Buch
Institutional Framework and Dysfunctionality of the Transitional Chinese Wage Bargaining Regime
Abstract
This book examines the institutional building blocks of China’s transitional wage bargaining regime taking into account the macroeconomic and political framework. Special attention is paid to the more volatile institutional setting in emerging economies. The approach enables an evaluation of the how China’s wage determination mechanism is developing. China’s economic reform process launched in 1978 had far reaching consequences on the institutional setting of its economic system. This resulted in substantial re-arrangement of its industrial relations. In an attempt to better understand the changes, this book draws on extensive empirical data, including a case study of wage developments at German companies in China and an analysis of the macroeconomic functionality of Chinese wage bargaining system according to the Keynesian paradigm focusing on inflation, nominal wage growth, productivity as well as the development of consumption demand and wage dispersion. The analysis suggests that the functionality of the Chinese wage bargaining system performs poorly and that the current transitional system lacks a strong institutional structure. Although China’s current wage bargaining system has seen some elements of strengthening its institutional structure, particularly in the area of more coordination, its design remains subordinate to the Communist Party of China’s primary goal of defending an authoritarian one-party rule. Under these conditions China is unlikely to establish a more functional wage bargaining regime.
Additional Information
Die gedruckte Ausg. ist im Rainer Hampp Verlag, Augsburg, München (www.Hampp-Verlag.de) erschienen.Citation
@book{doi:10.17170/kobra-2019010782,
author={Zenglein, Max J.},
title={Institutional Framework and Dysfunctionality of the Transitional Chinese Wage Bargaining Regime},
publisher={Rainer Hampp Verlag},
year={2018}
}
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2019-01-07T10:47:31Z 2019-01-07T10:47:31Z 2018 doi:10.17170/kobra-2019010782 http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/11021 Die gedruckte Ausg. ist im Rainer Hampp Verlag, Augsburg, München (www.Hampp-Verlag.de) erschienen. eng Rainer Hampp Verlag Urheberrechtlich geschützt https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/ China industrial relations economic systems institutional economics wage bargaining wage determination emerging economies 320 Institutional Framework and Dysfunctionality of the Transitional Chinese Wage Bargaining Regime Buch This book examines the institutional building blocks of China’s transitional wage bargaining regime taking into account the macroeconomic and political framework. Special attention is paid to the more volatile institutional setting in emerging economies. The approach enables an evaluation of the how China’s wage determination mechanism is developing. China’s economic reform process launched in 1978 had far reaching consequences on the institutional setting of its economic system. This resulted in substantial re-arrangement of its industrial relations. In an attempt to better understand the changes, this book draws on extensive empirical data, including a case study of wage developments at German companies in China and an analysis of the macroeconomic functionality of Chinese wage bargaining system according to the Keynesian paradigm focusing on inflation, nominal wage growth, productivity as well as the development of consumption demand and wage dispersion. The analysis suggests that the functionality of the Chinese wage bargaining system performs poorly and that the current transitional system lacks a strong institutional structure. Although China’s current wage bargaining system has seen some elements of strengthening its institutional structure, particularly in the area of more coordination, its design remains subordinate to the Communist Party of China’s primary goal of defending an authoritarian one-party rule. Under these conditions China is unlikely to establish a more functional wage bargaining regime. open access Zenglein, Max J. 2015-10-29 xiv, 209 Seiten Labor and Globalization ;; Volume 14 Kassel, Universität Kassel, Fachbereich Gesellschaftswissenschaften Augsburg, München 978-3-86618-899-0 2196-5382 China Arbeitsbeziehungen Institutionenökonomie Lohn Tarifverhandlung publishedVersion Labor and Globalization Volume 14
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