

Petropolitics

Fatiha Talahite

Université Paris Nanterre

info@extractivism.de | www.extractivism.de



| The Author

Dr. Fatiha Talahite is an economist, former senior researcher at the CNRS (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique), and now an associate researcher at EconomiX, CNRS at the Paris Nanterre University. She joined the CNRS in 1995, first at the Clersé (University of Lille), then in 2000-2012 at the CEPN (Paris 13 University), and finally at the Cresppa (Paris 8/Nanterre Universities) in 2022. Before 1995, she was a lecturer at the University of Oran (Algeria). Her work focuses on the transformation of the Algerian economy, as well as on gender economics, both theoretical and applied to the Arab-Muslim world. She is a research fellow at www.extractivism.de.

DOI: doi:10.17170/kobra-202305158025

Extractivism Policy Brief is an Open Access online publication downloaded freely at www.extractivism.de. Readers are free to share, copy, and redistribute this document in any medium or format for any purpose, even commercially, according to the [Attribution-NoDerivs 3.0 Germany \(CC BY-ND 3.0 DE\)](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/de/). Conditions imply that no changes are made to the text, and writers and the www.extractivism.de project are referenced correctly as the original. Extractivism Policy Briefs publish on social-economic, cultural, political, and timely topics concerning extractivism in both regions. Extractivism.de team is responsible for reviewing, fact-checking, editing, and publishing the final policy briefs. The opinions expressed in each publication are exclusive of the respective authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the project. Extractivism.de cannot be held liable for any consequences concerning a policy brief following its publication.

© Extractivism.de, 2023, All rights reserved.

IN SHORT

EN

- The dominant trend was that oil and natural gas were first and foremost a matter of market mechanisms and competition rules, even if they interacted with politics and geopolitics.
- The WTO persisted in treating hydrocarbons as commodities like any other, ignoring both their commons character and their impact on the environment and climate.
- The conflict in Ukraine has caused an upheaval. Within a few months, Europe faced a serious threat of energy shortages.
- In a few months, the rehabilitation of coal and nuclear power has shattered the results of long years of struggle, negotiation and compromise. In July 2022, the European Parliament awarded the "green energy" label to natural gas and nuclear power.
- This leads us to reflect on the notion of petropolitics and its treatment in this context of crisis. In this note, we are interested in its origin, its different uses and meanings over time, and how it is defined differently in Northern and Southern countries.

DE

- Es galt als vorherrschende Trend, dass Erdöl und Erdgas in erster Linie als Angelegenheit von Marktmechanismen und Wettbewerbsregeln angesehen wurden, auch wenn sie mit Politik und Geopolitik zusammenhängen.
- Die WTO behandelte Kohlenwasserstoffe nach wie vor als Ware wie jede andere und ignorierte sowohl ihren Gemeingutcharakter als auch ihre Auswirkungen auf die Umwelt und das Klima.
- Der Konflikt in der Ukraine hat einen Umbruch ausgelöst. Innerhalb weniger Monate drohte Europa eine ernsthafte Energieknappheit.
- Innerhalb weniger Monate hat die Rehabilitierung der Kohle- und Atomkraft die Ergebnisse jahrelanger Kämpfe, Verhandlungen und Kompromisse zunichte gemacht. Im Juli 2022 verlieh das Europäische Parlament dem Erdgas und der Kernkraft das Label "grüne Energie".
- Dies veranlasst uns, über den Begriff der Petropolitik und seiner Behandlung in diesem Krisenkontext nachzudenken. In dieser Arbeit untersuchen wir den Ursprung des Begriffs, seine unterschiedliche Verwendung und Bedeutung im Laufe sowie die unterschiedlichen Definitionen in nördlichen und südlichen Ländern.

