Maturing Governance of Urban Regeneration: Experimenting and Learning
Case Study of Guangzhou and Shenzhen in South China

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To My Late Grandparents,

Rizhen Ke and Hanying Tan
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Abstract

Over the last two decades, China has undergone urban regeneration at an unprecedented scale and speed, and property-led redevelopment has been widely deployed as dominant urban regeneration strategy in many Chinese cities. Meanwhile, more and more attention has been paid to the protest and resistance by parts of the civil society to the tremendous demolition and eviction during urban regeneration in China. Urban regeneration during the transformation period has been a fertile ground for the governance debate, especially with regard to the existing regulatory practices and institutional settings. This research aims to examine the governance of urban regeneration in China in an integrated manner by taking into account structural context, institutions, actors, and practices. It adapts the analytical research framework by DiGaetano and Strom (2003). It examines the epistemological dynamics of how different forms of knowledge are utilized, shared and produced by various actors according to their respective knowledge, behavioral logics, and interests. It also explores the interplay of institutions, actors’ practices, and knowledge in the spatial restructuring and social innovation processes of urban regeneration, as well as the collective social learning process through experimental pioneer projects and learning from international good practice. Thus this study tries to explain how formal and informal institutions are shaped by knowledge, and further proves that social learning contributes to policymaking and institutional innovation in China. Technical, institutional and local knowledge are activated and utilized to construct storylines by the government, planners, scholars, journalists, residents and NGOs, which contribute to the complex processes of framing and reframing problems and strategies in urban regeneration, and also of continuous experimentation on various adaptive strategies. The utilization, production, and transfer of knowledge enable actors to change their positions and influence the existing power structures. Knowledge has been viewed as a resource and as invisible capital. Three types of knowledge are complexly intertwined in the process of knowledge utilization, production and sharing. Knowledge utilization and production through networking and interacting of various actors enables social learning. Through learning from other projects and cities, problem and strategy framing becomes more structured and certain during a continuously experimental practice, and thus facilitates the production of practice-based and research-based knowledge. Knowledge production is very dynamic and active in the last decade, especially due to a shift towards urban entrepreneurialism. The increasing participation demand of
market and society are accompanied by the knowledge dynamics driven by non-state actors. Urban regeneration creates a great demand for knowledge concerning the coordination and balancing of plural actors’ interests and relationships. Institutional innovation in urban regeneration is realized through translating accumulated practice-based implicit knowledge into explicit research results or codified policy-related knowledge. Social learning is inextricably tied to problem framing, as the practice of problem framing and problem solving through pilot projects at the micro-level enables incremental “policy patching” through continuous policy revision. The close relationship among discourse, knowledge and social learning proves the necessity of undertaking discourse analysis as research approach in this study. The institutional framework of urban regeneration in the Pearl River Delta area in South China indicates dynamic innovations especially in the last decade. Three pioneer and experimental urban regeneration projects in Guangzhou and Shenzhen in the Pearl River Delta area in South China will therefore serve as case studies in this research.

Keywords: Urban Regeneration; Knowledge; Problem Framing; Social Learning; Discourse Analysis; Urban Governance
Zusammenfassung

Die Reifung der Governance der Stadterneuerung:
Die Rolle von Experimenten und Lernen
Fallstudien zu Guangzhou und Shenzhen in Südchina


Schlüsselwörter: Stadterneuerung; Wissen; Problem Framing; Soziales Lernen; Diskursanalyse; Städtische Governance
Chapter 1 Introduction

This chapter begins with a literature review on governance and, more specifically, the governance of urban regeneration. Next, an introduction of urban regeneration and the governance of urban regeneration in China is presented. The remaining part of the chapter focuses on a review of the knowledge turn in urban studies and social learning, and the research framework and research questions are explained at the end of the chapter.

1.1 Urban Governance

1.1.1 Governance as a Normative and Analytical Concept

A discourse advocating a shift from the use of “government” to “governance” emerged in the 1980s. This shift occurred due to a decrease of the state capacity to regulate economic and social practices (Stoker, 2000), which arose in tandem with growing emphasis on urban competition and economic growth (Pierre, 2014). Healey (2007: 17) emphasized that the idea of governance indicates a shift of intellectual attention “from the description and evaluation of government activity in terms of formal competences and laws to a recognition that the spheres of the state, the economy and daily life overlap and interact in complex ways” in policy formation and practices. Similarly, a shift away from “hierarchy and elitism” to “more and more inclusive forms of individual interest-driven and social or solidarity-driven participation in social coordination” is captured by the notion (Hoppe, 2010: 14). Nonetheless, there has been debate and doubt over whether the vocabulary of governance is merely a new rhetoric change, and some scholars have argued that the notion of governance does not offer any new theoretical or empirical dimensions.

The concept of governance is comprehensive, complex, and multifaceted. However, much contemporary literature tends to ignore the differentiation between the normative and analytical dimensions of the concept of governance (Nuissl & Heinrichs, 2011). Lang (2008) concluded that there are three dimensions of urban governance: empirical, normative, and analytical. Similarly, Nuissl and Heinrichs (2011) distinguished governance as a normative concept as rules of “good governance,” while they also
included a comprehensive analytical category of governance that pertains to the
regulation of public affairs at the intersection of state, market, and civil society. There
is therefore a consensus that the concept of governance includes both normative and
analytical dimensions.

(1) Normative Dimension

As a normative concept, the concept of governance is used to provide orientation and
evaluation for the practice of politics and administration. The normative interpretation
of governance emerged firstly in the North America. The concept of “good
governance” has been promoted by the World Bank as the evaluation instrument and
guidelines for its decisions on the funding of development projects in developing
countries. The World Bank (1992) defined “good governance” according to: (1) state
action according to the law; (2) transparency and accountability in the governance of
public funds and an independent audit system; (3) political accountability, respect for
human rights; (4) transparency of governance processes and institutions; and (5) an
independent judicial system. The definition of “good governance” has been adapted
with the development of practice since the 1990s (World Bank, 1992, 1994). However,
the core concept of “good governance” is “often overloaded and conflated with
multiple meanings and measures” (Norris, 2011: 188). As a normative concept,
governance is used in a more idealistic way. The normative dimension of governance
helps to bring more opportunities to provide orientation for improving existing
governance arrangement, through evaluation and reflection on the existing practice of
urban development (Koroso et al., 2013). In various contexts, urban governance has
been used as a normative model to promote the inclusion of civic actors as a resource
mobilization strategy, or to de-emphasize the influence of local governments (Pierre,
2005). However, it might also become problematic by putting too much burden of
service provisions on civic actors, which could result in “bad governance.”

(2) Analytical Dimension

Understanding urban governance as an analytical concept helps to define the objects
and processes that are worthy of study (Pierre, 2005). Motte (1997: 234) presented an
analytical framework and identified the basic elements of governance as (1) the
relevant actors that shape a particular decision-making process, (2) the relationships
between these actors, and (3) their cognitive referents as “ways of thinking or social constructs that are mobilized within planning practices.” Based on Motte’s framework, the analytical framework promoted by Nuissl and Heinrichs (2011) includes the following categories: (1) actors; (2) relationships; (3) institutional frameworks, including cognitive referents that reflect socially accepted mutual expectations and rules of conduct; and (4) the decision-making process. DiGaetano and Strom (2003) developed an integrated framework for comparing urban governance cross-nationally. In this framework, urban governance is constructed as a series of intermediations across the various levels of governance, which include the structural context, political culture, institutional milieu, and political actors. Meanwhile, the multi-layered structure of this integrated framework indicates a dynamic relationship among these levels such that the factors at one level shape the responses that stem from the other levels (see Figure 1). Healey (2004) identified three levels of governance, which are specific episodes, governance processes through which bias is mobilized, and governance culture (see Figure 2). Through close examination and comparison of the analytical factors in the frameworks offered by Nuissl and Heinrichs (2011), DiGaetano and Strom (2003), and Healey (2004), three fundamental factors which include actors, practices, and institutions can be identified. Consequently, the research framework of this study is built upon these three fundamental factors in addition to the multi-layered structure of the integrated framework from DiGaetano and Strom (2003).
Based on the respective analytical elements and frameworks, certain governance modes have been defined by various scholars. For instance, Healey (1997) introduced a set of elemental governance modes, including representative democracy, pluralism, corporatism, and clientelism, which are widely applied in explanations of existing
Western governance systems. Pierre (1999) distinguished four archetypal modes of governance, including managerial, corporatist, progrowth, and welfare. DiGaetano and Strom (2003: 367) identified five types of urban governance: clientelist, corporatist, managerial, pluralist, and populist, and they indicated that these modes of governance “can become institutionally embedded and thus resistant to even dramatic social, economic, and political restructuring.” Although governance seldom appears in a pure form in reality, familiarity with the modes of governance is conducive to enriching understandings of actors’ relationships and regulatory measures. The above governance approaches have shown the explanatory power concerning existing governance arrangements in Western countries, which are based on various comparative analytical frames of governance. Meanwhile, urban researchers have tried to refer to these modes of governance in empirical studies in order to explain governance in areas beyond the Western; however, the modes of governance embedded in the Western context have demonstrated constraints and limitations of over-simplification or overgeneralization in other applications. For example, Schroeder and Waibel (2010) identified the governance of economic upgrading processes in the Pearl River Delta in South China as pro-growth; the authors also noted that the blurred distinction among government officials or bureaucrats and politicians are due to the party-state system, while the ideal modes of governance are based on clearly defined actors. Meanwhile, the boundaries between state and market have also blurred (Wu, 2015b). Van Hulst and Yanow (2016: 104) claimed that “the boundaries between policy-makers and ‘targets’ of policy-making—like the distinction between those who govern and those who are governed—have blurred.” There are concerns that these modes of governance are mainly promoted and established based on Western contexts and that they have too many limits to properly explain urban governance in China (Lin et al., 2015), especially considering the nation’s transition from a planned economy to a market system with the duality of “institutional amphibiousness” (Ding, 1994). Moreover, urban governance modes are mainly developed and promoted with regard to the formal institutions, established decision-making practices, and dominant actors. The theory developed from European and North America experiences suffers from the constraint of being bound to context and a Western framework when it is applied to phenomena on a global scale (Connell, 2007). Informal institutions and practices also need to be taken into account in the urban governance of developing countries.
Some scholars tend to consider informality as fundamentally independent from formality (De Soto, 2000; Hall & Pfeiffer, 2000), while Roy (2005) has argued that informalities in various manifestations are produced by the state, from gated, high-end informal subdivisions to squatter settlements. Roy (2005: 156) also claimed that the policy epistemologies for addressing informal systems are not only useful for “Third World” cities but also more generally for urban planning concerning distributive justice; his rationale for this suggestion is that critical reflection of the failures and limitations of “good” planning models shows a more realistic sense of politics and conflicts and also enables contemplation on “the complex social systems through which plans must be implemented.” As a result, the explanatory power of Western-based governance modes is constrained to the complexities of informal institutions and decision-making in developing countries. However, using governance from a Western context as an analytical frame helps to identify relevant aspects and dimensions in Chinese cases of urban governance (Zielke & Waibel, 2014; Cheng, 2012).

1.1.2 Urban Governance and Urban Regeneration

Since the 1980s, discourses of governance have involved many other fields, ranging from environmental science, urban and spatial development, urban geography to international relations. The trends and theories of governance first emerged in the US and UK before they swept through other parts of the world, and nowadays, a range of theories is implemented to explain specific governance arrangements. Governance of urban regeneration has attracted increasing attention from scholars in recent decades. Urban regeneration, as an important practice in urban settings, provides fertile ground for the investigation of urban governance. Understanding the relationship between governance and urban regeneration strategies has become an essential research topic. Since the 1980s, there has been a burgeoning body of literature on public and private partnerships in urban regeneration in the UK (Cameron, 1992; Hastings, 1996; Hart, 2003), as private companies and the civil society have played increasingly active roles in urban redevelopment; for example, in the form of property-led redevelopment (Healey, 1992a; Turok, 1992). Governance primarily emerged from urban policy in the UK in the 1980s and 1990s when partnerships have characterized the national urban policies and practices (Leach & Percy-Smith, 2001). Urban policy and practices of
urban regeneration in the UK have led to paramount debates about urban governance and partnerships (Carley, 2000; Raco, 1999). The City Challenge program, which was launched in 1992, and other earlier area-based regeneration programs contributed to the emergence of discursive attention to partnerships between local authorities and private and voluntary sectors, as required by the scheme. The discussions of urban governance and urban regeneration mainly emerged from the research project of local governance funded by the Economic and Social Research Council in the UK in the 1990s (Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 1999; Jones & Evans, 2006). The partnership approach in the UK was closely tied to the conservative Thatcherite strategy to restructure boundaries and relations between the public and private sectors. Later, the term “partnership” was used in other policy areas beyond urban regeneration in the UK, and it spread to other areas beyond the UK as well (Elander, 2002). Such policies and practices aroused heated debate about a shift in urban governance from managerialism to entrepreneurialism (Quilley, 1999; Harvey, 1989), and further conversation was sparked about networks and partnerships concerning the role of the state and the control it may have (Davies, 2002a; Jones & Evans, 2006). Rhodes (1997) claimed that governance by network indicates the undermining of state power, while Davies (2002a), on the other hand, argued that networks are not the primary mode of governance in the politics of urban regeneration in the UK; Davies further promoted that partnerships should be treated as a distinct mode of governance. Davies (2001) differentiated three types of governance: governance by government, governance by partnership, and governance by regime.

Meanwhile, regime theory was firstly developed in the U.S. context (Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1989), where terms like “growth coalition” and “urban growth machine” (Logan & Molotch, 1987; Jonas & Wilson, 1999) have been used to systematically capture long-term interactions between local authorities, private companies and other agents in the urban regeneration process. The notion of an urban regime has been also applied to explain urban regeneration beyond U.S. cities (Tretter, 2008). Moreover, there has been much debate about the applicability of regime theory to explain governance in other areas, like Europe and Asia (Douay, 2008; Davies, 2002b, 2003). Pierre (2014) indicated that urban governance theory remains more relevant through time and space than urban regime theory, as the former more generally conceptualizes the idea of agency. He claimed that urban governance “offers a broader and more generic
framework,” since the “urban regime framework locks in on the bilateral relationship between the urban political leadership and the business community” (Pierre, 2014: 885). In other words, an urban regime could be considered as a particular form of urban governance (Pierre, 2005, 2014).

The decentralization and strengthening of civil society are drivers that have imposed demand for local and multi-level governance. The accounts of urban regeneration in the UK and US seem to indicate that the shift to governance allowed for more participation and cooperation through increasing the involvement of the private sector; however, this shift also elicited critical concern that governance would weaken urban democracy and entail more elitism in the urban policymaking process (Pares, Martí-Costa, & Blanco, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2005).

1.2 Governance of Urban Regeneration in China

1.2.1 Urban Regeneration in China

Over the last three decades, China has undergone urban regeneration at an unprecedented scale and speed, and urban regeneration in China has thus become an important topic for urban researchers. In this context, progressing urbanization has gradually led to the incorporation of various types of neglected areas that are in need of urban regeneration. For quite some time, inner-city redevelopment was the main task for the government, and it was often related to the preservation and transformation of traditional residential areas, such as the Hutong areas in Beijing (Lü, 1997) and Shikumen in Shanghai (Yang & Chang, 2007; Wai, 2006). One well-known experimental urban regeneration project called Ju’er Hutong was executed in the late 1980s, in order to explore strategies for preservation of urban fabric and traditional neighborhoods and meanwhile seek creative solutions to the practical problems of urban development through reflective design. Since then, the architect who was responsible for it has promoted the old town regeneration strategies of redevelopment, rehabilitation, and conservation (Wu, 1994), as well as the concept of “organic regeneration” (Wu, 2003b). The destruction of traditional buildings as part of this

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process has been criticized; for example, the Qianmen\textsuperscript{2} project in Beijing. Old town regeneration is also often carried out by addressing dilapidated housing or redeveloping dangerous housing (in Chinese: 危破房改造) (Lü, 1997) and shanty towns (Chinese: 棚户区改造), but a clear definition of “dangerous housing” is lacking in this field (Ren, 2014). Often, neighborhoods chosen for redevelopment were declared as dangerous housing to be set for demolition due to its promising returns on investment after redevelopment, even if their housing stock were still in suitable condition (Ren, 2008; Aurore & Peng, 2003); this practice was driven by urban land reform and commercialization of urban housing (Abramson, 1997). Low land-use efficiency and failure to accommodate modern transportation needs has been used as a dominant discourse regarding old town regeneration (Zacharias et al., 2015). Actually, the mechanisms that result in deterioration prior to redevelopment have proven to be influenced by state-led spatial production (Wu, 2015a). In Shanghai, the urban housing improvement program called the “365 Scheme,” which aimed to redevelop 365 hectares of low-income and dilapidated housing, was established in 1992 and completed in 2000. Similarly, an old dilapidated housing redevelopment program was launched in Beijing and has been in effect since the 1990s. The redevelopment of inner-city old towns is often combined with a housing program, such as the Housing Renovation Accompanied by Dilapidated Housing Redevelopment policy (weigai dai fanggai, in Chinese: 危改带房改) in Beijing since the year 2000; affordable housing\textsuperscript{3} properties (jingji shiyongfang, in Chinese: 经济适用房) are often used for the relocation of residents in urban regeneration projects. The fragmentation of housing and land property rights has been a common problem in urban regeneration, as residents only own the housing property but not the land. Moreover, the unclear housing tenure\textsuperscript{4} has proven to be especially challenging in the regeneration of old residential neighborhoods in China.

\textsuperscript{2}Beijing’s Qianmen area was carried out through large-scale demolition of historic buildings, and reconstruction of buildings which resembled historic building facade.

\textsuperscript{3}Affordable housings are provided by the government to middle and low-income families through subsidizing commercial housing purchases or by offering low-rent public (social) housing.

\textsuperscript{4}Unclear housing tenure is formed due to various reasons, for instance, some private property has been converted to public property or redistributed to other residents since the 1950s, due to the Socialist Transformation in the 1950s and the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s. There has been a large amount of debates and disputes on the ownership of those properties, and especially those disputes and conflicts become more prominent when they are confronted by urban regeneration.
The redevelopment of urban villages has become another important task of urban regeneration. In 2010, an urban village redevelopment program addressing 50 urban villages in Beijing was initiated. The regeneration of urban villages has been one of the most important and scrutinized topics in research of urban regeneration in China. Relevant issues have been discussed in the international literature, such as the roles of land owners, residents, and developers in changing governance arrangements, (a lack of) participation in planning, the social impact of upgrading, displacement and possible gentrification (Hao et al., 2011; He, 2007; Lin & De Meulder, 2012; Li et al., 2014; Tan & Schoon, 2014; Zhou, 2014; Wang et al., 2009; Wu & Wang, 2017; Zhuang, 2014; Wu, 2015a; Herrle, Fokdal, & Ipsen, 2014). Due to the economic restructuring of China, industrial sites have been abandoned, re-used, and redeveloped since the late 1990s in selected urban centers. A regeneration of the former industrial sites that belong to state-owned enterprises has been executed widely in various cities, especially after the policy entitled “Provisional Rules on Administration of Allocated Land Use Right During Reforms of State-owned Enterprises” (National Land Management Bureau, 1998) was issued in 1998, which allowed state-owned enterprises more autonomy in land disposal. However, the systematic upgrading and adaptive reuse of derelict industrial sites has only recently become an important task in urban regeneration; it is often related to a boom in “creative clusters” (Liu, Han, & O’Connor, 2013; Shan, 2014). In 2009, Guangdong province became an experimental site for the establishment of new institutional arrangements, in order to facilitate urban redevelopment and to create an elaborated system of urban regeneration based on clearly defined policies. For this purpose, a policy called “Several Opinions on Promoting Redevelopment of Three Olds to Increase Land Use Efficiency” (Guangdong Province Government, 2009) was issued. In this context, the term “three olds” refers to declining and run-down old towns, former industrial sites and urban villages (Schoon, 2014a; Ye, 2011; Lin, 2015). Urban regeneration has also been promoted as a part of events-led city beautification programs, for example for the

5 The agricultural land of these villages was expropriated and turned into urban landscapes, while the residential settlements were left to the villagers. Deprived of their original sources of income, the villagers started to rent out their residential properties to migrant tenants. With the urgently needed workforce and the growing number of migrant workers to be accommodated, the villagers enlarged their houses to the maximum extent, leading to extremely densely built-up areas with so-called “kissing houses” (jiewenlou) or “handshaking houses” (woshoulou).

6 State-owned enterprises received the land through administration transfer, and they only needed to pay very limited cost during the planned economy era. However, the state-owned enterprises only possess limited land disposal rights, as the land need to be transferred to the municipal government before its lease or trade in the land market. Nevertheless, a lot of state-owned enterprises have managed to sell and transfer the land use rights in the market since the 1990s, although it is not legally allowed.
Beijing Summer Olympics in 2008 (Shin & Li, 2013), the Shanghai Expo in 2010, and the Guangzhou Asian Games in 2010.

Urban regeneration strategies in Chinese inner cities have taken a dramatic shift from the former state-led pattern, characterized by strong welfare provision during the era of the planned economy, to a more market-oriented approach. Especially property-led redevelopment as an important urban regeneration strategy has been increasingly applied in many Chinese cities. In the early stages sporadic urban redevelopment has been implemented due to urban infrastructure construction. In the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, urban neighborhood regeneration was implemented mainly by local government and work units (also called danwei). However, the gap between the insufficient funding exclusively from the government or work units and the redevelopment task of huge amounts of dilapidated housing led to the necessity of developers’ involvement in urban regeneration. Since the mid-1990s, urban regeneration in China has accelerated and became dominated by property-led redevelopment (He & Wu, 2005; Wu & He, 2005). Property-led redevelopment strategies are widely deployed to redevelopment projects in urban villages, inner-city communities and sites of derelict industries due to their premium location and high commercial value. One of the most typical redevelopment projects realized with the help of such a strategy has even given the name to a famous pattern called “Xintiandi Pattern”7. Local governments have played an irreplaceable role not only in facilitating property-led redevelopment, and it could therefore be termed “state-sponsored property development” (He & Wu, 2007). Such property-led redevelopment leads to the phenomena of gentrification, which was termed by He (2007) as “state-sponsored gentrification.” The pro-growth coalition formed in property-led redevelopment mainly excludes local residents (He & Wu, 2005; Shin, 2009), however in some cases it “has been reconfigured to include relatively affluent local residents” (Shin, 2009: 2835). Nonetheless, the regeneration of Nanluoguxiang in Beijing was executed through involvement of local residents and aims at the local cultural preservation of historic community, which indicates the positive shift and also progress in urban regeneration governance (Shin, 2010a).

7 Xintiandi is a property-led urban redevelopment project in Shanghai. It is an area of reconstituted traditional mid-19th century shikumen (“stone gate”) houses on narrow alleys. The redevelopment strategy of Xintiandi has been considered one of the first examples of strategic urban redevelopment in China. In the project of Xintiandi, some of the old houses were renovated and converted to bookstores, cafes and restaurants, and shopping malls. Many of the old buildings, however, were demolished and replaced by similar new ones. Such a practice received much criticism as creating “fake antiques.”
While the scope of urban regeneration has widened, the applied methodologies have matured and a number of powerful institutional settings have been established in some Chinese cities (Altrock & Schoon, 2014), regeneration strategies in China have been characterized by their strong entrepreneurial nature, termed as “territorially based entrepreneurialism” (Wu, 2003a). Meanwhile, the tremendous demolition and relocation as a result of an implementation of those strategies have become a contentious issue that provoked heated debate in China. Since the end of the 1990s, displaced local residents were mainly offered cash compensation to become house owner elsewhere (Shin, 2007), but the acute affordability problems made it difficult for them to finance their new homeownership and stay in inner-city districts with the cash compensation they received (Shin, 2009). Unfair compensation schemes are one of the most important issues in this context. Rithmire (2013) claimed that the confrontation between citizens and local authorities over land has been one of the most visible flashpoints of state-society conflict in rural and urban China alike. Residents’ resistance to redevelopment is referred to as “property rights activism” (Lee, 2008). Hsing (2012) termed social actors’ conscious cultivation and struggles to form their own territoriality at both physical and discursive levels as “civic territoriality.” Shin argued that resisting neighborhood demolition should take “the fragmentation of property rights, supported by the coalition of residents on the basis of rights-based awareness” into account (Shin, 2010b: 128). In order to search for means to deal with such plights and challenges, public participation is often proposed as panacea by scholars and planners. Public participation in urban regeneration has been accepted as “good practice” and also as one main policy issue for a long time in the West (Ferilli et al., 2016). Comparatively, the implementation and practice of public participation in China’s urban regeneration is still at the very beginning, lacking policy and institutional support. However, there have been amounts of bottom-up practice struggling for more rights to participate, noting the importance of social capital in particular (Zhai & Ng, 2013; Verdini, 2015).

1.2.2 Governance of Urban Regeneration in China

The shift from government to governance can be observed in urbanizing China in the last two decades, and the trend coincided with the transition from a planned economic system to marketization after reform and the Open Door policy in 1978 (Wu, 2002;
Bian & Logan, 1996; Shen, 2007; Schroeder & Waibel, 2012). The role of local government in urban governance has been extensively examined in academia (Walder, 1995; Qi, 1995; Zhu 1999a; Xu & Yeh, 2005). Wang and Gu (2002), for instance, noted many challenges and problems with urban governance in China. The term “governance” (in Chinese: 治理 or 管治) became a buzzword and is frequently used in the discourse about urban development in China since the early 2000s. The nature of urban governance in China has been captured in several ways: entrepreneurialism (Zhu, 2011; Duckett, 1998; Duckett, 2001; Bercht, 2013); “socialist progrowth coalition” (Zhang, 2002), which is characterized by a strong local government with cooperative nonpublic sectors while community is excluded; or “local state corporatism” (Qi, 1995: 1132), which refers to the local governments that treat “enterprises within their administrative purview as one component of a larger corporate whole.” Zhu (2011) indicated that the marketization and power devolution have enabled the state to address institutional constraints which were formed during the era of planned economy, through institutional innovation within its system. Tang and Dryzek (2014: 110) claimed that governance in China confronts growing public resistance due to “seemingly illegitimate decision-making and poor policy implementation;” however, “the functional need to pursue social stability and governance legitimacy has become the main rationale for the authoritarian regime to adopt deliberative politics regarding practical governance matters.” Meanwhile, the party-state political structure remains an essential feature (Wu, 2002). The governance concerning inter-scalar or multi-level government is also worth further scrutiny. Increasingly curtailed state power and simultaneous broadening urban power both contribute to “a new style of urban governance and multifaceted urban restructuring processes” (Bercht, 2013: 135). Wu (2015c: 13) indicated that state restructuring in China is “a legacy of totalitarian institutions though it remains the character of authoritarianism which sustain the state’s control on society.” Bercht (2013:130) supported this point by indicating that urban governance in China is widely marked by “strong party-state leadership, political elitism and local corporatism.” Tang and Dryzek (2014:110) noted that “elite decisions and policy making in China could respond to persuasive influences and arguments generated among citizen participants” to a certain degree, and they further described the paradoxical and practical governance strategy in China as “deliberative policy consultation under an authoritarian regime.”
In recent decades in China, long-neglected inner cities have been turning into hotspots of urban redevelopment as a result of a series of market-oriented reforms, such as administrative and fiscal decentralization, land and housing reform, and profitable real estate development (Leaf, 1995). Within such context, governance of urban regeneration in China has aroused increasing attention from scholars (Altrock & Schoon, 2011; Wuttke et al., 2010; Wu, 2015c; Ng & Tang, 2004; Yao, 2008; Guo, 2006). Based on observations of the urban regeneration in the Pearl River Delta, “experimental urban governance” (Schoon, 2014b) and “conceded informality” (Schoon & Altrock, 2014) have been put forth as characteristics of governance in China. Urban regime and growth machine approaches have been adopted by many scholars for the analyses of urban development agencies in China (Zhu, 1999b; Li & Li, 2011). However, scholars noted that regime theory developed in the U.S. context could only be partially applied to the socialist context of China, as this theory cannot be applied to explain the political dimension of the pro-growth coalition in China, even though it works well with the economic dimension (Zhang, 2002). Wuttke et al. (2010: 9) pointed out that the existing governance of urban regeneration in China has faced immense challenges in the need to address a multitude of different and complicated interests, and the authors noted that “the responsibilities of the city’s administrative units are often overlapping, fragmented and lack coordinating bodies or mechanisms.” Governance in China has also been described by scholars as neoliberal (He & Wu, 2009; Wu, 2015c). Zielke and Waibel (2014) asserted that a wide range of multiple and hybrid modes of governance coexist in the urban redevelopment of China, including clientelistic, corporatist, and even populist modes; they also designated the creative development of space as “controlled creativity.” Lin et al. (2015) identified three main types of approaches to governance in urban village regeneration based on an analysis of institutional features, stakeholder features, and community contexts. They claimed that various forms of governance were adopted in the urban village regeneration of Guangzhou and Shenzhen, including decentralized governance, public-collective-private governance, collective-private governance and self-governance, while “other modes of governance (centralized governance, public-private governance and interactive governance) are rarely applied” (Lin et al., 2015: 1787).
Despite the depth of all of these studies, the governance of urban regeneration in China is still at its early stages, and the governance of urban historic area regeneration in China still has not received enough attention by researchers (Verdini, 2015). Consequently, more research based on historically contingent and spatially specific evidence is needed in order to enhance the understanding of the governance of urban regeneration in China. Governance as an analytical concept provides a comprehensive framework that facilitates the systematic examination of actors’ relationships and decision-making in the practical urban regeneration process, which is embedded in individual socio-spatial contexts. Most of the existing research has been centered on the role of the local state or developers, or a coalition of both; however, the role of civil society in urban regeneration governance is still under-researched. The notion of governance has drawn more attention to the interactions of state, market, and civil society, thus providing argumentation and reflection on the existing urban regeneration strategies. Secondly, as a normative concept, governance provides benchmarks that help to reflect on its existing forms. Furthermore, it contributes to promoting instructions through the perceived potentialities on how to improve governance capacity.

1.3 Knowledge Turn in Urban Study

1.3.1 Knowledge and Interpretive Epistemology

In recent decades, there has been a knowledge turn in social science-based spatial research (Matthiesen, 2005). Knowledge is often defined on its relations to information or data. For example, knowledge is defined as “information associated with rules which allow inferences to be drawn automatically so that the information can be employed for useful purposes” (http://www.seanet.com/~daveg/glossary.htm). Concilio (2010) claimed that knowledge is not additive and not stable; it cannot be packed and it is not always actionable. Ways of conceiving knowledge are reflected in various research paradigms. The communicative view assumes that knowledge is not stable, but rather a dynamic and evolving entity, and “it is created in social interactions: knowledge is a social construct” (Jakubik, 2007: 14). It is acknowledged that knowledge is embedded in social relations (Boer, van Baalen, & Kumar, 2002; Hendon, 2000). It has been also recognized that knowledge is multiple (Sandercock, 1998), due
to a variety of its sources and forms. Negev and Teschner (2013) suggested that stakeholders have and employ multiple types of knowledge simultaneously. Knowledge share or transfer helps to expand its assets and value (Gibney, 2011; Healey, 2013).

1.3.2 Knowledge and Social Learning

Kolb (1984: 38) defined learning as “the process whereby knowledge is created through the transformation of experience.” In other words, learning is inseparable from Knowledge. The utilization, production, and transfer of knowledge are based on learning; meanwhile, learning is impossible without knowledge. Lundvall and Johnson (1994) claimed that knowledge is the crucial resource and learning is the most important process. Borrás (2011: 727) claimed that “learning is not an automatic process; it is a consequence of a specific intentionality towards problem-solving.” Learning contributes to the change of knowledge forms, for example the conversion between individual knowledge and collective shared/organizational knowledge, between tacit knowledge and codified knowledge. Learning among various actors could be also viewed as knowledge transfer (Lippert, 2007), knowledge sharing, or knowledge exchange. According to the socialization processes promoted by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), individual’s tacit knowledge is shared and transmitted to another person, thus “common unarticulated beliefs and embodied skills are created and developed” (Uriarte, 2008: 7). Meanwhile, “internalization,” which is promoted by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) as one mode of knowledge conversion, referring to “a process of embodying explicit knowledge into tacit knowledge or an individual’s know-how or operational knowledge” (Uriarte, 2008: 8), could be also viewed as learning. Therefore, forms of learning entities, like individuals, organizations, or network (Zimmermann, 2009) need to be distinguished. Kolb (1984) promoted the experiential learning cycle theory, which is about four stages based on four learning modes: concrete experience, reflective observation, abstract conceptualization, and active experimentation. Bennett and Howlett (1992) distinguished three levels and types of learning: governmental learning, lesson drawing, and social learning. Based on Bennett and Howlett’s work, Borrás (2011) defined learning as three levels, namely government learning, policy network learning, and social learning, according to
specified aspects like who learns, learning about what, organizational capacity and policy change. Eraut (1994) noted that learning in professional practice relies on publication, people and practical experience.

In recent years, social learning has attracted increasing attention in urban studies, especially with regard to public participation. A clear definition of social learning is still absent, however, there are some shared views among scholars that social learning is embedded in social networks. Social learning is beyond individual learning, “situated within wider social units or communities of practice through social interactions between actors within social networks” (Reed et al., 2010: 4). Social learning involves the integration and interaction of various types of knowledge. Blackler (1993: 870) noted that social learning “involves a degree of personal investment; it can only be achieved by active participation.” Similarly, Agrawal and Gibson (1999) noted that social learning is embedded in a complex community, and it potentially leads to collective learning. Social learning is defined by Muro and Jeffrey as:

- a process of collective and communicative learning, which may lead to a number of social outcomes, new skills and knowledge as well as the development of trust and relationships may form the basis for a common understanding of the system or problem at hand, agreement and collective action. (2008: 330)

Webler et al. (1995: 445) indicated that “social learning refers to the process by which changes in the social condition occur - particularly changes in popular awareness and changes in how individuals see their private interests linked with the shared interests of their fellow citizens.” Therefore, social learning contributes to the formation of certain norms and values. Social learning is influenced by factors like formal and informal institutions, social dynamics including trust, leaders, and power relations, and technology like tools enabling information processing (Gerlak & Heikkila, 2011). Social learning includes two aspects: substance and value aspects. The substantial aspect refers to problem solving and solution, or task-oriented and technical issues; while value aspects refer to belief, moral, or value awareness (Webler et al., 1995; Braun et al., 2003; Steyaert & Jiggins, 2007). Besides, learning of implicit or tacit knowledge is very important, as tacit or uncodified knowledge is perceived as basis for social innovation. However, it is very difficult to observe how tacit knowledge is
utilized and shared. Holden claimed that:

Most contextual factors remain tacit even when subject to researchers’ investigations, and not by any will to deceive among research participants. That is to say, people hold a great deal of knowledge that is not readily available to share explicitly with others and is only passed along in the interstices of deliberate communication. (2008: 36)

Social learning normally leads to knowledge production. Concerning discursive practice and social learning, Verdini (2015: 368) noted that “although the Internet-based participation process has not reached a desirable level of consensus building, it has promoted a process of social learning between ordinary people and the professional elite.”

