The Experience of Affordances in an Intersubjective World

dc.date.accessioned2024-03-11T09:46:12Z
dc.date.available2024-03-11T09:46:12Z
dc.date.issued2023-10-20
dc.description.sponsorshipGefördert im Rahmen des Projekts DEAL
dc.identifierdoi:10.17170/kobra-202403089746
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/15545
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.doidoi:10.1007/s11245-023-09969-4
dc.rightsNamensnennung 4.0 International*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/*
dc.subjectAffordanceseng
dc.subjectDirect Perceptioneng
dc.subjectPhenomenologye
dc.subjectWilliam Jameseng
dc.subjectAron Gurwitscheng
dc.subjectPerceptual Organizationeng
dc.subject.ddc100
dc.subject.ddc150
dc.subject.swdWirtschaftspsychologieger
dc.subject.swdAngebotger
dc.subject.swdWahrnehmungger
dc.subject.swdPhänomenologieger
dc.subject.swdIntersubjektivitätger
dc.titleThe Experience of Affordances in an Intersubjective Worldeng
dc.typeAufsatz
dc.type.versionpublishedVersion
dcterms.abstractOur paper is concerned with theories of direct perception in ecological psychology that first emerged in the second half of the twentieth century. Ecological psychology continues to be influential among philosophers and cognitive scientists today who defend a 4E (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) approach to the scientific study of cognition. Ecological psychologists have experimentally investigated how animals are able to directly perceive their surrounding environment and what it affords to them. We pursue questions about direct perception through a discussion of the ecological psychologist’s concept of affordances. In recent years, psychologists and philosophers have begun to mark out two explanatory roles for the affordance concept. In one role, affordances are cast as belonging to a shared, publicly available environment, and existing independent of the experience of any perceiving and acting animal. In a second role, affordances are described in phenomenological terms, in relation to an experiencing animal that has its own peculiar needs, interests and personal history. Our aim in this paper is to argue for a single phenomenological or experiential understanding of the affordance concept. We make our argument, first of all, based on William James’ concept of pure experience developed in his later, radical empiricist writings. James thought of pure experience as having a field structure that is organized by the selective interest and needs of the perceiver. We will argue however that James did not emphasize sufficiently the social and intersubjective character of the field of experience. Drawing on the phenomenologist Aron Gurwitsch, we will argue that psychological factors like individual needs and attention must be thought of as already confronted with a social reality. On the phenomenological reading of affordances we develop, direct perception of affordances is understood as taking place within an intersubjective world structured by human social and cultural life.eng
dcterms.accessRightsopen access
dcterms.creatorKiverstein, Julian
dcterms.creatorArtese, Gisueppe Flavio
dcterms.source.identifiereissn:1572-8749
dcterms.source.issueIssue 1
dcterms.source.journalTopoieng
dcterms.source.pageinfo187 - 200
dcterms.source.volumeVolume 43
kup.iskupfalse

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