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dc.date.accessioned2024-06-03T12:51:51Z
dc.date.available2024-06-03T12:51:51Z
dc.date.issued2024-03-28
dc.identifierdoi:10.17170/kobra-2024052810232
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/15807
dc.description.sponsorshipGefördert im Rahmen eines Open-Access-Transformationsvertrags mit dem Verlagger
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rightsNamensnennung 4.0 International*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/*
dc.subjectinter-municipal cooperationeng
dc.subjectjoint business parkseng
dc.subjectcitizens’ preferenceseng
dc.subjectpoliticians’ preferenceseng
dc.subjectlocal tax competitioneng
dc.subject.ddc330
dc.titleDoes intense tax competition boost public acceptance for inter-municipal cooperation? Evidence from a survey among German citizens and local politicianseng
dc.typeAufsatz
dcterms.abstractIntense tax competition among local governments limits their potential for tax revenues. Inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) in general and joint business parks in particular constitute a platform to coordinate local tax rates with neighboring municipalities to reduce tax competition. We ask whether local politicians and citizens are aware of this logic and whether they account for it. Using survey data from German municipalities, we find citizens’ support for joint business parks to increase in the intensity of tax competition but not for other forms of IMC. For local politicians, we do not find any effect of tax competition on IMC support.eng
dcterms.accessRightsopen access
dcterms.creatorBischoff, Ivo
dcterms.creatorBergholz, Christian
dcterms.creatorHaug, Peter
dcterms.creatorMelch, Simon
dc.relation.doidoi:10.1080/17487870.2024.2333306
dc.subject.swdDeutschlandger
dc.subject.swdKommunale Zusammenarbeitger
dc.subject.swdGewerbegebietger
dc.subject.swdPräferenzger
dc.subject.swdBürgerger
dc.subject.swdPolitikerger
dc.subject.swdGemeindesteuerger
dc.subject.swdSteuerwettbewerbger
dc.type.versionpublishedVersion
dcterms.source.identifiereissn:1748-7889
dcterms.source.issueIssue 2
dcterms.source.journalJournal of Economic Policy Reformeng
dcterms.source.pageinfo140-161
dcterms.source.volumeVolume 27
kup.iskupfalse


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