Although there has been a large amount of research on the interaction of various actors and urban participation in China, the analysis from the perspective of social learning is still absent. There is lacking attention paid to social learning in planning practice, which is complicated by the failure of widely recognized knowledge transfer through “best practice.” Holden (2008: 35) claimed that “in urban governance contexts, the question of effective transfer of better or best practices is complicated by the failure in many cases for building and sharing knowledge to be a recognised and integral part of governance.” The perspective of social learning is conducive to examine the interaction between various actors and tap into the knowledge dynamics of public participation in urban regeneration.

1.4 Knowledge and Governance of Urban regeneration

According to the cognitive turn in social science, possessing knowledge is considered to be represented by the basic capacity to act on a knowledge-based approach. Zimmermann (2009: 58) indicated that “the cognitive and interpretative approaches in political science brought our attention to the role of knowledge in politics and planning.” Foucault (1991) asserted that the act of governing has become interdependent with certain sorts of institutionalized analyses, reflections, and knowledge. In a certain sense, new forms of governance are inherently entwined with new forms of knowledge production (Zimmermann, 2009). There has been consensus about the close relationship between governance and knowledge, highlighting the insufficient academic attention that the knowledge dimension has received (Getimis,
Muñoz-Erickson (2014: 184) recognized that “knowledge is mostly treated as a neutral resource and not a central force in explaining policy innovation, much as rules, interests, and incentives are.” For Burrage (2009), it is equally important to uncover knowledge beyond “big science” in order to understand regeneration policy options. As knowledge (who, what, why, where, and how) can be gathered where local communities interact with local professionals across regeneration projects, and so on, it has the potential to transform the lives of local people when it can be harnessed and exploited for beneficial change. Burrage (2009) claimed that knowledge becomes a fluid resource (a form of “currency”), but it is a neglected commodity in urban regeneration, unlike notable physical resources such as land, capital, and labor.

The knowledge dimension is still absent from debates on the governance of urban regeneration in China, although urban regeneration in China has attracted increasing attention from researchers in both Eastern and Western countries. Scholarly attention revealed that Western paradigms and theories, which were developed based on experiences in Western Europe and North America, are quite limited in their ability to explain the governance of urbanization in China (McGee, 1991). For example, compared to Western countries, the distinctions among various actors (e.g., politicians, civil servants, private sector players, etc.) are rather unclear in Chinese urban practices (Zielke & Waibel, 2014), and the knowledge and ideas that are used to justify decision-making methods and practices of governance are often overlooked (Van Herzele, 2004). Knowledge is closely related cognitively to the notion of intrinsic socio-spatial contexts. Holden argued that:

The contextual components of social learning, however, are very seldom voiced or inscribed as components of a successful new plan or policy in a manner that is accessible to outsiders. This is even more the case when considering innovations that arise not from within the established institutions of power and responsibility but from groups brought together less formally, by a commonality of focus, worldview and values, to form knowledge communities. (2008: 35)

Friedmann (2005a: 184) noted that planning is “deeply embedded in the political culture of the country and/or individual cities, and such, is always historically grounded.” From the analytical dimensions of governance, knowledge is acknowledged as one important indispensable element (Healey, 2004; Nuissl &
Heinrichs, 2011). Moreover, Schroeder and Waibel (2010) noted that learning processes contributed to an urban governance shift in China. In this way, knowledge provides an effective micro tool to probe into the vivid governing processes and logics of China, and it can also further facilitate broader international debate concerning the Chinese transformation. In the regeneration of urban villages, old towns, and old industrial sites in China, various actors attempt to shape spatial transformation processes according to their respective forms of knowledge, which have shaped their interpretations of space, behavior logics and interests. All forms of knowledge are embedded in, and also shaped by, institutions. This paper aims to examine the interplay of institutions, actors’ actions, and forms of knowledge in the spatial development and social innovation process of urban regeneration.

1.5 Research Framework and Questions

1.5.1 Research Framework

With regard to the aforementioned knowledge-based perspective, this research aims to examine the interplay of institutions, actors’ practices, and knowledge in the spatial restructuring and social innovation process of urban regeneration. I am interested in the interactions among various actors with differing knowledge bases and how different forms of knowledge are utilized, produced, and transferred in the urban regeneration process in China. The knowledge-based approach helps to examine the epistemological dynamics in the utilization and production of knowledge and how such processes influence policy innovation.

This research aims to examine the governance of urban regeneration in China by taking into account structural contexts, practices, institutions, and actors (see Figure 3). The analytical framework is constructed and adapted based on the integrated model of governance by DiGaetano and Strom (2003). This research examines the governance of urban regeneration from the perspective of communication. The aspect of culture is not included in this dissertation due to the ambiguity that has arisen about the relevant institutions and culture. There do exist overlaps between institution and culture (Alesina & Giuliano, 2014; Lauth, 2015), such as informal rules (like norms, conventions, etc.) that could be defined as part of both informal institutions and cultural practices. Lauth (2015) noted that cultural patterns and routines are treated as
informal institutions in many neo-institutional approaches, while informal institutions can be understood as integral parts of cultural patterns. Meanwhile, the layer of institutional milieu in DiGaetano and Strom’s integrated model that refers to political and governmental arrangements is adapted into institutions. In order to avoid ambiguity, “institution” in this study refers to formal and informal rules (like values or beliefs). Moreover, various actors - including residents, developers, media, government, planners, and more - and their interactions are examined in this study; in other words, the actors’ arrangements transcends political actors. For this reason, the center ring of political actors in DiGaetano’s integrated model is adapted to merely actors for this study. Additionally, the institutional intermediation area of DiGaetano and Strom’s integrated model is replaced by practice, which refers to interactions and actions of various actors in this study.

Figure 3. Research framework
Source: Author, adapted based on the integrated model of DiGaetano & Strom (2003)

1.5.2 Research Questions
This research addresses the following questions on the utilization, production, and transfer of knowledge by various actors within certain arrangements in the governance of urban regeneration in China. In other words, urban regeneration is a testing ground for examining the interrelationships between urban governance and knowledge. The research framework and research questions (See Figure 4) are presented as following:

**Research Framework and Questions**

![Research Framework and Questions Diagram](image)

**Figure 4. Research framework and research questions**

Source: Author

(1) **Question One: How is knowledge utilized, produced, and transferred by various actors in urban regeneration in China?**

In urban regeneration in China, various actors attempt to shape spatial transformation processes according to their respective knowledge, behavior, logics, and interests. All forms of knowledge are embedded in, and also shaped by, institutions, actors’ interactions, and structural contexts. This study aims to identify the forms and types of knowledge that are possessed, utilized, produced, and transferred by different actors in urban regeneration, and this research further examines how knowledge and actors’
relationships are mutually shaped by each other. Moreover, this study aims to explore which and how problems and strategies are framed by different actors. Consequently, the following sub-questions are formulated:

(1) What are the types and forms of knowledge involved in urban regeneration in China?
(2) How is knowledge utilized, produced, transferred, and shared by various actors?
(3) How are problems and strategies framed through different actors’ interactions?

(2) Question Two: What is the role of social learning in institutional innovation in urban regeneration in China?

The production of knowledge is viewed as a potential driver for institutional innovation and spatial restructuring. Institutions include formal or informal regulative mechanisms that impede or encourage innovation processes. This study aims to explore how (formal and informal) institutions are shaped by knowledge dynamics, and it further explores how social learning contributes to policymaking and institutional innovation in China. In addition, the study aims to explore the interplay between institutions and social learning, therefore the following sub-questions are offered:

(1) How are formal and informal institutions shaped by the utilization, production, and transfer of knowledge?
(2) How does social learning influence policymaking and institutional innovation in urban regeneration?
Chapter 2 Conceptual Framework and Research Method

2.1 Conceptual Framework

2.1.1 Types of Knowledge

Knowledge types are essential when knowledge is used as an analytical approach to examine the interaction of various actors within the complex web of “bottom-up” and “top-down” practice in urban regeneration. Concerning categories of knowledge, distinctions are made between codified and tacit knowledge; verbal and non-verbal knowledge; propositional and non-propositional knowledge; knowledge based on skills and abilities (Abel, 2008: 13). Alexander (2008) identified three kinds of knowledge, including systematic-scientific knowledge, performative knowledge, and appreciative knowledge. Matthiesen (2005) promoted “knowledgescapes” to distinguish between eight interrelated and overlapping forms of knowledge. Based on the “Knowledgescape” promoted by Matthiesen, Getimis (2012) further distinguished three forms of knowledge: (1) Scientific/Professional/Expert knowledge, (2) Steering/Institutional knowledge, and (3) Local/Every Day/Milieu knowledge. However, it is very difficult to identify the knowledge types according to the “knowledgescape” promoted by Matthiesen in empirical research. For example, many planners are unable to specify the type or nature of knowledge they use (Khakee et al., 2000). Similarly, Edelenbos et al. (2011) identified three types of knowledge: scientific, stakeholder, and bureaucratic or administrative knowledge. Abel (2008) also suggested, knowledge can take many forms, like everyday knowledge, theoretical knowledge, action knowledge, and moral or orientational knowledge. Similarly, Eraut (1994) identified two types of knowledge held by most people: “propositional knowledge” which enables practice, and practical “know-how” which underpins practice and cannot be separated from it. Eraut (1994) also proposed a third type of knowledge called “process knowledge,” which means knowing how to conduct the various processes that contribute to professional action.

Besides, there has been much discussion about the notion of “explicit” and “implicit knowledge,” or “codified” and “tacit knowledge.” Concerning “implicit” or “tacit knowledge,” Michael Polanyi (1966) is acknowledged as the creator of this distinction.
between explicit and tacit knowledge. Van Ewijk and Baud (2009) further identified different types of knowledge utilized in city-to-city cooperation programs, including tacit, technical contextual-embedded knowledge, cultural contextual-embedded knowledge, and generalized knowledge. Uriarte (2008: 5) noted that “since tacit knowledge is highly individualized, the degree and facility by which it can be shared depends to a great extent on the ability and willingness of the person possessing it to convey it to others.” Codified or explicit knowledge can be captured or identified from printed forms of reports, meeting memos, emails, publication, internet, and more (Uriarte, 2008), and it could therefore be transferred or shared in formal languages and made available for knowledge seekers. Tacit or implicit knowledge normally is captured in informal discussions or meetings.

Above all, the knowledge utilized in urban regeneration can be categorized into three types, including technical knowledge, institutional knowledge, and local knowledge. Distinguishing features of three types of knowledge can be analyzed from three aspects: (1) Where is it from? (2) Why is it valid? (Why do people trust it?) (3) How is it recognized (from discourse)? Such a typology of knowledge is intended to guide the empirical study and analysis in this research.

(1) Technical Knowledge

Technical knowledge utilized in urban regeneration is mainly manifested in the planning field. However, the definition of technical knowledge in urban regeneration planning is not simple, since the planning field is an interface between various disciplines. Planning, as one of the most important and common types of technical knowledge, can be identified in urban regeneration. Technical knowledge in urban regeneration is often explicit in codified forms, like planning documents. Making plans is an indispensable aspect of urban regeneration, as no redevelopment project could be executed without planning approval from the government. Plan making is one of the most scrutinized topics in the research of urban regeneration, indicating interest relations among various actors. Current research tends to conduct analyses on the final products of planning (Li et al., 2014), while plan-making processes themselves have not received enough attention. Starting from this point, exploring the technical knowledge utilized by various actors in the plan making of urban regeneration is
crucial. Concerning planning knowledge, Concilio (2010) claimed that in planning, as well as in other domains, the crucial issue is no longer that of finding, collecting, and making necessary knowledge available; the most crucial issue is to recognize knowledge as an evolving and collective whole, framing planning action. In empirical study, planning knowledge in urban regeneration is mainly codified and explicit in visible planning products and relevant policy documents. In a certain sense, the technical knowledge in planning of urban regeneration refers to:

- the theoretical knowledge of cause-effect relations;
- empirical knowledge on whether, how and with what strength certain actions have caused certain effects in various contexts, as well as methodological knowledge for analysing which effects certain actions can be expected to produce in the specific context and time horizon dealt with in a specific planning process. (Tennøy et al., 2016: 3)

Such technical knowledge is mainly possessed and utilized by planners as specialists or experts. Technical knowledge is valid as it is often viewed as expert knowledge or professional knowledge. Experts or specialists refer to the people “who have special skills or knowledge in (usually) a fairly narrow and definable area,” and they are expected to solve problems which “ordinary” people cannot cope with (Beerel, 1987). People trust technical knowledge as it is possessed by people, who got professional trained in university or institute with certain qualification. Booker and McNamara (2004) stated that “expert knowledge” refers to what qualified individuals know as a result of their technical practices, training, and experience. Ayyub (2001) claimed that experts are usually identified on the basis of qualifications, training, experience, professional memberships, and peer recognition. Chettiparamb (2013) claimed that professional and technical knowledge are increasing challenged by experiential, perceptive and tacit knowledge. Expert knowledge is mainly codified and explicit in various forms, which is indicated from planning documents, policy, academic research, and more. Planners, as the technical knowledge carriers, play important role in the process of urban regeneration.

(2) Institutional Knowledge

According to Matthiesen (2005: 7), institutional knowledge refers to “knowledge about the systemic and functional as well as formal and informal logics of organizations and
institutional arrangements.” It includes codified or explicit knowledge, which is mainly reflected in formal rules (North, 1991), like constitutions, laws, property rights, and also tacit or implicit knowledge, referring to informal restraints (North, 1991) like sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and code of conduct. Utilization of institutional knowledge could be identified from discursive interaction among various actors. Matthiesen (2005: 7) claimed that “institutional knowledge is distributed highly unequal between different actor networks and societal strata,” therefore the actors that possess actualized institutional knowledge and resource-based capacity can apply it while the other marginalized actors which possess only outdated institutional knowledge can only try to “adjust these shortcomings via ‘soft’ personal knowledge networks and informal institutions.”

The institutional knowledge is rooted and embedded in the political structure of China. Hsing (2012: 54) claimed that “urbanism seems to have provided a unifying ideology for the political elite.” Institutional knowledge is the aggregate mental product of individuals, like meanings, values, norms, and symbols. Attention needs to be paid to the taken-for-granted habits and values, that are deeply embedded in cognitive patterns of actors. Such habits and values could be reflected in the practices and discourses. Moreover, institutional knowledge is rooted and remincent of Confucian culture, the core value of which “emphasized the group over the individual, authority over liberty, and responsibilities over rights,” and it values “harmony and cooperation were preferred over disagreement and competition” (Huntington, 1991: 24). Moreover, existing institutional knowledge is based on the bureaucracy structure. Curien noted that:

Local political leaders are appointed by their hierarchical superiors in the Communist party-state, and progress in the organisational chart of the CCP depending on the assessment made by the central party-state. Therefore, any action by local authorities and planners depends on the requirements of the party-state hierarchy, not the concerns of the local populations. (2014: 30)

(3) Local Knowledge

Antweiler (1998) referred to “local knowledge” or “indigenous knowledge,” defined as consisting of factual knowledge, skills, and capabilities, most of which have some empirical grounding. Antweiler (1998: 470) stated that “the political undertones
underlying the terms for local knowledge are illustrated with particular clarity by the change in the meaning of the most widespread term ‘indigenous knowledge’.” Headlam and Hincks (2010) put forward that much of local knowledge takes the form of tacit knowledge acquired through intuition, trial and error, and learning as individuals “experience” the context within which they live and work. Besides, local tacit knowledge is mainly possessed and utilized by local residents in daily life. Fraser and Lepofsky (2004) considered the knowledge of residents to be the most insightful because it is based on their experiences of local areas. Fraser and Lepofsky (2004) highlighted that the very basis of the tacit knowledge held by local communities, the experience generated from living in poverty and deprivation, can preclude individuals from putting their knowledge into practical use. Headlam and Hincks (2010) also found out that owing to the fact that local communities are often precluded from putting their local knowledge into practice, the “collective” are usually dependent on “experts” to transform their knowledge into action.

2.1.2 Knowledge and Actors: Power and Network

Gibney (2011: 621) claimed that “knowledge cannot be thought of as either value- or power-free,” as its spatial flow and its impact on wealth spread, social inclusion, and empowerment, is influenced by “the interplay of a variety of factors, including deeper power and resource dynamics.” Weiler (2009) promoted the notion of “politics of knowledge,” referring to relations of knowledge and power in urban politics. The power relationship influenced what is counted as relevant knowledge and whose knowledge to be included or excluded in urban regeneration practice. Stone et al. (2001) also indicated that government officials tend to value the “expert knowledge” from the researchers as consultant more than the local residents’ knowledge. Hordijk and Baud (2006) also claimed that expert sources of knowledge are given priority by national and local government agencies above local inhabitants’ practice-based knowledge. The knowledge production and exchange are engaged with political practices “that protect the powerful and confuse the powerless” (Healey, 1992b: 10). Hillier (2000: 34) noted that “the forms of power at work in society are embedded with knowledge-both of substances (what) and process (how), and equally those forms of knowledge are embedded with power relations.”
Knowledge is shared and transferred within a certain network, and also between networks (Hillier, 2000). Certain implicit or tacit knowledge is shared by groups who speak the “same language” or have similar values or identity. Hillier (2000: 35) claimed that “networks are relational links through which person can obtain access to material resources, knowledge and power.” Meanwhile, the conflicts of power within the partnerships or networks, would hinder or constrain the acquisition and transfer of knowledge. It has been acknowledged that there are conflicts, competition, and also power regimes entailed in those networks and partnerships. Coulson (2005) found out that the flow of knowledge (vertical or horizontal) is facilitated or constrained by the structural nature of the partnership or network. Flyvbjerg (1998) noted that knowledge can be chosen (or even bought) by actors for strategic reasons. Atkinson et al. (2010: 55) claimed that in the knowledge trading process “forms and types of knowledge are always entangled with related forms of communication such as the mass media, closed expert cultures, professional consultancy or public deliberation.”

This research tries to examine which knowledge makes difference in the governance of urban regeneration, and how knowledge dynamics shape the power relations among various actors, and also the interplay of knowledge sharing and network in urban regeneration in China. Scrutinizing the influence of knowledge dynamics on the power relationship sheds light on actors’ relationship, which is the core feature and nature of the concept of governance.

2.1.3 Knowledge and Practice: Shaping Practice Through Framing

Schatzki (1996: 89) defined practice as “a temporally and spatially dispersed nexus of doings and sayings.” Taylor (1971: 27) argued that “practices are not just in the minds of the actors but are out there in the practices themselves, practices which cannot be conceived as a set of individual actions, but which are essentially modes of social relations, of mutual action.” Bourdieu (1990: 52) proposed the influential theory of habitus, which is “constituted in practice and is always oriented towards practical functions.” Knowledge is closely related to practice, as “knowledge developed through experience and social interaction, and assumes that people and collectivities develop skills in sorting out what is accepted as ‘true’ and ‘good’ in any knowledge claim”
(Healey, 2013: 1514). Therefore, there is close relation among practice, knowledge, and discourse during the interaction of different actors. To understand the practice of urban regeneration, it is important to examine what is said and done by various actors. Wenger (1998) used the term of “community of practice,” referring to the groups of people that are informally bound together by doing things in a share way, and the knowledge and expertise they learn from the mutual interaction. Snyder and Wenger (2010) indicated that the activities of “community practice” consists of face-to-face conferences, teleconference, visits, projects, websites, listserv and informal interactions, which range from face-to-face to virtual; formal to informal; public to private. Muñoz-Erickson (2014) applied knowledge-action systems analysis (KASA) to analyze land use and green area governance in San Juan, and found that a diverse network of actors are contributing diverse knowledge types, which show potential for innovation in governance.

All practice is rooted and based on the problem and strategy framing, which is also the content and process of decision making in urban regeneration. Framing is an interpretative term, and the use of “frame” in social studies emerged in the 1970s (Goffman, 1974). For Rein and Schön (1993: 146), “framing is a way of selecting, organizing, interpreting, and making sense of a complex reality to provide guideposts for knowing, analyzing, persuading, and acting.” They further noted that framing transpires at three levels of personal life, scientific or scholarly inquiry, and policy-making (ibid). Similarly, Schön and Rein (1994) indicated two types of framing, which are “rhetorical frames” referring to the persuasive use of stories and argument in policy debate, as well as “action frames” that directly influence policymaking. Van Hulst and Yanow (2016: 104) claimed that “a theory of framing needs to transcend the cognitive efforts of problem setting and solving, taking up instead the constant sense-making work of multiple actors involved in framing processes seen to be thoroughly political efforts aimed at policy problems, and the identities and relationships of those involved in policy processes.” The discourse of framing appeared in the form of various causal storylines, including discourse about the existing “is” and the desired “ought.” The process of framing includes naming, selecting, and storytelling (Rein & Schön, 1977, 1996; Schön, 1993). Naming mainly refers to highlighting certain features of a situation, and metaphors are often used in naming the policy problem, and in the
naming process what should be seen is selected meanwhile ignoring or selecting out other features (Schön, 1993). Storytelling helps policy-relevant actors to bind elements of a situation into a pattern that is coherent and graspable (Rein & Schön, 1977, 1996). However, the discourse of framing and its influence in our perception and practice is difficult to assess, as they are often invisible or taken-for-granted (Schön & Rein, 1994). The practice of framing is engaged in the negotiation and mobilization processes of urban regeneration, aiming to achieve consensus, which refers to “processes in which individuals representing differing interests engage in long-term, face-to-face discussions, seeking agreement on strategy, plans, policies, or actions” (Innes & Booher, 1999: 11). Hillier (2002) noted that shared meanings and interests are built by actors, and new ideas for problem and strategy framing are generated from consensus-building. This research tries to examine the knowledge utilization, production, and transfer with regard to the problem and strategy framing in the urban regeneration in China.

(1) Problem Framing

Rittel and Webber (1973) suggested that finding the problem is the same as finding the solution; the problem can’t be defined until the solution has been found. In other words, problem understanding and problem resolution are concomitant to each other. Therefore, the understanding of the problem in urban regeneration is pivotal to explore urban regeneration strategies. Urban regeneration can be seen as a “comprehensive and integrated vision and action which leads to the resolution of urban problems and which seeks to bring about a lasting improvement in the economic, physical, social and environmental condition of an area that has been subject to change” (Roberts, 2000: 17). Urban regeneration problems are societal problems and also planning problems as so-called “inherently wicked problems” promoted by Rittel and Webber (1973). Problem framing depends on the degree of consent on the socially constructed “is” and “ought.”

Problem framing is a process of meaning making and interpretation of different phenomena through discourse. Hajer noted that:

Discourses frame certain problems; that is to say, they distinguish some aspects of a situation rather than others. (...) As such, discourse provides the tools with which problems are constructed. Discourses at the same
time form the context in which phenomena are understood and thus predetermines the definition of the problem. (1993: 45)

That is to say, problem framing is social construction through discourse by different actors. The dominant discourse of framing certain problem can be reflected in institutions and organizational practices. Stone et al. (2001: 34) claimed that “discourse coalition shapes the way in which society conceptualises a particular problem.” Problem framing is important to articulate actor’s interest and pursuit. Concerning knowledge utilization and problem framing, Hoppe asserted that:

The ‘is’ is represented in the stock of available and relevant knowledge that can be used in understanding the problem; especially in moving away from the problematic situation, perhaps but not necessarily towards the more desirable situation. There can be more or less certainty on this stock of knowledge. The ‘ought’ is represented in the set of norms, values, principles, ideals and interests at stake in defining the problem. There can be more or less ambivalence or ambiguity of normative issues at stake. (2010: 16)

Similarly, Heinelt et al. (2010: 54) explained that “knowledge then includes assumptions about ‘casuality’ or ‘conditionality’ as well as context information and normative judgments about what constitutes a problem and why it should be solved.” Besides, the availability of knowledge shows impact on the problem Framing. Based on the certainty of knowledge and ambivalence of values dimensions, Hoppe (2010: 16) distinguished three types of problem: unstructured, moderately structured, and structured problems.

(2) Strategy Framing

Hutchinson (2001) noted that there are a number of problems with the meaning of “strategy” for area regeneration, both theoretically and practically. Bennett (1996) noted that many people use the words “strategies,” “plans,” “policies,” and “objectives” interchangeably. Hutchinson (2001) used the framework of analysis developed by Pettigrew and Whipp (1993) to examine the importance of the strategy development process, its content, and the context within which strategy is developed. He put forward that strategy should be considered as process, content, and context. Mintzberg (2007) stated that there are intended strategies before action, and strategies as realized patterns. He referred to a realized intended strategy as deliberate strategy, and unintended realized pattern in action as emergent strategy. Considering strategy as
context, the urban redevelopment strategy is embedded in specific spatial and social context, including existing regulatory practices and institutional settings. Certain legitimated and officially conceded urban redevelopment strategies would serve as institutional context of other urban redevelopment strategies.

2.1.4 Knowledge and Institution

Institution is defined by North as “humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions” (North, 1991: 97). According to North (1991), constraints refer to formal rules (constitutions, laws, and property rights), and informal restraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and code of conduct), which usually contribute to the perpetuation of order and safety within a market or society. North further pointed out that “the institutions have been devised by human beings to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange” (North, 1991: 97). Formal institution could be identified from the official discourse. The formal institution is normally explicit and codified in the forms of constitutions, laws, and property rights. Meanwhile, the formal rules are often utilized as shared institutional knowledge by various actors.

To understand the link between knowledge and institution, there are three paradigms, which are paradigm of rational, paradigm of pluralism and opportunism, and paradigm of politics and legitimation. Concerning the paradigm of rational, Davoudi (2006: 15) termed it as instrumental model, referring to an unproblematic, linear and direct relationship between scientific and expert knowledge and “evidence-driven” policy outcomes. According to the paradigm of pluralism and opportunism, policy-making is considered as pragmatic problem-solving decisions that involve various sorts of knowledge, and the flow of knowledge into policy is dependent on the interaction of various actors. Under the paradigm of politics and legitimation, the knowledge process is infused with power and force, and knowledge is used to legitimate political action. Weiler (2002: 7) stated that “knowledge and power are bound to each other in a relationship of mutual legitimisation – knowledge is legitimising power and, vice versa, knowledge is legitimised by power.” The paradigm of politics and legitimation are more prominent in the urban regeneration of China, with regard to the party-state system.
Delvaux and Mangez (2008) claimed that knowledge plays a particularly important role in defining problems and fabricating policy ideas, during which ideas must pass a series of “tests,” which shape the types of knowledge that must be mobilised. As the institutional framing is closely bound to power structuring and knowledge utilization, which reflects the so called “knowledge orders.” For Zimmermann (2009: 59), knowledge order “refers to the existing hierarchies of different forms of knowledge that can be discerned by their internal structure and their validity claims.” Zimmermann (2009) further noted that knowledge orders become attractive for local politics and planning process analysis because it is a cognitive concept closely associated with practice, structural forms of interaction and actors. Concerning informal institutions, Nuissl and Heinrichs (2011: 54) claimed that “the cognitive referents of actors to a large extent reflect these informal institutions which are produced and reproduced in the recurrent interaction of people.” This research examines the role of knowledge dynamics in policymaking in urban regeneration in China, and scrutinize which and how knowledge contributes to policy innovation.

Problem definition at the policy document and constitutions could be seen as the final selection of problem framing, as result of decision-making. According to Hoppe (2010), the problem framing process is a process of puzzling, powering, and participation; the final dominant problem framing is the result of urban powering and negotiation, which are all the exercise of power. It depends on who has the power to define the problem. Fairclough (1992, 1995) claimed that discourses do not simply “float in the other,” but are embedded within institutions and organisations, and influence the relations of power within them. According to Hajer (1993), a “discourse coalition” can be said to dominate a given political realm, only if it dominates the discursive space, and it is reflected in institutional practices. A discourse coalition is formed or even strengthened during the process of institution formation and innovation. Stone et al. (2001: 34) further claimed that “a discourse becomes entrenched as the dominant mode of perception, it can be reflected in institutions and organisational practices as the conventional mode of reasoning.” Therefore, the problem and strategy framing becomes more structured and clear during the continuous experimental practice of urban regeneration, thus facilitate the institution innovation. In other words, the problem framing sheds light on social learning process, which is essential to understand the link between knowledge and institution. For example, policy learning
means the changes of personal skills, the introduction of new instruments and shifts in problem-solving capabilities and governing techniques of a certain policy (Zimmermann, 2009). Therefore, this study examines social learning by focusing on problem and strategy framing, which are indicated through discursive interaction among various actors in urban regeneration of China.

2.2 Case Study Selection and Research Method

2.2.1 Case Study Selection

The Pearl River Delta region is one of the most developed regions in China, and it has experienced tremendous economic and social development in the last three decades. Guangzhou and Shenzhen are the two core cities in this region and share the same framework of so-called “three old” redevelopment. Meanwhile, institutional arrangements and governance logics in the two cities reveal distinguishing features. Pierre (2005) argued that a comparative analysis of cities within the same national context allows the observer to control for a number of political and institutional variables. For this reason, comparing the governance, knowledge dynamics, and social learning in urban regeneration policymaking and practice of urban regeneration in Guangzhou and Shenzhen can shed light on the interplay among institutions, learning and governance, which is elaborated further in Chapter 3.

In this research, the case study focuses on three typical pioneer urban regeneration projects (see Table 1) in Guangzhou and Shenzhen in the Pearl River Delta area. The case study covers three types of pilot and experimental urban regeneration projects, which include urban village, dilapidated inner urban neighborhood and derelict industrial site redevelopment. Various urban redevelopment strategies are applied, while dynamic and complex interactions during decision-making processes indicate that closer scrutinizing of the three cases can help to understand how the specific types of knowledge are utilized, produced, and transferred by various actors in urban regeneration. The following Chapters 4, 5, and 6 focus on specific case studies to explore in detail how knowledge is utilized, produced, and transferred in the practices of specific regeneration projects.
Table 1. Case selection in Guangzhou and Shenzhen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Urban Regeneration</th>
<th>Case Study</th>
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<tr>
<td>Urban Village Regeneration</td>
<td>Xiasha Village (Shenzhen)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dilapidated Inner Urban Neighborhood Regeneration</td>
<td>Enning Road (Guangzhou)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Former Industrial Site Redevelopment</td>
<td>Kingway Brewery (Shenzhen)</td>
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Source: Author

2.2.2 Data Collection

(1) Observation

Field research of the village of Xiasha in Shenzhen started in 2009. Meanwhile, an observation of a number of other urban villages in Guangzhou and Shenzhen provided a more holistic perspective to better understand urban village regeneration. Fieldwork was conducted in urban villages including Liede, Xian, Yangji, and Sanyuanli villages in Guangzhou in the context of a project funded by the German Research Foundation entitled, “Megacities Megachallenge” from 2008 to 2011. In this context, I conducted intensive and continuous observations of villagers’ participation in the entire redevelopment process of Liede Village from 2008 to 2010, and my bachelor thesis was written based on this experience. Besides, there was the opportunity to conduct participant observation of the negotiations and decision-making processes of urban village regeneration in two other villages. Regular observations of Enning Road redevelopment project have followed since 2010. As a member of an organization known as the Enning Academic Group, stable and close relationships with residents in the Enning Road community were established. During the fieldwork, large amounts of documents were collected, such as petition letters written by residents, photos, governmental announcements posted in the neighborhood, and internal notes by the organization. Field visits to Kingway Brewery were completed in 2015 and 2016; since the project is still at a very preliminary phase of implementation, not much change has been observed from 2014 to 2016.

(2) Interview

Concerning Xiasha village, six semi-structured interviews with planners, lawyers, and villagers were completed from 2009 to 2011. Concerning Enning Road, 20 semi-structured interviews were conducted with planners, residents, journalists, officials,
NGO members, and more in 2012. A latter visit in Xiasha and Enning Road in 2015 was used for an additional 19 semi-structured interviews. The interviews with planners, officials, residents, and journalists in the three cases study were conducted anonymously as most of the interviewees hold certain work positions in the projects in this study and discussed sensitive subjects. Eight semi-structured interviews were conducted with planners and officials concerning the Kingway Brewery redevelopment in 2015 and 2016.

(3) Policy and Planning Document

Policy documents in Guangzhou and Shenzhen and planning documents related to the three case studies were collected from planning institutes, websites, and other relevant sources. Relevant news and reports were collected from the internet.

2.2.3 Data Analysis: Discourse Analysis

In recent years, discourse analysis has been widely used in various social science disciplines. Based on social science tradition, several strands of discourse analysis have been developed, grounded on different social theories from Laclau, Mouffe, Bourdieu, and Foucault. Since the 1970s, Foucault had a substantial impact on discourse analysis. The method of discourse analysis which is inspired by Foucault’s definition of discourse and power, has been acknowledged by academics as one of the most important methods. Researchers from many different disciplines like geography, planning, and politics have undertaken discourse analysis as a way to understand the dynamics of political processes (Hajer, 1993; Flybjerg, 1998; Richardson, 2000; Dryzek, 2005). The definition of discourse varies in accordance with the methods of discourse analysis based on various traditions. Hajer defined discourse as “an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practice” (Hajer, 2006: 67). Based on Foucault’s theories and the theory of knowledge by Berger and Luckmann, the German sociologist Reiner Keller (2005) promoted the widely recognized “Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse.”