FR

- La tendance dominante était que le pétrole et le gaz naturel étaient avant tout une question de mécanismes de marché et de règles de concurrence, même s'ils étaient en interaction avec la politique et la géopolitique.
- L'OMC a persisté à traiter les hydrocarbures comme des marchandises comme les autres, ignorant à la fois leur caractère commun et leur impact sur l'environnement et le climat.
- Le conflit en Ukraine a provoqué un choc. En quelques mois, l'Europe a été confrontée à une grave menace de pénurie énergétique.

- En quelques mois, la réhabilitation du charbon et du nucléaire a fait voler en éclats les résultats de longues années de lutte, de négociation et de compromis. En juillet 2022, le Parlement européen a attribué le label "énergie verte" au gaz naturel et à l'énergie nucléaire.
- Cela nous amène à réfléchir sur la notion de pétropolitique et son traitement dans ce contexte de crise. Dans cette note, nous nous intéressons à son origine, à ses différents usages et significations au fil du temps, et à la manière dont elle est définie différemment dans les pays du Nord et du Sud.

ES

- La tendencia dominante era que el petróleo y el gas natural eran ante todo una cuestión de mecanismos de mercado y normas de competencia, aunque interactuaran con la política y la geopolítica
- La OMC persistía en considerar los hidrocarburos como mercancías como las demás, ignorando tanto su carácter de bienes comunes como su impacto en el medio ambiente y el clima.
- El conflicto de Ucrania ha provocado una conmoción. En pocos meses, Europa se enfrentó a una grave amenaza de escasez energética.
- En pocos meses, la rehabilitación del carbón y de la energía nuclear ha hecho añicos los resultados de largos años de lucha, negociación y compromiso. En julio de 2022, el Parlamento Europeo concedió la etiqueta de "energía verde" al gas natural y a la energía nuclear.
- Esto nos lleva a reflexionar sobre la noción de petropolítica y su tratamiento en este contexto de crisis. En esta nota, nos interesamos por su origen, sus diferentes usos y significados a lo largo del tiempo, y la forma en que se define de manera diferente en los países del Norte y del Sur.

Petropolitics

Until recently, the prevailing trend was for oil and natural gas to be primarily a matter of market mechanisms and competition rules, even though it interacted with politics and geopolitics. While Europe was setting up a vast natural gas market, the WTO persisted in considering hydrocarbons as commodities like any others, ignoring both their character as common goods and their impact on the environment and the climate.¹ The demand to move away from fossil fuels in order to curb the catastrophic effects of climate change was itself part of this conceptual framework, and the point was to trust economic mechanisms and technological innovations to carry out a successful energy transition, through the gradual and smooth substitution of "green" and renewable energies for fossil fuels².

The conflict in Ukraine has caused an upheaval. Within a few months, Europe was faced with a serious threat of energy shortages. Panic-stricken, its leaders began to look in all directions for sources of supply, running the risk of upsetting the previous geopolitical balance. To substitute for Russian natural gas, Germany sought out Qatar, France turned to Algeria, Italy to Algeria and Libya, which provided a chance for these countries, after Europe had pushed them aside in favor of Russia, to re-establish their bargaining power. In the space of a few months, the rehabilitation of coal and nuclear power has shattered the results of long years of struggle, negotiation and compromise. In July 2022, against all evidence, the European Parliament granted the "green energy" label to natural gas and nuclear power!

From then on, the question of energy appears for what it is, eminently political. This leads us to reflect on the notion of *petropolitics*³ and how it can be handled in this context of crisis. In this note, we are interested in its origin, its different uses and meanings over time, and the way it is defined differently in northern and southern countries.

¹ This organization had ensured that it was compatible with the Energy Charter Treaty (1998) which aimed "to promote access to energy resources of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and in particular of the former USSR (...) in a renewed trade area, with a view to enforcing the rules of the market economy and remedying obstacles to international trade and investment, and, more fundamentally, to ensuring the security of energy supply" (Lamoureux, 2023). Today, countries

The first time that the term *petropolitics* was used in a publication was in a report for the US Senate (Ribicoff, 1973) accusing Arab OPEC countries of using the "oil weapon" against the United States as a way of inflecting their support for Israeli policy. This fact sparked a theoretical debate in the SAIS Review (Brewer, 1974; Cooper & Brewer, 1974) which concluded that economic interest overrode political motives in OPEC strategy. This controversy has persisted, but the term used currently is "oil weapon" rather than *petropolitics* (Maull & Maull, 1975; Paust & Blaustein, 1974; Licklider, 1982; 1988). Presumably, these authors preferred this designation to the original term *petropolitics* in order not to raise the Arab embargo to the lofty status of a policy. Only those who considered it a success continued to speak of petropolitics (Al-Sowayegh, 1984; Tuma, 1985).

