Aufsatz
Cooperation, norms, and gene-culture coevolution
Zusammenfassung
This paper studies how a continuum of individuals interacting in a binary public goods game can secure cooperation through transmitting and enforcing norms. The evolutionary model consists of three distinct dimensions: behavior, norms, and approval preferences. In line with the indirect approach proposed by Güth and Yaari (1992), behavior results from utility maximization, while norms and approval preferences evolve over time. The underlying evolutionary processes differ concerning speed and nature. Whereas norms evolve at the cultural level through peer interactions and socialization, approval preferences are (at least partly) biologically inherited and transmitted from parents to their offspring. We find that if cultural and biological reproductive fitnesses are derived from material and social factors, then an interplay of social disapproval mechanisms gives rise to stable equilibria in which positive cooperation levels persist. Moreover, we find stable equilibria characterized by heterogeneous behavior and moral attitudes across individuals.
Zitierform
In: Games and Economic Behavior Volume 147 (2024-08-10) , S. 242-267 ; eissn:1090-2473Förderhinweis
Gefördert im Rahmen des Projekts DEALZitieren
@article{doi:10.17170/kobra-2024082810728,
author={Mankat, Fabian},
title={Cooperation, norms, and gene-culture coevolution},
journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
year={2024}
}
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2024-09-23T10:29:37Z 2024-09-23T10:29:37Z 2024-08-10 doi:10.17170/kobra-2024082810728 http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/16056 Gefördert im Rahmen des Projekts DEAL eng Namensnennung 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ evolutionary game theory cooperation norms 330 340 Cooperation, norms, and gene-culture coevolution Aufsatz This paper studies how a continuum of individuals interacting in a binary public goods game can secure cooperation through transmitting and enforcing norms. The evolutionary model consists of three distinct dimensions: behavior, norms, and approval preferences. In line with the indirect approach proposed by Güth and Yaari (1992), behavior results from utility maximization, while norms and approval preferences evolve over time. The underlying evolutionary processes differ concerning speed and nature. Whereas norms evolve at the cultural level through peer interactions and socialization, approval preferences are (at least partly) biologically inherited and transmitted from parents to their offspring. We find that if cultural and biological reproductive fitnesses are derived from material and social factors, then an interplay of social disapproval mechanisms gives rise to stable equilibria in which positive cooperation levels persist. Moreover, we find stable equilibria characterized by heterogeneous behavior and moral attitudes across individuals. open access Mankat, Fabian doi:10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.006 Evolutionäre Spieltheorie Kooperation Norm <Normung> publishedVersion eissn:1090-2473 Games and Economic Behavior 242-267 Volume 147 false
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