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Many researchers applied an interpretive or post-positivist approach to understand policy making in governance contexts (Fischer, 2003; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Dryzek, 2005). Since the cognitive turn in policy analysis in the 1980s, policy learning has aroused social scientists’ interest, and they came to acknowledge the capacity of the state and its bureaucracy in producing and utilizing knowledge and experience in policy innovation (Borrás, 2011). There has been a “discursive turn” in urban research during the last two decades, and discourse analysis has been used as an effective and useful analytic tool in urban studies (Hastings, 1999; Jacobs & Manzi, 2000; Lees, 2004; Mazza & Rydin, 1997). Atkinson (1999: 60) indicated that “discourse determines what can be legitimately included in and what is excluded from debates. A discourse produces its own ‘regime of truth’ in which knowledge and power are inextricably bound together.” Therefore, the close relationship of discourse, knowledge and power proves the necessity of discourse analysis in order to understand the role of knowledge in urban regeneration. Richardson (2002: 354) noted that “discourse theory puts the spotlight on the boundaries of thought and action. Using these tools reflexively is an attempt to first notice how these boundaries are established and maintained, and then to notice the effects of this closing down process.” Hidding et al. (2000: 129) pointed out that “each of us – academics, policy makers, politicians – tends to think within a discourse. But we do not need to be imprisoned within it. Moreover, being made aware of what we have been taking for granted … can be liberating, academically and politically.” In addition, they further suggested that discourse analysis necessitates the researcher gaining a view of the problem from the “outside” in order to recognize the hidden assumptions and practices that form the rules of discourse formation (ibid). Hajer (2006) proposed three concepts including metaphor, story line, and discourse coalition to conduct discourse analyses in practice. Besides, he also further suggested ten detailed steps of discourse analysis (see Table 2). This research applies the methodological approach promoted by Hajer (2006), which is founded on Foucault’s concepts of power relations and discourse.
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<tr>
<td><strong>Table 2. Ten steps of doing discourse analysis promoted by Hajer (2006)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Desk research: to make a first chronology and come up with a first reading of events</td>
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<td>2. “Helicopter interview”: interview with three or four actors that have the overview of the field</td>
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<td>3. Document analysis: get a basic notion of the process of events as well as the sites of discursive production</td>
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<td>4. Interviews with key players: to get a better understanding of the meaning of particular events for the interviewees</td>
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<td>5. Site of argumentation: searching for data to reconstruct the argument and account for the argumentative exchange</td>
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<td>6. Analysis for positioning effects: actors can get “caught up” in an interplay</td>
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<td>7. Identification of key incidents: it is essential to understand the discursive dynamics in the chosen case</td>
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<td>8. Analysis of practices in particular cases of argumentation: to see if the meaning of what is being said can be related to the practices in which it was said</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Interpretation: find a discursive order that governed a particular domain in a particular time</td>
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<td>10. Second visit to key actors: a way of controlling if the analysis of the discursive space made sense</td>
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Source: Adapted from Hajer, 2006: 73-74
Chapter 3 Urban Regeneration in Guangzhou and Shenzhen

The research is mainly focused on the governance of urban regeneration in Guangzhou and Shenzhen in the Pearl River Delta. These cities have benefited from China’s reform and opening up since 1978, and they have pioneered innovations to extensively exploit the chances offered by the reform. A review of the structural policy evolution and pilot project practices since the 1980s through policy narratives and discursive practices contribute to a closer examination of interplay among actors, institutional innovation, and practices. In addition, this kind of examination also enables reflection on knowledge utilization, production, and transfer in urban regeneration in Guangzhou and Shenzhen from the macro and meso levels. Policy innovations shed light on structural problem and strategy framing by authorities and also indicate the dominant values and rationales during different periods. The changing roles of various actors in urban regeneration in both cities indicate the conceptual evolution of governance and urban regeneration. Moreover, an overview of policymaking and practices in the two cities enables the comparison of governance, institutional innovation, and knowledge dynamics in Guangzhou and Shenzhen, thus facilitating further analysis of the main elements that influence the structures of governance in both cities. Guangzhou and Shenzhen are associated with each other, which includes both cooperation and competition. Guangzhou, as the traditionally dominant city in the Pearl River Delta, has gradually been confronted with the intra-regional competition from Shenzhen, which grew very rapidly from a rural area into a modern metropolis by grasping the opportunities offered by market liberalization (Zacharias & Tang, 2010).
3.1 Different Stages of Urban Regeneration in Guangzhou

3.1.1 Stage One: 1949-1978

Due to the shortage of funding for housing construction, the government encouraged private owners, tenants, and work units (also called Danwei) to renovate the housing since the year 1952. The municipal government promoted the strategy called “public sponsored self-construction” (zijian gongzhu), which means funding, construction, and design by the house owner themselves, with support from the work units on loan and construction material, and support from the state and community on construction material and technology. During the transition period of national economy from 1960 to 1965, the renovation of old dilapidated housing was executed through converting a large amount of wooden huts into houses of bricks and hybrid structure in order to address housing shortage. By 1966, about 10,000 wooden huts had been renovated. In the 1970s, Guangzhou set up the Unified Residential Construction Office, which was responsible for unified land acquisition, planning, construction, organization, and management. According to the welfare housing provision system during the planned economy era, the housing demolition, reconstruction, and reallocation of employees were conducted by the work units. In other urban communities, only sporadic urban

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renovation based on government subsidies were executed. In 1953, the state issued the regulation called “Methods of Land Expropriation for Construction” (Government Administration Council of the Central People’s Government, 1953), as the first law concerning urban housing demolition in China.

For a long time, urban regeneration institution was at an embryonic state in China. Urban development of Guangzhou during this period focused on housing renovation in historical inner-city areas with little amount of demolition.

3.1.2 Stage Two: 1979-1990

In the 1980s, urban regeneration in Guangzhou mainly focused on the renovation of old dilapidated housing. From 1981 to 1986, the urban regeneration strategy applied was sporadic renovation dominated by government. Sporadic urban regeneration was executed in small scale due to a shortage of funding. In 1987, the Dilapidated Housing Renovation, Construction, and Management Bureau was established, as the specialized institute responsible for the investigation, registration, and demolition of dilapidated housing. In the late 1980s, the market started to participate in urban regeneration in Guangzhou. In 1987, land-use reform was initiated in Guangdong province. It deregulated property development, albeit within the confines of the socialist system. The state retained ownership of land, but land use rights could now be transferred or leased to developers. The government could still expropriate or demand rights to use collectively owned land, but it had to reasonably compensate peasants. Land-use taxes started to be charged from users. In 1989, the law of land-use rights transfer in Shenzhen furthered the split between ownership and land use. The land value of urban villages immediately skyrocketed, and the expropriation compensation standard also increased rapidly. Especially after land reform in 1987, massive process of redevelopment in city center and expansion of new areas were triggered by the introduction of land market (Xu & Yeh, 2003). With the transition from welfare housing system to housing marketization, housing provision by real estate companies has become the increasingly dominating means. Therefore, market actors became very actively involved in urban regeneration in the late 1980s, for example in the redevelopment of Dongfeng community in Yuexiu District and Jinhua Street community in Liwan District. The both projects were initiated as experimental projects during that period. In 1992, the Land Development Center of Guangzhou was
established and Municipal Land Acquisition Office was established in 1995, indicating the preliminary formation of urban land market management system. Since the 1980s, the funding for urban regeneration in Guangzhou has expanded from the only finance support from government to more diversified resources, like foreign capital, loans from bank, land transaction income, and more. However, the strategy of involving markets in urban redevelopment turned out to be problematic and controversial, as the relocation of local residents was not addressed well in practice. Therefore, such urban regeneration strategy was adjusted, and large-scale comprehensive renovation was suspended. Meanwhile, main efforts were directed towards urban regeneration driven by municipal infrastructure construction at local level, like subway, streets, and green space construction.

3.1.3 Stage Three: 1991-1999

In the 1990s, the reform of the housing system and tax decentralization led directly to the tremendous development of the real estate market in Guangzhou, which increased the demand of land development in inner urban areas, and thus provided a great impulse to urban regeneration in China. Since the 1990s, Guangzhou government encouraged developers to participate in urban regeneration, and hereafter many projects were executed through urban regeneration strategies, which indicated a shift from housing renovation to a property-led redevelopment approach in a much larger scale. The government required the proportion of the building area for relocation and for sale to be 4:6, which means 40% of the new housing had to be used for the relocation of the original residents, and 60% could be sold in the real estate market. Developers were very motivated to participate in the old town redevelopment, as the government also granted tax exemptions, lowered loan interest on bank loan, and provided an infrastructure construction fund. This strategy resulted in high floor area ratios, and the destruction of old urban fabric and historical architectures (Lin, 2011). The Liwan square redevelopment, which was executed in 1996 as the biggest urban regeneration project at that time, was one of the most typical and controversial examples of this period. It received a lot of criticism, as it caused severe damage to the traditional urban fabric and historical architectures. Problems concerning demolition, investment, and relocation emerged from those projects with developers’ participation, due to the conflicts of housing demolition and compensation, and financial crisis of the
developers. Some projects failed to complete the relocation of former property owners and tenants. Therefore, government issued a ban on developers’ participation in urban regeneration in Guangzhou. After the ban, which remained in force from 1999 till 2006, the funding in old town regeneration needed to be shared by the municipality, district government and private property owners. Due to the lack of funding, this strategy greatly reduced the scale of regeneration in Guangzhou. During this period, old town regeneration was mainly executed due to construction of transport facility. The inner ring road and subway projects, initiated in order to relieve traffic jam, caused large destruction of historic Qilou buildings. Meanwhile, housing renovation, street beautification (e.g. urban greening), and municipal infrastructure improvement that were supposed to improve urban image were event-driven since 1995, when Guangzhou had decided to hold the 9th National Sports Games in 2001. Since 1998, Guangzhou government tried to encourage renovation of dilapidated housing through promoting a three-phase urban development strategy named “minor change in one year, medium change in three years and major change in ten years.” In 1999, Guangzhou government issued a policy called “Implementation Strategy of Dilapidated Housing Renovation in Guangzhou” (Guangzhou Municipal Government, 1999). During this period, the dilapidated housing regeneration was mainly funded by financial investment from government and most of the upgrading efforts were limited to urban beautification programs of main streets. In 2000, Guangzhou Land Resource and Housing Management Bureau issued the document called “Notice on Relative Problems of Reducing Land Use Fee in Dilapidated Housing Demolition and Renovation Projects” (Guangzhou Land Resource and Housing Management Bureau, 2000), in order to increase the social investment in dilapidated housing regeneration. Urban redevelopment progress in Guangzhou lagged behind Shanghai and Beijing, where a number of large-scale redevelopment projects have been carried out using public and private investment since the 1990s (He, 2012). On the one hand, urban regeneration in Guangzhou was slower and smaller in scale, compared to Beijing and Shanghai. On the other hand, the old town image and fabric in Guangzhou have been maintained due to this reason. In tandem with the development of urban regeneration in the 1990s, the institution of demolition and compensation was gradually established. The first national regulation about urban demolition and management called “Regulations on Demolition and Management of Urban Housing” (State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 1991) was issued in 1991. In 1992, Guangzhou municipal
government published the first relevant policy called “Regulation on Demolition and Management of Urban Housing in Guangzhou” (Guangzhou Municipal government, 1992). With the rapid influx of industry and migrant population since the 1990s, urban villages gradually formed with increasing building density surrounded by the urban fabric after the agricultural land expropriation by the government, as result of rapid urbanization.

3.1.4 Stage Four: 2000-2006

Many urban regeneration projects in inner old town were postponed since the year 1999, and urban growth shifted from the inner town to urban expansion both in policy and practice. Urban expansion by incremental space development was promoted by the “Urban Development Strategic Concept Plan of Guangzhou (2010-2020),” which was completed and published in 2000, and became a turning point in the urban development of Guangzhou. The plan promoted the strategy of “exploring to the south, optimizing the north, moving to the east, connecting the west” (Nantuo, Beiyou, Dongyi, Xilian). In 2000, two new districts called Panyu and Huadu were established by transforming from independent cities into districts of Guangzhou, and another two new districts called Nansha and Luogang were established in 2004. The development of new districts not only reduced the pressure on development in the inner urban core area, but also provided the municipal government with a large amount of financial revenue through land transfer fee in new district development. During this period, urban regeneration in Guangzhou was quite slow for two reasons: the development strategy focused on new urban districts instead of inner urban areas, and the ban of forbidding developers’ involvement resulted in a lack of funds for urban regeneration. Meanwhile, urban regeneration in other cities of China accelerated since 2000. With more and more conflicts with regard to urban demolition, the “Demolition and Management Regulation of Urban Housing” which was issued in 1991, proved to be insufficient to deal with the critical issue of compensation and relocation in urban regeneration. The revised regulation called “Demolition and Management Regulation of Urban Housing” (State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2001) was published in 2001. It claimed that compensation has to be made according to the market price estimation based on specific location, utilization, building area, and more. Besides, there followed more policies concerning demolition and compensation, like
the “Urgent Notice on Maintain Social Stability during Housing Demolition (No. 234)” (State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2003), “Guiding Opinions on Price Estimation of Urban Housing” (Ministry of Construction, 2003a), and “Procedure of Administrative Adjudication of Urban Housing Demolition” (Ministry of Construction, 2003b) in 2003. In the same year, the revised local regulation called “Methods of Urban Housing Demolition and Management in Guangzhou” (Standing Committee of Guangzhou Municipal People’s Congress, 2003) was issued in Guangzhou, providing clearer definition on the compensation means of property rights replacement and housing relocation. Inner city regeneration has been accelerated in order to improve city image, since Guangzhou government won the bid to hold 2010 Asian Games in 2004. Meanwhile, regeneration of urban villages in Guangzhou aroused tremendous attention from the government and urban researchers in Guangzhou since the 2000s (Zhang, 2003; Lan, 2005)

3.1.5 Stage Five: From 2007 Onwards

In 2006, Guangzhou government promoted a strategy of “inner adjustment” (zhongtiao). In the same year, the mayor of Guangzhou announced to cancel the ban on developers’ participation in urban regeneration in Guangzhou. Since 2007, a few comprehensive experimental urban regeneration projects were initiated, including Enning road redevelopment, Donghaochong-Southern Yuexiu comprehensive redevelopment, Nanhuaxi redevelopment, and redevelopment of Liede Village10, which was the first comprehensively redeveloped urban village in Guangzhou. Meanwhile, developers were allowed to participate in the redevelopment process again. In 2007, the “Law of Property Rights” (The National People’s Congress, 2007) came into effect. In 2008, the document called “Guiding Opinions on Old Dilapidated Housing Demolition, Compensation, and Reallocation in Guangzhou (trial)” (Guangzhou Land Resource and Housing Management Bureau, 2008) was issued. In 2007, Guangzhou government had started supporting the development of the service sector regarding dilapidated factories regeneration through the strategy termed as “Suppress the Secondary Industry and Develop the Tertiary Industry” (tui er jin san). In 2009, another document entitled “Guiding Opinions on Demolition, Compensation and

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10 Liede Village is the first comprehensively reconstructed urban village in Guangzhou since the municipal government has stopped prohibiting real estate developers from participating in urban village reconstruction. The general reconstruction strategy of Liede was “led by the municipal and district governments with the village as the main executive actor.”
Reallocation in Old Town Regeneration of Guangzhou (trial)” (Guangzhou Land Resource and Housing Management Bureau, 2009) was issued. In 2008, “Planning Guidelines for Reformation and Development in Pearl River Delta” (National Development and Reform Commission, 2008) was published by the central government in December 2008. Based on this guideline and also the urban regeneration experience in Foshan city, Guangdong province promulgated a policy called “Several Opinions on Promoting the Redevelopment of Three Olds to Increase Land Use Efficiency (No. 78)” (Guangdong Province Government, 2009) in 2009. Three olds redevelopment became the experimental and innovative urban regeneration strategy especially applied in Guangdong. The new institutional arrangement regarding “three old” policy is to involve existing users of the land directly in the renewal process and to assign them a significant share of any profits emanating from the redevelopment” (Lin, 2015: 875). Based on this policy, the Department of Land and Resources of Guangdong Province announced a series of guidelines and policies concerning urban regeneration process in a few cities in Guangdong as experimental cities, like Dongguan, Foshan, and Shenzhen. To meet the demand of economy restructuring, industry upgrading through evicting the old industrial out of urban area in Guangzhou also become an important task. Therefore, Guangzhou issued an ordinance to remove over 300 manufacturing sites that were considered environmentally unfriendly and hazardous from its urban core, and replace them with companies providing professional services in 2009. In the same year, Guangzhou government claimed to complete the regeneration of 138 urban villages within ten years, and comprehensive redevelopment would be executed in 52 of the 138 villages within three or five years. The strategy of urban village regeneration was guided by the so called “one village one policy,” which means every village has its own compensation policy, and the regeneration needs to be led by collective organization of village under the principle of “whoever invests, benefits.” Another three policies entitled “Implementation Opinions on Promoting Old Town Regeneration in Guangzhou” (Guangzhou Municipal Government, 2009a), “Implementation Opinions

11 In 2007, the Foshan city issued the Decisions on Promoting Old Town, Old Factories and Old Villaged Redevelopment, and experimental practice of various collaborative redevelopment strategies have been executed in Foshan in order to improve land use efficiency.

12 These manufacturing sites were required to move out of the urban core within a mandatory time frame, and a heavy fine would be imposed for any delay or noncompliance.
on Promotion of Urban Village (Old Village) Renovation and Transformation in Guangzhou” (Guangzhou Municipal Government, 2009b) and “Implementation Opinions on Land Disposal in Old Factories Redevelopment in Guangzhou” (Guangzhou Municipal Government, 2009c) were issued in 2009. According to “Implementation Opinions on Promotion of Urban Village (Old Village) Renovation and Transformation in Guangzhou”, 60% of the land transaction income would be used for the collective economic development of the village, and the remaining 40% would be shared by municipal and district government, using a 8:2 ratio. Government’s share would be invested in infrastructure construction and public service. Since then, the developers and village committees are active in urban village regeneration, as they were allowed to conduct land transactions through negotiations instead of compulsory public auction, and the transformation of rural collective into state land. Meanwhile, the two regulations of “Opinions on Strengthening Special Finance Management of Three Old Redevelopment” (Guangzhou Three Old Redevelopment Office, Guangzhou Finance Bureau, 2010a) and “Opinions on Finance Monitoring of Reconstruction and Resettlement in Old Village Redevelopment Projects” (Guangzhou Three Old Redevelopment Office, Guangzhou Finance Bureau, 2010b) were issued in 2010. The Guangzhou Government published the document called “Opinions on Accelerating and Promoting Three Old Redevelopment (No.56)” (Guangzhou Municipal government, 2009d) in 2009. According to this document, the principle of “government guidance and market participation” was promoted, and Municipal and Project offices of Three Old Redevelopment were established. In 2010, “Planning Guidelines for Old Town Regeneration in Guangzhou” (Guangzhou Planning Bureau, 2010) were published. In 2011, the state published the Regulation of Housing Expropriation and Compensation on State-owned Land (State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2011). In 2012, the municipal government issued the document of “Supplement Opinions on Accelerating and Promoting Three Old Redevelopment (No.20)” Guangzhou Municipal Government, 2012), according to which the principle of “guidance of government, planning in advance, redevelopment by area, infrastructure in priority, differential approaches, saving and intensive,” and “land reserve by government” was promoted and emphasized. Consequently, the market became less motivated to participate in the regeneration as this policy had increased the restrictions on the market.
Due to the conflicts concerning compensation and redevelopment, the progress of urban regeneration in Guangzhou had been slowed down since 2010. In 2015, the Urban Regeneration Bureau as the first urban regeneration bureau in China, was established in Guangzhou based on renovation of the former “three old” regeneration office. In 2015 Guangzhou government issued the so-called “One Plus Three” policy of urban regeneration, including “Methods of Urban Regeneration in Guangzhou (No. 134)” (Guangzhou Municipal Government, 2015a), “Implementation Methods of Old Village Regeneration of Guangzhou” (Guangzhou Municipal Government, 2015b), “Implementation Methods of Old Factory Regeneration of Guangzhou” (Guangzhou Municipal Government, 2015c), and “Implementation Methods of Old Town Regeneration of Guangzhou” (Guangzhou Municipal Government, 2015d). According to the Methods of Urban Regeneration in Guangzhou, the principle of “guidance by government, implementation by market, overall planning, saving and intensive land use, interest sharing, fair and transparent” is promoted. At the same time, the new strategy of micro regeneration, and urban regeneration funding were promoted. In 2016, one document entitled “Implementation Opinions on Further Strengthening Urban Planning and Construction Management (No.9)” (Guangzhou Municipal Government, 2016) was issued by the municipal government. According to this document, urban regeneration is considered as a critical approach to improve urban spatial quality. Meanwhile, the document of “Notice on Improving “Three Olds” Redevelopment to Promote Intensive and Efficient Land Use (No. 96)” (Guangdong Province Government, 2016) was issued by the Guangdong province government in 2016. According to this document, the regulations on planning control and guidance, interest distribution, and monitoring system have been revised and improved. In 2017, the “Master Planning of Urban Regeneration in Guangzhou (2015-2020)” was issued. It promoted a change of mindset of property-oriented development and land transfer, and states that the urban regeneration in the next five years should focus on the three goals of improving the living environment improvement, industry transformation and upgrading, and historical and cultural preservation.

3.2 Different Stages of Urban Regeneration in Shenzhen

A lot of market-liberation policies have been carried out in Shenzhen since the early 1980s. The location of Shenzhen on the border with Hong Kong provides Shenzhen a privileged channel of communication with the outside world, which is unique opportunity unknown to other cities in China (Zacharias & Tang, 2010). The establishment of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) has turned Shenzhen into an experimental area for market transition in the name of “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” The administrative boundaries have divided the region into areas governed by different institutions, including the border between Shenzhen and Hong Kong, and also the second boundary between Shenzhen SEZ and the mainland of China.

3.2.1 Stage One: 1978-1991

The Open Door Policy, a comprehensive program to modernize the socialist Chinese economy introduced by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, initiated an increase in foreign trade and investment, a decentralization of economic decision-making, and a gradual legalization of land transactions is initiated. In 1980, four SEZs were established in Guangdong Province: Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen. Shenzhen SEZ had a total area of 375 square kilometers and comprised a long east-western stretch of flat land south of a mountain range facing the Shenzhen Bay that separates the western part of the city from the new territories of Hong Kong. State-owned enterprises were appointed to undertake comprehensive urban planning, construction and management in the early years of development. For example, Shekou Industrial District was owned and developed by the China Merchant Steam Navigation Company (shekou zhaoshangju). Starting from predominant urban growth strategies after the policy of reform and opening up, the first two decades of rapid urban growth in Shenzhen were characterized by uncontrolled development bringing about the phenomenon of urban villages in the urban core despite early regulations for the development of villages dating back to the 1980s and thereby preceding the major waves of immigration (Wang et al., 2009). The so-called urban villages gradually formed during this period. The state started to expropriate former agricultural areas in the villages provide space for urban development. In parallel, former peasants were able to conduct a lot of self-construction activities on the territory they still controlled. They intended to earn profit by renting out rooms to accommodate the increasing amount of migrants and floating
population coming as laborers to the city when industrial development started to flourish in Shenzhen. In 1982, the first official document concerning urban villages in Shenzhen, which is called “Interim Regulation of Construction Land of Villages in Shenzhen Special Economic Zones (No. 185)” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 1982a) was issued by the government. According to this document, it was required that construction of villages had to be based on comprehensive planning and design after being approved by the municipal planning bureau. The policy stated that the land area per household should be 150 square meters and the basal building area per household is limited to 80 square meters in new villages. It indicated that the old villages would be expropriated by the government when new villages were planned and built, but the villagers were still allowed to use them temporarily. In 1982, “Provisions of Forbidding Illegal and Private Construction of Houses in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 1982b) were issued in order to prohibit unauthorized self-construction. Although the chaotic illegal construction activity in the SEZ decreased slightly, private occupation of land and private illegal construction still took place. Therefore, a document entitled “Supplementary Provisions of Forbidding Illegal and Private Construction of Houses in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 1983) was issued in 1983. The announcement of urban regeneration projects or planning often lead to illegal construction on the areas to be demolished. Therefore, the government needed to employ patrols and establish cameras to monitor illegal construction.

After Deng’s visit to Guangdong province in January 1984, several coastal cities and the island of Hainan received the status of Special Economic Zone. The visit strengthened the success of the SEZs and of Shenzhen in particular (Chung et al. 2001: 41). In 1986, the Shenzhen government therefore published a policy called “Notice of Further Reinforcement of Village Planning in Shenzhen Special Economic Zones” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 1986), which claimed that private buildings in villages should normally not be more than three floors in height, and floor area per capita should not exceed 40 square meters. Based on this policy, construction lines were demarcated in Futian District, but the required follow-up work was not completed due to various reasons. Suspending construction approval resulted in the intensification of illegal construction activities, though within a certain demarcated range of areas, and most buildings did not have more than five floors. To deal with the problem of
illegal construction, the government tried to issue a series of related policies. In 1987, a policy called “Interim Management Methods of Illegal Land Use and Building Construction in Special Economic Zone” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 1987) was issued, defining the situation of illegal land use and construction, and promoting penalties. In 1988, this was followed by a regulation called “Decisions on Problems Regarding Illegal Land Use Management and Land-Use Registration by Shenzhen Municipal Government” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 1988). Compared to the regulation from 1987, it defined the illegal land use types more specifically and set out corresponding penalties concerning illegal land use by state institutes, administration and enterprise units, private entities, and villagers. According to the regulation, the year 1982 when No. 185 regulation was issued served as a cut-off date in the identification of illegal land use in urban villages.

In 1989, the government started comprehensive land expropriation in Shenzhen with the promulgation of two regulations called “Provision of Land Expropriation in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 1989a) and “Demolition and Compensation Methods of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 1989b). The latter provided compensation standards for various projects. Those types of regulations and land expropriation by the state caused villagers to panic and resulted in a rush towards mass illegal construction. As a consequence, the government came up with a document called “Emergency Notification On Suppression of Illegal Land Use and Unauthorized Land Lease in Villages” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 1989c) in November 1989.

The dynamic growth that had taken place in this stage could easily be accommodated by an expansion of the built-up area. The road infrastructure allowed for city development in the north and west of the historic core of Shenzhen next to the Hong Kong border and around the port area in Shekou. Despite the widespread illegal construction in the villages, no major efforts were undertaken to upgrade or redevelop the existing parts of the city.

3.2.2 Stage Two: 1992-1999
In 1992, Deng Xiaoping’s “second tour” of the Pearl River Delta reaffirmed the importance and status of the Special Economic Zones. Meanwhile, measures to promote the urbanization and transformation of urban villages were carried out since the early 1990s. In 1992, a regulation called “Interim Regulation of Urbanization of villages in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 1992) was issued. According to the regulation, the urbanization of urban villages was to be implemented in social, political, administrative and economic terms. Villagers were granted local citizenship by transforming their rural villager hukous\(^{14}\) to urban citizen status. Land ownership was transformed from collectively owned land administered by the villagers to state-owned land. The original village committee, which was responsible for both the economic development of the village collective and villagers’ self-organization, was transformed into a so-called joint stock company (JSC) that focused on managing the economic assets of the village, while the community management was taken over by newly established residents’ committees and street offices. In 1994, the municipal planning department stopped issuing approvals for private building construction, and during this period there was a management vacancy concerning private and industry construction in urban villages. With the rapid and intensive development of real estate, illegal construction expanded from within the area of the Special Economic Zone to two newly established districts called Bao’an and Longgang outside the Special Economic Zone in 1993. Now, illegal buildings might have even about seven or eight floors. In 1999, there followed a policy called “Decision on Prohibition against Illegal Construction” (Standing Committee of the Shenzhen Municipal People’s Congress, 1999), which defined the types of illegal building specifically, but the respective disposal measures were not specific enough, and still lacked workable implementation details about the management of private housing construction. Another round of illegal construction blossomed, and the problems of urban villages became even more severe. As illegal construction penalties were not implemented strictly according to the 1999 policy, most of the villagers carried out illegal construction at great speed from 1999 to 2001, referring to this as “catching the last bus” of illegal construction. Some buildings reached up to 12 floors, and meanwhile, the village environment deteriorated. Besides, villagers refused to give

\(^{14}\) Hukou (huji) in mainland China refers to the household registration, which defines urban or rural residency status. Hukou is closely associated with the mobility, and exclusion of rural migrant workers in the city.
up using the old villages or hand them over to the government after the construction of new villages was completed. Nevertheless, although the situation could obviously not be controlled in the short run, the city government did not give up its general attitude towards illegally built houses, which were exempted from compensation schemes laid down for the demolition of houses in the “Measures of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone on House Demolition” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 1998) from 1991, revised several times throughout the 1990s.

Even during this stage, urban development was dominated by a vast expansion of Shenzhen’s built-up area. Consequently, stage two has seen only one major regeneration project, the redevelopment of Dongmen Old Town Area15 (1998-2001). Apart from this project, urban regeneration remained at an embryonic state, while key decisions for the major developments in the SEZ such as the new Central Business District (CBD) in Futian district were already prepared.

3.2.3 Stage Three: 2000-2008

Urban regeneration and a restructuring of existing urban fabric have been driven by growing pressure on available land resources. The limitation of the available land resources had come up for the first time with the boom of real estate in the late 1980s, and was intensified by foreign investment in the 1990s, fierce population growth, the development pressure on the existing CBD in Luohu, and the difficulty for the central government to allocate a sufficient amount of land for development as large proportion of land are eco green area which are strictly legally controlled from urban development. It could only be overcome temporarily with the incorporation of the outlying districts, but kept on being a pressing issue. An intensification of the densities in already built-up areas with the help of urban regeneration and redevelopment was therefore considered crucial (Wuttke et al. 2010). In this context, two important regulations were issued in 2001, called “Provisions of Dealing with Illegal Historical Industrial and Commercial Buildings in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2001a) and “Provisions of Dealing with Illegal Historical Private Buildings in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone” (Shenzhen Municipal

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15 The historic core of the city with a population of around 30,000 had traditionally served as a provincial border town and trading center before 1978. With the growth of the SEZ in stage one, it became the center of its commercial center that did not serve the needs of the bustling city anymore.
According to the two regulations, the illegal historical buildings constructed before the policy called “Decision on Prohibition against Illegal Construction of Shenzhen People’s Representative Committee” was issued in 1999, were encouraged to register and obtain legitimized property rights again after a survey and paying a fine. District governments were to deal with the respective cases. Although the provisions confirmed the will to punish unwilling land abusers, they showed a first sign of flexibility in terms of amnesty and belated legalization. However, another round of illegal construction happened after the two regulations were issued. As villagers had already successfully carried out illegal construction activities for several years, they found that, for a long time, the government’s penalty on illegal construction was not implemented strictly. Besides, they also perceived a lot of concessions and tolerance from the government, demonstrated by the continuous adjustment of the definition of illegal buildings in the issued policies. Villagers obeying the rules lost a lot of profit compared to those who broke them. Some illegal buildings grew as high as 15 floors and had lift. Interestingly, the provision dealing with private buildings stated in much detail that smaller private houses up to four floors and a total of 480 square meters constructed by villagers were even to be exempted from paying a fine, while exceeding stories and second homes were to be fined incrementally.

In order to carry out the redevelopment of urban villages, the first Reconstruction Bureau was established in Futian District in 2003. While the “urbanization” of urban villages in Longgang and Bao’an was carried out in 2003, illegal construction in the two districts were accelerated within a few months. In the autumn of 2004, comprehensive urban village redevelopment was launched through holding the Mobilization Meeting of Urban Village Redevelopment and Illegal Construction Inventory (城中村改造暨违建清查动员大会), and later municipal and district urban village redevelopment bureaus were established. “Decisions on Prohibitions of Illegal Construction and Land Use by Shenzhen Municipal Government” (Shenzhen Municipal Committee of the CPC, Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2004) were issued, claiming that strict measures would be taken to demolish illegal buildings erected after 1999. In the same year, the government issued “Interim Regulations of Urban Village [old village] Redevelopment in Shenzhen” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2001b).
Government, 2004), which encouraged the redevelopment of urban villages and provided a series of incentivizing policies. In order to explore more effective measures to deal with urban village problems, Shenzhen’s Futian district government initiated a joint research project on urban villages in collaboration with six research and planning institutes in 2005, conducting investigations on 15 urban villages in the district. The final report from this research (Research Report of Urban Village Regeneration in Futian District, 2005) proved to be significant as it provided comprehensive analysis from various perspectives and summarized the rather critical standpoint on urban villages. A policy called “Implementation Opinions on Interim Regulations of Urban Villages [old villages] Redevelopment in Shenzhen” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2005) in the same year. The so-called “Master Planning Guidelines for Urban Villages (old villages) Redevelopment of Shenzhen City (2005-2010)” were completed and published too. The plan indicated that one feasible measure for transforming the illegal and ambiguous property rights into legitimate would be through comprehensive redevelopment of urban villages. Meanwhile, industrial site upgrading also attracted more attention from the government. In 2007, “Master Planning Guidelines of Industrial District Upgrading in Shenzhen (2007-2020)” were completed and published. In 2008, the municipal government decided to initiate industrial district upgrading, and the Municipal Industrial Upgrading Office was merged into the Municipal Urban Redevelopment Office. In order to promote industrial district redevelopment and relative management, the policy called “Opinions on Promoting Industry Districts Upgrading Experimental Projects in Shenzhen” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2008a) was issued in 2008, listing 11 specific experimental projects for industrial district upgrading. Relevant policies about specific problems like land use function change, land ownership, and implementation actors were issued later, for example, “Several Regulations on Industrial Land Use Rights Transfer” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2008b), and “Temporary Methods on Industrial Buildings Transfer in Shenzhen” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2008c). In order to support industry upgrading in Shenzhen, the policy entitled “Notice on Creative Industrial Housing Construction Scheme in Shenzhen” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2008d) was issued in 2008.
With the first major reorganization of the functional and infrastructural layout of the SEZ being implemented, Futian district had become the key link between the two initial hotspots of urbanization in Luohu and Shekou, where the new CBD, planned in several stages since the late 1980s, began to take shape. The areas influenced by the old center in Luohu and the new CBD in Futian district also became important arenas for urban regeneration.

The Huaqiangbei\textsuperscript{16} upgrading project started in 1998, converting an industrial area between the two centers into a major commercial zone. It was among the first, followed by the redevelopment of Caiwuwei\textsuperscript{17} west of Dongmen area after 2003. In the development axis south of the new CBD, the urban village of Yunong village\textsuperscript{18} was demolished to give way to a new commodity housing project after 2004, while Gangxia village at the east of the new CBD was also redeveloped, after long preparations dating back to 2004, starting in 2008 with a first effort to actively involve the villagers in the redevelopment process. It was also in stage three that the regeneration of industrial areas started to gain momentum with the comprehensive upgrading of Overseas Chinese Town (OCT\textsuperscript{19}), started in 2005.

3.2.4 Stage Four: 2009-2013

Since 2009, urban regeneration in Shenzhen has been accelerated, and its tasks of urban regeneration shifted from the upgrading of urban village and industrial districts upgrading to comprehensive urban regeneration across the whole of Shenzhen, also including old residential and business area regeneration. Based on the policy of “Several Opinions on Promoting the Redevelopment of Three Olds to Increase Land

\textsuperscript{16} In 1982 the Shangbu industrial district where a series of electronic manufacture enterprises were located was constructed. Since 1986 this area has developed as one well known electronic components trading market, and it became the largest electronic components production, wholesale and retail center since the 1990s. The municipal and district government initiated and funded the first period of regeneration in 1998 and the second upgrading and regeneration in Huangqiangebei area in 2006.

\textsuperscript{17} Caiwuwei was an urban village located in the central commercial area of Luohu district. In 2000, environmental improvement and facility upgrading funded by the village and government was executed. In 2003, the plan called Redevelopment and Planning Scheme for Caiwuwei Financial Central District was finished and approved. In 2005, it was confirmed that the whole redevelopment project would be implemented by the Real Estate Company of Jingji and Caiwuwei Joint Stock Company. However, the negotiation of demolition compensation and relocation was quite difficult, and was only finished by 2007. Relocation of the villagers to the new flats was completed by 2010. The tallest landmark building in this area called “Jingji 100” was finished in 2010.

\textsuperscript{18} Yunong village was the first completely demolished and reconstructed urban village in Shenzhen. The redevelopment was executed through the strategy of “dominated by government, implemented by the market, and in collaboration with the villagers.” The redevelopment project started in 2004 and was completed in 2007.