The other term for the *oil weapon* was *embargo*. Similarly, again on a lexical plane, some have preferred the term *boycott* to *embargo*. Graf (2012) notes that "many contemporary observers talked of an Arab 'oil boycott', presumably since they deemed a boycott that is traditionally a weapon of the economically weak to be more appropriate for the oil-producing countries" (Graf, 2012, p. 208). This is a concrete example of how the transposition of relations of domination into language can be the result of a conscious lexical strategy of domination.

It may be noted that the term *oil weapon* has been used to refer to the embargo when it is practiced by oil exporting countries against client countries, but not in the other sense, when the embargo is practiced by client countries and is directed against oil producing countries. In the first case, it is a matter of refusing to sell their oil to embargoed countries, while in the second, it is a matter of prohibiting the purchase of oil from embargoed countries. And yet, there are numerous cases, and in most of them the prohibition of purchase was issued by the United States. Among the oil-producing countries that have been at one time or

consider this treaty outdated and are withdrawing from it one after the other, despite the recent announcement of its "modernization".

² We can mention here the failure of the tradeable pollution rights market set up by the Kyoto Protocol (Rosen, 2015).

³ This term can refer to oil politics or oil policies, depending on the context. This text is translated from French, which uses the same term, "politique" for both.

another targeted by such an embargo, and some of them still are, we can mention Iran, Iraq, Libya, Russia and Venezuela. In this case, we could speak of a *demand embargo*, as opposed to a *supply embargo* in the previous case.

The term *petropolitics* then shed its warlike connotation to become a general concept of international geopolitics in oil issues, applying to the policies of states, oil companies, international organizations, on a global or regional scale (Arriagada, 2006; Akdemir, 2011; Ramakrushna, 2019). Its use was then extended to the foreign policy of petro-states⁴ (Weber, 2014; 2018) and then to their domestic policy (Grant, 2011; Coronel, 2007; Stendie, 2013; Adkin, 2016). It was extended to other energy sources through the concept of *energopolitics*, including in particular nuclear power (Boyer, 2011). Finally, the concept has been extended to the effects of petropolitics on human rights (Ibeanu, 2002), the environment (Boyer, 2011; Cederlof & Kingsbury, 2019), the impact on native or indigenous peoples (Adkin, 2016; Stendie, 2013), as well as on territories, including those where pipelines pass (Stendie, 2013; Ramakrushna, 2019).

In this literature, the term *petropolitics* is most often used in the trivial sense of petroleum policy, and only a few authors provide an elaborate definition. Fontaine (2010) equates it with energy governance. Boyer (2011), who started out defining *energopolitics* as "power over (and through) energy," eventually opted for the concept of *energopower* (Boyer, 2014) that he defines as "the exploitation of electricity and fuel," a concept that he elevates to the status of complementing the Foucauldian paradigm of "biopower," in the sense of "life and population management." He explores "how modalities of "biopower" (the management of life and population) today depend in crucial respects upon modalities of energopower (the harnessing of electricity and fuel) and vice-versa."

Building on Boyer's (2011; 2014) work, Cederlof & Kingsbury (2019) identify two complementary modalities of power, *petropolitics* as a "means of geopolitical maneuvering around oil supply" and *energopower* that "defines energy not as a geostrategic commodity but as a relation that binds places together, shaping political possibility, identity, and social

relations." Grant (2011) implements both of these concepts in his study of petropolitics in Venezuela through the PetroCaribe trade bloc.

