant consumerist lifestyle suggests choice without commitment, sociability without lasting bonds. Existential decision is dissolved into aesthetic choice. ‘Homo consumans’ inhabits global space on a symbolic plane, disentangled from irritating binding commitments, like being on vacation from real life (Bruckner, 2004: 181f.)

However, as Bauman (1995a: 5) forcefully argues, only then is the actor indeed taking up the ‘authorship’ of his life when he is ready for ‘living with the results of one’s action’. Taking responsibility then is a rather different strategy to the ‘escape attempts’ of the ‘absentee landlord’ (1998: 3) or the ‘player’, both figures that serve Bauman to indicate non-engagement via absence and mobility. On the contrary, responsibility does not allow ‘travelling light’ and engagement with the other merely in the modus of ‘taste’. Taking responsibility for one’s actions and decisions implies getting entangled into ‘lasting networks of mutual duties and obligations’ (1998: 100). It eventually conjures up a need for ‘home’ that surmounts the ‘horror of being bound and fixed’. To take responsibility then means to belong, means to be ‘for once, of the place not merely in’ (1998: 89, 97). What might sound to some readers like a rather conservative and nostalgic message, implies no more and no less than the insight that opportunity spaces need to have a counterbalance in spaces of commitment.

Melucci (1996: 31) further elaborates on this line of argument when he defines identity ‘as the ability to recognize as ours the effects of our action’, which in turn requires ‘that we have a notion of causality and belonging’. To be a social actor in the true sense of the word can be based neither on the lure of possibility nor the illusion of withdrawal, but requires responsibility, defined as the ‘capacity to respond’ (1996: 48f.):

My responsibility towards that field of opportunities and constraints that constitutes ‘I myself’ is, on the one hand a capacity to respond for, by assuming limitations, memory, biological structure, and personal history; on the other, it is the capacity to respond to, by choosing among opportunities and grasping them, by positioning myself in my relations with others and by taking my place in the world.

**Conclusion**

Now that the dust has settled after the first enthusiastic embrace of the disembedding tendencies of globalization, it is perhaps time for a theoretical and empirical stock-taking in the other direction. But this reversal of perspectives neither implies a rejection of globalization as a theoretical challenge for sociology nor the embrace of it as a new paradigm of social science that renders all previous categories and insights obsolete. We agree with
Touraine (2007: 192) when he argues that sociology can best live up to the challenges of our time by returning to its roots: ‘the social bond’. Rather than lamenting homelessness and/or parochialist nostalgia in a globalizing modernity, the research agenda of a sociology of globalization could then indeed be the ‘reconstruction of the social bond on the basis of the actors’ demand’. This implies thinking about globalization not only out-bound as ‘disembedding’, but also to take ‘reembedding’ as in-bound globalization equally seriously. A research agenda that attempts to grasp social authorship and social integration in this reversal of perspectives could be focused on the social figure of the ‘homecomer’. Just as the ‘homeless mind’ was the social figure of fragmented modern society, the ‘homecomer’ might be the social figure of the current epoch. Whether we call this epoch late modernity or the global age is of secondary importance. It is an epoch where society is increasingly characterized by the search for social bonding. This search for bonding and a ‘centre that holds’ (Bauman, 1995a) might in turn hint at a basic pattern of social development pointed out by Karl Löwith (1961: 16), namely that episodes of hubris are inevitably followed by periods of nemesis.

References


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