Datum
2020-11-03Schlagwort
330 Wirtschaft 333 Boden- und Energiewirtschaft Internationaler UmweltschutzVerhandlungKlimaänderungVerteilungsgerechtigkeitKostenverteilungMetadata
Zur Langanzeige
Aufsatz
Negotiating weights for burden sharing rules in international climate negotiations: an empirical analysis
Zusammenfassung
We have collected data from a world-wide survey among COP delegates to empirically investigate preferences for certain burden sharing rules among key groups in a setting that reflects the possibility of observing concessions from negotiating partners. In our survey, the participants had the opportunity to select and combine up to eight (pre-defined) burden sharing rules and to assign relative weights to the selected rules in their preferred bundle. We examine whether such a mechanism helps to overcome the currently strictly (self-interested) strategic claims on equity in the negotiation process. We observe that delegates from different groups of countries show a general willingness for concessions. However, the degree to which different burden sharing rules are taken into consideration partly differs between countries. As a key insight we report that the individual assessment of the polluter-pays rule based on current emissions does not only stress the persistence of the traditional Annex-B/Non-Annex-B division but also suggests tendencies for a more fragmented grouping with different positions between, for example, delegates from developing countries (i.e. G77 members) and emerging countries (i.e. BASIC). At the same time, we observe tendencies for a more harmonized view among key groups towards the ability-to-pay rule in a setting of weighted burden sharing rules.
Zitierform
In: Environmental Economics and Policy Studies Volume 23 / Issue 2 (2020-11-03) , S. 309-331 ; EISSN 1867-383XFörderhinweis
Gefördert im Rahmen des Projekts DEALZitieren
@article{doi:10.17170/kobra-202104133657,
author={Kesternich, Martin and Löschel, Andreas and Ziegler, Andreas},
title={Negotiating weights for burden sharing rules in international climate negotiations: an empirical analysis},
journal={Environmental Economics and Policy Studies},
year={2020}
}
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2021-04-26T10:21:20Z 2021-04-26T10:21:20Z 2020-11-03 doi:10.17170/kobra-202104133657 http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/12738 Gefördert im Rahmen des Projekts DEAL eng Namensnennung 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ international climate negotiations distributive justice equity preferences burden sharing rules 330 333 Negotiating weights for burden sharing rules in international climate negotiations: an empirical analysis Aufsatz We have collected data from a world-wide survey among COP delegates to empirically investigate preferences for certain burden sharing rules among key groups in a setting that reflects the possibility of observing concessions from negotiating partners. In our survey, the participants had the opportunity to select and combine up to eight (pre-defined) burden sharing rules and to assign relative weights to the selected rules in their preferred bundle. We examine whether such a mechanism helps to overcome the currently strictly (self-interested) strategic claims on equity in the negotiation process. We observe that delegates from different groups of countries show a general willingness for concessions. However, the degree to which different burden sharing rules are taken into consideration partly differs between countries. As a key insight we report that the individual assessment of the polluter-pays rule based on current emissions does not only stress the persistence of the traditional Annex-B/Non-Annex-B division but also suggests tendencies for a more fragmented grouping with different positions between, for example, delegates from developing countries (i.e. G77 members) and emerging countries (i.e. BASIC). At the same time, we observe tendencies for a more harmonized view among key groups towards the ability-to-pay rule in a setting of weighted burden sharing rules. open access Kesternich, Martin Löschel, Andreas Ziegler, Andreas doi:10.1007/s10018-020-00289-0 Internationaler Umweltschutz Verhandlung Klimaänderung Verteilungsgerechtigkeit Kostenverteilung publishedVersion EISSN 1867-383X Issue 2 Environmental Economics and Policy Studies 309-331 Volume 23 false
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