

New Research in

Global Political Economy



Anne
Engelhardt

Anti-austerity movements and authoritarian statism in Portugal

Integrating social movement
research into Poulantzas' theory of
the capitalist state

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List of abbreviations

BE	Bloco Esquerda – Left Bloc
BES	Banco Espírito Santo
BPI	Banco Português de Investimento
BPN	Banco Português de Negócios
CDS-PP	Centro Democrático e Partido Popular
CDU	Coligação Democrática Unitária
CGTP	Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses
PaF	Portugal à Frente
Pi	Precários Inflexíveis
PCP	Partido Comunista Português
PECs	Programas de Estabilidade e Crescimento
PS	Partido Socialismo
PSD	Partido Social Democrata
RTP	Rádio e Televisão de Portugal
SETC	Sindicato dos Estivadores, Trabalhadores do Tráfego e Conferentes Marítimos do Centro e Sul de Portugal
STML	Sindicato dos Trabalhadores do Município de Lisboa – Trade Union for the Lisbon Municipality Workers
UGT	União Geral de Trabalhadores – General Union of Workers CdR Committee of the Regions

Abstract

In the last decade, Portugal saw different forms of open class struggle. Since 2003, the ruling class has been attacking the tremendous achievements of the 500 days of the Portuguese Revolution of 1974-1975 (Raposo 2015: 6). Today, privatisation, wage cuts, de-industrialisation and other forms of neoliberal 'reforms' are being implemented. The working class, the poor and the youth did not silently stand by and watch the dismantling of the welfare state that they and their parents had gained by significant effort (Stoleroff 2015: 1). Instead, they resisted in bitter strikes, mass demonstrations and creative flash mobs against attacks on their wages, living standard and future.

The aim of this paper is twofold: First, to explore and characterise how the Portuguese state changed during the last decade under a neoliberal offensive and, how the fractions of financial capitalism, supported by the Troika and the Memorandum of Understanding, particularly drove Portugal towards authoritarian statism. In this context, the state theory of the Greek Marxist Nicos Poulantzas and current progressions of his concept are employed to develop an analytical framework for that matter. Second, the paper analyses how the working class, the poor and precarious groups of the Portuguese society put up resistance, what problems occurred and the impact of the anti-austerity protest between 2010 and 2015. To frame this broad issue, the paper uses a framework of four parameters, which deal with the effects of the anti-austerity movements on an environmental, cognitive, relational and institutional level. Hereby, this concept aims to examine social movements embedded in the capitalist society and state. These four parameters will be partially borrowed from current concepts of social movement researchers, especially from Amanda Tattersall, Sidney Tarrow and Douglas McAdam; and partially developed from the ideas of the Marxists scholars E. P. Thompson and Colin Barker.

The paper tries to put the state, a capitalist theory on the one hand and disruption and class struggle on the other hand *alike* in focus, to create a more complex understanding of the current political conjuncture.

1. Introduction

*I'm from the 'generation unpaid'
and I don't care about this condition.
How stupid I am.
[...]
And I keep thinking,
how stupid just like me is a world
where one must study
to become a slave.
I'm from the 'I can't bear it!' generation
because this situation has lasted too long
And I am not stupid!'¹*

In contrast to Spain, Ireland and Greece, countries that also experienced strong anti-austerity protests, Portugal did not see any economic upswing for a very long time (Stoleroff 2013: 311). Thus, anti-austerity protests developed already before 'the sovereign debt crisis exploded' (ibid.) Together with the implementation of austerity measures in the public sector, the increasing implementation of precarious working contracts is a significant problem in Portugal. Young Portuguese students and workers that often hold higher education degrees can only expect unemployment after graduation. Even public employees increasingly receive precarious contracts ('recibos verdes').² The so called 'fuga de cérebro' or 'brain drain' is a large problem not only for the Portuguese economy, but also for its civil society. Only in 2013, about 110.000 people emigrated from Portugal (Cordeiro 2015). Portugal holds one of the highest emigration rates of qualified young workers, seeking for better living conditions in other countries. Now, two million Portuguese live and work outside of Portugal, which encompasses 20 per cent of the active population (Portuguese American Journal 2015).

In February 2011, two events triggered a change in this situation: First, the events in Tunisia and Egypt impressed many groups of young people. Second, the famous Portuguese band Deolinda published its new song 'Parva que sou' (How stupid I am), which expresses the feelings of the Portuguese youth experiencing precarious living conditions. Many activists described how this song and the events in North Africa paved the way to open the debate about the problem of casualization. Within a few weeks calls for

¹ These are verses from the Portuguese song 'Parva Que Sou' by Deolinda (2011); own translation.

² 'Recibos verdes' means 'green receipts'. These are the documents that Portuguese self-employed workers receive. At the same time, they stand as a metaphor for disguised employment, which has dramatically increased in the recent years, especially in the public sector.

a demonstration named ‘Geração à Rasca’ (generation on the edge³) came about. On March 12th between ‘200,000 and 500,000 participants’ (Baumgarten 2013) took the streets and attended ‘the biggest demonstration of civil society actors in Portugal, since the revolution 1974’ (ibid.). Only a few weeks later, the Portuguese government led by the PS resigned. In May of the same year, Portugal received conditional ‘aid’ in the form of credit in the amount of 78 billion Euros and signed the Memorandum of Understanding with the institutions of the Troika. In June, the conservative coalition of PSD-CDS was elected into government. Several austerity measures, like the increasing of VAT tax, transport, gas and water fees, school and hospital closures as well as wage cuts were implemented in a very brief time (Stoleroff 2013). To protest the worsening living and working conditions, different periods of labour and social unrest followed.

The events of 2011 changed the political landscape. Young, mainly nonorganized groups of activists took the street, without the support of trade unions or parties. Despite the demonstrations of March 12th, huge protests such as the ‘Acampadas’, the occupation of public places in the summer of 2011, a mobilisation for a big demonstration on October 15th, 2011, a massive demonstration in September 15th, 2012 and on March 2nd, 2013, occurred in the aftermath of the ‘Geração à Rasca’ manifestation.

Parallel to these mobilisations, the trade unions organised five general strikes and several sector-specific and public workers' strikes from 2010 to 2013. Furthermore, they mobilised for their own demonstrations, separated from the new groups of activists. On the surface, a parallelisation of anti-austerity protests developed; with trade unions on the one hand and social activists on the other.

Observing these events, the following questions arise: Why and how did labour and ‘independent’ movements – or the so-called ‘Old’ and ‘New’ social movements – work separately in the first place? How are these movements entangled with the state and its development under the influence of austerity and Troika policies? How and why did these movements start to work together? What were the results of these movements? If they succeeded, how should success be defined?

The structure of the paper will be the following: First, the relation between some currents of mainstream social movement research and different Marxist approaches will be explored.

³ Britta Baumgarten (2013: 10), translates it into ‘the desperate generation’. However, the name was chosen in relation to student demonstrations in 1994. The activists called themselves ‘Geração à Rasca’, without the ‘a’ -which means ‘to be short of money’ but also ‘miserable’. It was originally used by Vincente Jorge Vila, a journalist from Público, to discredit the student protests (Nogueira 2013). However, using the term ‘Geração à Rasca’ means, that the situation for the youth in Portugal has been worsening since 1994, so that they stand ‘at the edge’.

Secondly: a contemporary debate on social resistance in Europe will be observed along the cleavage of 'New' and 'Old' social movements. These are two patterns of collective action and analysis of movements that have been developed in the 1970s and are questioned in the current outbreak of anti-austerity protests.

Thirdly: Different perspectives on social movements will be introduced to develop a definition of collective action that can be employed in this paper. The concept of 'power' will be discussed in relation to social movements and connected to the Poulantzasian state theory, authoritarian statism and resistance. To understand the transformation of the Portuguese state, progressions of the Poulantzasian concept of authoritarian statism will be outlined and adopted.

Fourthly: In the methodology chapter different ideas about movements, power, the state, class and resistance will be brought together and condensed to four parameters.

Fifthly: The concept of authoritarian statism will be used to analyse the contemporary Portuguese state. Consecutively, different actors and organisations of the anti-austerity movements will be introduced and characterised.

Finally, the impact of their actions will be explored according to the four parameters and the results will be discussed in a summarising conclusion.

2. Approaching contemporary social movement studies

2.1 On Marxism and social movement research

This chapter will explore the relation between different Marxist currents and different social movement research. Especially the question to what extent social movement research has been separated from concepts about society, class and state analyses will be discussed. Moreover, the chapter outlines, how this separation is partially reversed by different scholars.

In the last five years, research on social movements has seen a tremendous revival in social science.

Especially Marxist scholars of different disciplines have attempted analysing social phenomena not as mere variables, but as interlinked processes of which none can develop independently. Thus, approaching this topic from a Marxist perspective, there seems to be an interesting contradiction. Although ‘Marxism is a body of theory that developed from and was crafted for social movements, [...] the main figures of ‘classical Marxism’ [...] have apparently not produced an explicit ‘theory of movements’ - that is, a theory which specifically explains the emergence, character and development of social movements’ (Barker et al. 2013: 1). Such a concept could have been interlinked with “other foundational concepts in Marxist theory like class struggle, hegemony and revolution or human species being, alienation and praxis’ (ibid.) as well as the analysis of the capitalist state. Already in 1978, Poulantzas made the criticism that although many Marxist scholars understand the state in conjunction to the relations of production, class struggle and social movements are considered as ‘add on’, which according to him leads to the problem that the specific conceptions, transformations and forms of the state are neglected, or cannot be explained (Poulantzas 1978a: 115–116). Despite the argument that a Marxist theorisation of movements has not been developed and that state and movements are not discussed in conjunction in general the emerging social movement studies which came rather from a behaviourist ‘America or European academia - consistently avoids the debate with Marxist perspectives’ (Barker et al. 2013: 2).

In the next chapter, I am going to sketch a current discourse on the ‘New’ and ‘Old’ social movements, to give an impression on what impact the distinction between Marxist and mainstream social movement research and the separation from state theory had. Mainstream social movement research lacks a theory of society, and Marxist (state)

theoretical approaches lack a clear analysis of the interaction between state and collective action.

2.2 'Old' vs. 'New' social movements: The missing conceptualisation of the capitalist state

The development of the distinction in 'New' and 'Old' social movements will be used as an example to show why an analysis of social movements needs to go hand in hand with an analysis of the society and the state in which this phenomenon is embedded.

The process of differentiating social movements in 'New' and 'Old' has been developing at least in the last forty years. Different concerns are expressed in this debate. The 'Old' stands for the labour movement which raises issues around higher and equal wages, contracts, health standards etc. and in the long run fights for a society without classes and class antagonism. In the 'New' part, the labour movement is understood as being undemocratic or too much incorporated into the state, while the 'New' social movements that raise different topics around gender, ecological concerns, racism and peace, see themselves as more democratic and more flexible in tactics. From 1968 onwards, this 'New' part seems to appear attractive to different marginalised parts of society. At the same time, the term 'class' got heavily under attack.

The division between 'New' and 'Old' social movements was understood by the Marxist state theorist Ralph Miliband as follows: He was concerned about 'the enduring strength of sexism, racism, and nationalism, not least among the working class and in labour movements' (Barrow et al. 2008: 12). At the same time, he was 'equally concerned that the new social movements also tended to reject 'the view that labour movements could be an appropriate instrument for the advancement of their own aims'' (ibid.).

While these are, important observations concerning the cleavages in the movements themselves, the role of the capitalist state and its apparatuses in shaping, separating and integrating social movements as well as the capitalist core and character of current states, have been neglected.

According to Panitch (1998: 20), the state did not exist in modern social studies until the late 1960s and early 1970s, when state theories with a Marxist approach have been taken up from different scholars and developed further. Interestingly, this happened parallel to the eruptions and break-ups between the so-called 'Old' and 'New' social movements. The term of 'New Social Movements' (NSMs) gained popularity after several international events around 1968. In that year, big social and labour unrest in Western Germany, the

USA, in France, and Czechoslovakia (Calhoun 1993: 385) took place. Topics like freedom of speech, identity issues, women's and LGBTQI-rights, migration, anti-racism and the environment gained visibility in separated movements (Barker et al 2013: 4). In his article '“New Social Movements’ of the Early Nineteenth Century’, Calhoun (1993) portrays how the topics of the NSMs were far from new. In contrast, they were amongst the first issues that activists of collective action at the end of the 18th century had brought to the streets. Organised labour struggles, on the other hand, are part of the newer forms of social movements (Thompson 1978: 144). They came to light, not to dominate collective action, but as a complementary way of struggle (Calhoun 1993: 390–391). Calhoun therefore wonders why the NSMs are perceived as being plural while the ‘Old’ social movement is described as singular. ‘In fact, the nineteenth and the early twentieth-century working-class movement (if it even can be described more than tendentiously as a single movement) was multidimensional, only provisionally and partially unified, and not univocal’ (ibid.). Calhoun goes even further as he stresses that identity politics, feminism, and anti-racist movements, as well as ‘green’ topics were often interwoven with labour struggles. In these topics, day-to-day conflicts as well as Utopian ideas were debated and defended against opponents as well as within the movements (ibid.: 388–391).

Why did the discourse shift towards a narrative of labour struggles that highlights its dominance, its closed and rather bureaucratic undemocratic structures? Why are labour movements often understood as standing outside of a plural and open field of different other movements?

A part of the answer is connected to the surveys on social movements. The academic world – which was dealing with social phenomena – was relatively closed, itself. Mainly white, upper class and upper middle-class men had the resources to observe society. Thus, for instance ‘[f]eminism attracted relatively little scholarly attention until later feminism prompted its rediscovery’ (Calhoun 1993: 388). Such is the case for the anti-slavery and early People of Colour movements, but somehow also for social movements in general. Although, the way people organised their actions on a day-to-day basis was as unconventional and as interesting to study as today, it was ignored unless activists who were involved themselves could lance papers on their observances. When especially labour movements gained visible success, they forced themselves in the consciousness of the academic world and they did so in a stronger way than other forms of collective action. Visibility (in terms of mass attendance or direct outcome) in general gets more academic attention than more invisible forms of success or struggle (Huke et al. 2015). Moreover,

mass protests and especially mass strikes, which could paralyse the economy, were indeed completely new phenomena at the beginning of the 20th century. 'The concentration of large parts of the population in industrial work [and growing cities] may also have played a role, offering unions a fertile organizing base' (Calhoun 1993: 417).

After the events of 1968 many activists that broke off with the 'Old' social movements also acted as scholars that were about to elaborate a critical theory of the state. They were keen to distinguish themselves from party structures, like the communist parties (Panitch 1998: 21) and the social democratic parties (Burstyn 1990: 180–182). What were the reasons for such a process? At the beginning of the 20th century, in several Western European countries, a parliamentary institutionalization of struggles between antagonist social and economic classes and movements arose which went along with the development of political party structures. 'This drew more than one branch of the socialist movement into the orbit of conventional politics' (Calhoun 1993: 405–406). While the Russian Revolution in 1917 was a success of several social movements and parties such as the Bolsheviks joining their forces in solidarity, the character of the communist parties from the late 1920s onwards changed (Barker 2013: 7–9). For varied reasons, they became permeated by dogmatic so-called Marxist theories, which in many countries lead to a glorification, or idealisation of the workers' movements and the negligence or obscuration of identity and environmental issues. However, the workers' movements are not by nature anti-racist or pro LGBTQI rights (Cohen/Moody 1998: 109). Neither have the women's movements, the environmental movements, or others been so. The inclusion of activists and topics from the one to the other movement based on solidarity for one to the other did not come without struggles, but happened throughout history. Calhoun (1993: 416f.) states that during these developments the institutional transformation of the state as a relational process, 'created mechanism for continual negotiation over some issues - notably labor and welfare concerns. This brought certain movement concerns permanently into the political arena while leaving others.'

Portugal delivers interesting examples for this separation, even though the processes of separation between labour and social movements started later than in other Western industrial countries. Due to its history, the country had a late and therefore brief period of social welfare and industrialisation. After the revolution in 1974, bargaining contracts, holidays and higher health standards were achieved. The dynamics of the revolution lead to the fact that movements and collective activists could inscribe parts of their interests and agendas into the state apparatuses. In addition, decent wages and working standards were

obtained in former low-wage jobs such as garbage collectors or fire fighters. The women's movement gained the right to universal suffrage that Portuguese women had been deprived of until 1974. Unfortunately, at the same time, the role of the family and the women as unpaid care worker at its core has persisted. This has remained a large problem, despite the establishment of certain levels of welfare services. The problem has been challenged by several protests, until today (Martins 2015). However, the strong institutionalisation of labour interests in the state in comparison to others has not led to a decline of solidarity amongst the movements, on its own. Esser (1981) and Burstyn (1990) give a very vivid picture, how solidarity between labour and other social movements declined due to new forms of class struggle from ruling classes. Labour party leaders and trade union leaders were squeezed between the implementation of neoliberal policies on the one hand, and its affiliated members on the other. The exclusion of other political topics and activists of these issues went along with the development of state apparatuses that were more or less able and willing to institutionalise demands. While it is true that labour demands got a higher profile in the political and economic struggles in the 1970s and 1980s, this has changed tremendously in recent years. Additionally, actors of the capitalist fractions who supported neoliberal interests won different struggles in the 1990s. In countries hit by the current economic and political crisis, including Portugal, austerity measures went hand in hand with the institutionalisation of neoliberal programmes. Actors of these projects such as the social democratic parties excluded progressive labour policies from their agenda, while being in government. Interestingly, however, activists of women's and LGBTQI rights have therefore been able to a certain extent to inscribe themselves in the neoliberal policies of the state apparatuses – unless they do not endanger profit generation. This can be seen in a very recent example in Portugal: While the social democratic party PS (Partido Socialista) was in power in 2011, they implemented harsh austerity measures but improved the right for women on abortion. Since very recently, while the PS has held the parliamentary majority in the Portuguese parliament together with Left Bloc, the Portuguese Communist Party and the Greens, they legalized same sex adoption rights (lgbtqnation.com 2015) and eased the right to abortion. However, the popular proposal to increase the minimum wage has been blurred. The separation between the labour and social movements is still persistent, but can only be fully understood through the role of the state, which will be defined later.

