Market-driven harvesting of non-timber forest products and the governance of communal forests in the south-east lowveld of Zimbabwe.

Despite forests providing a wide range of important products and services for much of Zimbabwe’s population, natural forests are threatened by deforestation. The highest rates of deforestation occur in communal forests. Communal forest resources in Zimbabwe show evidence of increased degradation and signs of a breakdown of local institutions for resources management. These signs of a breakdown of local institutions are coupled with evidence of a lack of any emerging alternative institutions for conservation of forest resources. Promotion of market-driven harvesting of non-timber forest products (NTFPs) was initiated as a deterrent to unsustainable forest use. The basis for promoting market-driven harvesting of NTFPs stemmed from the argument that harvesting NTFPs is more benign and tends to maintain forest cover particularly when compared with timber harvesting and other alternative land uses. It also stemmed from the conservation paradigm which suggests that biodiversity conservation primarily depends not only on the technical and scientific interventions to prohibit or limit use of particular NTFPs, but in providing the right incentives for land-holders to adopt sustainable land uses that do not lead to environment degradation and loss of biodiversity. However, even after promoting market-driven harvesting of NTFPs in Zimbabwe; success cases of governance of communal resources remain isolated, and externally initiated, and heavily subsidized by the outside world. This study sought to evaluate both proximate and distal causes of the challenges in market-driven harvesting of NTFPs as an incentive for the governance of communal forests. To understand both proximate and distal causes of the challenges for the governance of communal forests, the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework and the Network of Adjacent Action Situations (NAAS) framework were adopted. The strength of the IAD framework stems from its systematic theoretical focus on the impact of rules and norms on individual incentives in complex systems while the NAAS facilitates the reconciliation of occurrences outside of a single action situation to characterize the linkages that develop between adjacent action situations. Thus, after endeavoring to understand the contextual factors (proximate causes) in the IAD framework (rules in use, attributes of community, and biophysical attributes) of the resource, the study went a step further to dig deeper and inquired on what occurs outside of the focal action situations to characterize the linkages that develop with the adjacent action situations (distal causes). The objective of taking this step was to evaluate how the dynamics in the focal action situations are shaped by the governance strategies in different arenas thereby influencing governance of communal forests. The thesis sought to answer the following three research questions. Firstly, what are the existing governance structures shaping the dis/incentives market-driven harvesting of NTFPs, respectively conservation of NTFPs on the one hand and governance of NTFPs harvesting, respectively governance of communal forests on the other? Secondly, how are the existing governance structures shaping the dis/incentives in the market-driven harvesting of NTFPs, respectively conservation of NTFPs on the one hand and governance of NTFPs harvesting, respectively governance of communal forests on the other? These two questions are addressed in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 which address the proximate causes. Lastly, how are the dynamics in the two interdependent focal action situations (market-driven harvesting of NTFPs, respectively conservation of NTFPs on the one hand and governance of NTFPs harvesting, respectively governance of communal forests on the other) shaped by the governance strategies in other arenas? This question is addressed in chapter 8 which addresses the distal causes. In chapter 4 through a systematic review of legislative policies, the overarching principles that underlie property rights bundles for harvesting of NTFPs from communal lands were examined. Findings show that the inhabitants of communal lands are authorized users for communal forests. The right to regulate internal use patterns, transform forest resources and make improvements on communal land is vested in local authorities thus shifting the responsibility for proactive management of forest resources away from the direct users. In chapter 5, the examination of the degree of policy coherence through summative content analysis revealed that the legislative policies are 77% coherent. However, it is the technical or procedural dimension (instruments and actors) that contributed to the fair level of coherence and there is a bias against the strategic dimension (goals). This highlights a problem of fragmentation across legislation. In chapter 6, a meta-synthesis of 47 studies covering community attributes of rural inhabitants in Mwenezi and Chiredzi districts in Zimbabwe revealed that resource use practices can be differentiated along dominant livelihood strategies and these three broad categories of forest users differ in their relation to, and interference, in capacities and contribution to the governance of communal forest resources. Differentiation along livelihood strategies highlights the dis/incentives as different motives for resource use practices have different effects on the governance of resources. A field study was conducted in Chikombedzi located in Chiredzi Ward 11 (-21.6383; 31.2624) and Masapwe/Chingwizi located in Mwenezi Ward 13 (-21.2921; 30.9646) districts in south-east lowveld of Zimbabwe. The data was used in chapter 7 and 8. In chapter 7, thematic analysis showed that the governance structures for the market-driven harvesting of NTFPs from communal forests in Zimbabwe comprise hybrids and the adoption of the hybrids is based on the transaction costs of self-organization involved in the market-driven harvesting of NTFPs. The uncertainty and asset specificity in the production of NTFPs through harvesting as well as in the governance of harvesting of NTFPs has necessitated the intervention of NGOs and export specialist traders. These interventions add another layer of complexity as NTFPs producers registered with community-based projects need to monitor for compliance of rules for harvesting related to customary rights, rules for harvesting related to certification standards as well as rules related to the functioning of the producer group, particularly usage of machinery. NTFPs producers registered with community-based projects have to comply with sustainable harvesting regulations but so far there is no way of binding other harvesters who are not working with NGOs and export specialist traders by the same regulations. In chapter 8, thematic analysis revealed that there are multilateral agreements, transboundary treaties, voluntary sustainability standards, safety standards and networks such as PhytoTrade Africa affecting the harvesting and governance of communal forests in the south-east lowveld of Zimbabwe to varying degrees. These have created new local institutional structures and altered appropriation activities within communal forests. In fact, there is a ‘problem of many hands’ whereby too many actors are contributing to the governance of communal forests to the extent that no actor (entity) can be held accountable for the outcomes. Using the IAD framework and the NAAS simultaneously has not only enabled the identification of the proximate causes but has shown the linkages between the governance of communal forests and other arenas which oftentimes are taken as a black box. For researchers, these findings serve to emphasize a holistic approach in studying common-pool resources as too often the other working components have been left out thereby misrepresenting the decision maker’s environment. Theoretically, the findings have shown that the multiple use of communal forest resources results in rivalry in consumption of forest resources (primary collective action problem), rivalry in the resources to induce or enhance collective action in the governance of communal forests (secondary collective action problem) as well in the resources for coordination and enhancing cooperation among the different actors involved in the governance of communal forest resources (tertiary collective action problem). The findings have contributed to answering the question why success cases of governance of communal forest resources remain isolated even after promotion of market-driven harvesting of NTFPs not only in Zimbabwe. The tertiary collective action problems need to be addressed in order to solve both appropriation and provision problems currently faced by rural households in communal areas. These findings have implications for policy making and policy implementation. A problem of fragmentation across legislation coupled with the absence of coordination in implementation means that the responsibility and accountability for governance-related interventions is spread over several public and private actors. As such no actor amongst those involved has sufficient oversight over the governance of market-driven harvesting and ultimately the governance of communal forest resources.