Wahrheit in Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-07-26T07:33:17Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2023-07-26T07:33:17Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2023-06-21 | |
| dc.description.sponsorship | Gefördert im Rahmen des Projekts DEAL | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.17170/kobra-202307268482 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/14927 | |
| dc.language.iso | ger | |
| dc.relation.doi | doi:10.1515/witt-2023-0005 | |
| dc.rights | Namensnennung 4.0 International | * |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | * |
| dc.subject.ddc | 100 | |
| dc.subject.swd | Wittgenstein, Ludwig | ger |
| dc.subject.swd | Philosophie | ger |
| dc.subject.swd | Wahrheit | ger |
| dc.subject.swd | Weltbild | ger |
| dc.title | Wahrheit in Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie | ger |
| dc.type | Aufsatz | |
| dc.type.version | publishedVersion | |
| dcterms.abstract | Truth in Wittgenstein′s Later Philosophy. In this paper I attempt to examine Wittgenstein′s understanding of truth in his later period. In doing so, I orient myself primarily on the remarks published as Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty. My primary aim in the destructive part is to show that his later philosophy neither espouses a redundancy and deflationary, nor an epistemic and anti-realist conception of truth. Both strands of interpretation are strongly represented in the debate. An examination of Wittgenstein’s remarks on the correspondence theory of truth will also shed some light on his thoughts about truth. Furthermore, in the preceding constructive part of this paper, I will try to demonstrate that (1) for Wittgenstein there is a strong link between truths that we accept based on our certainties and our use of the term “truth” and (2) that skepticism about truth, which claims that all accepted truths in our Weltbild (“world-view”) could be actually false, fails to give any meaning to its use of “truth”. This culminates in Wittgenstein′s insight, that the question of what truth is can only be answered relative to the Weltbild. Therefore, talking about truths that transcend our Weltbild becomes nonsense. | eng |
| dcterms.accessRights | open access | |
| dcterms.creator | Forster, Daniel | |
| dcterms.extent | 59-93 | |
| dcterms.source.identifier | eissn:1868-7458 | |
| dcterms.source.issue | Heft 1 | |
| dcterms.source.journal | Wittgenstein-Studien | ger |
| dcterms.source.volume | Band 14 | |
| kup.iskup | false |