Nevertheless, there are not only divergences between 'Old' and 'New' movements. Not just since the beginning of the economic crisis from 2007ff. there have been obvious cleavages inside the labour movement itself. Esser (1981) observed this problem already at the

beginning of the 1980s. While most of the trade unions mainly support regional bargaining sectors and highly organized labour areas, the number of unionists fighting against precarious contracts in the widening low wage sector is limited (Gerlach et al. 2011: 38). Portugal saw quite current examples of this development: Precarious contracts that mainly affected young people were hardly contested by the big trade union federations (Stoleroff 2014). Thus, it was no surprise that the demonstrations of 'Geração à Rasca' were organised by young students and precarious workers instead of the still strong Portuguese trade unions (ibid.). As a result, it comes as no surprise that the 'precarious' developed their own networks and structures outside the traditional Portuguese union landscape.

Despite the problems that exist within and between the movements, it is also the state that adds its part to the division by reacting to the different movements in diverse ways. Therefore, the discourse on 'New' and 'Old' social movements is symptomatic to studies that have no systematic social theory. When the state as a crucial factor is left out of the debate the reason for this historical distinction cannot be completely understood. Thus, the question on how the state can be conceptualized in Marxist social movement research arises. A conjunction and thus convincing operationalisation of Marxist state theories and Marxist social movement research exceeds the scope of the paper. This work instead intends to spark a debate about the division on 'Old' and 'New' movements, while suggesting some ideas about that issue. These suggestions however, will not achieve to speak the last word on that matter.

2.3 Social movements in a constant state of flux

In general, it can be stated that the discourse on 'New' and 'Old' social movements is characterised by the absence of a systematic social theory. A clear categorisation of the state and classes is vague, or sometimes even completely absent. Therefore, I attempt to find a sensitive way to bring the role of the state into social movement research, without developing a 'domination-orientated' view.

Along this line, it is necessary to find a way to operationalise movements, which I will turn to later. To understand the impact of social movements it is important to understand them as what they are: *Movements!* They are not static entities with a clear beginning and end, nor are their outcomes fixed physical objects. Movements are processes and hence fluctuating, incoherent and contradictory. They are not classifiable based on single gains or failures, but rather by reference to the dynamics, through which they appear and which they generate themselves in turn. Science produces texts and thus disconnects its observations

from space, time and environment in which these are circulating. However, as E. P. Thompson states, ‘in any given society we cannot understand the parts unless we understand their function and roles in relation to each other and in relation to the whole’ (Thompson 1978: 133). Thus, certain claims about social events and hence also social movements can be correct in one moment, but could be distorted a few weeks or years later. Organisations can be actors in it, can dissolve into movements, regain strength or change entirely. Movements can also seemingly disappear and arise vividly again, without an obvious reason. These characteristics and the hybridism of movements make it so hard for social science to give them an adequate scientific description (Balint et al. 2014: 11).

3. Analysing social movements in the context of austerity and authoritarian statism

3.1 Contemporary studies on social movements

In the following section, contemporary concepts of social movement research will be introduced and pondered in which way they can be employed for a profound analysis of the Portuguese anti-austerity protests.

Social movements are a form of sociological and political hybrid. Neither do they have a strong structure such as a party or a trade union, nor are they spontaneous events such as riots (Giugni 1998: 377). Therefore, defining social movements represents a challenge. This is true because the definition of social movements always depends on a political and/or scientific aim and mood of inquiry. As Michael Burawoy (2014: 17) remarks, early sociologists such as Émile Durkheim and Max Weber understood social movements as an irritation in a – from their point of view – rather functioning society. Contrary to a profound analysis of collective action as being part of societal interaction, activists were often pathologised. A group of social scientists from the US, which emerged around the 1960s and 1970s, such as Charles Tilly, Douglas McAdam and Sidney Tarrow attempted to break with this tradition (Diani 2008: 3). They analysed social movements as ‘rational extra-parliamentary politics’ (Burawoy 2014: 17) and stressed the separation as well as complementary aspects of movements and their targets. According to Diani four different major paradigms arose from that period in the research on social movements (Diani 2008: 3). The first one is the ‘resource mobilization approach’ that ‘focused on the resources necessary to convert grievances into overt protest behavior’ (ibid.). This paradigm was rediscovered at the end of the 1980s. Elements of it can be found today in the ‘power resources approach’, which is used especially in the research field of trade unions and

categorises their resources to organise and win labour conflicts. Another paradigm is the 'political process approach', which 'has privileged the interaction between protestors and the polity and its impact on the forms and outcomes of collective action' (ibid.). The 'framing approach' developed in the 1980s and 1990s 'has investigated how cultural representations of actors' experience develop which can facilitate the spread of collective action' (ibid.). Diani himself evaluates social movements focusing on the way they are emerging, in belief that their base always comes from already existing social networks 'of informal interaction between a plurality of individuals, groups or associations' (Diani/Bison 2004: 282). Individuals and organisations join their forces but not their identities: 'Under those circumstances, collective action will be most effectively conceptualized as a coalitional process' (Diani 2008: 3). I will later come back to this point of coalition inside movements, which is an important analytical category. Despite different approaches concerning social movements, all these concepts agree that the main character of collective action is the use of different forms of public protest to reach visibility (Baumgarten 2013; Calhoun 1993) such as demonstrations or, as could be seen in the recent period flash mobs, occupations of squares and, political strikes.

Contemporary social science can reveal important aspects about social movements: First, it outlines the way they are organised and exhibits how they differ from other political and societal actors in civil society. Secondly, it explains how they mobilise and organise their resources, to eventually succeed in their cause. Thirdly, it shows how movements are interlinked with polity and its political outcomes and impacts. Fourthly, cultural aspects and questions of identity are raised in the framing approach as well as in the New Social Movement studies. Finally, the roots of social movements are discussed, for instance in Diani's observations on social networks and the role they play, by starting protests and framing causes. All the paradigms contain precious ideas on how to understand and observe social movements. However, the question that Paul Mason is using as a title for his very rich and valuable book: 'Why it's still kicking off everywhere?' (Mason 2013) is often not answered. The 'reason for revolt' or the 'opponent' is not clarified or taken for granted. As social movements are sociological phenomena they require social interaction. They do not simply appear within a neutral structure, but are embedded into power structures, politics, ideas, normative concepts, etc. Movements always go 'against' something to reach a target and they interact with an opponent or antagonist who represents the reason for grievance or the obstacle. In many paradigms, the antagonist is understood as an already given object and only appears as a disturbance of the movement – for instance in form of police violence

– or as a measurement of the outcome or impact the movement has. According to my own field research this way of understanding the opponent only shows half of the picture. Therefore, a closer look on the opponent(s) needs to be taken.

Another topic that is rarely discussed in social movement studies is the question why activists do not use other ways of enactment than collective action like writing letters or using the election to express their political will. Why do they seek a solution to their problems in building alliances and coalitions to start a movement? I argue that the form of enactment is dependent on power relations in society. Rucht (2002) mentions that due to the lack of other possibilities of (political) influence, people need to make use of collective and public action. Calhoun (1993: 405–406) states that ‘in a movement of people who have few resources’, public and especially unconventional activities are one of the most prominent features social movements can turn to. Alternatively, people that have weak possibilities to shape society need to collect forces to go against people that have easy access to do so.

For these reasons, I aim to understand social movements and their dynamics in correlation to power as being part of and contesting given power relations at the same time. However, what is the origin of power and how can it be understood in critical social movement research?

3.2 Understanding power in (relation to) social movements

This section focuses on the concept of power employed in social movement research. Several concepts related to power, will be studied concerning their ability to answer the question why social movements occur at all and how and why they act in relation to the capitalist state.

In mainstream social movement research, power is discussed in the following way: According to Urban (2010: 444), the sociologist Walter Korpi understood ‘power’ as the ability to punish or reward other groups. Power holders can assert themselves against other actors through rational preferences of actions and strategies (ibid.). This definition is strongly related to interaction. However, power is rather understood as a characterising category of a group or person. The definition does not explain where power comes from. It is just there. Tattersall (2010: 23) broadens the definition of power holding. Through power, a person or a group can influence the political landscape of one region or country. It is in control of political and social agenda setting. Tattersall’s definition still does not clarify the source of power. Power is perceived as a necessary variable for social movements, to develop. Power is obviously something that is connected to political and

social influence and agenda setting. In social science, it is mainly evaluated as something inside the structures of the movements. For instance, Diani (1997) implements Pierre Bourdieu's category of 'social capital' into his analytical concept to evaluate power structures in social movements. Alexander Leistner (2013) develops an elaborated and inspiring form of the 'key figure' approach to analyse the ability of groups or single actors to influence the agenda and strategies of social movements inside of them. These approaches are of course very important to understand the dynamics inside movements as power relations have an impact on collective actions and activists themselves as well as on their ability to reach their targets. However, coming back to the question of 'why' social movements develop and the reason for revolt, I suggest that the asymmetric structures in capitalist societies provide the foundation for situations in which people who are deprived from the ability to influence their situation unite to gain attention. Therefore, understanding power relations in society is one of the main sources of understanding the emergence and actions of social movements.

Nicos Poulantzas argues that although a profound concept of power is of 'supreme importance for political theory' (Poulantzas 1978b: 99), none of the famous Marxist scholars like 'Marx, Engels, Lenin and Gramsci' (ibid.) produced an elaborated definition of power. This is especially surprising as power relations were always at the centre of their concerns. Therefore, Poulantzas somehow filtered the already existing preconceptions of power out of Marxists theories and condensed them into a theoretical frame. Poulantzas argues that there must be a core or reason for power relations in society. He develops a 'relational conception of power' so that power is not a 'thing' or a quantifiable 'substance' that a group of people 'owns' or 'holds in their hands' (Poulantzas 1978a: 135-136). It cannot be exchanged with other groups or classes, counted or split (ibid.). Thus, speaking of 'power holders', as many social scientists (Tattersall 2010; Urban 2012 and others) do, is inadequate from this perspective. Poulantzas states that power is also not 'located in the levels of structures' (Poulantzas 1978b: 99-100). However, it is 'a concept indicating the effect of the ensemble of the structures on the relations of the practices of the various classes in conflict' (ibid.: 101). Power *can* be the effect of asymmetric institutions that give groups possibilities to influence society and deny it to others. Power is a *potential* effect. It is not just there but needs to be exercised. It becomes visible in the practices of actors inside the institutions, only in relation to actors that are necessarily included in these institutions. Such institution can be for instance a company where workers are necessarily included to gain wage to survive. Due to the ownership, the employer *could* force workers,

to work more, earn less or lose their job but he or she does not necessarily need to do so. Contrarily, it is impossible, the other way around. An institution like a company with a class conflict at its core, structures the ability to influence the working process. Forcing workers to do something is the effect of power due to this structure. Without asymmetry, the core of which, according to Poulantzas, is always the class conflict, power would not be observable. This effect is structuring society in capitalist, patriarchal and racist relations, which are always produced, reproduced and interwoven through and with human action (Kannankulam/Georgi 2012: 4). Thus, the field of power is 'strictly relational' (Poulantzas 1978a: 135). All kinds of struggle, and not only class struggle, are therefore always acting inside fields or apparatuses, which exist through and reproduce the effect of power relations (ibid.). One of the apparatuses where the effect of power is observable is the state. It is understood as an ensemble of apparatuses where power relations condense – are brought together and dealt with collectively. Poulantzas developed an elaborated theory of the capitalist state, its apparatuses and transformations that are helpful to understand the current political changes in Portugal and the way, social movements are acting towards it. Thus, I will proceed with a conceptualisation of the capitalist state, which is neglected or underdeveloped in contemporary social movement studies.

3.3 Conceptualizing the capitalist state within social movement studies

Materialist state-critical scholars theorise the state and the society not as separated fields but in conjunction (Wöhl/Wissel 2008: 9). Due to an under-theorised conception of the state in relation to power, both materialist and other currents of state theorists tend to either describe the state as an instrument or a subject. Though, according to Poulantzas, this is exactly what the state is *not*. It is neither a structure run by reasonable wise men that represent the interests of all people, nor is it an instrument representing the interests of one class or a subject with its own will (Esser 1981: 373; Poulantzas/Martin 2008: 308). It is neither a neutral arena, nor a monolithic entity or bloc. Poulantzas' concept is rather an elaborated progression of Marxists state paradigms. To understand his theory of the capitalist state, it is worth going back to his concept of power.

3.3.1 The state as condensation of power relation

As mentioned earlier, power is the effect of asymmetric institutions that give groups access to influence society and denies it to others. Power becomes visible in the practices of actors

inside institutions, such as the state. Poulantzas argues that power is not an effect of every social situation, but always has a certain core: in terms of the class contradictions that take a special form in a capitalist society it is the appropriation of the surplus value, the position in the state etc. that form this core (Demirović 2007: 137). In other words: ‘the ‘social relations of production’ [is] a term often misunderstood as defining simply the immediate relations between capitalist and worker ‘at the point of production’, but actually encompass[es] the whole world of production, exchange and distribution, of power and culture’ (Barker et al. 2013: 13). This is what is also seen as the core of the power relation inside the capitalist state. The state does not ‘own’ power (Poulantzas 1975: 26). The state is rather the relation of classes and a specifically organised condensation or cristallisation of its power relations (Poulantzas/Martin 2008: 308; Demirović 2007: 100; Wöhl/Wissel 2008: 9–10). The state is a ‘capitalist’ state, because its ‘core’ or foundation of existence is the separation between private property and the corporative form of production. Thus, it is only relatively autonomous from the economic sphere and from class struggle unless the ‘core’ does not become a matter of contention. As the contradiction between the capitalist forms of production and private ownership is persistent, classes and fractions of classes are always in struggle. In this struggle, the state does not serve as an instrument for one of them, but is a materialised frame that eases, organises and therefore canalises their struggles (Demirović 2007: 101). These ‘canals’ are always contested and therefore changing themselves. The capitalist state cannot and must not get rid of the contradiction, while it structures the forms of the struggles. As mentioned before, the state is not a monolithic bloc. Due to the struggles, it is a heterogeneous ensemble of apparatuses (Wöhl/Wissel 2008: 9–10) that have more or less institutionalised the interests of one or the other classes. Poulantzas does not distinguish between ‘civil society’ on the one hand and the state on the other. Civil society is materialised inside the different apparatuses. As there are differences for instance between the state apparatus of a trade union and a state apparatus of the police, there are also struggles among these apparatuses that reflect in a distorted way the different interests of capitalist classes and fractions, but also the interests of working and popular classes (Poulantzas 1975: 26).

The fact that the state apparatuses are not homogeneous and rather contested in themselves, becomes visible for instance when looking at the role of the Portuguese army during the revolution in 1974/75, which itself was a prism of different economic and political interests. Nevertheless, in that time it mainly expressed the interests of the working and peoples’ classes (Poulantzas 1976: 92).

In relation to this definition, Panitch (1998: 20) describes three preconditions for examining a capitalist state: First, '[S]tructural selectivity' of the state on behalf of the field of class struggle should be considered. 'Structural selectivity' derives from the idea that the capitalist state has two decisive tasks. As its core lies in the remaining contradiction between private property and corporative form of production, it organises the competing and antagonistic interests of the different capital owners and fractions of capitalists. At the same time, it disorganises and separates the interests of the subordinated and working classes (Demirović 2007; Wöhl/Wissel 2008). The disorganisation of the working classes, youth and poor is not just possible through repression, but is inherent in the struggle relying on real concessions and compromises (Demirović 2008: 38–40). The latter become institutionalised in the apparatuses through laws, moral codes, etc. and – as shown before – can lead to cleavages among the social movements and their actors. The more tensions and struggles increase, the more will the state autonomy increase to settle the compromise between fractions and classes. As described in the chapter about 'New' and 'Old' social movements, a typical example for this strategy is the cooperation between the government and workers' organisations for instance during a cycle of crises (Kannankulam 2008). In Germany, this was recently done with the 'scrappage allowance' and 'short-time compensation'.

Second, regarding the first aspect, the specific connections between state institutions and class actors should be observed to understand the current situation of the state in matter. In this paper, this will be done in relation to the Portuguese Constitutional Court and the government.

Third, the structural selectivity and the interconnection of state institutions and class actors must be analysed to understand how capital accumulation proceeds to legitimise its domination (ibid.). However, the last step will be turned around: Instead of analysing the forms of struggles from classes in power, this paper rather seeks to observe social movements and their possibilities to challenge existing power relations. According to Huke et al. (2015) measures on how hegemony is stabilised already get too much academic attention. Although, it is important to understand how capitalist classes can maintain their hegemony, I will turn to the classes that are mainly deprived from political influence and try to understand, how they seek to change their social impact and 'make [themselves] felt within state apparatuses' (Poulantzas 1976: 81).