\textsuperscript{19} cf. www.octloft.cn
Use Efficiency” (Guangdong Province Government, 2009), Shenzhen issued the well-known “Methods of Urban Regeneration in Shenzhen” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2009a) in 2009, which provided specific guidance for carrying out comprehensive urban regeneration. It has been described as the first official systematic regulation on urban regeneration in China and can be seen as a significant step forward in terms of establishing a professionally managed urban regeneration strategy. With the urban regeneration measures, the city made an attempt at “standardizing” its regeneration activities. In particular, they define urban problems (Art. 2) as a prerequisite, foresee renewal processes to comply with general planning principles (Art. 3, 4), provide funding (Art. 6), allocate responsibilities for implementation (Art. 7, 8), and give urban renewal an area-based foundation with the definition of renewal units (Art. 11, 12). Different types of renewal (comprehensive improvement, functional change, demolition and reconstruction) defined in chapters 3-5 of “Methods of Urban Regeneration in Shenzhen” tailor the respective renewal strategies to the local requirements. In 2010, a series of supporting policies and regulations were issued, including “Opinions on Further Promoting Urban Regeneration” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2010), “Basic Practical Procedures of Urban Regeneration Projects of Demolition and Reconstruction (trial)” (Shenzhen Planning and Land Resource Committee, 2010a), “Guidelines on Plan Making and Application of Urban Regeneration Units in Shenzhen (trial)” (Shenzhen Planning and Land Resource Committee, 2010b) and “Provisional Regulations on the Proportion of Affordable Housing in Urban Regeneration Projects in Shenzhen” (Shenzhen Planning and Land Resource Committee, 2010c). In 2010, a programmatic document called “Special Planning of Urban Regeneration (Three Olds Redevelopment) in Shenzhen (2010-2015)” was completed, coordinating urban regeneration at the municipal level and providing guidance to delineation and comprehensive planning for urban regeneration units. In order to provide more detailed specific guidelines for practical urban regeneration in Shenzhen, more regulations were issued in 2012, including “Specific Rules on the Implementation of Urban Regeneration Methods in Shenzhen” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2012a) and the “Notice of Management Measures on Strengthening and Promoting Urban Regeneration Implementation in Shenzhen” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2012b). They further promoted the standardization and operability in urban regeneration practice. According to the specific rules, land that
is to be provided by the regeneration unit to the government in order to construct municipal infrastructure, public facilities and projects should now amount to less than 15% of the whole scope of regeneration but comprise more than 3000 square meters. The year of 2012 became a critical turning point that the land resource supply from redevelopment of built-up areas started to exceed the supply of non built-up land. Thus, urban regeneration became a very important resource for land use supply. The situation of land scarcity later became increasingly serious in this respect since the possibilities of a further annexation of land came to an end, the steep topography in some areas of the city limited the land resources available for development and non built-up areas became more and more valuable in ecological terms over time. Land scarcity is also a budgetary issue since the lease-out used to serve as an important source of income for the municipality. In 2013, an official guiding document called “Opinions on Optimizing Space Resources Allocation to Promote Industrial Upgrading and Transition” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2013) was issued, followed by six supporting documents thereafter.

Interestingly, this stage is also characterized by yet another change in the legal status of informal construction as stated in the “Decision of the Standing Committee of Shenzhen Municipal People’s Congress on Addressing Historical Illegal Buildings in the Process of Rural Urbanization” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2009b) from 2009. It referred to the transformation of urban villages that had taken place in the late 1990s and early 2000s and intended to survey all respective buildings not complying with formal rules within one year, allowing the municipal government to “differentiate the extent of offense of illegal buildings... and handle these buildings in batches step by step separately by affirming property right, dismantling or confiscating according to law or allowing temporary use according to these decisions” (Art. 5). Demolition was now foreseen for illegal buildings seriously hampering orderly development (Art. 9), confiscation for those that comply or do not seriously violate planning regulations (Art. 10), notwithstanding the possible permission of temporary use (Art. 11). A particularly striking fact is that the regulation foresees compensation and subsidy for the demolition of illegal buildings and requires proper consideration of the interests of villagers and their collective organizations (Art. 12). With the help of the more complex regulations, the city has not only continued its work on urban villages, but also prepared for the redevelopment of huge former industrial sites.
3.2.5 Stage Five: From 2014 Onwards

In 2014, based on a reflection on the limitation of existing policies, a new official document called “Temporary Management Measures on Strengthening and Promoting Urban Regeneration Implementation in Shenzhen (No.8)” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2014) came out, sharing the same name with the policy issued in 2012 and making clearer amendments based on the old policy. According to this upgrade, concerning the urban regeneration units applied by respective stakeholders for the demolition and reconstruction, the proportion of clear legal land tenure area which is legally registered should be no less than 60% within the demolition scope; and concerning the old industrial area that apply for comprehensive improvement, the proportion of clear legal land tenure area should be no less than 50% within the whole scope. Besides, concerning the demolition and reconstruction of illegal buildings or land use, it is required to contribute no less than 32% of land to the government as land reservation for public facility construction, while only 15% of land contribution is required for the regeneration of the legal building or land use. Therefore, the stakeholders including developers and villagers are stimulated to actively disclose the property rights held in the area as they could not initiate the redevelopment without meeting the precondition mentioned above. In 2014, the “Opinions on Improving Urban Regeneration Management System in Shenzhen” (Bureau of Personnel of Shenzhen Municipality, 2014) were issued. Based on this document, the Municipal Urban Regeneration Office was renamed as Municipal Urban Regeneration Bureau, which indicated that the power and administrative status of the institute has been elevated. Since then, a series of administrative reform on urban regeneration management has been promoted. In 2015, one document called “Decision on Experimental Site of Urban Regeneration Reformation in Luohu District” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2015a) was issued and it would be valid for two years. The reform was initiated as it has been gradually realized by the government that the time-consuming complicated application and approval procedure was the main obstacle to an efficient progress of urban regeneration. In 2009, the municipal urban regeneration office was responsible for the regeneration unit planning approval task. One researcher who worked in the respective office said that:

There are about two or three hundred projects that need to be checked, but we are totally unfamiliar with these projects and a lot of problems
emerged. For example, we can’t identify the materials that are faked, it is very difficult for us. Therefore, in the second year this preliminary checking is mainly carried out by district government, as they are much more familiar with the land parcel and also enterprises there. After the first step we will check and decide on the feasibility of the projects. In 2012, the urban regeneration office has been set up, so they also share the work of checking and approval, therefore the procedure becomes three levels. In 2014, one journalist made a list of all the administration procedures required in an urban regeneration project in Longgang, and he found that it would take about 600 days to go through all the procedures, and normally it takes three or four years to achieve urban regeneration approval from government. Therefore, the government decided to simplify the administration procedure and thus abolish the procedure of checking by urban regeneration office. (Interview on March 11, 2016)

In the practical project approval, it is found out from the interview that street office also took up some tasks for a certain period. The researcher who worked in that office said that:

In 2009 and 2010, the preliminary project checking task is even taken over by the street office, however, this procedure could not find any explanation on such means from regulations of urban regeneration. In the practice they found that the administrative efficiency in street offices is rather low, so this means of approval was abolished again. (Interview on March 11, 2016)

Such urban regeneration management and administration reform in order to improve the approval efficiency was carried out through converting various approvals granted by departments from different levels into a single approval, and also transferring the approval rights from a department of municipal level to the district level. After two years of practices, the experience of urban regeneration management reform has been promoted to apply at the city level. In this context, the document entitled “Decision on Implementaion of Urban Regeneration Reform” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2016a) was issued by Shenzhen municipal government in 2016. Since 2015, many district governments in Shenzhen have been active in making various regulations on urban regeneration approval. Therefore, it has been more challenging for the developers to understand the urban regeneration approval regulations, as they varied from district to district.

In 2015, a series of policies on planning ratio, land use conversion, land price calculation, land expropriation compensation, and exchange have been issued, which include “Technical Guidelines for Planning Plot Ratio Approval of Urban
Regeneration Unit in Shenzhen” (Shenzhen Urban Regeneration Bureau, 2015), “Disposal Methods on Regulating Land Use and Plot Ratio Change of Unconstructed Transferred Land” (Shenzhen Planning and Land Resource Committee, 2015a), “Notice on Relative Issues about Confirmation of Land Price Calculation” (Shenzhen Planning and Land Resource Committee, 2015b), “Regulations on Land Withdraw in Urban Regeneration in Shenzhen” (Shenzhen Planning and Land Resource Committee, 2015c), “Several Regulations on Relocation and Compensation in Land Expropriation and Land Exchange (trial)” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2015b), and “Temporary Usage Management Methods on Historical Illegal Buildings of Non-villagers in Shenzhen (Trial)” (Shenzhen Planning and Land Resource Committee, 2015d). Meanwhile, the housing levy and compensation regulations have also been revised and improved. In 2016, decisions by Shenzhen municipal government on revision of “Implementation Methods of Housing Levy and Compensation in Shenzhen (trial)” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2016b) and “Several Opinions on Improving Housing Levy and Compensation Mechanism (trial)” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2016c) were issued.

In 2016, “Urban Regeneration Planning for the 13th Five Years” (Shenzhen Planning and Land Resource Committee, 2016) in Shenzhen was published by the government, as the guiding document for the urban regeneration in Shenzhen. In 2016 the revised version of “Temporary Management Measures on Strengthening and Promoting Urban Regeneration Implementation in Shenzhen (No.38)” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2016d) was issued. According to this document, a key urban regeneration unit (zhongdian gengxin danyuan) was promoted (Art.9 & 10), legal land use proportion in urban regeneration projects has been decreased (Art. 11), land price calculation rules have been simplified, and increasing affordable housing supply through urban regeneration (Art. 20) has been promoted. Affordable housing for talent and creative industrial housing for industrial upgrading have been given more and more attention by the policy makers. In 2016, two policies titled “Regulations on Construction of Creative Industrial Housing in Urban Regeneration Projects in Shenzhen” (Shenzhen Planning and Land Resource Committee, 2016a) and “Regulations on Construction of Affordable Housing in Urban Regeneration Projects in Shenzhen” (Shenzhen Planning and Land Resource Committee, 2016b) were
published. Meanwhile, the “Methods of Urban Regeneration in Shenzhen” have also been revised based on feedback and experience from the urban regeneration practice since 2009, and the revised “Methods of Urban Regeneration in Shenzhen” were published in November 2016. Due to the urban regeneration management reform since 2015, the districts in Shenzhen became very active in issuing their own urban regeneration implementation methods, for example, “Implementation Methods of Urban Regeneration in Futian District (trial)” (Futian District Government, 2016) and “Implementation Methods of Urban Regeneration in Luohu District (trial)” (Luohu District Government, 2015).

3.3 Conclusion: Institutional Innovation in Guangzhou and Shenzhen

3.3.1 Policy and Practice Innovation Through Experimenting

Since 2009, institutional innovation in Guangzhou and Shenzhen has taken place at unprecedented speeds, with administrative restructuring and a series of “regulations,” “opinions,” “methods,” and “notices” being issued and revised continuously. Meanwhile, various experimental pilot projects have been implemented in Guangzhou and Shenzhen. Schoon (2014b) termed the governance of urban regeneration in the Pearl River Delta as “experimental governance.” For example, the implementation methods of urban regeneration in Shenzhen have been revised every two years since 2012, based on the evaluation and feedback of urban regeneration practice. Young et al. (2015: 171) argued that “experimentation/learning and scaling up are usually under the control of the central government” in China. For this reason, policy innovation is enabled through converting implicit knowledge into explicit and codified knowledge, and during this process, knowledge production and sharing contribute to institutional innovation. Shenzhen enjoyed relative autonomy and local entrepreneurial development due to an administrative position that was directly responsible to the central government and because of its SEZ status as a “window of China.” Besides, its peripheral geographical location allowed Shenzhen more opportunity for experimental practice and innovation (O’Connor & Liu, 2014).

Urban policy on area-based and integrated urban regeneration programs, which mostly target deprived urban neighborhoods, have been widespread throughout Europe over
the last decades, which resulted in the acknowledgement of complex multidimensional urban problems concentrated in specific areas (Tedesco, 2011). Meanwhile, this area-based approach greatly inspired the discourse and practices of community participation and urban governance in Europe. The “three old” program in Guangzhou and Shenzhen can be considered an area-based approach, as certain types of areas are defined for regeneration due to low land use efficiency, with supplemental policy support. There has been much more discourse on the necessity of urban regeneration due to land scarcity pressures in Shenzhen than in Guangzhou. Until the promotion of the “three old” redevelopment policy in 2009, there was no comprehensive concept for the urban regeneration of Guangzhou and Shenzhen. Before then, the regeneration of urban villages, old towns, and old industrial sites had been implemented by different departments and only in sporadic projects. The “three old” program greatly encouraged the notion of framing problems and strategies based on certain areas with the involvement of various actors. The advocacy for “micro regeneration” in Guangzhou since 2015 and the “comprehensive improvement” in Shenzhen since 2009 indicate the trend and applicability of an area-based regeneration approach due to increasingly complex interest relations between various stakeholders. With the building of consensus on urban regeneration, institutions for urban regeneration have gradually been established and matured. The definition of urban regeneration in both cities evolved with the increasingly structured and shared framing of problems and strategies. Experimental urban governance in Shenzhen and Guangzhou has been driven by pragmatism and learning. However, the boundaries between an area-based approach and a project-related approach are blurred, as top-down project-related redevelopment must be adapted into area-based regeneration, which is more responsive to local needs due to conflicts in urban regeneration in China.

3.3.2 Urban Regeneration and Land Politics

The policy discourses on the “three old” redevelopment in Guangzhou and Shenzhen were built on low land use efficiency. More specifically, the discourse that frames the importance and significance of urban regeneration is closely related to the scarcity of land available for urban development. The available land for construction in Shenzhen

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20 An official from the Planning and Land Resource Committee Center mentioned that “the Office of Urban Village Redevelopment changed to Urban Regeneration Office, and the differences between them are that the former focused on the restructuring of urban villages, while the latter focuses on urban regeneration as a whole” (Interview on March 17, 2010).
is limited compared to Guangzhou, as Guangzhou has more land resources from its urban expansion since the year 2000. Construction on undeveloped land is strictly controlled and monitored by the central government, as building on agricultural land is strictly forbidden. Against the urbanization background in China, the amount of land that can be urbanized is determined in a top-down model of “quotas.” The master planning of land use is made with reference to the “Land Management Law of PRC” (Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, 1986). The maximum amount of available land that can be developed is thus defined, first province by province and then city by city. A master plan, regional plan, detailed plan, and regulatory plan are all made based on the fundamental “Law of Urban and Rural Planning” (Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, 2007), which was issued from a revision of the former “Law of Urban Planning” (Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, 1989). Curien indicated that:

from the system of allocating land to be urbanized to the system of drawing up, approving, and modifying territorial planning documents, not to mention the corpus of urban planning laws and standards, the entire architecture of urban planning in China is interlinked and organized into a strict pyramid structure. (2014: 27)

Tax decentralization reform has enabled the local government to keep land revenue from state-owned land transactions, which fundamentally motivated the local government to depend greatly on urban expansion and the sale of land to balance its budget. The local state became more entrepreneurial, and it has developed more decision-making power and more income from land development. The Guangzhou government shows a greater dependency on land revenue than Shenzhen. Since the emergence of the land lease market in the 1980s, land questions have gradually dominated the urban politics of China.

The most common method to implement a state-owned land transaction is through the establishment of land development corporations, which borrow bank loans to construct infrastructure on the land that is for sale. This practice means that the so-called “land reserve” (referring to land expropriation by the government before redevelopment) has been mainly utilized in new district development and is also deployed in the old town regeneration in Guangzhou. However, this strategy needs a vast amount of capital for compensation and relocation in the early period of regeneration, while the land transfer
to gain capital unquestionably results in high building ratios and damage to the fabric of the old town. Compared to Shenzhen, the Guangzhou government has relied much more on land development. It became known as a “land-driven fiscal regime” and received criticism due to the resulting social inequality and financial risk (Wu, 2015b). Since 2008, there has been a growing fiscal deficit so that less and less money is available for public investment in Guangzhou, and under such context, the government has become involved at times and even dominated the land development. This interjection resulted in a lack of appeal in market forces to participate in the “three old” regeneration. Land revenue reached as high as 30% of the entire public fiscal income of Guangzhou in 2013. By comparison, in Shenzhen, the tax and added value income from industry play more important roles in public fiscal income, so the Shenzhen government is less dependent on land revenue income. As a result, the market players are more motivated and encouraged to participate directly in urban regeneration in Shenzhen than in Guangzhou.

3.3.3 Interplay of Government and Market in Urban Regeneration

The market has occupied an increasingly important role in urban regeneration in both Guangzhou and Shenzhen. Hsing (2012: 3) pointed out that “what makes the story of China’s great urban transformation even more intriguing is that the contradictions inherent to industrialization and urbanization are compounded by China’s simultaneous transformation from state socialism to a market-oriented economy.” In more closely comparing the relationship between government and market in Shenzhen and Guangzhou, the degree of market participation in the two cities shows strong differences. Markets are much more involved in urban regeneration practices in Shenzhen since it was granted a wider scope and more freedom to develop and experiment in the field of urban regeneration in the name of developing a “socialist market economy” after the reform and liberalization policy issued in 1978. Shenzhen was able to establish its own planning system, and it carried out a series of legislative innovations, which greatly contributed to knowledge production and institutional innovation. Wuttke et al. (2010:9) noted that “experiments with market mechanisms or administrative innovations have been frequently backed or at least tolerated by the central state” in Shenzhen. Meanwhile, Guangzhou promoted a ban on the participation of developers in its urban regeneration in 1996. Since the ban on
developer participation in urban regeneration, top-down redevelopment dominated by the government resulted in a lack of involvement of the market and private investment in urban regeneration in practice in Guangzhou. Until 1998, the old town regeneration management in Guangzhou was still characterized by the strategy of sporadic redevelopment, and comprehensive regeneration with market involvement was lacking. Although the ban was lifted in 2006, Guangzhou still applied the strategy of land banking through land expropriation, which was mainly deployed in new town redevelopment. Developers still found it difficult to participate in the early period of the old town regeneration projects. Planning being based on physical blueprints proved to be inefficient in trying to cope with various stakeholders’ pursuit of interest based on property institutions within the context of the market economy. It was therefore necessary to produce relevant technical and institutional knowledge concerning the balancing of actors’ interests. The “regeneration unit” sheds lights on utilizing innovative technical and institutional knowledge. Guangzhou’s government applied the strategy of land banking in order to relieve fiscal stress through land transactions in urban regeneration and thus also enable the interference of spatial development. Consequently, the desire of the market players to participate in urban regeneration in China has decreased. One experienced planner commented that “although developers and the market are also involved, in fact urban regeneration planning in Guangzhou is mainly dominated and carried out by the urban regeneration institutes at the local district level. In other words, the governments is using the planning methods of the planned economy era, and they even try to dominate the negotiation of interest allocation, therefore Shenzhen is more advanced in this perspective” (Interview on January 28, 2015). The institutions of urban regeneration in Shenzhen are more market oriented than in Guangzhou, and its knowledge production is active in order to respond to the demands of the market. However, in Guangzhou, land trade revenue allocation in urban regeneration is still based on intervention from the government, which tends to be active and dominant (Bercht, 2013; Liu, 2009). In contrast, Shenzhen’s government encouraged and effectively managed the marketization of urban regeneration through a relative institutional arrangement (Lai et al., 2014; Zhu, 1999c). A mixture of regulatory structures and financial incentives justified by “public interest” or “common good” could be called the criteria-driven approach, which refers to “regulatory criteria and performance targets designed to encourage the efficient
achievement of policy objectives by a fragmented, market-like, agency structure” (Healey, 1997: 232). The series of regulations and policies concerning market performance regulation in Shenzhen is a good example of such criteria-driven approach.

3.3.4 Policy Innovation and Policy Learning

Policy innovation in Shenzhen and Guangzhou is driven by policy learning. In 1992, an urban management and public policy course particularly for government officials from the Shenzhen government was established in Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University. Since 1998, some study programs, such as the so-called “mayors’ classes,” have also been provided to Chinese government officials by a university in Singapore. The government in Shenzhen was interested in learning from Singapore due to its similar political ideology and governance structure, which make learning there more feasible and pragmatic (Zhang, 2012). Shenzhen is active in policy and institution learning from other institutes or areas. For example, the “urban regeneration unit” planning in Shenzhen was promoted in the Methods of Urban Regeneration in Shenzhen in 2009, based on learning from Taiwan experiences. Altrock and Schoon (2014) called the flexible mechanisms of experimental urban governance in China as “conceded informality.”

Borrás (2011) argued that organizational capacities play an important role in learning processes. O’Donnell (1999) noted that the officials originally from Guangdong and the engineers from the technical university, who were mostly well-educated and farsighted, were sent to Shenzhen by the central government. In this way, the central government contributed to the successful pursuit of political, cultural, and economic reforms with a pragmatic and innovative new policy that was impossible in other areas in mainland China. Since the 1980s, Shenzhen has been an attractive city for many people including liberal intellectuals, entrepreneurs, and young laborers from inner-mainland areas. As Shenzhen “came to be characterized by a freethinking, entrepreneurial spirit with loose control by the central government,” it was viewed as “space

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21 One official from the Planning and Land Resource Committee Center said that “previously, the office of urban villages’ restructuring belonged to the urban planning bureau, but after the reform, the urban planning bureau has merged with the land resource bureau, which become Planning and Land Resources Committee of Shenzhen Municipality. We have been doing research on urban regeneration since the year 2005, and we have learned from the experience of Hong Kong Reconstruction Bureau and Singaporean Reconstruction Bureau, and other cities in China or abroad” (Interview on March 17, 2010).
of tolerance, openness, fairness and competitiveness, full of uncertainties and opportunities” (O’Connor & Liu, 2014: 132). Shenzhen learned much from neighboring Hong Kong in the establishment of capitalist fundamentals, like land and labor commodification, but its policy-learning style gradually shifted from “laissez-faire Hong Kong to authoritarian Singapore, propelled by the aspiration, shared among policy-making party elites across China’s administrative hierarchy, of perpetuating the single-party rule” (Zhang, 2012: 2853). Zhang (2012: 2855) further claimed that “such a socially, historically, and geographically constructed field of policy mobility frames and filters policymaking imaginaries and legitimacies, legitimizing and enabling some patterns of ‘learning,’ while deterring or excluding others.”
Chapter 4 Case Study of Urban Village Regeneration: Xiasha Village in Shenzhen

4.1 Location and Background

Xiasha is an urban village located in the south of the Futian district and north of Shenzhen Bay in Shenzhen. The original Xiasha village is composed of six natural villages, and the villagers made their living by fishing, raising oysters, and farming before the 1980s. A majority of the villagers belong to the Huang clan. Before the reform and opening-up policy was issued, Xiasha was mainly composed of one or two floored traditional farmhouses (see Figure 6), ponds, ancestral temples, and farmland around the main residential area. In the 1980s, with the development of the Three Import and Compensation Trade (Sanlaiyibu), factories were built within and around Xiasha village. Meanwhile, villagers began to increase the heights of buildings in order to earn rental income from providing accommodation to the inflowing migrant workers. Due to the rapid development of urbanization, the farmland around the settlement area in the village has been expropriated by the government since the 1980s, and it has gradually become a typical urban village with what are called “kissing buildings.” Before 1992, the only open space in the village was one playground that included a basketball court and two small sports fields. In 1992, the government of Shenzhen issued a policy to promote the urbanization of urban villages called “Interim Regulation of Urbanization of Villages in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 1992). The urbanization of the urban villages in Shenzhen since 1992 includes the transformation of the local village committee, citizenship of villagers, land property, and more. According to the policy, the Xiasha Joint Stock Company (hereafter refer to as JSC) was established in the same year, and six natural villages were combined into one united administrative village called Xiasha. A local elite villager called Huang Yingchao became the chief of the JSC since then. Xiasha village proactively implemented the regeneration projects for the urban village

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22 Natural village refers to the traditional rural settlement and communities before Mao era. The concept of “natural village” in Chinese discourse is used as opposed to “administrative village,” which mainly refers to the administrational unit through integration of neighboring natural villages based on the socialist “production brigades” since the early Mao era.

23 Three import and compensation trade emerged in the coastal area in China since the 1980s, and it has become important form for cooperative trade especially in Canton province. It refers to the enterprises that mainly export the products abroad, but process imported raw materials and manufacture products according to imported samples, assemble imported parts, and with trade compensation included.
since the 1990s. Upgrading the public square through temples renovation and construction of recreation areas, an underground parking lot, a swimming pool, and a museum were all initiated, financed, and implemented by the urban village itself. Xiasha enjoys a reputation as an excellent example of urban village regeneration by the government and public due to its careful and prominent bottom-up public space upgrading. The urbanization approach in Xiasha differs from those in many other urban villages which have insufficient public space due to over-densified illegal construction or which have brought about large-scale demolition through property-led redevelopment.

Figure 6. Xiasha Village before the 1980s
Source: Xiasha JSC

4.2 Planning and Implementation

4.2.1 Construction of Central Park as Cultural Square

In 1992, Xiasha Village spent 3 million CNY hiring a planning and design company from England to formulate a plan\(^\text{24}\) (see Figure 7) which offered the idea of a central park in the village for the first time. In order to implement the plan, the JSC tried to convince hundreds of villagers to relocate, and 876 old residential buildings were torn down within one month. The construction of the central park was conducted by the Xiasha JSC, which collected funding and constructed a land parcel of 25,000m\(^2\) into a central square\(^\text{25}\) (see Figure 8). The central square is composed of a sports facility and

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public open space with two renovated temples as historical buildings. One temple with an 800-year history, called Yanghuang Temple, is a very important historical building in Xiasha and was renovated in 1992. Meanwhile, since 1994, much infrastructure, like roads and sewage pipes, have been constructed by the JSC26. The planning in 1992 was initiated and implemented by the village independently and proactively. The local efforts in the construction of the open space, which served to satisfy the villagers’ and residents’ daily leisure and recreation demands, was quite a rare phenomenon at that time, as most urban villages were still dominated by the illegal building boom of the 1990s.

![Figure 7. Plan of Xiasha in 1992](image)

Source: Xiasha JSC

In 1980, oversees descendants of the Huang clan founded the World Association of Huang Clan. In 1984, the Huang clan from Xiasha joined the association, and Xiasha became an active organizer for the association. In 1994, under the Xiasha JSC leader Huang Yingchao’s advocacy, Xiasha resumed a series of traditional cultural activities,

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26 One village who worked in JSC said that, “as you know, they are actually infrastructures and municipal constructions, it is very difficult for our joint stock company to take up all the tasks. Therefore, we really need the support from the government, either on the planning or technology. …The government at that time didn’t have relevant policy to provide financial subsidies to the rural area. We have constructed 16 roads, and we have done it all by ourselves. Over so many years, those infrastructures, municipal constructions, and supporting facilities have cost us over hundreds of millions” (Interview on March 20, 2009).
like ancestral worship ceremony in springtime (see Figure 9), Chinese calendar lantern festival, Cantonese opera, Big Basin Dish festival, and more. In particular, Big Basin Dish\(^{27}\) is one of the most important festivals in Xiasha. As such, knowledge about the traditional ceremony is unwritten and implicit, and only a few of the old villagers knew about it. In the 1990s, the leader Mr. Huang sought after old villagers who were still alive and had knowledge about the tradition worship procedures. Later, the authorities tried to note the specifics of these traditions based on interviews with the old villagers. Since 1978, ancestral worship had become popular again when most of the ancestral temples in many villages in Shenzhen were reconstructed or renovated, and ancestral memorial activities revived in the 1980s. Meanwhile, reconstruction of the genealogy of the local clan was also commenced. In 1999, a statue of an oyster farmer and a rice farmer (see Figure 10) was erected in the west of the square, as per the leader Huang Yingchao’s proposal, and their statue was intended to refer to the former identity and livelihood of the local villagers. Moreover, a museum of Xiasha (see Figure 11), which documents and exhibits the history and local development of the Xiasha village, was built and completed in 2005, and this museum offers free admission for all of its visitors. In addition, the space embellishment and design are also influenced by Fengshui and local worship, such as statues of traditional Chinese gods on a fake mountain (see Figure 12) and the pond with a small bridge over it in the north of the square.

\(^{27}\) Big Basin Dish is a 500-year-old tradition of Food sharing which began with the Huang clan, whose descendants form the bulk of the population of Xiasha.
Figure 8. Constructions of central square in the 1990s
Source: Xiasha JSC

Figure 9. Traditional ancestral worship ceremony
Source: Xiasha JSC
Figure 10. Statue of oyster and rice farmers

Source: Author (2015)

Figure 11. Xiasha Museum

Source: Author (2015)
Local tourism in Xiasha village was well known in Shenzhen, and it also became an important marketing strategy that helped to promote the development of the local economy. The village leader mentioned that:

The government has shown great support to us in this aspect. The tourism departments of the district and the city have come here to do investigations and research a few times. Of course, we would like the government to support us on this. The government also intends to put the tourism of our village on the lists of travel agents…we have cultural relics in the village. We want to promote our food culture to the whole city. We want to prove to the villagers that promoting the culture of Xiasha can also lead to economic profits. There are also many special desserts like Shoufen, Chaguo, and Zongzi. Tourists help enhance the local business of the village by their consumption, besides the money they spend in hotels. The ancestral temple can also attract tourists. (Interview on March 20, 2009)

Consequently, the utilization of local knowledge to renovate the local temple and revitalize the Big Basin Dish festival has also increased the attractiveness of Xiasha village, and it furthers the local government’s interests in marketing the city culture. The local government has therefore assisted in the promotion and marketing of Xiasha as a tourist destination with traditional culture in Shenzhen.
Since the 1990s, increasing reports of fire incidents and criminal issues in urban villages have contributed to the framing of urban villages as a problem or “cancer.” The high population density caused by the so-called “handshaking” or kissing buildings that were illegally constructed for the most part, which is a problem that is mainly attributed to the urban management failures of the government. In the official government documents, in regard to urban villages, environmental, fire, and criminal problems are frequently mentioned. Although such storylines have constructed the most common public perception of urban villages as problematic spaces, in actuality, villagers are very cautious about such individual storylines concerning their own property, as they might lose tenants or even be punished by the JSC due to such criminal activity

In order to improve the environment and fire prevention, the government of Shenzhen promoted an environment renovation project. The environmental upgrading project in Xiasha was also supported by the villagers, as they benefitted with increased rental income. In 2007, the Xiasha village was promoted as a prime example of an ecological community by the government. The implementation of the upgrade to the village was carried out in Xiasha with the support of the villagers.

One villager who worked in the stock company pointed out that:

The villagers earn more rent after the improvement of the environment. Therefore they are willing to trust us. As for Shangsha village (the village adjacent to Xiasha village), the problems there are complicated. For example, the social security and environment there are not so good. Most of the villagers do not have confidence in their joint stock company. For example, the government has ordered the removal of the illegal sheds for public safety. Our villagers are willing to follow the order, but their villagers are not so obedient in comparison. (Interview on March 20, 2009)

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28 For example, one official from the government said, “I was very surprised at how strong the property awareness of the villagers are during the time of SARS. Normally, we would believe that urban village should be the most potential place to have SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), however, it is totally opposite, the villagers were so careful and paid much attention to the hygiene, and it turned out the urban village has been a safe place that survive in SARS. As they will lose everything if their own building is found to have the problem of SARS, that is the main reason” (Interview on February 2, 2015).
4.2.2 Upgrading of Central Square

In 2007, the Shenzhen government promoted a transformation to enhance the property. In this context, Xiasha village started a second planning project called the Special Planning of Xiasha Community Redevelopment in Futian District, and the China Academy of Urban Planning and Design was responsible for making the plan. The planning project trustee was the urban redevelopment office in the Futian District. The planmaking and its implementation were all paid for by the government. According to the plan (see Figure 14), the old central square would be upgraded by constructing an underground garage, and also rearrangement of the swimming pool and playground in the central square would be carried out. According to the plan in 2007, the temple would be renovated again in 2008. When the village decided to renovate the local temple, they hired villagers who still carried knowledge on how to repair the temple. Improvements to facilities and the local environment were accomplished after the renovation; for example, the pipelines and other facilities for the water supply, electricity supply, and drainage system were improved, and building facades were refurbished in addition to the addition of roofs. This beautification project, called “Dressing and Capping,” was carried out in Xiasha in order to improve the urban
image. In Xiasha, the beautification mainly focused on the facades of existing buildings in the square and along the main road in the village. Gabled roofs were added to the tops of buildings, and all of the facades of the buildings around the main square were given the same tiles in order to produce a unified look with a Mediterranean style (see Figure 15). In addition, the square and relative infrastructure were all reorganized, including the basketball court, playground, swimming pool, and more. Concerning the design of the central square, the village hired a Fengshui expert to offer suggestions on the design of the square, such as where to best locate the pool. Concerning the location of the swimming pool, the planner mentioned that it “was not what we had planned. Those Fengshui masters hired by the government proposed its location. As long as their suggestions were reasonable, we accepted” (Interview on March 10, 2009).

Figure 14. Plan of Xiasha in 2007
Source: Special Planning of Xiasha Community Redevelopment in Futian District, 2007

29 Fengshui (also called Kanyu in Chinese) indicates the concern for the harmony relationship between buildings and surrounding environment. For example, Fengshui is paid much attention by the villagers, which is also part of the local culture and local knowledge. Especially, when it comes to deal with temple in the urban redevelopment of urban village, temple is also the most important thing that village care about, as temple is viewed by the villagers to be closely related to Fengshui. Although Feng Shui is also often considered as superstitious belief without enough sufficient scientific support of codified knowledge, it is still widely applied in the daily life especially in the village.
After 2007, the kitchen used for the Big Basin Dish festival was rebuilt at the original site next the ancestral temple, the external wall of which is designed as an exhibition of...
Xiasha’s history. The village insisted that no trees be planted on the central square, as they need the entire space of the square to hold the Big Basin Dish festival (see Figure 16). The planner said, “actually, we think the square quality is bad as it is so empty and all the trees are cut off. However, the village does not want to have any tree on it, due to the reason that it is not good enough for them to set up tables for Big Basin Dish festival” (Interview on January 28, 2015). Van Stigt et al. (2015:170) noted that “an urban plan that lacks public or stakeholder support may be abandoned by the decision-makers, although expert knowledge is available that, in the experts’ view, renders a decision to go ahead with the plan fully rational from a technical perspective.” Moreover, the respective planner mentioned that “the company thought the temple was too small to contain a large number of villagers. They want to enlarge the temple to twice the current size. But the ancestral temple is strictly preserved as a historical building and no big change can be done to it” (Interview on March 10, 2009). The central square upgrading in Xiasha proved that planning can be proactively implemented independently and supported by the local urban village community in accordance with top-down urban planning schemes while maintaining the village’s autonomy at the same time.

4.2.3 Redevelopment of Industrial Site

According to the 2007 plan, the northern part of the manufacturing area would be converted into high-rise buildings that contain a shopping mall, hotel, and residential buildings (see Figures 11 and 12). The redevelopment strategy of villagers seeking cooperation with real estate companies is very common in Shenzhen, as the village owns land and the real estate company possesses capital and expertise in building construction. Xiasha already had a lot of experience collaborating with real estate companies since the 1990s, as the high-rise building called Jinyulanwan in the southern part of the village was carried out through such a strategy, with the land resources from the village and the capital from a real estate company called Wanke.
Figure 17. Plan of the former manufacturing area in the northern part in 2007

Source: Special Planning of Xiasha Community Redevelopment in Futian District, 2007
During the redevelopment of the northern manufacturing sites, the villagers started to question the allocation of the incoming profits from the project. The villagers accused the village chief of corruption and misappropriating a large amount of income from collective land and property transactions in the last two decades, as their individual dividends had not increased in the last 10 years. The villagers tried to hang posters in the temple (see Figure 19) to gain attention from others and also visitors, like journalists and citizens. Distrust concerning the corruption of village chiefs is very common in the redevelopment of urban villages in the Pearl River Delta, and similar storylines have been found in the redevelopment projects of Liede, Xian and other village in Guangzhou. Villagers also used a similar strategy of protesting to question the village chief’s corruption in terms of collective property management.

