Negotiating weights for burden sharing rules in international climate negotiations: an empirical analysis

Simple item page
dc.date.accessioned2021-04-26T10:21:20Z
dc.date.available2021-04-26T10:21:20Z
dc.date.issued2020-11-03
dc.description.sponsorshipGefördert im Rahmen des Projekts DEALger
dc.identifierdoi:10.17170/kobra-202104133657
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/12738
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.relation.doidoi:10.1007/s10018-020-00289-0
dc.rightsNamensnennung 4.0 International*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/*
dc.subjectinternational climate negotiationseng
dc.subjectdistributive justiceeng
dc.subjectequity preferenceseng
dc.subjectburden sharing ruleseng
dc.subject.ddc330
dc.subject.ddc333
dc.subject.swdInternationaler Umweltschutzger
dc.subject.swdVerhandlungger
dc.subject.swdKlimaänderungger
dc.subject.swdVerteilungsgerechtigkeitger
dc.subject.swdKostenverteilungger
dc.titleNegotiating weights for burden sharing rules in international climate negotiations: an empirical analysiseng
dc.typeAufsatz
dc.type.versionpublishedVersion
dcterms.abstractWe have collected data from a world-wide survey among COP delegates to empirically investigate preferences for certain burden sharing rules among key groups in a setting that reflects the possibility of observing concessions from negotiating partners. In our survey, the participants had the opportunity to select and combine up to eight (pre-defined) burden sharing rules and to assign relative weights to the selected rules in their preferred bundle. We examine whether such a mechanism helps to overcome the currently strictly (self-interested) strategic claims on equity in the negotiation process. We observe that delegates from different groups of countries show a general willingness for concessions. However, the degree to which different burden sharing rules are taken into consideration partly differs between countries. As a key insight we report that the individual assessment of the polluter-pays rule based on current emissions does not only stress the persistence of the traditional Annex-B/Non-Annex-B division but also suggests tendencies for a more fragmented grouping with different positions between, for example, delegates from developing countries (i.e. G77 members) and emerging countries (i.e. BASIC). At the same time, we observe tendencies for a more harmonized view among key groups towards the ability-to-pay rule in a setting of weighted burden sharing rules.eng
dcterms.accessRightsopen access
dcterms.creatorKesternich, Martin
dcterms.creatorLöschel, Andreas
dcterms.creatorZiegler, Andreas
dcterms.source.identifierEISSN 1867-383X
dcterms.source.issueIssue 2
dcterms.source.journalEnvironmental Economics and Policy Studieseng
dcterms.source.pageinfo309-331
dcterms.source.volumeVolume 23
kup.iskupfalse

Files

Original bundle

Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
Kesternich2021_Article_NegotiatingWeightsForBurdenSha.pdf
Size:
825.83 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
Download

License bundle

Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
license.txt
Size:
3.03 KB
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Description:
Download

Collections

Artikel