Therefore, it is necessary to first analyse how the Portuguese ruling classes have maintained their influence in the capitalist state during the crisis to understand, why and how social

movements react the way they do. To do this, it is helpful to turn to a specific concept of Poulantzas that he developed to reveal that the struggles inside the state apparatuses that lead to transformation processes of the state.

3.3.2 Authoritarian statism and austerity

The concept of the state will now be employed to understand the transformation of the state towards an authoritarian form. Therefore, Poulantzas' initial conception will be introduced and connected with further progressions. Moreover, the process of the European Union towards an authoritarian state apparatuses ensemble will be outlined. Hereby, it will be easier to embed the transformation of the Portuguese state in this current political development.

Through class struggles, the capitalist state is in a constant state of flux. To analyse and support social movements and struggles it is inevitable to examine the 'metamorphoses' or 'transformations' of the state (Poulantzas 1978a: 114 – own translation). In the middle of the 1970s, while analysing different classes and hence political fights and the power relations among classes, Poulantzas observed several institutional and political shifts and changes on an international and national scale (ibid.: 186) that appeared after a worldwide economic slowdown and several national economic crises. Poulantzas argues that the changes he observed were the answer of states to a crisis as well as an expression of the crisis, itself (ibid.). He compares the actions of the state in times of a crisis with the actions of a wild animal, which is more dangerous when wounded (ibid.). Processes of crisis often expose ongoing conflicts between capitalist and working classes as well as between and inside capitalist fractions (Kannankulam/Georgi 2012: 17). Due to economic and political crises, the leeway for compromises and concessions from all sides that kept conflicts and struggles concealed, is narrowing (ibid.). Moreover, the crisis triggers different emergency policies of the state apparatuses that are declared as 'exceptions' for the period of the crisis (Poulantzas 1976: 92). These emergency policies lead to a transformation of the state towards more authoritarian policy, as the 'state of emergency' becomes the 'new normal' (ibid.).

Elements of this phenomenon are a 'normalisation' of 'suppression of the traditional political representatives (political parties)' (ibid.), changes in the relations of state apparatuses among each other towards a domination of repressive apparatuses such as the army and the police. Following Poulantzas, this does not just happen because these particular apparatuses concentrate the forces of the hegemonic class fractions, but also

because they are able to fulfil the political and ideological role of the state (or alliance of states) against the interests of the dominated classes (Poulantzas 1978a: 132). Furthermore, the ‘strengthening of the state’s ‘bureaucratic’ centralism’ and an increasing of ‘hierarchical ordering’ characteristics of authoritarian statism can be seen as elements of authoritarian statism. The transformation of the state due to a crisis occurs not always in the same way and thus contains ‘a series of particular modifications’ (ibid.). In comparison to the 1970s, the elements of authoritarian statism thus differ from the ones Poulantzas observed in his part. Observing the economic crisis and the European crisis in its aftermath today, it becomes obvious that core elements of Poulantzas’ theory of authoritarian statism have not vanished from current political developments in Europe (Kannankulam 2008: 160).

This is not expressed just in open strikes and increasing police repression, but also in the way the state apparatuses are related to one another (Kannankulam, 2008: 145–146). John Kannankulam (2008), Sonja Buckel (2011) and Lukas Oberndorfer (2013a) for instance, maintain that developments towards a bureaucratisation and a growing domination of certain apparatuses can be seen in relation to the apparatuses of the European Union and the different state apparatuses of its affiliated states. However, several new elements are part of the neoliberal reconstruction of the European society (ibid.).

Following Oberndorfer (2013a: 130) three distinct aspects related to an authoritarian state transformation currently leave the strongest footprint on the European society due to the European crisis.

First, the apparatuses that simply represent the interests of finance and export capitalist fractions, manage to articulate their interests increasingly open on a national and European level (ibid.). Thus, these apparatuses marginalise the interests of other classes and hence apparatuses. An explicit example for this consideration is the European wide introduction of the so called ‘six-pack’ subsequent to the new programme of ‘economic governance’ (Schulten/Müller 2013: 293). This system is an attempt to recognise warning signs for a new economic state crisis of the EU affiliated states. Part of the ‘six-pack’ is the permanent monitoring of state budgets according to certain macro-economic guidelines (ibid.). When the budget of a state does not match with these guidelines, automatic sanctions will be imposed on the state in question (ibid.: 294). One of these guidelines is to introduce more flexibility into the labour market (ibid.). This does not just affect workers on a daily base, as limited working contracts, low wages and false self-employment lead to stress and low living standards (Nowak/Gallas 2014: 132). As a result, it has also a direct impact on their work in hospitals, schools, transport services, etc., but also on staffing. It also pressures the

state to privatise national services, in case it is not able to flexibilise labour in further areas due to the resistance of trade unions or the constitutional courts. While the measures of the six-pack were part of the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ that countries like Portugal, Spain and Greece had to sign to receive conditional aid, the Competitiveness Pact introduced in 2012 widens the six-pack guidelines for all states in the Eurozone (Schulten/Müller 2013: 295). Hence, Oberndorfer (2012: 11) speaks of ‘Austerity Forever’ to describe the massive impact of the new law and the shift in power relations between different state apparatuses on a national and European wide level.

Due to this shift, a second characteristic for authoritarian statism is the decline of the role and function of political parties and the parliament as a whole (Oberndorfer 2013b: 77).

Third, in correlation to the second aspect, informal networking and the bending of laws from capitalist fractions become more frequent (Oberndorfer 2013a: 135). Thus, the possibility of democratic decision-making declines and is compensated through compulsion e.g. police repression at picket lines and demonstrations as well as the ongoing limitation of the right to strike. Therefore, next to the financial and economic apparatuses also the executive apparatuses are re-validated (Oberndorfer 2013b: 78).

In this context, Portugal has also seen a tremendous shift in its apparatuses, which will be examined according to Oberndorfer’s three parameters in the fifth chapter.

3.4 Classes, the state and social movements

While discussing Poulantzas’ concepts of power and state, his understanding of classes cannot be neglected. Of course, this again comes with a challenge, especially concerning the problems that appear when discussing classes and class struggles in conjunction with social movements. According to Poulantzas, classes are the ensemble of social agents that are mainly but not exclusively determined by their position in the process of production (Poulantzas 1975: 13). It was explained that ‘power’ is a potential effect. This means that it is only seen in forms of repression, restrictions, suppression, orders and hegemonic discourses or, the other way around: in demonstrations, strikes, or riots. Even though the form of production builds the core for the development of asymmetric structures that are understood as classes, the effect of power historically shapes more structures and power relations than labour. Historically exploitation is set along those cleavages, but they also shape all kind of social relations apart from class. Although class remains the core, class-based repression is by no means the ‘most important’ or ‘main’ form of suppression, experienced by the people: Racism puts people in different power relations and behaviour

towards each other, as well as gender and sexuality, age, the performance and shape of the body, nation, etc. All these characteristics developed their cleavages in a unique way: The expression of sexism and racism for instance can have regional differences. Nevertheless, it is experienced as a power effect and will be responded to with acts of resistance. Asymmetry of structures and power unfolds historically on the sphere of production, but shapes all kind of social relations, reproduction, culture, ecological exploitation etc.

Asymmetry emerges through the actions of agents that due to their position, capital and privileged statuses have an easy access to societal influence. Power is the effect that is seen when actors are eager to keep their path towards social, economic and political influence under control. This means likewise that there is always a second effect of asymmetric structures: resistance. Resistance is a reaction towards the effect of power. Resistance can be seen in individual forms of back talk, sabotage, riots, collective action, demonstrations, strikes and revolutions. It can be understood to gain power by changing the asymmetry towards one's own advantage. It can also be understood as an attempt to switch power relations or reinstall symmetric social relations – i.e. a society without classes and privileges.

'Marxists have often talked about 'movements' (and even 'social movements'). However, they have rarely stopped to ask what they meant by these terms, and how they might fit into their larger systems of thinking' (Barker et al. 2013: 23). In this paper, however, I try to relate the concepts of power relations, capitalist state, class and social movements to each other. As social movements are an effect of social, economic and political asymmetry between diverse groups in society, social movements are a collective form of resistance, however, not necessarily understood as class struggle itself. Power relations shape different spheres of society and thus, impact people in numerous ways. Therefore, social movements are first and foremost 'a whole 'multi-organisational field'' (ibid.) or 'an amalgam of political parties, trade unions, clubs of various sorts, exile organisations, underground organisations, newspapers, enrolling and representing the serried ranks of the exploited and oppressed' (ibid.). Nevertheless, social movements can be the base for all these various kinds of organisations. I argue that for actors of social movements in order to reshape power relations, their actions are diverse and so is their impact. I will show in the next chapter that class struggle can be an outcome of social movements, especially when certain groups of activists start to understand themselves as working or social classes deprived from societal influence.

Reasons for social movements to develop are various forms of crystallised power relations, mostly in form of the state, in forms of discourses and normative assumptions. They result in resistance of people on whom power relations are exerted. The aim of movements is therefore always to reverse asymmetry of power – although these asymmetries are diverse and so are the activists, who claim to ease, reverse or destroy their effects. Movements therefore occur as a network of strategies, actors and organisations and are themselves a foundation or source for new formations and dynamics. I argue that social movements have different effects, as their forms of resistance as well as the dynamics that collective actions release are diverse.

4. Methodology and operationalisation of social movements

In this section, I will condense the different analytical deliberations made before into four different parameters. Hence, it will be possible to analyse the impact of the anti-austerity protests in Portugal from different angles. Furthermore, I will explain how and why I decided to collect my data from expert interviews and how the material was worked up and operationalised.

The evaluation of success is connected to time, space and visibility of political actions. Social scientists must produce texts and therefore inevitably cement movements on paper. This is a methodological problem that I am confronted with as well.

In this context, the paper aims to develop an understanding of social movements through the dynamics they develop in correlation to the state and state apparatuses, class consciousness, relational developments, cognitive changes and environmental impacts.

The causality between social movements and their impact is not always easy to establish. Some impacts of movements are the outcome of collective action – even if they are not beneficial for the movement's aim – some are rather side effects or synergy effects (Giugni 1998: 373). Thus, it is useful to develop a pattern of categories, which can observe intentional and accidental origins of movements and intentional and accidental outcomes; influence on the movements as well as the impact of movements.

Tarrow and McAdam describe in 'Ballots and Barricades' (2010: 531) three 'mechanisms' that I attempt to employ in this thesis. The term 'mechanism' is reformulated as 'dynamics' in the following, to do justice to the processuality of this concept. Further, the concept will be applied to a wider understanding. As will be seen in the chapters below, dynamics are understood as being dependent on space, time and circumstances as well as being recursive – which means that they are an effect of social movements and have an impact on them.

4.1 Environmental dynamics

The first parameter is the environmental dynamic of collective action. This dynamic can be understood as existing before, but also during and after the movement (McAdam/Tarrow 2010: 531). The environmental dynamic summarises threats and opportunities that kick off social unrest. Opportunities can be, for instance, political schedules such as general elections that movement activists might consider as a possibility to gain special attention on their cause (Giugni 1998). Threats showcase rather the fear that a certain socio-political situation might last or even worsen. Such are, as will be described later, the austerity measures in Portugal. Beyond threats and opportunities, movements themselves can release environmental dynamics by influencing other social movements. The Arab uprising was a collection of social movements itself and in a domino effect, influenced the Indignados in Spain, Greece and Portugal, to occupy places, just like the Egyptian activists occupied their Tahir square (see chapter 7.1.1). McAdam and Tarrow emphasise that the new waves of social movements that could be seen in the last years, are not a 'global' actor, but can be understood as 'extensions of domestic social movements and therefore impossible to understand apart from domestic opportunities and constraints' (McAdam/Tarrow 2010: 530). In a similar fashion, Burawoy (2014: 16) underlines that social movements 'may share underlying economic causes but their expression is shaped by the terms and structure of national politics'. However, even if movements do not act detached from their regional and national situations (Poulantzas, 1978a: 131), they do have an influence on each other, are connected and share political and cultural characteristics. For instance, the element of 'occupation' was widely spread among activists in the years 2011 and 2013 from Egypt to the USA, from Spain to Turkey. Environmental dynamics have partially to do with the effect of power, which is seen in terms of a growing installation of austerity measures and the change of the Portuguese state apparatuses towards authoritarian statism, which will be discussed later. The environmental effect is always connected to the state since the latter builds the surrounding, the reason and often the opponent to which collective actions refer. However, it can also be triggered by cultural events that express resistance or grievance, riots, catastrophes like the earth quake in Fukushima that lead to stronger anti-nuclear power protests in Germany etc.

Environmental dynamics – opportunities, threats, and inspiration by other movements, cultural or certain political events - can lead to the development of social movements, can spur them on and can be the outcome of movements at the same time.

4.2 Cognitive dynamics

Cognitive dynamics affect the societal mediation of a certain demand or issue the collective action is referring to (McAdam/Tarrow 2010: 531). Already Rosa Luxemburg analysed cognitive dynamics of collective actions when she examined mass protests:

‘The most precious, lasting, thing in the rapid ebb and flow of the wave is its mental sediment: the intellectual, cultural growth of the proletariat which proceeds by fits and starts, and which offers an inviolable guarantee of their further irresistible progress in the economic as in the political struggle’ (Luxemburg 1906).

To categorize cognitive dynamics, it is worth looking at inner and external processes concerning the movements. Tattersall developed this distinction in terms of measuring success externally as ‘shaping political landscapes’ and internally as ‘increasing consciousness’ (Tattersall 2010: 23–24). Externally, especially polls and elections show how ideas on the political landscape are changing (Giugni 1998). In the discourse about austerity a new measure can be perceived as just or unjust, especially in terms of inequality (Webster 2013). It can lead to new debates and very likely also to a new wave of protests or strikes against austerity, which influences the debate again. Internally, cognitive dynamics are also linked to the movements and their activists. Their interpretations and understanding of certain programmes and ideas might change during the process of action and during discussions among activists as well. This again, can have an influence on the strategy and other dynamics such as the relational dynamic – the connection between organisations and networks that shape the amalgam of social movements.

In general, the visibility of a movement in terms of actions, leaflets, press conferences, flash mobs and strikes becomes very important when aiming to influence the socio-political debate. However, it is as well possible that the mainstream media ignores smaller protests and it can also happen that the activists do not prefer visibility, as they fear prosecution. Nevertheless, internal learning is always a result of collective activism, thus cognitive dynamics are always an outcome of social movements, regardless of how visible or invisible they might appear.

4.3 Relational dynamics

The third category that is borrowed from Tarrow and McAdam touches on the relational level of movements. Collective action does not develop on naked ground, but is shaped though already existing protest structures and will shape structures of movements that will

follow them. Social movements can start as a bundle of friends, and/or activists, networks and organisations that meet to organise resistance, thus social movements develop through new coalitions (Diani 2008). Old alliances might break apart, new groups and links between activists develop in the process. Relational dynamics are very important as different observations can be taken from them. For instance, Tattersall (2010: 145) and Giugni, (1998: 376) observed that the more organisations are involved in the planning of movement actions, the weaker is the impact of the movement in general. These findings are interesting in terms of strategies, but also in the way of understanding how movements were or were not able to shape the political climate or gain influence. It is also an interesting category, to see how networks are changing, interlinking, and how activists are switching their positions inside and through movements. In this context, the important work of Mario Diani (1997) and others that were mentioned before, which refers to power relations and key figures inside movements, can be linked to relational dynamics since the latter are changing in the process of collective actions as well. Especially power relations play an important role, when already established traditional organisations like trade unions and rather inexperienced or small networks eventually start to organise protests for the same causes, but possess different interests and abilities.

4.4 Institutional dynamics

To bring Marxist and mainstream social movement research together, I am widening the categories of the three dynamics borrowed by Tarrow and McAdam. The question at stake is what kind of impact social movements have on state apparatuses. State apparatuses are shaped by struggles and thus are themselves somehow in a state of flux. At the same time, they are organising the capitalist classes and disorganising protests and working-class struggles. The relation between social movements and state apparatuses can be understood also through a concept of dynamics. It is worth going back to the questions what state apparatuses are and how they can install structural selectivity. One state apparatus does not resemble the other. If we compare the constitutional court and the trade unions, we see huge differences in the way different class interests are represented. Also, the functions of these apparatuses are extremely different. The constitutional court is shaping the power relation through the means of law. Trade unions influence them through negotiations and strikes. The constitutional court represents – mainly – the strategic selectivity of the capitalist state. Although in the case of Portugal, it is in any case a crystallisation of class struggles, due to the history of the Portuguese revolution, from which the Portuguese constitutional court

emerged with a relatively progressive constitution. However, since the personnel of these apparatuses also belongs to different classes and different asymmetric structures, it is inevitably affected by social unrest (Poulantzas 1978a: 143). In times of austerity, the personnel are also affected by wage cuts and rising transport fees. In 2012, Portugal saw demonstrations of the police and the army against austerity and clashes between police forces i.e. striking police activists and police forces on duty. Thus, movements shape the state apparatuses, through class struggle and the demands of their own staff (Poulantzas 1975: 25).

The aim of the institutional dynamic is to visualise how social movements can shape power relations within and between the state apparatuses.