31 As after the village has set up the JSC, the village collective economy is also gradually transformed. JSC is responsible to manage the collective property and then distributes the income to the villagers, which have become shareholders of the JSC.
4.2.4 Top-down Redevelopment Planning Proposal Since 2012

Before 2012, urban regeneration in Xiasha was a positive representation of a community-led upgrading strategy that differs from the redevelopment strategies deployed by other urban villages in Shenzhen, like Gangsha and Dachong, that were characterized by complete demolition and reconstruction. Concerning urban village regeneration, Shenzhen prioritized the “complete replacement of some centrally located villages, and their subsequent integration into a larger design strategy” for a long time (Zacharias and Tang, 2010: 226). However, the regeneration strategy indicates a potential shift from community-led upgrading to comprehensive redevelopment with the promotion of the Plan for Urban Regeneration of the Jinsha district, which is composed of the four urban villages of Xiasha, Shangsha, Shazhui, and Shawei, since 2011. According to this new plan, the central park with temples, a swimming pool, and old trees would be maintained, but the residential buildings would be demolished and reconstructed into high-rise buildings. This plan was proactively
promoted by the district government. However, the original planner who was responsible for the 2007 plan mentioned that:

This version of the plan is very ridiculous and has been rejected. It is only the idea from the district government, as they want to demolish all of the urban villages in that area. They once invited us to make the plan for them, we rejected them as such large-scale demolishment is a very horrible idea for us. And their proposal was rejected by the municipal government. That is only some idea from the developers. (Interview on March 7, 2016)

Figure 20. Redevelopment plan of Xiasha village in 2013
Source: Futian District and Shenzhen Urban planning Institute (2013)
4.3 Analysis and Conclusion

4.3.1 Three Types of Knowledge

(1) Technical Knowledge

Technical knowledge utilized in the regeneration of the Xiasha village can be seen in the central square planning, construction, and upgrading, and also the redevelopment of the northern manufacturing part of the area. The construction of the central square as a public space in Xiasha is mainly due to the village leader’s emphasis on planning in the 1990s, when he decided to hire an English design company to implement a community-based plan and construct the central square, museum, and more. Compared to other urban village, Xiasha often received rather positive comments from the government. Technical planning knowledge was utilized by the Xiasha village quite early, since 1992, and the construction of the central square effectively contributed to the improved quality of public spaces and infrastructure in Xiasha village compared to other urban villages. Such improvements enabled Xiasha to represent a positive example that met the political goals pursued by the government. The planning of the central square upgrading was supported by the local government in pursuit of improving the image of urban areas, and the upgrading plan of the old industrial area reflected the cooperation and alliance between the developer and the local village. The planning sketches and texts served as documentation for mobilization and negotiation, and the Jinsha planning was utilized for mobilization by the district government and the developers. The utilization of technical knowledge in the negotiation and mediation processes of the Xiasha regeneration played a critical role in facilitating consensus on regeneration strategies, plans, and implementation practices.

Floor area ratio has been a tool of governmental control over urban regeneration projects in order to ensure that the livability and capacity of a city is not jeopardized by over-exaggerated redevelopment. Meanwhile, overall urban regeneration planning on the city or district level is done in order to regulate land use and function in urban regeneration processes. In the 1990s, planning and redevelopment in urban villages was not the main task of the government, though increasing attention was given to illegal construction in urban villages. In the planning of urban villages, the largest
concern of the villagers, developers, and government is the reconstructed floor area ratio, as the high density of the urban village populations is assumed by government to be a significant problem. For a long time, the floor area ratio was a controversial topic in urban village regeneration. Since the very beginning of regeneration in China, there has been much debate on floor area ratios. With the development of planning skills, a more detailed means of ratio calculation was promoted in the methods of urban regeneration in Shenzhen concerning various indexes in the relative policy; in this way, planning knowledge was institutionalized. As the floor area ratio was most closely related to profits in the construction project, both the village head and developers showed much concern about the related policy. During the making of the plan to regenerate the northern manufacturing sites, ideas about height, creative industry housing, affordable housing, and functional housing were included in the plan. There is one eminent characteristic of planning, as design and planning is more policy oriented.

Various actors differ in their perceptions of the technical knowledge involved in planning. The planner and local government official shared similar educational backgrounds and similar values and ideologies in regard to planning. The developers also possessed much knowledge of planning, as they liaised with planning specialists to facilitate the negotiations between developers and the government. In addition, the head of the Xiasha village was also concerned with planning since early in 1992. Regarding the villagers, they were mainly concerned with the area, layout, and location of the flats after the regeneration. The planners needed to explain the planning scheme to the villagers through the village conference held in the museum. The learning and utilization of the planning knowledge of the villagers and developers were rather oriented toward interest and motivation. Concerning the role of planners, the planner mentioned, “the role of our planners is to communicate and negotiate; facilitate the connection between different actors and find a balance” (Interview on January 28, 2015).

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32 For example, the planner said that, “the height of one building in the plan has been raised, as they have found some policies supporting creative industry, therefore they promoted to construct a school for creative fashion design in order to raise the ratio. Whenever there is some new policy issued, they are very acute, as the village and developer have more channels to information, and they are more sensitive to such information as it concerns their own economic interest” (Interview on January 28, 2015).
(2) Institutional Knowledge

For a long time, urban and suburban institutions comprised a dual system, while the knowledge of urban and suburban management was also dual. Urban villages are quite a new phenomenon that concerns both urban and suburban institutions and must address the transition from a suburban to an urban institution. The institution includes the Hukou system, land system, and also urban management. Institutional innovation in the urbanization of an urban village has been promoted and implemented by the government since 1992. In addition, there are some regulations on land parcels that need to be regenerated, particularly regarding the size of the area, and later the government found out three hectares is too large, as there are many small-sized land plots that need to be regenerated; therefore, they revised the idea. This example represents how knowledge transforms into institutions through absorption of practiced experience. Collective property rights in rural areas have been founded since post-Mao reforms; for example, some organizational forms from rural communes at that time still exist in current urban village organizational structures. Informal institutional knowledge is also embedded in the local clan and kinship. For example, in Shenzhen, most of the urban villages are developed by grouping several natural villages, which are mainly supported by either agricultural or fishing. Each natural village was built by a dominant clan with a certain surname lineage, and specific ancestral temples were built in the villages. The ancestral temple lineage system is very important for the villagers even after the institution transition of the urban village, as it is the most important symbol of strength in their collective identity as villagers who share blood ties in a family name. In other words, the clan is actually one of the most important local institutions. For example, one official from the urban regeneration office in Shenzhen also mentioned that they “divided the villagers into 11 teams according to their family relationship. You know people always prefer to believe their relatives or friends that they trust rather than others. This way is more harmonious rather than forcing them with criterion” (Interview on October 12, 2007).

In urban village regeneration, much institutional knowledge is both implicit and widely used by the local government, developers, and the urban village. Institutional knowledge is especially embedded in the context of the specific space and social
situation in different cities or even in different districts within one city. Such knowledge regards the utilization of various resources and the control of risks. Institutional knowledge involves many aspects of many ideas, like regeneration partnership building, the implementation of compensation and relocation, public participation, and administration procedures. For example, the reconstruction of the northern manufacturing site in Xiasha village occurred due to the partnership between the building developer and the village. The planner pointed out that:

The head of the joint stock stock company in Xiasha village is very strong. He thinks he can promote the restructuring of the whole Xiasha village. Besides, he is quite intelligent. He didn’t merely depend on his own strength; on the contrary, he introduced developers and established strategic partnerships with them. The real estate company call Jingji has been involved in the restructuring of Xiasha village through this kind of strategic partnership. With the agreement of property owners and the support of developers’ funds, the restructuring of Xiasha villages is easy to promote…. Actually, the village has connected with many developers and has rich resources. So, the village selected several developers to apply for a partnership and has reached a good partnership with Jingji Real Estate Company in the year 2007. (Interview on March 13, 2010)

Comparatively, the regeneration of Shangsha village, which is just adjacent to Xiasha village, has occurred much more slowly and quite differently. Institutional knowledge is also closely related to the specific urban regeneration strategy that is applied. As a result, in some sense, such practice-based knowledge could be also called institutional or steering knowledge, which is an idea promoted by Mathiesen (2005). In this way, the utilization of institutional knowledge is often related to power structures. The village proved to have much power in the decision-making processes in urban regeneration, which was called “niche authority” by Sonia Schoon (2012). Moreover, the utilization of institutional knowledge played an important role in Xiasha. The development coalition formed by the village and the government of Xiasha village was based on institutional knowledge, which indicates an understanding of shared profits and interest. For example, the village leader of Xiasha, who is also a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, strengthened this coalition due to his awareness of planning knowledge and also the practice-based bureaucracy and

33 The planner explained that, “the construction modes of Shangsha and Xiasha Villages are very similar. Due to different decision-making power structure, the progresses of the two villages are also different, resulted in the slowing down of the restructuring of Xiasha village, because the municipal government considers those two villages as a whole, which reflected in the former legal diagrams and statutes. But villagers and developers in Xiasha village said that they cannot wait for Shangsha village any longer, especially the developers have high demands on the time, so the restructuring of Xiasha village goes first”(Interview on March 17, 2010).
administrative knowledge of urban management. He thus successfully combined the common interests of the local village and the interests of the local government.

During urban village regeneration, there is a great need for institutional knowledge, including in the compensation negotiation or demolition implementation, and especially when conflicts arise. Such institutional knowledge is also important to ensure that contracts are legal and valid. Most of the time, this kind of institutional knowledge is in codified form like legal regulations or policy documents, but it also appears in tacit forms like informal unwritten rules. During the interviews, I found that formal institutional knowledge is transferred from law institutes to the government or developers and other actors through legal services; such knowledge is also transferred from the government to the village. In this way, the government is also an important client of the law institute. Such knowledge is also very important for the villagers; some village leaders show high awareness of laws, but some do not. For most of the average villagers, they lack such knowledge. The lawyer mentioned that “there were very few cases when we represented house owners, because most of them do not trust lawyers, they have their own methods, such as writing letters or paying visits to the higher government, and others” (Interview on March 16, 2010). The transfer of such knowledge from government to villagers could also be seen in some urban

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34 For example, one lawyer that worked in one law consulting company in Shenzhen said, “our main customers are developers, as they have high awareness of law. We help our customers figure out that with whom to sign valid contracts. Besides, we also help developers to evaluate the risks of their projects. For instance, if a developer wants to get involved in the restructuring of a urban village, we would evaluate the general legal risks for the developer. We would also help our customers negotiate agreements, which is very normal. For example, if a developer wants to cooperate with the government, the village collective company, or villagers, we would arrange documents of agreements for them. Usually, in the projects of urban villages’ redevelopment, our law firm would select some experts to form a group and provide relatively comprehensive law services, because in the process of ascertaining the real owners of properties, we need to know a wide range of laws, including the law of administration, the law of contract, the law of marriage, the law of succession, and the law of foreign countries, and more. Because the situation in Shenzhen is special, many villagers have gone abroad and become overseas Chinese, and a certain number of villagers have emigrated to other countries. However, with regard to the household registration, they are still villagers, so those people have double identities. Besides, some villagers may inherit properties from their fathers or grandfathers. Therefore, the restructuring of urban villages would also relate to laws of many fields, so when we are providing legal services, we may also need experts in different fields” (Interview on March 16, 2010).

35 The layer said, “as for the legal services for the government, mainly we help the government make laws and regulations. The government may need to supervise the projects of urban villages’ redevelopment, for example, if there are some articles in the redevelopment plan that require the developers to build infrastructure, such as roads, hospitals, schools, green land, and others, the government needs to supervise on that. Besides, the government also needs to supervise the funds of developers for compensation of demolition and relocation, in case the developers have no money to pay for demolition and relocation after they have got involved in and have signed an agreement with villagers. The compilation of a series of administrative approvals and permissions, even the compilation of little administrative punishment faces many legal problems. Our law firm has been recognized as professional in the field of urban regeneration, which conforms to the demands of the government. Therefore, we formed a cooperative relationship. Because demolition and relocation are very sensitive problems, therefore the government of Shenzhen municipality wants to confirm with us about the right procedure, because if they followed wrong procedure, the media and house owners, and so on, would criticize them, but it is difficult to recognize whether their actual actions are right. Sometimes, whether the government buys legal services also relates to the official in charge. If he or she thinks legal services are important, he or she would hire lawyers, or if he or she does not think so, then he or she would not hire us” (Interview on March 16, 2010).
regeneration practices in Guangzhou. Furthermore, from the trustee research project that is advertised by the government, it can be seen that institutional knowledge is in great demand by governments (for example, the website of Guangzhou Urban Regeneration Bureau offers evidence of this demand).

(3) Local Knowledge

Local knowledge is normally implicit and tacit. The utilization of local knowledge can also be seen in the revitalization of local culture, such as ancestral worship ceremonies or traditional festivals. When Xiasha joined the Huang clan membership association, due to the temple and the tradition of ancestral worship festival in Xiasha, the fame of Xiasha as a traditional Huang clan center was established. Local knowledge is also utilized in the Big Basin Dish festival. The traditional festival of the Big Basin Dish is held in Xiasha as a festival to strengthen the network of the Huang clan in China and overseas. The Big Basin Dish festival in Xiasha was claimed as an invisible cultural legacy in Shenzhen, and in the village museum built adjacent to the central square, there was an exhibition about the history, development, and culture of the Xiasha village. Such local knowledge is thus codified and converted to explicit knowledge.

Moreover, the local village also had a great impact on the renovation plan of the central square, such as the relocation of the swimming pool according to the local knowledge of Fengshui. Additionally, the square design without trees and new kitchen house construction next to the temple were implemented due to local demand in relation to the Big Basin Dish festival each year.

Local knowledge in urban villages is closely embedded in the local culture and traditional ideology. In the urban villages of Guangzhou and Shenzhen, temples are the

36 For example, one official from Baiyun district urban regeneration office in Guangzhou mentioned that, “We mainly guide villagers to discover the loopholes of the contracts. If the other hides something from you or even cheats you, when you are signing the contract, then the contract is naturally invalid according to China’s Law of Contract. In this process, we mainly help them to learn about every aspect. For example, have the developers told villagers about the profits? Have they paid the money to the villager? Do 80% of the villagers agree to it? If they didn’t know the above questions, then the process is illegal; if the process is illegal, then the result, namely the contract, is also invalid. On the other hand, we also try to teach villagers to calculate the accounts by themselves. We would tell them that they don’t have to borrow money or cooperate with developers, because we consider that to cooperate with developers is the last choice. When you want to cooperate with developers, you would have to give them a plot for financing. Even though we call it that the land is converted to state-owned, but the fact is the land is given to developers to earn money. If villagers have other better choices, for example, they can mortgage their economic properties or economic incomes to banks and borrow money from the banks. Usually, they can shoulder the interest rates of the banks. After the redevelopment, not only the village is changed but also the business modes are transformed. Even if they don’t want to borrow money from banks, they can also collect the funds by themselves, if the villagers have enough money. Even if they can’t collect all the money in one time, they collect the money in several times, which are all fine” (Interview on February 25, 2011).

most important visible spaces. Local Xiasha villagers’ belief system indicates a combination of Buddhism, Taoism, and also certain indigenous religions. In the regeneration of urban villages, FengShui as local knowledge still played an influential role, but not in a formally codified and acknowledged manner. In addition, the temple is the space where the village traditional cultural festivals take place. Meanwhile, festivals are actually important local cultural events to maintain or strengthen the villagers’ network, which might show important familial or geographical relationships. In urban villages, local culture is closely related to clan and surname worship. Through their social network, knowledge is shared and transferred, thus shaping or being shaped by the local knowledge community that shares knowledge, beliefs, rules, and values. In Shenzhen, a large number of villagers are Hakka, which is a distinctive cultural and linguistic sub-ethnicity of Han. As most early villagers previously made their living by fishing, most of the villages engage in Mazu worship, which has its origins in the neighboring coastal Fujian province and is often associated with fishing villages. As there is also a large floating population in Xiasha, the local culture of Xiasha has also transcended beyond the culture of the local villagers. During the urban village regeneration process, local knowledge about local networks was also applied by the developers or government to facilitate the negotiation and persuasion of the villagers. As the village leader in Xiasha Village showed much authority in current governance structures, local knowledge could therefore be utilized.

(4) Summary

Above all, different types of knowledge are interwoven in the practical decision-making processes in the regeneration of urban villages. The utilization of technical knowledge contributed to the idea of central square, the utilization of institutional knowledge enabled its implementation, and the utilization of local knowledge contributed to the local identity by making strong use of local tradition and cultural

38 For example, one official from the land and planning committee of Shenzhen said that, “concerning the floating population, original Xiasha villagers don’t reject or exclude them, but integrate them as part of the community. The village also holds sports games or special games annually. For example, there is a village bicycle team, in which half of the members are floating population and the other half are local villagers. The community provides equipments for them. This team is quite famous in the city. I think that’s great. The village also organizes ceremonies every year. We could say that Xiasha is a village that has developed relatively well, because its industries have been developed, and its community culture also has been fostered, which is what we called good combination of local culture and other culture. But honestly, such community is rare. Most villages distinguish their villagers and the migrant population very clearly and treat them very differently, which is what the Westerners called “Social Segregation” (Interview on November 9, 2010).
values when designing the layout and the furniture of the central square and its surroundings. Each actor possesses a mix of different types of knowledge. For example, the village utilized planning knowledge and local knowledge to promote the central square construction and upgrading, and the institutional knowledge of the collaboration partnership building was utilized by the village to realize the redevelopment of the northern manufacturing site. Meanwhile, the government utilized technical planning knowledge to improve infrastructure and the image of the city, and institutional knowledge about the organization and management of urban regeneration procedures to standardize and monitor the urban regeneration process. In addition, these types of knowledge were also used to promote the local culture and tourism market of the Xiasha village. The people whose knowledge is comprehensive of the above types are more popular in urban regeneration developer companies, as they have determined that all types of knowledge are indispensable in urban regeneration projects. With technical knowledge, it is important to communicate with planners, and institutional knowledge (e.g., political and legislation knowledge) helps to work out the administrative aspects and procedural approval, while local knowledge is important for negotiations with local residents.

4.3.2 Problem and Strategy Framing

There has been much discourse concerning the problem framing of urban villages. Kao (2011) indicated that in Guangzhou, the problem framing of urban villages shows a shift from “the problem of urban villages” to “urban villages as a problem” (see Figure 21). The government’s problem and strategy framing of urban villages is mainly concentrated on illegal property construction, overcrowding, the deterioration of the environment, fire hazards, criminal, and so on. In order to address the problem of urban villages, the government began to issue various policies in 1986 to fight against illegal construction, and illegal construction is equated with the problem of urban villages in the government discourse. For example, Zacharias and Tang noted that:

39 For example, one official from the urban regeneration office in Shenzhen explained about the structure of their organization, “there is contract advertising group and house authentication group, for example, there is a 100-square-meter house. The owner either confirms that is right or they can ask for measurement again. There is comprehensive planning group, which is in charge of daily affairs and meeting arrangements. A team management group, whose targets are team members, such as work attendance. There is relocation group that would starts working after contracts are signed. Planning technique group for planning, law consultation group providing consults for us and the villagers as well, and security group for security monitoring. Overseas affairs group serving for overseas villagers, who still have houses in the village, so we need to get their allowance to tear down their houses. Media propaganda group in charge of media affairs. In all, there are 9 teams with 53 people, each consists of 11 teams. All are department or sectional leaders with excellent capabilities working for government. Besides, there is one team member from the joint stock company” (Interview on October 12, 2007).
villages have a reputation for harboring proscribed activities and are viewed as a source of criminal elements. Shenzhen is known throughout China as the major city with the poorest public security record, although the government regularly claims this is untrue. Whether such a blemish on the city image should be attributed solely to the urban villages is a matter for debate, but it is certain that that reputation hurts Shenzhen’s ambitions to achieve global status. (2010: 230)

The policies issued in 1986, 1999, and 2004 demonstrate the continuous adjustment of the definition of illegal buildings and the relative punishment measures. The problem framing of illegal construction in the discourse of government appears mainly in policies, and its definition is also altered according to the time when certain policies are issued. However, the government did not strictly carry out punishments according to the policy for a long time. As a result, the policy issued by the government encouraged and stimulated speedy illegal construction, rather than suppressing such problems. Meantime, the villagers’ perceptions of the illegal construction problem became quite different from what the government expected. The strategy of punishments promoted by the government in dealing with illegal construction proved not to function as expected, and the strategy of the illegal construction was also not feasible. As one official explained, the concern of the government “means the problem of responsibility, when you legitimate the building, if there is still a fire, who is the one to blame and be responsible” (Interview on February 2, 2015)? Consequently, the government finally decided in 2004 that redevelopment is the way to solve the illegal construction problem. Especially with China’s urbanization, available space resource has become increasingly limited in Shenzhen. Therefore, the problem framing in terms of redeveloping existing space became the prevailing discourse of the government as urban village redevelopment is the most feasible solution to address the urbanization challenge. In the discourse of the government, the low efficiency of land use has also been mentioned to define the problem of urban villages in government reports or planning documents. For example, the Master Planning Guidelines for Urban Village (Old Village) Redevelopment in Shenzhen (2005-2010) elaborated the urban village problem as follows:

the village environment is hard to improve, life qualities of the residents are difficult to improve, and also the serious safety risk in many village has further hindered the improvement of urban structure and land-use efficiency and meanwhile devalued the surrounding land.
Such value-laden language utilized in government documents is related to the particular political goals and thus legitimizes state intervention in urban restructuring. Planners, in a certain sense, share many similarities with the government concerning the urban village problem and strategy framing. For both the government and planners, the problem framing of urban villages mainly concerns the area ratio and infrastructure, and it also relates to how technical planning knowledge is produced and utilized during this process.

The problem framing of urban villages by scholars has shifted in the last two decades. For example, in the 1990s, they defined the problem of urban villages as chaotic and inefficient management phenomena called “cancer,” and thus promoted the demolishment of urban villages. Since the 2000s, more reflection on the positive facets of urban villages have been offered by scholars, with increasing awareness of how the village has played an important role in the affordable housing rental market for low-income populations in cities. Consequently, academic have shifted to promoting the maintenance of urban villages. However, there has also been some criticism about the changing attitude of scholars. For example, one official from the urban regeneration office in the Futian District in Shenzhen said, “scholars normally have their own logic about urban redevelopment and promoting the demolition of villages…. The way behind this is that they mainly think it from the perspective of making use of the village, but do not reflect on what the city owes the urban village” (Interview on February, 2015). Meanwhile, increasing concern has been shown about the vanishing of urban villages as affordable accommodation supplies for the low-income young migrant population after such massive urban village redevelopment. For example, Zacharias and Tang (2010: 231) noted that “redevelopment means reducing the stock of affordable housing. In the relatively high-wage economy of Shenzhen, reducing the supply of housing to the lowest income groups would mean that service workers would have to commute long hours from remote locations, a situation that already characterized Beijing.”

The problem framing by villagers is more oriented toward personal interest. For example, during the process of urban village regeneration, it was determined that a common phenomenon is that villagers actively try to frame the problem of village leaders’ corruption. The villagers demonstrated and put up posters at the ancestral
temple to promote the corruption issue in Xiasha. Similar behavior has also been observed in the regeneration of Xian and Liede villages in Guangzhou. The lack of collective economic dividend for the villagers is often blamed on the corruption of village leaders. In addition, villagers were also active in framing the problem of compensation. For example, in Gangsha, villagers even created magazines to frame the problem of compensation. The villagers also utilized the experiences of other villages’ regeneration to conduct the problem framing of the compensation standard. Moreover, “nail house” which refers to the house whose residents refuse to leave and make way for new construction, is also one topic frequently emerged from urban village redevelopment. In Shenzhen in particular, the discourse of nail house is often related to millionaires or billionaires, which contrasts to the nail house in the discourse of North China relating to violent forced evictions and villagers’ resistance. The problem of the nail house is not framed by the developers, as the nail house indicates much higher costs and risks in the urban regeneration process for developers. In order to solve the nail house problem in Shenzhen, developers had to compromise with the nail house owners and pay higher compensation fees. In the case of the regeneration of the Xian village in Guangzhou, local residents’ learning and connecting during the redevelopment process was very prominent and aroused attention (Lin et al., 2015). The Xian village redevelopment project began in 2009. The district government, village committee, and real estate company made a coalition with the intention to demolish and convert the village into a new community. However, due to the inquiry into the corruption of the committee leader, some villagers resisted and refused to move. The village leader fled abroad with a large amount of money, and the villagers protested a lot. One of the villagers even consulted relevant legislation material and learned how to protest and make petitions, and the villagers took every chance to make themselves heard. From the villagers, various storylines about the corruption of the village committee were found.

40 For example, one official from the urban regeneration office in Guangzhou said that, “although villages have different requirements, they exchanged many experience with each other. For example, after the redevelopment of Liede village, many villages including those in planning stage or those just want to see the result, have paid a visit to there. Besides, several plans of the redevelopment of Fang village in Liwan district have also been approved, and newspapers and media have reported about that. We learn from their planning documents. However, heads of other villages would go there in person and try to learn from Fang Village. After learning, they will put similar requirements they learned about other villages as their bottom lines” (Interview on March 5, 2010).

41 About the strategy dealing with “nail house” problem, one official from the urban regeneration office said that, “ in Shenzhen, usually economic means is used to deal with the nail house problem. Although the advantage is to alleviate the conflicts, however, it resulted in the difficulty in distinguishing the illegal and legal situation. In other words, more nail house are encouraged to formed, and also such cause injustice and unfairness. In the inner mainland, nail house are doing extreme things, because the residents’ basic interest is not satisfied, but it is totally different in Shenzhen. Nail house owners are so rich, they just want to get more, so they won’t do extreme stuff to hurt themselves” (Interview on February 2, 2015).
In the redevelopment of urban villages in Shenzhen, the villagers’ identity normally includes three types: the original villagers, villagers with Hong Kong and Macau identity, and building collaborators from outside of the village. Concerning the villagers with Hong Kong and Macau identity, it is due to the trend called “taogang” (fleeing to Hong Kong), as many villagers tried to flee to Hong Kong to avoid hunger and seek a better life in the 1960s and 1970s. As these multi-identity villagers have lived in Hong Kong for a long time, when they came back to the village, they also had much awareness of public participation. For example, similar villagers with Hong Kong backgrounds can be found in many urban villages in Shenzhen. According to the institution of the village itself, the decision making of the village redevelopment would be made through a stakeholders’ meeting. In terms of the public participation institution, there is also relevant content in the policies and regulations. For example, urban regeneration could not be executed until no less than 80% of the community have agreed on the redevelopment. Such institutional arrangement about collective decision-making is formed based on the relevant practical experience. As Zacharias and Tang noted, incremental change would have to be accompanied with design controls that would have to be negotiated with the primary stakeholders, the villages themselves. Such approaches are challenging, but are near the cutting edge of planning anywhere in the world. Shenzhen could be a world leader in such negotiated regeneration. (2010: 232)

However, public participation in China is not similar to Westerners’ perceptions, like dialogue in civil society, public voting, and so on. Wuttke et al. (2010: 11) indicated that “public participation means that planners distribute questionnaires among the public in order to find out about necessary public service provision such as transport facilities, schools, and the like. It is social research rather than public participation as understood in democratic countries.”

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42 One official who worked for the regeneration office in Futian and attended the redevelopment project of Gangsha village told a story about the institution forming of public participation. He said, “in the Gangsha Village redevelopment process, the villagers are divided into 13 groups and the public consulting and discussion were held continuously for three days. All the villagers could attend and ask the government and developers questions freely. Why was the publication means applied by Futian district government? The reason is that lots of villagers from Futian are Hong Kong citizens at the meantime. Therefore, they would also invite the media from Hong Kong to observe the redevelopment of urban village. The best way to deal with this situation is public participation. For example, during the redevelopment of the first urban village called Yunong Village, some villagers are from Hong Kong and some journalists from Hong Kong come to make some interviews. It put much pressure on the government and developers to publicize the redevelopment process. Therefore, before we carry out the redevelopment, we go to learn some experience on public participation from Hong Kong” (Interview on February 2, 2015).
For the developers, the problem framing was quite different from other actors. In Shenzhen, compensation negotiation and demolition were often very complicated, and also quite risky. Consequently, developers were encouraged to participate in the compensation and demolition implementation directly. During such a process, the nail house was one of the trickiest problems for an urban regeneration project.\textsuperscript{43} In other words, the developers were not active in the problem-framing discourse in the urban regeneration process; however, they were directly engaged in the frontier of urban regeneration through compensation negotiation and motivation, the administration procedures required in the approval requiring process, and more. Indeed, various tacit knowledge has been utilized by developers. Meanwhile, many problems were acknowledged and confronted by developers; however, due to the reason that these problems might be inappropriate to be codified or made known by the public, they mainly appeared as informal rules. For example, the partnership of the developers and villagers also needed much tacit skill, and in idea of how to make the project more profitable, the strategy of resettlement and housing construction also reflects many unwritten problems and strategies. Especially with the illegal property and obscure property problems in Shenzhen, the developers often showed rather high awareness of legislation, as the developers often paid for lawyers to assist with contracts and laws. Especially in terms of the nail house, laws were often formal and important solutions. However, developers mainly conducted the problem and strategy framing internally and in a tacit or implicit way.

\textsuperscript{43} One person who worked in the law company in Shenzhen said, “Government of Shenzhen knows that they need to rule by law, and cannot do anything by force. The government won’t pull down houses by force, ignoring the interests of villagers and the provisions of laws. The government of Shenzhen municipality rules by law and it is harmonious. When conflicts occur, the government would put pressure on developers and require developers to make concessions, or the government itself would make concessions. Therefore, there are very few reports about governments’ malignant demolition in the Pearl River Delta, but governments in the Pearl River Delta even have more demolition tasks and the scale of demolition is usually larger. Our colleagues in other branches told us governments in Wuhan and Kunming are very strong. However, there are also disadvantages, such as some people said that the pace of the redevelopment of urban villages in Shenzhen is very slow” (Interview on March 16, 2010).
Figure 21 Problem and strategy framing in regeneration of Xiasha Village

Source: Author
Chapter 5 Case Study of Old Town Regeneration: Enning Road in Guangzhou

5.1 Location and Background

The famous redevelopment project called Enning Road is located in the center of Liwan District of Guangzhou City (see Figure 22), the well-known old inner-city area called “Xiguan.” Its southeast boundary just meets the famous shopping street named Shangxiajiu (see Figure 23). The street along the southern boundary of the redevelopment site is one of the best-preserved and longest historic Qilou streets in Guangzhou. This case is chosen due to several reasons. Enning redevelopment project has lasted for 11 years since 2006, and is still not finished in 2017. The planning scheme has gone through three versions made by different planning institutes. Its reallocation and compensation scheme was changed for a few times. Enning Road project has received a lot of criticism ever since it started in 2006, as the strategy concerning cultural preservation and allocation has been controversial in Guangzhou for a long time. Moreover, media, scholars, NGOs, and residents got actively involved into the whole urban regeneration process. Enning road project, as the first comprehensively redevelopment project in the old town of Guangzhou, is very important due to its typical and representative character.

Figure 22. Location of Enning Road project

Source: Author
Figure 23. Scope of Enning Road project

Source: Urban Regeneration planning of Enning Road in Liwan District, 2011

5.2 Planning

5.2.1 Three Versions of Planning

Three versions of detailed planning were produced by three various planning institutes from 2006 to 2011. The first plan named “Experimental Dilapidated Housing Renovation Plan of Guangzhou” (see Figure 24) was set up in 2006, when the government officially launched the redevelopment project of Enning Road. The second plan called “Old Town Redevelopment Planning of Enning Road Area” (see Figure 25) was made in 2007, after the first plan had failed to get approval in the planning decision making phase. The plan of 2007 clearly showed the idea of two North-south roads cutting through the area, as it is made according to the regulatory plan (see Figure 27) of Guangzhou municipality in 2007. The common feature shared by the first two plans is that most of the buildings were to be demolished in order to relocate all the residents within the site, and thus inevitably resulted in total


45 In July 2007, the regulatory plan called “Duobao Road Regulatory Planning Guidelines” was published on the website of Guangzhou planning bureau. According to the plan, the North-south road cutting through the area would be 26 meters wide and also the existing road of Enning road and Duobao Road would also be broadened. The floor area ratio of the parcel is 2.6 to 2.8, and the buildings are more than 8 floors on average.
destruction of the old historical community, including the urban fabric and also the local architectures.

Actually the first two plans indicate the urban redevelopment strategy widely applied in Guangzhou since the 1980s, and demolition of many communities in the old town area had been carried out due to municipal urban infrastructure construction, especially motorways, in Guangzhou. One experienced planner in Guangzhou stated that,

Urban regeneration of the inner old town all around in Guangzhou in the 1980s was carried out in this way, to tear down all the buildings and rebuild multi-floored buildings. Based on that, one planning mode was set up and later on, regulatory planning of Guangzhou was finished, the planning control index of which was calculated in such a way. Therefore, all the inner town areas were to be changed into modern communities. However, it could not be implemented due to the reason that developers were needed in the redevelopment process and there need to be profits after the compensation and relocation was settled. In order to make it practically feasible, normally the land ratio was rather high and the plans which support this strategy actually all got approved since then. (Interview on January 14, 2015)

The third version of the plan entitled “Urban Regeneration Planning of Enning Road in Liwan District” (see Figure 26) was made in 2009. This version promoted reopening an underground river and constructing Enning area as “historic old town with Lingnan cultural characteristics.” From this version of the plan, one can see that the strategy of demolishing the main part and reconstruction with high buildings is replaced by a much lower density plan scheme. This version of planning showed a great change of the whole redevelopment strategy, putting more emphasis on the preservation of local historical buildings. It finally got approved in the municipal planning committee and was published in 2011. After the third plan got approved, the official amendment was also made to the regulatory plan in 2007 (see Figure 27). In 2011, the new regulatory plan (see Figure 28) was published. The North-south roads were canceled, and the roads to be widened will remain unchanged, too. However such an adjustment actually required a lot of effort.

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46 Lingnan culture refers to three cultural branches in the Pearl River Drainage Area, including Guangxi and Hainan. Lingnan culture includes Cantonese dialect, Cantonese Opera, Lingnan calligraphy, art schools, architecture, mindscape, Cantonese cuisine, as well as music and handicrafts. Guangzhou is the center of Cantonese culture along the Pearl River and the most outstanding of Lingnan Culture.