The term made its entry into economics in a paradoxical way, with a short article by journalist Thomas Friedman (2006), published in *Foreign Policy* magazine, in which he claimed to establish a "first law of petropolitics" positing that political freedoms decrease or increase in oil-producing countries in direct proportion to the rise or fall in oil prices. Although published in a magazine, this "first law of petropolitics" has generated reactions and has been commented on and tested in academic literature (Watts, 2009; Townsend, 2009; Wacziarg, 2012; Raynea & Forest, 2013; Balan, 2016; Ibadildin, 2019).

Friedman (2006) himself admitted that he had based his "law" on imperfect correlations, and that it included exceptions. This was an argument put forward to contest its status as an economic law (Watts, 2009; Raynea & Forest, 2013). Refuted by Townsend (2009) and Wacziarg (2012)⁵, it was finally reduced to the status of a mere hypothesis, eventually provable in certain cases limited in time and space (Balan, 2016; Ibadildin, 2019). This attempt is part of a long series of theories aimed at establishing a perennial relationship between oil revenues and the political system (Dutch disease, resource curse, rent theories) and it is also part of the prolific literature on the subject.

In the field of economics, authors who refer to petropolitics are rare. One can cite this recent article by Boucekkiné et al. (2021) that examines the relationship between resource revenue volatility and institutional quality. This study, which covers 91 countries over the period 1973-2005, leads to the conclusion that liberalization decreases when the volatility of oil revenues increases.

Finally, there are two or even three meanings or uses of the term *Petropolitics*. The first refers to a policy centered on oil but whose objective is other than oil. The case that gave rise to this term was the OPEC oil embargo in 1973 that was accused of aiming to put pressure on American policy through the "oil weapon". However, in the view of many analysts, this embargo was primarily aimed at the economic interests of OPEC countries through the increase in oil prices. Therefore, it

⁴ Weber (2018) defines a petro-state as one that produces at least two million barrels/day and whose export revenues equal or exceed 5% of GDP.

⁵ "We use a variety of time series and panel data methods over a wide range of country subsamples and time periods, finding strictly no evidence in favour of this so-called 'First Law of Petropolitics'." (Wacziarg, 2012).

would rather fit into the second meaning of *petropolitics*, in the sense of oil policy, that is to say, whose objective concerns oil, from exploration to extraction, exploitation, sale, transport, up to the determination of the price. Finally, this notion can be extended to any policy, as long as it is determined in one way or another by oil. This is the third meaning or use of the term *petropolitics*. It can refer, for example, to the economic policy of oil-producing countries which includes the way they use oil revenues, their monetary policy, and their foreign trade policy. It can be extended to the employment, land, and environmental policies of these countries.

Going back to the first meaning of *petropolitics*, as a policy centered on oil but whose objective is other than oil, initially applied to the 1973 oil embargo interpreted as the implementation of the "oil weapon", many more instances do exist of course. One example is the meeting of oil-producing countries in Doha in April 2016, where Saudi Arabia put its hostility to Iran ahead of its oil interests. Indeed, while an agreement on a production freeze until January was about to be reached, with the aim of curbing the fall in prices and stabilizing the market, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia scuttled the negotiation by requiring the inclusion of Iran in the agreement, with the sole aim of preventing this country from taking advantage of the window of opportunity that was opening up to it to recover its market share, with the partial lifting of international sanctions following the coming into effect of the nuclear agreement.

A more recent example is linked to the war in Ukraine, with the European Union's decision on 31 May 2022 to ban the purchase of Russian oil, aiming for a reduction of almost 90% of these imports by the end of 2022. This embargo was to be imposed on the rest of the world, in particular through a ban on tankers and insurance companies from participating in the transport of Russian oil, under penalty of sanctions.