4.5 Methodical approach

As a starting point, the paper follows the thesis of Uwe Flick (2012: 251) according to whom theorisation and cognition develop during the field research and the reflection while writing down the witnessed experiences. Therefore, the conception closest to this approach is retroduction. It ‘can be contrasted to other research strategies such as deduction or induction, as not simply developing specific claims from general premises nor general claims from specific premises’ (Downward/Mearman 2006: 2), but requires a multidimensional understanding of the way how observations influence the use of theoretical concepts and vice versa: How reading theory influences the way we observe and analyse our environment. For collecting material, I firstly decided to read current articles of mainly Portuguese social scientists, and others that are dealing with the country in the period of the recent economic crisis. However, conflicts and tensions among the social and labour movements have not been analysed in a way that would help to trace crucial developments and dynamics.

Hence, the analysis of the anti-austerity movement is mainly based on nine semi-structured interviews with ten experts who occupied or still occupy distinct positions and represent different organisations in the anti-austerity movement. Moreover, articles of different newspapers were evaluated especially on statements according to dates and numbers, as the interviewees took part in many different protests and sometimes mixed dates and events. As the interviewed persons also refer to different international events, I used a few of them to illustrate a parallelisation of processes. All the interviews were taken in Lisbon – five of them one week before and four of them one week after the general election on October 4 in 2015.

5. Portugal's shift towards authoritarian statism

In this chapter it will be explained, how the Portuguese state is shifting towards authoritarian statism. It is argued that this process happened in two stages. The first stage is a rather belated half-performed transformation that started in the 1980s. The second stage started with the financial crisis of 2007ff and is still very much contested and negotiated in the ongoing class struggle.

According to Poulantzas, the worldwide transformation towards authoritarian statism started in the 1970s. However, although Portugal also saw an economic and political crisis in this period, a state of emergency that protects and widens the interest spheres of the capitalist fractions was not achieved, due to the 500 days of Revolution in 1974/75. In this period, the labour and social movements could inscribe huge parts of their interests in the Portuguese state apparatuses. Thus, Portugal has, for instance, still one of the most progressive constitutions in the world (Esposito 2014: 17). Moreover, Portugal does not belong to the capitalist centres and, since the Revolution in 1974/75, the Portuguese capitalist classes struggled to overcome the stage of the country as an economy of the global periphery (Stoleroff 2015: 10; Raposo 2015: 1).

It was argued before that authoritarian statism is a reaction and at the same time a solution to political and economic crisis of the capitalist state. However now, the current European crisis was a catalyst or engine that pushed the process, rather than a fix starting point that initiated the transformation. The initial crisis of the Portuguese state to transform towards authoritarian statism can be found in the Portuguese Revolution of 1974/75 that led to a state transformation, which was much more progressive than in Spain and Greece in the same period. Rather weakened Portuguese capitalist classes faced strong movements of workers, the youth and the poor (Poulantzas 1976: 70-71; 78). Instead of leading a transformation towards another form of authoritarian state, capitalist fractions were pushed aside by the strong labour and social movements, who in contrast to them, fought for a democratic transformation. 'Following the democratic transition, public administration grew progressively in response to increasing demands upon service provision (education and health in the first place) and as a source of employment' (Stoleroff 2013: 311). This means the state apparatuses have been transformed from the time of the revolution towards a rather democratic capitalist state. The capitalist classes remained relatively weak for another period. This paper argues for a thesis of a prolonged period of transformation. An example for the latter is the deep privatisation process, that started in the 1990s and

'reconstructed corporate groups which had been enfeebled by the nationalization process following the democratic revolution in 1974' (Rodrigues/Reis 2012: 196). Privatisation was advanced again from 2011⁴ onwards and the historic achievements of the working classes from the revolutionary periods have been increasingly erased from the Portuguese state apparatuses. As Alan Stoleroff (2015: 10) says in the interview: '[I]n a Poulantzian term - this government does represent the shift in the ruling bloc [...] constantly doing satisfying the best dreams of more aggressive bourgeoisie in the country'.

Considering the processes that will be analysed in this chapter, one could argue that the Memorandum of Understanding perfectly suited the Portuguese classes that represent mainly the interests of finance capital and seek to enforce the transformation against the resistance of trade unions and social protests. To underline my argument, I refer to Oberndorfer's three elements, which he uses to frame the transformation of the European Union towards authoritarian statism, and employ them on the case of the Portuguese state.

5.1 Relocating power relations between financial, law and labour apparatuses

The first element is the shift in the relation of state apparatuses amongst each other. The apparatuses that represent the plainest interests of the strongest capitalist fractions are the finance and economy ministries. In relation to the ministries and apparatuses that deal with labour, health and education, the financial sectors are getting in advantage due to the shift of the asymmetric structures. It is worth to trace this development for Portugal in three phases (Martins 2014: 2). The first phase is the realignment of the power relations among the staff in the state apparatuses due to the implementation of the New Public Management, which started in 2002 and continued until 2010 (Stoleroff 2013: 311). According to Stoleroff, the second is the 'Programmes for stability and growth' phase, which took place from March 2010 to March 2011. The third phase is the 'External Intervention' (ibid.), which deals with the Memorandum of Understanding and the policy of the Troika. It started on May 17, in 2011 and continues.

In the first phase; 'NPM entered political discourse [...] when centre-right coalition governments launched a Reform program'. The aim of the implementation of the New Public Management was 'to revise general labor legislation, investing political resources in the passage of a Labor Code that liberalized dismissals and destabilized collective

⁴ According to Schulten et al. between May 2011 and April 2012, 3.3bn Euros were generated by the sale of the Energy Services EDP and REN to Chinese investors. Other privatisations such as the water supply could not be preceded due to huge protests (Busch et al. 2012: 25).

bargaining in the private sector' (ibid). In 2003, the first 'Labour Code was adopted' which in 2009 paved the way for further reviews that eventually changed collective bargaining negotiations in several sectors, 'in the extreme', to individual negotiation of working conditions and salaries (Martins 2014: 2). Besides, also an increasing restriction on employment and the 'closure of a large number of entities' (Stoleroff 2013: 311) was the consequence of the new policy. While the number of employed public workers increased since 1979 from about 300,000 to 737,774 in 2005; in 2012, the figure had already declined to 583,812 (ibid.: 311-314). A clear signal that a shift between and within the administrative state apparatuses had begun, is the implementation of a new comprehensive law that paved the way for a split between civil servants: 'Magistrates, judges, diplomatic corps, police and criminal investigation and armed services' (ibid.: 312) maintained their 'traditional civil service status' (ibid.), while the working conditions in other sectors, like education and health were radically restructured. New sanctions and disciplinary dismissal against employees were implemented to reduce the public service sector (ibid.). This affected especially school teachers who increasingly received temporary contracts from a year to only a month of working agreement, but also doctors and nurses, as well as garbage collectors and fire-fighters on the municipal level. In this first phase, austerity measures were also implemented, such as 'selective cut backs in public investment; introduced contractualization and outsourcing; and decentralized management practices' (ibid.). Furthermore, measures like the restructuring of Social Security and 'reducing pensions and increasing the retirement' (ibid.: 311) were installed.

The second phase started in conjunction with the appearance of the economic crisis in Portugal in 2008. At the same time, the Spanish and the Irish economies saw the burst of 'intense housing bubble fueled by credit' (Rodrigues/Reis 2012: 193), the Greek economy experienced a tremendous crisis, among other reasons caused by a 'a structural fiscal problem' (ibid.). Portugal in contrast, neither had to struggle with a bursting credit bubble, nor with structural problems. It rather 'has endured stagnation since the institution of the Euro and thus persistent budget deficits' (ibid.). Compared to Spain, Portugal entered the Euro 'with an over-appreciated exchange rate and an already unbalanced economy' (ibid.: 195). Moreover, in the last 12 years the national economy never saw an observable upswing (ibid.: 193). To control the growing indebtedness, austerity measures and structural reforms – such as described above – restricted further economic growth, and thus Portugal fell into a 'vicious circle' (ibid.). The result was that the country experienced 'an average annual growth rate of 0.7 per cent between 2001 and 2010 compared with growth rates averaging

more than 3 per cent between 1987 and 2000' (ibid.: 194). In March 2010 'the government elaborated four versions of a Programme for Stability and Growth (PEC) in an attempt to rein in the debt' (Stoleroff 2013: 313). Parts of the first PEC were increasing VAT, a pay freeze in the public sector, and freezing recruitment. In May, the second PEC included a further increasing of the VAT, and increasing income taxes (ibid.). In this period, also the new order of the state apparatuses becomes obvious. A new policy was introduced in 2012 and implemented on the European level: 'any contracting of new services [were] entirely dependent upon authorization from the Ministry of Finances' (ibid.). Thus, every state institution had not only to hand in their annual budget plans, but every single labour agreement they were about to conclude. This placed the financial state institutions further on top of the other apparatuses. In September, the third PEC included another rise in VAT to 23 per cent, a pay cut for the public service from 3.5 per cent in lower wages to 10 per cent in wages above 1,500 Euro per month (ibid.). Above all, subsidies and overtime were cut, payments for a guaranteed minimum income were reduced by 20 per cent, pensions and promotions were frozen (ibid.). However, the Portuguese economy was caught in the whirlwind of international economic activity. In March 2011, the government of José Socrates proposed a fourth PEC, which included 'suspending the indexation of social benefits and pensions, cutting pensions' and 'increasing transport fees and cuts in hospital operating budgets' (ibid.). On March 12, the mass demonstrations of 'Geração à Rasca' brought the anger about precarious jobs and austerity measures of thousands of people to the street. A few days later, the PEC-IV was defeated in parliament and on March 23, the prime minister José Socrates had to resign (Freire 2015), as he was not able to transmit the Growth and Stability Pact 2011 that every member of the Eurozone was obliged to hand in 'to the European Commission during the European Semester' (Fasone 2014: 6). Thus, 'the government fell; but austerity rolled on' (Stoleroff 2013: 313).

The third phase of 'external intervention' started in May 2011: As the next general elections were called for June 5, the PS built a caretaker government from April to June and on May 17 the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed by the Socialist Party of Portugal (Martins 2014: 3); obtaining 78 billion Euro of financial assistance for the country (Stoleroff 2013: 313–314).

The three PEC packages were not replaced, but supported and widened by the pressure of the Troika from outside.⁵ The conservative-right wing government of PSD and CSD/PP

⁵ 'The assistance to Portugal was split between three instruments: the EFSF, for the greatest part, the International Monetary Fund directly, and the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), established under EU law by Council Regulation EU no. 407/2010 of 11 May 2010. 15 Financial assistance

proceeded – now with the external backing of the European financial apparatuses, the Troika and the MoU - to implement further austerity measures, mainly targeting the labour apparatuses. The MoU ‘established a broad set of structural measures. Regarding the labour market, it envisaged measures relating to protection in case of unemployment, protection of employment, working time, setting of wages and active labour market policies’ (Martins 2014). Hence, the portfolio of cuts in the public sector was widened massively. Among other things, the measures prescribed the reduction of the unemployment insurance benefits to ‘no more than 18 months’ (Stoleroff 2014: 8), 27 per cent of cuts of directorships and the reduction of the overtime payment by 50 per cent (Stoleroff 2013: 311–312). In 2012, holiday and Christmas subsidies were eliminated; pensioners receiving over 1,000 Euro also lost this extra support. This was especially problematic for the lower paid sectors as many of these public employees had taken debts over the year, to pay them back with the 13th and 14th ‘installment of their annual wages’ (ibid.: 314). Since this proposal was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, it was only implemented for one year. In order to find another way to cut this amount of money, the government proposed to restructure the TSU (Taxa Social Única) – the contribution that workers and employers pay for social security. It was envisaged to reduce the amount for the employers from 23.75 to 18 per cent and increase the share of the workers from 11 to 18 per cent (ibid.). Because of the massive protests of the *Que se lixe a Troika* (QSLT) movement, the government backed away from that reform. However, the retirement age was increased to 65 years and 50 per cent of ‘employees on fix-term contracts’ were reduced (Stoleroff 2013: 315; Martins 2014: 3). As these measures were heavily contested from activists, trade unionists and also lawyers and were sometimes overruled or even fought back, from point of view of the government and the Troika, ‘Labour Law emerged as an obstacle to competitiveness and its review as a crucial economic policy instrument’ (Martins 2014: 4).

Obviously, the influence of the national and European financial apparatuses increased massively over the last decade in Portugal. However, the struggle between mainly the financial, the law and the labour apparatuses is not decided, but the outcome becomes increasingly obvious. It is remarkable that the interests of the national financial capitalists and its apparatuses were not strong enough on their own to restore the power relations inside the state. They needed the support of the European financial apparatuses to progress their aims.

was assured for three years – subject to review before each instalment was paid – and thus expired in mid-2014’ (Fasone 2014: 6).

5.2 Bending and breaking the law

The second element of authoritarian statism, according to Oberndorfer, is that laws are increasingly twisted and broken by capitalist fractions. Since the economic crisis, Portugal saw a lot of different scandals that underline the relevance of this element. This chapter shortly refers to two examples: the actions of the caretaker government in 2011 and the re-privatisation of the Portuguese Bank BPN in 2011.

Bending the law: The MoU and the financial assistance of 78 billion Euro was demanded in a period, when Portugal had a caretaker government with limited permission to govern and was not allowed to make far reaching decisions (Reuters 2011). However, the Constitutional Court supported the government's decision to ask the European Union for financial assistance and stated that according to the Constitution, a caretaker government can act in case of emergency e.g. to rescue the country (Spiegel Online 2011). It was not declared as unconstitutional, although in connection to the Memorandum 'a series of structural reforms and the consolidation of the financial sector' (Fasone 2014: 6) was enforced, linked with the constraint to the new government 'to also cut wages and pensions, particularly in the public sector' (ibid.).

The government bonds were rated down in April 2011, thus the economic crisis of Portugal deepened further. In April, the MoU was agreed with the institutions of the Troika and implemented with the support of the PSD who previously rejected the PEC-IV.

After five years, the question remains, whether the caretaker government really acted for the benefit of the country i.e. to 'rescue' it, or if the conditional 'aid' of the Troika was not actually worsening the situation and thus the legal base for the caretaker government to sign the MoU can be questioned or at least understood as fragile. As evidence that the call for a bail-out and the implementations of the subsequently enforced constraints were not 'rescuing' the country from worsening living and economic conditions, the Portuguese Constitutional Court started from 2012 onwards, to declare most of the new restructuring measures and further cuts in the public sector, as unconstitutional (Fasone 2014: 6).

Breaking the law: In 2008, the BPN made 700 million Euro losses and was bailed out by the Portuguese state altogether for 113 billion (The Economist 2011a). In 2011, one condition for the financial aid of the Troika was, to sell the BPN 'with no minimum price set, with target to find buyer by end-July 2011' (Reuters 2011). Thus, although the Portuguese state offered the BPN already for only 180 million Euros, it was forced to sell it to the first tenderer for any given offer. The first tender turned out to be Isabel dos Santos the daughter of Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos and – the so-called 'richest

women of Africa' (Kahl 2015). Dos Santos bought the BPN for 40 million Euro 'a fraction of its euro asking price' (The Economist 2011b) Different parliamentary actors assumed that the time frame and the pressure of the Troika were set as an excuse to present the BPN as 'a gift' for Angolan capitalists (Simantke 2014). This assumption is not unreasonable. Nicos Poulantzas had already analysed a close economic relation between Angola and Portugal by describing the 'Espírito Santo Group, strongly rooted in Angola' (Poulantzas 1976: 62). In the last decade, it became obvious that Portugal's economic and political relation to its former colony Angola have gone into reverse (Ames 2015). In 2011, about 100.000 Portuguese immigrants lived in Angola, being four times more than the number of Angolan immigrants living in Portugal. At the beginning of their term, the PSD-CDS government planned to privatise the public TV and radio station RTP. There was rumour that the vice-minister Miguel Relvas planned to sell the state-owned company to an Angolan friend and his enterprise 'Ongoing' (Louça 2015). In July 2014, Portugal's oldest bank 'Banco Espírito Santo' (BES) collapsed after it sold parts of its shares to an Angolan company (Goncalves 2014). The remaining company of BES was bailed out by the Portuguese state for 4.9 billion Euro (Deutsche Welle 2014) and again, Isabel dos Santos was interested in buying some of the leftovers. In 2015, dos Santos was competing with Spanish investors over the fourth biggest Portuguese Bank BPI (Kahl 2015).

Back in 2011, Portugal was experiencing the climax of its economic crisis. For the Troika, to support the country it would have made sense to sell the BPN for a high price and thus give the state more time, to find a tenderer that would have been willing to buy it for a higher offer. The question remains of course, whether it is reasonable, to sell it at all. On top of this, one must question the legal framework of the Troika to intervene in the selling of the bank and prevent competition, one of the most important engines that drive capitalism. Against this background, it seems that giving the BPN away for a ridiculously low price might have improved the conditions for Angolan capital to get more than a foot in the door of the Portuguese financial market. However, this did not happen on a legal base.