47 The respective planner said, “we are under great pressure when we want to adjust the road system and cancel two roads in the area. It is not easy as we have to try hard to persuade the transport department that why the two roads could not be built here. It
Figure 24. Plan in 2006

Source: Experimental dilapidated housing renovation plan of Guangzhou, 2006

Figure 25. Plan in 2007

Source: Old Town Redevelop planning of Enning road area, 2007

took lots of efforts to make it. Our most important task is to amend the original idea, especially like the planning of two roads. But this effort of negotiation could not be seen from the planning work” (Interview on January 23, 2015).
Figure 26. Plan in 2011

Source: Urban Regeneration planning of Enning Road in Liwan District, 2011

Figure 27. Regulatory plan of 2007

Source: Guangzhou Planning Bureau
5.2.2 Plan Making Process

The earliest official demolition permit of Enning Road redevelopment program was issued by the government in September 2007, and the official demolition started to be carried out in 2008\(^ {48}\). When the third version of the plan was firstly published on 21 December 2009, already more than half of the households in the community had signed the compensation and relocation contract, and a large amount of buildings had been demolished. In 2009, one news report entitled “Planning of Enning Road redevelopment should not undergo secretly” promoted that “the planning process should be published and listen to public opinion” (Xinkuai News\(^ {49}\), 2009). The journalist who wrote the report said,

at the beginning we mainly paid attention to the conflicts of demolition and relocation, as the Law of Property Rights was issued in 2007. However, lots of change has been made on the demolition later, as quite a few buildings that were to be demolished were announced to be maintained, therefore we started to notice the publicity of planning, and

\(^{48}\) No detailed planning on Enning Road had been published until the demolition started in 2008, as the first two plans were not approved and never published.

paid attention to the demolition of the architectures from then on.  
(Interview on February 5, 2015)

Since then, more doubt on the legitimation of the demolition permit concerning the reason of “illegal demolition without planning guidance” was further strengthened by scholars and local residents. In March 2010, a letter signed by 220 local residents which was addressed to the People’s Congress and Standing Committee member of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference of Guangzhou municipality claimed that the “implementation of such a large scale demolition without strict detailed plan actually disobey our current national urban reconstruction and demolition management law.” A professor who is an expert in historical and cultural preservation criticized that “launching demolition before completing planning shows the immaturity of the government’s decision making” in a report entitled “Permanent pain caused by demolition before planning” (Yangcheng Evening News50, 2011). In response, one planner from the Municipal Planning Bureau explained that the demolition was actually legal due to the reason that “it is issued legally based on the regulatory planning of Guangzhou, and the demolition could be implemented when the demolition permit is issued for the reason of public interest”51 (Jinyang News, 2009). Besides, the planner who made the third version of the plan also agreed that “demolition without detailed planning is actually quite unreasonable,” and he explained that the problem was that “in practice demolition is allowed as long as the reconstruction scope is defined by red lines52 of demolition” (Interview on December 5, 2012). One officer from the district government also reflected that “it is a bit too fast to start when whey launch the demolition, even the government themselves had no clear idea about the plan and development scheme at that time” (Interview on December 5, 2012).

Therefore, the dispute is on whether the detailed plan is needed for issuing the demolition permit, and such an argument has put pressure on the government to publish the plan as soon as possible. The respective planner mentioned that “the reason why people reacted strongly is that government started the demolition without

51  According to the existing planning regulations and procedure, a series of documents are required to get the demolition permit license: (1) construction project approval documents; (2) construction land planning permit; (3) state-owned land use rights approval document; (4) relocation plan and scheme; and (5) compensation and resettlement document. http://news.sohu.com/20091216/n2689777906.shtml accessed 16 May 16, 2015
52  According to the existing planning regulations in China, red lines of demolition refer to the official demolition scope defined by the government.
planning, and it is true that there is not any planning, so we get the plan published as soon as we can” (Interview on December 6, 2012). One government official also mentioned that,

it is true that the government did not publish clear opinions or standpoints for a long time, and government’s voice is not heard by public. During the time of a heated debate about planning in 2010 and 2011, I had to stand up and explain to the public that there have been three versions made by government at that time, although we had never published the first two versions. Still I had to explain why. (Interview on December 21, 2014)

Meanwhile, the policy entitled “Guiding Opinions on Demolition and Compensation of Urban Regeneration in Guangzhou,” which was established in 2009, promoted the principle of “planning beforehand” in the practice of urban regeneration.

In a certain sense, the problem framing above helps to draw the attention of the public to planning. Especially after the publication of the plan in 2009, public participation on plan making could be observed from residents and NGO’s response. From 22nd Dec 2009 to 21st Jan 2010, the third plan was published to collect public feedback. In December 2009, a letter written by five residents and signed by 183 residents entitled “Protect Real Xiguan, No learning from Shanghai Xintiandi” was published in a newspaper, strongly claiming that “the so-called plan is actually commercial development games in the name of old town redevelopment and preservation of Xiguan historical culture”53 (Xinkuai News, 2010). In the letter, the residents challenged that the government tried to evict them and to reconstruct one commercial street with fake antique style in the name of “public interest.” In the letter “public interest” and “Xintiandi” were brought forward to question the scheme itself, and residents put doubt on the aim of the project based on such a debate including to improve the environment in searching public interest or to develop a Xintiandi-style leisure street for commercial interest. In the letter mentioned before signed by 220 residents, it was criticized that “the aim of project is purely commercial and tourism development in the name of public interest.” For a long time, public interest and Xintiandi were used as buzz words in the field of urban planning. Actually in this process media played a vital role, as one journalist explained that,

Actually in the whole process we were helping them by providing some suggestions, since most of the residents mainly care about their own interest like housing compensation, then we told them that you could not

get much public support if you only cared about private interest. Yet, public interest is a strong excuse to resist the demolition, for example culture represents a strong public interest. (Interview on February 8, 2015)

He (2012) also noted from the Enning road case that the dominating neoliberal discourse advocated by city decision makers which justifies the elimination of urban functions and local residents is often under the rubric of “public interest.” Besides writing the letter, residents also tried to contact the planner who made the third plan through personal contact. But it turned out that the residents’ complained that “we tried to get the phone number of the planner, but still we could not reach him by phone” (Interview on November 20, 2012). It is observed that residents blamed the large-scale demolition to the planner of the third plan, as they did not know that actually the demolition before 2009 had been carried out according to the second version of plan. The planner of the third plan pointed out that:

they even doubted that there was demolition team behind us, or some even said we initiate the demolition, but this is not the fact. When we took over the planning task, demolition was already taking place and what we did was to slow it down. But it was very difficult for us to respond to such suspicion. (Interview on January 23, 2015)

Meanwhile, an active response of the NGO called the Focus Academy Group to the published plan also could not be neglected. The Focus Group tried to organize a five-month investigation in the community and wrote two reports called “Suggestions on the regeneration plan of Enning Road and Social assessment report of the redevelopment project of Enning Road.” Moreover, the Focus Group successfully organized an exhibition and a round-table meeting involving scholars and residents in 2012. Besides, residents and the Focus Group even “tried to make a plan themselves, which did not work out due to various reasons” (Interview on February 5, 2012). Although the impact of the Focus Group did not have direct influence on the decision making of the program, the government, planners, media and the Focus Group shared similar comments on its impact in attracting lots of public attention and making the regeneration of Enning Road better known by more and more people.

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54 In March 2010, a group of students from various universities in Guangzhou and a few societal volunteers formed “the Focus Academy Group of Enning Road” (hereafter referred to as “Focus Group”). The group members have various disciplinary backgrounds, including Urban Planning, Architecture, Sociology, Anthropology, Economics, Geography, Journalism, Art and other. The Focus Group established their own website.
5.3 Implementation Strategy Adjustment due to Demolition Complexity

In 1999, Guangzhou Municipal Government issued the banning of “prohibiting developers’ participation in old town redevelopment” due to several reasons (see Chapter 3). As a consequence of the ban, a shortage of funds hindered the redevelopment progress of the old town. Therefore the government re-invited developers to participate in 2006, because their financial capacities and their executive know-how seemed indispensable. Under such circumstances, Enning Road was initiated and launched as the first comprehensive old town redevelopment project by the municipal government in 2006. According to the redevelopment strategy promoted by the government in 2006, the municipal government was responsible for the financial issues, and the district government was responsible for land expropriation, compensation, and resettlement. The redevelopment funding was first achieved from bank loans achieved by the Municipal Land Development Center, and later the loans were paid back through the capital investment of developers in land transactions. The tasks of compensation mobilization and relocation negotiation were managed by the Liwan District Unsafe Housing Redevelopment Project Office (hereafter called project office).

In order to sell the land, the first step was to sign a compensation agreement and to evacuate the residents. The demolition implementation was carried out based partly on the idea of the second plan in 2007, although that plan was not published at that time. However, the implementation process turned out to be much more challenging than they expected due to continuous resistance against evacuation and demolition. Compensation and relocation is always one of the most important and concerning topics in urban redevelopment projects. Before the redevelopment of Enning Road, there were totally 2760 households, of which 1950 households needed to be allocated. There were totally 1352 buildings, 297 state owned buildings and 831 private buildings, and 224 buildings with unclear property owner. As in inner urban area, the land and housing ownership are mainly restructured based on the socialist ownership, which regarding the state’s control of urban land as “embodiment of public interest” (Zhu, 2004; Shin, 2009). The reallocation of public property was comparatively easier, as the tenants would move to affordable public housing, which would obviously
increase their living quality. Most of the people in public housing are willing to move, although there were also lots of complaints about the inconvenience after reallocation far away from the original place in transportation and medical services etc. However, private property compensation was much more difficult and complicated. Quite a few private owners were not willing to move mainly due to the reason that the compensation was not satisfactory, as the monetary compensation standard was considered not enough for them, and also they were not willing to relocate far away from the original site. Besides, some residents were not willing to move and to demolish the building for the reason that they had lived here for a long time and had a strong emotional attachment to the community. In a letter entitled “Opinions and strong requirements from relocated households in Enning Road redevelopment project” written by residents in 2009, they made complaints about the compensation and requested to increase the monetary compensation standard so they could afford purchasing similar flats nearby. Meanwhile, lots of reports concerning the compensation conflicts came out in newspapers and online. In 2007 and 2008, the compensation of private owners is to relocate to flats in peripheral areas of Guangzhou, and it was announced by the government later in 2009 that 600 more flats nearby would be provided as relocation housing. Residents tried to stop the demolition in Enning Road through challenging the official reason of launching the project called “unsafe housing redevelopment.” In urban regeneration in China, unsafe housing (see Chapter 3) is often used as the main reason to initiate redevelopment in inner urban areas. In 2006, Guangzhou government announced the start of Enning Road project as “redevelopment of unsafe housing.” According the investigation by the government, it is said that the total floor space of unsafe housing in the redevelopment site reached 24937.85 square meters, which accounted for almost 18% percent of the total building area in the project in 2007. For example, there was one seven floored building which was built in 1995 as factory and later privatized and renovated as residential flats in 2002. When the demolition notice was announced in 2007, the residents in this building said, “our building is rather new and solid, how could it be an unsafe building? What is the reason to tear it down?” Then a letter written and signed by 80 households in the building was sent to the National People’s Congress, claiming that “demolition of the

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55 Most of the state-owned property is in bad condition due to insufficient maintenance, with problems like overcrowding, lack of indoor toilets, and rooms with little light.

building should be abolished as it disobeys the lately published Law of Property Rights.” Such effort showed some effect, as it was announced in 2009 that the building would not be demolished. During this process, the media again played an important role, as one journalist stated that,

at the beginning the residents did not know which law to use to protect their property rights, and then we consulted with some lawyers and then suggested the residents to appeal to the National People’s Congress. Actually most reports that were made were supported by experts, and we had lots of professional suggestions from them. As we have to interview experts quite often, we also learn from this process. We try to help and give suggestions because we hope to improve the residents’ participation capability in public affairs, and they need such knowledge and advice. (Interview on February 8, 2015)

Besides, some suggestions and aid provided to local residents by some Focus Group members that majored in law were also observed when the residents showed demand for property rights protection through the legal instruments.

The conflicts concerning compensation inevitably slowed down the demolition of building and also hindered the implementation of the original strategy to collect redevelopment funding by land transactions. Meanwhile, since the launch of the demolition activities the physical environment in the community continued deteriorating since 2008, and the remaining residents suffered from various problems, like fire accidents, flooding on rainy days, piles of rubbish and mud everywhere, frequent burglary, and more. A report entitled “Why Enning Road project failed” criticized that “the demolition failure turned the old historical community into a theme park of demolition”\(^57\) (Xinkuai News, 2010). In August 2010, the mayor of Guangzhou paid a visit to Enning Road to inspect the implementation process\(^58\), which indicated that the Enning Road demolition also attracted attention from municipal government level. Again, media played an important role in this municipal mayor’s visit. The respective journalist stated that,

We made some report about the negative consequences of demolition and we also made use of the chance of the Asian Games to emphasize the Enning Road problem. Concerning various problems we seek to talk to one person who is member of People’s Congress, and it was he who suggested the mayor to pay a visit to Enning Road area by himself. Thus we tried to use various excuses to make the government to revaluate the


redevelopment strategy of Enning Road project. (Interview on February 8, 2015)

From 2007 to 2010, Guangzhou government tried several times to search for potential developers. Yet, it turned out that few developers were interested. The respective planner mentioned that,

several developers have come to visit the site, and after evaluation they found out it would only be financially feasible if all whole parcels of land were given to them. But after the tortuous relocation negotiation and historical building preservation, the available land was too fragmented and did not show enough market value for developers. (Interview on 5 December 2012)

Luckily, the scheme of reopening the river\textsuperscript{59}, promoted in the third plan in 2009, proved to be crucial in pushing the implementation of the project move forward. The idea and implementation of opening the river not only showed great change of the redevelopment strategy of the project by abandoning the original redevelopment strategy that totally ignoring the cultural preservation, but also speeded up the stagnated compensation mobilization since 2010 (see Figure 29 & 30). The respective planner mentioned that “to open the river actually is due to some political aim of the government, as they hope to improve the city image during the Asian Games. The Asian Games were such an importante chance to open the river” (Interview on January 23, 2015). “In 2012 municipal government made the decision to build the Cantonese Opera Museum of Guangzhou in Enning Road area (see Figure 31). Such a decision was made due to very accidental reasons. One official explained that,

as the new mayor wanted to build a museum and was seeking land for it all around Guangzhou, they happened to find out that there was land available after the demolition in Enning Road, and they decided to build it here. But it was not planned to build a museum here according to the plan. Therefore, such a decision is just some idea of the political leader. (Interview on February 7, 2015)

Meanwhile, the planner mentioned that,

after the museum is built here, it could be said that finally this project becomes a government-sponsored public welfare project, it is the same as if the government purchased the land and constructed it into green land. In other words, actually the top-down museum decision saved the project in dilemma, turning the market-oriented project into a municipal public project. (Interview on February 5, 2015)

\textsuperscript{59} There is a river called Dadichong that goes though Enning Road area from west to east, and this river is connected to Lizhiwan River which was reopened and beautified in 2009 before the Asian Games held in Guangzhou in 2010.
Figure 29. Enning Road area in demolition (2011)

Source: Photo by Li Benli

Figure 30. View of Enning Road area in 2017

Source: Author
“Micro regeneration” was promoted in the “Methods of Urban Regeneration in Guangzhou” (Guangzhou Municipal Government, 2015a) and “Implementation Methods of Old Town Regeneration in Guangzhou” (Guangzhou Municipal Government, 2015d). In February 2016, the project office held an auction on investment, renovation, and management of Yongqing area, which is in the west part and next to the Cantonese Opera Museum in Enning Road redevelopment area, and the real estate company of Wanke won the bid and started the micro regeneration project since then, which aimed to renovate 7200 square meters of vacant buildings.

The official in the project office mentioned that,

actually since 2013 we started to plan about how to involve social capital in the old town regeneration in this area. As the space in Enning road has been very fragmented after sporadic demolition. At that time, the concept of Maker is getting popular, and I also talked to some friends of mine who are working on this field. The low cost and good location of this area is perfect to be use as office space for small Maker companies. However when we initiate this project, Wanke is the only company that showed interested in it. It would have been better if there were a few more developers participate and compete for the bidding. (Interview on March 15, 2017)

According to the requirement of project office, the company needed to follow the
principal of “renovate the old building as old,” and provide at least 2000 square meters of office space for creative industry. In March 2016, “Guidelines on Micro Regeneration in Yongqingfang” was issued by the Regeneration Bureau of Liwan District, and the strategy of “dominance by government, implementation by enterprises and participation by residents” was promoted. However, during the implementation, there are many conflicts between the company and local residents emerged. For example, the residents blamed that the developers blocked their window after the renovation and refurbishment of the old buildings, and their housing quality and daily life was also effected by what has been executed by the developers. In 2017, four representative residents sent one letter which was signed by 60 residents to the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress in Guangzhou, complaining about all the problems brought by the micro regeneration project60 (Xinkuai News, 2017). Renovation and reuse of vacant buildings in Yongqingfang aroused heated debate about micro regeneration strategy, as the first project that applied the strategy of micro regeneration since its promotion by the regulations. Besides, the conflicts between local residents and the estate company also provoked again the criticism regarding exclusion of local residents in the regeneration process (see Figure 32).

![Figure 32. Micro regeneration of Yongqingfang area (2017)](http://epaper.xkb.com.cn/view/1065834)

Source: Author

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5.4 Historical Building Preservation

In May 2007, Liwan district government published the demolition scope with red lines for the first time. The area of the redevelopment site is 11.37 hectares. What became an eye-catching topic and widely reported by the media, was that many locally well-known and well-maintained historical buildings were found on the demolition scope in 2007. One of the most controversial parts concerned the demolition of Enning Qilou street, and it was soon announced that the Qilou street would be preserved after the report. Yet another building called Jinsheng Theater was less lucky, as most part of it had already been demolished before reports about it aroused public attention. Since then the demolition and preservation of local buildings in Enning road gradually got known by the public through various reports. For example lots of stories are made noticed through the media by activating all kinds of local knowledge and also expert knowledge about these historical buildings. The journalist stated that,

at the beginning we mainly paid attention to the demolition issue, but not the culture aspect. However, frequent adjustment the list of the buildings for demolition motivated us to visit the community ourselves. It is such visits that make us find out that actually there existed quite many historical buildings which are worthwhile to maintain. Before we reported about this, no people really noticed the value of this community, and also very little about this area was known by the society, like residents or scholars. (Interview on February 8, 2015)

A professor majored in traditional architecture pointed out that,

during the demolition of one house, the owner of the house tried to tell the story and history of the house, claiming that Bruce Lee lived there before, although there is lot of debate about whether it is truly the former residency of Bruce Lee, as people from Hong Kong argued that his former residency was in Hong Kong. Anyway, it is interesting that finally martial arts culture is also promoted and mentioned later in the official planning due to this reason. (Interview on January 20, 2015)

Besides, more stories about local buildings, for example some famous Canton drama artists’ former residences told by the local residents, were also heard during that period of demolition. Moreover, the professor mentioned above contributed a lot in evaluation of the old traditional residential buildings in the community, and lots of residents helped to collect information on the valuable old buildings and elaborated their memory concerning these buildings. The professor said “some residents came to my lectures and that is how I got to know them, and these residents provided help for
us to do field investigation” (Interview on January 20, 2015). Meanwhile, the Focus Group made investigations and interviews in order to compile a community diary of Enning Road area. Such practice and pressure had some impact. The government published the “Historical Building Preservation Plan of Enning Road” in 2008, and also made an adjustment of the demolition list and scope for several times from 2007 to 2014.

The greatest change could be observed in the third version of planning, which paid more emphasis on cultural preservation. In a certain sense, it is a main reason to contribute to the changing idea of the plan. In the first two plans, culture was still not paid enough attention to, although the disapproval of the first two versions also showed a certain awareness of cultural preservation and challenge shared by the government and planners already. The media report has helped to raise public attention and awareness of the cultural value of this community. As a result, the third plan paid more attention to the historical buildings, and the demolition was also adjusted quite a lot and thus it was tried to maintain many more buildings in the end. Moreover, the cultural value of Enning road was admitted officiall, when it became one of the historical communities in the “Historical and Cultural Famous City Preservation Plan of Guangzhou City”. When the draft plan announcing 22 historical cultural communities in Guangzhou urban area was published in January 2012 to collect public opinions, Enning Road was not in the historical culture community list. Therefore, 78 local residents in Enning Road area signed an open letter entitled “Suggestions on including Enning Road area as historical and cultural community” in 2012. Meanwhile, the Focus Group also wrote a letter of suggestions. Finally, Enning road became the 23rd historical and cultural community of Guangzhou in 2012. The journalist said “we do not provide assistance to residents in this process, but the residents seem to already know quite well how to use public policy and law to protect their rights now. The way to stop demolition is to get it into the historical cultural community list” (Interview on February 8, 2015).

61 The first two versions of planning were abandoned by the decision makers, as it apparently would definitely lead to repeat the Liwan Square lesson that has already received so much criticism. During the first two versions of planning, it could be seen that the government and planners also have their rationality. The past failure practice of Liwan Square makes them believe that it is inappropriate to reconstruct Enning after such an example of planning failure. The rationality is formed based on the value of economic balance. In almost all the regeneration projects, the planning scheme is importantly and closely related to economic balancing, which referred to the reallocation of the residents and made the project financially feasible.

62 According to the Historical and Cultural Famous City Preservation Plan of Guangzhou City, there are 22 historical culture communities in Guangzhou before 2012.
The Enning case, in a certain sense, is important and quite significant as it is social collective learning, which contributes to the increasing awareness of the public towards historical cultural preservation. The local government also admitted that the planning of Enning road “took a detour due to lacking acknowledge of old town preservation” in 2010. One official from the district government who is responsible for Enning Road project mentioned that,

my own opinions also changed after these years and I realized that historical cultural preservation is getting more and more important. Enning Road is a serious lesson for Guangzhou, and it directly and indirectly contributed to the slowing down speed of urban redevelopment in recent years. (Interview on December 21, 2014)

Media played a very important role in the advocacy of traditional building preservation, through reporting various storylines about the local buildings to be or not to be demolished. A discourse coalition formed by media and local residents, NGO members and some scholars can be observed in the construction of storylines. Moreover, during that process expert knowledge and local knowledge are utilized and transferred within the coalition. Problem and strategy framing of historical cultural preservation in the Enning Road case showed collectively increasing awareness of cultural preservation. The collective actions of house-owners in Enning road case indicate increased public awareness about heritage concervation and the potential to influence the decision-making and planning processes (Shin, 2014a).

5.5 Analysis and Conclusion

5.5.1 Three Types of Knowledge

(1) Technical Knowledge

The technical knowledge of old town redevelopment is mainly reflected in the planning document. From the three versions of planning, it could be seen that the planning understanding of Enning Road is in transition. Wu (2015b) claimed that planning is used to facilitate growth and legitimize the state power. The planners in Guangzhou are the knowledge holders of planning. Planning of Enning road is mainly trusted by the government to the planning institute. Some scholars from the university would participate indirectly through being interviewed by journalists.

Meanwhile, the residents tried to learn about planning knowledge. Even for the professional knowledge holders like planners, they also noted that the role of planners as mediator, not as a only technocrat. In recent decades, the utilization of planning knowledge does not limit to the planning project trustee by the local government to the planning institute. With the gradual marketization transition of the planning institution in China, planning service is provided by various actors, including some freelancer planners and consulting institutes. In addition to planning knowledge, there are also some other expert knowledge there was utilized in the urban regeneration.64

The first two versions of planning followed the strategy in favor of demolition and reconstruction is based on the dominating technocrate, and is constraint by the physical hyperfunctional planning. Concerning the making of the third version of plan, more technical knowledge were valued in the process, for example the consultancy group of experts was initiated by the project office.

(2) Institutional Knowledge

At the beginning, the strategy of Enning road project was intended to execute by selling the land and seeking collaboration of developers. Such strategy is based on the institutional knowledge of land reserve in new district development, including how to make the land auction and seek appropriate developers. During the compensation and demolition period, local government have to sign the agreement and contract one by one with the residents. Various skills and forms of tacit knowledge, were utilized during the negotiation process. During the urban redevelopment process of Enning Road, residents frequently resorted to seek help from lawyers and also wrote letters in order to make themselves heard by the public. The knowledge they utilized included some explicit and codified knowledge, based on law, policy, and governmental administration regulations. Besides, it is observed that such knowledge is transferred from journalists to residents, and also from the citizens in other urban regeneration project to the residents in Enning road. According to the “Law of Urban and Rural Planning”, the system called “one proposal and two permits” includes the most important administrative instruments to supervise and manage urban development at the plot level. One proposal refers to the proposal for site-choosing. Two permits refer

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64 One planner from Shenzhen municipal planning institute said that “there is a need to reach consensus on the urban redevelopment, some expert meeting would be held by inviting relative experts from the market or some department. Besides, during the internal approval procedure, some experts with professional knowledge in architecture, economic, infrastructure, industry, transportation etc. would be invited to examine the planning scheme” (Interview on March 3, 2015).
to the land-use planning permit and the construction project planning permit, which indicate the legitimacy of the project implementation is closely related to the planning technocratic system.

(3) Local Knowledge

Actually, the local knowledge is activated during the urban regeneration of Enning road community. For example, lot of local knowledge about the traditional building were utilized by residents and media, in order to make the value of local architecture preservation known by the public. Besides, during the regeneration process, some local knowledge about the daily life in the community during the demolition period is also produced and shared by the residents that remained in the community. The “eyes on the street” which was first promoted by Jacobs (1961), is also a kind of local knowledge. Ikeda (2004: 254) further specified that the “locality knowledge” called by Jacobs consist of “knowing how to get things done, but also of knowing whom to trust and under what circumstances.” The local knowledge is mainly tacit and implicit, mainly shared and stored among the local residents. Compared to Xiasha Village, in the case of Enning road, local knowledge is loosely and unevenly distributed among local residents within the urban community with heterogeneity. In Enning road case, local knowledge is not acknowledged or often precluded in decisions making as local community is not powered.

Healey (1998) found out that policy “experts” and “professionals” possess their own form of “local knowledge” which is acquired through their interactions with different individuals and organisations from different sectors. Since the 1980s, the value of local knowledge has been gradually recognized, in tandem with an increasing important role played by community participation or involvement in urban regeneration in the Western countries. Healey (2007: 242) stated that the residents “know more about experiencing the city from their positions and perspectives than any outside expert. This knowledge is validated by observation and by sharing experiences with others.”

5.5.2 Problem and Strategy Framing

From the urban regeneration process of Enning Road, the problem and strategy framing could be analyzed from three aspects, including plan making, plan
implementation and cultural preservation. Firstly, problem and strategy framing are concomitant to each other, as problem framing contributes to an adaptation of the intended strategy and also an application of the emergent strategy. For example, problem framing on cultural preservation led to the adjustment of the planning scheme, and problem framing on the legitimacy of demolition urged the government to make and publicize the third version of planning. Moreover, problem framing on the compensation and relocation led to the failure of the intended strategy of involving developers and land transactions, and finally replaced by the emergent strategy around the public funding of the Cantonese Opera Museum construction.

Secondly, various problem framing activities are interlocking, as the problem of planning, implementation and cultural preservation are both the reason and consequence of each other. For example, the problem of demolition and compensation is the consequence of the definition of the planning problem, and problem framing around the making and publicity of planning was constructed in order to stop the implementation of demolition and an increase in the compensation standard. Thirdly, the problem and strategy framing of the government was challenged continuously by the problem framing by residents, NGOs, and media. From this case, it could be observed that there are two kinds of problem framing in order to disapprove the other, one is through construction of different storylines and the debate concerning the same topic, and the other is through framing a new problem. For example, the government conducted the problem framing of dilapidated housing in order to start the redevelopment, and residents fought against the definition of dilapidated housing in order to stay. In order to counter the government’s advocacy of the dilapidated housing problem and also to gain more justifiability to stay, the residents and the media tried to construct the issue of local traditional cultural preservation by defining Enning road area as a historical and traditional community.

Problem and strategy framing are constructed based on the discourse of different actors, including government, NGOs, residents, and the media. During problem framing, discourse coalitions are also formed. For example, the media and residents became a strong coalition in framing the problem of planning, demolition, and cultural preservation. The media played the role of transferring some planning knowledge, legislation knowledge to help the residents to form a discourse by writing letters, resort to legal assistance, and also to help residents to publish their letters and stories on the news. These three types of knowledge are important as they enable the
residents to improve their capability to express themselves, making their storylines more compelling and trying to set up dialogues with decision makers most of the time indirectly. In a certain sense, it is the motivation and help of the media that the coalition of media and residents together helped framing the problem by doing so putting direct or indirect pressure on the governmental decision-making. Within the discourse coalition, different actors are constructing various storylines that are supporting and strengthening each other based on similar advocacy. Knowledge and other resources are transferred within the discourse coalition. Nevertheless, when the motivation of the problem framing is examined, it is found that even within the same discourse coalition different actors have quite diverging motivations. For example, the residents try to fight for the increasing compensation and get social attention and support through problem framing concerning a challenge to the legitimation of demolition with planning, the public interest debate on the plan scheme, the compensation problem concerning property, unsafe housing as excuse of launching the project, local cultural preservation value, and more. Concerning the media, it shows its basic concern helping to promote problem framing and to putting pressure on the government to adjust the strategy and also to make decision making more transparent.

From the emergent problem and strategy framing process, it could be said that it shows continuous experimentation and groping for an adaptive strategy by the government. The problem and strategy framing of Enning Road project is actually a social collective learning process. As a controversial experimental redevelopment project, Enning Road project shows great significance for urban regeneration in Guangzhou. Especially, problem framing of cultural preservation makes decision makers put more emphasis on urban cultural preservation, which has been paid much less attention in the former urban regeneration. Such problem framing plays a key role in putting pressure on the continuous adjustment of strategies in the Enning Road project. In other words, the intended development-led strategy proves to be problematic in the practice of urban regeneration in Guangzhou, with increasing public awareness and knowledge of property, cultural preservation and planning etc. The intended strategies of spatial planning, compensation and demolition are forced to be changed and adapted due to successful problem reframing by the media, scholars, residents and NGO. Meanwhile, lots of emergent strategies are gradually applied, like opening the river, site choosing for the museum etc. Strategies framing
is unstable and discontinuous. It is highly flexibility and thus applicable. The process therefore shows that the governance of urban regeneration in Guangzhou is now in transition, with the trend towards more diversified stakeholders involved and participated, and more concern about cultural preservation. Broader public participation of academics, activists, and resident is necessary (Shin, 2014; He, 2012). The problem framing by residents in Enning road shows the feature of “cross-neighborhood networks of mobilization” which has been noted by Hsing (2009).
Figure 33 Problem and strategy framing in regeneration of Enning Road

Source: Author
Chapter 6 Case Study of Old Industrial Site Regeneration: Kingway Brewery in Shenzhen

6.1 Location and Background

The Kingway Brewery is located in the southeast of the Buxin area in the Luohu District in Shenzhen, which is close to the Shuibei Jewelry Industrial District (see Figure 34). The Kingway Brewery was founded in 1990, as the only local beer producer in Shenzhen. In 1996, the Kingway Brewery was announced as the first site of industrial tourism in Shenzhen (see Figure 35). The area of the regeneration unit is 90,283.9 m². Due to decreasing profits in the beer industry, the beer production and sales business of the Kingway Brewery was bought by another company called Huarunxuehua in 2012. Since then, the Kingway Brewery changes its name to the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd; the industrial site is planned to be converted to real estate by the company.

Figure 34. Location of Kingway Brewery in Luohu District of Shenzhen

Source: Author
Since 2005, in order to promote upgrading and restructuring in industry, the Guangdong provincial government put forth the so-called “dual transfer” strategy, which refers to the transfer of industry and labor from the Pearl River Delta to less developed areas in the hinterland. Such strategy is also called “Empty the Cages for New Birds (teng long huan niao).” The industrial land-use proportion in Shenzhen is very high. In 2013, industrial land use in Shenzhen reached 283.9 km$^2$, which is already 32.7% of the total urban construction land area (see Figure 36). By relocating industry out of the city center, in addition to the massive decline of urban industry, derelict industrial sites are left in inner cities, and they are often framed as areas with problems of inefficient land use, especially by the government. Webster (2011: 321) noted that “many development zones have outlasted their usefulness as single-function locations for industry and have themselves begun to undergo renewal as mixed-use areas.”
Since the mid 1990s, the phenomena of derelict industrial districts have become increasingly prominent, with many enterprises moving away from SEZ. Some industrial sites have actively promoted industry upgrades and urban regeneration since then, and practical examples of such can be seen in the regeneration of Huaqiangbei, Chegongmiao, and Bagualing in Shenzhen. All of these regeneration initiatives have been implemented by the market. In 2007, the policy of “Several Opinions about Industry Upgrading and Redevelopment from Shenzhen Municipal Government” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2007) was issued. Old industrial district upgrading has progressed from the experimental stage to the comprehensive implementation stage, according to the Guidelines of Master Planning of Industrial District Upgrading in Shenzhen (2007-2020) (draft for comments). In 2014, the policy called “Temporary Measures on Strengthening and Improving Urban Regeneration Implementation” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2014) was initiated. According to this policy, the government encouraged enterprises with preferential regulations like land price reduction and land-use extensions in order to inspire new industrial space and infrastructure provisions through old industrial district upgrading.
6.2 Plan Making Processes

6.2.1 Disapproval of the First Plan

Regeneration plan of old industrial sites has to be examined by several departments before its final approval by the municipal government. The entire planning process includes two parts: the urban regeneration annual scheme and the regeneration unit plan. Before the unit planning was carried out, the urban regeneration projects had to receive approval by the district government and be included in the annual regeneration scheme. The regeneration unit of the Kingway Brewery was approved by the Municipal Planning and Land Resource Committee and included in the Fourth Urban Regeneration Unit Planning Annual Scheme of Shenzhen in December 2012. In June 2012, the Kingway Brewery trustee handed the urban regeneration unit planning to the Municipal Planning and Design Institution of Shenzhen. The approval of the regeneration unit planning mainly included three steps, of which the first two were to receive approval by the district government and then by the management bureau which is affiliated with the planning committee, and the last step was to be approved by the Municipal Urban Regeneration Office. Planning of the Kingway Brewery regeneration was carried out from 2012 to 2015. The meeting of the municipal planning and land recourse committee on August 17, 2012 promoted the idea that the Kingway Brewery should be preserved as a beer museum in order to enrich urban regeneration strategies and extend the memory of the city, as the Kingway Brewery represented industrial history of Shenzhen. In 2014, the first version of the Kingway Brewery regeneration plan was completed. According to the plan (see Figure 37), most of the factory would be demolished and turned into a jewelry trading center. The planning achieved approval in the first two stages in a very short time. However, the planning was disapproved by municipal regeneration office at the third step, which contributed to the continual adjustment of the planning scheme from 2014 to 2015.
In the reply from the municipal regeneration office, it was announced that the reason for disapproval was due to “insufficient industrial cultural preservation.” Developers were very motivated and driven to convert the industrial site into commercial or residential sites through demolishing the old factories due to such ample profit possibilities. However, the government gradually realized that such a strategy was very problematic. The researcher who worked in the planning research center of Shenzhen mentioned that:

> There was internal reflection and discussion in the department, and we realized that it is very problematic if all the industrial districts are converted into residential areas. The amount of land converted from industrial to residential buildings is too huge, and also industrial sites should not be totally converted into residential areas. Therefore, we need to encourage more land use conversion from industrial to industrial. (Interview on February 5, 2016)

Since 2009, the old industrial site’s redevelopment through large-scale demolition and reconstruction received much criticism from the society, so the municipal planning committee therefore was under great pressure and motivated to craft a positive example with emphasis on preservation, which would indicate the government’s concern for cultural and heritage preservation.
6.2.3 Planning Adjustment Concerning Industrial Cultural Heritage Preservation

The government insisted on the preservation of the brewery, but it did not provide a detail scheme or suggestion. Consequently, the planning bureau offered the suggestion to organize a workshop for further discussion, and the workshop was organized and funded by the developers. The developers invited three relevant experts on the recommendation of the government. At the start, one meeting and an on-site fieldtrip to the brewery were organized. The planners made reports about the regeneration plan for the project. After that, the three experts worked on their respective proposal schemes in 2015 (see Figure 38). It was then preliminarily decided on what to preserve, and the three experts finally came to a consensus that the east side should be preserve. From then, the planning scheme was adjusted quite a few times with respect to the preservation of the east part of the Kingway Brewery. However, the developers were quite against such decision. After negotiation, the developers agreed to compromise, but they still tried to preserve as little as possible. They therefore tried to make a new plan which showed a compromise based on the feedback from experts and the planning committee. The planners and developers proposed three various planning schemes, each of which took into account the industrial heritage preservation. However, the three plans were all rejected by the planning committee as the preservation area was too small or the building ratio the developers proposed was too high.