If we extend these policies to natural gas, there is also the use of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines as pressure tactics in this conflict. Following the sanctions decided by Germany, as well as the European Union and the United States, the Nord Stream 2 company must file for bankruptcy at the beginning of March 2022. It should be noted that as of December 2019, the construction of this pipeline, which began in April 2018, had to be interrupted because of sanctions by the United States, only to resume shortly thereafter. As for Nord Stream 1,

which has been operational since 2012, Gazprom has put forward technical reasons to justify the reductions and interruptions in transit during the summer of 2022, before finally announcing at the beginning of September the postponement *sine die* of its restart.

It can even be said that a petropolitics rarely involves the oil factor alone and is often linked to objectives of power, hegemony, and inter-state rivalry, especially if it is deployed on a geostrategic scale. In other words, as Bina (2013, p. 2) writes: "Oil is not an object but a trajectory, indeed a constellation of exigencies, events, actions and reactions, disputes and refutations, disparity and deviation and, above all, contradiction and conflict across historical time and social relations fused and conjoined."

Many works have shown how oil is intimately linked to the history of colonization and empire, and how, in colonial and post-colonial wars, rivalry between empires for the control of energy sources is inextricably linked to the struggle for their hegemony (Meziane, 2021; Malm, 2016; Barak, 2020; Mitchell, 2011). In contrast, few works describe alternative strategies in countries of the South.

A notable exception is Grant's (2011) study of PetroCaribe which is a regional oil trade alliance led both by Venezuela and Cuba seeking to "establish an anti-imperial energy region in the Caribbean." In this study, Grant applies the concepts of *petropolitics* and *energopower* as two complementary modalities of power. He writes: "Petropolitics frames PetroCaribe as a means for geopolitical maneuvering around the supply of oil, enhancing the regional influence of Venezuela while empowering the Caribbean Island-nations vis-à-vis oil-exporting states" (p.1), while "Energopower defines energy not as a geostrategic commodity but as a relation that binds places together, shaping political possibilities, identity, and social relations" (p.1). He shows how PetroCaribe was part of a post-neoliberal, anti-imperialist development project, aiming to "establishing flows of energy and people on a logic other than market-based competition" (p.23). The aim was "seeking to reconfigure historically-entrenched power relations within the neoliberal petropolitical paradigm" (p.1) in favor of a "more inclusive, democratic development model based on fossil-fuel consumption" (p.23). PetroCaribe has strengthened the energy security of the region's states by enabling them to obtain oil on preferential terms and by increasing their oil processing capacity. By helping the region's "sister nations" secure

their energy sovereignty, Venezuela has extended its influence in the Caribbean. In return, "Cuban internationalism enabled social transformation in Venezuela and across the energy region" (p.23).

We can compare this experience of petropolitical alliance in the Caribbean to the petropolitics in the Maghreb and particularly to the energy solidarity between Algeria and Tunisia, for the supply of the latter in energy (electricity and natural gas) according to bilateral preferential agreements, at prices lower than those of the international market.

Compared to PetroCaribe, this Algerian-Tunisian petropolitics has no ideological objective, it does not aim to promote an alternative model to neo-liberal policy. Its goal is to preserve peace and good neighborliness between "brotherly countries", which is a key issue today as many conflicts are brewing in the region, in the Sahel, in Libya, and especially in the context of the deteriorating relationships between Algeria and its western neighbor, Morocco.

We can also see that, unlike the Algerian-Tunisian energy solidarity, the policy that aimed to link Morocco to Algeria through the Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline (GME) which also provided Morocco with natural gas at a preferential price, in addition to the rights of passage on its territory, was not successful in the end. The transit through Moroccan territory of Algerian natural gas intended for Europe was not essential; on the contrary, it lengthened the route. It was meant to bind the two countries that had been in conflict since 1975 over the issue of the decolonization of the Spanish Sahara. By pushing them to engage in a joint project linking their territories, the Spanish and European promoters of the project hoped that it would encourage their

