Uncertainty and Speculators in an Auction for Emissions Permits

dc.date.accessioned2016-08-10T07:06:19Z
dc.date.available2016-08-10T07:06:19Z
dc.date.issued2016-04-16
dc.description.everythingEuropean Union (EU) Horizon 2020 program, action ERC-2014-STG, Project HUCO, grant number 636846eng
dc.identifier.uriurn:nbn:de:hebis:34-2016081050649
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/2016081050649
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherSpringerger
dc.relation.doidoi:10.1007/s11149-016-9299-1
dc.rightsUrheberrechtlich geschützt
dc.rights.urihttps://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectcap-and-trade programeng
dc.subjectemissions tradingeng
dc.subjectrisk aversioneng
dc.subjectspeculatorseng
dc.subjectuniform-price auctioneng
dc.subject.ddc330
dc.subject.jelD44ger
dc.subject.jelD45ger
dc.subject.jelQ55ger
dc.titleUncertainty and Speculators in an Auction for Emissions Permitseng
dc.typeAufsatz
dcterms.abstractAuctions have become popular as means of allocating emissions permits in the emissions trading schemes developed around the world. Mostly, only a subset of the regulated polluters participate in these auctions along with speculators, creating a market with relatively few participants and, thus, incentive for strategic bidding. I characterize the bidding behavior of the polluters and the speculators, examining the effect of the latter on the profits of the former and on the auction outcome. It turns out that in addition to bidding for compliance, polluters also bid for speculation in the aftermarket. While the presence of the speculators forces the polluters to bid closer to their true valuations, it also creates a trade-off between increasing the revenue accrued to the regulator and reducing the profits of the auction-participating polluters. Nevertheless, the profits of the latter increase in the speculators' risk aversion.eng
dcterms.accessRightsopen access
dcterms.bibliographicCitationIn: Journal of Regulatory Economics, June 2016, Volume 49, Issue 3, pp. 315-343
dcterms.creatorHaita-Falah, Corina

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