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dc.date.accessioned2021-03-16T12:35:03Z
dc.date.available2021-03-16T12:35:03Z
dc.date.issued2021-03-10
dc.identifierdoi:10.17170/kobra-202103163526
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/12641
dc.description.sponsorshipEuropean Union (EU) Horizon 2020 program, action ERC-2014-STG, Project HUCO, grant number 636746; Gefördert im Rahmen des Projekts DEAL
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.rightsNamensnennung 4.0 International*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/*
dc.subject.ddc330
dc.titleBygones in a public projecteng
dc.typeAufsatz
dcterms.abstractThe experimental literature suggests that contributions to a public good made dynamically, over multiple stages are higher than contributions made in a static setting, even when players do not receive feedback about co-players’ previous contributions between stages. Because the dynamic setting without feedback is strategically equivalent to the static one, this finding is puzzling. One important difference between the two settings, however, is that the dynamic setting gives the opportunity to sink contributions while in the static one this opportunity does not exist. I test whether the sunk character of the dynamic contributions explains the higher contributions in the dynamic setting. Symmetric players contribute in two stages to a threshold public good and receive feedback after each stage. The experimental treatment differ in whether the first-stage contributions are sunk or not when deciding on the second-stage contributions. The results show that making the first-stage contributions sunk increases the second-stage individual contributions, and this is more so the case at higher levels of the first-stage contributions. This suggests that the sunk contributions do, at least partially, explain the better performance of the dynamic setting.eng
dcterms.accessRightsopen access
dcterms.creatorHaita-Falah, Corina
dc.relation.doidoi:10.1007/s00355-021-01315-0
dc.subject.swdÖffentliches Gutger
dc.subject.swdRückmeldungger
dc.subject.swdVerhaltenger
dc.subject.swdUnterstützungger
dc.subject.swdExperimentger
dc.type.versionpublishedVersion
dcterms.source.identifierEISSN 1432-217X
dcterms.source.journalSocial Choice and Welfareeng
kup.iskupfalse


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Namensnennung 4.0 International
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Namensnennung 4.0 International