5.3 'Democracia à Rasca': The decline of democracy in Portugal

Considering the first two elements, it is no surprise that the Portuguese parliamentary system has become increasingly pale. The abstentions in the General Elections, in 2011 and 2015 and the election of the President, in 2016 increased about over 50 per cent. This is partially connected to the fact that about two million Portuguese citizens that can vote, live

outside of the country. However, besides the implementation of the MoU the parliament had not much to decide upon, as nearly all political decisions are connected to budgetary issues, which depended on the consent of the Troika. Currently, they still depend on the European Commission, due to the European Competitiveness Pact. Hence, the newly formed Socialist Party minority government had to struggle to defend its budget against the European Commission. Even though Portugal could get remove the Troika, the European Commission can still put a veto on the Portuguese budget. The Financial Times recently commented exactly in the spirit of this technocratic thinking: ‘An agreement by Portugal’s new Socialist government to draw up ‘Plan B’ deficit cuts to ensure its ‘anti-austerity’ budget complies with EU rules has done little to satisfy investors who are continuing to penalise the country’s government bonds’ (Financial Times 2016). The quote expresses two important aspects of the contemporary EU policy: Firstly, Portugal’s budget must observe the European rules and secondly, must ‘satisfy’ international investors. It is not spoken in this or other articles, about democratic decisions of the Portuguese parliament, the interests of the Portuguese society, let alone the needs of the impoverished working class, youth and pensioners in the aftermath of draconian austerity measures. Democracy has been muted by fiscal interests, since the economic crisis hit the Eurozone. This, however, did not happen on all levels of the state and in civil society and it did also not happen against the resistance of working classes, youth and poor.

6. Social and labour struggles in Portugal: Challenging austerity

6.1 A chronology of contestation from 2008 – 2015

In the following section, the different waves of contestation will be outlined and characterised to embed further analyses of its actors.

The development of the anti-austerity protests in Portugal can be divided into three phases. The first phase encompasses the public-sector struggle between 2008 and 2011. It was mainly driven by the public-sector workers and their affiliated trade unions. Bigger strikes mainly took place in the education and health sectors in 2008, when the economic crisis was already looming. These protests developed from labour struggles into anti-austerity actions when the government implemented the first PEC. In this period, the labour movement organised the first general strike of the anti-austerity protests in November 2010. The second phase started in February 2011, when social movement networks entered the stage of the anti-austerity struggle. Strikes, especially in the municipalities went on. However, the mass demonstrations were mobilising people who were not organised in any

trade union / party, or have not been active before at all. The mobilisation of these groups was a new important aspect of the struggle. This period continued until the end of 2013 and saw four important mass demonstrations, four general strikes and several different forms of protests. It was probably the most important period of anti-austerity struggle in the country, so far.

From 2014 until 2016 the big mass actions vanished, but not the activists. In this context three parallel processes can be observed. First: Social movement activists and trade unionists tried to follow the example of Spain and started to organise their neighbourhoods, especially on the question of housing. Second: Sectoral strikes increased again, to stop privatisation and further casualisation. Third: On the parliamentary level, some small concessions were made by the newly elected minority government of the PS that is tolerated by the Communist Party and the Left Bloc. The population experiences a slight relief even though only few austerity measures have been taken back and impoverishment continues.

6.2 The traditional Portuguese labour movements

This section will outline the main actors and organisations of the Portuguese trade union landscape. A general overview of the structure and development of the Portuguese trade unions will be given to explain current tensions within the labour movement. Moreover, the character of the current general strikes as part of the anti-austerity movement will be analysed to measure the importance and impact of this action.

The general strike on November 24, in 2010 was one of the biggest actions taken by the labour movement, as not only the CGTP, but also the UGT mobilised its affiliated unions to the strike, which had happened the last time in 1988 (Pinto/Accornero 2013: 26).

In 2010, about 490 trade unions were counted in Portugal, most of them affiliated to the two big trade union umbrellas. Although Portugal counts altogether seven union federations. There are no clear figures about the union density. It is estimated to be between 11 and 20.5 per cent in 2012 in total (Addison et al. 2015: 4–5; Stoleroff 2015: 13). The union density in the public service is estimated to be 40 per cent, although it is also true, that ‘reliable and up-to-date statistics do not exist’ (Stoleroff 2013: 316). In the private sector, it is approximately only about 10.9 per cent (Stoleroff 2014: 5). The amount of trade unions is connected to a complex system of representation possibilities: Trade unions can represent regions or sectors – or both (Worker-participation.eu 2014). Thus, the sector of

the dockworkers counts altogether 19 trade unions all representing the same sector, but in distinct parts of the country.

During the 48 years of right-wing military dictatorship, trade unions were incorporated in the so called 'SN' (sindicatos nacionais – National trade unions). They built the base of the cooperative Constitution of Salazar's 'Estado Novo' (Sänger 1994: 32). The aim of this structure was to deprive union actors from any political right (ibid.). In the 1960s Portugal had 325 trade unions with 1.4 million members who suffered from the organised atomisation due to the dictatorship. However, at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s they showed the political and organisational potential by managing to organise significant illegal strikes in the industrial sector in the South of Portugal, which eventually assisted the processes of the revolution in 1974 (ibid.: 120-121). After the revolution, political organisations and independent trade unions were legalised (Schilling 1975). Since that period, mainly the PCP and the PS have been competing on a political and syndicalist level (Sänger 1994: 459). While the PCP was not able to gain considerable support at parliamentary level, it became very strong in the labour movement. In fact, it remains widely represented in the trade unions (Deubner 1982: 65–66; Stoleroff 2014). The trade union federation where the PCP has the strongest representation is the CGTP. It was founded directly after the revolution in 1974 with the attempt to unite the whole labour movement under one umbrella. Today it covers about 500,000 workers in 141 trade unions, 88 of them are affiliated to the CGTP, and the others cooperate with the federation on a regular basis (Worker-participation.eu 2014). Stoleroff locates the CGTP 'ideologically and politically outside of the 'governing block'' (Stoleroff 2014: 1), as its strategy is a combination of radical demands, strike actions and demonstrations. While the social-democratic party PS gained huge support at a national and political level, it did not receive the same influence among the trade unions. In 1978, the UGT was founded as a second trade union federation to undermine the political control of the PCP in the trade union landscape (Sänger 1994: 95). At the beginning, this had some progressive aspects as the PCP very much tried to control any kind of labour unrest and trade unions in general (Stoleroff 2015: 21; Sänger 1994: 95–96, 459). Today the UGT represents about 200,000 workers and is politically close to the PS as well as the PSD, although the PS has the main influence (Worker-participation.eu 2014). As the UGT is ideologically linked with the 'hegemonic governing bloc', it is rather acting in the 'interest of competitiveness of national economy' (Stoleroff 2014: 1), thus it is much more willing to negotiate and cooperate with company managements and the governmental parties. Although the political

and strategic divisions between the two main federations have been very persistent during the anti-austerity struggle, they ‘maneuvered between divergence and convergence in action’ (ibid.). For instance, the UGT rejected the offer to support the general strike in November 2012; however, many of its affiliated organisations joined the strike anyway.

In 2013, the UGT changed its position. The election of a new leadership on its annual congress and the conclusion that negotiations and bargaining failed, while austerity remained, it started to join further actions with the trade unions of the CGTP (ibid.: 11). Especially FC, STE and FESAP joined their forces to organise strikes and protests in the education sector and eventually the two federations UGT and CGTP organised the fifth general strike on June 27 together again which according to different activists became probably the biggest general strike of the five ones experienced in the anti-austerity struggle.

Statistics and reviews about the developments since 2014 are not (fully) published yet. The interviewed persons claimed that the struggles in 2014 mainly affected the transport sector i.e. the airports and the trains as the unions and the workers in these sectors were striking against the planned privatisations of their workplaces. In 2015, strikes were also held more at a sector level than on a national or regional level.

In conclusion, the trade union landscape is rather weak, and union density is low. However, as in many other Western nations, the public and service sectors have become the new bastions of trade union organisations. Thus, while austerity impacts mainly the public sector, the trade unions have been able to mobilise a bigger force in order to resist further cuts. The division between the two main trade union federations UGT and CGTP is set along political cleavages. It divides the workers in important strikes, even when affiliated trade unions of the UGT decided to join strike actions of the CGTP on their own. During the anti-austerity protests the tensions between both federations have declined, but are persistent nevertheless.

6.3 Portuguese social movement networks

In this part, the different activities of social movement networks will be mapped to get an overview over the potential of these activists to challenge austerity-measures. The social movements occurred in combination to the economic crisis and the political crisis that occurred in the aftermath of it. It saw four peaks, one in March 2011 with *Geração à Rasca* (GR), the second smaller peak was in October with the platform O15, the third in September 15, 2012 and the fourth in March 2, 2013.

6.3.1 *Geração á Rasca*

GR entered the political landscape and came as a major surprise to the established political parties and the traditional apparatuses that represented protests – the trade unions (Gil 2015: 6). ‘For the last 40 years, the vast majority of the demonstrations was organised by the Communist Party. And the Communist Party [...] we are aware of the fact that we are not mobilising the entire working class. There are sectors that we just can’t get’ (Vileia 2015: 3).

The relation between protests and the state apparatuses in their current transformation is very apparent: As labour rights were cut, especially young workers were affected by precarious jobs and false or forced self-employment. This led to increasing precarisation of the youth also in groups of societies that came originally from middle-class families. The first wave of social movements came as a reaction towards this precarisation of the living conditions and the absence of trade unions that consequently challenge that topic. GR started in February 2011 with four friends that studied politics and spent the day together discussing the Arab revolts, the song of Deolinda and subsequently their own working conditions (Gil 2015: 5). The group realised that they had similar atypical contracts and labour conditions and that their friends and many other people they knew had the same problem. The success of the demonstration that they organised was immense. In Lisbon, between 200,000 and 300,000, in Porto about 80,000 people came to the street to protest precarisation of working conditions and the austerity measures implemented by the Socialist government (Duarte/Baumgarten 2015: 70). As the polls were changing and seeing for the first time the oppositional centre-right party PSD ahead of the PS, the parliamentary opposition started to resist the 4th PEC. After the mass demonstration on March 12, the movement called itself M12M (Movimento 12 Março). It organised further small protest actions, but generally declined. In May 2011, new activists entered the stage, friends of/and Spanish exchange students in solidarity joined the Spanish Indignados when they found out that the Placa del Sol was attacked by police forces. A solidarity demonstration in front of the Spanish embassy turned into a few weeks occupation of Rossio Square in Lisbon (ibid.). After people dropped away, in September new and old networks and groups like Indignados de Lisboa, Movimento Gerações [Movement generations], Movimento Sem Emprego [Movement without employment] formed a new platform with the aim to organise an international demonstration on October 15 (Romeiro 2015, 3). The platform was able to collect money from different protests for campaigning

material and launched a big (fly-) poster campaign. Without the help of either trade unions or parties, the platform organised a demonstration of 100,000 people in Lisbon and a public assembly where ordinary people could speak in front of the big demonstration. Demands like the nationalisation of banks and a new general strike were raised (Stoleroff 2015: 5). The activists of the platform 150 also supported the general strike on November 24 in 2011 and on March 22, in 2012. They were calling and mobilising for a demonstration on these days and tried to protest alongside the trade unions (ibid.). Until that date, the trade union leadership of the CGTP had never organised demonstrations during the general strikes. Their argument was that as the transport sector was on strike, people would not be able to come to the demonstration and get home afterwards. Through the competition that they felt towards the social movements and the pressure it released, they were forced to organise demonstrations (Camargo 2015: 6). However, the trade union leadership was keen to keep 'their' general strike demonstrations separated from the one of the social movement and on March 22, in 2012 even the police supported their intention and forced a separation in the demonstration between trade union blocs and social movement activists (Mariano/Sousa 2015: 4).

6.3.2 The first wave of 'Que se lixe à Troika'

In August 2012, the network 'Precários Inflexíveis' in Lisbon invited other groups and platforms for a meeting to launch a new protest. 'We knew that the prime minister would have to present some draconian measures' (Camargo 2015: 2). The new platform called itself 'Que se lixe a Troika' – 'which means in good English 'For the Troika to go and fuck itself' right - or to screw itself – basically' (Stoleroff 2015: 4). The activists were following very closely the national schedules of the parliament in case, new budgets and hence austerity measures were planned to meet the restrictions of the Troika (ibid.). And indeed, at the beginning of September 2012, the prime minister presented the plan to restructure the TSÚ (Taxa Social Única) which would directly give six per cent of workers' wages to the employers that would pay less for social security insurance (Camargo 2015: 2). Thus, the demonstration on September 15 grew to a mass protest as all over the country about one million people – 10 per cent of the Portuguese population went to the street to contest these measures (Mariano/Sousa 2015: 4). Alone in Lisbon, between 400,000 and 500,000 people entered the streets (Stoleroff 2015: 4).

The protest forced the government to drop the project to restructure the TSÚ. On November 14, 2012, the trade unions organised another general strike, which was coordinated with

trade unions in Spain that mobilised for a general strike at the same day and trade unions all over Europe, which organised sectoral strikes or at least small demonstrations and rallies. The social movement activists around QSLT and other networks supported the strike and the picket lines, again. The support even in the night and early morning hours was even much bigger than in the two preceding years. The social movements organised again a demonstration and this time, the trade union leadership agreed to have a joint demonstration in the afternoon of the general strike. The demonstrations during the general strikes were in general not as massive as the one of GR and the two of QSLT. However, the demonstration on November 14 was very militant as one of the main slogans was ‘*Governo para a Rua – a luta continua*’ - Down with the government – the fight goes on. It finished in front of the parliament with a speech of the CGTP trade union leader Arménio Carlos. After the trade union officials left, ten-thousands of people stayed in the São Bento square in front of the parliament. A small group of people threw stones at the police forces that protected the stairs and the entrances towards the public assembly (Raposo 2015: 3). After one hour, the police reacted and shot fireworks into the crowd and dissolved it. Police groups were beating people while some activists put up burning barricades (Rodrigues 2015: 2). Interestingly, the trade union leadership did not dissociate itself from the riots, but stated that night on TV that the daily violence of the state and austerity are much worse than a few burning barricades and stones. The relational dynamics between the social movements and trade unions were growing in the following year.

6.3.3 The ‘Grandoladas’

In 2013, in the middle of February a new form of protest entered the political landscape. During a budget discussion in parliament when the former Prime Minister Passos Coelho spoke, a group of about 40 people started to sing ‘*Grandôla Vila Morena*’, the famous song of the Portuguese Revolution (Amaral/Lopes 2013).⁶ Coelho was not able to speak on.

⁶ Grandôla is a village in the South of Portugal in the region of Alentejo, well known for a powerful base of the Communist Party, already under António Salazar. The song by José Afonso was forbidden and not allowed to be played in the Portuguese radio stations. In 1974, in the night of 25 April, the military forces planned to organise a Coup d’ Etat. When they occupied a Catholic radio station they broadcast the illegal song ‘*Grandôla Vila Morena*’ as a sign that the occupation was successful. After listening to the forbidden song on a Catholic radio station, masses of people came to the street. They realised that the army started to occupy central key sectors of Lisbon. Thus, it started as a Coup, and entered eighteen months lasting revolutionary process. Exactly this draft of the revolution is still vividly alive even among younger generations (Louça 2015: 8). The song ‘*Grandôla Vila Morena*’ is sung especially among trade unionists and members of the Communist Party. It is also generally connected to the ideals of democracy and freedom (ibid.).

Instead he was reminded with the song that ‘o povo é quem mais ordena’,⁷ until the police brought the singers out of the parliament building (Vilela 2015: 10). The protest was broadcasted publicly on national TV and found a lot of support. When ministers planned to speak publicly in universities or at rallies, groups of people showed up to interrupt the politicians and sing the famous song of the revolution. According to the protest form, the activists were called ‘Grandoladas’ after the song (Amaral/Lopes 2013). Thus, for several months it became impossible for the ministers of the government to release their timetables to the press as they worried that their speeches would be interrupted again (Louça 2015: 7).

6.3.4 The Second Wave of ‘Que se lixe à Troika’

‘[W]e knew again that these schedules for European compromises would take place, and we launched it’ (Camargo 2015: 3).

The second mass demonstration of QSLT saw over one million people in about 24 cities of Portugal and about 500,000 people in Lisbon alone (Hatton 2013). In all cities people finished the demonstration by singing *Grandôla Vila Morena* at 6 pm (BBC News 2013). This time, the demonstration was organised together with the trade union leadership of CGTP (Louça 2015: 3).

Another protest was launched in June 1, 2013 in relation to several international events like Blockupy in Germany and protests in Spain and France (ibid.). Unfortunately, the protest this time was much smaller (ibid.). On June 27, another general strike took place. It was called by both the CGTP and the UGT and supported by several social movement activists.

6.3.5 The inhibited bridge blockade

On October 2013, the platform QSLT planned a new event and released the date for a new protest, when the Communist Party and the trade union federation CGTP announced another date and action for a protest. On October 19, the plan was to cross and thus block the main bridge ‘April 25’, one of the most important traffic routes in Portugal. Activists of QSLT were confused to see that the trade unions seemed to compete again against each other (Camarago 2015: 3). However, they supported the idea to block the main traffic route in South Portugal by crossing the 27th biggest bridge in the world by foot. Meanwhile, the Portuguese government met with the leadership of the trade unions to convince them to refrain from this form of action. The bridge was blocked in 1994 and it turned into a violent

⁷ ‘The people are the leading’ - important phrase of that song, later rediscovered and used as a protest call against austerity.

battle between trade unions and the police. The battle of the '25 April' bridge ended in the resignation of the right-wing government of Cavaco da Silva who was prime minister in that period. In 2013, when trade unions decided to cross the bridge again, he was the president of the country (Louça 2015: 8). Thus, the PSD-CDS government sought different excuses why passing the bridge by foot cannot be allowed. They even offered the trade union leadership to pass another bridge and they also maintained that the bridge could collapse under the weight of the masses which was a weak argument as the Lisbon marathon crosses the bridge every year (Raposo 2015: 1). The trade union leadership succumbed to their idea. Two days before the protest, the leadership changed the strategy and stated that instead of crossing the bridge by foot they would use buses and cars (Louça 2015: 8). This was a huge blow for the social movements that were already mobilising for that protest (Raposo 2015: 1). On the one hand, the trade unions backed off and on the other hand they crossed the bridge by buses. Under these circumstances it became impossible for the other actors of the social movements to keep mobilising for a demonstration crossing the bridge by foot and thus blocking it.

