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2022-10-22Subject
100 Philosophy 300 Social sciences PhänomenologieErklärungAsymmetrieBegriffsbildungDatensammlungExperimentelle VersuchsforschungMetadata
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Aufsatz
Stuck in between. Phenomenology’s Explanatory Dilemma and its Role in Experimental Practice
Abstract
Questions about phenomenology’s role in non-philosophical disciplines gained renewed attention. While we claim that phenomenology makes indispensable, unique contributions to different domains of scientific practice such as concept formation, experimental design, and data collection, we also contend that when it comes to explanation, phenomenological approaches face a dilemma. Either phenomenological attempts to explain conscious phenomena do not satisfy a central constraint on explanations, i.e. the asymmetry between explanans and explanandum, or they satisfy this explanatory asymmetry only by largely merging with non-phenomenological explanation types. The consequence of this dilemma is that insofar as phenomenological approaches are explanatory, they do not provide an own type of explanation. We substantiate our two claims by offering three case studies of phenomenologically inspired experiments in cognitive science. Each case study points out a specific phenomenological contribution to experimental practice while also illustrating how phenomenological approaches face the explanatory dilemma we outline.
Citation
In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Volume 22 / Issue 3 (2022-10-22) , S. 575-598 ; eissn:1572-8676Sponsorship
Gefördert im Rahmen des Projekts DEALCitation
@article{doi:10.17170/kobra-202307218439,
author={Casper, Mark-Oliver and Haueis, Philipp},
title={Stuck in between. Phenomenology’s Explanatory Dilemma and its Role in Experimental Practice},
journal={Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences},
year={2022}
}
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2023-07-31T09:59:35Z 2023-07-31T09:59:35Z 2022-10-22 doi:10.17170/kobra-202307218439 http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/14950 Gefördert im Rahmen des Projekts DEAL eng Namensnennung 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ phenomenology explanation explanatory asymmetry concept formation data collection experimental design 100 300 Stuck in between. Phenomenology’s Explanatory Dilemma and its Role in Experimental Practice Aufsatz Questions about phenomenology’s role in non-philosophical disciplines gained renewed attention. While we claim that phenomenology makes indispensable, unique contributions to different domains of scientific practice such as concept formation, experimental design, and data collection, we also contend that when it comes to explanation, phenomenological approaches face a dilemma. Either phenomenological attempts to explain conscious phenomena do not satisfy a central constraint on explanations, i.e. the asymmetry between explanans and explanandum, or they satisfy this explanatory asymmetry only by largely merging with non-phenomenological explanation types. The consequence of this dilemma is that insofar as phenomenological approaches are explanatory, they do not provide an own type of explanation. We substantiate our two claims by offering three case studies of phenomenologically inspired experiments in cognitive science. Each case study points out a specific phenomenological contribution to experimental practice while also illustrating how phenomenological approaches face the explanatory dilemma we outline. open access Casper, Mark-Oliver Haueis, Philipp doi:10.1007/s11097-022-09853-3 Phänomenologie Erklärung Asymmetrie Begriffsbildung Datensammlung Experimentelle Versuchsforschung publishedVersion eissn:1572-8676 Issue 3 Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 575-598 Volume 22 false
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