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Aufsatz
Tipping Versus Cooperating to Supply a Public Good
(2017-02-17)
In some important multiplayer situations, such as efforts to supply a global public good, players can choose the game they want to play. In this paper we conduct an experimental test of the decision by a group with fixed membership, playing over a finite number of periods, to choose between a “tipping” game, in which every player wants to contribute to the public good provided enough other players contribute, and a prisoners’ dilemma, the classic cooperation game. In the prisoners’ dilemma, the first best outcome is ...
Aufsatz
Uncertainty and Speculators in an Auction for Emissions Permits
(Springer, 2016-04-16)
Auctions have become popular as means of allocating emissions permits in the emissions trading schemes developed around the world. Mostly, only a subset of the regulated polluters participate in these auctions along with speculators, creating a market with relatively few participants and, thus, incentive for strategic bidding. I characterize the bidding behavior of the polluters and the speculators, examining the effect of the latter on the profits of the former and on the auction outcome. It turns out that in addition ...
Aufsatz
An Experimental Investigation into ‘Pledge and Review’ in Climate Negotiations
(Springer Netherlands, 2016-06-06)
A novelty of the new Paris Agreement is the inclusion of a process for assessment and review of countries’ nationally determined pledges and contributions. The intent is to reveal whether similar countries are making comparable pledges, whether the totality of such pledges will achieve the global goal, and whether, over the coming years, the contributions actually made by countries will equal or exceed their pledges. The intent is also to provide an opportunity for countries to express their approval, or disapproval, ...
Aufsatz
Cooperating to avoid catastrophe
(Nature Publishing Group, 2018-07-09)
Aufsatz
Identification of individuals and groups in a public goods experiment
(2019-07-03)
Revealing the identities of contributors has been shown to increase cooperation in public goods games. In this paper we experimentally investigate whether this finding holds true when decisions are made by groups rather than individuals. We distinguish between groups in which members can discuss face-to-face to reach a decision and groups in which members communicate via computer chat. The results confirm the positive effect of identification on cooperation among individuals. For groups, however, we only find a small ...
Aufsatz
Grundlagen der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung in kulturgeschichtlicher Perspektive
(2010-12-15)
Der vorliegende Bericht soll die Ergebnisse einer Untersuchung der wirtschaftsgeschichtlichen Entwicklung der Regionen Kassel/Nordhessen und Jena/Thüringen zusammenfassen. Als leitende Frage hinter der Untersuchung steht das Problem, inwieweit das gegenwärtige Innovationspotential der beiden Regionen von den Gegebenheiten ihrer Geschichte bestimmt wird. Dabei sollen mögliche Hinweise auf die geschichtlichen Grundlagen heutiger Unterschiede
in den Untersuchungsregionen in den Blick gerückt werden. Von besonderem ...
Aufsatz
Die Innovationskraft der Unternehmen in Nordhessen
(2011-01-03)
Die vorliegende Untersuchung hat das Ziel, die Stärke des Regionalen Innovationssystems Nordhessen mit Blick auf die Unternehmen zu analysieren. Sie basiert auf Erhebungen im Rahmen des von der Volkswagenstiftung geförderten Projekts „Regional Innovation Systems“ (RIS). Einen Schwerpunkt dieses Forschungsprojektes bildete eine breit angelegte Unternehmensbefragung in der Region Nordhessen, deren Ergebnisse in diesem Beitrag vorgestellt werden. Zudem werden drei vergleichende Auswertungen vorgenommen: (i) Ein Vergleich ...
Aufsatz
Voting on the threat of exclusion in a public goods experiment
(2019-04-01)
Ostracism is practiced by virtually all societies around the world as a means of enforcing cooperation. In this paper, we use a public goods experiment to study whether groups choose to implement an institution that allows for the exclusion of members. We distinguish between a costless exclusion institution and a costly exclusion institution that, if chosen, reduces the endowment of all players. We also provide a comparison with an exclusion institution that is exogenously imposed upon groups. A significant share of ...
Aufsatz
The choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems: a survey of experimental research
(2019-11-01)
A growing experimental literature studies the endogenous choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems arising in prisoners’ dilemmas, public goods games, and common pool resource games. Participants in these experiments have the opportunity to influence the rules of the game before they play the game. In this paper, we review the experimental literature of the last 20 years on the choice of institutions and describe what has been learned about the quality and the determinants of institutional choice. Cooperative ...