‘But then the idea of stopping the bridge and walking it by foot [...] that this did not happen [...] killed the social movement and the oppositions to the government. [...] because there were months with people saying, ‘we will pass the bridge by foot, we will pass the bridge by foot!’’ (Gil 2015: 3)

The trade union leadership of the CGTP was not prepared to take the struggle further (Raposo 2015: 1). After this event, the movements seemed to decline and as Baumgarten and Duarte (2015: 72) put it, ‘[l]eaving the field to the trade unions’. While it is true that since the end of 2013 no big mass demonstrations have been taking place, also no general strikes were organised since then. Instead, two interesting developments can be examined. Social movement activists are more active in their neighbourhood, especially around the issue of housing and state racism against migration communities. At the same time, they still support sectoral labour struggles, which have been intensifying in the past months.

6.3.6 *The character of current social movements in Portugal*

Social movements in Portugal differ in many ways from protests that could be seen in Spain or Greece in that same time. They can be characterised through three different attributes. First, the movements are not continuous in their protest austerity measures (Romeiro 2015: 8-9). They organise punctual events, but do not maintain their pressure through occupations, rallies or other forms of activism over a longer period.

Second, the organisers of the protests got together in very small activist platforms. ‘If anything, to use the contemporary sociological language it was ‘social networks’ to some extent’ (Stoleroff 2015: 4). Activists of these social networks were often rank and file, sometimes leading members of Left Bloc, the Communist Party, trade unions, political left groups as well as independent groups of friends and student collectives (Gil 2015: 3; Romeiro 2015: 9; Camargo 2015: 2).

Third, although not many activists were involved in the platforms, the range of organisations involved in these platforms was vast. Thus, tensions and divergences emerged very frequently. The organisers of the platforms had very different strategies to deal with the problem. They were inviting activists of diverse groups along and told them not to speak in the name of their organisation (ibid.: 5). They developed different concepts to prevent one group from taking the entire speaking time at a demonstration. At the same time, these platforms were not able to develop a clear programme with clear demands.

This observation can be linked with the analysis of Tattersall (2010: 148) and Giugni (1998: 375) who stated that in terms of cooperation and platforms ‘less is more’. The impact of structures with few different organisations involved is found to be much higher, than an involvement of too many groups. Nevertheless, these platforms had several impacts such as the pressure on trade union federation and the rejection of the TSÚ reformation.

Another interesting feature is that the activists and platforms were supporting strikes on various levels and thus were able to bring the social movement and the labour movement together, even if it took some time for the leadership of the trade union federation CGTP to drop the competition against these platforms.

6.4 ‘Social Movement Unionism’ in Portugal

This section refers to the dockworkers union SETC on the one hand and the RTP staff council in the period of 2011-2013 on the other, as both practices of Social Movement Unionism (SMU). The concept of SMU encompasses trade unions or labour organisations that orientate their structures and members on ‘building networks with different active groups and educate their rank and file members to prepare for and intervene in social movements’ (Turner/Hurd 2001: 12). Thus, the practice includes trade union activism beyond the politics of an enterprise or sector to highlight own cases in society, while at the same time, help to build broader structures of resistance for common aims (Engeman 2015: 2). I assume that this form of activism delivers one of the main reason and way why and

how trade unions and social movements grew further together during the process of struggle.

During the anti-austerity protests in Portugal, many different interesting forms of unionism developed, some of them in divergence to the traditional trade union movement some – especially the general strikes – in convergence them. In this paper, two examples will be introduced, the RTP, because the struggle of the staff council against the privatisation of its company has hardly been covered so far. The other example is the impressive struggle of the Portuguese dockworkers that gained an increasing support especially from international dockworkers unions. Both were able to link their struggles to the broader social movements against austerity measures and played an important role in increasing its dynamics and impacts.

6.4.1 *Independent actions of the staff council in RTP from 2011-2013*

The company ‘Rádio e Televisão Portugal’ (RTP) is the main state-owned television and radio company in Portugal. Like BBC in Britain and ARD/ZDF in Germany, the RTP broadcasts daily news and political and cultural talk-shows with a small amount of time for advertisement. It is financed by the state and by the radio and television fees included in the electricity prices. In 2011, the newly elected centre-right government planned to privatise the company (Louçã 2015: 1). The rumour appeared that minister Miguel Relvas planned to sell the company to an Angolan friend and his firm ‘Ongoing’ (ibid.). At the end of the year the new elections of the staff council took place. António Louçã and a group of his colleagues opposed the planned privatisation and thus organised an alternative ticket in opposition to the old right-wing staff council and won 8 out of 11 seats. In the period from 2011 until 2013 the newly elected staff council organised resistance against the privatisation (ibid.). The council members decided to publish all the information of their meetings with the management through leaflets and informed the employees in RTP of every step the management board was planning, against the will of the management itself (ibid.). As the board was forced by law to inform the council members about planned changes in the company, the council was able to gain more information and spread it (ibid.). This led to the situation where the manager of the RTP board complained about the staff council in the national parliament (ibid.: 3).

In August 2012, the government decided to keep the company, but planned to lend it to a private enterprise for 20 years that could keep the profits but was not forced to buy it or

invest in its infrastructure (ibid.: 2). The staff council attempted to work closer with the trade unions and the trade union federation CGTP to stop this project. However, they were not supported as the union leadership defined the staff council as ‘undependable’ and ‘ultra-left’ (ibid.). Without the support of the trade unions the council called for a general staff assembly, and on 29 August, despite the summer holiday season, hundreds of RTP employees flooded the small rooms and floors and flocked to the assembly (ibid.). Approximately 500 of 1,500 workers came to listen to the new plans; the meeting had to be held outside of the building as the rooms were too small.

‘And this plenary assembly, was [...] like a mass demonstration in the inner rooms of RTP – this was a mighty leverage against António Borges who introduced the plan to give away the company to a private enterprise for 20 years’ (ibid. - own translation).

Furthermore, the staff council decided to call for the support of the demonstration on September 15, which was organised by social movement activists of the new platform ‘Que se lixe a Troika’ (QSLT) who similarly did not get any help of the CGTP. Supporting the demonstrations of QSLT brought along two achievements: The staff council of RTP was next to the dockworkers the only organised trade union bloc on the QSLT demonstration in Lisbon. The leadership of the CGTP was forced to call the staff council members of RTP, to meet them in the demonstration and take press photos to give their rank and file members the impression that they have actually supported this mass protest (ibid.: 4). In this event, the RTP council played a significant role to push the main trade union federation to engage with the social movements, which they eventually did from then on until the end of 2013. While supporting these protests and the increasing pressure on the government, the RTP council also achieved to stop the planned privatisation. The management of RTP fell and was replaced by a new board, which could organise the outsourcing of some sectors and the replacements of fix labour contracts through workers of temporary employment agencies (ibid.). However, the government had to give up the plan to privatise RTP as a whole (ibid.). The RTP staff council was also able to prevent dismissals; instead the management had to pay high compensations (ibid.: 3). Unfortunately, this and other measures lead to the situation that the management was also able to buy out militant staff council members one by one.

6.4.2 *The struggles of the dockworkers union SETC*

The dockworkers in Portugal have been involved in a three years long conflict about working standards and collective bargaining agreements with the government, and against

the privatisation of the port management. In that period, the trade union SETC (Sindicato dos Estivadores, Trabalhadores do Tráfego e Conferentes Marítimos do Centro e Sul de Portugal) could mobilise its affiliated members not just for strike actions but also for demonstrations against austerity in support of the social movement activists and recently in support of housing protests. The trade union SETC is internationally connected through the IDC (International Dockworkers Council). Hence, it has a regular worldwide exchange on working conditions in other countries and is able to gain worldwide support for their struggles. SETC is one of 19 dockworker trade unions in Portugal.

The restructuring of labour standards that started in Portugal a few years ago and aimed to reach better 'competitiveness' in the world market, penetrated also the sector of the dockworkers (Mariano 2013).

In 2012, some of the dockworker unions affiliated to the UGT, and the government signed an agreement that allowed international cargo operators like PSA (Port Singapore Authority) to decrease port expenditure between 25 per cent and 30 per cent (Watson 2012). Thus, global and national operators could employ low skilled workers for low salaries and bad working conditions (Mariano/Sousa 2015: 1). To prevent the new law, the dockworkers union SETC and others experienced with different forms of strikes. Some weeks they were only working a few hours a day and thus delaying transportations of freights. In October 2012, they closed the ports for 20 days and organised a demonstration on November 29, supported internationally by different dockworkers' unions especially from European countries (ibid.). In this process 47 workers lost their job due to their activity in the strike (ibid.). However, the law as well as the dismissals could be revoked (ibid.).

'Only with the international solidarity it was possible to stop this. [...] with the employers that want to sell all the ports of theirs with a right-wing government that wants to get rid of professional dockworkers and replace them by casual and cheap labour here in Portugal - well there is not a lot of space to deal with this. We are going to strike sooner or later again, in Lisbon at least' (ibid.).

The dockworkers' union works on three diverse levels. The first level targets the national trade union work of the dockworkers. The SETC aims to reorganise its own dockworker union and tries to unite the 19 unions that represent Dockers all over the country (ibid.: 6). As the ports are working individually with international cargo, during strikes they can be played out against each other. The companies can choose another port that is not on strike and transport the freight to another port in Portugal or South Europe (ibid.). A bigger trade

union that organises all dockworkers in Portugal would be able to stop this. The second level concerns the international dockworkers labour organisations. The trade union SETC is affiliated to the Dockers union IDC. This international organisation was established in 2000 as a split from ITF [International Transport Workers Federation], after the strikes of the Liverpool dockworkers were not as consequently supported by the international trade union as it would have been necessary (ibid.: 4). Currently, the organisers of the trade unions meet very regularly to exchange their knowledge about their working conditions and show solidarity with workers that are in struggle.

The third level of activism is the constant involvement of the trade union in social movement activities. On September 15, in 2012 the dockworkers started to present themselves as a bloc on the QSLT demonstration. From that day on, the SETC in Lisbon was active, nearly every week in nearly all demonstrations that took place until November 14 where they also had a strong bloc in the demonstration of the general strike (ibid. 4).

‘[T]he social movement [...], we have been very close to them. And now [...] some of us are involved [...] to get in contact with some of the social movements - the precarious movements, representing precarious, unemployed people, for solidarity groups of the housing and for helping unemployed’ (ibid.: 6).

On these three levels, the trade unions were again mobilising for protest actions from November 2015 until January 2016 and reached a new collective bargaining agreement.

6.6 Conclusion – main actors of the anti-austerity protests

The actors and organisations involved in the anti-austerity protests in Portugal encompass very diverse groups. While the struggle against austerity and precarisation is originally the field of the trade union federations UGT and CGTP, they were supported as much as contested by new actors that entered the stage of struggle. Social movement networks and Social Movement Unionists are both structures that do not feel represented by the classical trade union movement. Nevertheless, they are not classical New Social Movements, but mainly challenge working conditions. Thus, they are also concentrated on labour struggles. Besides, trade unionists such as the dockworkers, increasingly engage in social protests. The divergence between ‘Old’ and ‘New’ social movements has vanished in Portugal, if it ever really existed. However, there are strong trade union structures, which instead of embracing new forms of protests are mainly competing against the new actors or try to seek control over these new forms of anti-austerity struggle.

7. The dynamics of the anti-austerity movements in Portugal

7.1 Environmental dynamics: Inspiration, threats and opportunities

In the first part of the analysis, environmental processes will be discussed to understand the different ‘sparks’ and grievances that brought activists to the protest in very concrete circumstances. Therefore, statements in the expert interviews referring to other social movements’ changes due to austerity measures, the crisis, or other issues, are introduced and explored along the dynamics through which they were either started or which they released.

7.1.1 Inspiration and domino effects

In the first period, social movements in Portugal in 2011, one could observe a domino effect around the Mediterranean Sea. According to most of the interviewees who were co-organisers of *Geração à Rasca* or/and *Que se lixe a Troika*, the events of the Arab Spring were an important inspiration to start a protest in Portugal (Vilela 2015: 4 – 5). The activists are also aware that their protest in March 2011 inspired the *Indignados* movement in Spain and vice-versa: The occupation of the *Placa del Sol* had an impact on the relatively small *Acampada* movement in Portugal in June/July 2011 (Camargo 2015: 6). The mutual dynamic between Portugal and Spain during the anti-austerity protests can be seen in further different examples. The international protest day of October 15, 2011 was discussed and organised in close contact with Spanish activists (*ibid.*: 7). The ‘European General Strike’ on November 14, 2012, was basically an ‘Iberian’ general strike as only Spain and Portugal carried through a national cross-sector strike. These general strikes took place in contrast to Greece, Cyprus, Italy, and France that rather saw demonstrations and some sectoral strikes that day. Another small example is the *Grandoladas*: When these flash mobs happened, activists in *Placa del Sol* sang *Grandôla Vila Morena*, too (Vilela 2015: 7). Next to Spain, the anti-austerity protests in Greece and the resistance against the Troika became an increasing reference among Portuguese activists (Romeiro 2015: 2).

In addition to the protest against austerity and precarious living conditions, the forms of protests and the forms of mobilisation were also inspiring the activists transnationally (*ibid.*: 4). Next to the discovery of the Internet and social networks to mobilise for mass demonstrations also other forms like the occupation of public squares have been an inspiration from the protests of Tahir Square in Egypt. This form of protest can be observed later in the year, in the US in September 2011, during the Occupy Wall St. protests. The

form of having public assemblies and giving ordinary people a voice in the protests was also (re-) developed in Spain and later, again used in the Occupy movement in the US. The Occupy movement, which brought public speaking and protest camping on central city squares together, influenced the Portuguese protest on October 15. After the demonstration in front of the national assembly, activists organised a stage and loudspeakers and thus brought up a national assembly of ordinary people in front of the national parliament, which was not seen as representing them anymore. In front of about 20,000 people who stayed in front of the parliament after the demonstration, every person could speak for three minutes and raise demands. People symbolically voted for different proposals by raising their hands. After the assembly, activists occupied the place in front of the parliament and organised a small camp, which lasted about two months.

Even though the activists made many attempts to organise a transnational protest especially between 2011 and 2013, it cannot be analysed as a transnational social movement. The causes for the social unrest are linked with regional and national conflicts. Despite this observation, the forms, reflections and mutual protest days had many elements of transnational collective resistance. There is an increasing understanding that capitalists operate globally and thus, to contest capitalism collective action must be organised on a regional as well as the international level (Mariano/Sousa 2015: 5).

7.1.2 A demobilising and mobilising threat: Austerity provokes fear and anger

In Portugal, threats and reasons for resistance are very diverse. Especially austerity is perceived as a shock considering the decline of living standards. Furthermore, the housing question in relation to institutional racism and sexism has been raised from different activists. Moreover, the anger about the paternalistic Troika policy and the fear to lose the job, to have no future in general, but also to be deprived from the possibility of resisting against the current situation have been raised as a threat, to become active.

It was stated many times during interviews and discussions that ‘austerity pretty much robbed the stage’ (Camargo 2015: 5) or is ‘the mother of all causes’ (Gil 2015: 10).

‘[A]t night when you see the trucks from food banks [...] you see much more people going. [...] These are people who had one year ago a completed life. It’s: You lose a job, you were paying a house, you lose everything and you are emotionally and psychologically going down’ (Rodrigues 2015: 2).

Precarious living conditions and the attacks on labour standards were an important threat for activists to get involved in the anti-austerity protest (ibid.). Four holidays have been cancelled, which forces 24 hours shift sectors like the dockworkers to work more without compensation (Mariano/Sousa 2015: 3). Nevertheless, especially ‘LGBTPQI are [...] amongst the most precarious people there is. Not only the usual work oppressions, but many more oppressions that impose on these people and that work to make their lives more and more difficult’ (Camargo 2015: 8).

On the one hand, the new working conditions lead to fear, which has a restricting effect, and on the other hand to anger, which is rather mobilising. As the labour contracts are very short, people are afraid of losing their employment after a few weeks or months (Vilela 2015: 2). In the constellation of fear, the austerity measures and the deregulation of labour can demobilise and weaken protests and structures, such as trade unions and other organisations of the working classes, youth and poor. This is not only connected to fear, but also to the amount of time people are able to spend at a mobilising/political meeting (Romeiro 2015: 1).

The other side of the coin is anger. According to Raposo (ibid.), it could be felt in the streets during the mass demonstrations that were themselves an unorganised expression of the anger that exists among a big part of the population. It is related to the working condition, but as could be seen in the title ‘Que se lixe a Troika’ is also strongly related to the paternalistic treatment they felt from the Troika (Vilela 2015: 1).