reconciliation. When the idea of this pipeline emerged in 1990, the two countries were in a dynamic of dialogue and openness, promoted by the episode of democratization in Algeria (1988-1992), and the land border between them had been reopened. But this did not last and the border was closed in 1994, while the construction of the gas pipeline had already been underway since 1993. Started in 1996, a year after the launching of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, into which it will be integrated, the pipeline worked for nearly 25 years despite the stalemate of the conflict. But the relationship between the two countries deteriorated and Algeria did not renew the pipeline-operating contract with Morocco which expired at the end of October 2021. To supply Spain and Portugal, Algeria has another pipeline, Medgaz, which connects it directly to Spain without passing via Morocco. One of the reasons why, in contrast to the Algerian-Tunisian energy solidarity, the collaboration between Algeria and Morocco was not successful, is probably the fact that, unlike the first, the "solidarity of gas pipelines" was not an autonomous initiative of the two countries, but was made under pressure from Europeans, with a view to supplying Europe with natural gas. Thus, within this petropolitics, multiple complex and contradictory interests interfered. In the meantime, the construction of the Nordstream 1 pipeline and the access of Europe to Russian natural gas has changed the deal and drastically limited Algeria's access to the European natural gas market.

References

- Adkin, L. (Ed.). (2016). *First world petro-politics: the political ecology and governance of Alberta*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Akdemir, I.O. (2011). Global energy circulation, Turkey's geographical location and petropolitics. *Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 19, 71-80.
- Al-Sowayegh, A. (1984). *Arab Petropolitics*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Arriagada, G. (2006). *Petropolitics in Latin America: A Review of Energy Policy and Regional Relations*. Washington D.C.: Inter-American Dialogue.
- Balan, F. (2016). On Asymmetric Causal Relationship in Petropolitics. *Economic Annals*, 61(209), 7-25.
- Barak, O. (2020). *Powering Empire: How Coal Made the Middle East and Sparked Global Carbonization*. Oakland: University of California Press.
- Bina, C. (2013). *A Prelude to the Foundation of Political Economy: Oil, War, and Global Polity. The Economics of the Middle East*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Boucekkine, R., Prieur, F., & Vasilkis, C. (2021). Stochastic petropolitics: The dynamics of institutions in resource-dependent economies. *European Economic Review*, vol. 131, p. 103610. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eurocorev.2020.103610>
- Boyer, D. (2011). Energopolitics and the Anthropology of Energy. *Anthropology News*, 52(5), 5-7.
- Boyer, D. (2014). Energopower: An Introduction. *Anthropological Quarterly*, 87(2), 309–333.
- Brewer, J.V.E. (1974). Petropolitics. *SAIS Review (1956-1989)*, 18(3), 24-31.
- Cederlof, G., & Kingsbury, D.V. (2019). On PetroCaribe: Petropolitics, Energopower, and Post-Neoliberal Development in the Caribbean Energy Region. *Political Geography*, 72, 124-133.
- Cooper J.R. & Brewer J.V.E. (1974), Letters to the Editor on Petropolitics. *SAIS Review (1956-1989)*, 18(3), 59-63.
- Coronel, G. (2007). Pétropolitique dans un État autoritaire: l'exemple du Venezuela d'Hugo Chávez. *Outre-Terre*, 18(1), 205-226.
- Fontaine, G. (2010). *Pétropolitique: une théorie de la gouvernance énergétique*. London: Editions interuniversitaires européennes.
- Friedman, T. (2006). Friedman, T. L. (2006, May-June). The First Law of Petropolitics. *Foreign Policy*, 154, 28-36.
- Graf, R. (2012). Making Use of the "Oil Weapon": Western Industrialized Countries and Arab Petropolitics in 1973–1974. *Diplomatic History*, 36(1), 185-208.
- Grant, Z. (2011). *Petro-Politics in Venezuela* [Bachelor's thesis]. Coastal Carolina University.
- Ibadildin, N. (2019). *The Resource Curse, Petropolitics and Institutional Development*. Almaty: Kimep University.
- Ibeanu, O. (2002). Janus Unbound: petrobusiness & petropolitics in the Niger Delta. *Review of African Political Economy*, 29(91), 163-167.
- Lamoureux M. (January 3, 2023). L'avenir du Traité sur la charte de l'énergie, *Actu-environnement*. <https://www.actu-environnement.com/ae/news/avenir-traite-charte-energie-40902.php4>
- Licklider, R.E. (1982). The failure of the Arab oil weapon in 1973-1974. *Comparative Strategy*, 3(4), 365-380.
- Licklider, R.E. (1988). The power of oil: the Arab oil weapon and the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and the United States. *International Studies Quarterly*, 32(2), 205-226.
- Malm, A. (2016). *Fossil Capital: The Rise of Steam Power and the Roots of Global Warming*. London/Brooklyn: Verso Books.
- Maull, H., & Maull, H.W. (1975). *Oil and influence: The oil weapon examined (Vol.117)*. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
- Meziane, M.A. (2021). *Des empires sous la terre, histoire écologique et raciale de la sécularisation*. Paris: La Découverte.
- Mitchell, T. (2011). *Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil*. London/Brooklyn: Verso Books.
- Paust, J. J., & Blaustein, A. P. (1974). Arab Oil Weapon-A Threat to International Peace. *The American Journal of International Law*, 68(3), 410-439.
- Ramakrushna, P. (2019). Petropolitics and Pipeline Diplomacy in Central Asia: Can India Afford to Wait in the Wings?. *India Quarterly*, 75(4), 472–489.
- Raynea, S., & Forest, K. (2013). *The non-generalizability of The First Law of Petropolitics*. Mimeo.
- Ribicoff, A. (1973). *Petropolitics and the American energy shortage. Report to the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate*. Washington D.C.: US Senate, Committee on Government Operations.
- Rosen, A.M. (2015). The wrong solution at the right time: The failure of the Kyoto protocol on climate change. *Politics & Policy*, 43(1), 30-58.
- Stendie, L. (2013). *Public participation, petro-politics and indigenous peoples: the contentious northern gateway pipeline and joint review panel process* [Master's thesis]. University of Oslo.