Figure 38. The three schemes of industrial preservation made by experts

Source: Municipal Planning and Design Institution of Shenzhen
A large amount of research was carried out by the government and developers during this period, including inviting experts who are specialized in planning, architecture, and landscape planning to attend a research seminar. They also organized a field trip to local sites of positive industrial heritage preservation, and they also visited the public workshop called “New Heritages and New Value” initiated by the Urban Design Center. The Urban Design Center is affiliated with the planning committee, and it is a platform that aims to organize resources and enhance communication between experts and projects. The planner said:

The Kingway project is important as the only project that considers industrial heritage preservation among almost 100 industrial site redevelopment projects in Shenzhen. Most of the projects are carried out in complete demolition and reconstruction, therefore the government received quite a lot of criticism and pressure from the society. (Interview on March 2, 2016)

One joint trip was planned with developers and planners to Nanhaiyiku, which was also transformed from an old warehouse into creative industrial workshops, in order to convince the developers of the possibility that the dilapidated factory buildings could be converted into a very attractive new space. The planner also mentioned:

our jobs is to communicate with them and show them some good examples from abroad like some cases in Melbourne, in order to inspire them. The boss of the developers also tried to learn by himself during this process, and gradually he also changed his attitude and became more supportive. (Interview on March 4, 2016)

The planner who attended the planning process expressed that:

the developers also showed a change in their ideas, as at the beginning they did not want to maintain anything and even want to do that by trying to get help from some Guanxi. As planners, we are just technology providers, and our impact is very limited. We provide what they need when the developers go to negotiate with the government. Actually, there are not any rules about industrial heritage preservation needed to carry out, according to the existing legally binding law. It is only because the political leader promoted this idea. Even at the beginning, the government had no idea on how to preserve, they figured out some general ideas on how to negotiate with developers only after three experts were invited to propose the preservation scheme” (Interview on February 03, 2015)

After negotiations and communication between developers and the government, they came to a consensus that the east part of the north land parcel, where main part of the
old factory buildings was located, would be preserved and transferred to the government (see Figure 39).

![figure 39](image)

**Figure 39. Industrial heritage preservation scheme**

Source: Municipal Planning and Design Institution of Shenzhen

The planner said:

The developers gradually realized that it is very necessary to make more compromises, and they tried to figure out the extent of compromise they could make by gradually trying out the bottom line of the government through continuous negotiation and bargain. All such negotiation was done informally. In order to promote the progress of the project, the developers gradually agreed to make more compromises. (Interview on February 3, 2015)

6.2.3 Final Planning Adjustment and Approval

In November 2014, two architecture companies were hired to make detailed architecture designs at three different times, as the developers produced a new idea about the mall in order to promote the combination of commercial function and preservation of the industrial architecture. Though the developers planned to have buildings dedicated to jewelry trade, they later found it necessary to build a large
shopping mall on the site after they did some investigation. The architecture design therefore had to be adjusted according to the new idea. Since the developers wanted to build the shopping mall in the south part, they believed that preserving the east part of factory was not a good idea for the construction of the mall. Consequently, they tried to negotiate with the government in order to receive approval to demolish the southern part of the northern land parcel and convert it into a square nearby the mall. The head of the developer company managed to bargain with the municipal regeneration office through personal contact, and they received an uncertain reply: “you can have a try and resubmit the new plan.” In this context, the developers believe this was unspoken approval. They therefore adjusted the architecture scheme to propose demolition in the south part and construction into a square. However, after the completion of the new scheme (see Figure 40), the developers showed it to the municipal regeneration office before seeking formal approval for the application, and the regeneration office replied by questioning why they changed the design to be different from the plan they had already agreed upon. The developers realized that they had incorrectly interpreted the message from the informal contact before, and again they had to change the design to indicate maintaining the south part.
During the approval application for the plan, various departments from the government provided comments. The municipal infrastructure department suggested that a gas station was lacking there; therefore, the planners carried out research about the gas station location, and during this process, several rounds of negotiation took place. The developers tried to build a gas station out of the land they owned, but the government did not approve it. Consequently, the developers had to make a compromise. Meanwhile, the developers indicated that they wanted to build a square, and they claimed that the square should be allowed to be connected to other areas and transformed into a park. It was a long process that required the developers to change their attitude from total rejection to gradual compromise regarding the idea of preservation. The planners tried to mediate between the developers and the government, and later, the decision after mutual compromise was that the east side would be preserved. In this situation, developers also benefited from the compromise they made, as the government approved the building area increase from 470,000 m² to...
490,000 m², and also one part of the apartment building area increased from 20,000 m² to 80,000 m². The planner said:

Actually the building area of 470,000 m² approved by the management bureau could be rejected by the municipal regeneration office, but the government approved the building area of 470,000 m² and an additional 20,000 m². Moreover, the maximum ratio of industrial land use in Shenzhen is 6, but the ratio of this project already reached 7 and it was approved, which means a large amount of land price is saved by developers. Because the developers would have to pay a large amount of money to apply for the land-use adjustment from industrial use to commercial use, the commercial land-use price is about 10,000 to 20,000 yuan/m² and the industrial land use is only about 2000 to 3000 yuan/m². Besides, the land-use combination of commercial and industrial function would not be allowed in other projects, but it was approved in the project, which is also the result of compromise from the government. And the developers are quite satisfied with such result. (Interview on February 3, 2015)

Finally, the regeneration unit plan (see Figure 41) was approved by the municipal planning and land committee in November 2015.

![Figure 41. Final plan submitted to Planning and Environmental Committee](source: Municipal Planning and Design Institution of Shenzhen)

6.3 Analysis and Conclusion

6.3.1 Technical and Institutional Knowledge

(1) Technical Knowledge
Tennøy et al. (2016: 2) claimed that “professional planners are important actors in these processes, as process leaders and as knowledge carriers, users and producers.” Perlstein and Ortolano (2015) concluded that there are three types of planners in China, including planners who work for the planning department of a municipal government, those who work for local planning institutes, and those employed in nonlocal planning institutes. However, in practice, there have been more than three types of planners in China, especially since most of the planners who receive similar planning training and education but work in different institutes, like universities or real estate companies, still identify themselves as planners. Tian (2016: 472) pointed out that “in China, however, plan-making is more top–down, elite-centered, or expert-driven. Planning academics have actively participated in planning practice, playing the double roles of scholars and practitioners.” In other words, it is difficult to identify planners only based with whom they are affiliated; the education background is more important in their own identification. Meanwhile, most of time, they play various roles like planner, scholar, developer and politician all at the same time. Consequently, distinguishing these actors’ identities is not easy and is often done with oversimplification or overgeneralization. More closely tapping into how technical knowledge is utilized and for what reason is a significant step for shedding light on the research questions in this study.

In the urban regeneration planning process of the Kingway brewery, there were three types of planners involved. The planner from the municipal planning institute was responsible for the plan making and approval procedure, which means providing planning consultancy. Since last decade, there has been commodification and marketization in the planning profession, which means that technical planning knowledge is also a consultancy commodity as it is utilized to achieve legitimacy in urban regeneration. Meanwhile, a developer hires architects to contribute to spatial and building design, which is also a kind of consultancy service or commodity. The chief planner of the Kingway project said, “in the past it was either simple demolition or maintenance, or dressing and capping the buildings. This time, we try to integrate the old and new structure and reuse it; it needs more technique of spatial design” (Interview on January 28, 2015). The knowledge about architecture and physical
spatial design is also one of the most important technical knowledge in urban regeneration.

There are also planners as professionals who examine and approve the unit planning application made by the developers and respective planners. Technical knowledge is utilized to intervene in the planning decision-making process. These planners have more decision-making power as they are representatives of the state and can intervene in urban regeneration. Through examining the specific details of individual planners in China, Perlstein and Ortolano (2015) further pointed out that the capability to exert influence in the decision making of planners relates to the types of organizational affiliation, and the planners’ roles in China are more complicated than in Western academic literature. The decision-making processes are based on the planning technical product of urban regeneration planning from the regional scale, as the planning institute that was affiliated with the municipal planning department also made such plans in order to aid the decision making of urban regeneration in Shenzhen. Although these two types of planners are in different institutes, their education backgrounds are similar, and only the role and their decision-making power differed. In a certain sense, planning is a tool or instrument for officials with political power. Planning has been considered an instrument of place marketing to stimulate local growth and attract investment (Yeh & Wu, 1998; Wu, 2015b; Tian, 2016). Meanwhile, technical knowledge has been employed in the process of consensus building facilitated by the planners through workshops and face-to-face negotiation, in which the developers and government represented differing interests concerning the industrial site’s preservation.

Meanwhile, in the case of the Kingway Brewery regeneration, three experts were invited to create preservation schemes for this project, which indicates that relative technical knowledge was utilized to provide more ideas in order to mobilize the developers to change their idea or mindset on the industrial cultural heritage preservation. Rydin (2007: 53) noted that the status of planners as experts resides in their command of specialist knowledge. In this case, technical knowledge plays a role as an instrument of mobilization and intervention for the government.

(2) Institutional Knowledge
The complicated and even unclear land-use ownership was a point of difficulty for the redevelopment of old industrial factories. Consequently, related policies were issued that concern the problem of unclear ownership. According to one policy, the legal land-use percentage for the demolition type of old industrial redevelopment should not be lower than 60%, and the legal land-use percentage for the comprehensive improvement type of old industrial redevelopment should not be lower than 50%. In industrial site regeneration, institutional knowledge about property rights is very important, especially concerning the application in the administrative procedures.

Relative institutional knowledge concerning the regeneration unit’s planning application and approval procedure was utilized by the planners involved in the Kingway regeneration. The institutional knowledge concerning planning in urban regeneration could be considered “knowledge about laws, regulations and procedures of planning and decision-making defined in planning legislation; knowledge about how to carry out planning processes; knowledge about public participation in planning processes, and so on” (Tennøy et al, 2016, which is based on Healey 1992b, 2009). In the interviews, it was also uncovered that the planners with more experience in urban regeneration projects and those who had more personal network resources with planning departments were valued for the real estate company too. The reason for this is that institutional knowledge and technical knowledge have become valuable resource to achieve planning legitimacy. In particular, sophisticated administrative and bureaucratic procedural knowledge derived from working as a planner in a professional capacity enable the planner to better understand micro-politics and how to balance competing interests. There have also been unclear boundaries between technical knowledge and institutional knowledge, as the influence and function of technical knowledge only become more influential to stakeholders when they are converted to institutional knowledge, which is combined with organizational and administrative regulations. On the other hand, institutional knowledge is developed and based on technical knowledge.

In the processes of planning and negotiations, the developers also tried to attain a permit to change to a more profitable scheme through the personal network called Guanxi. There was also some informal negotiation and communication between the planner, developers, and the government. These actors finally reached an agreement.
that the developers could increase the floor area ratio to a certain extent under the promise that the developers agreed to preserve the east part of the industrial buildings. Even such informal negotiations have proved effective in encouraging industrial heritage preservation, and these negotiations therefore represent a conversion from tacit informal institutional knowledge into formal institutional knowledge. According to “Technical Guidelines for Urban Regeneration Unit Planning Floor area ratio Censorship in Shenzhen” (Shenzhen Urban Regeneration Bureau, 2015), the developers would be awarded their desired floor area ratio when they managed to maintain the historical building and transfer it to government. The technical knowledge of the floor area ratio reward and transfer is important for the spatial and environmental quality improvement, and they are especially beneficial for more space that can be accessible to the public.

6.3.2 Problem and Strategy Framing

Regarding institutional knowledge in old industrial cultural heritage preservation, there were no specific regulations or policies to define what constitutes industrial cultural heritage before 2014. There have been debates on the value of old industrial buildings in Shenzhen which were constructed no more than 30 years ago. The Bi-city Biennale of Urbanism/Architecture sheds light on the shift in value and strategy acknowledgment of the old industrial site in Shenzhen. The Bi-city Biennale of Urbanism/Architecture was originally initiated by the urban planning department of Shenzhen Municipal Government in 2005 and was joined by Hong Kong in 2007. The first Shenzhen Biennale of Urbanism/Architecture was held in the OCT-LOFT area, and issues about urban villages were one of the main focuses in the biennale. The 5th Biennale has been presented as an exhibition in two transformed industrial sites, which were the former Guangdong Float Glass Factory and an old warehouse at the Shekou ferry terminal. In a certain sense, the biennale provides a public forum for urban problem and strategy framing by various actors. The main aim of the two biennales in the industrial site of Shekou was to promote industrial conversion and regional upgrading and also the Making New Shekou strategy, which arose much public attention and discussion on old industrial heritage preservation and reuse. From the implementation of the old industrial site redevelopment in Shenzhen since 2009, most projects were carried out through converting industrial sites into residential buildings, which the government found to be very problematic. In order to promote
positive real-life examples of industrial cultural heritage preservation, the government intervened in the regeneration strategy making in the Kingway Brewery, and relevant institution innovation on industrial cultural heritage preservation was promoted based on the practice experiences in the Kingway regeneration. The concept of “new heritage” (see Figure 42) was encouraged through the Kingway project, especially concerning the situation in which the value of many old industrial sites have not been realized or they had not been listed on the preservation list yet; the definition of old industrial heritage and preservation is thus very critical. From the policy innovation of old industrial redevelopment in Shenzhen, the problem-framing process has concerned the conversion from implicit knowledge to explicit knowledge, which is indicated by the process of a gradual realization of the problem and conception framing of the problem. The planner who was directly responsible for the Kingway planning said:

Historical building and community preservation has been a compulsory regulation in the new version of planning-making technical guidelines issued in February 2015. Now, we are making a list of e historical sites based on evaluation. We all went to investigate, and also the local community and street can report to us about the valuable buildings. So, then we will compile a list that would be an important reference for the urban regeneration planning making from now on. (Interview on March 4, 2016)

Comprehensive improvement, functional change, and demolition and reconstruction have been proposed as three regeneration strategies in the Methods of Urban Regeneration in Shenzhen, which was issued in 2009 (see Chapter 3). The researcher who worked in the planning research center of Shenzhen dictated that:

Before 2014, the comprehensive improvement strategy mainly referred to fire prevention-oriented comprehensive improvement of old villages. Comprehensive improvement is a task undertaken by the urban management office instead of urban regeneration office. And comprehensive improvement always depends on the subsidy and funding support from the government, and stakeholders are not motivated to carry out comprehensive improvement, as much more profit is predictable after demolition and reconstruction to higher floor area ratio. (Interview on February 5, 2016)

An institution of comprehensive improvement was gradually set up during the last two decades of old industrial redevelopment implementation. The strategy and content of comprehensive improvement has been enriched gradually, and such process can also be considered as knowledge production and utilization. Especially since 2013, this policy promoted the strategy of comprehensive improvement of old
industrial districts. According to the policy called “Temporary Measures on Strengthen and Improvement of Urban Regeneration Implementation (No.8)” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2014), the government tries to encourage implementation of such strategy by issuing related policies to allow additional construction, expansion, function change, and land-use extensions. In addition, the “composite urban regeneration” strategy, which refers to an adaptive mixture of three strategies according to the specific demand, was promoted in the policy in Shenzhen after the biennale exhibition in Shekou. The political leaders paid a visit to Shekou, and they found that such industrial upgrading through service facilities and spatial and environmental quality improvements was very effective, as it is feasible without time-consuming building and planning approval procedures. The leaders therefore actively encouraged and promoted the strategy of Shenkou, namely the “Shekou mode.” The researcher who was directly involved in related policy making mentioned that:

Before making this policy, we conducted investigation in all districts, and we tried to talk to representatives of enterprises and officials from district government. …However, after such policy was issued, the market was not so interested and did not respond actively, and the most popular and dominant strategy they preferred was still demolition and reconstruction. (Interview on March 11, 2016)

According to the “Methods of Urban regeneration in Shenzhen” (2009: Art. 38), no land price would be charged with regard to the legal existing construction area, and additional building areas only need to pay half price of the standard basic amount when the old industrial districted is converted to an industrial function or other industry that government prefers. Compared to urban village and old town regeneration, industrial site regeneration is easier, as the stakeholders are less complicated. There has been much functional change in industrial districts; however, large amounts of such spatial upgrading and functional change have not been reported to the government and avoid governmental sanction. The main reason for this trend is to avoid the additional administration fee payments due to functional change. Indeed, many industrial sites are converted into commercial or residential use by stakeholders. Despite that such conversion is illegal, “in practice, the local districts turn a blind eye, since it is entirely in their interests to promote their redevelopment” (Zacharias & Tang, 2010: 227). A new industrial land-use pattern (M0) was promoted in the planning system of Shenzhen, which mainly refers to industrial research, creative industry, design, incubation, industry without pollution, and relative services. For example, Tianmian Creative and Design Industry Park and Tianbei Jewelry Industrial
Park in Shenzhen were converted from their original industrial sites. Land-use conversion does not need endure the auction procedure; it is rather carried out by the owners and the costs are therefore cut down quite a bit. In the Urban Planning Standards and Regulations of Shenzhen City (2013), the creative industrial building and service infrastructure building portion has been increased. In order to improve the function and service of the redevelopment project, a certain percentage of new space for new industry is compulsory according to the planning regulations. According to the regulations, new industrial land (M0) is allowed to reach the floor area ratio of 6, and 30% of the building area could be used for commercial services and dormitories. This policy has been favored and misused by developers who have converted most of the industrial property into commercial and housing projects in the name of industrial upgrading. Consequently, the limitation of a certain percentage of industrial area regeneration into M0 is promoted in the 13th Five Year Planning of Urban Regeneration in Shenzhen.

In Shenzhen and Guangzhou, creative industrial parks prove to be the most common and popular strategy for old industrial redevelopment. The OCT in Shenzhen is one of the most well-known projects, and it has been taken as an example by many other industrial sites. One important document concerning creative industrial development, entitled “Master Plan of Promoting and Developing Cultural and Creative Industry of Shenzhen (2011-2015)” was issued in 2011. However, there has been increasing criticism and reflection on such strategy. For example, many commercial and business activities are carried out in the name of creative industrial parks in order to enjoy the preferential policies of creative industrial parks. Clearer criteria or a clearer definition of what constitutes a creative industrial park are still lacking. Some projects of creative industrial parks announced by the government were not implemented for a long time, or changes occurred in the redevelopment strategy during the implementation process.
Figure 42. Problem and strategy framing in regeneration of Kingway Brewery

Source: Author
Chapter 7 Knowledge Dynamics and Governance of Urban Regeneration

7.1 Utilization of Knowledge in Urban Regeneration

7.1.1 Three Types of Knowledge in Urban Regeneration

(1) Technical Knowledge

There are various products that result from technical planning knowledge in China, including formal planning documents like regulatory planning and project-related detailed planning, in addition to informal planning like strategic planning for urban regeneration and relevant policies in codified forms. Wu (2015b: 203) claimed that “the state uses planning for growth as a governance technique to restore the structural coherence that had been temporarily disrupted by opening China to the world and the shift in capital accumulation.”

The types of planning that are directly relevant to urban regeneration occur during the preparation of regulatory plans and detailed construction plans. Both kinds are part of the current formal planning system65, based on “a hyper-quantitative, matrix-based functionalist method, reflected as a pyramid structure from the plan allocating land to be urbanized” (Curien, 2014: 28). The planning procedures, which are guided by technical knowledge, mainly include established content like demographic predictions, land use, and required infrastructure according to the index of the national rule. The land-use function in particular is guided by very technical knowledge. Typically, each block is assigned a single land-use function, while mixed use still lacks technical support. Land-use zoning is also based on the Athens Charter. Zoning is completed by allocating to each block a certain single land-use function, like residential, industrial, or commercial. Infrastructure, including water, electricity and gas supplies, are proportioned and defined block by block according to existing law, and the standards

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65 The formal planning system in China mainly includes master planning at municipal level, and district planning and regulatory planning at district level, and also the detailed planning based on project or specific plot level. The Chinese system of planning was borrowed from the Soviet model.
for different functions differ from block to block. Technical knowledge shows the impacts of traditions and the educational system from both Soviet and U.S. planning systems. Planning in China has also been impacted by new land development based on the Athens Charter; however, social impact of planning is not considered enough. Curien (2014: 29) noted that “Soviet influence has been combined with the pursuit of a modernist urban planning model involving large-scale zoning” since the 1980s. The Athens Charter and the American urban grid approach are viewed by many Chinese planners as “benchmarks of modernity and success” (Curien, 2014: 29). However, in regeneration projects, it is not simply population predictions and calculations anymore, rather it is based on the necessity to negotiate.

Regulatory plans have proven to be quite effective tools in the development of new districts in which the existing population density is still low compared to built-up areas like urban villages or old town areas. However, regulatory plans have failed to address the complexities of property ownership and cultural preservation in inner old town areas. For example, in the case of the Enning Road redevelopment, the first version of the regulatory plan, which was prepared based on an oversimplified functional model in the planned economy era, failed to properly manage historical preservation, and it also did not consider the demand from the market and the community in the old town (see Chapter 5). Due to the illegal construction boom in urban villages, regulatory planning control is often in a very challenging situation. For example, the regulatory plan failed to control continuous informal construction in urban villages in Shenzhen since the 1990s (see Chapter 3). Market-driven development of land plots at the local level leads to inevitable and frequent changes in regulatory planning, which greatly decrease the influence of regulatory planning in practical urban redevelopment. As a result, Shenzhen initiated planning-based innovation by establishing legally binding statutory planning through learning from the Hong Kong experience. Statutory planning (in Chinese: fading tuze) in Shenzhen has taken the form of a legal document with a clearly defined legal status and publicity that is enforced by the government more strictly than the normal regulatory planning, which is less legally binding and enforced less strictly due to uncertain

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66 The regulatory planning was introduced to mainland China through learning from the zoning in the US and Hong Kong during the planned economy era in the 1980s, in order to cope with the land use management and urban development.
urban development in other Chinese cities. The Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen\textsuperscript{67} is responsible for examining and approving the statutory plans and supervising their implementation. Statutory plans provide technical standards and guidelines for urban design and detailed construction plans. Due to the complex illegal construction and uncertainty about further redevelopment, many urban village areas included in the statutory plan for Shenzhen were strategically left blank and unplanned so that their redevelopment can be more flexible; such situation is referred to as “opening the skylight” (in Chinese: kai tianchuang\textsuperscript{68}) by the planners. One experienced planner in the municipal planning and research institute in Shenzhen explained that:

> When we were preparing the statutory plans for the central district of Shenzhen from 1998 till 2010, ‘open the skylight’ was utilized for urban villages. It means no specific planning indicator concerning this land plot was defined, and the existing built-up situation was included in the statutory planning. However, the compulsory indicators of building area, like floor ratio, building height, and public facilities would be defined when the urban redevelopment of this village started. (Interview on January 30, 2015)

The planners in China have acknowledged the limitations\textsuperscript{69} of formal planning instruments and the idea that were transferred a few decades ago from the Soviet planning system and other areas like the US and Europe. As knowledge is not devoid of value or context, the property rights arrangement and complex post-reform institutions in particularly are quite different from those in Western countries. Among planning practitioners, there is high demand for technical knowledge that has been generated from local contexts and specifically addresses challenges confronted by urban regeneration in China. Already the first Chinese textbook of urban planning, called \textit{Principles of Urban Planning} (chengshi guihua yuanli)\textsuperscript{70}, has been very critical

\textsuperscript{67} The Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen (UPBSZ) employ experienced experts in urban planning, transportation, architecture, geography, environment, and other fields, as consultant for the urban planning and development. UPBSZ consists of 29 members, including civil and also non-civil servants.

\textsuperscript{68} It literally refers to “opening the skylight” in Chinese. It is often used to refer to the situation of leaving a blank in a publication to show that something has been censored.

\textsuperscript{69} In urban regeneration, especially, it concerns about the adaptation of land use function, meanwhile the mix of land uses or the changing of land use function or density all needs to be based on the necessity of negotiation. In industrial site redevelopment projects, the land price of different land use is quite different, for example residential, commercial and also industrial land use are quite different.

\textsuperscript{70} The first version of this textbook was published in 1981, co-edited by professors from Tongji University, Chongqing Construction and Engineering College, and Wuhan Construction and Engineering College. One of the most important core courses in all planning departments of universities in China is called Principles of Urban Planning based on this textbook since the 1980s. Besides, the textbook of Principles of Urban Planning is also one of the most important guidebooks regarding the preparation for national exams for registered professional planners. In a certain sense, this textbook is viewed as the “bible of urban planning” in China (Curien, 2014). With the increasing importance of rural planning, the Law of Urban Planning is revised as Law of Urban and Rural Planning in 2007, therefore, contents about rural planning were added in the fourth version of this textbook.
concerning technical planning knowledge learning and training by all of the urban planning students and practitioners in China. Tennøy et al (2016: 16) noted that “planners rely on academic knowledge from their university education, and they learn from each other. One central method facilitating knowledge-sharing has been the mixing together of planners with different academic backgrounds and specialties.”

There have been few regulations or laws that define the relationship between urban regeneration planning and the current formal planning system. Urban regeneration planning in both Guangzhou and Shenzhen includes urban regeneration planning at the city and district levels, in addition to relevant planning at the specific plot or project level. Regeneration plans at the city and district levels are referred to by government in decision-making processes; for example, the Planning Guidelines for Old Town Regeneration in Guangzhou (Guangzhou Planning Bureau, 2010), Master Planning of Urban Regeneration in Guangzhou (2015-2020) (Guangzhou Municipal Government, 2017), Guidelines of Urban Regeneration Development Planning in Futian District (Futian District Urban Village [Old Village] Redevelopment Office, 2012), and also Special Planning of Urban Regeneration (Three Olds Redevelopment) in Shenzhen (2010–2015). Such plans are prepared by the municipal planning institute in order to provide top-down urban regeneration guidelines for the regeneration plan and decision-making processes at the local level. Detailed plans of the urban regeneration of specific areas have served as technical documents that are critical for achieving legitimacy in urban regeneration, reflected in construction permits and land-use permits (see Chapter 5). Planners are carriers of technical knowledge who craft regeneration plans and act as mediators and coordinators throughout the entire process of urban regeneration. In other words, regeneration planmaking could be viewed as a “commodity” of planning consultancy services provided by professional planners within the marketization of the planning profession. For example, planners from a planning institute are involved in the regeneration planmaking processes in the cases of Xiasha, Enning Road, and the Kingway Brewery regeneration. The roles of planners are manifold, including acting as consultants who provide planning and design services to developers or villagers and thus having to listen to the demands of their clients; meanwhile, planners as representatives of the local or municipal government need to consider public interest and political decisions.
One experienced planner who was responsible for the planmaking in the Kingway project said:

As planners, our task is to convey our general value, in order to help our clients maximize the pursued interests and, at the same time, to provide constructive advice for the government. Our work is already beyond the technical level: we make one planning document with our technical knowledge based on all the suggestions and feedback from various actors. (Interview on January 28, 2015)

In this case, the principal planner was responsible for preparing the redevelopment plan according to the economic profit interests of the developers, as project trustees, and at the same time, this planner needed to respond to the government’s request of industrial heritage preservation and public infrastructure provisions concerning this project (see Chapter 6). Perlstein and Ortolano pointed out that:

Chinese urban planners have a distinct professional identity, which is supported by professional publications and organizations specific to their work. Furthermore, urban planners’ work is typically carried out for a particular section of the government bureaucracy: the system overseen by the Ministry of Housing and Urban and Rural Development (the central government ministry formerly known as the Ministry of Construction). (2015: 2)

However, with closer examination of the three case studies, it became clear that the utilization of technical knowledge was not limited to planners in certain planning institutes. For example, in Xiasha village, the village leader proactively consulted an English planning company and utilized technical knowledge derived from the Western planners to improve the public spaces in the community. In the Kingway Brewery case, technical knowledge about industrial heritage preservation from three invited experts was utilized by government officials to assist the government’s decision-making process in the preservation of the original brewery buildings and helped to persuade the developers of industrial heritage preservation in redevelopment. The developer actively consulted the technical knowledge provided by two architectural firms to make detailed architectural designs for further optimization and adjustment according to the developer’s new ideas for converting the old industrial building into a shopping mall, an idea that resulted from the negotiation and communication between developers and the government concerning the industrial heritage preservation and reuse (see Chapter 6). In the universities, “many planning faculty members are active practitioners in planning institutions or consultants for
governments” (Hou, 2017: 97). This became crucial in the Enning Road case where the university seemed to play an important role, as a professor from the university was in charge of the preparation of the third version of the regeneration plan. Meanwhile, journalists and residents actively take part in learning and utilizing technical planning knowledge to form discourses and debates on planning issues, influencing decisions by the local authority regarding historical building preservation with the help of a public participation initiative (see Chapter 5).

Collective consciousness, which is rooted in the reminiscent “heavy industry oriented development strategy” adopted from the Soviet planning system, is still ingrained in the expertise of many members of the political elite and also some planners (Lin et al, 1996; Dorn, 1998). Hou (2017: 97) indicated that urban planning in China is “still a technical oriented discipline, with strong emphasis on aesthetic physical urban design and efficient municipal engineering, a feature to which both planning education and national institutional arrangements have contributed.” With increasing awareness of property rights and marketization, traditional technical planning knowledge based on the Soviet model and planned economy has proven to be insufficient in China, thus innovation of planning instruments and plan-making approaches is required. The planning processes in the three case studies in this research indicate that urban regeneration planning could no longer be carried out through the approach of blueprint planning, which was promoted by the government as in the former planned economy era. The utilization of technical knowledge must be combined with collaborative or communicative planning in urban regeneration. Society has become more active in utilizing technical knowledge due to issues related to local historical preservation and property compensation in urban regeneration.

(2) Institutional Knowledge

Institutional knowledge is utilized by various actors like the local government, the Joint Stock Companies (JSC) in charge of managing and developing the assets of urban villages, developers, and residents or villagers in Guangzhou and Shenzhen. For example, the government in both cities utilized institutional knowledge as indicated by issuing a series of policy documents and institutional innovations. Such institutional knowledge is embedded in the existing political structure and
administrative context. Both formal and informal institutional knowledge are utilized in the processes of regeneration, like redevelopment partnerships and network building, planning approval, negotiation of compensation, and implementation of relocations. In the regeneration of Xiasha village, institutional knowledge about the communes and production brigades established during the period of Mao’s reign was utilized by the JSC of Xiasha village in negotiations on compensation after redevelopment and mobilization in urban village regeneration. As Tennøy et al. noted, planners:

refer to governmental documents, previous municipal plans and other plans relevant to the issues discussed. Several planners also demonstrated their knowledge of what was politically acceptable in the specific context. The main sources for this knowledge were policy documents, public statements and politicians’ actions in previous cases, as well as direct exchanges between planners and politicians. (2016: 12)

For example, in the case of Kingway Brewery, the principal planner who was responsible for planmaking utilized institutional knowledge about regeneration unit planning approval applications from the policy and regulation documents, and also adopted relevant institutional knowledge acquired through exchanges between planners and politicians, which is important for achieving planning legitimation for the delivery of urban regeneration. Meanwhile, informal institutional knowledge of clan and local networks was utilized in the negotiation and mobilization processes of the urban regeneration of Xiasha village. Finally, in the redevelopment of Enning Road, the lack of institutional knowledge about the property complexities in the old town area by the government resulted in various conflicts and residents’ resistance against the implementation of regeneration concerning property rights disputes.

As property-led redevelopment strategies have been widely deployed in Guangzhou and Shenzhen, developers became active in learning and utilizing explicit and tacit institutional knowledge in urban regeneration. For example, an organization called Shenzhen Urban Regeneration Real Estate Consulting Services Company\textsuperscript{71} organized several seminars to provide knowledge about the practical and detailed procedures of urban regeneration. The seminars were mainly about regulations and policy documents, and also included some informal institutional knowledge as so-called

\textsuperscript{71} \url{http://www.chengshigongxu.cn} accessed on October 6, 2017
internal experience and skills, like how to build cooperative partnerships with urban villages, how to bargain in compensation negotiations, and so on. One experienced planner said:

there are many people familiar with the rules, and they do a lot of research about the policy and property rights protection. The developers hire such people from the market to find out our bottom lines, like what is acceptable and adaptable. They will hire professional specialists to help to promote a lot of suggestions in order to maximize and pursue their interests. (Interview on January 28, 2015)

In other words, institutional knowledge is crucial for developers to acquire planning and construction permits before entering the administrative procedures and mobilizing and negotiating with the property owners during plan implementation.

Meanwhile, large numbers of practical urban regeneration projects experience increasing protest and resistance from local residents or villagers. The “Regulations on Petitions in the Form of Letters and Visits” issued in 2005 provide citizens with an important channel through which they can appeal local decisions by submitting petition letters to central authorities. Meanwhile, petition letters put pressure on the local authorities, as the logic of “zero petition” dominates the political evaluation of the local authorities by the higher-level department (Doyon, 2012). In the Enning Road case, institutional knowledge about petition letters was utilized by the local residents to express their resistance against the demolition and relocation. At the same time, the publication of these petition letters by journalists was a result of the utilization of relevant institutional knowledge, and thus the impact of petition letters on the government’s decisions increased (see Chapter 5). However, informal institutions can be even more effective in addressing social conflicts and negotiation in practice than formal government institutions (Weber et. al, 2014; Young, 1997). For example, Tan and Schoon (2014) noted that in the regeneration of Liede village, the villagers “created” many informal strategies by using informal institutional knowledge like clan structures, family ties, “guanxi,” seeking support from the media, and so on. Their efforts were expended in order to protect their property interests in a situation with limited possibilities to effectively express their viewpoints under the formal participation system. Similarly, in the case of Enning Road, residents applied various informal means of protest like seeking help from media, local formal
networks, and personal contacts through the utilization of informal institutional knowledge. Wuttke et al. (2010:10) noted that “interest groups are generally incorporated into the party state and private interest are generally pursued through the informal channels of personal network (guanxi).” Similarly, Schoon and Altrock (2014: 217) suggested that “the modes of governance among and within these bodies are rather informal, but closely bound to the accepted concept of ‘guanxi’ and intertwined with the political culture. They possessed their professional working network that belongs to non-visible governing relations (qian guize).” It was found that “guanxi,” or personal contacts, are often used by individuals or units in order to influence control structures in urban planning (Ng & Xu, 2000). For example, in the Kingway case, the main developer utilized his personal network and contacts to informally negotiate with government officials about the floor ratio and industrial heritage preservation details.

(3) Local Knowledge

Practice-based and context-embedded local knowledge has been utilized in the regeneration of urban villages and old towns in Guangzhou and Shenzhen, although these types of knowledge are quite difficult to identify due to their tacit nature. The practical processes and results are observable, while local tacit knowledge utilized by decision-makers is difficult to identify. Moreover, there have been blurred boundaries between informal institutional knowledge and local knowledge. For example, clan and local norms embedded in the urban village context are informal institutions and also local knowledge.