Another factor that made the anti-austerity protests dynamic was the threat of privatisation (Gil 2015: 2; Louça 2015: 1) of electricity, water, transport and other sectors that affect the daily live. Moreover, ecological issues concerned activists such as the ‘massive plan for privatisation of natural resources [...] [F]orests, oceans, agriculture (Camargo 2015: 1) and the increasing influence of Monsanto in the agriculture business (Rodrigues 2015: 3; Romeiro 2015: 2).

7.1.3 Opportunities: Mobilisation and schedules

Beside the threats, activists see opportunities in protests mainly in the chance to bring people together (Romeiro 2015: 1; Gil 2015: 2) to discuss and eventually create a new political form of party (Louça 2015: 2). According to Tattersall (2010: 146–147), social movements can unfold an impact, especially when developing an escalation strategy towards a certain political date like elections or similar events. According to McAdam and Tarrow (2010: 532) elections and social movements are ‘the two major forms of political

conflict in democratic systems'. The anti-austerity protest activists in Portugal were, however, not using elections as an environmental dynamic.⁸ Instead, Geração à Rasca, Que se lixe a Troika and the Grandoladas utilised the budget discussions in the parliament and the schedules of the ministers to mobilise for protests.

7.1.4 Still there – social movement networks and the housing crisis

As stated before, the social movement activists did not go home and leave the field of protest to the trade unions. Instead, their space of activity has shifted into their own neighbourhoods. One of the main problems that occurred through austerity is the question of the living space. Due to the decline of wages, especially young people are not able to buy houses and moreover, also older generations have to give up their homes, as they cannot afford to pay the instalments or the gas prices (Romeiro 2015: 1).

According to Estanque et al. (2013: 35) more than 50 per cent of young workers earn between 450 and 600 Euro a month, the poverty risk rate among young employees is about 20 per cent. As renting is rather unusual in Portugal, nearly 60 per cent of young adults still live in the house of their parents (ibid.). Due to the so-called 'welfare-family' model (ibid.) that has been increasingly installed over the past years, the pressure on women and domestic violence increased (TVI24 2010). In 2009, 29 women were killed by their partners or ex-partners (ibid.); in 2012, the figure rose to 33 (Sambado 2012) and in 2015, 40 women died due to domestic homicide (DN/Lousa 2015). Social movement activists respond to the housing issue and question on domestic violence in several and often, in combined ways. In one way, they organise self-defence courses and get into discussion with women about different topics that concern gender and feminism (Rodrigues 2015: 4). Concerning the concrete question of housing, Raposo (2015: 5) reports about the case of a woman and her 13-year-old child who were about to lose their house. Activists of his trade union made a successful attempt to reclaim the house. Currently, different efforts are made to organise tenants for social housing. Most of the between 80 and 90 participants at the first meeting in a neighbourhood in Lisbon were women (ibid.).

The question of housing is also connected to the issue of institutional racism, especially in the suburbs of the bigger cities like Lisbon and Porto (Romeiro 2015: 7). 'These communities, they feel the crisis in a much more intense way. They [...] are the first ones to

⁸ Except of the taxi drivers who organised a street blockade in Martim Moniz and in front of the airport of Lisbon two days before the general election on October 4, 2015 to protest against the right of the international cooperation Uber to employ bus and taxi drivers in Portugal (Rádio Renascença 2015).

lose their house [...] they still live in slums. They feel the repression in a much more intense way. [...] The police are in constant presence in their community' (ibid.).

According to the interviews, most of the activism supporting decent housing focuses on the protest against the demolition of slums, self-build houses, in the periphery of Lisbon. This affects especially migration communities that are not allowed to own houses, and had to construct their own places, often without any electricity or water supply (Rodrigues 2015: 1; Romeiro 2015: 1).

As the housing question is connected to gender related questions, institutional racism, austerity, and decent wages it is likely that the issue of a space to live will be one of the most important environmental dynamics for social movements in Portugal, in the following period.

7.2 Relational dynamics

Relational dynamics shape the inner life of social movements, but also the intra-political relations between different organisations and networks. Relational dynamics can be observed through a rise in membership for organisations, or the development of new networks, organisations and parties. However, in this paper I will concentrate on another aspect, which Tattersall (2010: 22–23) calls 'sustaining relationships' e.g. lasting connections between networks, organisations and activists that develop out of processes of collective planning, mobilising, protests and demonstration. The relational dynamic is decisive for the movements to be strong enough to put state apparatuses under pressure or inscribe their interests in its structures. The other way around, sustaining relations are necessary to resist counter-campaigns of the ruling classes.

The relational dynamics between the networks and organisations in Portugal can be observed on three levels: First, the development of the relationship between UGT and CGTP, second, the development between the CGTP and social movement networks and third, the dynamics between the social movement unionists of the Dockers and the RTP and the CGTP on the one hand and the social movements on the other.

7.2.1 The trade union federations CGTP and UGT

Previously, it was already outlined that the trade union landscape is divided along political cleavages. In the pre-Troika period from 2010 to 2011, the CGTP refused to negotiate with the government, while the UGT agreed to some concessions. In 2010, 2011 and 2013 the

UGT decided to support the political general strikes, but still negotiated with the government (Stoleroff 2015: 10).

In 2013, the UGT worked closer to the CGTP. During the general strike in November 2012, UGT affiliated trade unions supported the strike although their federation denied its assistance. The relational dynamic between both federations can be understood as an up and down, but on average increasing until the general strike on June 27, 2013. Afterwards, it declined.

7.2.2 The CGTP and Social Movement Networks

Another relational dynamic can be observed between the CGTP and the social movement networks. In sum, we can see a similar development as between the CGTP and the UGT. The relational dynamic increased until October 2013, but declined when the CGTP denied continuing the protest over the bridge '25. Abril' on October 19, 2013. However, in this circumstance, the political cleavages between social movements and the trade union federations mainly controlled by the Communist Party is more complicated. In programmatic terms, the CGTP and the social movements seem to be close. Both reject the government policy and the Troika and both were willing to organise resistance against it. Nevertheless, the trade union leadership understands the social movement activists as a competitor rather than a like-minded network of groups. Another difference is the rhythm and speed in which both structures were able or prepared to act. In general, one can observe from 2011 until 2013, how the trade union federation is keen to control the rhythm of activity but is again and again put under pressure by the social movement networks that are much smaller than the trade union apparatuses.

'There was a lot of pressure upon the leadership, the CGTP union federation and it felt that pressure! [...] the tension between the very much organised structured labour confederations hoping to be itself the backbone of a class based social movement against the crisis measures and against the power. [...] And they had to frequently justify their own moves in relation to those other movements' (Stoleroff 2015: 3; 6).

The pressure becomes visible when analysing the development of the general strikes. The CGTP acted with a mixed set of tactics against their alleged competitors. As was already explained, it was rather unusual for the Portuguese labour tradition to organise demonstrations during a general strike. The national strike action on November 24, 2010 against the first three PECs was organised without any demonstration of trade unions. People who are not organised in trade unions structures were thus excluded from the

protest activities. Instead, there was a concert taking place in one of the central squares in Lisbon and a small group of young anarchists and unemployed organised a spontaneous demonstration that brought 2,000 people together (Gerome 2010). Even though the trade unions stated that about three million workers attended the strike (ibid.), hardly any picket lines were organised, except from a few trade union officials who mobilised for urgent interventions in case private companies would be brought in to break the strike. Under these circumstances, the first general strike was for many employees rather a holiday, than a possibility to protest and gain collective experiences in picket lines, demonstrations, blockades etc. The general strike in November 2011 was different. As the social movement networks that appeared in March 2011 and announced to organise a demonstration already proofed at least two times that they can bring masses to the streets, the CGTP and the UGT organised a demonstration themselves. It started a little earlier and it seems as if they would 'run away' from the demonstration of the social movement activists that arrived a few minutes after the last group of trade unionists had left the place. However, the demonstration(s) were important to bring the activists together (Romeiro 2015: 3).

In the general strike of March 2012, the social movement activists made a stronger attempt to bring the two demonstrations together, but were violently blocked from the trade union demonstration with the support of the police. During the developments of the year 2012 the trade union leadership became more approachable. As they were not the main actors of the mass demonstration on September 15, in 2012 against the TSÚ, they had to start to get closer into contact with the social movement activists. Thus, the general strike in November brought both movements together: Many social movement activists, unemployed, pensioners, students supported the now increasingly organised picket lines during the night, especially in the transport sector. Moreover, in the afternoon, the demonstration was held together – for the first time since the beginning of the anti-austerity protests, trade unions and social movement activists had mixed blocks and a united demonstration.

'A few years ago, you would have a general strike and you wouldn't have a protest, not even you wouldn't even have a protest in the afternoon or anything. Now, we get protests in the afternoon, we get people participating in pickets' (Camargo 2015: 5).

Despite the police violence against the demonstration and the riots in front of the parliament, the trade union leadership did not dissociate from the protests. Thus, the next demonstration that was organised by Que se lixe a Troika in March 2013 had a contrasting character, as the CGTP supported the mobilisation right from the beginning. They were keen to not be surprised again by a mass demonstration in which they are not the main actor

(Louça 2015: 3-4). At the same time, the trade union leadership increasingly tried to (re-)gain control over the anti-austerity movement as a whole (ibid.). Between March and July 2013 several demonstrations were organised to contest the government and on July 27, the fifth and last general strike was organised in the period of anti-austerity struggle. Unfortunately, the demonstrations were smaller as the trade unions again refused to mobilise for strong protests to unite employees, precarious, unemployed, pensioners and students for a serious protest (Romeiro 2013). In this period, a political crisis of the government was already looming.

‘When there was the political crisis [2013] [...] I mean that was a real crisis and the government had the state apparatus, had the ruling bloc not been able to hold its cohesion. Then we would have had a very significant crisis. But there wasn't a corresponding, mass mobilisation at that moment to really push it’ (Stoleroff 2015: 6).

The hesitant strategy of the trade unions remained also in case of the blockade of the bridge on 19 October, in 2013 (Raposo 2015: 1). However, the competition the trade union leadership felt in terms of the social movements, the rhythms between both parts of the movement were different. Spontaneity and flexibility in tactics is a characteristic of the social movement activists, but not of the trade union leadership. In this sense, both structures were not able to further relate and their relational dynamic declined after October 2013.

7.2.3 Social Movement Unionists, the CGTP and social movement networks

The third interaction is observable between the social movement unionists and social movement networks, as well as the social movement unionists and the trade unions.

The two examples of social movement unionism, introduced in this paper, are the RTP staff council from 2011 until 2013 and the dockworkers union SETC. Both structures started their activism in 2012 when major attacks from the government on their workplaces were launched. The broader union federations neglected both trade union structures. The trade union of the dockworkers is not affiliated to the CGTP. Nevertheless, from September 2012 onwards it started to support CGTP activities such as demonstrations and strikes. The RTP, the dockworkers and the staff council from the VW car factory Autoeuropa were the only trade union structures that supported the mass demonstration against the TSÚ on September 15 (Camargo 2013: 89).

In terms of the relation between social movement activists and the social movement trade unionists, the relational dynamic grew stronger and can be perceived as one of the successful outputs of the anti-austerity protests. From September 2012 onwards, the RTP staff council members as well as the dockworkers were keen to support the social movement protests. The militant RTP staff council fell apart for various reasons. However, the dockworkers could keep their contacts. Currently, dockworker unionists are supporting the housing protests (Mariano/Sousa 2015: 5-6).

The other way around, people that were active in the social movement protests are still supporting strikes and picket lines for instance of the dockworkers (Romeiro 2015: 6; Rodrigues 2015: 2), or are involved in labour struggles, similarly to the strike of the precarious employees in the company '24 saúde' (Camargo 2015: 5).

In sum, social movement activists increased their contacts to the labour movement and internationally, and so did the social movement unionists like the dockworkers.

As there are 19 dockworkers trade unions in Portugal, there is the attempt to unite them, to be able to resist the government and international companies that set dockworkers at different ports against each other. Thus, the relational dynamic among the dockworkers themselves, increases due to the experiences they collected in the protests and strikes of their sector (Mariano/Sousa 2015: 6).

In terms of the questions if and how 'sustaining relations' could be build, the relational dynamic between social movement networks and dockworkers is a small success-story. Due to the environmental dynamics, new groups of activists developed and the pressure they released by organising mass demonstrations forced the classical trade unions to change strategy and tactics concerning the protests and the collaboration with other collective actors. When the dynamics went down, the wide alliances that have been created between the CGTP leadership and the social movement networks vanished.

7.3 Cognitive dynamics: Gaining influence and learning by struggling

According to Tattersall (2010: 24), one of the 'successes' of social movements can be the 'shaping of the political climate' and internally the 'increasing consciousness' of the activists in collective actions.

7.3.1 Changing the political landscape

It is very hard to answer whether social movements have an impact on the way people act and think today, or if the drastic changes that the austerity measures brought along were the

main influence. Nearly all the interviews contain very contradictory statements concerning this question (Rodrigues 2015: 4). Most of the activists who were interviewed before and after the general elections in October 2015, understood the election as a measuring stick for cognitive changes. However, the result was very ambiguous (Guardian 2015). The governmental centre-right coalition PaF won the election with about 38 per cent and was declared as being the winner, despite implementing heavy austerity measures (BBC 2015). However, the PaF also lost its majority, as the PS was not willing to enter a coalition with them. The PaF therefore entered the shortest government period in the history of Portugal: After 11 days, the PaF was brought down by a no-confidence vote supported by the PS, the BE and the PCP (Guardian 2015). The Left Bloc, the Communist Party and the rather centre-left PS gained 60 per cent altogether, which was understood as a vote against austerity (Associated Press 2015). However, the mood among the activists was not euphoric. The elections saw huge abstentions of more than 50 per cent (ibid.). Moreover, it was not clear whether the PS is willing to form a minority government with the electoral support of BE and the PCP. Eventually, the centre-left minority government was installed. However, the experiences with Syriza in the previous months lessened the confidence that electoral shifts towards the left will bring huge changes (Mariano/Sousa 2015: 8; Rodrigues 2015: 5). In general, the cognitive dynamic concerning the electoral level is slightly increasing (Raposo 2015: 5), but not understood as one of the major outcomes of the anti-austerity protests (Mariano/Sousa 2015: 8).

7.3.2 *Increasing consciousness and learning*

To discover cognitive dynamics, apart from the electoral and political landscape of Portugal it is worth looking at the active structures and their collective actions. In terms of the general strikes, but also other protest actions, several changes in terms of strategy and learning while struggling, can be explored.

As mentioned before, the first anti-austerity general strike took place in November 2010. According to Raposo, the general strike was organised due to a lot of pressure from different trade unions, but it was a 'kind of bureaucratic general strike' (Raposo 2015: 2). Hence, it hardly involved trade union rank and file members (Stoleroff 2015: 2), not to speak of social movement activists in the action, itself (Camargo 2015: 6). The tradition to organise picket lines as well as the organisation of demonstrations was hardly installed. In the following example about the central postal station, it will be outlined how trade

unionists, employees of the postal service and social movement activists learned about the necessity of picket lines during strikes.

As the first general strike in 2010 was almost organised by trade union officials and shop stewards mainly without a connection to the work places, most of the workers went home during the strike. The knowledge of picket lines existed, but the reason why they were important came to the fore, when the management of the Central Postal Station of CTT implemented strike-breaking measures. The CTT postal truck drivers start in the night and deliver the post to the different post offices, from where the post is distributed to the houses. The CTT trucks were planned not to start that night, as the strike was on. However, the workers themselves – truck drivers and office managers had left the place to spend a free night at home. The company used these circumstances and employed private truck drivers to deliver the post packages and letters. As trade union officials went from public company to company, they found out about the planned break of the strike and physically blocked the streets in order to stop the trucks from passing. About 200 trade union officials blocked the street. The CTT management called the police in order to push the blockade away. It was clearly illegal to break the strike; however, the police came in to support the CTT management. Journalists recorded the battle of the CTT picket line between police forces and trade unionists and released video clips on the internet.⁹ After a few hours, the battle was lost, the police could push the blockade away and the trade unionists gave up. In the aftermath of the strike, many postal workers watched this video and realised that their management was deliberately employing strike-breakers. During the general strike one year later, about 200 postal workers blocked their own work place. The management did not even try to employ strike-breaking methods. In the night from November 13 to November 14, in 2012, the postal picket line became a venue for workers, students, pensioners and unemployed that were up at night to support the picket lines of buses, garbage collectors and printers. Due to the first experience with strike-breaking measures, the picket lines of the general strikes in the aftermath of the first one were massively supported by the postal workers and later also social movement activists (Raposo 2015: 2).

Similar experiences were repeated especially in the case of the bus company ‘Carris’ where picket lines were defended against the police. Although, the management called the police at every picket line, it was important that next to the employees of the companies also

⁹ See also (drcursor 2010): Greve Geral - Repressão e utilização de gaz pimenta sobre o Piquete de Greve dos CTT (CGTP) 1/2 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uLNfz_I2qzc.

different activists spend their nights at the picket line to support the workers in their attempt to strike (Gil 2015: 3-4).