- Townsend, S. (2009). Friedman's first law fail: oil prices do not predict freedom. *Economics of Peace and Security Journal*, 4(1), 78-83.
- Tuma, E.H. (1985). *Arab Petro-Politics*. London: Routledge.
- Wacziarg, R. (2012). The first law of petropolitics. *Economica*, 79(316), 641-657.
- Watts, M. (2009). The Rule of Oil: Petro-Politics and the Anatomy of an Insurgency. *Journal of African Development*, 11(2), 27-56.
- Weber, Y. (2014). *Petropolitics and foreign policy: fiscal and institutional origins and patterns of Russian foreign policy, 1964-2012* [Doctoral dissertation]. The University of Texas at Austin.
- Weber, Y. (2018). Petropolitics. In A. Tsygankov (Ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Russian Foreign Policy* (pp. 99-117). Abingdon/New York: Routledge.

EXTRACTIVISM

| The Project

The collaborative research project ***extractivism.de*** links the Universities of Kassel and Marburg. The project scrutinizes the extractivist development model and proposes new economic, political, and sociological conceptions of extractivism. It preliminarily focuses on Latin America and the Maghreb patterns. The project researches the conditions under which these patterns affect the persistence and transformative capacity of extractivism and its respective institutional settings. Finally, it explores how extractivism affects cultural processes and habitual routines and questions under what conditions and how far the development model extends into institution-building and social practice, i.e., everyday life.

The project aims to understand extractive societies not as deviants from the Western trajectory of development but in their own logic and their own particularities. The project, therefore, combines a strong empirical focus with theoretical work. It links both broad field research and data gathering of primary data and the qualitative and quantitative analysis of available secondary sources with a stringent transregional comparison. It develops methods in cross-area studies and investigates whether and why similar patterns of social change emerge in different areas and world regions despite significant cultural, social, or religious differences. Finally, the project intends to translate the findings for politics, society, and development cooperation.

Please visit www.extractivism.de for further information.