Local knowledge is shared and embedded within local networks. For example, in Xiasha village, it has been widely shared among local villagers within the community with cultural and economic homogeneity. Shared local knowledge of clan and ancestral worship has been ingrained in the traditional rural community structure and local culture. In addition, utilization of local knowledge is also closely related to power structures within a community. In the case of Xiasha village, local knowledge of ancestral worship, temple renovation, clan history, and village history was effectively utilized and integrated into the design of the central square and upgrading processes, and traditional local cultural and festivals experienced a renaissance. It was
utilized and integrated because the local JSC had the power to make decisions, which was called local “niche authority” by Schoon (2012), and local authorities in China like street offices and residents’ committees have played important roles in urban regeneration (Verdini, 2015). However, it was found in the empirical study that local knowledge was often marginalized or excluded in the decision-making process in urban residential area regeneration in Guangzhou and Shenzhen. As Jones et al. (2013: 8) noted, “all too often the actual influence of peoples’ expressed voice is minimal or tokenistic, as certain actors hold the power to frame and even marginalize it.” In the Enning Road case, local knowledge was excluded in the top-down regeneration planning processes, while residents and journalists proactively constructed storylines about the local architecture and the neighborhood through utilizing local knowledge, which indirectly influenced the decisions of the government. For example, storylines about the former residences of Bruce Lee and famous Cantonese opera artists in the Enning Road community contributed to the conceptual integration of martial arts and Cantonese opera in the third version of regeneration planning, further inspiring the construction of museums for Bruce Lee and Cantonese opera on Enning Road. Debates of local historical and cultural preservation have clearly been built based on local knowledge here. Local knowledge of historical buildings was utilized by residents and journalists in discourses framing cultural preservation (see Chapter 5).

To summarize, a comparison of local knowledge utilization in the Xiasha and Enning Road cases indicates that power structures in communities influence the utilization of local knowledge, and the utilization of local knowledge sheds light on these power relationships.

Though local knowledge in urban regeneration is often possessed and utilized at the local level, the utilization of local knowledge is not limited to local actors. For example, in the case of Enning Road, local knowledge was utilized by the local government in the negotiation and mobilization processes. Government officials arrived at their own understanding of such local knowledge, and they deployed it to facilitate the implementation of urban regeneration. One official who worked in the urban regeneration office in Guangzhou said:

If we cannot persuade the villagers, we try other methods; for example, we first explain to some villagers who have made great achievements or
work in government-affiliated organizations and invite them to talk or persuade their folks and friends. Or we would also pay visits to some senior villagers, because in China, especially in villages, the influence of senior villagers is quite strong. If someone is a minister, he or she may also need to go to his or her uncle’s home to wish him or her a happy new year. We make use of this cultural heritage. But of course, we would visit those seniors who tend to accept what we are saying and explain to them step by step. Besides, if possible, we would also organize visits for them to other villages like Liede and Yangji villages to communicate with local villagers. Now, it is an information era, and information is like water, you cannot just block it, instead all you can do is to dredge it. (Interview on February 25, 2011)

According to the interviews with government officials and developers, people with local knowledge and who speak the local language are indispensable, such as the project team of a government office or developers in the practical implementation processes of urban regeneration. Local knowledge in urban regeneration in the Pearl River Delta is reflected in the term “informality,” which has been an important research topic in urban studies in the last decades, especially concerning the study of urban villages (Wu et al., 2013). Schoon and Altrock (2014) termed the utilization of informality in urban villages as “conceded informality.” Local knowledge has its own reasoning processes and is expressed in more complex and dynamic ways than the neat singular construction in a planning system (Van Herzele, 2004; Healey & Hillier, 1996). The utilization of local knowledge in the cases of Xiasha and Enning Road indicated such complex and dynamic features.

7.1.2 Simultaneous Utilization of Multiple Knowledge

These three types of knowledge are intertwined and related to each other so that none of them can exist without support from the other types. These three types of knowledge are used simultaneously. The empirical study shows that technical and institutional knowledge are valued and actively utilized by developers when shaping their strategies to bargain and negotiate with the government. For example, in the Kingway case, the developer used different planning schemes, which had been prepared by planners according to the developers’ proposals, to informally negotiate through personal contact with government officials in order to determine the intentions of the government regarding industrial heritage preservation. In this scenario, both technical knowledge and informal institutional knowledge were
utilized by the developers as resources for strategic negotiation with the government. For the developers in the Kingway Brewery project, technical and institutional knowledge of urban regeneration planning were very important tools for obtaining the official legitimation of the redevelopment and also for maximizing economic profits related to the floor area ratio. Therefore, the legitimation of the maximum floor area ratios could be considered as a very strong profit-driven motivation for developers to utilize technical and institutional knowledge as a certain kind of resource. In other words, the utilization of planning technical and institutional knowledge in urban regeneration processes sheds light on how the utilization of knowledge is driven by market demands. One planner in the municipal planning institute in Shenzhen explained:

planners who are experienced in urban regeneration plan-making are highly demanded during job hunting especially by the real estate companies. As their planning technical and institutional knowledge shows a lot of advantages in bargaining for maximum floor area ratio and finding strategies to achieve planning approvals from planning departments of the government as soon as possible. In recent years, a lot of real estate companies provided many well-paid positions to attract such planners to switch jobs from the planning institute to their company. (Interview on March 12, 2016)

The results of the empirical study show that certain forms of technical knowledge and institutional knowledge were utilized by the developers as tacit strategies through taking advantage of policy loopholes in order to maximize their economic benefits. The strategic utilization of technical knowledge is closely related to the widely shared but hidden institutional knowledge about the loopholes in policies. For example, one researcher and planner at the Shenzhen municipal research center explained that:

the planners who work in the real estate company need to understand both planning and institutions at the same time, as this is critical for maximizing the benefits for the real estate company. The planners who are experienced in statutory and detailed plan-making are helping the developer to achieve the maximum building ratio or even cheat on the building ratio as there are still conflicting policies or loopholes in the existing policies. In addition, the designers help the developers to cheat on the building area through some tips based on the loopholes of the existing regulations. For example, some empty space without closed walls that is included in the design but exempted from land prices according to the regulations is converted into rooms during the construction. It means a flat of 80 m², according to the design and formal document, in fact has 100 m², which is more profitable for developers and more attractive for buyers. Many developers use these tricks;
however, the government gradually also realized this problem and became increasingly strict on this. (Interview on March 21, 2017)

Since the negotiation process in urban regeneration is time consuming and demands the sensitive and complex coordination of different actors, local knowledge and informal institutional knowledge are valued and utilized by the developers or the JSC of urban villages in the compensation and relocation negotiation processes of urban village regeneration. For example, in the regeneration of Liede village, local knowledge and informal institutional knowledge were utilized by the JSC in order to mobilize and persuade the villagers to sign the compensation contract. This result greatly reduced the transaction costs, which could have been higher due to local resistance and conflict concerning compensation and relocation (Tan & Schoon, 2014).

7.1.3 Knowledge Utilization and Power Structure

Power structures have significant impact on the utilization of knowledge. As Ng and Xu (2000) noted, administrative interference from high-level government officials influences local planning departments concerning the development control process, and a mayor also may influence decisions and arbitrate over the validity of planning-related legislation and policies. Similarly, Friedmann (2005b: 106) noted that when a municipality sets up parcels of land for sale and “looks for reliable agents,” those can include “anyone fortunate enough to have access to the decision-making authorities on land apportionment, and is often a close relative or associate of influential government officials.” The planners’ influence on decision-making is limited, although it is these actors who prepare the regeneration plan. For example, in the case of Enning Road, the location and construction of the Cantonese Opera Museum was not included in the initial regeneration plan, but it was added only after an accidental decision and idea from the mayor of Guangzhou in power at that time. Technical knowledge of planning and local knowledge was totally excluded during the decision-making about Cantonese Opera Museum, but served as technical instrument to legitimate the decision of the mayor afterwards. Moreover, the utilization of knowledge is enabled by the support of certain power structures. Urban villages with strong local leaders who enjoy the trust of the villagers indicated a higher possibility of successful redevelopment than those with weaker leadership (Schoon, 2014a,
A clear distinction among actors as government officials, politicians, villagers, developers, and so on is quite difficult in an empirical study, as many actors play multiple roles at the same time. In the Xiasha case, the village head’s dual identity as villager and politician enabled him to utilize large amounts of local knowledge in the village’s regeneration, as he had power as decision maker and also resources to mobilize local knowledge. Moreover, certain knowledge could be excluded or marginalized due to the existing power structures. In the critical theory paradigm, knowledge is considered to be value laden and constitutive of interests (Hordijk & Baud, 2006). Hordijk and Baud (2006) claimed that the powerful actors can strengthen their claims by using “expert knowledge” and exclude the interests of less powerful actors through rejecting practice-based and traditional knowledge or by contesting the source and legitimacy of such knowledge. For example, local residents of Enning Road were marginalized in decision-making process as decision makers considered them to lack useful knowledge and capabilities. Property owners protested using media, petitions, lawsuits, and marches due to dissatisfaction with compensation and relocation in the area’s urban regeneration process (Lee, 2008). Such practices are strongly motivated by the desire to defend property rights as a potential form of deliberate political advocacy planning in China (Abramson, 2007). Exclusion of local knowledge due to power structures is clearly visible in the Enning Road case. Although more participatory practices, like public hearings or consultations, have been promoted, they were merely “tricks played by the local government to ensure urban renewal projected through wider ‘consensus’ and a tool used to obtain the legitimacy in the name of public interests” (Wu, 2015c: 14). Wu further claimed that “the resistant voice and dissensus are muffled and marginalized by the consensus of ‘harmonious city,’ and moreover, the political subordination of disadvantaged citizens is actually legitimised” (ibid). Rural migrants are often totally excluded from the processes of urban redevelopment, but meanwhile, they are severely affected by displacement caused by the demolition of urban villages. Lin and Meulder (2012) pointed out that the informal sector and households involved in reciprocal actions should be considered as important stakeholders in the regeneration of urban villages.

In the same way, the utilization of knowledge also makes a difference by reshaping
the power relations. In the Enning Road case, technical, institutional, and local knowledge were utilized by residents, NGOs, and journalists in the public discourse of cultural preservation, which contributed to their increasing influence on the government’s decision making. Knowledge has certainly become an invisible resource that transcends land and economic capital for the community, and knowledge helps to restructure power relations between state and community.

7.2 Production of Knowledge in Urban Regeneration

7.2.1 Two Types of Knowledge Production and Policy Making

The border between explicit and implicit knowledge is blurred. The “grey area” between them could be a source or opportunity for social innovation through transforming implicit knowledge into explicit or codified knowledge. The distinction between them is a very important issue and is closely related to knowledge production and social innovation. Explicit knowledge is concerned with the exploitation of existing knowledge, while tacit knowledge is concerned with the exploration of new knowledge (Popadiuk & Choo, 2006). Based on the double spiral interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge, Nonaka et al. (2001) defined four modes of knowledge conversion, including socialization (from individual tacit knowledge to group tacit knowledge), externalization (from tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge), combination (from separate explicit knowledge to systemic explicit knowledge), and internalization (from explicit knowledge to tacit knowledge). In a certain sense, these means of knowledge conversion are quite similar to the four learning modes in the experimental learning cycle theory offered by Kolb (1984). For example, the externalization mode suggested by Nonaka et al. bears resemblance to the abstract conceptualization method promoted by Kolb. Externalization refers to creating concepts or diagrams by articulating tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge (Uriarte, 2008). Baud (2002: 155) promoted three modes of knowledge production, which include (1) the exchange or circulation of knowledge from local practices, which helps define research problems; (2) the “embedded knowledge” exchange, which becomes more encoded and generally used within networks of practicing professionals (engineers and technicians, entrepreneurs); and (3) the “generalized” knowledge produced in “controlled settings” (laboratories, experimental). According
to the social constructivist shift, knowledge is produced through social interaction (Friedmann, 1987) or collaborative social learning processes (Healey, 1997). Unlike scientific knowledge generated from controlled experiments in laboratories in the natural sciences, knowledge production and utilization in urban regeneration is co-constructed and based on interaction of various actors which are the users and sources of the three types of knowledge. From the empirical study of urban regeneration in Guangzhou and Shenzhen, the production of knowledge can be concluded into two types: practice based and research based.

(1) Practice-based Knowledge

Practice-based knowledge in urban regeneration mainly refers to knowledge derived from projects and programs. Schreurs (2008) claimed that Chinese governance processes often rely on the launching of pilot projects in selected provinces and cities so that learning occurs from the results of experiments, and successful experiences can be scaled up. For example, the regeneration of Enning Road contributed to respective policy innovation concerning “micro regeneration” in Guangzhou. The experience of Kingway Brewery contributed to policy innovation regarding “cultural heritage preservation” in Shenzhen. The regeneration strategies accumulated in the “three old” practices and policy experiences in Guangdong have been integrated into national policies on land redevelopment. In 2016, the policy called “Notice of Guiding on Promoting Redevelopment of Low Efficient Land (trial)” was issued by the National Land Resource Department. Young et al. (2015: 171) noticed that “provinces and cities may compete to become pilots, but the central government decides on the location of pilot projects, takes the lead in evaluating the results, and makes decisions regarding which initiatives are ready to be scaled up for broader application.” “Three old” redevelopment as pilot projects or programs are intended to explore institutional and technical knowledge regarding the adaptive strategies of urban regeneration in China, which could be associated with the well-known metaphor of “crossing the river by groping the stones.” Formal institutions have been established at unprecedented speeds in Guangzhou and Shenzhen through the experimental “three old” program. Urban regeneration in Guangzhou and Shenzhen has evolved with the accumulation of knowledge, as both the policy and practices have become increasingly sophisticated over time. For example, the institutions of
In recent decades, property-led regeneration has been widely been carried out in urban villages, inner-city communities, and derelict industrial sites in China due to their premium locations and high commercial value. Several well-documented “good practice” projects are even considered to be designated urban regeneration patterns or strategies; for example, the so-called “Xintiandi Pattern” (see Chapter 1) and the “Liede Pattern” (see Chapter 3). In a certain sense, pilot or experimental projects have promoted the production of technical planning and institutional knowledge in Guangzhou and Shenzhen. In the case of Xiasha village, the upgrading strategy that did not include large-scale demolition has been touted by the government as a prime example, and it was also promoted as one of the three urban regeneration patterns in the “Methods of Urban Regeneration in Shenzhen.” From Kingway Brewery redevelopment, the practical experience of encouraging industrial heritage upgrading through certain floor area ratio awards to developers was integrated into later-issued policy. To sum up, practices at the project level contribute to knowledge production and also further lead to policy innovation through converting practice-based knowledge into policies.

(2) Research-based Knowledge

Research-based knowledge is mainly produced by planning institutes, universities, or other research institutes affiliated with the government. In one sense, such knowledge mainly refers to knowledge produced by research, which can be oriented toward policymaking, especially when research is carried out in a “consultancy” method. However, doubts have been raised over whether this is truly independent work and if it may be susceptible to political interference (Jones, 2009). In the policymaking processes of urban regeneration, many research programs and consultancy contracts are implemented. Policymakers play the role of knowledge intermediaries defining
the relationship between knowledge utilizer and actors of knowledge production or synthesis, ensuring that knowledge provisions match the need of policies (Jones et al., 2013). For example, since the establishment of the Guangzhou Urban Regeneration Bureau in 2015, a few policy research projects have been funded and outsourced to other research institutes. Such researched-based knowledge derived from consultancy projects is mainly in the form of technical or institutional knowledge, and it has a direct influence on policymaking. Another example is the research on urban regeneration in Futian District conducted by six research institutes in 2005, which enabled the relevant knowledge to gradually become explicit and codified in academic research reports. As a result, research-based knowledge influenced policymaking in urban regeneration in Shenzhen at the municipal level. It also indicated that research-based knowledge is not separate from, but closely related to, knowledge derived from projects and programs in urban regeneration. In addition, such policymaking-oriented and research-based knowledge is co-constructed and produced by various actors from the government, planning institutes, research institutes or universities, law companies, and so on. One lawyer mentioned that:

They think that our lawyers’ suggestions are more pragmatic, because our lawyers do not have to consider department interests, whereas some of the government departments would need to consider their interests. The government has realized that lawyers just provide legal services from the perspective of laws, legislation, and the market, so it is also promising for professional and experienced lawyers to join the government’s groups. (Interview on March 16, 2010)

Healey noted that the mainstream policymakers, who are referred to as experts, with their procedures for organizing experience into ‘scientifically’ valid ‘knowledge,’ may find communication between citizens and themselves difficult. But this may be because their conceptions, their ‘conceived world’, to use Lefebvre's term, is strange and alien to those who are not situated in their particular ‘community of practice.’ (2007: 242)

There are gaps between policies derived from research-based knowledge and their implementation in practical operations. Jones et al. (2013) pointed out that over-reliance on technical knowledge results in technocratic policies with little citizen involvement in problem framing. One lawyer who works in Shenzhen said:

about 30% of the regulations are unable to be implemented in reality. For

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example, developers are not allowed to participate in old town regeneration in the early stages of the regeneration according to the current regulations, only selected developers by government through public competition are allowed to participate after all of the preliminary involvement of the government in old town regeneration. However, in reality, the developers are still the ones who are involved in negotiation and mobilization since the starting stage of old town regeneration projects. (Interview on March 22, 2017)

Moreover, although there are a large number of academic publications on urban regeneration in China, such research-based knowledge remains in the circulation of the academic community and is rarely able to bridge the gap between research and practice. One experienced planner who has worked in the regeneration office of the Futian government for more than 10 years said that:

Many scholars are quite idealistic and expect to find a one-time solution to solve all of these urban problems. However, in practice it is a very gradual process, and even small steps or a little progress achieved in one project is incremental but relatively reasonable already. Very few scholars speak the local language and talk to the people there, so they did not really understand urban villages, though they keep talking about them. The academic analyses they make are limited in their own logics and do not consider the logic of the villagers. (Interview on February 2, 2015)

Research-based knowledge relating to “good practice” projects in Western countries in the form of academic publications will only be referred to when it is relevant and contributes to the practical implementation of projects within a limited timeframe. For example, in the Kingway case, the planners made one report that referred to a few projects of industrial heritage reuse and preservation in Germany and the UK in order to justify and support the planning scheme they made. Reading good practice guides, planning guidelines, and research summaries is a very important means of knowledge acquisition and utilization for planners involved in organizing urban regeneration projects (Wenger, 1998).

7.2.2 Market-driven Knowledge Production and Institutional Innovation

Since the land reform in 1987, massive property-led urban regeneration in the city centers of Guangzhou and Shenzhen was triggered by the introduction of land markets. Later, housing reform and tax decentralization in the 1990s led to the active participation of real estate markets in the urban regeneration of both cities. Driven by
the demand for regulations concerning the critical issues of demolition and compensation in urban redevelopment, institutional knowledge was produced and then applied to the implementation of relevant policies, like the “Regulations on Demolition and Management of Urban Housing in Guangzhou” (Guangzhou Municipal Government, 1992) and “Measures of Housing Demolition in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 1998). Meanwhile, administrative institutions were also established in response to the development of the land and housing market. For example, the Shenzhen Urban Planning and Land Administration Bureau was established in 1989 to integrate planning, housing, and land administration. Such a combination was an innovative reform in China. Shenzhen was a forerunner in having initiated planning system reform in order to adapt to the challenges that were caused by the extremely rapid urban growth driven by the land and housing market. For example, the establishment of the Urban Planning Board of Shenzhen and legally binding statutory planning emerged from the production of institutional knowledge and technical knowledge in Shenzhen. Such reforms were also characterized by the gradual integration of non-state actors. In this context, the floor area ratio has been one the most controversial topics in the debates of technical planning knowledge in urban regeneration in Guangzhou and Shenzhen. In Shenzhen, a series of policy-oriented research projects on floor area ratios and statutory plans have been funded by the government. Based on the research-based knowledge, relevant policies on the calculation of floor area ratios were issued; for example, the “Technical Guidelines for Planning Plot Ratio Approval of Urban Regeneration Unit in Shenzhen” (Shenzhen Urban Regeneration Bureau, 2015) and “Disposal Methods on Regulating Land Use and Plot Ratio Change of Unconstructed Transferred Land” (Shenzhen Planning and Land Resource Committee, 2015a). In order to provide clear guidelines and regulations on making plans for the urban regeneration unit, which was promoted in the “Measures of Urban Regeneration” in 2009, the government entrusted the task of compiling the urban regeneration plan making regulations to the planners in Shenzhen’s municipal planning institute. The planner who was responsible for compiling the regulations said:

As the plans are prepared by market forces, we need to provide rules, and the developers and investors need to know how to make the planning: what content to include and what kind of procedures. We have to consider all of these things. When we were compiling the regulations, we continued to communicate with the government, and we revised them
According to the interviews with policymakers in Shenzhen and Guangzhou, different relevant departments at the district level were involved in the discussions of making and revising policies. In addition, preliminary drafts for comments were published to collect responses from broader parts of society during the policymaking processes in Shenzhen and Guangzhou. The planner and researcher who was responsible for revising the policy “Temporary Measures on Strengthening and Promoting Urban Regeneration Implementation in Shenzhen” (Shenzhen Municipal Government, 2016d) mentioned that “around 700 comments on the revised draft were received; people are very much motivated to respond as the revision of the rules directly relates to redistribution of their interest” (Interview on March 21, 2017).

**7.3 Knowledge Transfer: Social Learning Through Network and Interaction**

Two types of networks, policy networks at the policy-making level and issue networks at the project-based practical level, have been found in the urban regeneration processes in Guangzhou and Shenzhen. The associated knowledge shapes the network, and such networks are critical in the processes of problem and strategy framing. The formation and function of policy and issue networks are engaged in social learning processes. Knowledge transfer occurs through networking and interacting, and such processes contribute to social learning.

Policy networks aim to formulate regulatory criteria and shape the relevant institutions in urban regeneration. For example, policy learning between Shenzhen and other areas like Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore has taken place since the 1980s. Such policy learning is enacted through a certain policy network across different cities or countries. One experienced planner in Shenzhen’s municipal planning and research institute said, “We visited the Reconstruction Bureaus in Hong Kong and Singapore and conducted many interviews with them in order to learn about their experiences; for example, we learned about the organization establishment from
Singapore and about institutional arrangements of property distribution from Hong Kong” (Interview on January 30, 2015). According to the interview, the policy networks formed by developers, lawyers, government officials, scholars, and planners greatly contributed to the continuous policy making and revision in Shenzhen. One researcher and planner who was responsible for policymaking in Shenzhen mentioned that “the legal affairs office is responsible for final review of the regulations and policies issued by government. They are very careful about sentences and words in the policy; they provide lots of helpful comments and we work closely on the improvement of the policy” (Interview on March 21, 2017). Even informal personal contact within a policy network has an impact on policymaking. A researcher from the Shenzhen municipal research center mentioned that:

Our institute and another institute called Evaluation Center do a lot of research and provide us with some technical range value concerning scale to include in policymaking. However, our boss is very stressed as he is also not sure about the decision which is very influential and he is responsible for the risk. In this situation, he claims that this is confidential; however, he made people outside the office get informed about this issue. Such issue attracts a lot of attention by relevant stakeholders, therefore it is very easy for them to be informed, as there is informal and private communication between the developers and the head of our institute. We will make some revisions if we hear about opposing or adversary opinions. Such simple informal contact is often used as not every rule we make is appropriate for public discussion. (Interview on March 21, 2017)

Schoon (2014b) noted that successful redevelopment models, nationwide governmental site visits and program exchange, and regulation promulgation are consultative styles of learning in policymaking. Policy learning refers to the changes of personal skills, the introduction of new instruments and shifts in problem-solving capabilities, and the governing techniques of a certain policy (Zimmermann, 2009). Social learning is embedded in this process of policy learning. The Chinese government has a tradition of experimental practice in policy framing through establishing models of practice and deploying past experiences to other areas through policies. Taylor (2013) suggested that dense interaction enables actors who operate with a common institutional framework to develop common values, beliefs, and understandings of policy problems and their resolution, and such shared norms and practices help to reduce coordination costs.
Moreover, issue networks are formed in the practice of specific urban regeneration projects. For example, in the case of Enning Road, issue networks concerning planning, demolition, compensation, and cultural preservation formed when the redevelopment project started in 2006. Wuttke et al. (2010: 10) claimed that “urban renewal in particular involves the interests of the government, developers, land owners and the public that differ with regard to planning, land pricing, compensation for demolition and ownership.” The issue networks aim to achieve a consensus; for example, the entrepreneurial partnership between Xiasha village and real estate developers, and developing strategies for industrial heritage preservation and redevelopment in the Kingway Brewery regeneration. The issue networks formed in the Enning Road case are another example. The residents, NGO members, journalists, and scholars co-constructed such networks concerning the issues of the planning, demolition, compensation, and cultural preservation since 2006. Technical, institutional, and local knowledge were exchanged in these issue networks through interactions among local residents, journalists, and NGO members in different activities like informal community meetings, exhibitions, petition letters, and so on. According to the interview, increasing awareness of the value of the cultural preservation in the Enning Road regeneration and reflections by government and scholars on the top-down exclusive planning approach could be considered as social learning through these issue networks. Consensus building, which is closely engaged with social learning, results in new ways of thinking and reasoning in terms of the content of rules or potential paths of resource flows which are later reflected in new policy discourses or storylines. The issue networks utilize various types of knowledge in order to influence decision-making through formal and informal rules. Oborn et al. (2010) noted that knowledge transfer and learning methods occur through various means including routines that enable personnel movement, training, observation, patents and publications, interactions with customers and suppliers, and inter-organizational alliances. As Hillier (2000: 49) expressed, “power is established and ‘truths’ legitimated via the intermediaries employed-including consultants’ reports, media coverage, telephone conversations, and so on – rather than the ‘rational’ arguments voiced at the representative fora of the formal participation process.” In the urban regeneration projects in Guangzhou and Shenzhen, various means of social
learning were present, including training seminars, the Bi-city Biennale, workshops, organized fieldtrip and interview in other cities, informal personal contact, and so on.

7.4 Knowledge Utilization, Production and Transfer: Problem and Strategy Framing

Problem framing depends on the degree of consent on the socially constructed “is” and “ought.” Urban regeneration processes in Guangzhou and Shenzhen involve continuous shifts in problem and strategy framing by various actors. For example, in the Enning Road case, urban regeneration received tremendous criticism, and the case can be characterized by a continuous adjustment of the unstable strategies that were applied and frequent stagnation due to social resistance from 2006 to 2017. Technical knowledge, institutional knowledge, and local knowledge were activated and utilized to construct those storylines by the government, planners, scholars, journalists, residents, and NGOs, and thus there was a continuous and complex interplay of problem and strategy framing. Hoppe (2010: 16) defined four types of problems according to certainty and degree of agreement, including unstructured problems, moderately structured problems, and structured problems, as well as disagreement. In recent decades, the streaming of problem and strategy framing in urban regeneration has contributed to the shift in the dominant form of problem framing from unstructured problems, to moderately structured problems, and then structured problems. Meanwhile, in urban regeneration processes, many deliberate and emergent strategies coexist, and there are also some intended strategies that fail in their implementation. Problem framing concerns normative knowledge that helps to evaluate and judge, and strategy framing concerns practical knowledge on how to act. Knowledge is the basis of value, norms, and standards through which actors decide what is and what ought to be. Problem framing is more prominent in the practices of specific on-site regeneration, while strategy framing is more visible in the narrative policy. Getimis (2012: 32) argued that “the scale of addressing a planning problem can differ from the scale of the decision-making and implementation. Actors’ arenas are constituted in relevant situations of problem solving at different scales or across scales.” In addition, problem framing before the implementation of the regeneration is mainly focused on insufficient land use and derelict physical aspects. However,
various complicated and detailed problems about cultural preservation, demolition, and compensation emerged during the implementation processes.

According to Healey (2007), strategy framing processes could actually mobilize actors or even form new social networks and therefore also stimulate the utilization of knowledge as a resource. Knowledge sharing and social learning during the entire processes of the three urban regeneration cases happened in various manners, like workshops, seminars, exhibition, petition letters writing, and so on. With knowledge transfer and learning among persons and projects, problem and solution framing becomes more structured and certain during the continuous experimental practice of urban regeneration, thus facilitating institutional innovation.

7.4.1 Dynamic Discourse: Through Internet and Media-based Interaction

Since 2004, with media developments like Skype, Wiki, Flickr, QQ, MSN, WeChat, Microblog, and more that are widely used by the public, the concept of “Web 2.0” emerged. With the support of such technologies, social interaction and communication have been greatly enhanced and have become incredibly influential. Technological advancements have also become dominant and indispensable tools for information and knowledge sharing among individuals, and they are widely and effectively used by rights defenders, journalists, scholars, and others. Teng (2012: 31) indicated that “characterized by user sharing, information gathering, the assembling of social groups around points of interest, and user-to-user interaction, it has turned Internet users from browsers to creators of online content.” For this reason, discourse framing though the means of Web 2.0 is very important and worthwhile to consider. Teng (2012: 30) claimed that “the rise of online media has greatly challenged the official media monopoly, changing China’s discourse ecology and even the concept of the media. As a result, it will have a tremendous influence on China’s rights defense movement and political transformation.” From the case of Enning Road, it can be seen that internet-based communication has challenged the typical top-down planning style in urban regeneration. In the empirical study of urban village regeneration in Shenzhen, it was also found that the discourse on advocacy of affordable housing for low-income migrant populations and cultural preservation could be observed in social media by journalists, planners, and scholars.
7.4.2 Chinese Logic: Political Achievement-Oriented Image Improving

Under increasing property value and land value with the rapid development of real estate in China, urban regeneration has mainly been conceived as high-end and profitable urban reconstruction projects. Urban regeneration therefore also became an important route for the political achievement of local government leaders through building their political identity and attaining legitimation through urban modernity, construction-based GDP growth, and the improvement of the image of their city. In other words, urban regeneration also serves as a criterion for assessing the periodic political achievement of government officials. Consequently, in urban regeneration projects initiated by the government in a top-down pattern, the government will act as the main knowledge broker to entrust certain planners and other experts to work on the project.

The contemporary political values and ideology in China are rooted in the country’s understanding of modernity and urbanism. The concept of modernization was firstly been promoted in the 1950s with the well-known “four modernizations” (sige xiandaihua), which indicate the connection between urban development and modernity. Like urban development, modernization is often related to Western-style imagining of cities, so city events therefore became important motivations for political achievement through combining urban regeneration and the crafting of the image of the city into so-called “face-lifting” projects. For example, environmental problems of urban villages have often been related to urban image. Villagers’ former building practices are defined as chaotic and ugly, which is why “Dressing and Capping” (chuanyi daimao) were utilized as urban beautification projects. “Dressing” has become an important strategy for addressing the assumed city image problem.

The planner responsible for the Xiasha project mentioned that in Shanghai, for example:

There are a lot of old houses with a flat roof built in the 1980s. And after two decades, the color of the surface started to fade away. So people refurbish the building again, which is called ‘dressing.’ If people add a roof to the buildings, it is called ‘capping.’ ‘Dressing’ and ‘capping’ were once very popular in Beijing and Shanghai in the 1990s. This is also related to the leaders. You know the former mayor of Beijing Chen
Xitong, who was arrested later. He was a big fan of adding a roof to the houses. So there used to be a saying ‘Xitong’s Cap’ in Beijing. He liked to blend Chinese flavor with modern constructions. On the other hand, the roofs served a practical use too, for heat insulation and drainage. So the term ‘dressing and capping’ was not created by Shenzhen. It has been promoted in the nation for a long time. (Interview on March 10, 2009)

Such motivations for improving the city image were also a strong impetus for the urban redevelopment programme of “three old” in Guangzhou that began in 2009 (Shin, 2014b, Ye, 2011). Another example of “capping and dressing” projects, like renovating building facades, was carried out on a large scale in preparation for the Asian Games in Guangzhou. Such a solution is often closely related to political achievement such as improving the urban image. Similar dressing and capping strategies have also been utilized in the Enning Road and Xiasha village projects. There was much critique about beautification projects that consumed large amounts of money. Nevertheless, it is still difficult to challenge decision-making according to political achievement-driven rationality with knowledge-based rationality due to its marginalized role in the current governance arrangement. Decision-making in urban regeneration is mainly influenced by elitism in pursuit of political and economic gain; for example, the coalition of political, economic, and intellectual elites (Ma, 2009; Shin, 2014a). Local elites, in particular, are motivated to implement urban regeneration policies and assigned tasks from upper-level government as their political career achievements are evaluated through performances like urban regeneration.

7.5 Conclusion: Social Learning and Institutional Innovation

Knowledge dynamics and governance mutually shape each other. The utilization, production, and transfer of the three types of knowledge influence the structure and power relations within or among networks through various ways of reasoning and framing, which contribute to the communicative discourse that is intertwined with power structures. In other words, networks and discursive framing practices carry power. The relations and constellation of actors in urban regeneration include policy and issue networks (see Figure 43), indicating the shift and maturing of governance with increasingly diversified actors from society and markets. The utilization,
production, and transfer of knowledge also enables actors to change their positions and influence the existing power structures. Knowledge has been viewed as a resource and as invisible capital. The utilization and transfer of knowledge need to be embedded in networks and combined with other kinds of social capital or resources. Trust and social capital are developed through these networks. The increasing participation demand is accompanied by the knowledge dynamics driven by non-state actors.

Technical knowledge, institutional knowledge, and local knowledge are utilized to co-construct storylines about property compensation and historical culture preservation by the government, planners, scholars, journalists, residents, and NGOs, thus a continuous and complex interplay of problem and strategy framing occurs. With knowledge transfer and learning among persons and projects, problem and solution framing incrementally become more mature and structured during the continuous experimental practices of urban regeneration, thus facilitating institutional innovation. In a certain sense, pilot or experimental projects and policies have been a key feature of a maturing urban regeneration system in China. During this process, institutional innovation took place through the production of knowledge; for example, the conversion of implicit knowledge into explicit and codified knowledge contributed to institutional innovation. Shared knowledge is embedded in innovation, and in the meantime, knowledge sharing and production lead to institution innovation. The continuous and incremental policy revision processes in Guangzhou and Shenzhen could be called “policy patching.” Although marketization has caused many changes concerning the roles and behaviors of the state, the state as a dominant actor continues to show distinguished features under the structural context of the self-regulating party-state arrangement. Meanwhile, there is no single type of governance mode in China, especially considering the political environment and the period of transition and transformation. Due to inequality and imbalance, governance even varies from project to project, city to city. Social learning has many forms and means: learning by doing (problem and strategy framing), learning by interacting and networking (policy and issue networks), and learning by being (formal and informal institutions). Social learning is inextricably tied to problem framing, as the practice of problem framing and problem solving through pilot projects at the micro-level enables “policy patching”
and the scaling up of practice-based knowledge. The understanding of social learning in urban regeneration enables us to reflect on what people do and how people think, and it also makes it possible to look into more complicated processes of social learning through controversial cases like Enning Road rather than focusing on capturing best practices in planning research. Finally, social learning also enables us to make better connections from knowledge to practice through policy innovation and to uncover more research questions concerning knowledge and governance in planning theory and social research.
Figure 43. Social learning and institutional innovation in Guangzhou and Shenzhen

Source: Author
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### Policy Appendix

#### National level


Province level

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