In sum, the experience of the picket line of CTT, but also the experiences employees and activists made during the strike, released important cognitive dynamics. The relevance of picket lines increased due to a more planned strike actions. Moreover, as was outlined before, also the relevance of social movement activists being active in the picket lines was important. Hence, workers that were afraid to lose their job, but wanted to support the strike, had a reason coming along as blockades. They could not drive the bus/truck/garbage car from the company area to the street as the entrances were blocked. Thus, they could passively attend the strike (Gil 2015: 3-4).

7.4 Institutional dynamics: The Constitutional Court and the governmental apparatus

In this part, I analyse what kind of impact social movements have on state apparatuses. As the state apparatuses are shaping the struggles and are shaped by them, apparatuses are somehow in a state of flux. In chapter 5 it was already outlined how the attempts of the ruling classes to regain control and dismantling the welfare state have changed the relationship between the state apparatuses, especially between the labour and finance institutions.

However, the aim of the paper is also to analyse how the anti-austerity movements reacted to this shift and if and how they were able to inscribe their interests into the apparatuses.

The chapter will concentrate on two apparatuses. The first part will be about the Constitutional Court and the so-called 'Constitutional Crisis' between 2012 and 2014 when the Court declared several austerity measures as unconstitutional. Second, and close to the previous apparatus, the chapter will outline the shifts in the government and the governmental crisis in 2013 that is closely connected towards the trade unions and the Constitutional Court. In general, the year 2013 was very important since the struggles peaked, the government was close to the edge and the Constitutional Court entered the stage as a new actor in the austerity battle.

7.4.1 The Constitutional Court – between juridical activity and activism

As already mentioned in chapter 5, until 2012 the Constitutional Court was supporting the bail-out programme installed by the government and the Troika. However, this position changed at the end of 2012 (Esposito 2014: 2).

To explain this institutional dynamic, it is necessary to shortly explain the (political) composition of the Portuguese Constitutional Court and the juridical peculiarity of the Portuguese Constitution in comparison to other European states. Consecutively, some of the measures that have been declared unconstitutional as well the impact on the relation between the Constitutional Court and the Portuguese government will be observed.

The Portuguese Constitutional Court consists of thirteen judges that are elected by a parliamentary majority (Fasone 2014: 7). Ten of those judges represent the “absolute majority in Parliament”, while the other three are ‘co-opted by those in office’ (ibid.). Thus, it is often the case that the judges are members of or at least close to the parties in government (ibid.). Between 2012 and 2014, in the period where the protests achieved the peak and the government slid into a political crisis, ‘half of the Court – six members including the three co-opted – was renewed’ (ibid.). From 2012 onwards, it could be observed that in many cases especially concerning their judgment on Euro-crisis law and moreover, the austerity measure, the Court has been permanently divided (ibid.). ‘Almost all the relevant judgments have been taken with a 7-to-6 majority’ (ibid.).

The Portuguese Constitution derives from the period of the revolution and was installed by one of the first provisional governments in 1976 (Esposito 2014: 17). Due to the strong social and labour movements of the Portuguese Revolution the working classes could include their interests into the Constitutional Law of Portugal. For instance, the Constitutional Law ensures ‘a democratic state based on the rule of law and open up a path towards a socialist society’ (ibid.). The state must ‘promote employment, move toward free health and educational services and develop centres of rest and holiday for workers’ (ibid.). Besides, the constitutional law provides a ‘social state, equality, labor and social security’ (ibid.). In the aftermath of the revolution several companies and banks were nationalised. Hence, the Constitutional Law determined that these nationalisations ‘shall be irreversible conquests by the working classes’, a principle which apparently finds no corresponding provision in other countries, at least in the western world’ (Fonseca/Domingos 1998: 129). The law on privatisation, however, has been reversed from 1982 onwards (ibid.: 131), due

to the attempt of the Portuguese ruling classes to enter the European Community and attract foreign investors.

In comparison to Spain, Italy and Greece, the Portuguese Constitution does not have a 'constitutional balanced budget clause'. This means, it can also rule against the so-called 'financial stability' and also against the 'Euro-crisis law' (Fasone 2014: 10). From the perspective of Poulantzas' state theory the juridical state apparatuses cannot be restricted by the financial state apparatuses, while the other way around it is indeed possible. This leeway can be – and has been used by the parliamentary opposition 'to overturn the austerity reforms' (ibid.: 9). However, the reason why the Constitutional Court declared several measures as unconstitutional was frequently connected to the action of the President of the Republic. The latter was a member of the governing PSD that raised judgments about several planned measures (ibid.).

In terms of the financial apparatuses, in 2012 the Constitutional Court decided on the 'proportional equality' principle that the abolition of 'the Christmas and holiday allowances together with the 13th and 14th month bonus' (ibid.) for the public sector is unconstitutional (Cisotta/Gallo 2014: 7).¹⁰ The interesting aspect is that it was only declared unconstitutional from 2013 onwards and not in 2012, so the state did not have to pay back allowances to the public employees (Fasone 2014: 12). Hence, the government did not have to re-negotiate the conditions with the Troika. Nevertheless, it was a clear warning to the government, not to cut further allowances and wages in the public sector. Therefore, further wage cuts for the public sector were stopped from 30 May 2014 onwards, the date when the Troika officially left Portugal (ibid.). Important laws concerning a decrease in pension, the dismissal protection and several planned changes in the payment of tax were overturned (Esposito 2014: 22). The budget legislation Acórdão no. 187/2013, which saw cuts in the pensions for public employees was completely rejected by the Constitutional Court (Fasone 2014: 27). This eventually had a huge impact on the financial stability agreements with the Troika. The government was forced to re-negotiate the bailout programme and had to reorganise the government (ibid.). Due to several scandals, the minister and vice-premier minister Miguel Relvas had to resign and additionally, the coalition between PSD and PP-CDS was on the brink of collapse (ibid.).

Christina Fasone (2014: 31) concludes that the Portuguese Constitutional Court 'even in contrast with international and European obligations [...] acted as the only counter-power to

¹⁰ The argument was set on the comparison between public and private sector workers. As the new austerity measure only counted for the public sector, it was understood as unequal or unjust (Cisotta/Gallo 2014: 7)

European institutions and to national political institutions.’ Due to this, ‘the Portuguese Constitutional Court has not prevented it from accusations of judicial activism’ (ibid.: 30). The question remains, in which way the Constitutional Court acted really in favour of the working class or at least under pressure of the movements. It is difficult to find proper reasons why the changes of the judges took place and how the elections of the new members of the Constitutional Court, that were responsible for the ‘blockades’, have evolved. From the point of view of the social movement activists, it is stated that the movements at least opened a political leeway for the judges ‘to be able to read properly the constitution’ (Camargo 2015: 4). It is also likely that the judges were somehow influenced by the protests or even impacted by the cuts in public subsidies and wages themselves. However, the Constitutional Court did challenge the austerity measures and was at least at some points moderating the attempt of the PSD-CDS/PP government to dismantle the Portuguese labour and social apparatuses. Moreover, the abolition of several austerity measures led to a political crisis of the government that could have been an important moment for the trade unions to join their forces with the social movements and social movement unionists to turn the government down. However, not a single attempt was made neither by the leadership of the CGTP, nor by the Communist Party.

7.4.2 Changes in the governmental apparatuses between 2010 and 2015

Despite declaring several austerity measures as unconstitutional, the Constitutional Court did not prevent the growing precarisation of the working classes and impoverishment, especially of young employees. In this section, a few institutional dynamics that were indirectly or directly achieved by the anti-austerity movement will be introduced to show how the anti-austerity movements were able to influence the state apparatuses.

The first defeat for austerity-implementing apparatuses came in March 2011, when the pressure of the demonstration organised by *Geração à Rasca* was so strong that the fourth PEC could not be implemented and the PS government had to resign and call for new general elections.

The second achievement was the rejection of the new TSÚ reform that was brought down due to the mass demonstrations and protests in September 2012. In March 2013, the *Grandoladas* and the mass demonstration on March 2 were organised against the pension reform for the public sector. This reform however, was eventually declared as unconstitutional. In the same period, the government had to stop the privatisation of RTP

and developed a new plan, to deal with the militant staff council. In April 2013, Miguel Relvas the vice-prime minister who also became a target by the Grandoladas and was not able to organise the privatisation of RTP, had to resign due to a scandal regarding his academic degree (Louça 2015: 2).

On 27 June 2013, a comparably strong general strike was organised by both trade union federations and it completely shut down traffic (Roberts 2013). Three days later the finance minister Vítor Gaspar resigned after the TSÚ was ultimately rejected (Crisótopo 2013). Moreover, the activities of the Constitutional Court lead to a renegotiation of the financial aid with the institutions of the Troika (Borja-Santos 2013). One day later, Paulo Portas, the head of the junior coalition partner CDS-PP, stepped down (Roberts 2013).

The 21 days of political crisis were a window of opportunity for the trade unions and social movements to organise mass protests and a further strike to bring the government down. The Portuguese President Cavalho da Silva used the lack of communication between the various parts of the movement to reunite the government. He rejected the resignations and re-negotiated the conditions for a stable centre-right government that eventually lasted until the regular general elections in October 2015 (Stoleroff 2015: 6).

In conclusion, the anti-austerity protests indeed released institutional dynamics, but unfortunately, did not use them to push their aim – stopping and reversing austerity measures – further. However, in some cases the achievements of the anti-austerity struggles became visible much later. The newly elected centre-left government plans to increase the minimum wage over a period of four years to 600 Euro and to decrease the working hours for the public sector from 40 hours back to 35 hours – the amount it had been before the Memorandum of Understanding. They re-introduced four holidays that have were abolished by the previous government and announced to amend and improve the laws concerning the right for impoverished families to own a house. The election of a left parliamentary majority and the reversal of several cut backs were achieved due to the joint massive pressure of the labour and social movements.

8. Conclusion

This thesis targeted two issues: First, it attempted to analyse how and in which way the Portuguese state changed during the last decade and specifically how it shifted towards authoritarian statism. Second, it aimed to outline how the working classes, poor and youth in Portugal resisted the impact of these shifts. Namely, it looked at austerity, impoverishment and the lack of living space. Furthermore, it sought to explore what effect their struggle could achieve.

To conclude here, means to cement the observations that have been made about the dynamics of social movements permanently in this thesis. By following the news on Portugal, it is not easy to close here and not to wait one or two weeks longer. Due to the elections in October 2015 much of the attention has shifted towards the parliamentary level again. As president Passos Coelho from the PSD initially refused to mandate the PS for the formation of a new government, a new political crisis was looming. When the left parliamentary majority, in this period, voted for same sex adoption and the diffusing of the abortion law, Passos Coelho denied signing these bills. Thus, they had to be brought up in parliament again. The tensions between the left parliamentary majority and the right-wing president were interesting. This is also true for the tensions between the European Union and the PS government that in February 2016 had to submit its budget plans to Brussels. The European Commission nearly rejected the budget and moreover, it forced the government to amend the budget. The new developments at this level as well as at the level of resistance will be worth following up.

However, the analysis that was done for the time frame from 2010 and 2015 must last in order to understand the current political processes in Portugal.

In terms of the metamorphosis of the Portuguese state, it was observed that the initial crisis took place in the 1970s, but developed into a political revolution, which shifted the Portuguese state towards a parliamentary democracy with a weak economy and a capitalist class that was aiming to become part of the European Community to gain higher influence on the world market. At the same time, the working class could include a bulk of their interests into the state apparatuses. Hence, the intentions of the Portuguese ruling class have been restricted by a large national sector and a relatively liberal labour law. Furthermore, the progressive Portuguese Constitution has set some restrictions for the dismantling of the welfare state and labour conditions. Nevertheless, the crisis in 2007ff. and the requirements of the Memorandum of Understanding, subsequent to the Portuguese economic crisis,

worked as an engine to boost the interests of the ruling class further. Moreover, the caretaker government bended the Portuguese law by bringing conditional aid in. The law was breached to privatise the BPN and other sectors. This happened despite the active role of the Constitutional Court from 2012 onwards in stopping several austerity measures. In summary, it can be stated that the Portuguese state undergoes a shift towards authoritarian statism, but the ruling class is not yet able to raise the financial apparatuses over all others, including the Constitutional Court.

Concerning the resistance of the working class, three different actors were identified to be analysed as relevant parts of the anti-austerity struggle: The traditional trade unions, especially the CGTP, the social movement networks and the social movement unionists. The trade union landscape of Portugal is rather weak, but strong among the public services, compared to the private sector. The political division and tensions between the two main trade union federations UGT and CGTP have declined in the year 2013 as both organised a comparably strong general strike. The UGT stopped in that period to accept negotiations with the right-wing government. The cleavages remain persistent nevertheless and divide the trade union landscape. The five general strikes, three of which were organised by both trade union federations, did not only reveal the weakness of the Portuguese working class, but also the lack of strategy and programme of the CGTP leadership. It was worked out that the CGTP had the major influence in 2013 to tackle the asymmetric power structures in the country. However, as union density is low, it was also discussed that the labour movement, despite having a long tradition of struggles, is learning many new aspects and somehow starting from scratch.

This is also true for the social movement networks that appeared the first time in 2011 and played a crucial role in mobilising huge groups of the society that had not taken part in protests for a long time or ever in their lives. The social movement networks consist of a relatively small group or people that are at the same time organised in many different organisations, which are somehow politically divided in strategy and programme to overcome austerity. Nevertheless, it was possible to bring these groups together in these platforms. The activists of the platforms *Geração à Rasca*, 15O and *Que se lixe a Troika* did not only mobilise for big demonstrations, but supported strikes on different levels and thus were able to bring the social movements and the labour movement together. Moreover, they could put the CGTP under pressure to join their demonstrations and link forces, even if this happened only for a small period.

In 2012, the social movement unionists such as the dockworkers in Lisbon and the staff council members in RTP started to develop from regular trade unions towards activists that united in solidarity with different struggles against precarisation and for decent housing. Both of these social movement unionist groups were able to achieve important gains in their struggle, but did continue to link up with social movement networks and other trade unions nationally and internationally.

In terms of environmental and relational dynamics, it does currently look as if all the activists have vanished and left the stage of struggle to the classical trade union structures. However, it was observed that social movement activists as well as social movement unionists are attempting to organise struggles over the housing question. It is very likely that this issue might become one of the most important environmental dynamics for social movements in Portugal, soon. As stated before, Spain, Greece and the Arab Revolts inspired the anti-austerity movement between 2010 and 2015. The fear and anger provoked by austerity measures introduced thousands of people, that were not previously involved, to different forms of activism. They saw an opportunity to bring people together as well as to use the schedules of political institutions.

Concerning the relational dynamics, as stated before, the actors and organisations involved in the anti-austerity protests in Portugal involve a range of very distinct groups. Although the struggle against austerity and precarisation is the main battlefield of the trade union federations, many different groups affected by austerity were not presented and supported neither by the CGTP, nor by the UGT. Thus, especially social movement networks supported as much as contested the old representatives of labour struggles, when they entered the stage of resistance. Nevertheless, they are not classical New Social Movements, as they also mostly contest working conditions and are concentrated on labour struggles. In conclusion, it cannot be spoken of a divergence between 'Old' and 'New' social movements in Portugal: Social movement activists are involved in strikes, while social movement unionists and rank and file unionists from the CGTP are involved in housing struggles. Nevertheless, there are still strong trade union structures that insist on being the only backbone of the labour struggle and act in competition towards new activists and forms of anti-austerity struggle.

In relation to the cognitive dynamics, a change in the consciousness was mostly observed at the level of learning processes inside the movements. There was also an increasing consciousness of the government to alter its tactical and discursive strategies. Hence, the impact on the movement was already visible by forcing it to change its tactics. At an

electoral level, the cognitive dynamic developed very slowly. Although the right-wing coalition managed to win most of the votes it could not achieve a parliamentary majority. Moreover, its minority government was brought down by the centre-left opposition. Now, the PS has formed a government. It is a minority government, supported by the votes of BE and PCP. The interesting point about the general election was the large abstention and the fact that the PS was still labelled as the party that accepted austerity measures and the Memorandum of Understanding, when building a caretaker government. As a result, the BE got a higher support.

Concluding the findings of the institutional dynamics, it was analysed that the anti-austerity protests indeed achieved institutional dynamics, especially by opening a leeway for at least seven of the thirteen judges in the Constitutional Court, to use the laws of the Portuguese Constitution in overruling several austerity measures. As stated before, the institutional dynamics and their positive outcomes are mostly observable now, two years after the anti-austerity movement has declined. In the institutional arena, several attempts of the ruling class to include more of their interests into the state apparatuses could be stopped. However, looking at the unemployment figures, the poverty, the tax rates, the increasing domestic violence and the housing crisis, many problems remain unresolved for the working class.

In this thesis, it was aimed to look at the activity of social movements without leaving the state out of sight. A sensitive way to combine the role of the state and social movement research was attempted by neither focusing only on the ‘organised’, ‘classic’, ‘labour’ movements, nor by neglecting them. Thus, it was interesting to see that the situation in 2013 was an important development. Social movement activists and trade unionists could have used the political crisis to push their targets further. However, as the tensions in the world market and in Europe remain, similar situations might come sooner or later again and might meet a working class that is even more prepared to resist. As Poulantzas analysed: *‘In fact, these political crises may provide the chance for a process of transition to socialism and genuine national independence - [...] One condition for this, of course, is that this movement and its organisations do not simply wait in passive expectation of the ‘great day’, but work constantly to create such a movement.’ (Poulantzas 1976: 133)*

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